

Technical Report 1101

Leadership for Change

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins
University of Hull

June 2000



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**EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director**

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FOREWORD

The Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) is the primary Army activity conducting research on the human component. Understanding and improving leadership is of considerable importance in improving Army and unit performance. General societal changes are reflected in the effectiveness of such leadership. The soldier is a member of a highly specialized organization with unique aims and objectives, and simultaneously is a member of the larger society. The problem is how leadership of the armed forces can best adjust to the changes and conditions in society.

ARI has initiated a program to study military leadership, understand its effects on unit performance and determine how it might be enhanced. In support of this larger program, ARI sponsored this report to better understand how Western European countries deal with military leadership in times of societal change.

Ten authorities from France, the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark were selected to write papers describing how military leadership in their countries was responding to the challenge of societal change. Professor Gwyn Harries-Jenkins of the University of Hull wrote introductions to groups of papers which dealt with: "The Challenges of Change," "Leadership Responses to Change," and "Towards a Model of Good Practice." These papers should be useful both in understanding the experiences of other countries and in preparing our own country for the effects of societal change.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

LEADERSHIP FOR CHANGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

The purpose of this report is to describe the link between the exercise of leadership and the challenges of change which are faced by contemporary military establishments in Western Europe. It has three objectives:

- (1) Identify those challenges, which are encountered by military establishments in response to societal and armed forces changes.
- (2) Identify the way in which military leadership as a social process can ensure the most effective response to such challenges.
- (3) Establish a model derived from an analysis of such exercises of leadership in selected European, military establishments.

Procedure:

Ten expert consultants from France, the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark were selected to write papers dealing with the objectives listed above. Professor Harries-Jenkins performed a comparative analysis and across the individual findings. Each national expert described how one of these objectives as met in his country.

Utilization of Findings:

It is expected that understanding the varied experiences and solutions of Western European countries in utilizing leadership to meet the challenges of societal change will provide useful concepts to U.S. planners who are being faced with similar situations.

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I: INTRODUCTION

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins

Leadership is an elusive and complex concept. A considerable number of definitions exist, many of which tend to emphasize the **command** function that is inherent in the term. As Henderson comments in discussing the link between leadership and cohesion in combat units:¹

Leadership may be defined as the phenomenon that occurs when the influence of A (the leader) causes B (the group) to perform C (goal-directed behaviour) when B would not have performed C had it not been for the influence of A

It is not our intention, however, to discuss the subtleties of the distinction between authority, power and influence in armed forces, nor do we wish to add yet another definition of leadership to the 350 or so which are said to be in existence. In this study of the link between the exercise of leadership and the challenges of change which contemporary military establishments in Western Europe face, we have three objectives:

- To note the challenges which military establishments encounter in responding to changes in armed forces and/or the parent society
- To identify the way in which military leadership as a social process can best ensure an effective response to these challenges of change.
- To establish a model of good practice derived from an analysis of the exercise of leadership in selected European military establishments.

In the current period of détente, the European military establishment faces a number of uncertainties in a search for the most appropriate leadership style and strategy best suited to meet the challenges of change. The pace and scale of such changes in the parent society and in contemporary armed forces are very considerable. In the military, the level and range of modernization are most striking; technological innovation, weapons development, systems expansion and improved communications complement more publicised alterations in the military role and function. To a considerable extent, armed forces have been able to adjust readily to these changes. Our constant concern, however, is whether they are equally able to evolve contemporary leadership styles and strategies designed to meet not changes in missions and materials but changes affecting human resources.

In considering this, a preliminary literature search suggests that in analysing the elements of such effective leadership in a period of change, there are four areas of particular concern:

- Strategy and Tactics
- Management and Leadership
- Culture and Imagery
- Soldier and Society

The first three of these relate specifically to **internal** aspects of military organization. They constitute the **internal** environment of the military, an environment which has considerably changed in recent years and which, it can be forecasted, will continue to change in the twenty-first century. It is an environment in which while the basic elements of military leadership remain constant, leaders to remain effective have to modify techniques and styles. The fourth area of concern is the subtle relationship between the Soldier and Society which constitutes the **external** environment of contemporary armed forces. This is an area where European military

establishments are particularly affected by the change from a mass army raised on the basis of conscription to an all-volunteer force (AVF).

1. Strategy and Tactics

These are two distinctive, if inter-related facets of leadership. The first of these is concerned with creating a policy for formulating the long-term goals for a complex organization. This is also concerned with the making of key decisions related to that policy and goals. The other facet is concerned more with the shorter term and with the consequences of group dynamics when implementing policy.² Whilst the latter is of immediate concern in the context of the missions to be carried out by European armed forces, a major question is the identification of the challenges to be faced in 2020 in the creation of policy and strategy and how these shape the requirements of leadership.

2. Management and Leadership

In the nineteenth century, the public perception of effective leadership was based on a simple image of the heroic leader. It is admirably summed up in a description of Major-General Archibald Hunter, a British Officer commanding three brigades in the Atbara campaign of 1898 in the Sudan:

Reconnoitring almost alone up to the muzzles of the enemy's rifles, charging bare-headed and leading on his blacks, going without his rest to watch over the comfort of the wounded, he is always the same – always the same impossible hero of a book of chivalry. He is renowned as a brave man even among British officers: you know what that means.³

Fifty years later, greater emphasis was placed on the role of the manager in the military. With the growth of management as an applied science and with the examples of the successful use of such management techniques as operational research in World War II, there was a tendency to downplay the importance of leadership within armed forces and to stress the utility of resource management. As Spacie notes,

A consequence has been the neglect of leadership as a social process and people being regarded all too often as just another measurable resource.⁴

In this study it is argued that both concepts are important in contemporary military establishments but that management does not replace leadership, it only complements it. Increasingly, the individual in armed forces has to be given an enhanced status if the challenges of change are to be met effectively. Accordingly, leadership continues to be of critical importance within contemporary armed forces as a social process.

3. Culture and Imagery

As an organization with a lengthy history it is inevitable that the military has developed an impressive culture. Where this is equated simply with imagery, that is, the cultural symbols, the consequences for the maintenance and development of effective leadership may be minimal. This is so, even when change materially affects those symbols. It becomes more

complex when we move from a consideration of military culture linked to its peripheral characteristics of symbols, rituals and heroes, to a review of the central core values of that culture. These values are of long standing; they are resistant to change and they are frequently irrational. What complicates the issue is that in addition to the macro-level values of "the Army", "the Navy", "the Marines", "the Air Force", we find a plethora of values associated with the sub-cultures of particular groups. So while the competing and often conflicting values of particular services may contradict theories of the universality of leadership principles, the effectiveness of individual leaders is heavily dependent on accommodation with the sub-culture of the group.

The growing trend for international co-operation in peace-keeping and combat missions, adds to these problems. The complications created by major differences in national military cultures have a considerable effect on the adoption of the most appropriate style of leadership for a given situation.

4. Soldier and Society

It is not only Western military establishments which are currently affected by change; the parent society, as a whole, is in a constant cycle of change and stasis. The soldier is accordingly affected by change both within and outwith the armed forces. The soldier is not part of an isolated caste. Irrespective of rank, race or gender, the soldier is both a member of a highly purposive organization with unique aims and objectives, and is a citizen, a partner, a parent and a member of society. The dilemma is how leadership in the armed forces can best adjust to the effects of this duality of change. Our previous studies in the **Comparative Research of Military Institutions (CRMI)** have noticeably identified specific critical areas where the basic challenges facing leaders in the armed forces are materially enhanced. We have noted the dilemmas of leadership in such areas as racial discrimination, gender equality, trade union representation and homosexuality. Some of these are now of lesser concern; others are nation specific, but all continue to reflect the effect of change in the parent society upon long established military practices. In addition, it is possible to identify an increasing number of instances where the individual soldier is not only prepared to challenge established rules and regulations within the military, but is actively encouraged by the parent society so to do. In such a situation, the exercise of military leadership is fraught with problems and dilemmas.

THE BACK-GROUND

Following the winding-down of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the immediate issue which confronted Western European military establishments was the identification of their future role and function. Analysts spent some considerable time and effort in looking critically at past performance and policies before acknowledging the problems of an uncertain future. During the Cold War an East-West confrontation had to be deterred "because it could not sensibly be fought".⁵ In this situation, leadership models were inextricably linked to policies whereby armed forces in Western Europe were prepared for a war which nobody expected to fight and where the outbreak of hostilities would be seen as a major failure of political intent. In the immediate aftermath of 1989, the peace dividend produced an initial reaction that armed forces could be smaller yet better, but the basic interpretation of "good" leadership changed little. Although the size of the military altered ("downsizing") and while the structure of armed forces changed radically ("the zero draft"), there was little demand for any major review of the aims and objectives of leadership. The more radical ideas of leadership for change could be discounted

since the ethos of armed forces continued to provide a link with the past. There was little suggestion, for example, that large parts of the European military establishment would be simply abolished or that, as had happened previously in Canada, rival services would be integrated. Nor was there any willingness in some military establishments to adapt leadership styles and practices to what was happening in the parent society. Some European armed forces did recognise that social change in the parent society in such areas as attitudes towards homosexuality, equal opportunities or family provision had major implications for armed forces. Others, however, whilst they equally shared a wish to keep the system in being, were unwilling to contemplate any reforms in what were seen as areas of little military relevance. The overwhelming tendency, therefore, was towards ensuring through effective leadership the maintenance of well established patterns and philosophies. Indeed, to the critics of European armed forces there was too ready a tendency to equate "good" leadership with the need to conserve at all costs the philosophies of the past. Theories of leadership were consistently changing but to critics of the Western European military, the legacy of the past still persisted. It appeared that there had been too little change from the time when the English lieutenant-colonel commanding 168 Officer Cadet Training Unit could write to *The Times* on 16th January, 1941

"Man Management is not a subject which can be "taught"; it is an attitude of mind, and with the old school tie men this was instinctive and part of the philosophy of life."⁶

In many respects, the Gulf war created an immediate demand for a review of what was the aim of military leadership and what were its specific objectives. Active operations initially promoted paradoxical demands for a return to leadership styles which had been effective in combat situations in the past. This was essentially a preference for active rather than passive leadership for it was closely related to the utilization of armoured divisions in active operations and to the employment of sophisticated air power in interdiction. Yet **Desert Storm** occurred at time of considerable further socio-political change. As part of a spectrum of peace-keeping, it represented but one facet of more general peace **support** operations. Alternative concerns of Western European armed forces were increasingly linked to non-combat missions associated with environmental disasters, humanitarian distress and economic dysfunctions as well as quasi-combat operations engendered by international terrorism. These wider ranging activities suggested that a model of effective leadership for the future would go far beyond the warrior or heroic image of the past. One interpretation of this future endorsed the identification of such leadership with the **constabulary role** of armed forces. As Janowitz determined some forty years ago,

"The military establishment becomes a constabulary force where it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military position."⁷

On the basis of contemporary experience, the theoretical model of leadership which was implicit in the constabulary concept was considerably refined. Since armed forces are increasingly involved in **defence diplomacy**, it can be argued that an important aspect of future leadership would be the new role of "soldier diplomat". Here, it could be concluded that in view of the increasing complexity of the task, a perception of effective leadership shaped exclusively by the limitations of the warrior image, prepared soldiers only partially for their future tasks. A central part of future education and training had to be derived from a position of "enlightened advocacy"

based on horizons and perspectives not bound by military considerations. Specifically, such training was to meet four challenges facing military leaders:

- To expand analytical abilities.
- To train "beyond the "battlefield".
- To learn to manage diversity of individuals.
- To develop an ethos which balanced professional competence with democratic mores and values.⁸

The dilemma facing European armed forces at this time, however, was that the military was not subject simply to pressures associated with its changing roles and functions. The latter, in themselves, created enough problems but the intensity of the difficulties which were experienced were exacerbated by the effect of what was going on in the parent society. As public attitudes altered towards a whole range of hitherto neglected social issues and as national legislation recognised new definitions of acceptable standards of behaviour, there was increasing evidence that public mores and military mores no longer necessarily coincided. This drew attention again to the ongoing relevance of the convergence-divergence hypothesis. Given the presence of widespread socio-economic changes in society in general, it could be argued that the military should respond to these in common with any other large scale complex organisation (convergence). Taken out of context, it would seem that what was good for General Motors in its response to social issues, was equally good for the military establishment. Such a conclusion was vigorously endorsed by a number of influential pressure groups. In contrast, those who stressed that the military was a highly distinctive and unique purposive group, argued that a monopoly of violence and extensive exposure to risk, distinguished it from all other organizations (divergence). Accordingly, it was stressed, armed forces were different, as was the model of ideal-type leadership.

