Doctrinal Orphan or Active Partner: A History of U.S. Army Mechanized Infantry Doctrine
Abstract
An historical study of mechanized infantry doctrine. The focus is on issues encountered in the U.S. Army with the introduction of an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) in 1982. Professional reaction to IFV fielding was largely negative. By 1985 several writers claimed Bradley equipped infantry was a specialized armored infantry--and that many employment problems arose from a failure to use it correctly. This paper concludes that the notion of a specialized armored infantry is invalid. Recorded combat experience suggests that an armored infantry concept which attempts to limit mechanized infantry to narrow "tank support" roles has been invalidated by combat experience. The study examines several paradigms and concepts that have served to undermine the Army's ability to develop comprehensive combined arms tactical doctrine. By examining mechanized infantry doctrine from its earliest days to the present the study notes most failures to express an adequate role for mechanized infantry within combined arms doctrine stem from a neglect of historically based doctrinal research. The study makes a general recommendation about the role of historical study in force and doctrinal development, on faulty paradigms within combined arms doctrine, and on the roles of mechanized infantry.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 02, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA384122
Entities
People
- Rod A. Coffey
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College