

Technical Report 1105

**Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership:
Seeking Insight Into the Acquisition and Use of
Practical Knowledge**

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September 2000



**United States Army Research Institute
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FOREWORD

The Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), is the primary Army activity conducting research on the human component. ARI is a directorate of the Total Army Personnel Command and the Army's principal agency for soldier-oriented research and development in personnel and training. The mission of ARI is to maximize Army effectiveness through research and development in the acquisition, training, development, and retention of Army personnel.

ARI has initiated a program to study military leadership, understand its effects on unit performance, and determine how it might be enhanced. In support of this program, ARI sponsored this report to explicate the role of tacit knowledge in military leadership. Understanding how tacit knowledge is acquired and how soldiers, with different levels of experience, solve practical leadership problems is of considerable importance to enhancing the performance of Army personnel. This research was designed using relevant theories on tacit knowledge, leadership, and knowledge acquisition. The Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders was used to assess the experience base of Army leaders' practical knowledge to gain further understanding of tacit knowledge and the processes associated with its acquisition.

This research has produced findings supporting the relationship between tacit knowledge and experience, with more experience indicating higher tacit knowledge scores. In addition, leaders with more experience were found to have a more thorough understanding of the information needed to solve potential problems. These results should be useful both in understanding how experiences effect knowledge acquisition and in the ability of leaders to solve problems.



EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

TACIT KNOWLEDGE FOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP: SEEKING INSIGHT INTO THE ACQUISITION AND USE OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

To provide preliminary insight into the process of tacit knowledge acquisition and to support the development of tools to assess the use of various knowledge-acquisition processes in solving practical leadership problems. These requirements were met by (a) reviewing relevant theory and research on tacit knowledge, leadership, and knowledge acquisition; (b) reporting results of analyses performed on free-text responses provided by Army officers to tacit-knowledge scenarios; and (c) discussing the implications of this research for ongoing efforts to identify and assess the processes associated with tacit-knowledge acquisition.

Procedure:

The Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders (TKML), an instrument designed to measure the experience-based, practical knowledge of Army leaders, consists of a set of problem descriptions each accompanied by 5-15 response options for dealing with the problem. Typically respondent are asked to rate the quality of each of these options. In this study, we asked respondents to provide ratings on half the questions and free-text responses on the other half of the questions. We administered three versions of TKML, one each for platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders, to 64 Army officers at two sites. Responses to the close-ended questions were scored relative to an expert standard and responses to the open-ended questions were compiled and categorized according to the type of information provided in the response. We performed analyses on the tacit-knowledge scores, rank, experience, and types of text responses provided in order to gain further understanding of tacit knowledge and the processes associated with its acquisition.

Findings:

We found relationships between rank and tacit-knowledge scores on the company and battalion inventories, providing support for the relationship between experience and tacit knowledge. We also found that the more experience officers indicated having with the company commander scenarios, the higher their tacit-knowledge scores. In examining the text responses, we found that many officers provided solutions that were not already represented in the existing set of options for a particular scenario. The additional solutions identified by respondents were compiled into tables (provided in the Appendix), which include information about the level of tacit knowledge and rank of officers who provided the particular responses. For those responses that incorporated an existing option, we found that officers who identified good solutions (as determined by expert ratings of existing solutions) to the company commander scenarios scored higher on the close-ended questions. In general, we found that

responses to the open-ended questions were often limited in detail, but we still were able to identify some processes that officers exhibited in responding to the scenarios. These included seeking additional information to understand the problem, making assumptions about the nature of the problem, and considering the implications of the chosen course of action. Based on exploratory analyses, we found that some of these processes were related to tacit-knowledge scores and experience with the types of situations represented in the scenarios. More importantly, these analyses allowed us to identify the types of information that can be incorporated into the problem descriptions in order to create more in-depth case scenarios that will allow us to better assess tacit-knowledge acquisition.

Utilization of Findings:

The results of this study provide further support for the validity of the TKML by showing differences in scores as a function of rank and experience with the situations presented in the scenarios. The results also provide insight into the processes that officers exhibit in responding to the scenarios (e.g., additional information needed, implications of the solution). The responses obtained to the open-ended questions were compiled according to these categories and are included in an appendix with this report. For each response, we include information on the officer(s) who provided the response in order to explore patterns of responding as a function of rank or tacit knowledge. This information could be used by officers to gain further understanding of the problem depicted in the scenario and any differences in perspective that officers at different levels have about the problem. These data also support ongoing efforts to develop case scenarios consisting of greater detail and complexity, which can be used to more fully assess the processes associated with tacit-knowledge acquisition.

TACIT KNOWLEDGE FOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP: SEEKING INSIGHT INTO THE ACQUISITION AND USE OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

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TACIT KNOWLEDGE FOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP: SEEKING INSIGHT INTO THE ACQUISITION AND USE OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

Introduction

Leaders in both military and civilian settings are faced with increasingly complex and dynamic environments. Advances in technology, increases in the volume of information, shorter time periods for decision making, and a reliance on fewer people are just some of the factors that contribute to this complexity. Under these conditions, it becomes virtually impossible to teach leaders what they need to know for all situations and to do so before the knowledge becomes obsolete. As a result, formal instruction (e.g., institutional training) is less likely to be an effective or efficient method of learning about leadership. Therefore, on-the-job learning can be expected to play an increasingly greater role in the development of effective leaders.

Given that much of the development of effective leaders will likely take place outside of structured environments (e.g., the classroom), there is an even greater need to understand the characteristics that distinguish more from less effective learners. Previous attempts to identify the knowledge, skills, or abilities of effective leaders have met with limited success. For example, general cognitive ability and experience have been proposed to explain leadership effectiveness. But these two factors only correlate modestly at best with measures of leadership performance (e.g., Bass, 1990). Fiedler suggests that "it is very difficult to believe that intellectual abilities fail to contribute to such critical leadership functions as decision-making and coordinating and organizing work processes, or that leaders cannot learn from past events" (Fiedler, 1995, p. 6).

One possible reason for the limited success of these measures is that they fail to adequately capture a key determinant of performance, that is, practical ability. Traditional measures of cognitive ability tend to assess academic rather than practical abilities (Sternberg, 1997). By academic we mean the abilities needed to perform well-defined, abstract tasks that have limited relevance to everyday experiences. Practical abilities, on the other hand, are required to perform ill-defined, context-specific tasks that are personally relevant. Therefore, measures that tap academic rather than practical abilities are bound to be limited in their capacity to explain performance on real-world, practical tasks. Similarly, measures of experience have been unsuccessful because typically they involve abstract notions of experience such as job tenure or number of leadership positions held. These measures are not necessarily informative about what one has gained from experience.

Our approach to understanding leadership, and performance in general, focuses on the knowledge gained from experience that is a function of the abilities needed to succeed in practical, real-world tasks. Building on a body of research in civilian settings (Sternberg et al., 2000), we implemented an approach to studying military leadership that focuses on experience-based, practically-relevant knowledge, which we refer to as *tacit knowledge*. Tacit knowledge is generally acquired on one's own and thus is characteristic of much of the knowledge one gains on the job. Preliminary research to identify, measure and validate the

tacit-knowledge construct in the domain of military leadership indicated that successful leaders possess knowledge that can be characterized as tacit, and that this knowledge explains leadership effectiveness and does so beyond traditional measures of cognitive ability and experience.

Since a substantial part of leadership development occurs in the field, how do we ensure that leaders get the most out of their experiences and that they learn the "right" lessons? This question raises the issue of how to promote tacit-knowledge acquisition. In our work, we identify two basic methods for improving the acquisition of tacit knowledge. One method is to teach the tacit knowledge directly. Direct methods involve teaching the "lessons learned" explicitly to less experienced officers either through formal academic instruction or mentoring. Although direct instruction may provide officers with some insights about leadership, the tacit knowledge may not be relevant to their personal experiences and goals. Indirect methods of instruction are more suitable to promoting the acquisition of knowledge that is specific to the individual and the context in which he or she performs. Indirect methods are intended to teach people the strategies used in acquiring tacit knowledge so that they can learn more effectively from their experiences.

As part of continuing efforts to explicate the role of tacit knowledge in military leadership, this report summarizes work aimed to (1) understand changes in tacit knowledge across leadership levels, (2) obtain insights into the processes associated with the use of tacit knowledge, and (3) solicit materials to support the development of tools to understand how tacit knowledge is acquired and used. In addition, identifying the processes underlying tacit-knowledge acquisition will enable us to recommend methods for promoting effective tacit-knowledge acquisition that can be applied to leadership development. In the research reported here, we sought to identify the processes leaders exhibit in responding to the types of situations that are indicative of experiences in which important lessons about leadership are acquired. This research served two purposes. First, it provided us with free text responses to scenarios that are typically presented along with a set of response options that officers rate in terms of their quality or appropriateness. This approach allowed us to identify the types of issues that emerge in addressing the problems presented in the scenarios, and thus provided preliminary insight into the types of processes associated with tacit-knowledge acquisition. Second, the research provided data that will be useful in subsequent phases of our research in which we will develop specific measures to assess more directly the processes underlying tacit-knowledge acquisition. These data provide guidance in choosing scenarios that will be most suitable for assessing these processes and suggest specific materials to include with those measures. In the process of meeting these objectives, we also obtained data that provides additional support for the construct validity of our existing measures.

We begin with an overview of the theoretical and empirical foundation for our tacit knowledge research. We follow with a brief review of relevant literature on leadership and our findings from research on tacit knowledge for military leadership. Then, we consider the processes that are proposed to underlie tacit-knowledge acquisition. Next, we describe the methodology by which we acquired and analyzed responses to the tacit-knowledge scenarios and report the results of our analyses. Finally, we discuss our findings in terms of the

relationship of tacit knowledge and experience, the insights gained from the text responses, and the implications of these findings for subsequent phases of the research.

Tacit Knowledge

The term "tacit knowledge" has roots in works on the philosophy of science (Polanyi, 1966), ecological psychology (Neisser, 1976), and organizational behavior (Schön, 1983). The concept stems from the idea that much of the knowledge that is relevant to competent performance is not openly expressed or stated. Individuals often are not aware of the knowledge that underlies their action. Terms like professional intuition and professional instinct imply that some of the knowledge associated with successful performance has a tacit quality. Research on expert knowledge is consistent with this conceptualization. Experts draw on a well-developed repertoire of knowledge in responding to problems in their respective domains (Scribner, 1986). That knowledge tends to be procedural in nature and to operate outside of focal awareness (see Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). It also reflects the structure of the situation more closely than it does the structure of formal, disciplinary knowledge (Groen & Patel, 1988).

According to Sternberg (1988, 1997), tacit knowledge is an aspect of practical intelligence, which enables individuals to adapt to, select, and shape real-world environments in pursuit of personally-valued goals. Tacit knowledge results from the application of information-processing components to practical problems, which tend to be poorly-defined, context-rich, concrete, and personally-relevant. In other words, tacit knowledge is a reflection of practical rather than abstract thinking skills.

Characteristic Features of Tacit Knowledge

Tacit knowledge is defined by Sternberg and his colleagues (Sternberg, 1997; Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, & Horvath, 1995; Sternberg et al., 2000) according to three main features. These features correspond to the conditions under which TK is acquired, its structural representation, and the conditions of its use.

First, tacit knowledge is knowledge that is generally acquired on one's own--through personal experience rather than through instruction. It is acquired in the absence of environmental conditions, be it media or people, that support its acquisition. When people or media support the acquisition of knowledge, they facilitate three knowledge acquisition components: selective encoding, selective combination, and selective comparison (Sternberg, 1988). We elaborate on these three acquisition components later.

Second, tacit knowledge is intimately related to action--it is wedded to particular uses in particular situations, or classes of situations. It takes the form of "knowing how" rather than "knowing that." As such, tacit knowledge is procedural in nature, but it guides behavior without being readily available to conscious introspection. People may not know they possess and/or may find difficult to articulate this knowledge.

Our research supports this second feature. We have found that when individuals are queried about their knowledge, they often begin by articulating general rules in roughly declarative form (e.g., "a good leader needs to know people"). When these general statements

are probed, they often reveal themselves to be more abstract or summary representations of a family of complexly specified procedural rules (e.g., rules about how to judge people accurately for a variety of purposes and under a variety of circumstances). This, we believe, is the characteristic structure of tacit knowledge and serves as the basis for identifying and measuring tacit knowledge.

Finally, tacit knowledge is knowledge with practical value to the individual. Unlike much disciplinary knowledge, it is knowledge that helps people pursue goals that they personally value. The more highly valued a goal is, and the more directly the knowledge supports the attainment of the goal, the more useful is the knowledge. For example, knowledge about how to make subordinates feel valued is practically useful for those officers who value that outcome, but not practically useful for officers who are unconcerned with making their subordinates feel valued.

We do not believe that practically useful knowledge must be acquired in any particular context or forum. Useful knowledge is, of course, acquired in classrooms, from experience in duty assignments, through mentoring relationships, and in self-study. We distinguish practically useful knowledge not from formally acquired knowledge but, rather, from knowledge (however acquired) that is not relevant to the practical goals an individual values. However, knowledge acquired on one's own is more likely to have practical value to the individual.

Knowledge with these three properties (acquired on one's own, action-oriented, practically relevant) should be useful for understanding performance in real-world settings, as well as for predicting success in such settings. Of course, its usefulness in explaining performance depends on the extent to which individual differences are present in the ability or inclination to acquire and use tacit knowledge. In an extensive program of research, Sternberg and colleagues have shown that tacit knowledge is relevant to competent performance in real-world endeavors. Tacit knowledge has been studied in domains as diverse as bank management, research psychology, and primary education, and it has proven successful in understanding and accelerating the lessons of experience (Sternberg et al., 2000; Sternberg & Wagner, 1993; Sternberg, Wagner, & Okagaki, 1993, 1995; Wagner, 1987; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Because this research provided the major scientific justification for our work with military leaders, we discuss these findings in more detail below.

Research on Tacit Knowledge in Civilian Settings

A primary objective of our research on tacit knowledge has been to identify the content of tacit knowledge and develop ways to measure it. Over the course of several projects, we have shown that tacit knowledge can be effectively measured (Sternberg et al., 2000; Sternberg et al., 1995; Wagner, 1987; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). The measurement instruments typically employed in this research consist of a set of work-related situations, each with between five and twenty response items. The situations pose a problem for the subject to solve, and the subject indicates how he or she would solve the problem by rating the various response items. For example, in a hypothetical situation presented to a business manager, a subordinate

whom the manager does not know well has come to him for advice on how to succeed in business. The manager is asked to rate each of several responses (usually on a scale of 1 = low to 9 = high) according to its importance for succeeding in the company. Examples of responses might include (a) setting priorities that reflect the importance of each task, (b) trying always to work on what you are in the mood to do, and (c) doing routine tasks early in the day to make sure you get them done. The set of ratings the subject generates for all the work-related situations is the measure of his or her tacit knowledge for that domain. In general, tacit-knowledge tests have been scored in one of three ways: (a) by correlating subjects' responses with an index of group membership (i.e., expert, intermediate, novice), (b) by judging the degree to which subjects' responses conform to professional "rules of thumb," or (c) by computing the distance between subjects' responses and an expert prototype. Using these measures, several relationships between tacit knowledge and other indicators of performance have been found.

First, tacit knowledge generally increases with experience, but it is not a direct function of job experience (Sternberg et al., 2000; Wagner, 1987; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985; Wagner et al., 1999; Williams & Sternberg, in press). That is, people who have worked in a job longer tend to have more tacit knowledge (e.g., business managers versus business students). But the length of time spent in a job does not guarantee more tacit knowledge. What matters most is how well the person utilizes their experience to acquire and use tacit knowledge.

Second, tacit-knowledge measures are predictive of job performance in a number of domains. In research in civilian settings, tacit knowledge predicts job performance moderately well, correlating about .3 to .5 with measures of rated prestige of business or institution, salary, performance appraisal ratings, number of publications, etc. (Sternberg et al., 2000; Sternberg et al., 1993; Sternberg et al., 1995; Wagner, 1987; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). These correlations, uncorrected for attenuation or restriction of range, compare favorably with those obtained for IQ within the range of abilities we have tested. Tacit knowledge also predicts both academic performance and self-reported adjustment in a college setting (Sternberg et al., 1993). Its prediction of the former is about as good as that of conventional academic-ability tests (with a multiple R of about .6), whereas its prediction of adjustment is better (with a multiple R of about .8).

Third, tacit-knowledge measures show only small positive correlations, if any, with measures of general intelligence. In a sample of academic psychologists, the correlation between tacit knowledge and verbal ability was -.04 and for business managers the correlation was a nonsignificant .16 (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). When scores on tacit knowledge tests do correlate with measures of intelligence, tacit knowledge generally predicts job performance better than *g* (Sternberg et al., 2000). Tacit knowledge also correlates trivially with other conventionally measured abilities, in particular, those measured on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery.

Fourth, tacit knowledge appears to be distinct from other variables such as personality, cognitive style, and interpersonal orientation. When tests of these attributes were given to managers, and hierarchical regression was used to predict performance on managerial

simulations, tacit knowledge of management was the best single predictor of performance on the simulation (Wagner & Sternberg, 1990). The contribution of tacit knowledge to prediction was still significant after controlling for all other variables.

Fifth, although tacit-knowledge measures do not correlate significantly with measures of potentially confounding constructs, subscores within a domain (e.g., tacit knowledge of self, others, or tasks) do correlate moderately with one another (about .3), suggesting that there may be a general factor underlying tacit knowledge, within a domain, that is different from the general factor measured by traditional psychometric tests of intelligence (Wagner, 1987; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Tacit-knowledge scores also correlate across domains (at about the .5 to .6 level), suggesting that there is at least some commonality in the tacit knowledge required for success in different professions (Wagner, 1987). This finding also supports the premise that there is an underlying ability to acquire tacit knowledge.

In summary, a program of empirical research has shown that tacit knowledge can be measured, that it generally increases with learning from experience, and that it explains successful performance in several domains. This research has also shown that tacit knowledge provides a significant increment of prediction above and beyond other psychological measures, including general cognitive ability and personality. We next consider the role of tacit knowledge in explaining successful military leadership.

Approaches to Understanding Leadership

Most definitions of leadership share the idea that leadership is a process of interpersonal influence (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1998). Beyond this abstract notion, however, there is little agreement as to whether leadership is best understood in terms of characteristics of the leader, the processes (behaviors) used to exert interpersonal influence, the actions of followers, or some more complex interaction involving the situation, traits and behaviors. We briefly summarize here the various approaches to studying leadership.

Trait-Based Approaches

Prior to the 1940s, the emphasis in leadership research was on identifying the characteristics, or traits, of effective leaders (Bass, 1990). A review of the literature by Stogdill (1948) suggested that for as many studies that supported the importance of a certain trait, there were equally many studies that did not support the trait. In response to this review, many researchers decided to pursue other approaches to understanding leadership. Nonetheless, some investigators continued to explore the distinguishing characteristics of effective leaders. Over the years, trait researchers have studied motivational factors (e.g., need for achievement and need for affiliation), personality characteristics (e.g., emotional maturity and locus of control), interpersonal skills (e.g., communication and empathy), and conceptual skills (e.g., analytical ability, creativity) (see reviews by Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1998).

Behavioral Approaches

During the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis in leadership research shifted from what leaders are to understanding what leaders do. Early behavioral research led to the identification of two contrasting styles of leadership, consideration and initiating structure (e.g., Fleishman, 1953; Fleishman & Harris, 1962). Consideration characterizes the degree to which leaders are supportive and exhibit concern for the welfare of their subordinates. Initiating structure characterizes the degree to which leaders define roles and structure the activities of their subordinates. These two broad classes of behaviors also have been identified as task-oriented and relations-oriented leadership (Likert, 1967). Like trait research, behavioral research was criticized for its inconsistent findings. It further was criticized for methodological problems. For example, the same individuals (e.g., subordinates) often were reporting on leader behaviors and leadership effectiveness. Out of the limitations with behavioral research emerged a set of new theories that attempted to take into account the complex relationships between leaders and their environments. Before discussing what are collectively referred to as contingency approaches to leadership, we note that behavioral approaches have not been completely abandoned. Some researchers argue that identifying the behaviors that are common to most leadership situations adds value to understanding a complex phenomenon (e.g., Yukl, 1998).

Contingency Approaches

Contingency or situational approaches, which dominated the field from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, seek to explain leadership outcomes in terms of the interaction between various leader characteristics or behaviors and a wide range of situational variables (e.g., Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1977; House, 1971; Kerr & Jermier, 1978; Yukl, 1971). Yukl's (1971) multiple-linkage model, for example, describes how situational factors such as subordinates' skill levels, the quantity and quality of resources at a leader's disposal, and group cohesiveness determine whether leadership based on initiation or consideration will be more effective.

A more recent situational model is cognitive-resources theory (Fiedler, 1986; Fiedler & Garcia, 1987). The theory proposes that certain conditions (e.g., stress) alter the relationship between cognitive resources, such as intelligence and experience, and outcomes such as group performance. In testing this model, Fiedler (1995) found that intelligence is positively correlated with leadership success under conditions of low stress, but that it is negatively correlated with success under conditions of high stress. Furthermore, the relationship between experience and leadership performance is greater under conditions of high stress than of low stress.

Although contingency-based research is intended to account for all the relevant variables that characterize a situation, most of the theories are only partially tested (Yukl, 1998). There are limits on the number of variables that can be included in a study and many of the variables have been difficult to measure. Due to the complexity of these models, it is not surprising that many of the findings regarding individual theories have been inconsistent across studies. Contingency theories continue to be popular with leadership researchers, but many new approaches to studying leadership have emerged in the past two decades.

Transformational Approaches

A more recent approach to studying leadership is transformational leadership theory, which addresses the relationship between leaders and followers. In this theory, the role of the leader is to inspire and stimulate followers to think and perform rather than to influence their behaviors through power and rewards (Bass, 1985; Yukl, 1989). Research testing this theory suggests that leaders who exhibit charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration elicit more positive outcomes in terms of subordinate performance (Bass & Avolio, 1993).

The transformational approach offers one alternative approach to addressing the question of what constitutes effective leadership. However, many approaches currently are being pursued in the field of leadership, some of which focus on leadership styles, leadership skills, team leaders, and organizational culture (Bryman, 1996). It is yet to be determined whether these approaches will be more successful than previous ones in understanding leadership. We note below some of the issues that have yet to be adequately addressed in leadership research.

Limitations of Existing Approaches

Existing approaches to studying leadership have underemphasized (a) what leaders know about how to lead and (b) how they gain that knowledge. Reviews of the literature confirm this observation (Bass, 1990; Hollander, 1985; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). There is increasing recognition in some domains, however, that the lessons gained from experience play an important role in successful performance (Kotter, 1982; McCall, Lombardo, & Morrison, 1988; Mintzberg, 1975; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Numerous researchers have found that on-the-job experiences contribute to the development of important managerial knowledge and skills beyond formal training (Davies & Easterby-Smith, 1984; Keys & Wolfe, 1988; McCall et al., 1988). In military organizations, experience-based learning is considered one of the three pillars of leadership development, along with institutional training and self-development (U.S. Department of the Army, 1990).

The idea of learning from experience is consistent with our proposition that effective acquisition of tacit knowledge is important for leadership performance. It also serves to highlight an aspect of leadership that largely is neglected by existing approaches, that is, the knowledge about how to be an effective leader. For example, how do leaders know whether a directive or participative leadership style is more appropriate in a given situation, with a given subordinate?

Another limitation of the literature is its overemphasis on exclusively quantitative approaches (Bass, 1990; Bryman, 1996). These approaches often fail to capture the full complexity of leadership. Some researchers (e.g., Yukl, 1998) suggest a need for both qualitative and quantitative approaches to studying leadership. Our approach to studying tacit knowledge combines qualitative and quantitative methods of studying leadership. We attempt

to identify context-specific knowledge about leadership, that is, knowledge about what to do in particular situations. We also attempt to quantify the possession of this knowledge so that we can assess its relationship to effective leadership.

Development of Military Leaders

Although there is limited research on leadership knowledge, Army leadership doctrine clearly acknowledges the importance of leader knowledge (U.S. Department of the Army, 1990). The Army has an integrated, progressive, and sequential program of leader development based on three pillars: 1) institutional training (formal schooling), 2) self development, and 3) operational assignments. However, more resources have been devoted to understanding and improving formal training and self-study programs than to exploring the role of operational assignments.

This is not to say that the importance of operational assignments is unrecognized. Most practitioners acknowledge that Army leaders learn about leading while doing real work in the motor pool, in the field, and in the barracks. But few studies have attempted systematically to understand this practical, experience-based knowledge and its relevance to leadership effectiveness. Army leaders spend the majority of their careers in operational assignments. Therefore, the potential for leadership development on the job seems great. On-the-job experiences provide opportunities for officers to learn how to apply leadership knowledge codified in doctrine and taught in the Army school system, and they provide a context for acquiring new knowledge about leadership--knowledge for which acquisition may not be well supported by doctrine or through formal training. Because leaders will likely acquire much of their knowledge from operational assignments, understanding what it is that they learn and how to promote successful acquisition of that knowledge is a valuable research objective.

The tacit-knowledge approach to understanding performance addresses knowledge that is experience-based, practically-relevant, and acquired with little support from the environment (e.g., through formal instruction and coaching). A multi-year study was conducted to apply the tacit-knowledge methodology to understanding what distinguishes more from less effective leaders (see Sternberg et al., 2000). The methodology and results of this long-term effort are summarized below.

Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership

The tacit knowledge for military leadership project was aimed at understanding the role of operational assignments (as one of the three pillars of leadership development) in the development of effective leaders. More specifically, we sought to understand how Army leaders develop "as leaders" while on the job. Our primary goals were: (1) to identify the tacit knowledge of effective military leaders, (2) to construct inventories to measure the possession of tacit knowledge, (3) to validate these measures against indicators of leadership effectiveness, and (4) to recommend ways to apply the products and insights from the tacit knowledge work to leader development. We developed and validated tacit knowledge inventories for leaders at

three levels in the chain-of-command: platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders.

We first interviewed 81 officers across three levels in the chain-of-command and gathered stories and advice about the lessons learned about leadership (Horvath, Forsythe et al., 1994). These stories were then simplified into coded tacit-knowledge items, which presented the knowledge in the form of condition-action statements. These simplified tacit-knowledge items were then administered in the form of a survey to over 1,500 officers who rated the quality of each knowledge item. A separate group of subject matter experts were asked to cluster analyze the tacit-knowledge items to identify content categories of tacit knowledge. The quality ratings and content categories were used to select the most promising items for developing an inventory to measure tacit knowledge (see Horvath et al., 1996 for more detail). For those items that were retained, a more detailed problem scenario was developed using the original interview data. Each scenario posed a leadership problem along with a set of 5 to 15 possible responses. A sample scenario is shown in Figure 1.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad		Neither Bad Nor Good		Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

C3. You are a company commander, and your battalion commander is the type of person who seems always to "shoot the messenger"--he does not like to be surprised by bad news, and he tends to take his anger out on the person who brought him the bad news. You want to build a positive, professional relationship with your battalion commander. What should you do?

_____ Speak to your battalion commander about his behavior and share your perception of it.

_____ Attempt to keep the battalion commander "over-informed" by telling him what is occurring in your unit on a regular basis (e.g., daily or every other day).

_____ Speak to the sergeant major and see if she/he is willing to try to influence the battalion commander.

_____ Keep the battalion commander informed only on important issues, but don't bring up issues you don't have to discuss with him.