An acceptance of the postulated correctness of the convergence thesis implied that the desirable pattern of leadership within armed forces should mirror very closely that adopted elsewhere. There was an associated presumption that in hitherto critical areas of social concern such as the recruitment and retention of homosexuals, the promotion of equal opportunities, positive action against sexual harassment and the consideration of family obligation, policies and practices in civilian and military organizations should coincide. Research evidence, however, has repeatedly shown that there is a wide diversity of reactions among European military establishments to this initial presumption.⁹ Irrespective of the normative correctness or otherwise of this coincidence of military and civilian attitudes, in practice, some national armed forces continued to argue that a uniqueness of mission justified the adoption of policies different from those existing in civilian economic and public sector organizations. In turn this justified the adoption of alternative strategies and models of effective leadership. The emphasis placed on the unique situation of the military in an operational context consistently suggested that the divergence thesis had an undoubted validity. Leadership within armed forces it was argued had to be different in its form and practice from that which was the norm in other organizational settings. In the post Gulf War setting, however, the argument that the operational context within which the military performed was unique has been subject to considerable critical analysis.¹⁰ The complexity of modern military operations is such that the old question, "What is military?" again has considerable pertinence. When the tasks carried out by national armed forces in peace support and other operations resemble more and more those performed by other crisis organizations, the postulated uniqueness of the military becomes very questionable. The shift towards convergence rather than divergence in this aspect of civil-military relationships, encourages a continuing critical evaluation of the ideal-type of military leadership.

In such an evaluation, however, a supplementary argument which is put forward contends that the tasks of armed forces are carried out by military professionals who are governed by a higher moral standard than is appropriate for members of other occupational groups. This has considerable implications for the self-image of military leadership, for the thesis extends the noted argument that there are unique situations and contexts for armed forces. The extended contention argues that the expected higher standard of morality goes beyond the situations and contexts that are unique to the military. The latter relate to what has been termed 'the functional line'.¹¹ This recognises the need for a level and intensity of co-operation beyond that which is demanded from members of other organizations. There are specific functional requirements such as 'bravery, selflessness and conscientiousness' which, if not specifically related to the need for co-operation are, nevertheless, major determinants of the expected higher moral standards. Moreover, the breach of these functional standards has potentially disastrous consequences both for the group and for the individual. Accordingly, the concept of "higher moral standards" has been, and continues to be, a critical factor in the identification of the ideal-type model of military leadership. The ensuring problem, however, is the extent to which the military professional is expected to demonstrate these standards and, by, extension exercise an appropriate form of leadership, in situations which are not directly related to the identified military functions. Two aspects of the problem are of particular significance:

- Firstly, the interpretation of the phrase, "directly related", that is, the identification of the boundaries of the military function.
- Secondly, the extent to which the internal interpretation within armed forces of the concept of "higher moral standards" accords with the external interpretation by the general public of the concept.

For the first, we are initially faced with differing national interpretations of the dimensions of directly related. That which is seen to be "directly related" according to one national interpretation of the link between a given form of behaviour and the functional tasks of armed forces, may be considered in a second country to be barely relevant or, indeed, to be of total irrelevance. Our research suggests that a dichotomy of interpretation is particularly prevalent in evaluations of the impact of gender relationships or demands for equal opportunities, on the exercise of the military function. For the second, we can note that the effect of differing national cultures is such that there are differences amongst national armed forces as to the identification of the appropriate higher moral standard as well as concomitant differences between military and public perceptions of the ideal standard. A tentative conclusion is that armed forces, in general, tend to favour a more absolute standard than is common in the wider society. The **Uniform Code of Military Justice**, especially Article 133 would seem to evidence this conclusion as do the statements by senior military personnel that "our standards must be higher than those that prevail in society at large"¹² or the contention that a bad person "cannot be....a good soldier"¹³. From this it can be inferred that the ideal-type model of military leadership reflects the preferences for unusually high ethical standards.

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II: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE

The major challenges to be faced by Western European military establishments as a consequence of societal changes, are substantially similar to those occurring in the United States. In practice, these currently centre on ethnic and gender diversity in a scenario in which increasingly sophisticated technology has exposed leadership to the critical evaluation encouraged by open media communications. The presence of the Satellite telephone on the battlefield is no longer a figment of imagination. Underlying these challenges, however, are the substantial consequences of the development of a modern, if not, post-modern military.

In this section, two papers consider these major challenges. In the first, Bernard Boëne and Christopher Dandeker present a sociological analysis of the situation which Western European military establishments encounter and the effect of change on traditional models of military leadership. Their central theme is the "dialectic of control", that is, the potential stress or conflict created by a policy of dispersion of authority within armed forces to lower levels of command paralleled by an increase in micro-management, occasioned by the growing sophistication of communications technology. This leads to a compression of the three levels of war – the strategic, operational and tactical levels, creating a number of challenges to the traditional exercise of military leadership.

In a complementary paper, Jan van der Meulen examines the specific problems faced by the Dutch military. He stresses that the shift from a conscript mass army to the all-volunteer force has encouraged a re-examination of the civil-military balance, particularly in the context of the complexities of a contemporary military identity. Military leadership, he concludes, now has to recognise the diversity of values not only within armed forces but also within the parent society. Leadership is crucial in creating and maintaining an organizational climate which favours this diversity.

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins

**POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES AND LEADERSHIP
STRATEGIES IN WEST EUROPEAN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS**

Bernard Boëne & Christopher Dandeker

Any sociological examination of military institutions must start with the simultaneous consideration of three major dimensions: roles, resources (human, material, doctrinal), societal influences¹.

Organisation can be seen as the ways in which a military establishment harmonises roles, resources and outside influences so as to optimise functional effectiveness as well as sociopolitical responsiveness and support. Military organisation and the profession that has gradually emerged over the last four centuries are structured in depth by *three levels* (tactical, operational, strategic) and *two logics* of collective action. Such logics of action (or systemic functions) are geared respectively (a) to applying the means of coercion on designated parties and (b) to providing concepts, co-ordination and support. The former is characterised by the search for *effectiveness*, measured in a holistic, qualitative way, in forcing one's political will on others; by the influence of powerful norms (discipline, expectation of heroic behaviour, open-ended commitment to organisational goals, all based on the sacredness of missions more or less directly related to sovereignty); by the limits such norms (as well as battlefield chaos and the anticipation of casualties) impose on instrumental rationality and the division of labour; finally, by the crucial importance of *leadership*, conceived of here as the ability to inspire individuals, in the name of a presumed collective higher good, to perform tasks that (due to risks to life, limb and mental integrity) are against their basic self-interest and transgress universal taboos on the taking of human life. In contrast, the second logic is governed by optimisation under constraint, entirely dominated by instrumental rationality, and marked by the possibility of assessing *efficiency* through analytical, quantitative methods according to technical, economic and sociopolitical criteria of success². In other words, this second logic of co-operation with friendly agents (both in and out of uniform) has *management* as its epitome.

The differentiation into levels, their relative importance and the degree of centralisation all vary over time according to the specifics of given historical contexts. For reasons which will be dealt with below, the post-Cold War period has seen an erosion and distinct compression of the three levels, while the extent of centralisation and decentralisation, though the scales tilt towards the latter, today remains uncertain at best³.

The articulation of the two logics of action, often enacted by the same agents (and which thus cannot be equated with surface structures, i.e. clearly identified slots in organisational charts), is one of dialectical tension: they are both present and active in every situation, each a source of constraint on the full development of the other. Only the mix, i.e. their relative influence, is apt to vary according to both immediate context and locus in the organisation. There was a time when, as one moved up the chain of command from the tactical to the strategic level, management gradually got the better of leadership in the role requirements of officers⁴ (though never to the point of turning generalship into a 'great engineering job'). Today's situation in that regard does not seem to leave room for such a clear pattern.

CHALLENGES

1. New Roles, Frequent Action

New missions have not displaced older ones: though the probability of major war appears to be low, it is not altogether impossible and training for it cannot be purely and simply dispensed with. Thus, the post-Cold War era has enlarged the use of force spectrum at the lower end by adding peace support and humanitarian aid to the list of roles. Since western

armed forces perform them in a third party capacity, those new missions tend to de-emphasise violence (and indeed are in some cases not far removed from internal security tasks). They often call for new skills such as mediation or negotiation. However, the possibility of violence at the initiative of belligerents is never out of the question (as could be seen in Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere); so that the ability to revert to more traditional application of force postures and roles looms large in the range of skills necessary at both unit and individual levels.

A second major characteristic of the missions now dominant is that they are multifunctional. They entail many tasks that are not military in nature, such as repairing roads and bridges, restoring utility networks, monitoring markets or elections, teaching school, operating infirmaries or radio stations, or arresting war criminals. In so doing, officers and other ranks come into contact with local politicians and civilian populations in ways that once were familiar to soldiers from countries with a past colonial tradition (Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, Italy) but are sometimes regarded as alien to their true calling by service members from other countries (notably the U.S.).

They are also multinational. Considerations of burden-sharing (in missions whose costs are high when measured against expectancy of gain in terms of national interest) and of legitimacy (avoiding accusations of neo-colonialism) usually turn those missions into coalition efforts, either *sui generis* or under the aegis of NATO or the UN. As is usual in such circumstances, relations among national contingents blend functional and political (diplomatic) considerations. This often generates unclear chains of command marred by criss-crossing lines of authority. Another issue relates to 'cultural interoperability', or lack of it, among those contingents, and its consequences on functional effectiveness as the chances of a levelling down of standards through a reduction to the lowest common denominator are far from negligible.

Finally, such new roles involve the use of strategic offshore firepower (in peace enforcement) and/ or the dispersal of ground troops in small packets so as to cover as much territory as possible (in peacekeeping). This tends to produce blurred battle lines as well as to reverse functional priorities and traditional orders of prestige among combatant and non-combatant (especially logistic) units⁵.

