

**Did the United Nations and or the United States Ignore the
Atrocities/Genocide in Rwanda?**

**A Monograph
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MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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ABSTRACT

Did the United Nations and or the United States ignore the atrocities/genocide in Rwanda? by Major Morris T. Goins, USA, 51 pages

This monograph analyzes the military operation of Rwanda in order to determine if the United Nations and or the United States ignored the atrocities and or genocide in Rwanda. This operation was viewed from the positions of the United Nations, National Command Authorities, and the United States military and the linkage to include the impact they had on each other.

The criteria of UN Resolution 260 A (III) are which authorized the commitment of military forces as well as NGO/PVO will be used to assess UN/US actions. American newspapers also assist with the analysis of what role the UN, US and the US military played in the decisions surrounding the Rwanda mission. The second criteria is the instruments of national power, and their impact on the commitment to Rwanda. These newspapers will shed light on the position(s) of the UN Security Council and the US. Congressional testimony, Army after Actions Review, journal articles, and books allow the viewpoint of the leaders of the international community to surface.

This monograph demonstrates that the UN and US did not leverage their full capabilities to support the Rwandan mission. The UN authorized missions but the members that make up the UN did not provide the necessary resources in order to conduct the mission(s) properly. Many leaders in the United States held the position for quite some time that the events in Rwanda were not a national interest to the US, so the US would not commit forces. This action was not supported by the policies of the Clinton Administration. The US military also did not support the Rwanda operation due the recently failed UN mission in Somalia. The US failed once the Commander-In-Chief requested options to provide the full range of courses of action available.

The importance or the so what of this monograph for the operational commander and or planner is that the responsibility of the military is to provide options to the National Command Authorities regardless of their personal opinions regarding the use of military forces to conduct operations such as those in Somalia or Rwanda dislike of the military operation(s). Another take away from the Rwandan mission for a operational commander and or a planner is that one must always use the deliberate planning process because it allows the best range of options during the crisis planning process.

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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

Did the United Nations and or the United States ignore the atrocities/genocide in Rwanda even though the situation was in violation of UN Resolution 260 A (III) and a humanitarian cause?¹ This monograph determines if the above statement is true by analyzing the commitment of UN/US forces to the country of Rwanda. The international community and the UN had stated that genocide was a crime under international law since 1951.² The definition of genocide as defined by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for Rwanda and Kosovo was the same.³

In 1959 Rwanda achieved its independence. Rwandan politics were dominated by the Tutsi, minority, which made up of about seventeen percent of the population while the remainder consisted of the Hutu. The Hutu became the political power after independence and forced the many of the Tutsi to become refugees. The Uganda-based Tutsi refugees, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), and its political arm, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), began their operations to overthrow the Rwandan government. Early in 1993 the RPA and RPF had gained enough control to have the international community force the two factions to share power in the Arusha accords of August 1993. On April 6, 1994 Rwanda's President Juvenal Habyarimana's plane was shot down and this opened the door for the rebels to gain total control of Rwanda. The next day the genocide began taking place.⁴ In April of 1994 reports of mass genocide taking place in Rwanda began surfacing to the international community. The Hutu had killed in the neighborhood of five hundred thousand Tutsi and between ten to one

hundred thousand conservative Hutu.⁵ There was no major attempt by the UN/US to stop the genocide or provide a long-term humanitarian aid program.⁶ Although the purpose of "Operation Restore Hope" was to stop the dying, US forces withdrew after only two months.⁷

The importance of this monograph to the operational commander/planner is how does one anticipate and visualize the future. In order to anticipate one must learn from the past in order to prevent part of the logic of failure as Dietrich Doerner addresses in his book *The Logic of Failure*. The components of logic of failure are failure to learn from the past, failure to anticipate and failure to adapt. This monograph provides the operational commander/planner with a possible framework of what type of mission(s) they maybe committed to when it comes to genocide.

This monograph investigates the issue of genocide in Rwanda by utilizing books, interviews, newspapers, UN and military documents. The military operation examined in this monograph occurred within the past six years. Many of the government officials remain in public office; therefore, at this time there are limited first hand sources about UN/US and National Command Authorities meetings and the decisions made in those meetings. Although extensive research has been conducted on the contents and results of those meetings, the entire story may not be completely known.

Chapter I states the monograph question: Did the United Nations and or the United States ignore the atrocities/genocide in Rwanda even though it was in

direct violation of the UN Resolution 260 A (III) and a humanitarian cause? The method of arriving at a conclusion after the analysis will also be addressed here.

Chapter II reviews the history of Rwanda. Actions in the country of Rwanda will be assessed on the bases of how the US did or did not use its instruments of power. The reason(s) for not making a long-term commitment will be explored. The analysis of this operation will determine why a better solution was not developed instead of the bandage approach that was ultimately taken.

Chapter III examines the policies of the UN and the US toward genocide. These policies will include humanitarian principles and mandates. Reasons why the UN and or the US did not take forceful approaches to stop genocide in this country will also be explored. Elements of the instruments of power will also assist in examining this case study. The analysis of this operation will confirm if there were any other reasons outside of maintaining the international law of stopping the genocide and humanitarian assistance.

Chapter IV analyzes the data covered in the first two chapters in order to determine why the commitment of the operation gained little support from the international community in spite of the magnitude of human suffering.

Chapter V reviews any lessons learned in order for the operational commander to understand what type of MOOTWs operations he/she may find their unit conducting in the future.

The international community has condemned genocide since 1951 and yet the largest genocide crime committed since World War II took place in Rwanda with as many as six hundred thousand murdered. Why did the UN/US not form a

coalition to stop this atrocity? The author will begin by examining the genocide in Rwanda.

Chapter 2 HISTORIAL SETTING

The Banyarwanda are East Africa's largest ethnic group. A Bantu people who live in Rwanda, eastern Zaire, western Tanzania, and southwestern Uganda, spoke Kinyarwanda and are close relatives of the Banyankole and Bakiga in Uganda, the Barundi in Burundi and other neighboring groups. The term Banyarwanda embraces three sub-groups Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi.⁸ Of these three the Hutu and the Tutsi were and remain the main ethnic groups. The Twa were the first inhabitants of the region once existed mainly in the mountains as hunters and gathers. In 1969 they made up about one percent of the Rwandan population.

The Hutu origins are unclear but they were the primary occupants of the region. This ethnic group was based on a clan organization and small-scale agriculture was their way of life. At the head of the leadership were the kings called "Bahinza" who retained power over the people because it was taught that this king would control the rain, provide/cause seeds to germinate, and protect the crops from disease.⁹

The last group that relocated to Rwanda were the Tutsi, which occurred approximately in the 14th or 15th century. At that time they were a nomadic people and the relocation occurred over time. The Tutsi had cattle and more

advanced knowledge of warfare, which became the bases of their prestige and power. In time they achieved social, political and economic dominance over the Hutu and of course the Twa. Due to the power of the Tutsi the land once owned by the Hutu was now the property of the Tutsi. This not only took place within Rwanda but also with its neighbors.