_____ When you bring a problem to your battalion commander, bring a solution at the same time.

_____ Disregard the battalion commander's behavior: Continue to bring him news as you normally would.

_____ Tell your battalion commander all of the good news you can, but try to shield him from hearing the bad news.

_____ Tell the battalion commander as little as possible; deal with problems on your own if at all possible.

Figure 1. Sample question from the Tacit Knowledge inventory for Military Leaders.

After constructing and revising the tacit knowledge inventories, we conducted a preliminary criterion-related validation study using a sample of 562 officers (platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders) stationed at six posts through the U.S. (see Hedlund et al., 1998 for more details). We hypothesized that the possession of experience-based, action-oriented knowledge (i.e., tacit knowledge) would distinguish among more and less effective leaders. We also expected that tacit knowledge would relate more highly to performance than other possible predictors like general cognitive ability, experience, and tacit knowledge relevant to other domains.

To assess the criterion-related validity of our instruments, we administered measures of verbal ability and tacit knowledge for civilian management along with the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders (TKML) to our sample of 562 leaders. Measures of verbal ability are commonly used as predictors of performance in professional domains. Our aim was to show that tacit knowledge could explain performance better than verbal ability. We included the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers (TKIM) to show that tacit knowledge is domain-specific. Although there is assumed to be an underlying ability to acquire tacit knowledge, we expected that tacit knowledge for leadership would be more relevant to effective leadership than would be tacit knowledge for management. We also measured experience as the amount of time in one's current job. Finally, for the criterion we obtained ratings of each officer's leadership effectiveness on three dimensions (task, interpersonal, and overall) from his or her superior, peers, and subordinates.

We obtained evidence of convergent validity with the criterion of leadership effectiveness at all three levels. In general, leaders who possessed more tacit knowledge, as indicated by greater agreement with the experts, were rated as more effective by their superiors (correlations ranging from .14 to .42). Company commanders with greater tacit knowledge were also rated more effectively by their fellow company commanders. We further identified two subscales of tacit knowledge at the company level that related with perceived leadership effectiveness. Specifically, company commanders with greater tacit knowledge about dealing with the boss were rated more effective by their superiors (i.e., battalion commanders), and those with greater tacit knowledge about motivating and developing subordinates were rated as more effective by their subordinates (i.e., platoon leaders).

We also found that tacit knowledge for military leaders generally was a better predictor of leadership effectiveness than verbal ability, experience, or tacit knowledge for managers. Experience, as measured by months in job, showed no relationship with leadership effectiveness. Tacit knowledge for managers was also unrelated to effectiveness, with one exception. Battalion commanders who had higher tacit knowledge for managers were rated as more effective by their subordinates. This finding may be explained by a greater managerial role on the part of battalion commanders in dealing with their subordinates. Finally, verbal ability correlated moderately with leadership effectiveness at the platoon and company levels. But when measures of verbal ability were entered into a hierarchical regression followed by scores on the TKML, tacit knowledge consistently predicted effectiveness above and beyond

verbal ability (overall model Rs ranged from .19 to .32). Our research indicates that tacit knowledge adds to our understanding of leadership effectiveness, and does so beyond traditional predictors that have had more limited success.

Over the course of our research with military leaders, we addressed the question of what it is that leaders know that is not explicitly taught, and we showed that this knowledge is relevant to understanding why some leaders are more successful than others. The tacit knowledge was uncovered through stories and pieces of advice leaders shared about their experience, which offer important “lessons learned” about how to be a successful leader. These stories and the tacit-knowledge items produced based on them serve as valuable tools for further understanding how and under what conditions tacit knowledge is acquired and how it can be used to develop more effective leaders. In the remaining discussion, we consider the processes proposed to underlie tacit-knowledge acquisition and how to measure those processes.

Practical Intelligence and the Acquisition of Tacit Knowledge

Implicit in our work on the identification and measurement of tacit knowledge is the notion that some individuals are better than others at learning from their experiences. Sternberg (1997) characterizes this underlying ability as practical intelligence. Practical intelligence is one component of a broader theory of successful intelligence that proposes that success in any domain involves recognizing one's strengths and applying them in the pursuit of personally valued goals. Practical intelligence is the ability to adapt to, select, and shape environment in the pursuit of personally valued goals. To adapt is to change oneself to suit an existing environment; to shape is to change an existing environment to suit oneself; and to select is to find a more suitable environment than the current one. Measures of tacit knowledge can assess any or all three of these aspects of practical intelligence. For example, tacit knowledge for management may address primarily one's ability to adapt to environments, while tacit knowledge for leadership may measure the ability to shape environments.

Practical intelligence can be more readily understood in contrast to academic intelligence. The distinction between academic and practical intelligence, first proposed by Neisser (1976) and later elaborated upon by Sternberg (1988, 1997), is based on the assumption that different abilities underlie successful performance on academic and practical problems. Academic tasks tend to be formulated by others, of little or no intrinsic value, have all the necessary information available, and be disembedded from the context of one's everyday experiences. They also tend to be well-defined, have one correct answer, and have one method of obtaining the correct solution (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Practical problems, on the other hand, tend to be unformulated or in need of reformulation, lacking complete information, poorly defined, characterized by multiple potentially correct answers and multiple methods for arriving at a solution. Practical problems are of personal interest and relevant to everyday experiences.

Tacit knowledge represents an aspect of practical intelligence—it is knowledge gained in the process of solving practical problems. It represents the ability to learn from performing

poorly-defined, context-specific practical tasks that do not necessarily have clear answers. So measuring the processes underlying tacit knowledge must be done in the context of real-world, practical problems. The question then becomes one of what to measure. What are the underlying processes that support the acquisition of tacit knowledge, enabling some people to learn more effectively from their experiences than others? Answering this question requires understanding how the learner approaches the situation and what he or she takes away from the experience. We briefly consider literature on the development of expertise and knowledge acquisition as it suggests what these processes might be.

The Development of Expertise

Literature on the development of expertise provides some direction for exploring the processes underlying tacit-knowledge acquisition. Early research defined expertise as problem-solving skills that generalize across domains (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972). Subsequent research found that experts and novices differed in their amount of domain knowledge and their understanding of the underlying deep structure of problems (e.g., Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). Some researchers (e.g., Anderson, 1983) came to characterize expertise as the accumulation of knowledge that results from extensive time spent in a domain and the development of automatic skill as a function of repeated practice performing a task. Hayes (1981) showed that even creative work, such as musical composition, is dependent on extensive experience, knowledge and practice, with most composers of genius (such as Mozart) requiring at least ten years of effort before they produced work of sufficient quality to be recorded. This type of expertise has been characterized as routine expertise (Holyoak, 1991) because it enables the individual to respond efficiently and effectively to well-learned and familiar tasks. This form of expertise, however, does not lend itself well to the performance of novel tasks (Sternberg & Frensch, 1992). Experts need not only procedural knowledge of what to do, they also need knowledge of when and under what circumstances those procedures should be applied (Smith, Ford, & Kozlowski, 1997). The latter type of expertise has been characterized as adaptive expertise (Holyoak, 1991).

Glaser (1996) has characterized the process of developing competence or expertise as involving a change in agency for learning. In the initial stage, the learner relies on substantial external support from other individuals (e.g., parents, teachers) to provide a structure for learning. The learner then passes through a transition stage in which less external support is provided and the emphasis is on learning self-monitoring, self-regulatory skills. In the later stage, the learner is responsible for facilitating his or her development. The emphasis throughout this process is on enabling the learner to develop the skills to regulate and control his or her learning. This control requires the ability to acquire knowledge, monitor its acquisition, and apply the knowledge to solving problems. These activities are represented in Sternberg's (1985, 1988, 1997) theory of successful intelligence.

According to Sternberg (1998, 1999), intelligence is a form of developing expertise that results from the application of information-processing components to one's experiences. The information-processing components consist of metacomponents, performance components, and knowledge-acquisition components (Sternberg, 1985, 1988, 1997). Metacomponents are

executive processes used to plan, monitor, and evaluate problem solving. These processes include problem recognition, problem definition, allocation of resources, strategy formation, solution monitoring, and outcome evaluation, and are often characterized as metacognitive processes in the literature. Experts have been found to exhibit better metacognitive skills than do novices, including the ability to monitor the effectiveness of their problem-solving strategies and modify ineffective strategies (Dorner & Scholkopf, 1991; Larkin, 1983). Metacognitive skills facilitate the development of adaptive expertise by enabling individuals to "recognize novelty or change, select potential responses, monitor and evaluate progress, and modify or create different responses to the task if necessary" (Smith et al., 1997, p.96).

Metacomponents, or metacognitive skills, control the execution of performance components, which are the processes applied directly to solving problems. These processes include inferring relations between stimuli, applying relations inferred in one situation to another situation, and comparing items of information. Finally, knowledge-acquisition components are used to learn how to solve problems in the first place. These processes include selective encoding, by which the problem solver decides what information is relevant for solving the problem; selective comparison, whereby old information is brought to bear upon new problems; and selective combination, by which various sources of information are combined to yield a meaningful interpretation of the problem. We consider these processes in more depth as they have particular relevance to the acquisition of tacit knowledge.

Knowledge Acquisition Processes

The first process, selective encoding, is used to filter information from the environment. When new information is presented in a natural context, relevant information is embedded in the midst of irrelevant information. A critical task for the individual is to recognize what information from among that presented is relevant to one's purposes. A good selective encoder knows which information is worth attending to; a bad one does not. For example, an officer needs to use selective encoding to figure out what he or she needs to do beyond what is specified in Army doctrine in order to get promoted.

The second process, selective combination, is used to put together the information that is selectively encoded in a way that forms an integrated and coherent cognitive structure. It is not enough to know the relevant facts; one must see how they interrelate and form a pattern. Once an individual has decided what information is relevant, he or she must make sense of the information. A good selective combiner makes the connections between the facts that typically elude the poor selective combiner. An officer might realize, for example, that promotion is not based on effective performance in one aspect of leadership, but rather a pattern of effective performance across a number of specific areas.

The third process, selective comparison, is used to relate the new information to previously acquired information. It is not enough to encode and combine new information; the information has to be tied to some preexisting knowledge base. A good selective comparer recognizes how existing knowledge can be brought to bear on the present situation. A poor selective comparer does not readily see the relations between existing and new information. For example, an officer may use his or her prior promotional experiences as a basis for

searching for cues about the important factors that determine who is promoted in the current position.

These components are used interactively to accomplish everyday tasks. A leader may be confronted with an overwhelming amount of information in a given situation. He or she must decide not only what information to attend to, but how to make sense of it. In order to determine how to deal with the situation, the leader must also be able to rely, to some extent, on his or her prior knowledge related to the situation in order to respond in a timely and appropriate manner. In order to learn from the situation, the individual must also be able to relate new information to existing knowledge. Knowledge-acquisition components help individuals to process incoming information and draw on existing knowledge.

The use of these three processes is illustrated in a story about an experience of a battalion commander that led to the acquisition of tacit knowledge.

I had a brigade commander who routinely stayed at the office until 1900 each evening. The subordinate battalion commanders on down also stayed until after 1900 when they saw the commander's light go out. One day when I was on duty, I stopped in the commander's office and saw him with his feet on the desk, reading a newspaper and watching the news on TV. Since I had a good rapport with the commander, I asked what he was doing. My commander said, "I have six kids at home. This is my chance to unwind from the day and catch up on the news." I took him in my jeep and showed him that all the subordinate commanders were still at work because he was still at work. He explained his behavior at the subsequent staff call and told the commanders to close shop and go home at a reasonable time.

First, the battalion commander notices that everyone stays until after 1900 in the evening. He also notices that the brigade commander's light is turned off at the same time (selective encoding). He associates the two occurrences and arrives at the conclusion that all the subordinates wait until the brigade commander goes home before they leave (selective combination). Next, he observes that his commander has his feet up, is reading a newspaper, and is watching television (selective encoding). He recognizes that these activities together suggest that his boss is no longer working (selective combination) and based on his past interaction with the brigade commander (selective comparison) decides to ask him about his behavior. He has learned through this process that a commanding officer's behavior can have a substantial influence on his or her subordinates.

We propose that tacit knowledge is acquired when the individual identifies the problem correctly and attends to the right information; develops a reasonable mental representation of the situation; and draws on prior knowledge to guide the encoding and combination processes to develop a solution. The individual often must recognize that the problem exists, develop a strategy for addressing the problem, determine how to implement the chosen course of action, and monitor the outcome of the solution. Because tacit knowledge is acquired in the context of solving practical, everyday problems, the individual typically has greater responsibility for the learning process, thus increasing the likelihood that some individuals will fail to learn effectively

and, in particular, acquire tacit knowledge. By understanding why some leaders learn more effectively from their experiences than others, methods can be developed to help leaders learn to be more sensitive to the lessons of experience. The purpose of this study was to gain preliminary insight into the processes associated with tacit-knowledge acquisition and to support the development of specific measures to assess those processes. We first describe the method used to collect and analyze responses, then we present and summarize our findings, and finally, we discuss the next stage of our efforts and the measures we are developing as part of those efforts.

Data Collection Method

This study was designed to solicit free text responses along with ratings of response options for a set of leadership scenarios. The scenarios are part of the Tacit Knowledge Inventories for Military Leaders (TKML) developed for three levels of commissioned officers: platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders.

Participants

The data used in this study were collected from officers at two Army posts (Forts Sill and Eustis). The officers at Fort Sill were primarily field artillery officers and those at Fort Eustis primarily transportation officers. These officers represented four levels of rank, ranging from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel, and held positions as platoon leader, company commander, or battalion commander. Table 1 shows the sample sizes by rank and site. The total sample sizes shown here include all officers from whom we collected data. Because some officers did not complete all of the measures, the sample sizes for individual analyses are less than those reported here and are specified for each analysis.

Table 1
Sample Sizes by Site and Rank

Site	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC	Total
Sill	14	6	4	7	31
Eustis	9	8	3	12	32
Overall	23	14	7	19	63

LT = lieutenant; CPT = captain; MAJ = major; LTC = lieutenant colonel

Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Military Leadership (TKML)

Versions of the TKML exist for three different levels of command (platoon, company, and battalion versions). The TKML consists of 10-20 short leadership problems (see Figure 1 sample question), which were drawn from interviews with military leaders. In previous research, respondents were provided with 5-15 response alternatives to each problem and asked to rate the quality of these alternatives for addressing the problem. In the present study, we asked participants to either (a) rate the quality of options provided or (b) generate their own solution to the problem. For the latter, participants were asked to "Please write a short

description of how you should deal with the situation.” Some participants were also asked two additional questions: “Has any situation like this happened to you or someone you know?” and “Please write a short description of some things you should not to do deal with the situation.” The open-ended response questions were used (a) to compare solutions identified through free-text responses to existing response alternatives, and (b) to assess the processes individuals exhibit in developing solutions to the problems. These response questions were also used to generate data to support later instrument development.

Each participant completed the TKML with questions in both formats. In Version A, participants provided their own responses to odd-numbered questions and rated alternatives provided for the even-numbered questions; in Version B, participants rated alternatives provided for the odd-numbered questions and provided their own responses to even-numbered questions. This method allowed us to obtain for each officer text responses indicating what he or she would do as well as data to assess his or her tacit knowledge relative to an expert standard.

Officers were asked to complete the TKML for all three levels of command in either version A or B during “umbrella weeks,” that is, periods during which officers are available to support research and development efforts. They completed the measures either online using MS Word or in a paper-and-pencil format.

Data Compilation and Analyses

The ratings individuals provided to the response options were entered into a statistical software package. Responses to the close-ended questions were scored by correlating the ratings provided across all the response options with the mean expert ratings on those same options. This provided an index of the proximity of the participant’s response profile with that of the experts, and thus an indicator of their level of tacit knowledge relative to those experts. We analyzed these scores to compare differences across rank, to compare tacit knowledge at different leadership levels, and to assess how experience with similar situations influences test scores. Because we used the correlation scores in our analyses and the sampling distribution for correlations tends to be skewed (Cohen & Cohen, 1983), all analyses were conducted using Fisher z transformed correlations.

Responses to the open-ended questions were entered into a spreadsheet and organized by question. We then coded these responses on several aspects. First, we noted whether any existing response options were included in the respondent’s answers. Second, we noted any additional solutions that were not represented in the existing set of options. Third, we extracted any additional components of the responses and sought to categorize them according to several information-processing dimensions. We found that the amount of detail (or lack thereof) provided in the responses limited the number of processes we were able to identify. Based on a review of the response data, the information most commonly provided in the answers was categorized into three processes: (a) seeking additional information to better understand the problem, (b) making assumptions about the cause of or circumstances surrounding the problem, and (c) considering the “bigger picture” or implications of one’s

course of action. Once we had classified all the responses, we explored the extent to which individuals who exhibited these processes differed in their tacit knowledge, rank, and experience from those who did not. Finally, we examined the response data to identify scenarios that appeared to offer the most potential for development into detailed case scenarios. By potential, we mean that the brief scenario description seems to represent an issue that is worth developing into a more in-depth problem. Specifically, we looked at scenarios for which respondents (a) generated many different solutions to the problem, (b) made different assumption about the problem, (c) requested needing additional information, and (d) considered the problem to have broader implications for the individual or organization.

Tacit Knowledge and Experience

We first present results based on our analyses of the responses to the close-ended questions. We discuss the results for the overall sample and note any differences that emerged as a function of data collection site. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for overall sample and a break down by site. The score on each inventory represents the correlation of the participants' ratings with the mean expert rating. A higher score thus reflects greater tacit knowledge. Experience represents the number of scenarios of open-ended format for which the respondent indicated some relevant experience. For example, a mean of 4 for experience with platoon leader scenarios (PLQ Experience) indicates that officers, on average, had experience with 4 of the 7 or 8 scenarios to which they were asked to respond. Note that experience was only measured in the Fort Eustis sample. The mean scores generally are higher for Ft. Sill than Ft. Eustis, which may reflect differences in specialization between these two sites or differences in the distribution of officers across ranks in these two samples. Because of this difference, we take site into consideration in subsequent analyses.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Tacit Knowledge (TK) Scores and Experience

	Overall			Sill			Eustis		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
PLQ: TK Score	51	.67	.12	25	.70	.07	26	.64	.16
CCQ: TK Score	42	.68	.15	21	.70	.11	21	.67	.19
BCQ: TK Score	37	.67	.10	19	.67	.11	18	.68	.08
PLQ: Experience	27	4.00	2.09				27	4.00	2.09
CCQ: Experience ^a	23	4.91	3.19				23	4.91	3.19
BCQ: Experience	20	2.85	2.28				20	2.85	2.28

Note. PLQ = Platoon Leader Questionnaire; CCQ = Company Commander Questionnaire; BCQ = Battalion Commander Questionnaire

^a Each inventory contains different numbers of scenarios, thus contributing to the higher average experience on the CCQ.

Table 3 shows the correlations among the different measures for the overall sample. For the purpose of analysis, rank was designated a continuous scale, with 1 representing lieutenants (LT) and 4 representing lieutenant colonels (LTC). Rank correlated with scenario

experience at all three levels and with tacit knowledge scores at the company and battalion levels. We would expect that rank would have the least association with experience and scores at the platoon level where all officers, including lieutenants, have had experience as platoon leaders. Therefore, we should find the smallest differences in TK scores and experience across ranks at this level, which is confirmed by the smaller correlations involving the PLQ. At the company and battalion levels, we expect rank differences to be more apparent since not all officers in the sample will have had experience at these levels. This expectation is confirmed by the significant correlations involving rank and both the CCQ and BCQ ($r = .44$ and $.41$ respectively).

In terms of the relationship among experience and TK scores, we found a marginally significant relationship at the company level. Individuals who indicated more experience with the types of situations included in the CCQ scored better on the items for which they were asked to provide quality ratings. The relationships between experience and TK scores were in the expected direction at the platoon and battalion levels, but the correlations were not significant.

Table 3 also indicates relationships among scores and experience for adjacent leadership levels. In particular, the correlations are stronger for adjacent than non-adjacent levels. For experience, the correlation is $.49$ among PLQ and CCQ and $.68$ among CCQ and BCQ, but only $.20$ among PLQ and BCQ. For TK scores, the correlation is $.48$ among PLQ and CCQ and $.52$ among CCQ and BCQ, but only $.36$ among PLQ and BCQ. Overall, the pattern of correlations displayed in Table 3 supports the proposition that one's tacit knowledge is a function of one's experience and level of command.

Table 3
Correlations among Rank, Experience, and TK Scores

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Rank	1.00						
2. PLQ: Experience	.39* (26)	1.00					
3. CCQ: Experience	.55* (22)	.49* (20)	1.00				
4. BCQ: Experience	.45* (19)	.20 (16)	.68* (15)	1.00			
5. PLQ: TK Score	.21 (51)	.23 (26)	.11 (20)	-.12 (16)	1.00		
6. CCQ: TK Score	.44* (42)	.11 (19)	.36^ (21)	.28 (15)	.48* (36)	1.00	
7. BCQ: TK Score	.41* (37)	.13 (15)	-.10 (14)	.25 (18)	.36* (32)	.52* (32)	1.00

* Correlation is significant at $p < .05$ (one-tailed); ^ Correlation is significant at $p < .10$ (one tailed)

Note. Sample sizes are indicated in parentheses.

Table 4 shows the correlations separately by site, with Sill results presented above the diagonal and Eustis results below. The results are fairly consistent across site and the overall relationships described above. The only noteworthy discrepancy is that the correlation between rank and TK score on the BCQ was not significant in the data from Fort Eustis. This may simply reflect the different distribution of officers across ranks such that the majority of officers from Fort Sill were lieutenants while the majority of officers from Fort Eustis were lieutenant colonels.

Table 4
Correlations among Rank, Experience, and TK Scores by Site

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Rank	1.00	--	--	--	.17 (25)	.47* (21)	.52* (19)
2. PLQ: Experience	.39* (26)	1.00	--	--	--	--	--
3. CCQ: Experience	.55* (22)	.49* (20)	1.00	--	--	--	--
4. BCQ: Experience	.45* (19)	.20 (16)	.68* (15)	1.00	--	--	--
5. PLQ: TK Score	.30^ (26)	.23 (26)	.11 (20)	-.12 (16)	1.00	.42* (17)	.35^ (17)
6. CCQ: TK Score	.48* (21)	.11 (19)	.36^ (21)	.28 (15)	.49* (19)	1.00	.54* (18)
7. BCQ: TK Score	.27 (18)	.13 (15)	-.10 (14)	.25 (18)	.46* (15)	.47* (14)	1.00

* Correlation is significant at $p < .05$ (one-tailed); ^ Correlation is significant at $p < .10$ (one tailed)

Note. Sample sizes are indicated in parentheses.

In order to examine the rank effects more closely, we conducted ANOVAs on each version of the TKML to look at mean differences in scores across ranks. Site differences were also examined. The means are presented in Tables 5-7 and shown in Figures 2-4. The results of the ANOVAs are summarized in Table 8.

For the PLQ, where all officers have had some experience in platoon leadership, we expected the least difference in scores across rank (Table 5). We see that in the combined sample, scores steadily increased over rank, but the increase was only moderate (.64 to .71). Table 8 shows no significant effect for rank at the platoon level, but a significant rank X site effect. This effect is most apparent by examining Figure 2, which shows that lieutenants from Ft. Eustis scored much worse than those from Ft. Sill. Again, this discrepancy may be attributable to the different specializations at these two sites or the different distribution of officers by rank. However, it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions based on the limited

sample sizes from each site. Instead, we focus for now on the effects based on the combined, larger sample.

Table 5
Mean TK Scores on the PLQ by Rank and Site.

Site	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC	Total
Sill	.71 (12)	.65 (5)	.68 (3)	.75 (5)	.70 (25)
Eustis	.54 (9)	.71 (6)	.68 (2)	.68 (9)	.64 (26)
Total	.64 (21)	.69 (11)	.68 (5)	.71 (14)	.67 (51)




Figure 2. Effects of rank and site on PLQ scores.

For the CCQ (see Table 6), we found a steady increase in scores across rank, with lieutenants scoring .60 on average and lieutenant colonels .76 on average. From Table 8 we note a significant main effect for rank, which is fairly consistent across sites (see Figure 3).

Table 6
Mean TK Scores on the CCQ by Rank and Site.

Site	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC	Total
Sill	.66 (9)	.66 (4)	.71 (3)	.79 (5)	.70 (21)
Eustis	.46 (4)	.70 (7)	.64 (1)	.74 (9)	.67 (21)
Total	.60 (13)	.68 (11)	.69 (4)	.76 (14)	.68 (42)




Figure 3. Effects of rank and site on CCQ scores.

For the BCQ, we again observed a steady increase in scores across ranks, but the difference between lieutenant (.62) and lieutenant colonels (.71) is smaller than was found for the CCQ. As indicated in Table 7, the effect for rank is marginally significant. It is not surprising to find the largest rank effect at the company level because this is where we can expect the most discrepancy in experience. Lieutenant colonels are in their current position in part because they were successful company commanders. Therefore, we might expect them to differ the most from other officers on the CCQ. These same lieutenant colonels may have limited experience at their current level of battalion command, and thus not outperform officers at other ranks as much on the BCQ. In general, it appears that officers who have demonstrated the most success in the Army (i.e., battalion commanders) generally have the most tacit knowledge pertaining to situations at all levels for which they have served.

Table 7
Mean TK Scores on the BCQ by Rank and Site

	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC	Total
Sill	.63 (8)	.60 (3)	.70 (2)	.75 (6)	.67 (19)
Eustis	.60 (3)	.70 (4)	.69 (1)	.69 (10)	.68 (18)
Total	.62 (11)	.66 (7)	.70 (3)	.71 (16)	.67 (37)




Figure 4. Effects of rank and site on BCQ scores.

Table 8
ANOVA of TK Scores by Rank and Site

Source of Variation	PLQ		CCQ		BCQ	
	F	p	F	p	F	p
Rank	1.65	.19	5.07	.01	2.68	.06
Site	1.09	.30	1.94	.17	.08	.78
Rank x Site	2.86	.04	1.47	.24	1.32	.29

Lastly, we followed up the above analyses with repeated measures ANOVA to examine differences in scores as a function of the test version. That is, we sought to determine if individuals scored better on the level-appropriate version of the test than versions geared toward other levels. Majors were eliminated from these analyses due to insufficient representation. As shown in Table 9 and Figure 5, we found that lieutenants scored best on the PLQ and worst on the BCQ. Captains also scored better on the PLQ than either the CCQ or the BCQ. Lieutenant colonels, however, scored best on the CCQ and exhibited no difference on the PLQ and BCQ. As suggested above, the performance of lieutenant colonels on the CCQ may reflect their proficiency at the company level, which is necessary to become a battalion commander. As indicated in Table 10, there were no significant effects for within or between-subject factors. However, not everyone completed all three measures, which limited the size of the sample for this analysis and thus the power to detect any effects.

Table 9
Mean TK Scores by Test Version and Rank

Test Version	LT (n=9)	CPT (n=7)	LTC (n=13)	Overall (n=29)
PLQ	.71	.70	.70	.71
CCQ	.67	.68	.75	.71
BCQ	.64	.66	.70	.67




Figure 5. Effects of test version and rank on TK scores.