Whereas the late phase of the Cold War had seen a dearth of military action (because mutual nuclear deterrence inhibited it at the centre, and earlier mishaps at the periphery had left scars that led western powers to consider use of force less functional than in previous periods), the era that opened at the turn of the 1990s has been marked by a quick-fire pace of constabulary action. Indeed, fatigue is threatened by an operational tempo which is seen as problematic wherever (as in the U.S., U.K., France or Italy) activism in the international arena is combined (for domestic legitimacy reasons, due to the absence of credible, massive military threats against vital national interests) with lower force levels.

2. New Resources, Fewer Quantities

The last decade has seen sharp drops in budget and force level figures in all but a handful of western countries. This has led in turn to qualitative changes, reinforced by the emergence and fielding of new technologies.

a) Equipment

The most spectacular advances, of which probably the better part still lie ahead, have been in the domain of communications and computer networks. Theorising about future 'digital battlefields' and 'information warfare', widely believed to have the potential for changing the name of military games, is the order of the day. So much so that some authors have been predicting the dawn of a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) which could de-emphasise violence by disturbing or intoxicating information flows, or pre-empting enemy moves.

In its more extreme formulations, such insistence on technological fixes to age-old problems is seriously flawed because new forms of war do not substitute for older forms, but add to them: hence a continued need for the traditional martial virtues. It also carries the risk of over-dependence on technology and exaggerated notions of what it can achieve as well as where it is apt to lead⁶. The relative disappointment with 'smart' weapons of 1980s vintage, which — however useful in other ways — have mostly failed to generate the decisive advantage they were made out to promise should caution us against such delusions.

It remains true, however, that interconnectivity has increased in tremendous proportions. Few people are now left out of the information loop, which in and of itself is bound to be a major driver of change in military organisation.

b) Personnel

Mass armed forces had been declining slowly for some three decades when the Cold War came to an end. The reduction in force which followed closely on its heels spelled their doom in all western nations, broadly defined, except Finland, Greece and Turkey. Everywhere, the proportion of conscripts has sharply decreased, and many countries have gone all-volunteer, or are seriously contemplating such a move. The functional effects of this change run in opposite directions. They consist of (1) a partial remilitarisation of organisational culture as uniformed personnel, now harder to procure, tend to concentrate on operational tasks they alone can perform, thus leaving support to private contractors at home and to reservists on overseas theatres; (2) a growing influence of the parent society, through recruitment and dependence on outsourcing; (3) a compositional make-up which is less socially representative than in the heyday of conscription, but increasingly diverse in cultural terms as the proportion of women and minorities based on race, ethnicity or sexual preference rises to unprecedented heights. Likewise, while the specialisation of individual and unit roles continues to increase at a pace set by technological innovation, the emphasis is now on versatility due to the scarcity and expensive costs of human resources — a major fresh source of complexity in today's military institutions.

All of this results in a manpower force which, owing to the general rise in educational standards on the outside, is better informed, more non-conformist and anxious to use initiative — that is if quality requirements are met. Yet the net effect is mixed. On the one hand, the present situation guarantees better

sensitiveness to cultural factors in operations of the peace support type⁷. On the other, it raises problems of organisational control (see overleaf).

c) **Doctrine and Force Configuration**

Most western nations have gone through a change of doctrine which reflects the disappearance of the old massive Soviet threat. While nuclear weapons are still there to structure global politics (at least in part), the Atlantic Alliance has moved from a strategy of deterrence to a strategy of action. Western nations feel responsible for an international order now governed by the principles they uphold, but which is at best imperfect: marred as it is by local or regional disorders originating from 'failed' or 'rogue' states, religious fanaticism and ethnic nationalism, which are apt to generate humanitarian disasters that world public opinion often deems intolerable. As no power or coalition is strong or willing enough to play world gendarme, the informal collective security framework that has emerged earlier this decade is in point of fact a selective security scheme in which spheres of influence or interest determine where the 'international community' will intervene next.

Such interventions are not wholly predictable as to location and exact specifications ; as a result, they cannot be planned in advance. Organic formations, which used to be deployed as wholes in the days of input-driven mass armed forces, are no longer part of the landscape. They have been turned into 'reservoirs' from which output-driven force packets are selected and cobbled together for the specific demands of the moment. This modular type of force configuration is indeed the best adapted solution to organisational problems of the day. Yet it is not without its drawbacks. First, it is apt to create difficulties when it comes to fostering secondary cohesion among units deployed at the last minute to new theatres of operations. Second, it implies a capacity to develop, and maintain in readiness, organic rather than mechanistic structures and forms of sociability throughout the services. These drawbacks may be alleviated by habits formed in peace support tasks and by the sheer operational tempo which low force levels and numerous commitments are bound to generate in the militaries of the most 'activist' nations.

Another development which is common to nearly all European militaries is the advent of intense inter-arm and inter-service co-operation, driven by the type of missions that dominates the post-Cold War scene. Whereas force integration in the Cold War used to be horizontal, with mostly self-contained major units allotted to distinct geographical areas, it is now vertical: members from different units/ arms/ services are led to co-operate routinely at battalion level or below. This has entailed requirements for 'purple' command and control arrangements. As a result, staffs and schools, especially at senior levels, have been amalgamated, and a 'purple' culture is (far from painlessly) emerging. The multinational dimension adds to the overall complexity, which can be measured by the frequency of such phrases as 'Joint', 'Combined' or 'Task Forces'.

3. Societal Influences

In the 1990s, trends that were nascent in western societies during the last decades of the Cold War have deepened and accelerated. Of interest here are those which result from increased individualism and technological developments.

a) Postmodern Trends

Individualism, stemming from role specialisation, purchasing power, and welfare programs that render personal solidarity dispensable, received a boost when the societal discipline made necessary by the Cold War's perils could no longer be seen as relevant. Citizenship, defined as a balance of rights and duties, was weakened and regarded as an expression of majoritarian tyranny. Minorities are now more vocal in affirming their differences, and their very success induces others in the central groups to follow suit ('rest of Canada' syndrome), thus leading to a fragmentation of cultural mainstreams. Identities, formerly based in part on ascribed status, become more subjective, i.e. chosen (and changed) if the values and lifestyle that go with them provide individuals with expressive meaning. The only central values that can regulate a postmodern society are tolerance, equal dignity of all identities, and the sanctity of life.

Rising individualism makes military socialisation, with its emphasis on group sociability (and the resultant lack of privacy), more problematic. Where conscription has been abolished, the external image projected by military institutions tends to hinder rank and file recruitment. Fragmentation of cultural mainstreams adds to cohesion problems. Soldiers refuse to be treated as serfs, servants or unthinking cannon fodder, and resent authoritarian styles of leadership. They want to have their individual and group identities recognised as well as treated as equal to any other. This leads to a questioning of values and ends, and of traditional norms and institutional authority. In tell-tale fashion, litigation is up, and retention suffers.

More generally, these trends make the legitimacy of military institutions and action more conditional, both outside and inside. Use of force is suspect unless it is resorted to for approved reasons and seen to be functional. Individualist insistence on human rights, and weaker allegiance to nation-states, may explain why peace support operations in the cause of stability, international law and suffering humanity are popular and regarded as noble by public opinion as well as by military actors themselves. Yet, although there is good reason to judge political leaders in many cases more timid than allowed for by the study of public opinion on this issue, cultures that consider individuals unique and irreplaceable, and life in all its forms the ultimate value, are bound to fear casualties much more than others⁸. Politicians in office understandably shy away from interventions that may lose credibility and moral justification because they are too long, ineffective and costly in blood and treasure.

b) The Impact of New Communication/ Information Technologies

Real-time TV coverage of events in theatres of operations certainly adds to these pressures because it guarantees immediate political resonance. The consequence is that civilian interference in military affairs has increased. In organisational terms, it also impacts on soldier morale in the field through feedback communication with families and friends back home. The novelty is indeed that military primary groups, classically seen as one of the mainsprings of soldier morale and effectiveness, are no longer sheltered from outside interference, notably through cell phones, against which junior leaders are pretty powerless for both technical and legitimacy reasons. There are even reported instances of service members ordering pizza and beer from the local food delivery shop while on training or actual operations. But new means of instant communication also impact higher up the chain of command by enabling senior leaders to by-pass intermediate levels and directly contact junior personnel in order to influence the course of events as they unfold. This, as has been noted by social scientists, tends to reduce the number of hierarchical layers, and sharply contrast flat rank structures in action with more traditional, long-spanned ones in garrison life.

4. Trends and Issues in Organisational Control

The sum total is that military action is tremendously more complex than it used to be. Operational structures, now closely resembling the "loosely-coupled systems" described by organisational sociologists, are constantly shifting; goals are apt to change in an ongoing manner. Flows of information operate both vertically and, for direct co-ordination purposes, laterally. Leaders routinely learn what has taken place in their units minutes or hours later, during debriefings or after-action reports. This approximates so-called 'matrix organisations', and requires both structural and mental flexibility, not to mention quality personnel, at all levels.

Several issues, derived from the above, deserve closer scrutiny.

a) The 'Dialectic of Control'

There has been a long-term process of dispersion of military authority to lower levels of the command chain. Developments in war and military technology, together with the development of the citizenship state have driven this. Thus, as a result of the importance of the consent of the governed to the legitimacy of political elites, persuasive forms of authority and 'group consensus' — to use Janowitz's formulation — have become significant features of the military command system. Yet, this system retains coercive and hierarchical elements that mark it out from civilian systems. This is due to the functional imperatives of a war-fighting organisation, but also to the residue of tradition. How much further the military can be 'de-hierarchicalised' and lose its coercive elements remains a moot point⁹.

The ongoing technological revolution in the means of communication has led to an increase in the speed of information flow, and thus to a major expansion in the quantity of information that military and political elites have to consider when

formulating decisions. It has also made more acute the problem of determining the quality of this information: what is true; who can be believed, how does one respond to propagandist uses of information on TV or the Internet? This adds to the pressures on political elites, their advisors and military commanders. In the very fast-moving events of modern war, leaders have less and less time in order to digest the increased and variable quality information at their disposal and to make decisions. These decisions and their outcomes will be scrutinised just as quickly, thus adding to the telescoping pressures — again NATO in Kosovo is testament to this process.

Dispersion is, however, connected with a counter-development: a tendency towards the centralisation of control and what has been termed the micro-management of military operations. These two conflicting trends constitute in the military context what might, following a formulation of Anthony Giddens, be called a 'dialectic of control'¹⁰. The drivers of the countertrend are, first, that the new technologies of communication provide the means of installing systems of micro-management; second, that political leaders and their advisors are increasingly aware that quite small-scale events at the tactical or sub-tactical level can have a major impact at the strategic level. Such events are likely to have both military and non-military dimensions (e.g. involving implications for refugees, human rights, and relations between military and other organisations). In addition, the media that report the events magnify their impact by emphasising their likely consequences through often graphic images. Third, as mentioned above, that the very speed of events and the consequent need to adapt strategy and tactics in the light of fast moving situations or at least to evaluate the need for such adaptation leads to a tendency to increase knowledge and control at the centre.