From the 15th through the 19th century there were frequent conflicts between the Tutsi and Hutu as well as between Rwanda and Burundi. Mwami Kigeri IV, a Tutsi, ruled Rwanda or at least the areas of easy access, but the Hutu controlled areas of the northwest of Rwanda. This area was where the struggle for hegemony continued throughout the history of Rwanda. In the 1880s the Germans appeared and new countries of Rwanda and Burundi were formed.¹⁰

The history of present day Rwanda is like most, if not all, the countries in Africa ruled and or governed by nations of Europe during the 18th, 19th and part of the 20th centuries. In 1885 the Council of Berlin had designated Rwanda-Burundi as the German sphere. It was 1896 when the Germans extended it authority over the two counties. The German government used the current Mwami local government to control and protect its interests in the region. The economic plan was to explore or develop cattle, but the diamonds, gold and copper of surrounding countries eventually made cattle on non-profitable plan.¹¹ In 1913 the German administration changed the Rwandan crop to coffee. This was the beginning of a change in Rwanda.

The Hutu began to realize money was power and not the cattle they had been raising for the Germans and Tutsis. To make matters worse the Germans began

a head tax that made the Hutus believe the German administration was their protector and this undermined the power of the Tutsi government. The German mission began to educate the Tutsi population at large in order to conduct operations of government, while only a few Hutu were educated. Things between the two major ethnic groups began to heat up. To make matters worse, a change in the European control of Rwanda was about to take place.

Belgian plans for the conquered territories involved their use as a pawn in the postwar World War I negotiations. In January 1916 the Germans occupied Rwanda with only one hundred sixty-six soldiers, a few artillery pieces and one thousand four hundred and four African troops. In April of that same year most of the force was withdrawn leaving a Belgian occupation force. By May 21, 1916 and without a battle the Belgian government was in control of Rwanda-Burundi. The four-power allied council of the US, Great Britain, France, and Italy had to recognize the newly conquered territories. In August 1923 the League of Nations approved a mandate for this territory under the leadership of Belgium.¹²

The Belgians conducted operations much as the Germans had done. There were early problems that were addressed such as how to promote social and moral progress. Government educational policy during the early years concentrated on training the sons of Tutsi chiefs, for administrative/civil service positions. During this period French became the language of the administration and Catholicism was the largest Christian denomination in the country.¹³ Other problems for governing this territory were the endemic: diseases, limited communication due to the language bearer, and scattered population. In order to

counter most of these problems the Belgians relied on the Tutsi aristocracy who remained the dominant political, social, economic structure.¹⁴ Although the Belgians felt the Tutsi were the natural loads of the Hutu, they did not have complete control.¹⁵ The Belgians had to alter Mwami, a Tutsi ruler, because he was abusive and did not comply with some of the League of Nations mandate. This caused Rwanda-Burundi and the Congo to be controlled by one administration. Decision-makers for the territories were located in Brussels while separate budgets were maintained for each territory. The next step was to develop the territory economically to be self-sufficient.

After the formation of the UN, Rwanda-Burundi was made a Trust Territory and the League of Nations mandate ended. On December 3, 1946 the General Assembly approved the Trusteeship Agreement and made Rwanda-Burundi the charge of Belgium. The agreement stated

...promote the development of free political institutions suited to Rwanda-Burundi. To this end the Administrating Authority shall assure to the inhabitants of Rwanda-Burundi an increasing share in the administration and services...of the territory; it shall further such participation of the inhabitants in the representative organs of the people as may be appropriate to the particular conditions of the territory... the Administering Authority shall take all measures conducive to the political advancement of the people of Rwanda-Burundi.¹⁶

It seemed the UN was serious about the advancement of the people of Rwanda-Burundi. There were visiting missions in 1948, 1951 and others at three year interval. The findings of the missions were that the development was occurring to slowly. Due to the findings, the Belgians changed the education curriculum. The Rwandan studies were changed from the studies based on African

languages and culture to a similar system practiced in Belgium. This once again demonstrates the UN attempted to help.

The High Council of State, presided over by the Mwami, was made up of appointed members and notables elected by and from the membership of the Territorial Councils. The implementation of this system in 1953 resulted in the preponderance of Tutsi representation on the councils of Rwanda-Burundi. While the 1954 Visiting Mission was in Rwanda-Burundi, the High Council of Rwanda decide upon the gradual suppression of ubuhake.¹⁷ In implementing this decision over the next four years, a series of acts brought about the redistribution of ownership of some two hundred thousand head of cattle. Although the administration looked upon this as a sign of progress, the Hutu leadership maintained that giving over cattle to the Hutu peasants did little good because the control of the pasturelands was left in the hands of Tutsi lords. The abolition of ubuhake, however, had an important psychological impact on the Hutu. If the Tutsi's control over the cattle could be broken, then their control over the land also could be broken.

INDEPENDENCE

In February 1957 the High Council of Rwanda, whose members were all Tutsi released a statement calling for Rwanda's independence. The statement called for additional training for the elite and this brought immediate response from the Hutu leaders who saw this as an attempt by the Tutsi to retain their control and or dominance in the government. In an attempt to counter the Tutsi control, the leaders of the Hutu published a document that stated the basic problem of the

country was the political, economic, and social domination of the Hutu majority by the Tutsi minority. The Hutu requested the Belgians continue the trusteeship until the problem could be corrected. In 1958 the Hutu attempted to convince the High Council and the Mwami of the gravity of the problem between the two ethnic groups, it fell on death ears.

During 1959 the political activity gained steam and riots also began to occur. Within a few months a number of political parties were established collegial and the major parties were the Hutu's Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA), Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), Rassemblement Democratique Ruandaise (RADER), and late that year the Hutu's formed Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU). This last party claimed independence would have been possible after there were guarantees of genuine democracy. The day after the political party PARMEHUTU was formed the Governor of Rwanda-Burundi prohibited all political meetings. Tension began to mount because of a perception that the UNAR had sponsored a campaign of intimidation of opposition parties. The tension finally erupted with physical attacks between the Hutu and the Tutsi in November 1959.

The 1959 attacks were the beginning of the refugee problem in Rwanda. As a result of the civil unrest the Hutu burned the homes of some of the Tutsi people creating seven thousand refugees. This type of action continued until April of 1960 when the total number of refugees were approximately twenty-two thousand. This figure does not include the people who fled to Burundi, Uganda, and the Congo.

In February 1960 it was announced that communal elections were to be held in June. The 1960 Visiting Mission of the UN Trusteeship Commission expressed opposition to the holding of elections at that time, believing that it was first necessary to bring about a measure of reconciliation between the opposing groups. However, the Belgians did not adhere to the recommendation and decided to go ahead with the proposed elections scheduled for June 26 and July 30, 1960. The outcome was heavily in favor of the Hutu although a few Tutsi were elected. In October 1960 the Belgian administration proclaimed the establishment of a Provisional Government for Rwanda with Kayibanda as the appointed head. He was a member of the PARMEHUTU political party.