Table 10
Repeated Measures ANOVA of TK Scores by Test Version and Rank

Source of Variation	F	p
Test	2.32	.11
Rank	1.22	.31
Test x Rank	1.15	.34

Tacit Knowledge and Free-Text Responses

Responses to the open-ended questions were subjected to different analyses. We first examined each text response to determine if any of the existing rating options for a given scenario were identified in the response. We then assigned a score to each answer based on the mean expert rating of the option identified in the response. For answers incorporating more than one option, we computed the average of the expert means for the different response options. For example, scenario P1 (see Appendix) involves a platoon that was ordered to prepare for a night move, but soldiers failed to pack and were talking to personnel from other platoons. The scenario is accompanied by 10 alternative courses of action, including telling the soldiers to start packing immediately and talking to the squad leaders about the situation. A sample text response for this scenario was "Get with the squad leaders and find out what went wrong. Tell the soldiers from the other platoon to leave." This answer incorporated two existing responses, one indicating "Order the soldiers from other platoons to leave the area" and the other "Assemble your squad leaders and talk about the situation." These options received mean expert ratings of 6.86 and 7.06, respectively, on a 9-point scale. The respondent thus received a 6.96 for this answer. For answers incorporating none of the existing options, no score was assigned.

We expected that individuals whose open-ended text responses included options with higher ratings would also score better on the close-ended questions. We found a marginally significant correlation at the company level indicating that individuals who, on average, received higher scores on their text responses also scored better on the multiple-response ratings (see Table 13 below). Higher scores on the text responses were also significantly correlated with rank and experience with the scenarios. We did not obtain the same results at the platoon or battalion levels. The failure to find significant effects may be due to the limited number of responses for which scores could be assigned. Many of the free-text answers included solutions that were not readily matched, at least on the surface, to existing response options. That is, respondents generated many alternative courses of action that did not appear to be represented in our existing response options.

In the next step of our text analysis, we compiled a list of all the additional courses of action identified by respondents (see Appendix). For each additional solution, we provide information as to rank and tacit-knowledge score of individuals who provided that response. Specifically, we identify the source(s) according to (a) whether or not the individual(s) fell in

the top or bottom quartile of scores on the close-ended questions, and (b) the rank of the individual(s) providing the response. This information is presented by scenario in the Appendix. We also similarly organized responses that we received to the question "What shouldn't you do in this situation?"

Finally, we sought to identify and organize any additional information pertaining to the solution of the problem that individuals provided in their responses. The amount of detail individuals provided varied from simple statements of a solution to extensive consideration of the problem and rationale for the chosen course of action. Unfortunately, the majority of the answers were limited to the former. For those who provided more detailed responses, however, we classified the information provided in these answers into three main categories as indicated above: (a) additional information sought about the problem, (b) assumptions made about the nature of the problem, and (c) implications considered regarding the course of action. These answers also were identified according to characteristics of their source(s). Our purpose in categorizing this information was twofold. First, we were interested in gaining preliminary insight into the types of processes that emerged as individuals attempted to respond to the scenarios. Second, we wanted to identify additional information about each scenario to support the development of measures specifically designed to assess more directly the acquisition of tacit knowledge.

Identifying Problem-Solving Processes

In regards to the first objective, we performed some exploratory analyses to determine if the types of processes identified were related to tacit knowledge scores, rank, or experience. We computed two indices for each of the three response categories. One index represented the total number of questions on which the individual exhibited the process, and the other index simply distinguished individuals who exhibited the process from those who did not. The first index was used in correlational analyses to assess the relationship of the number of times information was sought, assumptions were made, and implications considered with tacit-knowledge scores on the close-ended and open-ended questions, as well as with rank and experience with the scenario problems. The second index was used to compare the mean tacit knowledge score of individuals who exhibited the process to those who did not. The analyses were performed and are presented separately for each command level.

At the platoon level, we found a significant negative correlation between how often the respondent considered the implications of the solution and his/her score on the close-ended response questions (see Table 11). This correlation suggests that individuals who were less confident in their answers, felt more of a need to justify their solutions. Using the dichotomous index of process use, we observed the same effect—individuals who considered the implications of their course of action had lower TK scores than those who did not (see Table 12). Sample responses categorized under "Implications Considered" are provided below and help illustrate why this effect was found:

- "It is unprofessional to yell at the platoon sergeant and squad leaders in front of the soldiers"

- “Proceed according to the commander’s guidance because there may be more to the plan than you are aware of”
- “Let the NCOs deal with the insubordinate driver because they should be held accountable for the conduct and discipline of their subordinates”
- “Speak to the commander as a group because majority is a powerful force”
- “It is not right to keep tasking the same squad over and over simply because they are well trained”
- “Arranging for extras for the soldiers will keep them motivated”

We also found a marginally significant correlation between frequency of information sought and implications considered, suggesting that seeking additional information to solve the problem may also reflect a lack of certainty or familiarity with the problem.

Table 11
Relationship among PLQ Scores, Experience and Response Categories

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Rank	1.00						
2. PLQ: Experience	.43* (27)	1.00					
3. PLQ: TK Score	.21 (51)	.23 (26)	1.00				
4. PLQ: Response Score	.08 (54)	.13 (27)	.07 (51)	1.00			
5. PLQ: Add. Info.	-.04 (54)	-.02 (27)	-.09 (51)	-.24 (55)	1.00		
6. PLQ: Assumptions	.09 (54)	.09 (27)	.08 (51)	-.06 (55)	.15 (55)	1.00	
7. PLQ: Implications	-.13 (54)	-.13 (27)	-.40* (51)	.00 (55)	.25 [^] (55)	.19 (55)	1.00

Table 12
Mean Differences on PLQ Scores for Response Categories

Information Sought			Assumptions Made			Implications Considered		
No	Yes	t	No	Yes	t	No	Yes	t
.68 (27)	.67 (24)	.53	.65 (27)	.69 (24)	-.80	.71 (15)	.65 (36)	1.83*

* $p < .10$

At the company level, we found a marginally significant correlation between the frequency of implications considered and experience with the CCQ scenarios (see Table 13). This finding suggests that those who had more experience with the types of situations on the CCQ

had more to say about the implications of their course of action. The dichotomous index of process use did not reveal the same effect, indicating that it is not whether individuals considered implications or not, but how often they did in their responses (see Table 14). We can see evidence of greater certainty and the influence of experience in the sample responses for "Implications Considered" from the CCQ shown below:

- "Soldiers do not like to waste time; improve training and their attitude will improve"
- "If you do a good job, you will build a positive relationship with your commander"
- "This is not as much of a dilemma as it seems because preparation requirements for different training missions often overlap"
- "You have to empower junior officers and NCOs in order to get the job done"
- "Remember that you are training the future leadership of the Army"
- "Remember that no one commander can be everywhere at once"

Table 13
Relationship among CCQ Scores, Experience and Response Categories

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Rank	1.00						
2. CCQ: Experience	.58* (23)	1.00					
3. CCQ: TK Score	.44* (42)	.36 (21)	1.00				
4. CCQ: Response Score	.30* (44)	.56* (23)	.30^ (42)	1.00			
5. CCQ: Add. Info.	.03 (44)	.28 (23)	.03 (42)	-.05 (45)	1.00		
6. CCQ: Assumptions	.15 (44)	.30 (23)	-.05 (42)	.16 (45)	.12 (45)	1.00	
7. CCQ: Implications	-.07 (63)	.36^ (23)	-.01 (42)	.16 (45)	.14 (45)	.43* (45)	1.00

Table 14
Mean Differences on CCQ Scores for Response Categories

Information Sought			Assumptions Made			Implications Considered		
No	Yes	t	No	Yes	t	No	Yes	t
.68 (32)	.68 (10)	.127	.71 (19)	.66 (23)	1.35	.65 (12)	.69 (30)	-.42

* $p < .10$

At the battalion level, we found that the frequency of seeking additional information correlated significantly with experience on the BCQ scenarios (see Table 15). The more experience individuals had with the scenarios, the more additional information they felt they

needed to address the problem. In other words, those with experience may have known what types of information would be desirable to have to better understand the problem. Sample responses categorized as “Additional Information Sought” include:

- “Find out the history of each unit”
- “Find out about your wartime mission”
- “Find out what type of battalion it is—light infantryman or mechanized artillery”

Overall, there were many fewer responses in the response categories for the BCQ than the CCQ or PLQ, resulting in lower frequencies for any given process. Thus, the dichotomous index of whether or not the individual ever exhibited the process in his/her responses was considered a better indicator. We found mean differences in tacit knowledge scores for information sought and assumptions made (Table 16). Consistent with the experience measure, we found that those who sought additional information had higher TK scores, on average, than those who did not. It seems that individuals with more experience and more tacit knowledge pertaining to the BCQ situations were more likely to identify additional information that would be useful for addressing the problem. However, those who made assumptions about the nature of the problem had lower TK scores than those who did not. In looking at the responses, we found that the majority of assumptions were made by lieutenants who have limited experience with the types of situations found on the BCQ, thus explaining the lower tacit-knowledge scores of those making assumptions about the problems. Examples of these responses are:

- “You must be able to maintain all the brigade commander’s priorities”
- “Post already does a pretty good job with BOSS and single soldier activities”

Table 15
Relationship among BCQ Scores, Experience and Response Categories

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Rank	1.00						
2. BCQ: Experience	.46* (20)	1.00					
3. BCQ: TK Score	.41* (37)	.25 (18)	1.00				
4. BCQ: Response Score	-.07 (38)	-.13 (20)	.06 (36)	1.00			
5. BCQ: Add. Info.	.16 (39)	.53* (20)	.13 (37)	.03 (39)	1.00		
6. BCQ: Assumptions	-.13 (39)	.22 (20)	-.25 (37)	.36* (39)	.31 [^] (40)	1.00	
7. BCQ: Implications	.06 (39)	.25 (20)	-.16 (37)	-.04 (39)	.52* (40)	.43* (40)	1.00

Table 16
Mean Differences on BCQ Scores for Response Categories

Information Sought			Assumptions Made			Implications Considered		
No	Yes	t	No	Yes	t	No	Yes	t
.66	.73	-1.97*	.69	.60	1.94*	.68	.67	.903
(30)	(7)		(32)	(5)		(15)	(22)	

* $p < .10$

Supporting Instrument Development

Our second objective in analyzing these response data was to identify scenarios and specific information that can be used in further instrument development as part of a subsequent effort to assess tacit-knowledge acquisition processes. Although the existing measures provide a useful tool for assessing existing knowledge, they do not provide enough information to stimulate a thorough consideration of the problem situation, which is reflected in the limited text responses we obtained from individuals.

The challenge in developing a measure of tacit knowledge acquisition processes is to provide enough detail to allow respondents with little prior knowledge or experience to respond effectively to the problem, and to present a difficult enough situation in which to observe individual differences in knowledge-acquisition and problem-solving skills. We have chosen to use a format similar to an in-basket test, in which respondents are given background on the situation along with supporting documents they must sift through in order to understand the problem. The measure presents in-depth problem situations consisting of a brief summary of the situation along with supporting documents such as memos, personnel files, reporting procedures, activity logs, etc, that pertain to the situation. These documents are designed to be realistic and representative of those found on the job. A sample question is shown in Figure 6.

Sample Scenario 1: Developing Subordinates

OVERVIEW: You are a company commander (CPT Sam Martin) with four platoons. One of your platoon leaders (2LT Steven M. Jones) has shown a great deal of promise and has the skills to succeed as a leader. However, his performance has declined recently. He made an outburst toward you during a meeting in front of all the platoon leaders and you reprimanded him for his actions. The performance and morale of the platoon that he leads has fallen sharply. You need all of your platoons to be performing well for an upcoming JRTC exercise, especially since you are hoping for a promotion. It is your job as company commander to develop the leadership abilities of your subordinates, and to make sure that the platoons in your company are run well. Hence you have been counseling him on his leadership abilities over the past few weeks. You decide to sit down and review his personnel file before taking any further actions.

In his personnel file (included in the following pages) are several pieces of information: (a) 2LT Jones's Junior Officer Developmental Support Form, (b) the results of his latest physical exam, (c) a letter from the Battalion S-3 to 2LT Jones, (d) a Developmental Counseling Form, (e) an incident report, and (f) a letter of reprimand from the battalion commander. *(Note. In the scenario, actual documents are provided that present the above information, requiring the respondent to review and interpret various sources of information about the situation.)*

We are interested in your assessment of the situation and your response to the situation from the perspective of CPT Martin. Please answer questions 1 through 4 below based on the material you have read. Note that there is no one right or wrong answer to these questions.

1. What do you see as the main problem in this situation?
 - 1a. Why do you consider it to be the main problem?
 - 1b. What additional problems need to be addressed?
 2. What would you do to address the main problem you have identified?
 - 2a. What alternative courses of action did you consider?
 - 2b. Why did you choose your particular course of action?
 3. What information did you focus on in developing a response to the situation?
 - 3a. How did you use the information to arrive at a response to the situation?
 - 3b. Did you draw on any personal experiences in developing a response to the situation? If so, please explain.
 - 3c. What additional information/resources would you need to address this problem?
 4. What outcome do you hope will result from the course of action you have chosen?
 - 4a. What obstacles, if any, do you anticipate to obtaining this outcome?
-

Figure 6. Sample item for measuring tacit-knowledge acquisition.

Response Format and Scoring

The questions included at the end of the scenario are intended to assess the knowledge-acquisition processes more directly. Simply asking what the individual would do in the situation typically results in a very limited response, as we found in this study. Respondents are asked to answer to each question based on the materials provided in the case scenario. The questions are designed to assess the problem-solving or knowledge-acquisition skill as follows:

The following questions assess problem recognition and definition:

- What do you see as the main problem in this situation?
- Why do you consider it to be the main problem?
- What additional problems need to be addressed?

The following questions assess strategy formation:

- What would you do to address the main problem you have identified?
- What alternative courses of action did you consider?
- Why did you choose your particular course of action?

The following questions address information use, with the specific process identified in parentheses:

- What information did you focus on in developing a response to the situation? (*selective encoding*)
- How did you use the information to arrive at a response to the situation? (*selective combination*)
- Did you draw on any personal experiences in developing a response to the situation? If so, please explain. (*selective comparison*)
- What additional information/resources would you need to address this problem? (*resource allocation*)

The following questions assess strategy monitoring and evaluation:

- What outcome do you hope will result from the course of action you have chosen?
- What obstacles, if any, do you anticipate to obtaining this outcome?

By providing the specific questions, we can more readily identify each process that we wish to assess. Each process can be evaluated based on how well or how effectively the individual answers the question. Benchmarked rating scales will be developed to score responses on the knowledge-acquisition or problem-solving processes. These scales are developed by first administering the scenarios to more and less experienced individuals to generate a set of possible responses to the questions. Those responses are then compiled and presented to experts, who are asked to rate the responses on various dimensions (e.g., relevance of the problem identified, effectiveness of information use). We provide an example rating scale for evaluating an individual's rationale for his or her solution that draws sample responses from scenario P9 in the appendix:

Solution rationale - how well the individual explains or justifies the solution he or she developed.

Rating		Sample Responses
5	Rationale demonstrates clear understanding of the implications of the solution and its advantage over other courses of action.	• When a squad leader challenges your authority in front of his soldiers, he must be corrected on the spot to prevent your authority from being compromised
4		
3	Rationale is reasonable, but lacks full consideration of the consequences and alternatives.	• If the soldiers are exhausted, you should stay with them to make sure that the task is done to standard.
2		
1	Rationale is poorly developed and overly simplistic.	• The squad leader should be held accountable because he is the problem.

Identifying Promising Scenarios

Based on the data collected here, we found that certain scenarios seem more promising for our purposes based on the types of responses they generated. In selecting the scenarios, we looked at the number of additional solutions generated, the frequency of information sought about the problem, and the assumptions made about the problem. Scenarios that generated a variety of additional solutions likely present more complex, multi-dimensional problems for which there are different problem interpretations and approaches that could be taken to solve the problem. Such scenarios are promising for further instrument development because they provide a means for assessing various knowledge acquisition processes. Scenarios for which individuals indicated needing additional information also are promising because (a) they can be used to assess this particular process (i.e., identifying additional information or resources), and (b) they suggest specific information that may be included in a more detailed scenario. Finally, scenarios for which assumptions were made again suggest specific information that may be incorporated into a longer scenarios and indicate that there are different possible interpretations of the problem.

In looking at this information, we identified three scenarios at each level that seem promising for development into more detailed case descriptions. We briefly summarize the scenarios and the rationale for selecting them below.

Platoon leaders.

Scenario P1 is about soldiers who were instructed to prepare for a night move, but are not ready and are talking to personnel from other platoons. As indicated by the additional courses of action, there are various directions an officer could take to address this problem, including counseling the platoon sergeant, supervising the mission oneself, and asking the first sergeant for advice. Many respondents indicated that they would seek additional information to understand why the platoon was not ready, and several assumptions were made about why the platoon was not ready, such as the instructions were not clear or orders were changed. Material pertaining to the additional information and assumptions can be incorporated into the scenario to create a more detailed description of the problem.

Scenario P5 is about a driver who starts yelling at the platoon leader in front of the entire platoon. Respondents identified many different ways to address this problem, including counseling the driver, firing the driver, disciplining the driver in front of the platoon, and passing the issue up the chain of command. Respondents also indicated wanting additional information about the driver's situation in order to choose an appropriate course of action. Finally, assumptions were made about the history of this soldier (e.g., whether he is a good or bad soldier). Information about the driver could be incorporated into the scenario to allow respondents to interpret what type of soldier this driver is and what type of action should be taken. This information would give respondents more to consider before choosing a course of action.

Scenario P9 is about a squad that is given a mission of putting in a minefield because they are the best trained for the job. The squad, however, is exhausted and the platoon leader finds that the minefield is not up to standard. The squad leader tells the platoon leader that he is not interested in the standard. Respondents identified various courses of action including counseling the squad leader, holding the platoon sergeant responsible for accomplishing the mission, having another squad complete the minefield to standard, and terminating the exercise. Although the amount of information requested in the responses was minimal, the assumptions made suggest that additional information could be included about the available squads and the history of the squad chosen to create a more detailed description of the problem.

Company commanders.

Scenario C1 is about a company commander who takes over a newly-formed company with several new subordinate leaders. Soon after taking command, the leader discovers that the soldiers have a bad attitude about training and their performance on a field training exercise is poor. Responses to the situation range from reinforcing the standards to implementing training to correct the poor performance. Respondents indicated wanting more information about the reasons for the poor attitude and performance. Assumptions made suggest that more information could be provided about the training itself and the commander's philosophy. The

variety of information identified in the responses suggests that this scenario addresses a complex issue that is worthy of more detailed consideration.

Scenario C2 is about platoon leader who was transferred from another company in order to give him a second chance. The company commander who is now in charge of this platoon leader must decide whether or not to give the weak platoon leader an assignment on which he will likely fail. Although the number of responses generated by this scenario are less than that of other scenarios, they point to specific information that might be included to create a more substantial scenario. For example, respondents indicate that they would seek information from the new platoon leader and other key leaders about the expectations for his performance, and they would try to find out what type of support would be provided during the mission to help train this new platoon leader. The single assumption made for this scenario suggested a specific item that could provide direction as to whether or not the platoon leaders should be given the mission. The information provided in the responses, although limited in number, offer direct guidance for further development of this scenario.

Scenario C15 is about a company commander who receives unreasonable directives from his or her superior. Based on the courses of action identified, there are numerous ways to handle this problem including following the order, challenging the order, or seeking guidance from other leaders in the battalion. Respondents indicated wanting additional information about the perceptions that other leaders have about the directives. Assumptions made suggest that more information could be provided about the specific directive and the history of relations with this superior. It seems that providing more information about the context of this problem would create an interesting and more complex scenario for respondents to address and thus allow knowledge-acquisition processes to be assessed.

Battalion commanders.

Scenario B3 is about strategies for establishing training priorities in the battalion. Although the scenario as it is written does not present a specific problem, there is potential to expand upon the scenario in order to develop a detailed case description. The additional courses of action that respondents identified point to numerous sources of information about training needs that might be consulted in determining training priorities. This information could be provided as part of the scenario and the respondent then would be responsible for reviewing all this information in order to establish a set of priorities. The respondent would be required to justify the priorities based on the information provided. It is clear from the responses obtained that various issues need to be considered included mission requirements, the brigade commander's priorities, and the needs of soldiers. Therefore, we expect that the scenario could generate several different courses of action.

Scenario B12 is about communicating one's guidance effectively. It involves a situation in which the battalion commander's guidance was inaccurately passed down through the chain of command. As with most of the BCQ scenarios, this scenario generated few responses falling into the categories of "Additional Information Sought" or "Assumptions Made." However, it is one in which there are many potential approaches for addressing the problem,

and offers an opportunity for presenting additional information about the problem. This information may include the history of the unit, written statements of the commander's vision, and communications among staff members regarding specific guidance. The respondents would be required to determine the source of the inconsistencies in one's guidance in order to develop an effective and appropriate solution.

Scenario B13 is about a battalion commander who reluctantly gave his S-1 a company command in order to facilitate his professional development. After observing the S-1's command, it appears that this individual lacks the ability to command effectively. Respondents generated numerous additional courses of action to this situation ranging from helping the S-1 to become an effective commander to relieving him of his duty. Respondents also indicated that additional information about the S-1 in terms of personal problems or his views on his performance would be useful. This scenario holds promise in that a history of the S-1's performance could be created along with specific indicators of his current performance and evaluations of this commander from other officers. Respondents would have to interpret these various sources of information pertaining to the S-1 in order to develop an appropriate course of action.

In the next phase of our efforts to develop a tool to assess tacit-knowledge acquisition processes, the above scenarios will serve as our focus. We will outline what additional issues should be incorporated into the scenario descriptions and what types of materials (e.g., performance evaluations, training schedules) can be presented to convey additional information pertaining to the situation.

Conclusions

In the present study, we sought to provide preliminary insight into the process of tacit knowledge acquisition and to support the development of tools to assess the use of various knowledge-acquisition processes in solving practical leadership problems. Previous research showed that measures of tacit knowledge significantly predicted leadership effectiveness. In the current study, we obtained support that tacit knowledge is related to experience as indicated by significant correlations between rank and tacit-knowledge scores on the company and battalion questionnaires. We also found that the more experience officers indicated having with the company commander scenarios, the higher their tacit-knowledge scores.

By asking officers to provide free-text responses to items on the TKML, we obtained an abundance of new information pertaining to those scenarios. In examining those responses, we found many additional solutions to the problems that were not already represented in the existing set of options for the scenarios. In work being conducted under a separate contract, these data are being analyzed using a machine-learning method of knowledge acquisition and representation called Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer & Dumais, 1997). Using this technology, we will be able to match responses to existing alternatives and assign scores based on expert ratings. For our purposes, we reviewed each response and attempted to match it to an existing alternative. For those responses we were able to match, we found that officers who

identified solutions to the company commander scenarios that received higher expert ratings also scored higher on the close-ended questions.

In general, the responses we obtained to the open-ended questions were limited in detail, but there was enough information to allow us to begin identifying some of the processes that individuals exhibited when responding to the tacit-knowledge scenarios. The processes we identified included seeking additional information to understand the problem, making assumptions about the nature of the problem, and considering the implications of the chosen course of action. Based on exploratory analyses, we found that some of these processes were related to tacit-knowledge scores and experience with the types of situations represented in the scenarios. On the platoon leader questionnaire (PLQ), considering the implications of one's course of action was associated with lower tacit knowledge scores. A closer look at these responses suggested that individuals with less tacit knowledge pertaining to the situation may have felt the need to justify their chosen course of action. On the company commander questionnaire (CCQ), considering implications was associated with greater experience with the situations depicted in the tacit-knowledge scenarios. Here, the relationship may indicate that leaders with more experience have a better understanding of the implications of their course of action. On the battalion commander questionnaire (BCQ), leaders with more experience were more likely to indicate additional information that would be useful for understanding the problem. This finding may indicate that those with more experience know what to look for. Overall, these findings suggest that there are certain processes that may be associated with greater tacit knowledge that are worth further exploration. We have compiled all of these responses in the appendix, along with information about the rank and tacit knowledge officer(s) who provided the responses. Such information can be useful to officers who may want to further understand a problem depicted in a tacit-knowledge scenario and gain insight into the different perspectives that officers at different levels have about the problem. For our purposes, we will use the data collected here to support ongoing efforts to develop case scenarios consisting of greater detail and complexity, which can be used to more fully assess the processes associated with tacit-knowledge acquisition.