The dialectic of control, i.e. dispersion and micro-management, leads to a compression of the three levels of war — the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This is despite the fact that, objectively, the complexity and pace of events points to the need for dispersion. Thus, the fact that the lowest level events can have major consequences leads the political centre to have a tendency to being 'control freaks'. This is especially so when they feel under pressure and become aware of the need to, for example, keep public opinion, as well as the leadership and publics of potentially wavering allies, committed to the operation. The control-freak tendency can also lead to tensions within the top echelons of the military command system at the planning, deployment and operational phases of military activities. That is to say, the political level might draw on a narrower rather than a broader range of military expertise in formulating its decisions (e.g. the Chief of Defence Staff and not the individual service chiefs). It might narrow its circle of advisors and thus lessen the chance to hear critical but constructive criticism of plans. Finally, it might seek to manage operations in such a way that the military chain extending from the operational to tactical matters is subjected to political monitoring, e.g. target sets, the minimum altitude of military aircraft and so on.

The dialectic of control issue can only be resolved satisfactorily by trust- and confidence-building measures being installed at the political-military interface. This points to the need for appropriate education and training for personnel on

both sides of what has been and will continue to be a blurred dividing line¹¹. At the lower (even lowest) levels of chain of command, soldiers need to be politically aware of the broader framework in which their actions occur. In particular, there is a need for them to be able to place the objectives of an operation in the context of the contingencies of the situations they confront. As an ex-NATO commander put it¹², *'the ordinary soldier has to be educated to understand that his actions can have as large an impact on events as Madeleine Albright'*. This can only occur through trust and a doctrine of mission tactics. Successful application of these tactics requires all levels to appreciate the doctrinal basis on which they depend. In addition, the highest political and military levels need to be made aware that understandable though it may be for them to press for the centralisation of control, the logic of the situation points to the need for dispersion. By the same token, higher levels must recognise the damage that can be caused by second-guessing those situations from locations far removed from the action on the ground. It is here that Moskos's formulation on the 'soldier-statesman' and 'soldier-scholar' become pertinent¹³.

b) New Officer Roles

As argued elsewhere¹⁴, the soldier-scholar is required to think through the conditions for applying force in the new security context: for example, in those operations which lie midway between classical peacekeeping operations and war, where the defeat of an enemy is sought. The most likely military operations probably lie at this midpoint; experience and doctrine are relatively undeveloped here, although much has been learned during the last few years¹⁵.

The soldier-scholar's role is promoted not only by new strategic circumstances, but also by political and technological conditions. With the decline in the military experience of the political elite, both inside and outside government, politicians are less well versed than they used to be in the conditions under which force can usefully be applied in pursuit of security policy. Yet, the situation is complicated not only by the need to deal with new types of mission but also by the effects, alluded to above, of the revolution in communications. Thus it is increasingly risky to give the armed forces missions without the appropriate means and to use technology to micro-manage operations: the consequences harm the operation as well as civilian-military relations.

Both new peace support missions and more familiar operations, such as peace enforcement in Desert Storm, have promoted the development of the soldier-statesman — the military professional who is adept at handling the media and international diplomacy. Political skills are becoming increasingly important. In connection with the Gulf conflict, for example, General Sir Peter De la Billiere remarked on:

'...one of the basic principles of high command, which I was learning as I went along : that a senior commander must bring together everyone concerned, not only in theatre, but outside as well, and that often he must act almost more as a diplomat than as a soldier'¹⁶.

The soldier-statesman's role is becoming more significant because of the complexity of political problems of coalition warfare. This is the case especially in missions where threats to national interests fall well short of the threat to national survival that characterised war planning in the Cold War. Also, as mentioned above, the pace of events and their reporting made possible by the modern electronic media telescopes the decision time available to political and military decision-makers. Therefore much closer co-operation between them is required; the result is a blurring of the divide between political and military skills and a challenge to traditional ideas of the military professional as an apolitical technician¹⁷. Finally, because of the delicate nature of a mission, mandates may well change during an operation. Again in such a case, military commanders must be politically sensitive to the changing diplomatic context¹⁸. As alluded to earlier, the projected involvement of service personnel in tasks of 'defence diplomacy' such as arms control inspection, and 'outreach' activities involving the education and training of other armed forces on such matters as defence management and systems of civilian control of the military, will raise the profile of both soldier-statesman and soldier-scholar roles¹⁹.

Preparing military professionals for the roles of soldier-statesman and soldier-scholar requires innovation in education and organisation: for example, arranging for the efficient management of complex joint operations involving components from all three services and from other countries as well²⁰.

LEADERSHIP STRATEGIES

What conclusions may be drawn from the insights offered above on post-Cold War circumstances? Are some of the old leadership recipes to be regarded as obsolete, and discarded? If so, can one think of substitutes when it comes to the art of leading people and structures in military action and institutions today?

1. Ill-Adapted Legacies of the Past

a) Formal Leadership

Quite obviously, the old (oldest!) leadership recipe — relying solely on the power of sanction — is out of the question in all but the most exceptional circumstances. The military is no longer a mechanistic type of bureaucracy: so much has been apparent for some time, even if the shift from 'coercive' to 'enabling' systems and forms of sociability, or from long to short 'power distances', has been uneven among national organisational military cultures²¹ (and within those, among subdivisions). Sheer rank, or authority derived from status, will do little to help a leader in charge of open, loosely-coupled systems. Pure bureaucratic skills will hardly help a leader confronted with action in the field and tragic circumstances²². Furthermore, the educational and cultural characteristics of service members, especially at rank and file level, induce them to resent authoritarianism; technology-driven complexity, subtle peace support mission environments (and the need for initiative they foster among subordinates) as well as the compression of organisational levels and the requirement for broad understanding of the ins and outs of the frame of action — all point in the direction of trust, more latitude in

action once orders have been issued, and supervision restricted to outcomes: the very definition of 'mission tactics'. This entails high manpower quality requirements, as much of the above presupposes the ability and willingness to use initiative on the part of those on the receiving end of orders (or should one say 'directives'?). In other words, what was already true in the 1970s and 1980s is even truer today.

b) Leadership by Example

While less dysfunctional, a second traditional type of leadership, viz. personal example, can be regarded as less relevant under the conditions prevailing in the post-Cold War age. Indeed, the 'follow me' approach can only apply when and where interpersonal interaction is prolonged, or at the very least, eye contact is established. Otherwise, non-verbal communication of meaning (inspiring courage, confidence, and the like) is pointless. Now, communication through electronic means, offshore firepower, or the dispersal of troops in small groups over large distances in peacekeeping duties, either do not require or hardly provide the ideal circumstances in which personal example can be fruitful.

c) Normative Control

Relying on normative control through widely shared cultural codes — a recipe dating back to the late 1970s — is unlikely to work because of the modular structures and 'mix-and-match' configuration of forces now dominant. However, such a negative conclusion applies better to old supervisory, highly prescriptive leadership styles than it does to the general norms of 'purple' culture, preserving situational flexibility and latitude of action, that is envisaged here as best adapted to present circumstances. Indeed, one possible formulation, drawing on Van Doorn's classic view of the military as a 'fusion of organisation and profession'²³, would consist in saying that the balance is shifting towards more professional discretion and norms and less hierarchical (top-down, supervisory) organisational control.

d) Contingency Leadership

Nor does the notion seem better suited of variable leadership styles the relevance of which depends on circumstances. The contingency theory offered by Fred Fiedler some thirty years ago holds that the techniques applied by leaders ought to vary as a function of the tasks at hand, the characteristics of followers, the technology used, and the type of situational stress²⁴. The problem here is that the contingencies facing military leaders at most levels are continually changing, so that leadership techniques cannot be adequately differentiated and substituted in good time to adjust to ongoing changes.

2. Prescriptions

a) Leadership Style

In the post-Cold War era, leadership has to evolve from supervisory and hierarchical forms to broader techniques, more informal in character, and mainly concerned with the management of meaning and group consensus. In many ways, except in small groups where face-to-face relationships are still a basic reality in action, this spells the doom of primary, i.e. interpersonal, techniques long in use at platoon, company, squadron or even battalion levels. The new requirements of effectiveness in action involve generalising to nearly all levels the forms of leadership based on the manipulation of symbols hitherto reserved for high-level commanders. The example of Gen. Patton comes to mind (though the more histrionic aspects of it, e.g. the mother-of-pearl handle of the fancy revolver on his belt, may not be of the essence).

Dispersal in the field, lateral communications, short-circuits in multiple chains of command, interaction among arms, services and national contingents, the quasi-immediate political resonance of incidents, the reduced danger but increased stress of military action in third-party capacities, the growing need for initiative among other ranks, role ambiguity, higher average educational standards, civilian influences and postmodernity's new push for individualism on the outside — all point in the same direction. The leader's role in such a context consists primarily in building trust, sustaining commitment and fostering (what essentially amounts to *secondary*) cohesion. In order to encourage the initiative and creative thinking required by mission tactics, he (or she) has to pose problems rather than impose solutions : allow for the generation of ideas on the part of subordinates, and delay critical assessment. This implies restraint and patience, rather than the self-assured brusqueness of the old charismatic warrior role-model.

Likewise, in the face of ambiguities, potential controversy or situations for which classical military norms do not provide standard answers, the ideal style of leadership must enable leaders at all levels to approach and resolve ethical dilemmas. Coalitions, complete with the mix of functional and political considerations, criss-crossing lines of authority and conflicting interpretations of mission they are bound to produce, are apt to generate divided loyalties. What is to be done, as one Italian general put it in connection with Somalia, when orders from Rome contradict orders from New York? Or when accomplishing one's mission means putting the lives of subordinates at risk? The latter dilemma pervades action on most peace support operations, since they hardly involve vital national interests and therefore do not warrant the same type and degree of heroic behaviour, premised on the sacredness of mission, as when such interests are at stake. Moreover, these missions easily invite cynicism on the part of those who take part in them. For one thing, not unlike social work, the effectiveness of peace support (especially peacekeeping and peace enforcement) is often in doubt : even though it requires a lot in terms of time, energy, money, dedication and resistance to stress, it is difficult to gauge at best when troops are there, and likely to fade

rapidly when the operation comes to an end. The spectacle of atrocities, of belligerents trafficking in currencies, petrol, women and influence, of some national contingents of soldiers manifestly equating their mission with a 9-to-5 job, coupled with stringent rules of engagement and a feeling of powerlessness, can quickly demoralise a peace support force, especially when fatigue sets in, a few casualties are incurred and living conditions in the field are difficult. Yet, sound leadership can turn such problematic circumstances around. Integrity, selflessness, determination and persistence on the part of leaders are apt to work wonders simply because the potential gratification from helping suffering humanity in peace support operations, as surveys and interviews abundantly show, are enormous. In other words, a leader capable of articulating a vision can give meaning to sacrifices consented to in situations that may be hard to fathom.

A central problem, of course, is that peace support missions, even though dominant in practice over the ten years just elapsed and for some (indefinite) time to come, are in theory last in a natural order of priorities which gives pride of place to defence of the national sanctuary and co-operation with neighbours and allies in the interests of regional security. Service members are trained for high-intensity warfare, despite its low probability of occurrence, because low force levels do not allow for unit specialisation, and it is easier to adapt the training of soldiers down from war-fighting to peace support than vice-versa. But restrictions in the use of force can be frustrating when one is shot at by belligerents, and the control of such frustration through the infusion of meaning becomes one of the central tasks of leaders. All of this requires mental as well as organisational flexibility — a notion which appears to carry a lot more meaning than its buzzword quality would have one believe.