In 1960 the UN's General Assembly called for Belgium to hold a conference of all political parties before the general elections in 1961. The General Assembly also registered regret that the Mwami had been arbitrarily suspended by the Administering Authority and had not been allowed to return to Rwanda. The conference ended with no decision made. Just two days prior to the election Belgium announced that the elections would be postponed. On January 28th 1960 a meeting was convened by the Minister of the Interior, Jean-Baptiste Rwasibo, Gitera, President of the Council of Rwanda, and Kayibanda, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, to create a new flag. Also, Tutsi feudalism was offensive to the Rwandan people and must be eliminated. Over the next two days the Belgium government granted de facto recognition to the Republican regime to keep the peace and provide serious disorder. This action caused the UN who had strong objections and passed a resolution declaring that

Belgium was accountable for fulfilling the Trusteeship Agreement. On August 4th an agreement was unable to be reached and the Belgian Government withdrew the recognition of the Hutu Republican regime.

Elections were held on September 18th 1961 and the PARMEHUTU received seventy-seven percent of the vote; UNAR, sixteen percent; and APROSOMA three percent. As to the fate of Mwami monarchy, Legislative Assembly voted to abolish it. On October 26th, 1962 Kayibanda was elected the President of the Republic. The final act of the Belgian Government was when the General Assembly voted to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement. Three days later on July 1st, 1962 Rwanda had gained its independence.¹⁸

PRELUDE TO GENOCIDE

The Tutsi traditionally dominated Rwandan politics even though it only was seventeen percent of the population. Virtually all the rest of the population was Hutu. The Hutu themselves were divided into regional groups. The majority lived in the central and southern part of the country and supported the PARMEHUTU party that assumed power upon independence. The remainder of the Hutu population lived in the northwest, historically a separated region. During the first decade of independence, the Tutsi refugees invaded Rwanda repeatedly, seeking to regain the control of the government. The ruling Hutu responded by massacring domestic Tutsi.¹⁹

In 1973, a Hutu officer named Major General Juvenal Habyarimana led a coup that shifted political power to the northwestern region. The northwestern Hutu came to dominate Rwanda's military, economic life, political and engendering

resentment from other Hutu as well as from the Tutsi. He established a government dominated by a single party National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND). This party institutionalized ethnic discrimination through a policy known as establishing ethnic and regional balance. The country's political and social life became subject to quotas established according to ethnic proportions.²⁰ This party made Rwanda one of the most tightly controlled countries in the world.²¹

This tight control over Rwanda assisted in the gross national product growth, which occurred steadily between 1976 – 1980. The international community, multilateral agencies and bilateral donors came to view Rwanda as a success story in Africa. With the assistance of outside help, roads were built and clean water was available to most people. Unfortunately this prosperity did not last long before the coffee price fell in 1987, severe drought and a massive population explosion occurred causing the economic situation to deteriorate quickly. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund came to Rwanda's aide by contributing two hundred and sixteen million dollars. By 1991 the assistance rose to three hundred seventy-five million dollars. The money did not help alleviate the problem because of the political unrest in the country.²²

In the 1980s the refugee issue again surfaced. There were approximately four hundred eighty thousand Tutsi living in nearby countries. The Tutsi continued to call for their international legal right to return to Rwanda. However, the President of Rwanda did not grant this because the country could not support that many people with the country in the economic situation it was currently in.

As Uganda experienced its own unrest, many of these people dreamed of returning to their homeland. In December 1987, discontented Tutsis, some of whom had picked up military skills while fighting in Uganda's civil wars, founded an army called the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA). They also had a political arm named Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). With the country weakened the Tutsi made the decision to return home.²³

TUTSIS RETURN HOME

On October 1st, 1990 stability came to an abrupt halt. An expatriate rebel force consisting of about seven thousand fighters composed mainly of Uganda-based Tutsi refugees to include some Hutu exiles and RPA invaded northern Rwanda.²⁴ This engagement lasted for three weeks and was defeated by the Rwandese Government Army. The attackers were pushed back towards Uganda but subsequent months the RPF continued attacks from territory they held inside Rwanda. The fighting displaced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes in the north and cut the main lines of communications out of the country, which also worsened the economy.²⁵

The Government conducted a significant build-up of its military forces. In October 1990 the strength of the army was five thousand soldiers, and in 1992 it expanded to thirty thousand soldiers. In addition the fighting led to the formation of local militia, Coalition pour la defense de la republic (CDR) having alliance to the ruling MRND. Habyarimana's force had defeated the attacks. This strengthened his position, but the country was too poor to rebuild the army alone. France kept strong links with the French speaking nation and supplied all the

weapons and training that was needed. However there was a negative side to the buildup of which the French may or may not have knowledge of. The new force it supported began to round up the remaining Tutsis in Rwanda. President Habyarimana's own bodyguards seemed to have become involved in the selective killing of the Tutsis and were assisted by gangs of armed killers, called the Interahamwe.²⁶ This military advance combined with diplomatic pressure from the international community as well as Organization of African Unity (OAU) forced President Habyarimana to start talks.

In late October negotiations began between the two parties. The issues addressed were, allowing members of the RPA to join the Rwandan Army, as well, as the issue of the numerous refugees. Military action continued to erupt between the two sides, prolonging the negotiations well beyond the target date for their completion, which was October 10th 1992. Fortunately, there was a cease-fire, but fighting did not subside for very long.

On February 8th, 1993 a very serious cease-fire violation occurred when the RPF launched a military offensive in the Buhengeri-Gisenyi region in the north of Rwanda and seized territory in the buffer zone established by the cease-fire agreement. The RPF's statement claimed the military action was due to continued human rights violations and complicity with the massacre of more than three hundred Tutsis in northwestern Rwanda. The fighting caused nine hundred thousand persons to displace and crowd into make shift camps solely dependent on outside support for survival. The President of Rwanda requested assistance from the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. A mission by this

department to Rwanda was conducted in order to consolidate an appeal to fund the emergency by the international community. In April 1993 an interagency appeal for the amount of seventy-eight million dollars was requested in order to meet the need of Rwanda. By December 1993 only thirty million dollars, thirty-nine percent, of what was needed had been received.²⁷ The two sides agreed to another cease-fire, but the negative propaganda continued. The UN eventually authorized forces on the ground.

THE UNITED NATIONS TOOK ACTION

In February 1993 the governments of Rwanda and Uganda requested the UN develop an observer mission along their borders to prevent the spread of the military actions. After a delegation visited the border, the RPF stated they would not allow the observers on their portion of the border. The government of Uganda agreed to allow the mission to be located completely in Uganda. On June 22nd, 1993 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 846 (1993) establishing the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda.²⁸

The force was composed of eighty-one military observers whose mission was to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border to insure no military assistance reached Rwanda. At the same time a humans rights organization formed an International Commission of Inquiry into human rights. The UN's special representative to Rwanda report dated August 11, 1993 shed the light on the issue of the killings that had taken place not only in combat zones but also in areas far from the hostilities. This type of operation continued with the Hutu claming any Tutsi in Rwanda as part of the RPF.²⁹

As to the question of whether human rights violations between 1990 –1993 could be termed genocide, the Special Rapporteur put forward an initial assessment, stating that the cases of inner-communal violence brought to the attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group and for no other reason. He noted that Rwanda had acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, article II which defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.³⁰

Another round of peace talks began in mid-March 1993. This time the talks concluded successfully in August 1993.

