Joint Doctrine and Task Force Hawk: Lessons for the New Millennium

Abstract

This thesis seeks to determine if Joint and Army doctrine support attack helicopters in air-only operations. It focuses on Operation Allied Force and the role that Task Force Hawk was assigned. The premise being that because Task Force Hawk lacked a ground maneuver force, Allied Force was unlike any operation the attack helicopters had previously participated in. The thesis, through historical analysis, determines that there exist tensions between the Army and Air Force over the use of attack helicopters. These tensions cloud current discussion over helicopter use. Next, the thesis examines Joint and Army doctrine to determine if the task assigned to the attack helicopters had doctrinal foundation. Finally, the study examines the predeployment training, task organization, and in-country training for the helicopter crews to determine if their preparation was consistent with the requirements of the operations.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2000
Accession Number
ADA383848

Entities

People

  • Peter L. Vandeusen

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • C4I
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Air Power
  • Aircrafts
  • Airframes
  • Attack Helicopters
  • Combat Operations
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Doctrine
  • Fixed Wing Aircraft
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military History
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • Students
  • Tactical Training
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Aerospace logistics and air mobility.
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Military Science