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Appendix A

Compiled Responses to the TKML Scenarios

TACIT KNOWLEDGE FOR MILITARY LEADERS:
PLATOON LEADER QUESTIONNAIRE

P1. You are a new platoon leader. The battalion you support is preparing to conduct a night move. You assemble your platoon and tell everyone to start packing equipment in preparation for the move that same night. When you come back to inspect their movement preparation, you find that your soldiers have not packed the equipment and are talking to personnel from other platoons, who are hanging around the area. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Order the soldiers from other platoons to leave the area.	6.86	1.86
Take charge of the situation, get your unit moving, then talk to the NCOs to bring the chain of command online.	7.40	1.84
Tell the soldiers exactly what you want done and when you will return to reinspect.	5.82	2.11
Assemble your entire platoon and tell them that their work priorities are not on target.	4.42	2.05
Remind soldiers of the time urgency and the need to get many things done quickly in preparation for the night move.	5.66	1.92
Use verbal leadership and commands to influence your soldiers.	6.36	1.92
Wait and see if the soldiers do the task later on their own.	1.80	1.48
Assemble your squad leaders and talk about the situation.	7.06	1.96
Speak to the soldiers in a friendly manner without emphasizing your authority as their leader.	2.76	1.78
Warn the platoon sergeant that you will consider using punishment (such as an Article 15) if the platoon does not pull things together immediately.	2.36	1.72

P1. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Counsel the PSG/ NCOs and let them know this will not be allowed	X		X	X	X	X
Reprimand the NCOs	X					X
Notify battery leadership that additional time is needed to prepare	X					X
Explain the mission					X	
Express your disappointment in their lack of action					X	
Tell subordinate leaders/PSG to get the soldiers packing ASAP			X		X	X
After the soldiers conduct the move, issue appropriate written counseling				X	X	X
Talk to the XO and other platoon leaders to find out why soldiers from other platoons were in your area and not preparing themselves			X			
Have the PSG contact the NCO chain of the other soldiers						X
Ask the 1SG for advice			X			
Tell the PSG in private your displeasure with his progress		X	X		X	
Reissue instructions and have the PSG backbrief you to ensure proper understanding		X		X	X	X
Correct the soldiers on the spot and supervise them		X	X		X	X

P1. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Lose your composure; scream and yell	X	X	X	X	X	X
Embarrass the soldiers or NCOs over the matter				X		
Take corrective action on your own						X
Run to the commander with your problem			X			
Approach anyone outside the chain of command with the problem					X	
Jump to conclusions		X				X
Reprimand the NCOs or PSG in front of the soldiers		X	X	X	X	X
Ignore the situation without some form of disciplinary action		X	X		X	

P1. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ask the PSG or squad leaders why soldiers are not packed	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ask the platoon why they are not ready			X	X		
Ask soldiers if they had order to cease packing			X			
Ask the PSG and squad leaders why they were not supervising the soldiers			X			
Find out if the PSG understood the instructions					X	
Ask yourself if the instructions were made clear		X				X
Ask squad leaders why they allowed the soldiers to converse with other personnel		X	X			

P1. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
There are leadership problems in the platoon that need to be fixed	X					X
There must be another reason because soldiers generally do not disregard orders	X		X	X		
Something may have changed that you are not aware of						
The platoon may be on a break or resting					X	
The problem lies with the checker (PSG)		X		X		
If the orders were given to the PSG, s/he is accountable		X				X
Part of the problem could be that you did not give good instructions		X				X

P1. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Instruction should be issued to the PSG and squad leaders and not to the platoon	X					X
The PSG and squad leaders are responsible for ensuring that instructions are followed	X	X	X	X	X	X
This is a leadership problem and not a soldier problem						X
It is your job as platoon leader to check the checker (PSG)		X		X		
You need to set the standards for your platoon early or the platoon will run all over you		X				X
As an officer you want to maintain your bearing and show young soldiers how the chain of command works		X				X
You should always punish in private and reward in public		X		X		
If you loose your composure and yell at the soldiers, you lose your credibility and their respect		X		X		X
It is unprofessional to yell at the PSG and squad leaders in front of soldiers		X	X			
It is inappropriate to yell at soldiers without complete understanding of the situation		X	X			

P2. You are a platoon leader, and your unit is training at the National Training Center. Your battery commander makes your howitzer sections dig individual positions every time you stop, even in the offense. The other batteries do not dig in as much as you do. The Observer Controllers (OCs) tell you that your sections dig good positions, but they question why you do this so much in the offense. The battery commander's order is making a big problem for you because your sections are under-strength, and digging in so much burns everyone out and has a bad effect on morale. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Explain your view to the battery commander by talking in terms of Mission-Enemy- Terrain-Troops-and-Time (METT-T) and the effect of the decision on the unit's mission.	7.68	1.45
Tell the battery commander that his directive adversely impacts the unit's morale.	5.98	1.96
Go to the battery commander <u>alone</u> and ask him why he issued the directive.	6.64	1.95
Try to figure out on your own why the battery commander issued the directive and explain it to your soldiers.	4.10	2.37
Speak to the company first sergeant for advice and assistance.	6.78	1.58
Enlist the support of one or two other platoon leaders and go together to speak to the battery commander.	5.84	1.89
Based on the position of your troops, make a decision not to comply with the commander's directive on the basis of "mission first," then explain your actions after the fact.	1.94	1.27
Get together with the other platoon leaders and agree on a common position, get the support of senior NCOs, and then go as a group and together state your case to the battery commander.	4.00	2.31

P2. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Tell the BC about the requirements from the FM and the OCs recommendations	X		X			X
After talking with the BC, do whatever he tells you to do	X		X	X		X
Keep the soldiers motivated by emphasizing the benefit of realistic training (e.g., keeping them alive in actual combat)	X		X			
Explain the situation to the BC and recommend a solution (e.g., limiting digging to hasty positions part of the time)	X		X			X
Continue to meet the BC's requirements	X					X
Share the OCs compliments with the soldiers and encourage them to keep up the good work	X		X			
Inform the soldiers that you will ask the BC to lift the requirement	X		X			
Have the PSG talk to the 1SG about the digging so that the BC hears about the issue through both officer and NCO chains-of-command	X		X			
Tell the OC that this is the way you train and that you set the standard for others to follow			X			

P2. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Undermine the CDR's authority	X		X	X		X
Repeat what the OCs said because it has no bearing on the CDR's standard	X					X
Disagree with the OC			X			
Voice your complaints to your soldiers						X
Tell the CDR to come out and observe the soldiers			X			
Mention what other sections are doing or soldier morale when confronting the BC				X		

P2. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Look at the FM to find out requirements for digging in the offense			X			

P2. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If your chain of command has implemented and enforced the standard, you have no choice but to support it						X
If a task is the standard, you should do it regardless of unit strength because you might have to fight that way				X		
If the task is of opinion and not standard, then unit strength and morale should be considered				X		
There may be a good reason for digging in that you are not aware of			X			
If the platoon needed a break, you would stop digging and wait for further instruction			X			

P2. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Sharing your opinions with the soldiers will undermine the chain of command						X
"Do your duty faithfully, notwithstanding it occasionally wars with your private feelings," from "Worth's Battalion Orders."			X			
To stop digging in completely without receiving instructions would only anger the CDR and place more stress on the platoon			X			

P3. You have spent two months working with your new battery commander. In his last position as the Fire Support Officer for an infantry battalion he supervised a shorthanded team. Consequently, he was required to perform many duties himself. Your commander still tries to stay involved in all of the day-to-day details of running the unit, and he generally delegates tasks less often than you would like. You believe that your commander is overburdened, and you are worried about the consequences of his time-management techniques. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
If you know that the battery commander intends to give someone a task, speak to that person before the battery commander does, so that he or she has already started the task before the battery commander meets with him or her.	4.29	2.17
Wait to take action on specific things until after he mentions them to you.	2.51	1.52
Help your battery commander to better manage his time in any way you can.	7.55	1.26
Don't wait to be told what to do--anticipate what needs to be done, and if you are capable, do it.	8.31	1.00
If something needs to be done but you can't do it, find someone else who can and get him/her involved--without being asked by the battery commander.	7.49	1.61
Offer to take care of specific tasks before he mentions them to you.	7.78	1.25
When he returns from command and staff meetings, meet with him right away by yourself and write down everything that has to be done.	5.65	1.83
Rely on the NCO chain of command; deal with the appropriate NCO and get NCO support.	6.53	1.61
Go to the first sergeant and/or executive officer and ask for suggestions about what to do about the commander's management style.	6.04	2.13
Ask the battery commander often what you can do to help and to relieve his task burden.	6.52	1.95
Assume this is just the way he is and do your best to get along.	3.69	1.76

P3. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Explain to the CO that he needs to delegate better; remind him that his job is to command while the other leaders run the day-to-day aspects of the company	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tell the CO that you are capable of taking on more responsibility	X	X	X	X	X	X
Show the CO that you are capable by doing tasks correctly and on time	X			X	X	X
Explain to the CO how important it is that he trusts and uses all of his subordinate leaders, including you			X		X	X
Remind the CO that he is not shorthanded anymore				X	X	X
Acknowledge that the CO's word is the final say and that you will comply with any directives he gives			X		X	
Create a briefing system to keep the CDR informed					X	
Ask the CO what your role is as he sees it			X			
Inform the CO of the tasks he is neglecting			X	X		
Emphasize to the CO the value of doing tasks for professional development				X		X

P3. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do nothing; allow him to continue his present course			X		X	X
Tell subordinate leaders that the CO is incompetent (i.e., bad mouth the CDR)	X	X		X		X
Undermine the CDR's authority	X	X		X		X
Try to change the situation without the commander's knowledge					X	X
Abandon the CDR in his desire to be self-reliant					X	
Criticize or challenge the CO		X	X	X	X	X
Demand that you be given more responsibility		X	X			
Complain, but rather offer suggestions		X	X			

P3. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ask the ISG if he thought the same thing without compromising the CO's authority and respects of LTs	X		X		X	X
Consult fellow LTs to see if they saw things the same way			X			

P3. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If most or all agreed with your perception, you would go to the CO with others and tell him what you thought	X		X		X	X
Some people are micromanagers and cannot be changed						X

P3. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Doing tasks correctly will allow the CO to delegate additional tasks to others					X	X
One of the good things about the Army is you don't have to wait for a bad boss to retire or die--in a few months either (a) he will leave the unit or (b) you will get transferred						X
Allowing the situation to continue without attempting to remedy it would be unethical					X	
As his next in command, you must be open and honest with him				X		
The CO has enough to do each day with out having to be involved in every aspect of day-to-day operations—that's why he has 100 or so men under his command		X		X		
If the CDR is overworked, he may make hasty decisions on issues that require more serious consideration		X		X		
Micromanagement breeds laziness on the part of LTs and NCOs and impairs their preparedness			X			
Failure to communicate your views will lead to micromanagement and cause low morale among NCOs and subordinate officers		X	X			

P4. During the live fire attack at the National Training Center, your tank platoon is in an overwatch position, as part of the observation post (OP) plan. You are supposed to wait to be called forward into the attack. From your position, you watch the artillery come in on the enemy positions. The smoke from the artillery obscures the enemy's view. At this point, you should move out--you should call your commanding officer and tell him you are moving while the enemy is blinded. Instead, you wait to be told to move out, as the OP plan called for. Consequently, you move after the smoke lifts, and you lose three tanks, including your own. You are angry with yourself and ashamed; you believe you should have known better. How should you deal with this situation?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Think about this negative performance feedback from the NTC as a way to identify and repair your weaknesses.	7.32	1.67
Try to understand other people's roles in the decision, if any.	6.00	1.81
During the After Action Review, admit to your soldiers that you made a mistake; take responsibility for what happened.	7.30	1.82
Reflect on the decision and determine what you should have done, in order to derive the lessons learned.	8.34	.89
Remind yourself that you will do better on the next mission.	7.00	1.44
During the After Action Review, describe your mistake to your subordinate leaders in order to develop and train them.	8.14	1.05
Put the decision behind you; try not to dwell on it.	6.26	1.80
During the After Action Review, try to explain the reasons for your decision to your soldiers.	5.60	2.04
Don't let the soldiers get down on themselves because of your decision--build up their confidence and encourage them.	7.92	1.08
Discuss the issue with your company commander and convince your company commander to allow you the freedom to exercise initiative at certain times, like this one.	7.74	1.27

P4. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do not move without guidance--call and inform the commander of the current tactical situation and that now is the opportune time to move	X		X	X		
Talk to the commander about why you screwed up and seek clarification about what to do in that situation in the future			X			X
Explain to the CDR that you do not know the whole scheme of the maneuver			X			

P4. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Blame others for the mistake	X					X
Excuse your lack of initiative by saying you were waiting for orders	X					X
Execute without conferring with the CDR	X		X			
Repeat the behavior next time	X			X		
Complain about being at an OP	X			X		X
Hide any details about the event	X					X
Continue to be ashamed			X			
Assume that you cannot display initiative and that it is safer to follow orders						X
Write it off as a training mistake		X	X			

P4. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

P4. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You would not be ashamed because you followed your commanders plan	X		X			
As a green LT, you may not be privy to the big picture				X		
If there was no reason for sticking to the plan, the CO will let you know				X		
The issue should have been addressed during OPORD	X		X			

P4. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Proceed according to commander's guidance because there may be more to the plan than you are aware of (e.g., you may have helped another platoon/company)	X		X	X		
The goal of training is to learn; use it as an example for next time you plan an operation	X		X	X		
Following the commanders plan was the "right" thing to do	X		X			
There are leaders at all levels of the organization to allow for flexible, decentralized command and control within the higher commander's intent and mission	X		X			
All plans are essentially guidelines; basis for change depends on opportunity and initiative to adapt to the situation to accomplish the commander's intent						X

P5. You are a platoon leader, and one day your driver has a motivational problem while out in the field. He starts mouthing off to you while standing on top of the turret in front of the rest of the platoon. Everyone in the platoon is listening to what he's saying about you, and it is extremely negative and harsh. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
In front of the platoon, order your driver to do an unpleasant task as punishment for his insubordination.	1.88	1.39
Pull him aside and read him his rights: really chew his butt.	5.39	2.37
Go to the PSG and tell him to take care of this problem.	4.12	2.24
Order your driver to be quiet and get back to his job.	5.88	2.02
Pull him aside and tell him to come speak to you in one hour.	6.08	2.40
Answer your driver back immediately and defend yourself by arguing your position.	1.60	.97
Tell your driver you are recommending him for an Article 15.	3.64	2.32
Do nothing; walk away and wait for your driver to blow off steam.	2.44	1.81
Speak to your company commander about the problem and get his/her advice.	4.82	2.41
Speak to another platoon leader and get his/her advice.	4.88	2.16
Pull him aside, talk to him in private, and ask what's wrong.	6.63	1.94

P5. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Put the soldier at ease	X		X	X	X	X
Put the soldier at the position of attention	X		X		X	X
Explain that you will not tolerate disrespect from a subordinate	X	X	X	X	X	X
Counsel him verbally about his behavior	X	X	X	X	X	X
Have the chain of command counsel him	X			X		
Direct the soldier to take a few minutes to gather himself and his bearing			X			
Let the rest of the platoon that this behavior is not tolerated				X	X	
Explain that he needs to focus on the exercise and you will provide whatever assistance he needs when it is completed						X
Discuss with the PSG what you should do	X			X	X	
Consider him for appropriate discipline	X				X	X
Talk to the NCOs about maintaining discipline					X	
Fire him as your driver	X	X				X
Relieve the driver and have him moved to another section				X	X	
Remove him as tour driver, but keep him in the platoon	X				X	X
Keep him as your driver			X			
Administer written counseling		X		X		X
Ask the commander to press charges for insubordination		X			X	X
Put the soldier on extra duty		X	X			X
If he continues, explain that he could be punished under UCMJ		X				X
If he continues after you confront him, start disciplinary action (e.g., Article 15, Article 92, UCMJ)		X	X	X	X	
Consult the mental health provider or chaplain as necessary		X	X	X		
Remain calm			X		X	

P5. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Lose your temper and get in a shouting match	X	X	X	X	X	X
Embarrass him/reprimand him in front of the platoon	X	X	X	X		X
Fire him as a driver			X			
Let him get away with it					X	
Let soldiers frustrate you and affect your decision making		X	X			

P5. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to find out the cause of the problem (e.g., fatigue, professional or personal problems, or you)		X	X	X		X
Ask the driver if he know what he just did					X	
Ask the PSG what this soldier's problem was			X			

P5. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Your driver is probably a quality soldier so there is some reason why he "went off"						X
You likely did something unintelligent that caused the outburst			X			
If there is a reasonable justification for the outburst, tell the driver to be careful next time					X	
If he is a good soldier, try to understand what caused his behavior			X			
If this is not an isolated instance, take disciplinary action						X
If he is already a bad soldier, get him out of the Army fast			X			
If it is blatant disrespect, seek disciplinary action					X	
Soldiers aren't concerned about being reprimanded		X	X			
The response would depend on how well the platoon knows you and the driver, what he is mounthing off about, and what the mission is at hand						X

P5. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
He must be punished in some way that the rest of the platoon knows that this type of behavior will not be tolerated		X	X	X		X
If your soldiers know that you don't take any crap they won't give you any						X
Losing your control shows lack of maturity and discipline, and will cause you to lose the respect of the soldiers		X	X	X		
After the incident, it would be important to try to improve rapport with the driver and the rest of the platoon			X			
If the remarks are true, address them so as to eliminate rumors or half-explanations					X	
Have the driver report to you because it reinforces that you are the leader		X				X
Let NCOs deal with him because the NCOs should be held accountable for their subordinates' conduct and discipline		X		X		

P6. Your battery commander makes a decision you do not agree with. You try speaking with him and stating your position as effectively as you can, but his mind is made up and he is not going to change his position. Other platoon leaders agree with you that the battery commander's decision is wrong. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Use the first sergeant or executive officer as a voice-piece for your ideas: Convince one of them to state your opinions to the battery commander.	5.14	2.22
Speak to the battalion commander and ask for advice.	2.60	1.93
Tell only your NCOs that you support the battery commander's decision.	4.72	2.15
Tell your platoon that you support the battery commander's decision, and they must implement it.	6.56	1.93
Tell only your NCOs that you do not support the battery commander's decision, but ask for their help in implementing the decision anyway.	3.16	2.05
Tell the NCOs that you do not support the battery commander's decision, and ask for their opinions and advice on how to handle the situation with the troops.	2.86	1.75
Tell your platoon that you do not support the battery commander's decision, but ask for their cooperation in implementing the decision anyway.	2.16	1.68
Formulate the best possible argument that you can in support of the battery commander's decision, and then explain the decision to the platoon while asking for their support.	5.58	2.43
Go back to the battery commander and tell him/her that because you do not agree with the decision, it will be very hard for you to gain the support of the NCOs and troops to carry out the battery commander's wishes.	3.54	2.46
Wait an hour after the meeting, then approach the battery commander with an alternative solution.	6.30	2.12

P6. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Respect the CDR's final decision and execute it to the best of your ability	X		X	X		X
Obey the order if it is legal and ethical	X		X	X		X
Make every attempt to explain why you think it is wrong	X		X	X		X
Gather the other PLs and talk to the CDR as a group	X		X	X		
Ask the battery commander to explain his decision						X

P6. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Disobey the CDR	X		X	X		X
Organize an opposition to the CDR	X		X			X
Tell your subordinates that you think it's a bad idea, but to do it because the CDR says so	X		X			X
Tell your subordinates that you will go and convince the CDR that he is wrong						X
Jump the chain of command unless the issue is severe	X		X			
Continue to complain or argue about the decision	X	X	X			X
Voice your discontent publicly						X
Comply with the order without attempting to change it						X

P6. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

P6. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If the order will result in needless loss of life or equipment, then put the issue up to the XO or CDR	X		X			X
If it is a simple task, do it the BC's way and your way to show the benefits	X		X			
If it is a mission task such as an assault, then execute	X		X			
Based on your conversation with the CDR, you would know if he would be receptive to input from other PLs			X			

P6. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Execute the order because he is the commander and it is your duty to be faithful to him	X		X			
Talk to the CDR as a group because majority is a powerful force	X		X			
Seek assistance from the 1SG because he is the only other person besides the battalion commander who can change the battery commanders mind	X		X			
If your subordinates know that you tried to change the CDR's decision, they will feel that you are making them execute a bad decision simply because the CDR said so						X
Like/dislike of a superior's order should not play a part in the execution of that order				X		
The Army isn't necessarily a democracy, it merely protects one			X			

P7. You are a new platoon leader who takes charge of your platoon when they return from a lengthy combat deployment. All members of the platoon are war veterans, but you did not serve in the conflict. In addition, you failed to graduate from Ranger School. You are concerned about building credibility with your soldiers. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Do not change procedures that work.	7.92	1.02
Ask the members of the platoon to share their combat experience: Ask what they learned and how it can help the platoon.	8.18	.88
Work hard to get into excellent physical shape so that you excel in PT.	7.55	1.34
Maintain good military bearing by wearing a pressed uniform, shined boots, and having good posture.	7.02	1.56
Speak to your soldiers with a tone of voice that conveys respect for them.	7.63	1.51
Study field manuals and military history in order to gain technical and tactical competence.	7.80	1.27
Defer to soldiers on matters related to their combat experience, thus acknowledging that they know more than you do in some areas.	6.73	1.68
Tell your NCOs about all of the studying you have done to increase your competence.	2.69	1.46
Listen frequently to your soldiers; hear their views, opinions, comments, and suggestions.	8.17	.91
Announce right up front that you are in charge and the soldiers must accept this fact and treat you with appropriate respect.	2.14	1.49

P7. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Be yourself and accept that you are not a combat vet or a Ranger School graduate	X	X	X	X	X	X
Be the best you can and earn their respect through your actions	X	X	X	X	X	X
Try to establish a positive team environment	X		X		X	X
Clearly define roles and expectations of leaders and soldiers in the platoon			X		X	X
Compare the veterans' lessons with "book answers"	X					X
Use the advice of your NCOs to help in leading the platoon					X	X
Focus on the mission					X	
Get AAR comments on things to improve					X	
Be confident in yourself and your abilities		X		X	X	
Show your soldiers that you are fair and honest and have their best interest at heart		X		X		X
Find out as much about the new platoon before meeting with them		X		X		
Meet with the platoon and provide them with some background on myself and your philosophy		X		X		
Hold a meeting with the platoon and explain that you did not serve in the war, but congratulate them on a job well done		X	X			
Administer written counseling to anyone who is negative against you				X		

P7. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to impress them or act like you know everything	X	X	X	X	X	X
Dwell on your inexperience or let it hinder your performance		X	X		X	X
Make excuses	X	X	X	X	X	
Belittle the veterans accomplishments	X			X		
Compete with the veterans with stories	X					X
Struggle with PT or BRM			X			
Start changing the systems that are in place right away		X	X			
Expose your weaknesses		X	X	X		
Falsify your record or pretend your something you're not		X	X			X

P7. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to find out where the veterans stand in their METL				X		

P7. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
The platoon just returned from deployment and must begin a lengthy recovery process					X	
Some soldiers look at your patches and judge you on that first impressions, other wait to see what kind of person you are			X			
NCOs and soldiers expect you to lead to the best of your ability		X				X
The only thing that matters is that you are in charge			X			
Experience will come with future deployments					X	
Platoons get new LTs all the time						X

P7. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Many leaders have fewer badges than many of the soldiers they lead—it is only a big deal if you make it one						X
By including NCOs in the decision making process you create a teamwork environment and increase your credibility						X
If you do your job well and treat soldiers fairly, credibility is not an issue			X	X		X
Lead as you have been taught and you will develop credibility						X
No new PL has instant credibility with a platoon—you must build credibility		X				X
The goal is to get them to accept you as their platoon leader rather than to become one of them	X				X	X
As opportunities arise act because actions speak louder than words					X	
Trying to impress them shows a sense of insecurity on your part	X	X		X		
Never forget that soldiers are your most precious commodities, so you must take every step to earn their trust and confidence so as not to fail them		X		X		

P8. You are a new platoon leader, and you are under a great deal of stress. Everyone is expecting a lot of you, and there never seem to be enough hours in the day to accomplish everything. There is a lot of competition for key awards and positions in the future, and other officers are working as hard as you are. At home, your family also needs your time and attention. How should you manage your stress?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Find a trustworthy military person or confidant (not your rater) to talk to about your frustrations and problems--someone who will provide you with <u>positive</u> feedback about your performance.	5.52	1.81
Ask a senior military leader whom you respect for specific advice and suggestions.	6.86	1.43
Find a trustworthy military person or confidant (not your rater) to talk to about your frustrations and problems--someone who will provide you with honest feedback about your performance.	7.66	1.26
Try not to take problems home from work.	7.74	1.51
If tempted to take work home, ask yourself whether it is really critical, or whether you can wait until tomorrow.	7.96	1.32
Find a trustworthy military person to talk to who will give you positive reinforcement.	5.78	1.42
Put your problems in perspective by reflecting on people who are worse off than you are.	4.90	1.83
Remind yourself of your long-term goals--five or more years out--and look for relationships between the current situations and your long-term goals.	6.41	1.85
Take up a hobby of interest to you and do it even though you are tired.	4.88	1.88
Remember to place your career in perspective by focusing on the many aspects of your life that matter in addition to your unit.	7.84	1.30
Speak to your commander about your stress, frustrations, and problems, and request her/his advice.	6.20	2.09

P8. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Seek job-related ways to alleviate stress (e.g., time management strategies, delegation of responsibility)	X		X	X		X
Seek personal ways to alleviate stress (e.g., working out, meditating, walk with the family, watching ESPN)	X		X	X		
Communicate with your spouse about your work requirements	X			X		X
Set aside time each day and on weekends for family	X		X	X		
Prioritize tasks and confirm which tasks are important with the commander	X		X			X
Work hard and do the best you can each day			X	X		X
Work hard at work and turn it off when you go home			X			
Allocate time each day to think about non-work related issues	X					
Discuss your priorities and expectations with your NCOs to gain their support			X			X
Seek advice from PSG and other platoon leaders						
Do what the army pays you to do at your current level efficiently and do not focus on awards or promotions			X			
Try to gain a better understanding of your role and what things you do and do not need to worry about			X			

P8. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Neglect your family	X	X	X			X
Try to do everything yourself	X					X
Abrogate your military responsibility by telling the PSG to handle things	X					X
Worry about awards, promotions, etc.			X			X
Give up	X			X		X
Cut corners or cheat						X
Complain unless you truly are overloaded						X
Take your problems out on others				X		

P8. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

P8. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
How one manages stress is a very individual thing	X		X			

P8. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
The day will always come when the Army no longer needs you or your services, but your family is for the rest of your life				X		X
Work and family are both important, but neither can afford to be sacrificed	X		X			
Do your best because whatever happens will happen			X	X		
How you accomplish the mission and take care of soldiers will ensure your success						X
Seek advice from Sgt Majors because they usually have developed good techniques for managing stress			X			
Home should be like a refuge; leave it that way			X			
Communicate with your spouse because s/he needs to understand and support you						X

p9. You are an engineer platoon leader training with your soldiers. One squad is given the mission to put in a minefield for the Infantry battalion. You pick the second squad because they are good soldiers, have better equipment, and are better trained to do the job. But the squad is exhausted and the soldiers really complain. They note that it is nearing the end of the exercise and they are very tired. You tell them what you want done and you make the standards clear. When you return to check, the minefield is not up to standard and the squad is sitting around eating. You talk to the squad leader, and point out that the minefield is not up to standard. He tells you in front of the squad that the squad is not interested in your standards and that what they have done is the best you are going to get. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Relieve the squad leader, put a team leader in charge, and provide him with your guidance to complete the task.	6.74	2.25
Recognize that the soldiers have reached their limit and tell them you recognize this and will take steps to ensure they are not pushed too far in the future.	3.82	2.39
Try to convince the squad leader and soldiers that you will not give them another mission until they have had a chance to rest, but that they must bring the minefield up to standard.	4.72	2.40
Assume that the soldiers are overworked and let them off the hook this time--do not make them complete the task.	1.60	1.14
Punish the squad leader by recommending him for an Article 15 for mouthing off to you about the soldiers not caring about your standards.	4.69	2.62
Order the soldiers to stop eating immediately and complete the task, and threaten punishment if they do not comply.	3.32	1.85
Say that you recognize they are tired, but tell the soldiers that the task must be completed, and ask what assistance you can arrange for to help them get the task done.	7.12	1.96

P9. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Counsel the squad leader on his behavior and responsibilities	X	X	X	X	X	X
Consider the squad leader for appropriate disciplinary action	X	X	X	X		X
Hold the squad leader accountable for accomplishing the mission to standard	X	X	X	X	X	X
Hold the PSG accountable for accomplishing the mission	X	X	X			X
Ensure that no one rests until all aspects are finished		X	X			
Seek advice from the PSG on how to deal with the incident	X	X	X		X	X
Tell the PSG to instruct the squad leader on military bearing	X		X			X
Tell the NCOs that there is a proper way to show disagreements					X	
Warn the squad leader and give him an opportunity to correct his deficiencies before taking disciplinary action			X			X
Recommend to the company commander that this NCO be disciplined appropriately			X			
Fire the squad leader and supervise the job yourself				X		X
Have another squad do it to standard	X			X		X
Assist the squad to complete the task						X
Terminate the training exercise					X	
Inform the CO and ISG of the situation			X			
Explain to the squad leader in front of the squad the importance of mission accomplishment and that his squad was the best choice for completing the mission		X		X	X	
Tell the squad leader and squad that you are disappointed with their performance and that it has changed your opinion of them		X		X		

P9. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Lose your temper and yell at or threaten the squad	X		X	X	X	X
Engage in an argument with the squad leader	X	X	X	X		X
Let the squad sit while you do all the work				X		
Assign the mission to another squad						X
Leave the squad leader with the squad once he is relieved						X
Sacrifice the standard		X	X			X
Walk away or ignore the response		X	X		X	X

P9. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Hold a conference with the squad leader and PSG to find out the reason for the insubordination		X	X		X	
Ask the squad leader if s/he understood the impact of the remarks		X			X	X

P9. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Recognize that you made a mistake in choosing this squad				X		
A different squad would have been sent based on rest			X	X		
It is possible that the squad is completely exhausted				X		
It is unlikely that there is a squad leader like this in the army			X			