At the conclusion of the Arusha peace talks, two final protocols were signed. One was the integration of the armed forces of two parties, and another covering a number of miscellaneous issues including human rights, and state security services. The Arusha Agreement called upon the UN to play a vital role during the twenty-two month transitional period. The end state of this transitional period was broad-based transitional government, and national elections. The UN established a DMZ within Rwanda along with a force to monitor and report any violations of the agreement. By September 10th, 1993 it proved impossible to establish the transitional government. The UN again took actions.³¹

On September 24th, 1993 Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented an operational plan to the Security Council that proposed a UN peace-keeping force of two thousand five hundred and forty-eight soldiers with the mission to support the quick establishment of the transitional institutions. The name of this mission was United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda

(UNAMIR).³² On October 5th, 1993 the Security Council by a unanimous vote authorized United Nations resolution 872 (1993), the establishment of UNAMIR.

The force of UNAMIR began arriving in Rwanda on October 22nd, 1993. During the month of November 1993, two separate incidents occurred where over sixty people were killed and the UNAMIR reports stated "well armed and ruthless" gangs carried it out. The Rwanda leader obstructed and tried to modify the power sharing provisions for eight months. The Habyarimana Administration attempted to retain power by co-opting the opposition Hutu through bribery and appeals to solidarity against the Tutsi. He and the extremists also developed a forceful option by training militias, broadcasting anti-Tutsi hate radio, and plotting to kill moderate Hutu leaders and Tutsi civilians. The beginning of the genocide commenced just after April 6, 1994 when Habyarimana's plane was mysteriously shot down and the guilty party was never brought to justice.³³

THE GENOCIDE

After the death of President Habyarimana a clique of the Hutu power leaders from the military seized power. The population was instructed not to move, and the Hutu government began to organize the population. In a matter of days the Hutu began to establish roadblocks and the genocide had begun. By April 12, 1994 at least one hospital was filled to maximum capacity with two thousand Tutsi. The doctors locked the pharmacy and would not treat the sick and dying because they were Tutsi. On the morning of April 16th, 1994 a vehicle loaded with gunmen shot and killed everyone in the hospital complex. In the province of Kibue, one out of every four people were Tutsi. After a month most of the Tutsi

had been killed. In many of the villages of the province of Kibue not a single Tutsi survived. The Tutsi mounted a defense in Bisesero, but it was a matter of time and they were killed. In the end Bisesero was the final resting-place for tens of thousands of Tutsi. Manase, a Tutsi, said,

And they did not kill simply. ... They saved bullets and killed us with bamboo spears. They cut Achilles tendons and necks, but not completely, and then they left the victims to spend a long time crying until they died. Cats and dogs were there, just eating people.³⁴

The UNAMIR were still in Rwanda when the genocide began. Ten Belgian soldiers were brutally killed guarding the Prime Minister. The governments providing the UN forces began withdrawing their soldiers and by April 21st, 1994 only two hundred and seventy men remained. It was true the UN force was vulnerable. When the international community withdrew all but a small portion of the forces, it signaled that the situation of the Rwandan people was of no concern of the UN and the international community.³⁵

Despite the speed of the genocide the one thing that assisted in the deceleration of the killing was international observers. The Tutsi had gathered in massive numbers at sites like Kamarampaka Stadium, Nyarushishi camp just to name a few. The Hutu quickly adopted the technique of informing a few Tutsi at these sites that they were needed for questioning. These persons were taken away and were never seen alive again. This caused genocide to take longer to conduct. As reports of genocide reached the outside world starting in late April, public outcry forced the UN to reauthorize a UNAMIR II.

However, in the following months the UN was unable to raise enough equipment and troops to accomplish the mission.³⁶ The conditions in the area worsened. In May 1994 Ugandan officials had to deal with ten thousand bodies floating down the Kagera River daily. This problem could have caused major health crisis. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali the UN Secretary General stated on May 25th 1994 that, " I have tried, by writing to more than thirty heads of states after the United States and other Western countries made it clear they would not get involved." In Annapolis, Maryland President Clinton called Rwanda among the world's bloody conflicts where the stakes did not justify the use of American military force. President Clinton continued by stating, "we cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending in our forces" addressing the commencement at the United States Naval Academy.³⁷ This statement to the cadets of the United States Naval Academy would possibly hamper future recommendations to the national policies makers. The recommendation may possibly come from those very cadets in the future. On May 27th, the Secretary General of the UN appealed for more American support. President Clinton had promised to help in recruiting more peacekeepers for Rwanda.³⁸

The result of this action was the UN authorized two unilateral missions, one from France and the US. France began its two-month, 2,300 strong military relief mission, Operation Turquoise in June 1994. The French operated mostly in the southwestern portion of Rwanda. This was a protected zone and when the French later withdrew, there were some one million people being sheltered. The

Clinton Administration decided to describe the situation in Rwanda as "genocide", which was a change from the "acts of genocide" used before by the administration. This came as the Senate Foreign Relation Committee prepared a letter to President Clinton, which urged him to acknowledge the genocide in Rwanda.³⁹

The United States dispatched its military personnel in late July 1994. The US government responded quickly.⁴⁰ On July 22nd, 1994 President William J. Clinton held a news conference at the White House and stated,

The flow of refugees across Rwanda's borders has now created what could be the world's worst humanitarian crisis in a generation. It is a disaster born of brutal violence, and according to experts now on site, it is now claiming one life every minute.... Today, I have ordered an immediate, massive increase of our efforts in the region, in support of an appeal from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.⁴¹

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili met with reporters on July 28th saying the we are the only organization with the capability to assist in Rwanda. The UN should have executed the mission without the US' involvement, which will allow them to conduct the mission without having to always depend on the US military.⁴² A *Washington Post* report citing international relief officials and US criticized the Department of Defense's organizational response to the President's commitments. Moreover, the military planned to depart Rwanda after performing only a portion of the four principal humanitarian tasks that the National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and other senior officials publicly pledged to undertake.⁴³ This came on after Somalia and during the Haiti operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

At the peak of the US mission, there were three thousand six hundred soldiers of which the majority operated outside the Rwandan border. The US planned to operate in Kigali, but the Tutsi had taken over the government and the US did not recognize it. The refugee camps held an estimated eight hundred and fifty thousand Rwandans, mostly Hutu. There was a small US force, whose mission was to protect the airport, and was also restricted to the airport.⁴⁴ After three months Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder commander of the US force stated in a memorandum that his force had successfully achieved the mission objectives and the forces were withdrawn.⁴⁵ Things in Rwanda did change for the better.

From the autumn of 1994, some form of order was restored to Rwanda. Schools began reopening, and fields were cultivated once again. Reconciliation was not made any easier by the return of perhaps some eight hundred thousand Tutsi exiles from abroad. In many cases these people took land that had been abandoned by the Hutus, so there was the possibility of further tensions as refugees Hutus returned. Attempts by the new government to break up refugee camps within Rwanda, in hopes of forcing their inhabitant's home, often sadly ended in bloodshed.⁴⁶ The wounds and scares left by the genocide were and still remain deep.

ANALYSIS

There is no book currently published by an official that would shed light on inter-circle decisions of UN/US when dealing with Rwanda. Also there are no books that do not address the killings, so the international community can not

use the excuse, we did not know the genocide occurred. As already stated, the UN had reports in 1993 of genocide conducted by the Hutu upon the Tutsis.