The requirements of group consensus in contexts where groups are unstable, and bring together people of diverse origins, training and characteristics, call for the ability to identify and pursue mutual interests — which goes to underline the importance of teams, rather than isolated individuals²⁵. This applies to in-group mission tactics, but also to out-group interaction : to co-operation and teamwork across organisational boundaries among leaders of units from different arm, service or national contingent backgrounds.

b) Skill Requirements

From all of the above flow a number of leadership training needs. First, leaders must be able to understand the wider context in which they operate, as well as to assess and factor in non-military consequences of military action ; be aware of the limits of force while retaining the ability to switch modes of action, from less to more muscular, as required ; articulate a vision. Mediation, negotiation and public relations skills are called for. This points to a requirement for broad grounding in the social sciences, in keeping with the new roles soldier-statesman, soldier-scholar and soldier-communicator alluded to earlier. Port-of-entry as well as continuing education in history, international relations, politics, economics and sociology becomes a must for leaders at all levels.

Language skills, likewise, are more in demand than used to be the case. Though French is the official second language of NATO and the UN, command of English is now a *de facto* universal requirement. But for contact with local populations of for intelligence purposes, as well as for congenial relations among neighbouring national contingents, other languages are needed. Contrasting with the days when multinational integration (e.g. within NATO) was horizontal and linguistic skills were mostly required of senior leaders and central staff officers, today's vertical integration imposes the same requirement on most levels in the chain of command.

Beyond foreign languages looms the issue of cultural understanding and interoperability among national contingents (over and above the problem raised by the creation of a "purple" culture *within* national armed forces, supposedly easier to achieve — but not always so). While the sheer diversity of such contingents (especially on operations under the direct aegis of the UN) points to the need to develop general sensitivity to cultural otherness rather than to learn particular cultural codes in any detail, it remains true that West European military contingents on most peace support operations cross the paths of a limited number of partners (U.S., British, French, Italian, etc.). Hence the need for service members of a given West European country to operate effectively when acting in concert with representatives of another such country's contingent. Habits have been formed over the years, and shared NATO culture can take care of basic problems. Yet, much remains to be done if closer European military integration is to become reality.

Finally, a good leader in the present circumstances is one who feels at ease with technology : who knows its capabilities, limits and the burdens it places on military organisation. This does not mean that all leaders have to be engineers. One does not need to understand the details of how every piece of equipment functions in order to use it effectively. And indeed an important conclusion is that, given the time required for social science education, comprehensive training in engineering should be reserved for a minority — for those few who will act as interface between technologists and leaders²⁶. This conclusion is derived simply from the realisation that fully one quarter of a full military career for those who will reach general rank is devoted today to training and education, a proportion which cannot be indefinitely extended.

c) **The Comparative Dimension : Analytical Convergence**

It is not a matter of indifference that the main points on leadership in this chapter, though independently arrived at, are paralleled by those of two Israeli authors in a collective volume recently published²⁷. To some extent, this may reflect the fact that both the present writers and their Israeli counterparts draw on the same literature on leadership and organisational sociology²⁸; they also share classical references in military sociology (though those Israeli writers would probably describe themselves as anthropologists), and are faced with similar trends (notably as regards technological developments). But the convergence remains impressive in that the military experience in which their analysis is grounded is in many ways substantially different from that of West European armed forces. The Israel

Defence Force has been engaged over the last three or four decades, in continuous action ranging from high-intensity warfare to internal security, all in defence of national interests. This contrasts sharply with the lack of action which confronted West European militaries during the latter half of the Cold War (with the possible exception of the British forces in Northern Ireland and the 1982 Falklands War), and with the peace support missions as third-party forces that have dominated the last ten years. Israel's defence forces have been faced with a higher level of controversy at home and abroad from the mid-1980s onwards than have their European counterparts, and do not seem to have enjoyed the same spectacular public image improvement over the last decade.

Despite such differences, the diagnosis is essentially identical, and prescriptions for military leadership very similar. The communications revolution ("teleleadership?"), boundaries that are permeable to civilian influences and political considerations, the effects of coalitions ("interorganisational frameworks"), unstable goals and modular structures, real-time media exposure, the emergent properties of vertically integrated units from various national, arm or service backgrounds acting in concert, role ambiguity or conflict and ethical dilemmas, the need for increased initiative on the part of other ranks, higher educational standards among recruits, new leadership roles and professional education requirements, the value of teams, "transformational leadership" (individualised consideration and intellectual stimulation of subordinates) and the need for the "management of meaning" — all are part of both treatments. In some cases, while the vocabulary is different, the point made is broadly the same, as when Shamir and Ben-Ari refer to "blurred front-lines" whereas we point to the compression of the three conventional levels of military action.

These Israeli authors' fail to note the dispersion of authority, the "dialectic of control" and the very short reaction time which induce senior leaders to use the new technological means at their disposal to counter this dispersion trend. And they do not mention the changing internal balance as between organisation and profession, to the detriment of the former, in contemporary military establishments. Nor do they raise the issue of possible frustration and how best to control it.

However, they offer a comparison which we believe has seminal potential, and indirectly expresses a similar point. They note that diplomats may provide a relevant model for the future of military professionalism in that they operate as networks of professionals enjoying a fair measure of initiative in field circumstances marked by fast-changing developments and goals, yet maintain allegiance to their nations while adhering to a subculture and an ethic that transcend borders...

CONCLUSIONS : CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The changes and prescriptions outlined above seem radical. And indeed the departure from the military's classical image is in many ways substantial. But that image is that which still prevails in lay people's eyes, and it may well be half a century behind the times. The break with the past may

appear great only because we tend to forget that social science classics in the military field, written in the 1950s, had already shown it to be outdated.

Those of us who have been schooled in the Janowitzian tradition can only be struck by the elements of continuity. Seen in that light, some of the new trends can be thought through as the deepening and broadening of trends that were apparent half-way through the Cold War. The central role accorded professionalism within the framework of military organisation, the constabulary concept premised on minimum force in the cause of viable international relations rather than decisive strategic victory, the "fusionist" political-military nexus which made it necessary for professionals to factor in the non-military consequences of military action and ideally called for as close a social and cultural integration into the parent society as possible, the need to control frustration, and a more fraternal style of leadership ("the recognised equality of unequals", as Janowitz put it²⁹) had already been noted and analysed some forty years ago.

This is not to deny that change is taking place. But it may be in order to caution those who think in terms of a watershed insulating post-Cold War situations from whatever had gone before, that the new trends can be traced back to a previous period where the same factors — strategic, technological, sociopolitical — which are shaping today's circumstances were already at work. We are only further down the same road. So that the reference in St. Luke's Gospel to "something old, something new" may better capture the essence of our present context than any notion of radical change.

A final point deserves to be made, which was brought to our attention by a comment on the view advanced here of new leadership requirements during the debate which followed our joint presentation. When he heard what we had to say on the need for mission tactics, two-way leadership interaction, trust-building, teamwork, ethics training and the like, Bernhard Fleckenstein of Germany exclaimed: "*This makes you a perfect Innere Führer*". He was referring of course to the *Innere Führung* scheme devised early on by the Bundeswehr to ensure that military effectiveness would not come again at the expense of democratic values. The point is that the German military felt obliged, some forty years ago, to formalise a set of principles along lines which, if Fleckenstein's assessment is valid, have high functional value in the present context for other West European military establishments. Those armed forces have been content so far to rely on national tradition, and leave much unsaid. But if the need for military co-operation in the field continues at the current pace, or better still, if European defence becomes a reality, then the diversity of national military traditions in such a central matter as leadership will increasingly be felt to be a stumbling block. Should this be the case, the need for a common, explicit (i.e. formal) leadership philosophy will emerge, and it might well be worth considering the principles of *Innere Führung* (though perhaps not the monitoring devices that come with it in Germany) as the basis on which a unifying doctrine might rest.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 'Simultaneous' is a key word here, as any unilateral interpretation based upon only one of those dimensions is bound to be seriously flawed. Consideration of roles alone tends to generate views of the military as fundamentally apart from the rest of society. The study of technological resources and their impact on military organisation and profession, on the contrary, frequently leads to the conclusion that they are converging with their civilian

environment. Sociopolitical factors are apt to have divergence or convergence as their consequence depending on historical context. The degree of military distinctiveness is in point of fact the resultant of all three types of dimensions, and cannot easily be ascertained a priori.

- 2 While success is easily measured in technical and economic terms, the sociopolitical dimension of effectiveness has long been evaluated in a vague, impressionistic way. However, surveys conducted to assess trust, approval ratings or public image have brought more precise measures.
- 3 Military organisation, as Georg Simmel had seen, is usually more centralised than other types of organisation, because danger and the sacred dimension which pervades the defence or promotion of sovereignty impose more exacting co-ordination requirements than in other departments of activity. However, the complexity which stems from technological sophistication and the deepening division of labour accompanying it have produced long-term decentralising trends in military as well as in civilian organisations for well over a century. New communication and information technologies, which make it possible for senior leaders to reach field actors in real time, have the potential to reverse that trend at least in part. (More on that below).
- 4 Elsewhere in this volume, Lt.Gen. Spacie elaborates on the type of leadership required at each level on the basis of professional (Army) experience in the last few decades. At platoon or shop floor level, action is short-term, and the requirement is for pragmatic and practical skills rather than for vision (though even here there is some need to look at the wider context). At the medium level of squadron or company commanders, some hands on leadership are required. This is the most difficult level, for one thing because of physical separation and of the need to combine long-term vision with day-to-day realities and to link infantry with other arms ; for another, because it is difficult to change attitudes and beliefs. Top level strategic leadership is mostly removed from field action. Here the charge is to create the vision, set standards, and keep in touch with the ground level without going too far by interfering. The top leader can be led astray by focusing too much on the day-to-day and not enough on the big picture. Top leaders need to listen and create time for strategic thinking. However, leading troops may not be the same in future, and this chapter sets out to explore the modalities of change affecting military leadership.
- 5 See Bernard Boëne, « The Armed Forces' New Missions : A European View », *Tocqueville Review*, vol.16, n°1, pp.145-165 ; Boas Shamir & Eyal Ben-Ari, « Leadership in an Open Army ? Civilian Connections, Interorganisational Frameworks, and Changes in Military Leadership », in Jerry Hunt & George Dodge, eds., *Military Leadership in the 21st Century*, Greenwich, CT : JAI Press, 1999.
- 6 There is room for doubt as to whether what Clausewitz named the « fog of war » or « friction » can entirely be eliminated through technology. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, « Technology, the RMA and Future War », *Strategic Review*, 33 (Spring 1998), pp.63-70.