P9. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
At this point it is critical that the task is accomplished and that you and the PSG do what it takes to get it done					X	
If the soldiers are exhausted and express concerns, you should stay with them to help and make sure along the way that the task is done to standard				X		
If this is not the squad leader's first offense, he likely would be kicked out of the Army			X			
The squad leader should be held accountable because he is the problem		X	X			
When a squad leader challenges your authority in front of his soldiers, he must be corrected on the spot to prevent your authority from being compromised		X	X	X		X
It would have been better to bring in another squad to assist because it is not right to keep tasking the same squad over and over simply because they are well trained		X	X			

P10. You are a platoon leader, and your battalion requires the company to turn in training schedules six weeks in advance. But the battalion does not give you six weeks notice on requirements. Thus, there are a lot of changes to the training schedule. The battalion tells you six weeks out is too far in the future to assign projects, yet they expect you to plan training six weeks out! The soldiers think that these changes in the schedule jerk them around and sometimes cause morale problems. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Tell your soldiers to stop griping and worrying about the changes in the schedule-remind them that they always prepare their classes the night before anyway.	2.98	1.61
Let the soldiers know the changes to the schedule are not your fault, and that you appreciate their need to be able to plan.	5.02	1.61
Buffer the platoon from changes that take place higher up by filtering the information you give them about these changes--provide soldiers with as much stability and predictability as possible.	7.78	1.28
Submit all required paperwork to change the schedule to the battalion, but for your own platoon, publish a special calendar that is more short term but is always accurate.	6.10	2.25
Tell your platoon to ignore the training schedule, since it changes so much.	1.88	.98
Speak to your company commander about the disruptions caused by the changes in the schedule, and solicit his advice and assistance.	7.78	1.00
Let the soldiers know that you agree with them that sometimes it seems that the battalion and company don't know what they are doing.	3.04	1.71
Don't publish your own short-term schedule because then soldiers will think with too short-term a focus and won't take the necessary time to prepare for classes, etc.	4.48	1.93

P10. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Inform the company commander of the situation and let him alert the battalion commander to the problem	X		X	X		X
Inform the battalion commander of the situation and let him alter the brigade commander if necessary	X					X
Discuss the issue with the platoon and let them know that it will be addressed at the BN training meeting	X		X			X
Accept the changes and tell the soldiers to be flexible	X		X	X		
Try to protect soldiers from the changes	X		X			X
Support your soldiers' requirements as much as possible to reduce morale problems	X					X
Explain to the platoon the reasons behind the changes	X		X	X		
Let it be known that the battalion needs to come on line	X		X			
Raise the issue at the next staff call or training meeting using well-organized, constructive	X		X			
Press the issue often with the CO	X		X			
Continue to push for predictability in the BN by advising the chain of command of every conflict that occurs			X			
Try to incorporate flexibility into the training schedule		X	X			X
Explain to the platoon the benefits of having an advanced schedule		X				

P10. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Reduce the quality of training and planning because you think things are going to change	X		X	X		X
Dismiss the needs of the soldiers	X		X			X
Falsify the training schedule to compensate for anticipated conflicts	X					X
Create an us vs. them climate with HQ			X			X
Jump the chain of command						X
Assume the battalion is just jerking you around			X			

P10. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to find out why the BN gives you changes on such short notice			X			

P10. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If changes are coming from the brigade, make that known to the BN commander	X		X			
Change is inevitable in the military and you just have to react			X			X
This is a green tab issue at a higher level than a LT				X		
This is a soldier issue of moral that can be corrected at the unit level			X			

P10. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If all levels work together, the negative effects on the soldiers can be minimized	X		X			
Advanced schedules are useful in that they provide warning to prepare for ranges, PT tests, etc.			X			
You should make the best use of the changes to build flexibility and strength into the plan and the people who put it together						X

P11. Your platoon has been working on building a range for 17 months. The assignment has been unpleasant. One reason for this is that the range site is more than an hour's drive away from the Army post. Suddenly, you are told that your platoon has to finish the project in the next three weeks. This will mean that you will have to stay out at the range and work nights, all in the summer heat of Georgia. What should you do to keep your soldiers motivated?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Tell the soldiers what to expect so they can plan ahead, even when you know the work will be unpleasant.	8.28	.78
Expose yourself to many of the same hardships as your soldiers by spending time with them in the hot sun, staying with them even when it is unpleasant, etc.	8.60	.70
Focus your efforts on providing for their basic needs--get them hot meals, weekends off, and ice in the field, for example.	8.48	.81
Do everything you can to get public recognition for your soldiers when the task is complete and they are back at the base--make sure everyone knows how hard they worked.	8.30	1.18
Speak to your company commander and try to arrange for a more pleasant assignment to follow this unpleasant one, and then let your soldiers know what is to come to give them something to look forward to.	7.50	1.53
Reward the soldiers for good work; let them know they are appreciated.	8.50	.71
Find out why the project is important, and then communicate these points to your soldiers to show them why their effort is meaningful.	8.36	.90
Give the soldiers a reward to look forward to, such as extra time off when the project is complete.	7.94	1.15
Empathize with the soldiers' situation and allow them to take steps to make themselves more comfortable, such as modifying their uniform.	5.92	2.31

P11. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Arrange for soldiers to return to main post to take care of personal business (e.g., family visits)	X			X	X	X
Arrange for extras such as special meals, civilian establishments, movies, swimming time	X	X	X	X		X
Focus the platoon on the importance of the mission		X	X	X	X	X
Establish a plan/time line for meeting the objective	X			X		
Request that the chain of command visit the soldiers at all hours of the day	X	X				X
Tell your platoon that the harder they work the sooner they will be finished			X		X	
Set up base camp operation at the range	X				X	X
Try to arrange for night classes on a college level and capitalize on a captive audience					X	
Inform the battalion commander of the situation		X				X
Look for assistance from within the BN for completing the job		X		X		X
Arrange the work in shifts so the soldiers don't get worn out from the morning sun		X	X	X		

P11. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Complain in front of the soldiers	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ignore the soldiers' situation or their needs			X	X	X	
Give them a direct order without guidance and expect them to follow it		X	X			X
Threaten or yell at the soldiers				X		
Let complaints take the focus off of completing the mission					X	
Make excuses for taking the mission						X
Keep the soldiers out there the whole time				X		
Sugarcoat the fact that it will be hard work				X		
Tell the platoon not to worry about the suspense						X

P11. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

P11. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
This is not unusual for construction type jobs	X			X		
The situation is probably the result of bad planning	X			X		
If soldiers are well-trained soldiers, they will be motivated						X

P11. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If soldiers know they will get an opportunity for time off, they will work harder to give others time off when needed				X		
It is important to remember that once the task is over, you are done					X	
Arranging for extras for the soldiers will keep them motivated		X	X			
As a leader, your attitude and behavior sets the tone for the whole platoon		X				X
If you go home because you are tired, the soldiers will interpret this action as indicating a lack of caring and selfishness		X	X			
Do not pass disagreements along to your NCOs because they will tell the soldiers and everyone will be unmotivated		X	X			

P12. You are a platoon leader, and you receive a new private. On his second day in your platoon, he says that he wants to kill himself. You refer the soldier to the Medical Health Center and the Chaplain. Soon after, you learn that the medical center has not assigned a person with relevant professional training to help the soldier. The Chaplain is not having much effect because the soldier is not religious. In general, you have doubts about the qualifications of the people assigned to help him. You are very concerned about this situation. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
On your own, confer with the mental health officials and ask their opinion.	6.74	1.71
Every time you speak with the soldier, make sure a witness is present to protect yourself from later misinterpretations or allegations about what was said.	4.94	1.68
Once the situation de-escalates, take the soldier on an extended training exercise where he can meet and establish friendships with fellow soldiers.	5.08	1.73
Ask the members of the platoon to help the new soldier by not making fun of him and by working together to keep an eye on him--let them know that they can make a big difference if they help out.	6.00	2.16
Speak with your commanding officers, inform them of the situation, and ask their opinion.	8.16	.96
Call the soldier's parents and ask for their advice and assistance.	4.86	2.47
Put your concerns and a list of the actions you have taken in writing to your commanding officer in order to protect yourself.	5.14	2.31
Take immediate action yourself by sitting down and talking with the soldier and giving him 24 hours to decide if he wants to stay in the Army.	2.72	1.74
Tell the private that he has to pull his weight and do his job.	3.56	1.73

P12. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to get medical health to assign relevant, trained personnel to the situation	X		X	X		X
Stay in touch with the soldier daily and stay on top of it until it is resolved	X		X			X
Maintain close supervision of this soldier until he is placed in care that you deem effective	X		X	X		X
Pair him up to work with you best NCO	X		X			
Assign a buddy to stay with the soldier at all times	X					X
Talk to the soldier about his concerns and ask the soldier what help he requires or wants						X
Do what you can to make the soldier understand that killing himself will not solve his problem			X			
*Keep the soldier busy with tasks that make him feel important						
If you do not get a response through the chain of command, take it to the 1SG			X	X		

P12. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore the situation and fail to take it seriously	X	X	X	X		X
Fail to inform the chain of command	X					X
Make the issue public with the platoon	X		X			X
Allow the soldier to be by himself	X					X
Try counseling the soldier yourself	X		X			X
Challenge the competency of the medical personnel through their channels						X

P12. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to find out why he wants to kill himself	X		X			
Try to find out if he has trouble adapting to Army life or if he has issues back home			X			

P12. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

P12. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do as much as possible but remember you still have a platoon to run				X		
Remember that you as the platoon leader are ultimately responsible for this soldier			X			
Pair him up with strong leaders who can be relied on to watch him and can provide him with good mentors			X			

P13. You are a new second lieutenant. Due to numerous inactivations you have been assigned to the battalion staff until a platoon becomes available. You are somewhat intimidated about working with people who outrank you by such an extent--your direct boss is the battalion executive officer. However, as an officer, you know you have a job to do. Rate the quality of the following strategies for establishing yourself as an effective officer in your new position:

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Do not try to act like you know it all.	8.16	1.15
Be assertive; do not be afraid of using your rank.	5.20	2.15
Do not worry about upsetting people, even higher-ranking officers, when you are doing your duty.	4.64	2.07
Be careful not to use words or say things that might offend people who outrank you.	6.06	1.86
Check with other lieutenants or captains and hear their opinions and get their input on an issue before taking the issue to the boss.	7.18	1.65
Be respectful when you speak to officers who outrank you.	8.42	.81
Approach competent officers directly, and ask frequently for their advice and help.	7.80	1.43
Find out who the competent officers are by reputation, then seek out these individuals and use them as mentors and sources of advice.	8.02	1.27
Concentrate on the facts you are trying to communicate when you speak to high-ranking officers--present the facts accurately and do not change what you are saying to avoid upsetting higher-ranking officer	7.96	1.38

P13. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do your job as if it were any assignment given to you and perform it to the best of your ability	X	X	X	X	X	X
Try to learn everything you can about your new position	X	X	X	X	X	X
Request that the XO counsel you and inform you of his expectations	X	X	X	X	X	X
Look for help when you do not understand something	X	X	X	X	X	X
Be confident; don't be intimidated	X	X	X	X	X	X
Take initiative, be aggressive and proactive		X	X	X	X	X
Try to accomplish tasks with minimal guidance	X				X	X
Seek advise from someone you trust						X
Depend on your NCO for guidance		X	X			X
Make the best of the situation						X
Attend all unit functions					X	
If the situation gets out of control, talk to the BN XO			X			
Tell the XO about your skills and background				X		
Let the XO know that you are intimidated by the senior officers		X		X		

P13. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Make excuses or harp on the fact that you are a new LT	X			X	X	
Let them see that you are intimidated	X		X	X		
Be afraid to voice your opinions or ask questions		X	X			
Leave your boss until you understand what he wants						X
Dump your responsibilities on your NCO			X		X	
Be lazy or fail to take initiative			X	X		
Complain or display a negative attitude		X	X			
Avoid the XO		X		X		X

P13. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

P13. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If the BN XO is smart, he will recognize your limited experience and provide a great deal of guidance and mentoring so you don't fail				X		
Any XO worth his/her salt would see this as an opportunity to develop a young officer and have a direct impact on him/her		X				X

P13. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
It is important to recognize that everyone was new at one time	X	X				X
It is important to remember that superiors are people too			X			
Look at the situation as one in which LTs do not normally get a chance to excel in						X
If you have questions, there is no better place to be than with the battalion staff to ask questions				X		
It is better to ask for assistance than to try to show you can do everything because it will just get you in over your head		X	X			
Being proactive rather than reactive shows initiative		X		X		
Once you have accomplished a few missions, the BN XO will see that you are competent and have faith in your abilities		X	X			
If you gain the respect of the senior officers and NCOs on the battalion staff, you will be successful when you get your platoon because PLs seek often seek the aid of staff personnel		X	X			

P14. You and your company commander don't talk about your performance very often. When you do, he usually blows up and chews you out, but never explains what you did wrong. In fact, you rarely know exactly what your company commander thinks of you or what he expects. He generally just tells you what he wants, and that's it: He never communicates with you concerning your overall performance or development. What should you do in a situation with this type of company commander?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Have a friendly competition with the other platoon leaders in order to set goals and judge your progress.	4.32	1.52
Speak to another company commander about your problem and ask for his advice.	3.35	1.83
Avoid talking to other officers about your complaints about your company commander--figure things out for yourself as best you can.	4.59	1.87
Try to learn by talking with others about the boss's likes and dislikes, in order to understand his style and expectations.	7.02	1.35
Use your fellow lieutenants as a feedback group to determine how your performance compares with that of your peers.	6.22	1.54
Ask the first sergeant if your subordinates are having problems with the company commander, so that you can counsel them.	4.22	1.96
Accept the fact that this is just the way your company commander is, and drive on.	5.38	1.95
Ask the XO or senior lieutenant questions about the boss's opinion of you as a way of getting more information.	6.06	1.86
Recognize that cooperation among the lieutenants in a company is key to the success of a platoon leader, and make sure that you cooperate with the other platoon leaders.	7.68	1.20
Use your fellow lieutenants as a social support group to determine if your experiences with the company commander are normal.	7.04	1.11
Assume that when your boss is not chewing you out, it basically means that he is satisfied.	4.92	2.00
Use your fellow lieutenants as a social support structure to vent your feelings and reduce your stress.	5.54	1.97
Approach your company commander, explain that your goal is to do and be your best, and tactfully ask him for detailed performance feedback and developmental counseling.	8.20	.90
Speak to platoon leaders in other companies about your performance and frustrations.	3.46	1.68
Ask the first sergeant what the company commander says about you behind your back.	2.52	1.55

P14. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Use the OER support form as more of a guide to know what the commander expects	X		X			
Request a meeting the CO right away to discuss the issue	X					X
Have the BC put feedback down on a general counseling form and refer to the initial counseling expectations	X		X			
Make sure that every time you get a mission from him, that he defines the goal, his intent, and the measures of success that he feels will be addressed	X			X		X
Solicit advice and opinions about your performance from the 1SG	X		X			
Approach the CO and ask questions				X		
Use the chain of command to get feedback			X			
Try to anticipate or discern your weak and strong areas			X			

P14. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Challenge the commander openly or criticize him	X		X			X
Wait to talk to him about the issue	X					X
Avoid contact with the commander	X		X			X
Ignore the issue	X			X		
Jump the chain of command			X			X
Excuse the CO's behavior as a leadership style						X
Continue to bother the commander			X			

P14. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to find out why the BC yells at you			X			

P14. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You should have been initially counseled where the commander presents his/her expectations	X		X			
There may be a problem that you are unaware of and once you explain that to the BC, he may take more time to explain why he is upset with you			X			

P14. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

P15. You are a medical service platoon leader, and you have been in the unit for several months. You have frequently seen your peers yelling at soldiers when the soldiers make a mistake. You do the same thing when one of your squads does not follow the platoon's standardized load plan--and you really lose control. You believe you were out of line, and you did not achieve the desired results. You also believe that yelling at people is demeaning and wrong. What should you do now?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Recognize that it is not appropriate to scream at people, and that there are other, more effective ways to handle situations.	8.38	.85
Think about how your superior officers' anger has or would affect you--try to put yourself in the shoes of the sergeant and the other soldiers.	8.18	.92
Apologize with sincerity to the squad.	6.66	1.80
Write a note to yourself on your camouflage notebook that says "Control Your Temper," in order to remind you to stay in control.	5.12	1.94
Ask yourself how other effective leaders at your level would have handled the situation, and make plans to modify your behavior accordingly in the future.	7.72	.90
Speak to the chaplain or a counselor about how you might better control your temper.	5.72	1.94
Next time you are about to lose your temper, practice a technique like counting to ten several times to delay and hopefully stifle your outburst.	6.64	1.32
Sit down with your soldiers and explain why you felt so strongly about the ambulances' standardization; try to make them see why you felt this was worth yelling about.	5.72	2.19
Take deliberate action to reward soldier initiatives in the future to encourage them to be more forward.	6.37	1.86
Ask your company commander for ideas about how you should have handled the situation.	6.48	1.72
Accept that even though you may not like to do it, being in the Army sometimes means yelling at others.	4.26	1.95
Ask other platoon leaders whom you admire for their advice about handling similar situations in the future.	6.84	1.72

P15. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Admit to the platoon that you made a mistake	X	X	X	X	X	
Tell the PSG and squad leaders that you bad about the way you handled the situation		X	X	X		
Resolve to better deal with substandard performance	X				X	X
Ensure that everyone knows what the standard is and have them redo the task	X	X		X	X	X
Explain to the platoon that you were dissatisfied with their performance and that instructions must be followed		X	X		X	X
Explain to the platoon that you must work together as a team			X	X		
Work through your NCOs to deal with substandard performance	X					X
Develop a formal counseling program for the unit						X
Give anyone who want to speak a chance to express anything of concern			X			
Ask the PSG and squad leaders on how to improve your performance in the future			X			
Ask the squad leader if he can suggest another way of doing the task		X		X		
Supervise the loading yourself next time						X
If they do not meet the standard a second time, counsel them						X
Acknowledge that they are doing a good job and encourage them to continue			X			
Tell the platoon that you realize that they are human and make mistakes, that they will learn from their experiences and drive on		X		X		

P15. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do not repeat the behavior	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lose your control					X	X
Make a public apology					X	X
Ignore what happened		X	X	X		X
Yell at someone in public		X	X			X
Make excuses about your actions			X			

P15. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ask questions to get the facts about the situation					X	

P15. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Not every situation calls for yelling, but if you believe that yelling is demeaning, then you may need to consider a different career		X	X			

P15. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Remember to praise in public and discipline in private	X					X
Let the platoon know that losing your temper was not the proper way to fix things and didn't achieve anything					X	
If yelling does not accomplish your desired endstate, then it is probably not a good leadership style						X
If you lose your military bearing, you will lose the soldiers' respect and confidence in you	X		X	X		
Don't look for their forgiveness when apologizing, just do it because it is the right thing to do			X			
Apologize to the platoon because this will gain their respect and credibility		X				X
In the future, treat soldiers with dignity and respect				X		
Remember that you are humans first and soldiers second		X	X			
Yell at the NCO because they are responsible for seeing that the soldiers meet the standard		X				X

TACIT KNOWLEDGE FOR MILITARY LEADERS:
COMPANY COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE

C1. You take over a newly-formed company as a company commander. At the same time, the company also receives a new first sergeant, two new platoon leaders, two platoon sergeants, and a supply sergeant. You quickly begin to perceive that the soldiers in the company have a bad attitude regarding training. A few weeks after taking command, you deploy the unit to the field for a 21-day Field Training Exercise (FTX). There, you again observe (on the second day of the FTX) that the soldiers' performance is poor. For example, their stand-to procedures don't meet your standards. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Call your key leaders together and communicate your training standards in terms of the company's METL.	7.74	1.31
Sit down with your first sergeant, discuss the situation, and ask for his opinion.	8.08	0.88
Talk to the informal leaders in the company (for example, specialists who have demonstrated knowledge gained by reading field and training manuals) <u>privately</u> to find out <u>why</u> the soldiers have a negative attitude about training.	4.39	2.21
Call a company meeting and communicate clearly your training standards in terms of the company's mission-essential task list.	5.34	2.45
Speak to your platoon leaders as a group, but away from the soldiers, tell them your standards and show them how to deal with the stand-to problem.	7.82	1.06
Speak with each of your platoon leaders individually and privately and tell each one to deal with the problem.	4.39	1.95
Give the platoon leaders several more days to conduct their own training so that you can more closely observe and interact with the soldiers.	4.74	2.54
Personally inspect the stand-to procedures--inspect each fighting position and range card yourself.	5.76	2.55
Call a company meeting, tell the platoon leaders to stand off to the side, ask the soldiers why their performance is poor, and listen to their reasons.	2.11	1.69
Get the first sergeant and the platoon leaders together to discuss the situation with you.	7.18	1.77
Threaten disciplinary action to the entire company if the stand-to procedures are not performed well during your next inspection.	1.42	0.83
Conduct an After Action Review on stand-to and define your criteria for success.	7.97	1.1
Speak to the battalion commander and get his advice and direction regarding the best way to handle the problem.	4.79	2.28
Call a company meeting fully involving the platoon leaders, ask the soldiers why their performance is poor, and listen to their reasons.	3.62	2.28
Investigate where the soldiers got their prior ideas about what constituted acceptable standards.	4.32	2.3
Bring in the entire chain of command, all at once, for a group discussion about the situation.	4.84	2.13

C1. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Hold the leadership accountable for executing the plan and enforcing standards	X				X	X
Build a team	X					X
Have the ISG check the PSGs' understanding and initiative corrective training thru the NCOs	X					X
Establish higher standards	X					X
Reinforce the existing standards	X			X	X	
If reinforcing the standards is ineffective, counsel everyone in writing on their performance	X			X		
If reinforcing the standards is effective, counsel everyone on a good job				X		
Pick one or two things to fix each day and continue to improve in lacking areas	X			X		X
Observe soldiers' performance and spot check stand-to procedures	X			X	X	X
Approach the situation from a developmental perspective			X			
Establish section level training priorities and a train the trainer program					X	
Ask for feedback from the NCOs					X	X
Establish a written SOP to ensure there are no questions to your decisions		X	X			
After several AARs, reassess the situation and remove from positions individuals with attitude problems		X	X			
Cite specific examples of what was done well and what was done bad		X	X			
Reinforce an achievement attitude		X	X			

C1. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Yell at the soldiers or leaders	X	X		X	X	X
Accept low standards	X			X		X
Ignore the situation	X		X	X		X
Immediately change all SOPs	X					X
Punish soldiers for not meeting the standards				X		
Let that everyone is new be an excuse			X			
Try to fix the problem alone or depend only on the officers to fix the problem			X	X		X
Fail to let your staff know your intentions and standards						X
Complain with your soldiers		X	X			

C1. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Determine if the problem is a matter of compliance or guidance	X					X
Try to find out why morale is so low					X	

C1. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Soldiers have a poor attitude about training because training was bad						X
It is possible that you did not make your philosophy, vision or intent clear						X
This is essentially the crawl phase for the company					X	
Nobody likes the 1SG—it is not his job to be liked			X			

C1. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Soldiers don't like to waste time; improve training and the attitude will improve						X
Holding leaders accountable for fixing the problems makes them feel like they are part of the solution part of the team				X		
The section leaders have the biggest mission in the FTX because they need to change the "old habits"					X	
Don't come down on them hard because it is a newly formed unit that needs time to develop						X
The 1SG is not the soldier's buddy--he needs to ensure that standards are met		X	X			
As a new commander, you need to ensure that soldiers see you doing the right things as well		X	X			

C2. You are a company commander on your final National Training Center (NTC) rotation as a company commander. Your company is cross-attached to a mechanized infantry battalion to form a task force. Before you deployed to the NTC, you were given a new platoon leader (and his platoon) who had been transferred from another company in order to get a second chance. You have reason to believe he is weak tactically. When the task force is organized into company teams, you are required to provide a platoon to an infantry company. You have been advised by your first sergeant to send this new platoon over to the infantry company. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Give the weak lieutenant specific step-by-step instructions regarding how to do his job.	4.84	2.16
Talk to the first sergeant, ask him to explain the reasons for his opinion, and listen to these reasons closely before making a decision.	7.32	1.34
Send your best tank platoon over to the infantry company.	6.63	1.79
Keep both your strongest and weakest platoons and send an average-performing platoon over to the infantry company.	6.61	1.33
Send the new platoon leader and his platoon over to the infantry company.	2.66	1.62
Speak to the soldiers in the poorly-performing platoon: Tell them you have confidence in their ability to perform well, and that to display your level of confidence you are sending them over to the infantry company where they will represent your company.	3.76	2.06
Send the platoon you would normally send.	7.34	1.62
Send the weak platoon leader out with a strong company to observe and learn, without giving him any responsibility.	3.59	2.14
Have a closed-door talk with the weak lieutenant: Tell him he has a free opportunity to learn here, and he should do his best to learn what he can and then call you with any problems.	6.47	2.04
Speak to your battalion commander and tell him that you were given this new, ill-prepared platoon leader before you deployed to the NTC, and ask for his direction in making your decision.	3.21	2.15
Speak to the platoon leader; try to uncover the reasons for his weaknesses, and deal with these issues as best you can.	7.16	1.44
Tell your platoon sergeant to look out for the weak lieutenant.	5.26	2.48

C2. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Make sure he understands what he is doing before sending him	X		X			
Make him part of the team			X			
If you disagree with the ISG, tell him why						X
Give this platoon leader and his platoon an assignment and see if they can execute it to standard			X			
Give him the opportunity and if he messes up, make it a teaching point		X	X			
Keep the "weak" PL under close surveillance		X		X		
Mentor and work with the PL as much as possible to get his platoon up to standard		X	X	X		

C2. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Say no the ISG based solely on the information provided						X
Do what the ISG says just because he said so						X
Avoid giving the new officer an opportunity to succeed	X	X		X		X
Fail to give him proper guidance and training		X	X			X
Tell him that you heard he is weak and you must watch over him						X
Send the weak platoon		X	X			

C2. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Talk to the new platoon leader and key leaders in the platoon to get a sense of how they think they will perform	X		X			
Assess whether mechanized infantry CO is strong enough to handle and train the less capable leader						X
Assess whether the platoon has a strong PSG who can manage the task						X

C2. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You should have a TAC SOP that clearly defines which platoon should be attached to an infantry company				X		

C2. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Weigh mission requirements vs. training value in deciding which platoon to send			X			
Send another platoon because you have not had enough time to evaluate the "weak" platoon leader			X			
If that platoon is attached to the infantry company, that platoon should go				X		
If you continue to pass off the LT on others, he will not develop professionally and his soldiers and the Army will suffer in the long run		X	X			
Provide the weak platoon with extra training because you have a responsibility to professionally develop your subordinates		X	X	X		
Send a more experienced platoon so as to not embarrass your company or battalion		X	X			

C3. You are a company commander, and your battalion commander is the type of person who seems always to "shoot the messenger"--he does not like to be surprised by bad news, and he tends to take his anger out on the person who brought him the bad news. You want to build a positive, professional relationship with your battalion commander. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Speak to your battalion commander about his behavior and share your perception of it.	5.00	2.68
Attempt to keep the battalion commander "over-informed" by telling him what is occurring in your unit on a regular basis (e.g., daily or every other day).	4.95	1.9
Speak to the sergeant major and see if she/he is willing to try to influence the battalion commander.	5.82	2.14
Keep the battalion commander informed only on important issues, but don't bring up issues you don't have to discuss with him.	5.50	2.15
When you bring a problem to your battalion commander, bring a solution at the same time.	8.53	0.6
Disregard the battalion commander's behavior: Continue to bring him news as you normally would.	6.53	2.1
Tell your battalion commander all of the good news you can, but try to shield him from hearing the bad news.	1.92	1.08
Tell the battalion commander as little as possible; deal with problems on your own if at all possible.	2.47	1.31