The Secretary General of the UN attempted to assist Rwanda on numerous occasions by asking the Western World for assistance. He also submitted for approval, UN missions in Rwanda to either stop the genocide or to assist the refugees in the area. In both cases the international community did almost nothing. In previous years France assisted by being part of the problem versus being part of the solution. African countries also did little to help as well as the European countries. Where was the world's only major power?

The President of the United States and the policy makers assign roles to each instrument of power - diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Some time the military instrument has been of primary importance, at other times it has been marginal, it not irrelevant.⁴⁷ As stated above President Clinton had publicly stated, on more than one occasion, that the US had no national interest in Rwanda. In a *New York Times* article President Clinton admitted that the US "did not do as much as we could have and should have."⁴⁸ Did the US military do their job, which is to provide the Commander-in-Chief with options, as in the case of Rwanda? The evidence suggests the answer to that question as a possible no.

The United States military had at least three possible operational courses of actions? The first was a massive force, which may have been as large as a US division. This force would have had the combat power to accomplish all political aims and objectives set by the National Command Authorities. The second course of action would have been to commit a brigade into Rwanda, to stop the

genocide and conduct a battle hand over with a UN follow on force. The third and final course of action, may have been the use of US Air Force air power bases in the area. In a newspaper article, the mindset of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was exposed.

Such humanitarian missions are fine now and then, Pentagon officials say. But these operations sap time and attention of senior officials, cut into combat training exercises, tie up equipment and personnel and take increasingly scarce defense dollars away from other operations focused on the Pentagon's primary mission of making sure US armed forces remain strong enough to win two regional wars nearly simultaneously.⁴⁹

The above statement is true but the US military must carry out its Title X responsibilities. The part of the military's Title X responsibility is the supporting of the national policies. The President's policies did not change in regard to supporting Rwanda, in July 1994. The military seemed to fail in its mandate of providing the Commander-In-Chief options that may be the reason the US did not commit to stopping the genocide that occurred in Rwanda.

Chapter 3 THE POLICIES OF THE US/UN

The policies of the United States toward the commitment of forces to either support a UN mission to stop genocide or assist in humanitarian operation will now be reviewed. In order to understand the policies, the mindset of the leaders of the time must clearly be understood.

As a result of the operation in Somalia the US Congress did not like UN peacekeeping operations. However, the unfolding TV tragedy of the Goma period

had a political impact and the scale of the disaster very soon overwhelmed the relief agencies. There was a clear message and pressure from the Africa lobbies to Washington to take action. This was now something the US could not avoid. It was not national interest that mobilized the United States but conscience. Congress' reservation toward peacekeeping was circumvented by the insistence that the planned Operation Support Hope was not peacekeeping but humanitarian assistance.⁵⁰ The Clinton Administration determined that in obtaining the conscience of the American people it would do just enough to avoid potential risks which would allow the Clinton Administration to claim that they had tried. In April 1994 President Clinton reported to Congress the deployment of combat equipped US forces to Burundi to assist with the evacuation of US Embassy personnel and citizens from Rwanda. The president made no further report on deployments to or connected with Rwanda situations, nor did the US Congress take any action on the matter. The national policy towards Rwanda arose as either specified or implied tasks through the process of distilling the key points in this President's speeches.⁵¹

The US Senate also placed a time limitation on the mission, which required all US forces to withdraw from Rwanda no later than October 1, 1994. This was an attempt by government officials to prevent casualties. Casualties would place jeopardize the mission and portray their decision to commit forces to Rwanda in a negative light. The American forces left Rwanda, having been seen to be there, and having made a contribution, according to General Schroeder, "with no loss of US military personnel and no residual US military obligations."⁵² The US

government was not alone in having any intention of seeing the problem through.

As with any military operation the question is what is the policy on intervention?

President Clinton early during his first term drafted a Presidential Decision Directive that endorsed multilateral peace operations. There were specific criteria to inform the decisions to when the United States should commit US forces to a UN operation. The two criteria were vote in favor of future UN peace operations and second, a threat to a national interest which would cause the US to participate in that mission.⁵³ These guidelines stated before the US votes to establish a new UN mission there should be clear threat to international order, which could include threats arising from a sudden and unexpected interruption of established democracy or gross violations of human rights. There were still more guidelines, such as a consensus within the international community to deal with the problem on a multilateral basis, clear objectives, finance, and a mandate in order to complete the mission. There were guidelines just for the US, which stated the US, might contribute forces if specific or general US interest would be advanced by participation. The commitment of force would not impact on the military readiness to fight two major theaters of war, US participation was necessary in order to persuade others to participate, and the command and control structure was acceptable and finally must have Congressional support.⁵⁴

Led by former, mostly Republican, foreign policy officials, the Clinton Administration was faulted for supposedly ignoring American national interests in its conduct of foreign policy. Jeane Kirkpatrick, President Ronald Reagan's ambassador to the United Nations, argued that President Clinton's has made

American foreign policy subservient to the UN. She also contended the Clinton Administration implemented the decision of the UN Security Council and Secretary General. The administration began to attempt to change its stance in regards with the UN.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher addressed the role of multilateralism in the administration's policies linking its potential utility directly to American national interest. It is warranted only when it serves the central purpose of American foreign policy: to protect American interest.⁵⁵ President Clinton's speech to the UN General Assembly,

the United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to the UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no. Does the proposed mission have a clear objective? Can an end point be identified for those who will be asked to participate? How much will the mission cost? From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions for every proposed mission before we vote and before the missions begins.⁵⁶

In the aftermath of the firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia where eighteen young American soldiers lost their lives the policy and position of the United States had to change in regards to the commitment of US forces in a United Nations mission. The administration began to review Presidential Decision Directive 25. Within the Clinton administration there were growing differences over the direction of the US policy. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin urged for a complete overhaul of PDD. The position of Secretary Aspin was due to the growing unease at involving United States forces in nation-building exercises and the kind of police actions that had failed so miserably in Somalia. The Secretary argued

that the US forces readiness to fight two major theater of war would be degraded. Secretary Aspin was not alone in his position, he had the widespread support of senior military officers who, after Somalia, were increasingly wary of getting involved in these types of missions, especially if it required that US forces be placed under foreign control.⁵⁷

One immediate indication that the administration took these concerns seriously was a series of public statements by senior officials detailing new constraints placed on the type and degree US participation in future peace operations. US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright informed Congress US contribution to such operations will most often be in areas such as logistics, intelligence, public affairs and communication. The Pentagon supported this position fully. Reflecting similar caution, the Pentagon proposed adding two new guidelines for deciding whether US forces should participate in multilateral peace operations, one suggesting that participation should be a last resort and another proposing that the stakes and interests be weighed against the risks to US forces.⁵⁸

The Clinton Administration conducted an intense period to gain support for the new version of PDD - 25. On May 3rd, 1994 President Clinton signed PDD - 25 which contained the administration's new policy on multilateral peace operations. Though many of the essential elements remained the same from the previous versions, the new policy had adopted a fundamentally different tone. The tone truly reflected the Pentagon's position instead of the incoming Clinton Administration. The change no longer supported the earlier versions supporting

such operations politically, militarily, and financially. The goal of the policy was neither to expand the number of UN operations nor to increase the US' involvement in the operations. The US would aim to ensure that peacekeeping would be more selective and more effective in the future.⁵⁹ Again, the Pentagon made the recommendation to add the phrase "risks to American forces" as part of the decisions relating to US participation in future operations. After dialogue with Congress another phrase, "consequences of inaction" was also added. Finally, the policy endorsed the concept of shared responsibility between the Department of State and Defense. The Department of Defense would have management and financial responsibility for all peace enforcement operations and any peace operations in which US combat troops participated. The State Department would be responsible for traditional peacekeeping operations in which no US combat troops participated.