- 7 See Charles Moskos and Laura Miller, « Humanitarians or Warriors ? Race, Gender and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope », *Armed Forces & Society*, vol.21, n°4, Summer 1995.
- 8 Authors like Edward Luttwak relate this long-term value change to the smaller size of families, but the opportunity cost of dying or being seriously wounded for impersonal reasons in affluent societies with so much to offer probably would account for it just as well.
- 9 A vehicle to discuss this point is the current debate about how far military justice systems can be made to conform to civilian legal norms without damaging operational effectiveness.
- 10 Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London : Hutchinson, 1977.
- 11 Fusionism has attracted a good deal of attention in the literature on civil-military relations. See S.P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge : Harvard U.P., 1957 ; and *The Common Defense : Strategic Programs in National Politics*, New York : Columbia U.P., 1961 ; M. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, Glencoe : Free Press 1960 ; A. Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern times*, New Haven : Yale U.P., 1977. See relevant discussions in P.D. Feaver, « The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control », *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23 n° 2, Winter 1996, 149-78 ; E. Luttwak, « From Vietnam to Desert Fox : Civil-Military Relations in Modern Democracies », *Survival*, vol. 41, n° 1 Spring 1999, 99-112 ; L. Mackenzie (Maj. Gen.), « Military Realities of UN Peacekeeping Operations », *RUSI Journal*, February 1993, 21-24 ; S.C. Sarkesian « The US Military Must Find Its Voice », *Orbis*, vol. 42, n° 3, Summer 1998, 423-437. See also « The Future of Military Culture », special issue of *Orbis*, January 1999. V. Davis, *Civil-Military Relations and the Not-Quite Wars of the Present and Future*, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 1996, (including an essay by D. Avant, « Military Reluctance to Intervene in Low-Level Conflicts: A Crisis », 25-32) ; D. Snider and M. Carlton-Carew, eds., *U.S. Civil-Military Relations : In Crisis or Transition ?*, Washington, DC : Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995 ; E.A. Cohen, « Civil-Military Relations: Are U.S. Forces Overstretched ? », *Orbis*, vol. 41 n°2, 145-65 ; R.C. Barnes, *Military Legitimacy : Might and Right in the New Millennium*, London : Cass, 1996. R K Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises*, Harvard 1977. See also C.P. Danopoulos and C. Watson, eds., *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook*, Westport, CT : Greenwood, 1996.
- 12 In an off-the-record briefing to one of the present chapter's authors.
- 13 See C. Moskos, J.A. Williams & D.R. Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military*, New York : Oxford University Press, 1999. B. Boëne and Joseph Soeters have offered additional roles, « soldier-communicator » and « soldier-salesman », to Moskos's list. See B. Boëne & C. Dandeker, eds., *Les Armées en Europe*, Paris : La Découverte, 1998.

- 14 See C. Dandeker, « The United Kingdom : The Overstretched Military », in Moskos, Williams & Segal, eds., *op.cit.*
- 15 See J. Gow and C. Dandeker, « Peace Support Operations : The Problem of Legitimation », *The World Today*, 51 (August/ September 1995) :171-74 ; C. Dandeker and J. Gow, « The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success », *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1997, vol. 23, n° 3, 327-348.
- 16 General Sir Peter De La Billiere, *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War*, New York : HarperCollins, 1992, 104.
- 17 This point, we suggest, applies in all types of operation today, including various types of peace support as well as enforcement and war.
- 18 Thus, although it is reasonable for the military to request clear objectives and rules of engagement, it is unrealistic to ask that these change as little as possible while an operation is in progress. The latter request is an example of *late modern*, not *post-modern*, thinking.
- 19 See *Strategic Defence Review*, 15, para 49.
- 20 For example, the JRDF structure, Permanent Joint Headquarters (1996) and the establishment of Joint Services Command and Staff College are designed to develop the joint ethos required of future operations. This is linked with the possible development of a more robust central defence staff manned by officers whose ethos is to put defence above individual service interests. See the discussion on « jointery » by B. Robertson, « Joint Needs in 2010 », 271-92, 284-85.
- 21 See J. Soeters, « Valeurs militaires, valeurs civiles : vers le soldat-communicateur ? », pp.271-286, in Boëne & Dandeker, eds., 1998, *op.cit.*
- 22 The Dutch Srebrenica battalion commander demonstrated the pitfalls of relying on an overly bureaucratic selection system. He was not up to the job, and as in previous wars, this problem pointed to the need to focus on who was best for the job in hand. There are slots, however, which gain by being filled by pure managers, notably in MoD staffs and responsible positions. The differences between the two logics of collective action outlined earlier go far to justify such criteria for the allocation of manpower, even if political skills are now required in any context.
- 23 J. Van Doorn, « The Officer Corps : A Fusion of Profession and Organisation », *European Journal of Sociology*, 6, pp.262-282, 1965.

- 24 F. Fiedler, *A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness*, New York : McGraw-Hill, 1967.
- 25 Teamwork starts with the interaction between leaders and their deputies. Likewise, the British Army, according to Lt.Gen. Spacie, has demonstrated the value of a blurring of the old division between command and staff. That is, leadership is a property of the team, and the staff officer in the command HQ is part of that team. The staff officer should think as the commander because he will be part of the team.
- 26 This may create a dilemma as engineers make more pragmatic officers (as revealed by many a survey of service academy cadets and graduates), and a pragmatic ethos is part of the ideal profile of officers in the present circumstances.
- 27 Shamir & Ben-Ari, *op.cit.* Although our own work, published jointly or separately, does not address leadership issues *per se*, some of the conclusions reached here were tentatively offered in the last few years, notably in Boëne, 1995, *op.cit.*, and « A Tribe Among Tribes : Postmodern Military Institutions and Civil-Military Relations ? », paper delivered at the ISA RC01 interim meeting, Modena, Italy, January 1997 ; Christopher Dandeker's work relates to leadership issue via a paper on Personnel Strategy for the Armed Forces (in C. Dandeker and F. Paton, *The Military and Social Change*, London Defence Studies, n°39, 1997), papers co-authored with James Gow on Strategic Peacekeeping, and the ongoing study into the problem of Equal Opportunities and Ethnic Minority Representation.
- 28 Among many other references : B.M. Bass & B.J. Avolio, eds., *Improving Organizational Effectiveness through Transformational Leadership*, Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications, 1994 ; J.H. Buck & L.J. Korb, eds., *Military Leadership*, Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, 1981 ; J.M. Burns, *Leadership*, New York : Harper, 1978 ; M.M. Chemers & R. Ayman, eds., *Leadership Theory and Research : Perspectives and Directions*, San Diego : Academic Press, 1993 ; M.D. Cohen & J.G. March, *Leadership and Ambiguity : The American College President*, New York : McGraw-Hill, 1974 ; J.M. Kouzes & B.Z. Pozner, *The Leadership Challenge*, San Francisco : Josey-Bass, 1987 ; G. Kunda, *Engineering Culture : Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation*, Philadelphia, PA : Temple U.P., 1992 ; A.L. Oliver, « On the Nexus of Organizations and Professions : Networking through Trust », *Sociological Inquiry*, vol.67, n°2, pp.189-212, 1997 ; W.G. Ouchi, « Markets, Bureaucracies and Clans », *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol.25, pp.129-142, 1980 ; E.H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, San Francisco : Josey-Bass, 1985 ; K.E. Weick, « Educational Organizations as Loosely-Coupled Systems », *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol.21, pp.1-19, 1976.
- 29 Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, Glencoe, Ill : Free Press, 1960, p.423.

LEADERSHIP FOR CHANGE: REDRESSING THE CIVIL-MILITARY BALANCE.

OBSERVATIONS FROM A DUTCH PERSPECTIVE

Jan van der Meulen

HISTORY AND IDENTITY

In 1960 the Royal Netherlands Army founded its own Study Centre for Military Leadership. It aimed at providing mid-career training to officers and senior ncos. At the time there was a twofold motivation for this new educational layer. On the one hand, the characteristics of modern mobile warfare called for giving more and more responsibility to lower levels of command. On the other hand, changing societal attitudes towards authority made it relevant to conceptualize soldierly behaviour in terms of cooperation rather than obedience. In accordance with that, it seemed evident that different kinds of leadership styles had to be developed and taught.

Since then leadership never ceased to be an issue. It kept being hard pressed by organizational demands and generational styles. Roughly speaking, the former could be looked upon as technology driven, the latter as value connected. In a continuous flow of studies, seminars, projects, some very substantial, others more symbolic, leadership as a concept has been a major venue for self-reflection. Along the way an awareness grew of the relevance of management practices elsewhere. Not all military leaders liked to be referred to as managers, but there was no denying that a wealth of literature and a world of experience had to be taken into account - if only to conclude that their applicability to the armed forces was conditional.

In the post Cold War area, new missions and organizational restructuring have added yet another round of rethinking leadership. The latter has found a timely formulation in the army's **Military Doctrine** (among other things elaborating 'mission-oriented-command'), it has gotten its place in mission statements and codes of conduct and it has been confronted with zero-draft-soldiers in want of new rewards, old punishments and different motivation. Last but not least, leadership has been tested during real peacekeeping, especially but not only in the Balkans. This has generated quite some notes from the field as well as a number of empirical studies. Peacekeeping has also led to enhanced public scrutiny of leadership, from top-level, where generals are advising politicians, all the way down to platoon and group level, where lieutenants and sergeants are commanding soldiers. Typically, the recently founded offspring of the **Study Centre for Military Leadership** is called the **Institute for Leadership, Media and Instructor Training**.

In the past forty years, 'leadership for change', has been part and parcel of professional self-definitions in the Dutch military. Being a successful leader entails an understanding of change, operational, technological, social and cultural. Very often this (also) implies striking a civil-military balance, that is, deciding on ways and degrees of civilianization versus uniqueness. Whether management *per se* is at stake, or the application of ICT, or rather the recruitment and training of nowadays youth, striking this balance and convincingly communicating that it is the best one, constitutes a cornerstone of leadership. Surely it makes a difference whether we are looking at general policy intentions or at day-to-day translations of these, but throughout, the identity of military organization and military profession can be said to be the crux of the matter. Seen in this light, leadership for change mirrors and fits in with the dominant paradigms of military sociology, that is, with convergence versus divergence, and with occupationalism versus institutionalism. In terms of missions, leadership for change touches on the dichotomy between blue-helmeted versus green-helmeted tasks.

This perspective and its ramifications can be applied to a range of topics, indeed from technology-driven to value-connected ones. In this paper, I focus on the latter kind of topics. I will elaborate, in the context of Dutch civil-military relations, some of the connections between zero-draft, value change, leadership and identity. Of course this is not to suggest that developments in other areas (tele-leadership and budget management for instance) are not important. Obviously they are and

their impact on professional identity can be thorough. So this paper very much tells a partial story about leadership for change.

ZERO-DRAFT

As was hinted at above, in the sixties the confrontation with a new generation, cultivating its own typical style, formed an important impetus for a revision of leadership. Policies and practices were adapted in ways that suited the demands of draftees, ideally up to the point where the effectiveness of the organization would forbid any further concession. 'As civil as possible, as military as necessary', turned into a semi-official motto, very much suggesting the direction of the transformation the armed forces were going through. There can be no doubt that this process of civilianization deeply changed Dutch military culture, not just in relation to draftees, but touching on a range of topics: the role of unions, the institutionalization of military law, minority policies, to name only a few. Much of this became normal and could be looked upon, certainly in retrospect, as an utterly unavoidable and mostly valuable updating of the armed forces.