C3. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Make sure all news is reported quickly and without delay	X	X	X			X
Meet with the BN CDR upon assuming command to lay out your goals and objectives	X					X
Use the chain of command (e.g., the BN XO, 1SG, SMG) to pass along information to the BN CDR	X			X		X
Recognize that the BN CDR's behavior is not personal	X					X
Let the BN CDR know that you are being proactive to prevent the event from escalating					X	
Explain to the BN CDR the different situations you face and ask for his understanding				X		
Continue to be professional in dealing with the CDR		X	X	X		X
Be prepared to answer the BC's questions when you bring him bad news			X			
Tell the CDR that if he continues to "shoot the messenger" he will be kept less informed						X
Continue to perform your duties as required		X	X	X		

C3. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Avoid telling him bad news	X		X	X		X
Never waiver from your integrity	X			X		X
Argue with or confront the boss	X	X	X	X		X
Give bad news without a solution				X		
Delegate problems to another soldier to avoid possible repercussions from the BC		X		X		

C3. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C3. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Situations like this are not that unusual—most people take things out on the messenger	X	X	X			X
There is not much you can do-- you can't change the BN CDR				X		X
Good units do not have much bad news						X
The BC is either acting immature or trying a hard line leadership					X	

C3. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Be upfront and timely with bad news so as not to surprise the BN CDR	X				X	X
Report bad news because it doesn't get better with time		X	X	X		X
If you stop reporting information this will cause distrust and loss of confidence	X					X
Allowing the BN CDR to have input in setting your goals and objectives will help develop a good working relationship	X					X
It is your job to keep the CDR informed of all issues, negative or positive						X
To have a positive, professional relationship you must do what the CDR requires and not overload him with extra stuff					X	
If you do a good job, you will build the kind of relationship you want						
You need to have a thick skin and ensure that you don't take things personally		X	X			X

C4. You are a company commander on a battalion-level field training exercise. Your unit has just completed a night move and has been in position for about two hours. At midnight, you learn that a weapon is missing. The platoon sergeant with responsibility for weapons is confident that he knows where the weapon is because he saw it during the sensitive-items check completed after he arrived. A sensitive-item report is due to brigade at 0400 hours. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
If you are confident the weapon will be found at first light, submit a sensitive item report stating that all weapons are accounted for.	1.11	0.39
Do not speak to the battalion commander until shortly before the sensitive-item report is due; at this point, completely and honestly report all of your actions since the weapon was discovered missing.	3.29	2.59
Immediately mobilize everyone in the unit, and conduct a 100% inventory followed by a hands-on search.	7.68	1.92
Before the sensitive-item report deadline, notify the battalion executive officer of the situation in person.	5.53	2.49
Consult the standing operating procedures manual to ensure that you follow the rules correctly.	7.29	2.01
Immediately notify the battalion commander and tell him your plans for finding the weapon and resolving the incident.	7.63	1.7
If the weapon is not located within one hour, notify the entire chain of command of the lost weapon.	6.24	2.41

C4. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Have the PSG get the weapon and show it to you	X		X	X		
Have the PSG recommend a best-case scenario on what happened to the weapon and initiate a search			X			X
Prepare to send up a report as soon as possible				X		
Request additional resources to assist in the search						X
Put on night vision goggles and notify higher ups that they might see some lights		X		X		
From that point on ensure that all soldiers have all sensitive items dummy corded to their person		X		X		

C4. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Hide the fact that there is a missing weapon from your superiors	X	X	X	X		X
Delay in reporting the missing weapon						X
Fail to report it because you think it will be found						X
Wait to do the search						X
Involve the whole company in the search						X
Panic						X
Take anyone's word about the weapon		X	X			

C4. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C4. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Usually the SOP states to inform the proper elements immediately upon realization that a weapon is lost	X		X			

C4. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Report bad news right away because it does not get better with age	X		X			
Organize a search because it is better than jumping to any conclusions		X	X			

C5. You are a company commander. Your battalion is training for gunnery. Currently, all of the companies are well-prepared to pass gunnery. There is a great deal of competition among the companies and all of the commanders have Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs) due in the next few months. You have an NCO (platoon sergeant) in your unit who just arrived from teaching gunnery at the branch school. He tells you about some advanced training techniques using available equipment that have significantly improved gunnery scores in other units. This information has not been made available to units in the field. After some practice with the techniques, you find that they significantly improve the scores of your sections. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Do nothing--allow the information about the training techniques to be passed through NCO channels if it comes up.	2.42	1.6
Share the information about the training techniques with the battalion commander, then tell all of the other company commanders.	8.21	1.07
Train your company using the information, execute gunnery--presumably beating all of your fellow company commanders--then tell everyone how you did it after the fact.	2.26	1.43
Initiate a meeting with all company commanders, platoon leaders, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants, and have your new platoon sergeant present and describe the techniques.	7.11	2.12
Tell the platoon sergeant to keep close hold over the information about the training techniques so that only your company possesses this information.	1.53	0.83

C5. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Incorporate the techniques into all gunnery practices	X					X
Acknowledge the NCO who provided the information	X			X		X
Fight to keep the BN CSM from taking your PSG and making him the Master Gunner	X					X
Share the information with the BN Master Gunner					X	
Use the techniques and inform the BN CDR about the techniques that have improved scores		X	X	X		
At the BN CDR's request, make the techniques available to other companies				X		
Stick to the current techniques which are shown to be successful because not everyone may adapt to the new techniques		X	X			

C5. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Use them and don't tell others	X	X	X	X	X	X
Not use the techniques	X		X	X		X
Disclose the information during staff meeting					X	
Tell the BN CDR until you have proof that the new techniques work				X		X
Use it only to advance your career						X
Fail to credit the new PSG						X
Force soldiers to learn something new right before a major test		X	X			

C5. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C5. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If they are proven to work, then share the information						X
If you view it as a chance to improve your OER, then share the information						X
If you view it as a chance to beat the competition, then keep the information to yourself						X
People often withhold information for their own benefit				X		

C5. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Sharing the information will improve the battalion rather than just the company	X	X	X		X	X
Sharing the information is the right thing to do	X					X
Sharing the information will make you look get and you will get the OER you are looking for	X			X		X
Share the information because you are training for combat, not for OERs		X	X			
Don't worry about evaluations because if you're a poor performer, the Army will find out anyway				X		
Share the information with the Master Gunner because he will concentrate on getting the battalion up to speed		X	X			

C6. You are a battery commander. Consequently, you work for both your battalion commander and the brigade commander whom you support. During preparation time for the National Training Center (NTC), you are also preparing for a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Your battalion commander is interested in the BCTP, but the maneuver brigade commander wants you to focus on the NTC. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Find out from the battalion commander what his priority is: Get your battalion commander's guidance and act accordingly.	7.58	1.81
Focus on BCTP regardless.	3.35	1.89
Place your priority on the training event that will most benefit your soldiers (NTC), regardless of the wishes of the battalion and brigade commanders.	3.79	1.79
Focus equally on the two training events.	5.45	1.84
If both training events have equal training value, then support the event scheduled by your battalion commander (BCTP).	4.16	1.99
Focus on NTC regardless.	3.30	1.84
Focus on your weakest area.	6.05	1.56
If both training events have equal training value, then support the brigade commander's wishes (NTC).	4.03	1.55

C6. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do everything possible to accomplish both tasks to standard		X	X	X		
Inform both CDRs of the situation and ask which one is the priority	X		X			X
Set priorities based on the advice of the two commanders	X		X			
Focus on the areas where the two training preparations overlap and focus on them						X
Keep both CDRs informed at all times as to the focus of your efforts						X
Make the rater's mission your priority		X		X		
Inform the BN CDR of the conflict ask that he resolve the problem with the BDE CDR		X	X			

C6. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Blow one of them off	X	X	X	X		X
Let yourself get stuck between the two senior commanders						X
Favor one CDR over the other without talking to the BN CDR		X	X			X
Overtask your resources to accomplish both missions						X
Provide excuses						X

C6. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out who rates you		X		X		

C6. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If your battery needs you to prep for NTC, you are in big trouble				X		
If there is a problem, the BN CDR can address it with the BDE CDR		X	X			

C6. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
This is not as much of a dilemma as it seems because the preparation requirements often overlap						X
You should anticipate conflicting or competing requirements ahead of time in order to plan alternatives or provide advance notification of your inability to support both requirements						X
If the battery is ready for NTC, focus on BC/TP or vice versa			X			
If the BDE CDR has a problem with your tasking and preparation, he has to take the issue up with the BN CDR		X	X			

C7. You are a new company commander. There are a lot of things you want to fix in the company. You have quickly become overwhelmed by the many pressures you face and the many demands on your time. You realize that you cannot possibly do everything. What should you do to better manage your key leaders and your time so that you are able to accomplish more in the same amount of time? Rate the following strategies:

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Have your key leaders execute the alternative after you select it.	4.42	1.94
Allow key leaders on their own to select alternatives to solve problems and implement these strategies.	5.87	2.27
Use key leaders to solve problems by having them research alternatives in their area of responsibility that would solve the problems and report these alternatives to you.	7.34	1.56
Try to report earlier in the morning and/or stay later at night to get more done.	3.21	1.88
Give your key leaders more specific directions when it comes to solving problems—tell them what to do to get the job done.	4.21	2.09
Learn to spot check by walking around the company area and getting a general idea of what's going on--don't feel compelled to check every single thing personally.	7.82	0.83

C7. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Delegate authority to key subordinate leaders for accomplishing tasks	X	X	X	X	X	X
Prioritize what is important and focus on the priorities	X			X	X	X
Meet with subordinate leaders regularly to get updates and issue guidance	X	X		X	X	X
Evenly distribute tasks to ensure completion	X			X		X
Provide key leaders with the resources to accomplish assigned tasks	X	X	X			X
Manage your time and help key leaders manage their time	X					X
Work on the high payoff task yourself						X
Find out what the boss wants you to do and do that first				X		X
Reward those that support your ideas and punish those who do not				X		
Hold weekly training meetings	X				X	X
Publish a calendar/schedule of when certain milestones are due		X	X			X
Supervise all tasks		X	X			

C7. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to do everything yourself	X	X	X	X	X	X
Try to fix everything "now"					X	
Avoid things you cannot get to and allow things to pile up any further	X			X		X
Focus only on the few people that are capable of doing everything you want in a timely manner				X		
Tell someone to do something and not follow up				X		
Hold meetings for the sake of meeting	X					X
Lose sight of what is important					X	

C7. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out where the greatest training needs lie					X	

C7. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
This happens to every new CDR	X					X
You just know which tasks to deal with first						X
There is no doubt as a company CDR that you just can't do it all						X

C7. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
The only way to swallow an elephant is one bit at a time	X					X
By trying to do everything yourself, you accomplish little and fail to provide training/growth for your subordinates						X
Failure to take action now will only cause more problems later						X
You have to empower the junior officers and NCOs in order to get the job done						X
Conducting weekly meetings allows everyone to see what you are trying to accomplish and generates new ideas				X		
Micromanaging subordinate leaders will cause them to get frustrated and not perform to standard		X	X			
Your subordinate leaders are responsible for ensuring that their subordinate leaders are getting the job done		X	X			

C8. You are a new company commander who has just taken over your unit. One of your soldiers is leaving the army. The supply sergeant brings you a Report of Survey and a \$250 Statement of Charges for the soldier's missing TA-50 and asks you to sign one or the other. You talk to the soldier and learn that the equipment was lost on re-deployment and that the chain of command had not taken appropriate action. The soldier had notified the old commander three times in writing, saying that his equipment was missing--but the commander took no action because he did not want to submit a late Report of Survey. (The Battalion Commander also did not want any late reports of survey.) The soldier says he will sign the Statement of Charges because he just wants to get out. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
In spite of his dislike for late reports, notify the battalion commander that you are initiating a late report of survey on the soldier's lost TA-50.	7.97	1.17
Have the supply sergeant validate the statements made by collecting relevant information from the soldier and other sources, put this information together, and bring it to the battalion commander.	8.05	1.09
Initiate a late report of survey <u>without</u> first informing the battalion commander.	3.05	1.47
Point out to the battalion commander that the chain of command failed to properly uphold its responsibility and failed the soldier, and explain that this situation must be rectified now.	6.53	2.08
Allow the soldier to sign the Statement of Charges so that he can leave.	2.13	1.28
If the battalion commander is hard on company commanders who initiate late Reports of Survey, <u>do not</u> initiate the report.	1.66	0.85
Attempt to contact the past company commander to find out why, exactly, he did not take care of the situation.	4.84	2.27

C8. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ensure that subordinate leaders know how to properly account for equipment	X			X		
Give the previous CDR an opportunity to sign the survey						X

C8. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Have the soldier sign the statement of charges	X	X		X		X
Confront the BN CDR about his desire to avoid late Reports of Survey						X
Fail to thoroughly investigate the situation						X
Let the soldier leave the Army with a bad impression						X
Try to cover for the CDR by punishing the soldier		X	X	X		

C8. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C8. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
The chain of command failed its responsibility			X			
It is not the soldier's fault and he should not have to pay for a mistake his chain of command made		X	X			
Give the soldier the benefit of the doubt		X	X			

C8. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Initiate the survey because that it what is fair to the soldier	X	X	X			X
Process the Report of Survey because it is the right thing to do the BN CDR sets the tone to do things right the first time out of the box			X			X
Inform the BN CDR that this could become a IG issue if the soldier decides to file a complaint						X
Allowing the soldier to sign the statement is wrong because it would be a disservice to the soldier		X	X			
The issue here is accountability—the soldier did not maintain accountability of his equipment		X		X		

C9. It is the first week of your command as a new company commander, and you want to establish yourself quickly as an effective leader. You have assessed the current physical training program, and you believe it could use a total overhaul in order to ensure that the company will meet the PT standards. Your company does not have a qualified master fitness trainer. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Ask for a volunteer from the entire company to take charge and run the PT program, and supervise this individual very closely.	3.49	1.8
Talk to your first sergeant and get his/her advice.	8.00	0.97
Ask for a volunteer from among your platoon sergeants and platoon leaders to take charge and run the PT program, and supervise this individual very closely.	4.41	2.17
Offer a reward or incentive to any soldier who comes up with the best idea for how to revamp the PT program.	4.16	2.36
Publicly praise and reward soldiers who demonstrate initiative in revamping the PT program.	5.84	1.89
Consult a fellow commander who has a solid fitness program for guidance and suggestions.	7.35	1.06
Ask for a volunteer from among your platoon sergeants and platoon leaders to take charge and run the PT program, and give this person the authority to do it his/her way.	4.86	2.08
Assess the company's other goals and decide which of the goals is most important before taking action on the PT program overhaul.	5.49	1.98
Appoint the most competent person to work with you in revamping the PT program.	6.70	1.73
Ask the soldiers and key leaders for their ideas and suggestions before deciding on a course of action.	6.27	2.23
Ask for a volunteer from the entire company to take charge and run the PT program, and give this person the authority to do it his/her way.	3.89	2.08
Speak with your battalion commander to get his/her suggestions regarding the PT overhaul before deciding on a course of action.	6.14	1.84

C9. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Get someone trained as a master fitness trainer	X	X	X	X	X	X
Work with the ISG myself to revise the PT program	X			X	X	X
Have the unit take a diagnostic PT test	X			X	X	X
Have a master fitness trainer assess the unit PT program and provide a recommendation	X	X		X	X	X
Have key leadership trained by a master fitness trainer from another battery until an NCO is fully trained	X	X	X		X	X
Have the top NCOs in the platoon develop and implement a PT program and hold them accountable for ensuring that PT standards are met	X	X	X	X	X	X
Revise the program in accordance with an existing training model				X	X	X
Establish checkpoints to evaluate progress (i.e., monthly PT tests) and get soldiers reactions to the new program	X			X		X
Ensure that all NCOs know that what the goal is for achieving PT standards and that they follow the program	X			X		X
Be present at all PT sessions and let the soldiers see you go first in each event	X				X	X
Challenge the unit to excel by offering rewards and recognition (e.g., honor board showing individual achievements)	X					X
Take advantage of recognized Army programs like "fit to fight"					X	
Ask superiors to send a master fitness trainer to your company				X		
Talk about healthy eating during formation					X	
Institute a PT program that you had success with in the past		X		X		

C9. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore the problem	X			X	X	X
Revamp the PT program without consulting key leaders and doing more research	X			X		X
Always lead PT yourself	X			X		
Institute your own personal program				X	X	
Make total changes to the PT program all at once			X			
Start a vigorous PT program without assessing the impact on duty performance	X					X
Try to initiate the program without having someone who is properly trained				X		
Wait to do something until someone is trained as a master fitness trainer					X	X
Set unattainable goals						X
Complain to your BN CDR		X		X		

C9. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out why there is a PT problem				X		

C9. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You should not try to change anything after being in command a week				X	X	
There is nothing soldiers dislike more than getting up early to attend bad training						X
The Army allocates time for this training, so you should make it effective						X
All NCOs and officers should be able to give effective PT					X	
Deployments, taskings, maintenance, and so on may have kept your soldiers too busy to do PT				X		

C9. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Getting your NCOs trained will allow them to conduct better PT and show that they are prepared to lead your soldiers	X					X
It is important to identify the real problem before you go off half cocked				X		

C10. You are a new company commander. The previous commander was a micromanager. This individual was extremely detail-oriented, gave very little positive feedback and often tore down the platoon leaders when even the slightest infraction occurred. For example, the old company commander noted one day that one of the platoon leaders was wearing a dirty soft-cap, and he called the entire platoon a disgrace. This behavior on the part of the outgoing company commander was very hard on the platoon leaders. Several developed nervous conditions such as ulcers and sleep problems. Your goal is to create a more positive leadership atmosphere in the unit. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Give all unit members more responsibility than they had before, and hold them accountable.	7.11	1.87
When you must give negative feedback to your platoon leaders, do so constructively, pointing out specific areas that need improvement and explaining how this improvement can be achieved.	8.37	0.82
Allow the platoon leaders and their soldiers the benefit of the doubt--don't jump to negative conclusions.	7.95	1.14
Assign work goals with clear milestones to all officers.	7.76	1.48
Involve senior NCOs in the decision-making process.	8.00	1.16
Give the platoon leaders frequent, specific positive feedback.	8.16	0.95
Continue with the micromanagement style since it is common practice in the company, and relieve and/or replace the lieutenants who cannot handle the stress.	1.39	0.82
Let your subordinates know your intent and then let them develop their own plans.	7.24	1.62
Recognize soldiers' achievements with awards.	7.79	1.85
Have positive expectations: State often that you believe that every member of the unit has the ability to perform well if he or she applies himself or herself and works hard.	8.42	0.89

C10. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Emphasize that your role is to mentor and guide the platoon leaders	X	X	X			
Let the PLs know that they can and should come to you if they have issues to discuss or need advice			X			X
Convey to your key leaders your leadership style, command philosophy and standards	X	X	X			X
Make changes in a timely, but not too abrupt manner	X		X			
Hold a company sensing session to assess the command climate		X	X			
Try to create a command climate that allows for honest mistakes and encourages initiative		X	X			X
Treat others with respect		X		X		
Do everything the previous commander didn't do (i.e., don't micromanage)		X	X	X		
Correct actions that fail to meet standards			X			
Have your subordinates teach you about their jobs		X	X	X		
Try to get some new PLs that aren't as thin shelled and spineless		X		X		

C10. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Continue the same behaviors or foster the same atmosphere	X	X	X	X		X
Be intolerant of honest mistakes and shoot the messenger of bad news						X
Fail to be available to your subordinates and provide them with regular feedback						X
Fail to correct behavior or punish when called for						X
Punish in public without overwhelming reason to do so						X
Coddle the units and allow standards to fall						X
Apologize for the previous CDR						X

C10. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out what the leadership is capable of doing		X		X		

C10. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
It is possible that the last BC was a micromanager for a good reason		X		X		
It is possible that the BC was too scared to let the junior officers and NCOs fail		X		X		

C10. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You cannot micromanage—you must let your soldiers do their work				X		
Realize that in order to have great command climate, the junior leadership must be allowed to manage and make mistakes with their soldiers		X		X		

C11. You are a company commander with a new brigade commander. Before the new brigade commander took over, the battalion conducted After Action Reviews by critiquing each training task according to the Mission Training Plan. The new brigade commander asks to see how AARs are conducted in the brigade—he wants to find someone who does AARs improperly so he can use this individual as an example to show what needs to be improved. When the brigade commander observes you he says he does not like your AAR format and he feels you are critiquing instead of letting the soldiers talk. Thus, you must now develop a system for listening more to your soldiers while still maintaining an effective command. Rate the quality of the following strategies.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Ask yourself why you talk when you do and evaluate whether you need to speak at these times to optimally benefit your unit.	7.47	1.64
Listen most to soldiers who have the best interest of the unit at heart and have no hidden agendas.	6.55	1.66
Ask around among the soldiers to discover the informal leaders in the group, then seek out and listen to these soldiers.	4.42	1.67
Try listening at moments when you would customarily talk.	7.61	1.15
When soldiers' safety is at risk, use directive leadership instead of listening.	7.45	2.19
Whenever you have time, seek out your soldiers, ask them questions, and listen to their opinions and views.	7.84	1.13
Do not listen to soldiers when they lack the knowledge necessary to make a decision.	2.50	1.39
Schedule regular meetings with your NCOs when you just sit and talk about the unit—and make these meetings times when you do less talking and more listening.	7.03	1.48
Listen most to soldiers who are squared away and who command the respect of other soldiers.	5.66	1.66
Listen to soldiers who are willing to express their opinions before a group.	5.42	1.65

C11. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Observe an AAR that meets the standard and change your AAR to match	X			X		X
Do as the BDE CDR says and allow soldiers input about what happened in the AAR and suggestions for improving it	X	X	X	X	X	X
Review the guidelines on how to conduct an effective AAR	X	X	X	X	X	X
Change the AAR format so that you are acting as a mediator/facilitator instead of critiquing their performance	X			X		X
Let someone else (e.g., XO or junior leader) run an AAR and just sit and observe	X				X	X
Invite both the BDE and BN CDRs to your next AAR to observe and provide feedback	X					X
Rehearse the next AAR with a trusted officer and have him observe and provide feedback	X				X	X
Ask the BN CDR for guidance	X					X
Get advice from the S3 or fellow CDR about ways to improve your AAR	X					X
Consult with the ISG and NCOs	X			X	X	
Verify with the BDE that you have the right format to run AARs	X					X
Tell the BN CDR about how the BDE CDRs views of AARs compare to how the BN conducts AARs	X					X
Talk with the BDE CDR about his AAR comments		X	X			
Request formal training from the S3 for all your key leaders on how to conduct an effective AAR			X			X
Get information about how to conduct AARs from CALL and NTC lessons learned				X		
In the AAR, present opening and closing comments	X					X
In the AAR, ask each person to identify three positive and three negative things				X		
In the AAR, point out great things done by the soldiers					X	
Have an open door policy		X		X		

C11. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore the BDE CDR and continue with the same AAR format	X	X	X	X		X
Take the situation personally or make it a bigger issue than it is	X					X
Invite the BDE CDR back when you have not corrected the problem	X			X		
Critique individuals but rather point out deficiencies					X	
Critique without presenting solutions						X
Completely take over the AAR and fail to let subordinates express their concerns			X			X
Make a major change without some research				X		
Fail to make changes because you are following BN policies						X
Be so critical of what the soldiers have to say		X	X			

C11. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C11. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
The Army has plenty of information to help you run an effective AAR				X	X	
There is a new boss who has new expectations which should be supported	X					X
The AAR process is built on soldier involvement and participation						X

C11. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Have the soldiers generate recommendations because it includes everyone in the decision-making process and requires soldiers to implement their own chosen course of action						X
If the 1SG and NCOs all agree that the AAR could use some work, then you should develop a new format for future AARs					X	

C12. You are a company commander, and there has been an ongoing problem in your unit with alcoholism and especially with soldiers driving under the influence of alcohol. Two soldiers in the unit who previously had bad problems have since joined Alcoholics Anonymous groups and are now recovered. One other soldier is now in jail because of a car accident he caused while intoxicated which resulted in the death of a civilian. You are extremely concerned about this ongoing problem, and you would like to do something to get through to the soldiers about its seriousness and impact upon your unit. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Regularly pull a soldier out of formation, at random, and ask him/her to speak to the unit about why driving under the influence is a bad idea.	4.03	2.03
Encourage soldiers to form their own informal peer support group to combat alcoholism.	6.18	1.72
Provide incentives to soldiers for going three consecutive weeks without drinking and for other milestones of good behavior.	5.82	1.93
Present in detail the story of the soldier who is now in jail to the whole unit.	5.32	2.18
Have the reformed alcoholics give presentations stating how they beat their problem to drum up peer support.	5.84	1.85
Use different approaches from day to day when you talk to the troops about the problem--for example, one day mention the soldier who is in jail; the next day mention the success of the Alcoholics Anonymous groups.	6.24	1.68
Prepare an analysis of what driving under the influence costs a soldier in lost pay and fines, and make this information readily available to all soldiers.	7.11	1.5
Conduct frequent health and welfare inspections to search for alcohol.	4.55	1.84
Call in Alcoholics Anonymous sponsors to give a talk about the dangers of alcoholism.	7.08	1.15
Be tough on the soldiers: Threaten the most extreme punishment possible for even the slightest infraction of the rules.	2.97	1.73

C12. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ensure that soldiers obtain alcohol awareness education	X		X	X		X
Make it clear to all soldiers that there is genuine concern for their well-being by making this problem a priority	X	X	X			
Begin a designated driver program in the company and reward soldiers for participating		X	X	X		X
Research other companies to find out what they have done to resolve alcohol problems	X		X			
Make standards in reference to DUI clear and post policy letters	X	X	X			X
Continuously stress the dangers of alcohol		X		X		X
Organize trips to the county jails, the morgue, etc		X	X			
Consult the families of the dead civilian to determine if they would be willing to talk to soldiers						X
Have available those numbers that can provide treatment		X		X		
Put together a program to occupy their time so they don't drink				X		
If soldiers are caught violating the regulations after they have been briefed on them, they should be punished			X			X
Have leadership submit potential high risk individuals to ADAPC for counseling		X	X			

C12. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Use a standard, boring training briefing to try to get the message across						X
Ignore the situation	X	X	X	X		
Fail to establish a definitive position and punish violators						X
Promote the use of alcohol						X
Make blanket statements about consequences						X
Make it a personal crusade						X
Single people out to make examples out of them		X	X			

C12. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to find the root cause of the problem. Are soldiers being worked too hard? Does the leadership foster an environment of overindulgence			X			

C12. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C12. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Have the soldiers who have had problems talk to the unit so that soldiers can get the real story from someone involved			X			