The change to the policy was rooted in two factors. First, the President electoral mandate, which stated that the administration would focus on domestic issues and put international issues on the back table unless it was a threat to US national interest. Second, the military opposition to an expansive US role in multilateral peace operations. Due to problems the US military was involved elsewhere, the military community skepticism began to hold greater say in the internal administration debates/dialogue. This was reflected in tougher decision-making guidelines, the addition of a third set of guidelines with outlined US commitment in combat operations and the issue of allowing a US force to be placed under the command of a non-US commander. The framework of the final

guidelines closely matched the Weinberger doctrine, due to the input of General Colin Power, who helped write both documents.⁶⁰

President Clinton's administration's peacekeeping policy represented an evolutionary change. There were three major changes to the new policy. First, the United States is now prepared to make available the full spectrum of its military capabilities to multilateral peace operations. The second major adjustment was United States contributions; even of combat forces can be subject to the operational control of United Nations commander. Finally, the issue of money would be shared between the Department of Defense and State to increase available financing for future UN operations.

However, the three major changes to the policy were only truly as seen on paper. In reality President Clinton's administration did not abandon previous constraints on United States participation. The Department of Defense refused to provide the United Nations headquarters with data on specific capabilities, while other countries provided the information. The Clinton Administration frequently reiterates that large scale and high risk United Nations operations, to include combat, will remain under United States and or NATO control; the commander of the NATO is normally a United States General Officer. Finally, the issue of funding once again was a problem. The new policy outline a working relationship of the Departments of Defense and State, and the United States Congress rejected the concept of shared responsibility by refusing to appropriate any DOD funds for peacekeeping.

This was the legacy of President Clinton's Administration, a set of guidelines for future United States decisions on multilateral operations. The administration's decision not to support the United Nations raising and maintain a standing force or earmarking United States units for possible United Nations missions allowed the United States' policy maneuver space to participate in missions of the administration's choice. The final guidelines may have provided a useful checklist but not much more. In the case of Rwanda the decision on whether or not to support operation and send American forces need did not conform to the guidelines as written.

In the end, those who had hoped that the Clinton administration would opt for a fundamentally different attitude toward the multilateral use of force was sorely disappointed. But then they were bound to be. The administration's new realism is a reflection of both domestic political circumstance and the continuing absence of a clearly defined strategy in which the use of forces in situations where less than vital national interests are at stake can garner significant and enduring political support. Despite several years of effort by two Presidential administrations, the need to devise such a strategy still remained.⁶¹

The United Nations' policies that addressed Genocide and Human Rights have stood for a number of years. These United Nations Resolutions date from the last century.⁶² The position of the United Nations has been to remain neutral during a conflict. When the crisis in Rwanda began the United Nations had news that trouble was just over the horizon. The process to establish a mission to assist a country and or a people can be a difficult process. The situation of a country and or a people is brought to the United Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly has a dialogue about the current situation and either approves

or disapproves its recommendation to the United Nations Security Council. This recommendation may consist of military forces and or logical capabilities and possibly money. The Security Council votes on the operation, to include the mandate for the mission. A United Nations mandated is the rules, and regulation for the proposed mission. Once the mission is approved the most difficult portion of the process begins, getting nations of the UN to contribute to the mission. The Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali began a campaign to raise support for the mission(s) to Rwanda. So, what was the process for the United Nations' mission(s) to Rwanda?

The Security Council was presented an operational plan for support for Rwanda in 1993. The plan contained a four-phase deployment schedule and called for a peacekeeping force of two thousand, five hundred and forty-eight military personnel. The mission assisted in providing security in and around the capital in a "weapon free" zone. The end state of the mission was elections in a peace and save environment with most if not all the refugees returned to their homes. The timeline from deployment to mission complete was estimated to be two years.⁶³ The Security Council authorized resolution 872 (1993) but only a six month mandate for the mission, which caused the mission to be reviewed after it's first ninety days to determine if progress was being made.

The mission faced numerous delays while news of trouble over the horizon reached the United Nations Security Council. On April 20th, 1994 the Security Council was notified about the prospect of no agreement nor cease-fire in the near term. Three options were provided to the Security Council in order to

attempt to assist Rwanda with its internal problems. The decision was to change the mandate and also reduce the number of military forces to two hundred and seventy.

The Security Council on May 13th, 1994 authorized another United Nations mission to Rwanda. This force was to number five thousand five hundred, to also include armament and high mobility to deter hostilities.⁶⁴ The deployment of the next mission, UNAMIR II, also proved to be a bridge to far. One reason there was a delay was due to the fact the international community experienced fatigue conducting peacekeeping operations.

The international community had been involved and or watched the Somalia mission, and the United Nations was involved in seventeen missions in April of 1994. This type of attitude and position caused the Member States not to respond quickly in May with contributions of troops, equipment and airlift to meet the requirements of the mission force. Some of the Member States of the United Nations that responded in a timely manner did not have the capability to meet the requirements. Appeals for addition support became individual agreements, which had to be negotiated. The support that was needed ranged from weapons to radios, which prolonged the deployment of the peacekeeping force to Rwanda. Boutros Boutros-Ghali appeared on the news program Nightline and made the following statement.

It is genocide, which has been committed. More than 200,000 people have been killed, and the international community is still discussing what ought to be done. I have tired. I was in contact with different heads of State and I begged them to send troops. I was in contact with different organizations and tired my

best to help them find a solution to the problem.
Unfortunately, let me say with great humility, I failed.
It is a scandal.⁶⁵

Five thousand troops were due to be deployed to Rwanda unfortunately only five hundred were on the ground in Rwanda by July 25th, 1994.

Chapter 4 **Why the lack of support**

The lack of support and or action seems to be pointed or stem from the United Nations' Security Council. The Security Council authorized the two missions to Rwanda, but failed to support those missions. The United Nations was reluctant to intrude on the airwaves, with the use of radio, of Member States without their permission in order to take some type of action. If the United Nations had intruded on the airwaves then portions of the information part of the instrument of power would have provided at least an early leverage point. The decisions made by the Security Council following the outbreak were slow and over shadowed by the mindset of cost of the military operations. If the Council members expected the Rwandan situation to become so deadly to civilians, encompassing genocide and costly follow up humanitarian operations, they may have decided differently. This leads to the next question. Was the political will there to support the United Nations' military operation to Rwanda? The evidence gathered in the research for this monograph points to answering the above with a no!⁶⁶

The world's major powers make up the Security Council, which means they have the military capabilities needed to support such a mission. Within the Security Council there is also an order and only one super power as of 1994, the United States of America. The countries with the capability for rapid military response lacked the will to respond. There were some countries in the region with the forces and capabilities to intervening; the United Nations members who pay the majority of peacekeeping cost could have funded the mission.⁶⁷

The United States also had the capability to respond, with at least three possible courses of action. The first being, maximum intervention with according to some sources which, said would have required a US division sized force. The second course of action would have required a United States reinforced brigade. The final course of action called for no ground troops but the threat of air power would be enough to stop the genocide not unlike the action taken in Kosovo.⁶⁸ Most of the international community claims that the information of the genocide was unclear.