As a master concept though, civilianization never completely could shed its negative connotations, especially but not only in the eyes of career personnel, officers as well as NCOs. The perception stayed on, within military and society, that at grass root level, discipline and cohesion suffered because of not holding on to crucial military standards. Whether in reality performance and effectiveness were hampered in any serious way has been contested - some argued that, when it really mattered, discipline, cohesion and performance in fact were above standard, precisely because of a culture of relative freedom and room for initiative. No matter which viewpoint was right (probably both to some degree), the perception of sloppiness together with an untidy (self-) image, very much touched on identity and leadership. Those who were training and commanding soldiers face to face and day to day (that is, sergeants and junior officers), had to struggle hardest communicating and enforcing the whereabouts of military exercise and practice. They very much needed all the empowerment they could get, at the Study Centre for Military Leadership and otherwise.

After the end of the draft and the start of an all-volunteer force (in the mid nineties) there was a rather pervasive feeling in the Dutch military that this was the moment to do away with the excesses of civilianization. Among other things this meant: no more sloppy discipline and no longer any untidy looking soldiers. Instead, sticking to rules and meeting standards without compromise became a norm throughout the organization - and thus also a touchstone for leadership. In fact, as some commanders observed, this was the kind of strictness the new type of soldiers wanted and expected, maybe even the organizational climate they came for in the first place.

For a professional military this process of cultural adaptation seemed natural enough. Even more so, because of the peacekeeping missions the armed forces found themselves accomplishing from the end of the Cold War onwards. Those missions were for real, in demanding, often risky circumstances, which called for the highest performance. Being deployed together with soldiers from other nations (NATO allies in particular) only stimulated disciplinary behaviour and correct appearance - even though it had to be recognized that armed forces from different countries do not simply merge to some kind of cultural uniformity, nor in general, neither vis á vis leadership styles. As the Dutch military has discovered, it does make a difference whether one is working with for instance British, German or American colleagues.

ZERO-TOLERANCE

Professionalization, peacekeeping/-enforcing and internationalization have been and still are important parameters in redefining identity and in striking a new civil-military balance. It so happens that at the

same time society itself, for some time already, has been preoccupied with correcting its own, allegedly over-permissive character. Stressing values and norms, very often explicitly formulated in codes of conduct, has grown into common practice in all sorts of organizations and surroundings: the police, schools, public places, trade and industry. So somewhat paradoxically the military, cultivating its own typical codes of conduct, in fact is very much in tune with the trend of time.

Presently the Dutch army is engaged in a project for resocializing young ex-delinquents, especially but not only from ethnic minorities. For a couple of months, groups of boys live and work in the barracks under a strict zero-tolerance regime, learning and practicing basic values and norms, while at the same time receiving courses in crafts like mechanic and welder. At the end of the period it is possible to apply for a soldierly career, but there is no obligation to do so. For the army, recruitment is a spin-off of this project but not its main drive. It is rather about taking responsibility and helping out society, while not eschewing public relations. To wit, the meaning and impact of a project like this, has to be managed in a prudent way. Because the military has very good reasons for avoiding the impression that it is especially keen on recruiting any soldier, no matter his background in terms of education, mentality and legal record. In fact, from the start of the all-volunteer force onwards the typical worry has been about an influx if not an overrepresentation of low-quality recruits, hampering the performance and damaging the image of the armed forces. It would not be very helpful if the success of projects like these would confirm the image one particularly wants to avoid.

Give the scale of the project and indeed the way it is being communicated to the media and the public, probably the latter fear is overblown. It does underline a more general point though which has to be taken seriously. Because even while under zero-draft circumstances it is logical enough to redress the civil-military balance, to skip all too easy permissiveness and to let some classical features of military life have a come-back, an excessive swing in this direction can be counterproductive too. In fact, like society in general, already the military has discovered that no matter how important and imperative it is to install and enforce standards of behavioural 'correctness', there is no simple falling back on zero-tolerance. While the latter can be a fruitful and necessary touchstone for leadership in a range of circumstances, it is hardly an exhaustive program for matching nowadays soldiers, commanders and missions.

DIVERSITY

More specifically, a number of variables can be listed to suggest the complexities of military identity, filtering down to leadership at grass-root level and putting into perspective a one-dimensional cultural reversal. To begin with and to pursue a point just made a little further: in nowadays societies, aiming at high-quality recruits very much implies incorporating diversity, in terms of gender, ethnicity, and sexual preference. Sticking to the (white) male adolescent, typically preoccupied with 'booze, birds and brawling', is too narrow a basis for recruitment, in numbers as well as in quality. While no doubt this traditional type of soldier still embodies military virtues which cannot be spared, the soldier should not be allowed to act as some kind of informal gatekeeper, defining and dominating culture. Leadership is crucial in recognizing and countervailing these in-group-processes and in creating and maintaining an organizational climate which favours diversity.

Besides the diversity just hinted at (gender, ethnicity, sexual preference), there is a proliferation of youth styles which also has to be taken into consideration. To be sure, it would be futile to try reconcile any such style with the demands and indeed the rigours of military life. Evidently, the anti-authoritarian, non-conventional and/or hedonistic characteristics of some styles preclude any mutual affinity. On the other hand though, an organization which recognizes life-style-diversity and succeeds in working with it, partly by a respectful policy vis á vis privacy and personal life, broadens its basis. This is not only about adapting to youth-culture but also, later in the life-course, about dealing with military families and parenthood. Again, leadership at different levels is vital in cultivating organizational sensitivity towards

irreversible trends in the way people, young, very young and no so young, live now. Clearly, this is an ongoing process of mutual learning and negotiating, formally and informally. In the Dutch armed forces, unions of military personnel are important players in translating and presenting needs and wishes of their members as well in checking policies and practices throughout the organization.

Last but not least, there is a third set of variables precluding any straightforward falling back on rigorous discipline as a recipe for all seasons. Yes, peacekeeping missions have stressed the need for high standards of conduct, for correctness in communicating with fellow soldiers and superiors, with colleagues from other nations, and especially with the native people concerned. But these missions have also made clear that there is a need for soldiers who dare take initiative, who have learned to speak up and who are aware of ethical dilemmas, which sometimes ask for painful and possibly risky decisions, with an impact possibly stretching far beyond the situation itself. If back in the sixties the characteristics of modern mobile warfare gave more responsibility to lower level of commands, the humanitarian interventions of the nineties seem to add almost an extra dimension to leadership, very much including leadership at platoon- and group level. Evidently, this has a lot to do with the growing diversity of the soldierly role itself.

SETTING AN EXAMPLE?

These observations suggest that in recent years redressing the civil-military balance has been and still is a complex undertaking. While some of its prime movers were especially about getting rid of all too easy-going conscript culture and without compromise going back to military basics instead, in the mean time there has been a growing awareness of the ambiguities involved. Whether in terms of recruitment, performance or image, the reconstruction of what is thought to be classical military culture, cannot possibly be enough. Nor in general, neither with respect to leadership. While some of the change very legitimately may hark back to the past, most of it has to incorporate today and anticipate tomorrow.

In the process of balancing the old and the new, of reformulating values and norms and of reshaping the organization according to a professional format, there have been unmistakable signs of a regained self-confidence. To put it somewhat more precise, signs of regained organizational and professional self-confidence which show in public. Going one step further, the perception has been voiced that the military has (re) won a position from where to set an example to society. Because soldiers, so it is said, are more than just citizens in uniform, and because the military, instead of reflecting society, should rather hold up a mirror to the outside world and confront it with a model of excellence, not just in a professional but also in a moral sense. Often messages like these are phrased by the political and military top leadership, trying to motivate their personnel in times of profound change, uncertainty and operational challenge. Whether this feeling really is widespread throughout the organization and how deep it goes, is difficult to tell as far as the Dutch military is concerned. No doubt some services, some units and some individuals are more prone to it than others.

Again, this is about balancing, now of pride and pretension. While the former is only natural and can be well-deserved, as a rule the latter should be avoided. Taking the moral highground as naturally belonging to the armed forces is fighting yesterday's battle and is hardly convincing in nowadays civil-military context. If anything, such a posture makes the organization extra vulnerable to criticism whether of collective or of individual performances. Such a conclusion leaves room and relevance enough for organizational excellence, occupational self-esteem and normative professionalism. All of them very much dependent on leadership for change.

III: LEADERSHIP RESPONSES TO CHANGE

A common characteristic of the leadership response in the European military to the challenges of change, is a willingness to embrace the **AUFTRAGSTAKTIK** concept of operations. Whilst the German armed forces exercise fully this "free conduct of operations" in which decision making initiatives are delegated to local commanders, other European countries have followed their example, albeit with reservations. Vogelaar in his study of Dutch experience in peace support missions, examines critically the effectiveness of "mission command", their doctrinal version of **auftragstaktik**. He stresses that decentralisation of command – **Opdrachtgerichte Commandovoering** – depends for its success on three essential components:

- firstly, the establishment of **clear objectives**. This is most readily achieved when the mission itself is unambiguous and clearly communicated to all levels in the chain of command.
- secondly, the provision of **adequate means** both of personnel and appropriate equipment.
- thirdly, the creation of a sense of **mutual trust** whereby soldiers at different levels of the hierarchy of command, know, understand and respect each other.

Vogelaar notes, however, that a number of factors can limit the full implementation of the decentralization of command. Some of these are technological in nature. Improved sophisticated communications, for instance, make it easier for senior commanders to exercise direct control at a distance. Other constraining factors are the inevitable concomitants of the peculiar nature of peace-support missions. Their slow pace of operations, for example, matched by the tendency for routine procedures to become ends in themselves rather than means to an end, can limit the effective exercise of command. Most importantly, political considerations, especially the principle of accepting no casualties, impose severe limitations on the exercise of delegated responsibility by commanders in the field.

This analysis of Dutch experience in specific peace support missions, is complemented by a review of the concept and conduct of Western military leadership from a Danish perspective. Sørensen notes that Denmark has also accepted the basic principles of **Auftragstaktik**. This marks a shift away from the more traditional principle of **Befehlstaktik** with its emphasis on hierarchical command (do this, in this way, with these tools, at this speed). The transition, though, has not been an easy one and a preliminary complication in peace support missions has been the effect of role change upon the traditional military self-image. Increasingly, Danish personnel in these operations have identified with the expanded **civilian** functions of contemporary military tasks. This can lead to the conclusion that 'no major differences seen in principle to exist between socio-psychological and group dynamic factors in the civil and military organization'. A contrary conclusion, however, stresses that contemporary military leadership is still uniquely identified with a specific corporate culture. The ensuing role uncertainty and lack of role identification raises major questions about the establishment of a model of good practice which is universally agreed.

Both Vogelaar and Sørensen show that the complexities of modern military leadership are materially increased when national armed forces are engaged in multi-national operations. Sørensen thus notes the impression of Danish officers when serving in Bosnia that while UK units could readily adopt the principles of **Auftragstaktik**, US units did not. One explanation of this difference of command structures draws attention to the effect of cultural differences upon military policy decisions. Soeters, however, provides a fuller analysis of the issues which are present. In an analysis of the integration difficulties and opportunities which arise in these operations, he notes the difficulties of adopting a policy of decentralized command in multi-national operations in view of the diversity of interests and opinions which prevail. To minimise

the effect of these, he suggests that leaders in these operations, "should stress – ostensibly and emotionally – some central issues". Four such issues are initially identified:

- first, commanders have to emphasize the **joint character** of the mission;
- second, the **equal status** of all units involved has to be recognised;
- third, it is important to create **cultural awareness** by means of cross-cultural training; and,
- finally, although it is logical to structure the work in a multi-national force along national lines, it may be fruitful to create **integrated multi-membership teams**.