C13. You are a company commander with some relatively junior lieutenants. Your goal is to develop these lieutenants. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Involve the lieutenants in every administrative action in the company.	5.53	1.87
Beginning early on, encourage the lieutenants to determine their own goals, and use this information during counseling sessions.	7.43	1.28
Involve the lieutenants only in those decisions that affect their platoons.	3.95	1.84
Explain the big picture to the lieutenants regarding upcoming missions.	8.03	0.9
When going on a mission, explain only their portion to the lieutenants.	2.68	1.31
Tell the lieutenants when things in the battalion are bothering you.	3.36	1.91
Involve the lieutenants in administrative activities only with soldiers from their own platoon.	5.25	1.86
Don't share ideas with the lieutenants; make your own decisions and implement them.	1.92	1.02
Have the lieutenants present for administrative punishments (Article 15s, etc.) only if their schedules allow it.	2.86	2.11
Start a professional development program to assist the lieutenants in their growth.	8.34	1.12
Involve the lieutenants in all decisions.	5.03	2.15

C13. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Provide frequent and honest counseling and offer guidance on ways to improve	X	X	X	X	X	X
Encourage them to ask questions and allow them to make mistakes	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mentor and coach them to become better LTs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Make your leadership philosophy and expectations clear to them		X	X	X	X	X
Give them responsibility commensurate with their experience and hold them accountable	X	X	X	X		X
Ensure that the senior NCOs and more senior LTs in the company are helping to develop the LTs	X		X		X	X
Develop an individually tailored plan with goals, objectives, and timelines	X	X	X		X	X
Utilize an existing program for developing junior LTs or tailor an existing one to your needs				X		
Assess the LTs strengths and weaknesses in each area you want to develop	X					X
Give them a mission and have AARs when the mission is completed	X					X
Continue to have OPDs with the LTs and ensure that they are making progress		X	X			
Assess their progress indirectly (without letting them know they're being tested)					X	
Have them conduct classes on their weaknesses	X			X		
Work hard on setting the example					X	X
Go to lunch with the LTs frequently and discuss issues					X	

C13. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore them and hope for the best	X			X	X	X
Fail to provide guidance to them			X			X
Fail to involve LTs in the decision making process	X	X		X		X
Ignore the regulation that exists to accomplish this mission				X		
Be harsh on junior officers for making mistakes		X	X			X
Create a competitive atmosphere			X			

C13. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C13. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C13. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Remember that you are training the future leadership of the Army	X					X
Remember that good officers are made by good NCOs					X	
Following an existing system will allow you to develop all your LTs in the same manner				X		
Look for a decent OPD because you don't have time to develop a new one				X		
You want the LTs to feel confident in their abilities and this is accomplished by regular feedback sessions to them		X	X			
A good commander is patient with this LTs and allows them time to develop and assists them to become productive leaders		X	X			

C14. You are a company commander. You have a platoon leader who is causing you problems. Once he was cleaning his weapon on the mail loading dock and he pointed it at a civilian. Another time he was late to a range. He frequently argues with you and does not do what you ask him to do. This is a new problem for your first sergeant--he has never experienced this situation before. The behaviors are continuing and growing in severity to a point where the lieutenant is insubordinate. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
If a relatively severe instance of insubordinate behavior occurs in public, shift the focus and avoid humiliating the platoon leader in public, but have him see you one-on-one later on.	4.72	2.51
Use all assets available to you--but do not involve your boss (the battalion commander).	3.19	1.81
Deal with the situation immediately--do not let it fester.	8.64	0.68
Counsel the platoon leader only when his/her performance warrants it.	2.58	1.57
Ask the battalion commander to give him a letter of reprimand.	4.11	1.97
If a severe instance of insubordinate behavior occurs in public, dismiss the platoon leader from the room and deal with him later.	5.72	2.47
Before taking action, find out if the platoon leader has been counseled before for his bad behavior.	6.06	2.1
Talk with the platoon leader and work out the problem.	6.28	1.63
Establish regular sessions during which you counsel the platoon leader about his performance.	7.44	1.4
To prepare for counseling sessions, get together with your first sergeant and role play various scenarios for dealing with the platoon leader including his potential reactions to your actions.	5.31	2.14
Wait awhile to see if the situation improves on its own.	1.53	0.91
If an instance of insubordinate behavior occurs between the two of you in private, immediately reprimand the platoon leader.	7.78	1.76

C14. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Counsel him and tell him his behavior needs to change	X	X	X	X		X
Ensure that he is fully aware of the standards of conduct and that failure to adhere to them will result in administrative action	X		X			X
If problems are not resolved through counseling, impose VCMS or recommend him for UCMJ	X	X	X	X		X
Ask the BN CDR to remove him from your company	X	X	X			X
Request guidance from the BN CDR			X			X
Explain on a counseling statement that such behavior will not be tolerated			X			X

C14. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Allow the LT to continue his actions	X	X	X	X		X
Hesitate to take immediate action to fix the problem						X
Pass him off to another platoon; you need to make him a soldier or make him a civilian						X
Allow his attitude to influence other soldiers and affect their morale			X			
Reprimand him in public		X		X		

C14. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out if there is a personal issues that caused him to act unprofessionally	X	X	X			

C14. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If he has already been counseled, he should be relieved of his duties		X	X	X		

C14. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Discipline him because the situation is too serious for him to just receive a "warning"						X
Try to help him, but don't neglect the majority of your soldiers for one bad soldier	X		X			
Relief him of his duties because you don't have time to teach a LT manners and etiquette		X	X			

C15. You are a company commander, and your battalion commander often gives directives that you believe are unreasonable. You have tried to give your commander input regarding these directives, but he has not listened to your input. The NCOs and soldiers also feel these orders are unreasonable, and the situation is causing you considerable stress. You have generally lost respect for the battalion commander. He gives you another order you believe is unreasonable. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Speak to the sergeant major and see if she/he will use her/his influence with the battalion commander to improve the situation.	6.22	2.13
Let your key subordinates know this is not your directive but rather the commander's.	2.22	1.29
Do your best to gain the NCOs' and soldiers' compliance by explaining the rationale for the commander's orders, being as convincing as you can be.	6.64	1.62
Go alone to the battalion commander and tell him/her you believe the order is unreasonable.	7.56	1.34
Keep trying to give your battalion commander input regarding his unreasonable directives.	7.47	1.36
Represent the orders as your own to your key subordinates.	7.53	1.5
Say that the system is to blame for the unreasonable order.	1.94	1.37
Let your soldiers know that this is not your directive but rather the commander's.	1.83	1.28
Assign the unreasonable order a lower priority and accomplish it in the manner you choose.	3.39	1.71
Get your key leaders together and go as a group to the battalion commander and say that the order is unreasonable.	1.89	1.41

C15. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do your best to accomplish the mission	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ask for clarification of the order; what his goal is	X	X	X		X	X
Bring valid options/solutions with you when you talk to the BN CDR	X	X	X	X	X	X
Talk to other company CDRs about the issue	X		X	X		X
Along with other company CDRs approach the BN CDR			X	X		
Seek guidance from the BN XO and CSM	X	X	X			X
Write a letter to the BN CDR expressing your feelings						X
Be tactful in talking to the BN CDR					X	
Tell the BN CDR that his orders are creating morale problems					X	
Talk to the BN CDR about the problems you had after the mission is accomplished		X	X			
Tell the BN CDR that you are getting out of the Army because it is not worth working for people like him						X

C15. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore the BN CDR's directives	X			X	X	X
Talk badly about the BN CDR to the soldiers or company leadership	X			X		X
Confront the CDR in public or get in an argument with him	X	X	X	X		X
Disobey orders without making every effort possible to do the right thing				X		X
Carry out the order without trying to talk to the BN CDR			X			X
Immediately go to the BDE CDR		X	X			X
Begin by telling the BN CDR that he is causing morale problems					X	
Ignore the problem						X
Worry or stress about the problem						X

C15. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out if the S3, XO and CSM perceive things the same way					X	

C15. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If the order will result in serious negative consequences, approach the BDE CDR		X	X	X		X
If the order will not cause bodily harm or injury to the soldiers, execute it	X		X			X
If the situation has been going on for a long period of time, then the safety of the soldiers is a concern				X		
Always remember that "the boss may be right"						X
Fate dealt you a lousy BN CDR and there is nothing you can do about it				X		

C15. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do not let the fact that you disagree with this decision cause your company to develop disrespect towards the BN CDR					X	
If you go to the BDE CDR, and he disagrees with you, your career is over				X		
Bringing other solutions will help the BN CDR see alternative ways of dealing with the order		X	X			

C16. You are a company commander with both military and civilian personnel in your unit. You have no E5 sergeants--instead, you have civilians doing supervisory jobs with soldiers working under them. You are experiencing problems in maintaining group cohesion: For example, civilians see soldiers taking off for training and wonder why they have to keep working; soldiers see civilians getting cash awards for good performance and wonder why they can't have similar awards; and so on. You must deal with these problems to keep your unit running smoothly. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Try to develop cohesion separately in the civilians and military members by having separate social functions.	1.65	1.16
Educate the soldiers and the civilians about the differing requirements of their jobs: Tell your soldiers that they have contractual obligations and they must accept their situation; tell the civilians that their situation is different from the soldiers' situation.	7.32	1.51
Have both civilian and military members of the unit draw up a poster of your organization (an organization chart) and post it where everyone can see it.	5.36	1.48
Form a morale committee composed of both civilian and military personnel to plan company social functions.	7.00	1.2
Create a sign-out roster, and have people sign out when they leave their place of duty, stating where exactly they are going and why.	3.92	1.88
Study your own procedures to ensure that you are being fair and equitable to both the civilian and the military personnel.	7.92	1.04
Schedule outings, potluck dinners, parties, and dining outs that include all members of the unit and their families.	7.97	1.07

C16. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Talk to someone who knows how to work with civilians	X			X		
Explain to soldiers how the civilians work and why their rewards are different	X			X		
Conduct a sensing session to clearly identify unit goals and focus everyone on mission accomplishment			X			X
Conduct teambuilding activities (e.g., intramural sports) with civilians and soldiers						X
Seek advice from key leaders, peers, and superiors about how to deal with the situation						X
Remind them that they are soldiers or civilians by choice						
Avoid being torn between the two groups			X			
Try to relieve tension between the two groups			X			
Post policy letters to keep everyone informed of the different requirements		X	X			
Explain to the civilians the training requirements of the soldiers		X	X			
Reorganize the work structure		X	X			
Explain that there is nothing that you can do and that they will have to accommodate the differences		X	X	X		
Get rid of the civilians		X	X			

C16. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore the situation or dismiss their concerns	X			X		X
Pretend that there are no differences between civilians and soldiers						X
Separate the two groups to discuss their issues						X
Give in to the whims of either group						X
Allow military members to weaken their standards because of civilian members						X
Try to change the policies		X	X			

C16. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C16. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C16. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You should attempt to integrate civilians and soldiers for the benefit of the unit			X			

C17. You are a company commander, and your unit is dispersed and is assigned to various garrison commands. Thus, you cannot possibly exercise direct control over your troops. The garrison commanders have non-judicial authority over your soldiers. You want to develop a good relationship with the garrison commanders. What should you do to take care of your soldiers under these conditions?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Talk to the garrison commanders whenever there is a problem with one of your subordinate leaders.	7.46	1.35
Visit the local garrison commanders on a regular basis.	8.24	1.38
Request extra resources (and do what you can to expedite the request) to help garrison commanders provide for your soldiers, if necessary.	7.54	1.26
Have your boss contact the garrison commanders to inquire about soldier support issues.	5.59	2.27
Do not talk to the garrison commanders unless one of your subordinate leaders comes to you and tells you that there is a problem.	1.76	1.09
Coordinate with the garrison commanders whenever possible to ensure that your soldiers' needs are being met.	7.89	1.66
Speak to your soldiers individually as often as you can to check up on how they are being treated.	8.05	1.58
Check with the garrison commanders about the quality of support being provided to your soldiers.	7.68	1.33

C17. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ask the garrison CDRs to discuss difficulties they are having with your soldiers before considering non-judicial punishment	X					X
Send the garrison CDRs copies of unit activities to include training schedules, social events, etc	X					X
Invite the garrison CDRs to upcoming events	X					X
Ensure that soldiers understand the garrison command's philosophy	X					X
Ensure all soldiers are aware of the company plan and standards					X	X
Allow the 1SG to work the CSM channel to monitor the well being of the soldiers					X	
Talk to the SGM of garrison				X		
Attend the functions of the other commands		X	X			

C17. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Talk bad about the garrison CDR to your soldiers	X	X	X	X		X
Assume that the garrison CDRs are taking care of your soldiers	X	X		X		X
Disregard the garrison CDR and fail to keep him informed of company activities and training events	X		X	X		X
Ignore your soldiers and not make effort to visit with them	X			X		X
Expect to have enough time to visit everyone					X	
Place the soldiers in the middle of confrontations between you and the garrison CDRs						X

C17. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
How can you be in command of someone without UCMJ?	X					X

C17. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Things get very sensitive when you support several different CDRs						X
There is no way you could visit all the places and soldiers you need to					X	

C17. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
There must be open lines of communication between you and the other garrison commanders	X	X	X	X		X
Management/leadership by wandering around is the only solution						X
Meeting regularly with the garrison commanders ensures that they understand that you care about the welfare of your soldiers				X		
You must know exactly what is going on with your soldiers and not be surprised when things come down		X	X			

C18. You are a company commander, and you believe that you have an incompetent battalion commander. This incompetence is both technical and tactical. Often this person issues directives that are not going to achieve the mission. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Infer the underlying intent of the directive, go to your commander, and inform him of your interpretation of the underlying intent and the steps being taken to achieve this intent.	6.65	2.03
When provided with the next unworkable directive, go back to the commander immediately and try to help direct the commander's thinking onto more appropriate and workable solutions.	6.92	1.53
Use your first sergeant to help you develop ways to make the directive work well and look good to the troops.	6.43	2.19
Speak to the sergeant major and the executive officer, ask for any relevant information, and listen to their opinions.	7.65	1.03
Confront the commander and provide specific examples of why his directives are incompetent.	3.49	2.3
Speak to the brigade commander about the problem, arming yourself with specific examples of incompetent directives.	2.51	1.84
Continue to follow directives and let the chips fall where they may.	2.97	1.74
Explain to your subordinates that the battalion commander does not understand the area in question because it is not his primary specialty.	1.95	1.31
Infer the underlying intent of the directive and develop your own strategy to solve the problem and achieve the mission.	6.57	1.92
Communicate the battalion commander's intent (rather than his specific directive) and ensure that it is met.	6.84	1.91

C18. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Work with others in the chain of command to try to have a successful BN	X	X	X			X
Hold organization effectiveness sessions						X
Ensure that your soldiers can execute in the field			X			
Ensure that your soldiers are taken care of			X			

C18. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Be disrespectful to the CDR	X		X	X		
Disobey the CDR's intent or directives		X	X			X
Weaken the standards or develop a confusing leadership climate						X
Contribute to widespread disillusionment of the BN CDR						X
Tell others the orders are stupid or that you are only doing them because the boss said so						X
Gang up on the BN CDR with other CO CDRs and the BN XO						X
Jump the chain of command		X		X		
Put the soldiers in harms way		X	X			

C18. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C18. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C18. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You should work towards the betterment of the unit	X		X			
Being disrespectful to the BN CDR will not further the cause			X			
It is always better to execute as much of the CDRs intent as possible		X		X		

C19. You are a company commander on deployment. Your unit is sustaining continuous operations. You are feeling the stress of the many demands upon your time, but you want to maintain your mental effectiveness and readiness. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Sleep.	7.51	1.46
Take time alone each day to read inspirational books or materials.	6.05	1.68
Use your peers as a sounding board and support group.	7.27	1.22
Maintain contact with family and friends back home to keep you centered and remind you there's more to life than your job.	7.38	1.32
Take time alone each day to think, regroup, and work through what's on your mind.	8.14	0.98
Keep perspective by remembering that you have other talents and skills that are not related to your current job.	5.27	2.06
Work as hard and as fast as you can: Have as your goal getting to tomorrow's work as soon as possible.	4.35	1.99
Mentor or counsel troubled soldiers regularly to keep your own problems in perspective.	5.38	1.88
Each day, reflect on your successes and on what you can do better in the future maintain a positive focus.	8.16	0.99

C19. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Identify tasks that can be delegated and delegate them	X	X	X	X	X	X
Together with the 1SG work on prioritizing tasks					X	X
Ensure that you and your subordinates are taking care of themselves through rest and diet	X			X	X	X
Have a fun day (e.g., play sports, have a cookout)	X			X		X
Give subordinates days off when possible						
Arrange an OPD to break the monotony					X	
Keep a diary noting the daily stresses, review them, and figure out strategies to deal with them	X					X
Ensure that key leaders and soldiers are aware of standards				X		X
Emphasize mission accomplishment					X	X
Allow your key leaders time to execute assignments						X
Ensure that the BN staff gives you warning with an order comes down that will pertain to you				X		
Manage/lead by wandering around and spending time with the troops	X					X
Give rewards for exceptional performance to those whom deserve it		X	X			
Find a way to relax and give your mind a break for a while	X	X	X	X	X	X
Change your routine	X					X
Get professional help	X					X
Get as much PT as possible	X					X
Make sure there is a wake up criteria				X		

C19. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Disregard the stress and persevere without getting some help or relief	X			X	X	X
Micromanage; try to do everything yourself		X	X	X		X
Leave the 1SG out of the issue	X			X		
Postpone tasks that are required to accomplish the mission						X
Expect soldiers to react in a way they are not trained to act				X		
Stay in one place a long time					X	
Become too stressed to cope with your job		X	X	X		
Let subordinates see that you are stressed						X
Cut soldiers off from their families	X			X		
Eat lots of MREs					X	

C19. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

C19. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
The 1SG/Commander relationship is important					X	
Your key leaders should be trained at this point to take on some responsibility		X	X			

C19. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Make sure to get rest because lack of sleep will impair you and your team's mental effectiveness and readiness	X			X	X	X
If you persevere without getting rest or help, you risk making a poor decision that might cause harm or jeopardize your mission	X					X
Delegating duties to the lowest level will allow you to concentrate on more important/overarching issues				X		
Remember that no one commander can be everywhere at once					X	
Work to maintain yourself because the safety of your soldiers may depend on it		X	X			
You need to make sure that soldiers are getting enough sleep but are still able to accomplish assigned missions		X	X			
You need to keep your soldiers motivated and feel pride in their accomplishments		X	X			

TACIT KNOWLEDGE FOR MILITARY LEADERS:
BATTALION COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE

B1. You are a new battalion commander, and you want to develop detailed knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of each of your company commanders. Rate the following strategies for their effectiveness in helping you gain this information:

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
If you plan to talk to the soldiers, discuss beforehand with each company commander your intention to talk directly to the soldiers and explain your reasons for doing so.	6.05	2.4
For each company, direct a sensing session of the entire company with the company commander present in order to get a sense of the unit.	3.41	2.21
Ask the command sergeant major, battalion XO, and operations officer for their assessment.	7.69	1.44
If you choose to talk to the soldiers, express your desire to each company commander to use the information you will learn to help with their development as leaders.	6.31	2.27
Ask your company commanders to talk to their own soldiers and ask a specific list of questions, and then report back to you with the information they have learned.	3.83	2.16
Talk directly (in private) with the soldiers and ask them to comment on the commanders' strengths and weaknesses.	2.05	1.46
Talk directly (in private) with the soldiers and ask them their opinions about the quality of their training, what they are learning, and other impressions they have.	7.07	2.12
Ask your company commanders to speak to other commanders' soldiers (not their own soldiers) and report back to you with the information they have learned.	1.59	1.07
Assign a battalion staff member who does not rate the company commanders to speak with the soldiers and report to you on what he/she learns.	2.44	1.58
Rely on historical statistical indicators of performance.	4.78	2
Talk directly (in private) with the soldiers and ask them specific questions about their work hours, their job descriptions and responsibilities, and other factual items.	6.64	2.06
Speak to the company commanders individually and ask each of them to comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the other company commanders and units.	3.19	2.85
Ask the brigade commander for his/her assessment.	6.07	2.41

BI. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Observe the CO CDRs in various activities	X	X	X	X	X	X
Speak to each CO CDR individually to find out their perceived strengths and weaknesses	X	X	X	X	X	X
Review documents (OERs, written reports, external evaluations)	X	X		X	X	X
Talk with outgoing BN CDR	X	X				X
Assign diverse tasks (e.g., leading tactically, managing routine tasks) and evaluate how well the CDRs perform those tasks	X	X			X	X
Conduct an internal evaluation to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the battalion		X	X		X	
Observe the CDRs in social settings					X	
Ensure that your battery CDRs understand their weaknesses and how to better themselves			X			
Ask the battery CDRs about what they studied and their military goals					X	
Execute the existing training plan and conduct a 90-day assessment of each unit and their commanders	X					X
Go to their formations and run PT with them	X					X
Spend time with the CO CDRs so they get used to your presence	X					X
Hold weekly staff meetings and QTBs		X				X

BI. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ask the soldiers about their CO CDR's weaknesses	X			X	X	X
Rely on conventional or formal assessment techniques	X				X	X
Rely heavily on the previous BC's opinions or old counseling statements	X	X	X			X
Ask the company commanders about each other						X
Formulate conclusions about their strengths and weaknesses on limited information			X			
Give them little tests to see how they perform to your expectations					X	
Fail to meet with them or observe them in action		X				X
Fail to give them guidance and feedback		X				X
Micromanage them				X		
Tell others about the CO CDRs' weaknesses				X		

B1. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out the history of each unit, "What is their mission?" "What is your mission?"		X				X

B1. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B1. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Avoid scheduling formal times to observe them because they will only show and tell you what you want to know	X				X	X
Observing them in action allows you to get a feel for their decision making abilities						X
By seeking information from multiple sources, you will obtain a better understanding of the priorities your company commanders		X				X
Assigning CDRs diverse tasks will bring to light their strengths and weaknesses		X				X

B2. You are a battalion commander and it is the end of your first battle at a major externally-evaluated training exercise, during which your unit revealed some major shortcomings. During the After Action Review, the Chief Evaluator is highly critical of the battalion and dwells on all the negative things your unit did that day. You carefully record all of the negative observations, but you know full well that the battalion also did some very positive things that day. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Leave the After Action Review and return to your units; once there, communicate exactly what the Evaluator said.	3.02	1.79
If you have a good relationship with your CSM or other similar person, discuss your frustrations and feelings with him or her.	6.28	1.85
Forget about trying to get any positive feedback: Thank the Evaluator directly for the negative feedback, say you will deal with the problems immediately, and do so without expecting anything more from him.	4.53	2.32
Be careful not to vent your frustrations with the Evaluator's feedback in front of the soldiers or your junior officers.	7.6	1.8
Ask the Chief Evaluator if he has anything else he would like to say.	6.25	2.04
Mention one or two successes the battalion had, and ask the Evaluator if he would like to comment on these positive events.	6.74	2.16
Leave the After Action Review and return to your units, but when you report to them make sure to note the successes that occurred that day as well as the failures and shortcomings.	8.52	0.88
Speak to the Evaluator at another time, and state your desire to receive positive as well as negative feedback so that you know what the units are doing right and wrong.	7.77	1.62
Share your feelings with a friend or confidante at your own level to help you work through any negative feelings.	6.42	1.96

B2. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Focus CDRs on the things they need to fix			X			X
Ask what you unit did that was positive and concentrate on that	X		X			
Conduct your own AAR and brief the positive things			X			
Advise your commander of your concern for balance						X
Seek advise from more experienced peers						X
Inform the Chief Evaluator's superior about the issue						X
Ensure that soldiers understand that the purpose of training is to fix things that are broken			X			
Require the company CDRs to fix the bad things		X	X			
Visit the CDRs training periodically to evaluate them on their compliance		X	X			

B2. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Dwell on negative comments	X	X		X		X
Openly challenge the evaluator at the AAR						X
Dismiss the evaluators findings		X				X
Tell your unit that the Chief Evaluator is biased						X
Ignore the good points and allow the unit to develop a bad attitude based on OC comments				X		
Lower your head in shame						
Take anger out on the commanders or the soldiers			X			

B2. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B2. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B2. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B3. You are a new battalion commander and one of your most important and challenging tasks is to establish the training priorities for your unit. While everything looks important and you would like to meet every possible contingency, you also realize that you do not have the time or resources to "do it all." Rate the following strategies for how effective they would be in helping you establish your priorities.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Study the brigade's training schedule.	7.71	1.5
Talk to the brigade S-2, S-3, and CSM to verify your understanding of the brigade commander's training focus.	7.98	1.2
Schedule meetings to discuss training with each of your staff members during your first week of command.	7.05	1.64
Explain your goals and your plans for the battalion very clearly to your officers and staff.	8.39	1.08
Assess the tactical and technical competence of your soldiers individually by giving them formal and informal tests.	4.42	2.14
Rely on the assessments made by the previous battalion commander.	5.78	1.8
Select three to five upcoming missions (based on the brigade training plan) to focus your soldiers' energy on.	6.83	1.6
Before doing anything, make sure you understand the commander's intent two levels up.	7.64	1.52
Soon after taking command, visit each staff section's shop and get a full briefing on their operations.	7.81	1.37
Talk to the brigade commander to determine his training priorities.	8.44	1.09

B3. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Focus on those tasks in your METL	X	X	X	X		X
Ask for input from key leaders in establishing a set of priorities	X	X			X	X
Review predecessors training guidance				X		
Plan training in accordance with Army doctrine				X		
Review previous NTC AARs				X		X
Compare Brigade and Battalion METL	X					X
Set priorities to match the BDE CDR's priorities			X			
Establish your own priorities after consulting various sources	X	X		X	X	X
Establish crawl, walk, run model (i.e., start with basics and build up)	X				X	
Review your priorities and resources with your CDR so he knows what you are able to accomplish	X					X
Compare the priorities against an assessment of the battalion's strengths and weaknesses	X				X	X
Compare priorities against an assessment of available resources	X		X		X	X
Request additional resources to address priorities	X					X
Ensure that subordinate CO CDRs follow the same philosophy with individual and collective training				X		
Delegate as much work as possible to responsible individuals					X	
Talk to the chaplain					X	

B3. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to do everything at once	X	X		X	X	X
Set priorities based on the previous CDR's assessment without making your own assessment of performance	X					X
Prioritize based solely on your own goals and objectives without consulting your staff	X	X		X	X	X
Fail to prioritize						
Prioritize less essential tasks			X			
Presume knowledge of the training problems					X	
Ignore deadlines or cut priorities short because of a lack of time		X	X		X	
Assume you know the BDE CDRs intent					X	
Complain to soldiers				X		

B3. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out about your wartime mission	X					X
Try to find out what is the best way to accomplish the training and what has prevented it from happening in the past		X				X

B3. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You must be able to maintain all of the BDE CDR's priorities			X			
If you have exceeded the standards of one of the BDE CDR's priorities, you can place one of your priorities above his			X			

B3. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Find out the BDE CDR's priorities because he is the one that your BN works for and you are there to support him			X			
The BDE CDR has to establish priorities based on his boss' priorities, so it should work the same way at your end			X			
If you do not prioritize, you will fail to accomplish the objectives of your mission essential tasks						X
If you make all the decisions regarding training yourself, you are not developing your staff		X				X
You should follow training doctrine because it is good		X				X