The rebel's own radio station did not report of the scale of the killed until middle of April 1994. American newspapers failed to give any such indication until April 22nd, 1994. When the American newspapers began to report of the genocide in Rwanda it was belated that fighting bands had reduced the country to chaos. For reason(s) that still remains unknown most foreign observers still could not conceive that the genocide was according. In late April *The Washington Post* posed the question of why only twenty thousand refugees had crossed borders, when five hundred thousand Tutsis had left their homes and the

borders had been closed by the Rwandan Army.⁶⁹ *The New York Times* within a few days reported that the missing Tutsi people were either hiding or killed. The United States senior officials did not want to get involved into the Rwanda crisis for a number of reasons, although the US did commit troops it was after the genocide was over and only the commit of logical units.

The planning considerations were, to have no residual military presence in the area, United States support should be considered only if it is unique, and not found in international organizations or other countries. Secretary of Defense William Perry described the rationale and criteria for the commitment of United States forces; the solution is unique to the US military and the risks to the United States' force are minimal. The mission statement/plan was to save lives and to protect the United States forces. Secretary Perry stated these criteria would be applicable to the next mission, if the US committed forces.⁷⁰ There was also a discrepancy between President Clinton's Administration and senior leaders within the Department of Defense.

The Clinton Administration did not force the military to meet each of the United Nations' tasks because the tasks were too costly, too risky and or unnecessary. The military plan to depart after performing only a portion of the four principal humanitarian tasks that National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and other senior officials pledged to the American public it would undertake.⁷¹ From the beginning Lieutenant General Schroeder was allowed to develop withdrawal criteria that defined end state/success with terms such as, resisted mission creep, set conditions for rapid transition of relief support from military to

civilian agency control. Clear mission guidance thus allowed the commander considerable freedom of action in determining his operational objectives and end state, and was key in avoiding the additional tasking to deploy forces that has become known as mission creep.⁷² In order to shed light on both sides, one must remember that President Clinton, the administration, and the senior leaders of the military were focused on the crises in Cuba and Haiti, which were occurring during this time period.

ANALYSIS

So why were the people of Rwanda allowed to suffer the effects of genocide in the twenty century? There are a number of reasons, and the answer is to address the problem systemically, which means there is not one point or area to correct in order to prevent this type of problem in the future.

The genocide accorded on the post Somalia operation where eighteen young American soldiers had lost their lives. This did not effect the American public, but the effect of Somalia did impact the senior military leaders by way of their recommendation of whether to commit United States military forces to a United Nations mission. This also affected the Clinton Administration the same way it affected the United States military senior leaders. The United States stood by the killing of US soldiers in Somalia just six months earlier, but in Rwanda not only chose to avoid involvement but blocked any Security Council action pending completion of exhaustive, time-consuming plan for intervention.⁷³ It seemed the United States officials along with all its capabilities did not want to support another United Nations mission, especially to Rwanda, which was not a national

interest. This mind set/mental model allowed the United States to charge the United Nations for repair parts on the equipment the UN need to conduct the mission.

Another reason there was the delay in action on the part of the international community; Rwanda was not a national interest. As shown above President Clinton informed Boutros Boutros-Ghali upon this trip to the US, that Rwanda was not a United States national interest. Rwanda was not a US national interest, which caused the US not support the UN mission, until almost a half a million people had been killed. The Rwanda mission was not the only thing occurring at the time. The US was involved with a national interest issue, in its own hemisphere, Haiti. In the months of April thorough September 1994 the United States was conducting negotiation with Haiti in an attempt to prevent a military forced entry operation. Although the Haiti mission was important the only major power should be able to handle multiple operation simultaneously. The United States can conduct multiple military operations as proven during World War II. The United States supported and engaged Japan and Germany but cannot conduct military operations in Haiti and Rwanda? The answer is the United States has the might but elected not to fully support the operation. Was the ultimate reason for none commitment to the Rwanda mission was political will? The answer seems to be that the National Command Authorities did not have the will and or the knowledge to rally the American public behind committing US forces to another African country, which may cause US casualties. The international community and mostly the United States did not

address the situation in Rwanda where approximately five hundred thousand people were killed.

The most blinding flash of the obvious is intervention is no substitute for prevention. Whether pursuing prevention or intervention, policy makers and military leaders must use their imagination to better anticipate the behavior of foreign actors. Dietrich Dorner states in his book *The Logic of Failure* that failure is made up of three parts. The three components are the failure to anticipate secondly, the failure to learn and lastly, failure to adapt. This framework seems to have been part of the reasons there was minimal action taken by the United States toward the mission in Rwanda. Western officials failed to foresee the genocide, despite the warning signs. The international community is unwilling to deploy such robust forces they must refrain from coercive diplomacy aimed at forcing the rulers from power because that course of action may force the ruler to commit genocide. The policy of the United Nations and the United States seemed to be incorrect. In his book *On War* published in 1832 Carl Von Clausewitz stated,

No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right that is, successful any intentional effect it has on the conduct of war can only be good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong.⁷⁴

There is no single formula for deciding when to intervene in humanitarian crises.

The statement by Clausewitz is applicable to peacekeeping and humanitarian

missions, as it is to war. This statement is proven true as in the case study of Rwanda. The senior leaders both military and civilian leaders of the United States stalled, blocked others from acting and compounded its craven policy when it ordered its officials not even to use the word genocide, until avoiding it became a political embarrassment.⁷⁵ It was seen as too difficult and not of sufficient interest and value to prevent the outbreak of violence, and once violence had broken out, it still was not of sufficient interest to warrant the expense of resources and risk of more casualties to stop the violence from spreading. While others remained focused on the world's other crises, the people of Rwanda were forgotten.⁷⁶

Chapter V Conclusion

The United Nations and the United States did ignore the atrocities and genocide in Rwanda even though it was in violation of the United Nations Resolution 260 A (III). In the previous year the Clinton Administration supported a United Nations military operation in Somalia and it cost eighteen American soldiers their lives and the administration major political problems at home. The Clinton Administration did not commit to Somalia, the Bush Administration did but President Clinton had to shoulder the burden of responsibility for a failed mission early in his first term as President. There seems to be one branch of the United States government to shoulder the blame for non-support to the United Nations' mission(s) to Rwanda, the Executive Branch.

