Network Centric Warfare in Operation Allied Force: Future Promise or Future Peril
Abstract
Elements of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) had a significant impact on the Headquarters, U.S. European Command conduct and oversight of Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO combat operation conducted in and around the Serbian province of Kosovo from March to June 1999. A number of technological advances that constituted significant elements of NCW at the theater and operational level made conduct of Operation ALLIED FORCE unique. NCW connectivity brought with it a number of problem areas that, if unchecked or uncorrected, could adversely impact European theater operations in the future. Theater access to real-time, full motion video surveillance of targets of interest, the reliance on reach back technology by the European theater intelligence community, daily reliance on VTC's to facilitate essential war fighting coordination and SIPRNET data sharing advances at HQ USEUCOM were all successes of NCW during ALLIED FORCE. Despite these successes though, NCW in Kosovo was not a panacea for war fighting connectivity in a coalition setting. A minor stumbling block was realized in the lack of U.S. and European information interoperability, as well as the potential for senior leaders inappropriately inserting themselves in tactical level decisions. The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) provide a starting point for NATO keeping up with the U.S. technologically, but if our European allies don't carry through, this "technology gap will widen, threatening NATO cohesiveness.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA382095
Entities
People
- Robert M. Stuart Ii
Organizations
- Naval War College