Sanctions: The Calculus of Coercion
Abstract
Of the three components of a national security strategy, the one that seems to be the most used, but least understood in terms of impact and efficacy is economic; specifically, the use of economic power in the service of national interests. That very often, economic coercion doesn't work or has unintended consequences shows that the use of economic power as an instrument of policy is problematic. Often, sanctions are imposed as a consequence of the lack of feasible alternatives: military action would be too massive, and diplomatic protest too meager for any intended effect. Prior to any action being taken, an "economic preparation of the battlefield" or "EPB" should be done. Much like the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) that defines military operations, the EPB provides the basis for determining how friendly courses of action, specifically economic warfare, will affect the enemy and how the enemy will respond. The calculus of coercion states that the cost of compliance must be less than the cost of sanctions for economic coercion to have an effect. If, on the other hand, the cost of compliance is greater than the cost of defiance, the end result will be defiance. By methodically and analytically looking at the enemy and his systems, a logical and causal path can be laid out to achieve the desired effect.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 07, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA382436
Entities
People
- Mark Zodda
Organizations
- Naval War College