The Department of Defense is responsible for providing the Commander-In-Chief military options to a problem set. The research allows the author to come to a few conclusions. First the military was not willing to commit United States forces to the peacekeeping operations in Rwanda after the failure of the United Nations mission in Somalia. The senior leaders of the military seemed to use the Weinberger Doctrine as its sole reason for not supporting the commitment of United States forces to Rwanda. The Weinberger Doctrine's first criteria is "the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies."⁷⁷ Not providing the Commander-In-Chief military options are in direct violation of the responsibility of the senior military officers.⁷⁸ The United States Department of Defense let the Commander-In-Chief down and in turn let the people of Rwanda down.

The Executive Branch of the United States government was the cause of Rwandan mission failure. Once President Clinton made the decision to commit United States forces to Rwanda and the military recommendation of a course of action that did not allow for the goals Tony Lake had established, then the military should have been told to develop another course of action. The second reason the Executive Branch of the United States government let the people of Rwanda and the international community down was not calling the atrocities genocide earlier. In its own policies the Clinton Administration stated it would support a United Nations mission in order to get more support from the international community.

The United Nations is a world organization that can only request from its members for support for an operation. If that support is not provided then the United Nations is only as good as its weakest link. The United Nations and the international community must apply more pressure in an attempt to get the support to stop genocide, which is a crime under international law. The world has an historical example of not supporting an international organization for the betterment of the world, the League of Nations.

The importance or the so what of this monograph for the operational commander and or planner is that the responsibility of the military is to provide options to the National Command Authorities regardless of personnel dislike of the military operation(s). Another lesson learned from the Rwandan mission for an operational commander and or a planner is that one must always use the deliberate planning process because it allows the best range of options during the crisis planning process. Again, as Doerner states in his book one must do everything within their power to prevent the logic of failure. Just one person never experiences failure, we all do.

Who experienced failure because of Rwanda? Those who suffered were the Rwandans, the international community, the United Nations, the United States, President Clinton, and the United States military. In other words the world suffered as a result of no actions taken in Rwanda. Are we our brother's keepers? Yes we are.

¹ Wesley K. Clark, "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead," Parameters (Winter 1999) 2 – 14. This twelve-page article only addresses the status of NATO and its commitment to the Balkan region. It raises the issue of regional stability but never addresses Africa.

² United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide"; 12 January 1951 [document on-line]; http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm; Internet; accessed 19 January 2000. Contained in Article I it states the following "the contracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

³ United Nations Security Council "Resolution 955 (1994)"; 8 November 1994 [document on-line]; <http://www.un.org/ict/english/Resolutions/955e.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2000. The following is the definition used by the UN for Rwanda. Article II "Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Killing members of the group. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." This is the same definition as defined in the 12 January 1951 document above.

⁴ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaghn, 1999), 25. This book takes an objective look at the past, present and future of Rwanda. It points out the things done both good and bad by the action and inaction of the international community.

⁵ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaghn, 1999), 25. In his book All Too Human A political Education President Clinton's press secretary George Stephanopoulos does not address the issue of Rwanda once. All other military operations are addressed, Somalia and Haiti.

⁶ Alan F. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs Vol 79 no 1 (Winter 2000), 100. It states in this article the genocide began in April 1994. In an article in Parameters by John E. Lange it says the United States did not deploy forces until July 1994.

⁷ Alan F. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs Vol 79 no 1 (Winter 2000) 94 – 118.

⁸ Catharine Watson, Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion. (American Council for Nationalities Service, 1991), 2.

⁹ Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550 – 84, AREA HANDBOOK for RWANDA. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969) 6 - 7.

¹⁰ Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993 – 1996. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996) 7.

¹¹ Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550 – 84, AREA HANDBOOK for RWANDA. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969) 10 - 11.

¹² William J. Durch., UN Peacekeeping, American policy, and the UN civil wars of the 1990s. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 369.

¹³ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaghn, 1999), 16.

¹⁴ Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550 – 84, AREA HANDBOOK for RWANDA. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969) 13.

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- ¹⁵ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaghn, 1999), 16.
- ¹⁶ Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550 – 84, AREA HANDBOOK for RWANDA. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969) 15.
- ¹⁷ Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550 – 84, AREA HANDBOOK for RWANDA. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969) 16 - 17. The relationship between the Tutsi and Hutu came to be expressed in the form of a patron-client contract called ubuhake.
- ¹⁸ Department of the Army, Pamphlet 550 – 84, AREA HANDBOOK for RWANDA. (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969) 17 - 24.
- ¹⁹ Alan F. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs Vol 79 no 1 (Winter 2000), 94.
- ²⁰ Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993 – 1996. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 10.
- ²¹ Alan F. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs Vol 79 no 1 (Winter 2000), 20.
- ²² Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993 – 1996. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 11 – 12.
- ²³ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaghn, 1999), 20.
- ²⁴ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaghn, 1999), 20.
- ²⁵ Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993 – 1996. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 12.
- ²⁶ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaghn, 1999), 21 - 22. The Hutu had their own "Ten Commandments" and they are as follows. "First, every Hutu should know that Tutsi woman.... Works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group... we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who marries a Tutsi woman, befriends a Tutsi woman, and employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary. Fourth, every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result any Hutu who does the following is a traitor; makes a partnership with Tutsi in business, invests money or the government's money in a Tutsi enterprise, lends or borrows money from a Tutsi. Fifth, all strategic positions, political administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted to Hutu. Eighth, the Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi." This quote is located on page 23.
- ²⁷ Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993 – 1996. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 12 – 16.
- ²⁸ William J. Durch., UN Peacekeeping, American policy, and the UN civil wars of the 1990s. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 371.
- ²⁹ William J. Durch., UN Peacekeeping, American policy, and the UN civil wars of the 1990s. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 375.
- ³⁰ Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993 – 1996. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 22.

³¹ William J. Durch., UN Peacekeeping, American policy, and the UN civil wars of the 1990s. (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 373.

³² Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaughn, 1999), 44.

³³ Alan F. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs Vol 79 no 1 (Winter 2000), 96.

³⁴ Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), 26 – 31. An excellent book that places you into the genocide through the eyes of the very few Tutsi that survived the ordeal.

³⁵ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaughn, 1999), 44.

³⁶ Alan F. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," Foreign Affairs Vol 79 no 1 (Winter 2000), 98.

³⁷ Paul Lewis, "Boutros-Ghali Angrily Condemns All Sides for Not Saving Rwanda," The New York Times. 26 May 1994, A1.

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⁴³ R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Mission to Rwanda Criticized," The Washington Post, 5 September 1994, A1.

⁴⁴ Nina M. Serafino, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Military Intervention by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned" for Kosovo, Library of Congress, May 20, 1999, 22.

⁴⁵ US Army PeaceKeeping Institute, Operation Support Hope 1994: After Action Report (Headquarters United States European Command, 1994), 68.

⁴⁶ Charles Freeman., Crisis in Rwanda. (Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-vaughn, 1999), 48.

⁴⁷ Parameters "US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa"; Winter 1997- 1998 [document on-line]; <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97winter/henk.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 January 2000.

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⁵⁰ R. M. Connaughton., "Military Support and Protection for Humanitarian Assistance Rwanda April – December 1994", The Occasional, number 18, 1996 page 56 - 57.

⁵¹ Nina M. Serafino, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Military Intervention by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and "Lessons Learned" for Kosovo, Library of Congress, May 20, 1999, 22.

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