B4. You are a battalion commander. Your brigade commander has made it clear that he does not wish to speak with you about pressing issues that arise in your battalion. Also, he expects perfection from your battalion at all times, and he seems to view your battalion's poor performance at the JRTC as unforgivable--he keeps harping on past failures. The brigade commander does not provide you with feedback on your strengths and how to improve your weaknesses. His communication style is formal, abrupt, and in your opinion, ineffective. He begins every conversation by reminding you that you are only an O-5. You are frustrated because you never know where you stand, performance wise, in your brigade commander's eyes and you lack a person from whom to receive performance feedback. In general, you find your situation with the brigade commander to be intolerable, and morale in your unit seems dangerously low. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Speak to the Assistant Division Commander, explain your need for extra feedback, and request feedback on your performance.	3.95	2.19
Deal with the brigade commander as best you can, but hold regular sessions with the members of your unit to air concerns and voice problems in the hope of improving morale.	7.1	1.76
Remain loyal to the brigade commander so you do not model disloyalty in front of the members of your unit.	7.97	1.08
Seek a formal appointment with the brigade commander, state that you and he seem to have a problem, and ask him why.	7.71	1.5
If you choose to speak with the Assistant Division Commander and your officers are critical of your decision, then explain your reasons for your actions to them and let them know they are welcome to voice concerns about how you are leading the unit.	4.75	2.45
Speak to your family members, the chaplain, or other friends from outside the military in order to deal with your personal frustrations.	6.12	1.82
Jump the chain of command and speak to the Assistant Division Commander about the problem with the brigade commander.	2.15	1.35
If you speak to the Assistant Division Commander, prepare yourself for the possibility of a disruption of loyalty in your own unit.	4.68	2.2
Talk to your fellow battalion commanders about the problem and try to develop a joint solution.	7.12	1.52
Request advice from one of your brigade commander's superiors whom you already know and trust.	5.17	1.4
Talk to the brigade XO and the brigade S3 and try to get some information.	7.19	1.73

B4. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Strive to do your best with the guidance available			X	X		
Ask the BDE CDR to provide you with counseling as required		X				X
Emphasize to the BDE CDR the importance of providing you with clear guidance regarding training objectives		X	X			X
Ask the BDE SGM to help you with evaluation and give your unit feedback		X	X			
Rely on self-analysis in lieu of BDE CDR's guidance to improve the BN training and morale			X			
Compare your performance with fellow BN CDRs			X			
Be honest and let the BDE CDR know how you feel			X			
Analyze the AAR from JRTC to glean lessons learned and implement them into training guidance	X		X			
Ensure that the BN is training to standard based on the BDE's METL	X		X			
Implement strategies to improve morale and effectiveness in the unit	X		X			
Pass info to the BDE CDR by means other than direct communication						X
Run your BN and let the BDE CDR interject his ineffective comments whenever he wants		X		X		
Retire from the Army						X

B4. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore or avoid the BDE CDR	X			X		X
Hesitate to act		X				X
Veer from the CDR's intent			X			
Badmouth the BDE CDR in front of subordinates						X
Allow morale to worsen and the unit to become ineffective						X
Go to the CG				X		

B4. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B4. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B4. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Focus on the future rather than the past	X		X			
Work to make the BDE a good one regardless of the BDE CDR's disposition			X			
Realize that you have been placed in a difficult situation and the important thing is your BN, not the personal attacks by the BDE CDR		X		X		
Don't hesitate to take action because the situation will not get better with time		X				X

B5. You are a battalion commander and your goal is to implement effective training. Rate the following strategies in terms of how good they would be at achieving your goal.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Provide soldiers and their families with a copy of an extended training schedule (for example, six months out).	8.05	1.13
Develop specific rules and procedures that your battalion uses regularly in order to manage training.	7.83	1.33
Go to the brigade S-3 and demand that the training schedule not be changed.	4.88	2.1
Give soldiers three or four-day holiday weekends whenever possible.	6.92	1.84
Take into consideration school vacations and events when planning training.	8.19	1.21
Brief families collectively on the extended training schedule once it has been developed--have a family dinner in the mess hall, for example, and then go over the extended training schedule.	7.9	1.47
Be willing to change the training schedule in order to capitalize on unplanned training opportunities.	6.14	2.14
Have regular meetings with your brigade commander to keep him/her focused on what your battalion is doing.	7.68	1.32
If someone violates the training schedule without authority, and without good cause, recommend the person for appropriate punishment.	5.12	1.81
Once inside the specified time limit, do not make changes to the schedule once the schedule has been distributed.	7.24	1.62
If you take away a soldier's weekend for a training exercise, make sure he or she gets it back during another training cycle.	7.81	1.37
Try to dissuade your superiors from making sudden changes to the training schedule.	8.32	0.9
Communicate your training goals and your vision to your subordinates and your superiors.	8.86	0.35

B5. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Follow the Army's training doctrine	X	X		X	X	X
Focus on training those tasks in the METL	X	X		X		X
Review previous AARs and assessments to identify potential issues with the conduct of training	X			X	X	X
Use Quarterly and Annual Training Guidance from above to implement effective training plan	X			X		X
Assess the BN's strengths and weaknesses	X					X
Seek input from your CDR and your subordinate CDRs about what you need to work on	X	X				X
Establish written SOPs and training objectives and hold CDRs accountable to them	X		X	X		X
Make sure units have the available training resources they need	X			X	X	X
Regularly evaluate the quality and progress of training	X			X		X
Provide battery commanders frequent feedback on what the need to improve upon			X			
Make sure training meetings are run by the book and by qualified trainers	X			X		X
Make sure your subordinates are issuing the proper orders and seeing that the troops are executing			X	X		
Have the company commanders tell you when other people interfere with their training schedule					X	
Start an OPD program with your officers				X		
Emphasize training at the platoon level and below		X				X
Talk to the chaplain					X	

B5. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Put out your training guidance without consulting key subordinate leaders	X	X				X
Fail to properly evaluate the training needs and establish goals and priorities	X					X
Fail to evaluate available resources	X					X
Let the staff do whatever they want		X	X		X	
Keep appropriate staff away from training					X	
Let your company commanders compete for unit missions					X	
Overtask the unit				X		
Listen to your predecessor					X	
Try to do everything	X					X
Do nothing				X		

B5. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B5. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B5. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You should plan the training in a building block fashion from the lowest echelon and above--- crawl/walk/run as necessary	X					X
Use the 8-step training model to ensure there is proper planning and execution to the training event	X				X	
Keep it simple; the more complex you get, the more ineffective it is				X		
Written SOPs and objectives help eliminate any questions as to what is expected			X			
Use existing training because there is no need to reinvent the wheel		X			X	

B6. You are a battalion commander, and there are many unmarried soldiers in your unit. You are concerned about the special needs and problems unmarried soldiers may have, since they do not have a regular family life. Your goal is to ensure high morale for your unmarried soldiers. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Take special pains to ensure that single soldiers have some place to be on holidays—by arranging meals or outings for single soldiers, for example.	8.03	0.95
Discourage single soldiers from taking holiday leaves and encourage them to take on holiday duties so that married soldiers can spend holidays with their families.	1.93	1.64
Maintain procedures and facilities single soldiers need in order to communicate with family members back home--provide access to telephones, writing supplies, and so on--and encourage the soldiers to keep in touch with their families.	8.07	1.14
Encourage married soldiers to invite single soldiers to their homes for holidays or other special occasions.	7.95	1.2
Take measures (for example, obtaining furniture, making game rooms, and allowing soldiers to decorate the way they like) that will make the billets where the single soldiers live feel more like home to them.	8.17	1.26
Allow soldiers from other units to share in the improvements you make to your soldiers' living quarters.	6.07	1.97
Keep single soldiers busy with training and company sports so they won't get bored.	5.66	2.19
Spend time with the single soldiers in their dining facility and gym.	8.05	0.95

B6. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Get input from single soldiers (e.g., through BOSS meetings) on a regular basis	X	X	X	X		X
Encourage activities that are catered to single soldiers	X	X	X	X		
Offer regular non-duty related activities			X			
Provide the command interaction and attention that conveys your empathy to this situation			X			
Make the single soldiers understand their importance to the unit	X		X			
Get the CSM involved	X			X		
Treat married and single soldiers the same						X
Write their parents or grandparents and let them know how they are doing						X
Have chaplain conduct single soldier counseling		X	X			X
Encourage married soldiers to take single soldiers of the same rank/position "under their wing"		X		X		

B6. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore the situation and quality of life issues for soldiers	X		X	X		X
Have single soldiers work harder than married soldiers						X
Place the needs of unmarried soldiers above the needs of married soldiers						X
Use the standard sensing sessions to address the problems						X
Set the expectation that the goal is to make barracks living comparable to civilian living						X
Leave the problem to only the CSM and NCO chain to handle		X				X
Treat this as an enlisted soldier problem only		X				X

B6. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B6. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Post already does a pretty good job with BOSS and single soldier activities			X			

B6. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Unit level sports and activities foster a team spirit that can make up for regular family life			X			

B7. You are a battalion commander, and you want to make sure that your soldiers and junior officers share your vision for the battalion. Rate the effectiveness of the following strategies for communicating your vision to your unit.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Distribute your command philosophy in writing to all soldiers in your battalion.	7.39	1.69
Reinforce your vision in all daily activities and interactions, and do so for the entire term of your command.	8.29	0.93
Do not adhere to a single perspective--be willing to change your vision as necessary to reflect changing needs of the unit.	6.64	2.35
On a daily basis, visit company areas in the garrison and in the field, and highlight shortcomings and the progress that has been made toward achieving your vision.	6.41	2.39
Communicate your vision starting on the first day of your command.	7.78	1.9
Reward those who support your vision, and punish those who don't.	4.17	1.92
Solicit feedback and ideas from your junior officers regarding your vision--be alert for ways to improve it.	8.08	1.24

B7. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Share your vision with the battalion	X	X	X	X	X	X
Conduct OPDs to pass the message to the officers and explain your intent	X		X	X	X	
Check to make sure the senior leadership is reinforcing your vision	X			X		X
Ensure that your vision is disseminated to all staff and subordinate leaders and that they understand your intent	X	X		X		X
Talk to the battalion on a regular basis to reinforce your vision	X	X	X		X	X
Conduct team building activities and brown bag luncheons				X		
Live your vision by example		X		X		X
Meet with junior officers individually and share your vision	X					X
Informally survey subordinates in the motorpool, PT, training, etc. to determine if they understand and buy into you vision	X					X
Get soldiers to support your vision by letting them know how it will benefit them and having them identify something in the vision statement to support	X	X			X	X
Delegate authority and have everyone share responsibility for the BN's success	X					X

B7. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Assume everyone knows, understands, or shares your vision	X		X	X	X	X
Simply write a vision statement and not follow up	X				X	X
Limit communication between CDRs and all ranks	X					X
Fail to clearly communicate your goals and guidance		X	X			X
Get mad or fire those who do not understand your intent				X		
Fail to put your vision in writing		X				X
Fail to involve your leaders		X				X

B7. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B7. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B7. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
You need to keep officers aware of what is going on at all times and allow them to have voice in the decision making process			X			
You don't always have to use their suggestions, but allowing officers to talk and listening to their comments will go a long way			X			
Having officers provide input will allow them to share in the vision	X					X
Having each key leader select a different aspect of your vision to support will encourage them to buy into the vision		X				X
Granted that not all of the things you say will be liked, but some things are negotiable			X			
Reiterating your vision will ensure that is consistently understood					X	

B8. You are an artillery battalion commander. You are in direct support of a brigade whose commander is a light infantryman, while your background is mechanized artillery. On several occasions, the differing perspectives of you and your brigade commander result in communication difficulties. For example, you are used to moving on the battlefield at a very fast pace, whereas your commander is used to moving at a slow pace. In fact, communication problems arise often between the two of you. Your goal is to improve your communication with your brigade commander. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Ask a peer of your brigade commander, such as a divarty commander, for help with the problem.	5.17	2.2
Invite the brigade commander over to your house to watch a sporting event or movie and try to establish a friendship with him.	4.07	2.24
Speak to the brigade commander, express your feelings about why the two of you sometimes have trouble communicating, and ask for his help with the problem.	7.27	1.73
Make an effort to think from the brigade commander's point of view about your unit's activities and performance.	8.02	1.03
Speak to the brigade commander, ask him why he believes the two of you sometimes have trouble communicating, and ask for his help with the problem.	7.31	1.78
Find an interest or hobby you and your brigade commander share, then use this shared interest to develop analogies to help you communicate with him more effectively: In other words, talk in terms of topics you both understand.	6.05	2.14
Make an attempt to interact with the brigade commander as a person outside of the work environment, in a wide variety of settings.	5.64	2.13
Speak to your brigade commander's superior about the problem and ask for his advice.	1.92	1.09

B8. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Learn to speak the maneuver language		X	X	X		X
Request a meeting with the BDE CDR			X	X		
Get the BDE CDR's intent and guidance whenever possible		X		X		X
Seek the advice of your fellow BN CDRs with light artillery backgrounds	X		X			
Allow the BDE CDR assess how he needs to use you			X			
Let the BDE CDR know the capabilities of your unit		X	X			
Try to teach some critical aspects of FS to the maneuver leaders			X			
Stick to written order		X	X			

B8. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore or disrespect the BDE CDR		X	X	X		X
Fail to provide support						X
Challenge the BDE CDR's interpretation		X				X
Try to avoid him						X

B8. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
What type of battalion it is—light infantryman or mechanized artillery						X

B8. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If fires are "broke" it is never maneuvers problem, it is the problem of the FSCOORD at that level		X		X		

B8. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
The key is to understand that you support the infantry and must understand your place on the light infantry battlefield	X		X			
Work with him because you are there to support the BDE CDR		X	X			X
You must be able to adapt to what type of unit you are assigned to			X			
The more you work together, the more the situation will correct itself						X

B9. You are a new battalion commander and you are feeling somewhat lonely and frustrated with your job. Your goal is to manage your stress effectively so that it does not interfere with your ability and motivation to perform at your best. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Budget time for inspirational reading.	6.54	2.03
Develop a mutual support group with other battalion commanders--talk to them frequently.	7.25	1.54
Realize that dealing with stress is important to your promotion, and soldier on.	4.58	2.24
Spend more time at the office and work harder--recognize that more satisfaction will come from pushing yourself harder and getting more done.	2.73	1.73
Combat stress by engaging in physical exercise or an activity you enjoy.	8.19	0.86
Use your spouse or other close friend from outside of the military as a sounding board.	7.37	1.79
Use your junior officers to bounce ideas off of.	4.37	2.41
Talk over your feelings with the brigade commander.	5.16	2.12
Take up a hobby that is unrelated to your job demands.	7.08	1.49
Budget time for personal reflection and relaxation.	8.03	1.03
Keep a journal or notebook of ideas in order to organize your thoughts and work through things on paper.	6.86	1.61
Remind yourself often that all battalion commanders experience such feelings and that your feelings are normal and will resolve themselves in time.	6.25	2.06
Take as much leave as you are entitled to, and while on leave, do not think about work or have contact with work personnel.	6.12	1.82
Realize that it is your job to tough things out for 24 months.	3.8	1.89
Renew your vision and remind yourself of why you wanted to be a battalion commander.	7.25	1.32

B9. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Confide in your XO/CSM about your frustrations and ask for their input	X	X	X	X	X	X
Try not to work late nights in the office and on weekends	X			X		X
Leave things at the office	X		X			X
Set the example by taking the appropriate time off						X
Prioritize your work	X	X		X		X
Delegate effectively and allow staff time to effectively perform their jobs		X	X			X
Keep everything in perspective	X	X				X
Try to determine what issues are stressful and how you can better deal with them	X					X
Eat three meals per day and get a good night's sleep	X					X
Relax and take power naps		X				X
Have fun				X		
Maintain a healthy spiritual life						X
Seek out exciting and different training activities to keep things fresh	X					X
Include nontraining type activities where soldiers and junior leaders can relax and spend time with their families						X

B9. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Keep your problems to yourself	X	X	X	X		X
Try to work through your problems by yourself	X		X			X
Vent your frustrations on family, friends and subordinates				X		X
Overtask subordinates	X					X
Dwell on negative things				X		
Isolate yourself from the units					X	
Panic	X					X
Start drinking					X	
Let your frustrations get so bad that you decide to retire					X	

B9. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B9. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If you love your job, there is no reason to be stressed						X

B9. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Weekends should belong to you and your family	X					X
"Accept those things you cannot change; have courage to change those things you can and the wisdom to know the difference..."	X					X
Avoid taking things home because the stress only becomes worse			X			
Everyone needs an outlet for relieving their stress						X
If you don't get help you will eventually crash and be no good to anyone		X				X

B10. You are a battalion commander, and one of your primary goals is to ensure that your soldiers have predictability in their lives. Thus, you are concerned about planning training way in advance, and you make it a point to do so. For some time, your unit has been scheduled for a pre-planned battalion-level training exercise. At the last minute, there is a brigade command and staff meeting. At the meeting, the brigade staff announces that they are making major changes in your battalion training plan. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Ask to have a minute alone with your commander and express your concerns to him privately, allowing him to voice these concerns openly at the meeting if he chooses to do so.	7.27	1.92
After the meeting, attempt to get a consensus among all the battalion commanders regarding this issue, and communicate this shared viewpoint to the brigade commander.	6.24	1.85
Be silent, but try to recruit your commander to your position after the meeting is over.	4.76	2.38
State that soldiers need predictability in their lives, and note that the senior leaders should be setting the correct example.	5.78	2.14
State that good training exercises require predictability so that leaders of all levels can learn.	6.71	1.88
Stand up and remind the brigade staff, the brigade commander, and your peers about the brigade's specific doctrinal responsibilities for training.	3.92	2.18
State that the brigade staff's proposal to change the short-term training schedules is a violation of training doctrine.	4.63	2.5
Be silent: Do not try to second-guess the brigade staff's decision.	2.05	1.55

B10. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Adhere to the changes as best you can	X	X	X	X		X
Keep subordinates informed	X		X	X		X
Ask why changes are being made and if they can be avoided		X	X	X		X
Remind the S3 and BDE CDR what impact the change will have on your unit		X	X			X
Fight to the extent possible to delay or minimize changes	X	X	X			X
Continue to work on keeping predictability in the schedule		X				X
Provide the BDE staff with alternatives to disrupting your training			X			
Voice your concerns to the CDR professionally			X			
Keep an open mind			X			

B10. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Refuse to do the mission			X			X
Give up and accept the changes as inevitable						X
Display an improper attitude and appear not to be a team player		X				X
Continue to pursue the final strategy as if it was your own		X				X
Complain		X				X

B10. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to find out if the change was truly unavoidable or if it represents someone's idea of helping you						X

B10. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B10. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If you cannot change the situation, you do not have a choice but to adapt and be flexible			X			X
Being flexible is just as important as being predictable—adapt, adjust, and overcome			X			
You need to recognize that you cannot always prevent changes to the schedule		X	X			
If the BN knows you stress predictability, any one-time or infrequent change should not disrupt the BN pace			X			

B11. You are a battalion commander. You have one company commander who is particularly intense. He sets extremely high--even unrealistic--standards for himself. While his company has yet to pay the price for this problem, his expectations are so high that he never can meet them, and this situation is hindering his personal health as well as his professional development as an officer. His company is scheduled for a major training exercise next month. Your goal is to help him better understand how he is hurting himself by maintaining unreasonable standards. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Talk to all of your company commanders as a group about potential roadblocks to their development, mentioning too-high standards as one potential problem and describing examples to illustrate your point.	6.46	1.99
Wait to speak to the company commander until after he goes to the training exercise, using examples based on his experiences there to illustrate your points.	2.9	1.84
Do nothing: Allow him to learn from his own mistakes that no one can successfully maintain unrealistic standards forever.	2	1.31
Ask another company commander to have a friendly chat with the obsessive company commander about the need to set realistic goals.	3.58	2.28
Have a discussion with the company commander about his potential problem before he leaves for the training exercise, using examples you are aware of from your daily interactions with him in your unit.	8.08	1.04
Warn the company commander before he goes to the training exercise that you believe he has a serious problem that requires his immediate attention and that may ultimately derail his career.	3.39	2.26

B11. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Advise the CDR of the potential negative impact his high standards will have on himself and his unit	X	X		X	X	X
Ask the CDR about his goals and how he intends to meet them	X	X	X	X		X
Explain to him that goals are things to aim for and that failing to meet them doesn't make him a bad commander	X		X			X
Revise the CDR's plan to ensure that realistic training is scheduled	X	X				X
Define your criteria for success for the CDR so he won't think he has to outdo everyone	X				X	X
Counsel him on the steps he needs to take in order to improve		X		X		X
Visit his training frequently to observe and indirectly supervise his training	X					X
Go to the field and demand a daily brief	X					X
Ensure that the CDR knows that you are tolerable of mistakes	X					X
Work on his training plan rather than lowering his standards						X
Have the chaplain hold a sensing session with the CO CDR		X				X
Express concerns about his health						X
Send him to sick call to assess his physical condition	X					X
Tell him that you will relieve him if he doesn't improve				X		

B11. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore the situation and allow him to maintain his unrealistic standards	X	X		X		X
Tell him what he must do to achieve success	X				X	X
Applaud him for his plan	X					X
Hope he gives up his command before it takes too much of a toll on his/her health	X					X
Allow him to destroy the unit or himself	X					X
Give him more work to do				X		
Give negative feedback w/o offering solutions			X			
Fail to counsel him		X		X		X
Threaten the commander with any counseling action		X	X			
Tell him that his style is wrong					X	
Relieve the commander					X	

B11. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Try to figure out why he is acting this way—is it because of perceived inadequacies or just trying to get notice and separate himself from his peers	X					X
Talk to him about his personal life to see if there is something there that is making him set unattainable goals			X			
Find out how his behavior is effecting his family				X		

B11. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
High standards are good and can be reached if the training plan is good						X

B11. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Be up front because continuing with the current pattern will have both personal and professional consequences for him	X					X
Counsel this battery commander because he is about to get someone hurt				X		
As the BN CDR, your role is to counsel, coach and mentor this company commander		X				X
As BN CDR, you are responsible for the CO CDR's welfare as well as the welfare of his troops		X				X
If there is an underlying problem you should attempt to get him help			X			

B12. You are a battalion commander, and you notice early in your command that your guidance often becomes distorted when it reaches the lower ranks. For example, one day you comment that you want the line companies at 100% personnel strength for aircraft mechanics before you will start to assign them to headquarters. A few days later, the headquarters maintenance tech asks you why you are going to fill the line units at 150% of authorized mechanics before assigning them to headquarters! Your goal is to ensure that your guidance is communicated accurately to all levels of the organization. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Hold meetings with your platoon leaders to verify what they know.	4.27	2.05
When you must communicate important information verbally, try to speak directly to as many officers and soldiers as you can.	5.73	2.1
Hold the chain of command responsible for accurately passing information down to lower ranks.	7.8	1.01
Work on your relationship with your senior NCOs.	7.08	1.32
Conduct periodic discussions with your soldiers to correct misperceptions, clarify your intent, and locate sources of information loss.	7.56	1.57
Ask your company commanders to conduct periodic discussions with the soldiers so that the company commanders can verify that the lower levels are receiving accurate information.	7.83	1.15
Whenever possible, post and distribute written statements outlining your objectives.	6.83	2.09
Encourage your junior officers to be on the lookout for soldiers' statements about your orders that are not completely accurate--and ask the junior officers to correct these misperceptions immediately.	7.25	1.7
Develop an NCO professional development program that stresses how to pass down information properly.	6.63	2.16
Spend more time leading by walking around the unit and talking to people.	8.08	1.26
Look for breaks in the chain of command.	6.86	1.55
Use multiple means of communicating the same message.	7.97	1.34

B12. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Conduct checks to ensure your guidance is clear and understood	X	X	X	X		X
Call the CO CDRs together and explain the guidance again		X	X	X		X
Have a meeting with the entire BN to explain your goals and command philosophy	X			X		
Have a meeting with key BN leaders (PSG and above) to address the issue			X			
Bring the problem to the attention of the CO CDRs and senior staff		X	X			X
Maintain open communications with your staff		X				X
Put your goals out well in advance			X			
Ask key leaders how they see the goals being implemented and what can be done better		X	X			
Get ruthless with those CO CDRs that did not meet the standard		X		X		
Do not try to pad your numbers just to get results		X		X		

B12. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Do nothing	X			X		X
Do it all yourself						X
Make command decisions based on how far the chain of command may take them			X			
Fail to recognize the information flow/ communication barriers in your unit						X
Punish the person who reports the incorrect data						X
Brief each company commander separately		X				X
Require briefbacks except where necessary		X				X

B12. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B12. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B12. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
All it will take is one good example; the others will fall in line soon after		X		X		
If guidance is not communicated correctly, talk to CDRs about the problem			X			

B13. You are a battalion commander. Reluctantly, you gave your S-1 a company command for his professional development, even though you had questions about his abilities. He was a loyal S-1, but not a very good one: He had problems with organization, and his workstyle was a bit "helter-skelter." In conversations with lieutenants you have learned that they are having a hard time with this individual. Also, as you walk around the battalion, you see other indications that confirm your doubts about this person's abilities. In general, you are concerned and you have doubts about this officer's ability to command effectively. What should you do?

Response Options	Expert Mean	Expert SD
Ask your sergeant major to spend more time coaching the former S-1.	5.17	2.38
Ask a competent company commander to mentor the problematic officer.	4.47	2.42
Provide the former S-1 specific help with organization such as hints and strategies you and others have found useful.	8.14	0.83
Set the former S-1 up with a strong ISG and company XO.	7.19	1.94
Explain to the former S-1 specifically why it is important for him to change his behavior for the soldiers' benefit.	7.46	1.41
Help the lieutenants you spoke with to work through their direct superiors to solve problems.	5.41	2.34
Communicate regularly with the officer and encourage him to use you as a resource whenever he has problems.	8.1	1.41
Come down hard on the former S-1 about his shortcomings and threaten to take disciplinary action if he does not improve.	2.27	1.54
Conduct sessions with the former S-1 during which you talk to him about aspects of his behavior you want changed.	7.34	1.59
Talk to the S-1's first sergeant to get a better feel for what's going on.	5.95	2.15

B13. Additional Courses of Action Identified:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Mentor and coach the former S-1 to assist him become an effective CDR	X	X	X	X	X	X
If he doesn't meet objectives set for him, relieve him		X	X		X	X
If there is no improvement, conduct written counseling	X	X			X	X
Ask the former S-1 what his plans are for accomplishing your objectives			X			
Talk to the CDR's LTs to get their perceptions on what he needs to change			X			
Ensure that the officer understands that he has other officers to support him (ISG and PLs)	X					X
Emphasize work ethics	X					X
Monitor the situation closely and follow up in 30 days	X					X
Make sure the officer understands that he is accountable for his performance and what the implications are of poor performance		X			X	X

B13. Things You Should Not Do:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ignore the problem	X	X		X	X	X
Fire him on the spot	X	X	X	X	X	X
Talk bad about him to his fellow commanders or subordinates		X	X	X		
Fail to make your expectations clear and inform him of your reservations		X				X
Relieve the commander without giving him proper assistance			X			
Reward non performance	X					X
Continue to place self inflicted loyalty over fairness to others	X					X
Zing the guy on his OER						X
Pass the issue to his senior rater without proof that you have counseled the CO CDR		X	X			
Pass him on to his next chain of command						X

B13. Additional Information Sought:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
Ask the former S-1 if he is having any personal problems	X					X
Ask the new commander where he thinks he is at			X			

B13. Assumptions Made About the Problem:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
None						

B13. Implications Considered:

Responses	TOP 25%	BOT 25%	LT	CPT	MAJ	LTC
If you reluctantly gave the command to him, then you should be honest and let the individual know your concerns		X				X
Be up front about the problems he is having because it avoids ambiguities about your expectations		X				X