The dominant theme, it is stressed, is the need to acknowledge the effect upon contemporary military leadership in Western European armed forces of the move towards increased multi-national co-operation.

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins

MISSION COMMAND IN DUTCH PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS

A. L. W. Vogelaar

1. INTRODUCTION

Until 1989 the Dutch Armed Forces had been oriented towards defending NATO-territory against a massive attack from the East. After the Berlin Wall had tumbled down it was felt that the focus of attention should be turned more and more towards peace support operations. Therefore, in the nineties the Armed Forces have been involved in many peace support operations. The presentation of the most recent policy document for the Dutch Armed Forces¹ shows that peace support operations are even considered the core business for our Armed Forces. This means that the military should be prepared and trained as much as possible to perform its tasks in these kinds of missions.

But, what are these tasks? What should the armed forces be prepared for? During the Cold War for many it was perfectly clear what should be done. On the one hand, staff departments were busy planning all kinds of operational, logistic, material, and personnel aspects and, on the other hand, operational units were busy training for the planned operations. Although many knew that reality would be different after the first shot of that planned war had been fired, it created a kind of certainty. With the end of the Cold War and the preparation for peace support operations the future is not so certain. It is hardly foreseeable in which regions the Dutch Armed Forces will be operating within the next few years, or in what kinds of missions. The Dutch doctrine² mentions a large variety of missions in which the Dutch Army may be involved within the near future. Furthermore, it is not possible to forecast with which organisations the Dutch soldiers will have to co-operate in those operations: with what other militaries, with what kinds of relief organisations, and with what kinds of local authorities, et cetera?

There are some certainties, however. Firstly, units will probably operate more dispersed than in war, which implies that small units operate relatively far from their base. Therefore, lower-level commanders have to be able to solve many problems on their own. Secondly, many of these problems will be completely new, not only for them, but also for their commanders. These problems may arise from several sources. For instance, the behaviour and its underlying norms and values of the local population or the local belligerents may be rather different from the soldiers' norms and values, leading to many misunderstandings and conflicts and even mutual dislike; also, the co-operation with soldiers from other countries and with relief organisations may be far from smooth; the local belligerents may not comply with the agreements which in its turn may lead to many uncertainties about what to do in specific situations, especially when the peace support units are not fully equipped to fight the belligerents; soldiers may come across all kinds of violations of human rights and with human suffering; et cetera³.

As mentioned before, in peace support operations the chances are substantial that small units will be confronted with the aforementioned problems, because of the high dispersion of units during these operations. Therefore, the commander on-scene will probably be a lieutenant or a sergeant and it will be most effective if he or she is capable of dealing with these problems and taking initiatives in a professional way. This is the more important if the problems have to be dealt with in a very limited time-frame and if there are no ready procedures for taking action. This requires decentralisation of command and the trust of higher commanders that their sub-commanders are able and willing to make the right estimates of the situation and, after that, taking appropriate action.

In this paper the Dutch position on decentralisation of command (**Opdrachtgerichte Commandovoering** in Dutch, or **Mission Command** in English) is elaborated. Firstly, the Dutch philosophy on that subject will be unfolded in relation to effective leadership in ambiguous situations. After that, some results of our research into this subject during peace support operations is described. Then, some general threats to the system of Mission Command are discussed. Our conclusion is that most threats could be avoided by building mutual trust into the organisation. Finally, the concept of mutual trust is explored and some measures are described which should build the required trust.

2. THE DUTCH ARMY'S MISSION COMMAND DOCTRINE

In its recent doctrine publication⁴ the Dutch Army has explicitly chosen for a system of Mission Command (MC). The system has been derived from the system of *Auftragstaktik*, which has been developed and applied by the German armed forces. The system proved to be very effective during the early years of the Second World War⁵. According to the Dutch doctrine, one of the reasons for striving towards MC is that, in the post-Cold-War era, the army will have to operate in varied circumstances and operations. This makes it very difficult to plan every operation in great detail and, therefore, much should be left to the initiatives of local commanders⁶. According to the Dutch military doctrine, MC should be applied in all kinds of operations and in both operational and peacetime circumstances.

For the implementation of MC in the Dutch army, the same arguments have been used which many authors use to explain the successes of *Auftragstaktik*: in the chaos of war, decisions can best be made by sub-commanders directly involved in the operations; decentralisation creates commitment and stimulates courage at every hierarchical level; decentralisation prevents an information overload up and down the hierarchy; local commanders are stimulated to act on the most recent and actual information; et cetera⁷.

MC, as it has been developed in the Dutch army, consists of four elements⁸:

A commander gives his orders in a way that assures that his subordinates understand his view, their own mission, the objectives to be met, and the broader context of that mission in the operation of the entire unit.

- a. A commander indicates to his subordinates what objectives they should meet and the reason why meeting them is necessary.
- b. A commander allocates to his subcommanders appropriate means to fulfil their mission.
- c. A commander leaves his subordinates free in the way in which they want to accomplish the mission, except for strictly necessary preconditions, for instance because of the missions of higher or subsidiary units.
- d. During the operation, a commander only gives his subordinates instructions, when the success of the operation is at stake.

The Dutch doctrine of MC presumes that commanders at every hierarchical level are able and willing to take responsibility for their decisions and actions. Therefore, commanders at every level should be trained and stimulated to take initiatives and risks instead of only following

orders. Furthermore, it is mentioned that - besides taking responsibility - the desired accompanying leadership behaviour for MC would consist of a number of aspects: commanders at every hierarchical level should be prepared to set the example for their men, they should be self-confident and courageous, they should show decisiveness and not be risk-avoiding⁹. The system does not only depend on the qualities of commanders, it also depends on the qualities of the interrelationships between commanders. In a system of decentralised command commanders at different hierarchical levels depend on each others' initiatives. Therefore, the system should be built on a high level of implicit co-ordination between commanders. The Dutch doctrine¹⁰ mentions team spirit, unity of view, cohesion and mutual trust as important preconditions for MC to be viable. Therefore, the recent Dutch army's leadership policy¹¹ describes *mutual trust* and *mutual respect* together with *autonomy of action* as essential aspects of leadership. When mutual trust and mutual respect are absent, a system of decentralised command will fail.

3. STUDIES OF MISSION COMMAND DURING DUTCH PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS

In this section some findings of our studies of Mission Command during Dutch peace support missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina are presented. We analysed from a number of interviews with soldiers of different ranks (from private to lieutenant-colonel) if the elements of MC as described in section 2 have been met. To be specific, we analysed in what measure:

- autonomy of action for sub-commanders was guaranteed during the missions (elements d and e of the MC-doctrine);
- the objectives for commanders were clear (elements a and b);
- the units had appropriate means at their disposal (element c);
- mutual trust was guaranteed.

In this analysis the degree of autonomy of action may be considered as the degree in which decentralisation actually takes place. The clarity of objectives, the appropriateness of the means and the degree of mutual trust may be considered as requirements for decentralisation.

We interviewed soldiers of four different battalions: a logistics and transport battalion (Logtbat, 28 respondents) and an infantry battalion (Dutchbat, 18 respondents) which served in UNPROFOR¹²; an armoured battalion serving in IFOR (14 respondents); and an armoured battalion serving in SFOR (26 respondents).

3.1 Operation UNPROFOR¹³

When the international community recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state in 1992, an internal conflict arose between the Serbian community, on the one hand, and the Muslim and Croatian communities, on the other. In 1993, the Croatian and the Muslim communities were also fighting each other in the central region of Bosnia. As this conflict caused many victims and a stream of refugees, it was decided by the United Nations in 1992 that an international military protection force (UNPROFOR) should intervene. From 1992 until the end of the UNPROFOR-mission in 1995 the Dutch army contributed a combined Dutch-Belgian logistics and transport

battalion (Logtbat) for logistic support of UN-forces and for humanitarian help, and an infantry battalion (Dutchbat) to be deployed as a peacekeeping unit.

In both units we studied if, and under what conditions, MC can be applied in peace support operations with a highly political profile, like UNPROFOR. This question was answered by focusing at platoon and group command levels¹⁴.

We found that **autonomy of action** was only partly given to platoon and group commanders. From one perspective, Logtbat platoon commanders and Dutchbat platoon and group commanders operated very autonomously. Logtbat platoon commanders led their convoys of trucks, driven by their soldiers and group commanders, through Bosnia far from the compound. They had to solve many problems en route themselves. Group commanders (and sometimes platoon commanders) of Dutchbat had to keep things going at observation posts, where they stayed with their men for weeks. Furthermore, they led the patrols. These commanders also had to perform their tasks far from the compound. From another perspective, however, there were many restrictions for these commanders. For example, there were strict rules for conducting patrols and driving convoys. Patrols had fixed routes and had to be executed when ordered by higher commanders in the operations room (opsroom), even if the group commander (the patrol commander) did not see the point of it and thought that another route would produce more information. For convoys there were rules about the order of the cars, about the routes to be taken, about speed, et cetera. After some years an instruction book consisting of many pages about what to do in which situations had been compiled. Furthermore, beside the many rules restricting autonomy at platoon level, the patrols and convoys were followed closely by radio by their superior commanders in the opsroom. In a number of cases these higher commanders interfered in the decisions of their subordinate commanders, who were subsequently strongly frustrated by that. For instance, a group commander, a sergeant, who had just decided to disarm a Muslim fighter, was ordered by one of his superiors not to do it and to leave the place immediately. Subsequently, the group commander and his soldiers did not trust this superior commander anymore. Another example was a convoy commander who had just decided to spend the night at a certain place, because driving further in the dark would be too dangerous. However, he was ordered by the opsroom to drive to the compound that same night, without getting further explanation for this decision. Although these examples may be refuted by many instances in which platoon or group commanders were left to make their own decisions without interference, the fact remains that initiatives of sub-commanders could always be overruled by higher commanders on the radio. It depended on the superior commander, the subordinate commander, and on the situation if interference took place. From our analyses the conclusion may be drawn that, on the one hand, platoon commanders and group commanders were rather restricted in their autonomy to complete their missions. This restriction was caused by both the rules they had to follow and by the always present possibility that decisions could be overruled by their superiors. On the other hand, the platoon commanders and group commanders were autonomous with respect to internal functioning in their platoons or groups respectively, such as how tasks were divided among their soldiers, how their soldiers' problems were dealt with, et cetera¹⁵. In the following we find a number of arguments for this relative lack of autonomy.

A first requirement is that units which have to perform a mission are supplied with **adequate means**. Especially for Dutchbat this requirement was not met. The soldiers

had to operate in a hostile environment with too light weapons. Peacekeeping proved to be impossible because the warring parties were unwilling to attend to the official terms of UNPROFOR and they heavily outnumbered Dutchbat both in quantities of personnel and in equipment. Therefore, it was impossible to accomplish that part of the mission for which violence could be necessary. For Logtbat with their humanitarian mission, there were enough means (personnel, trucks, et cetera) to perform their tasks. Safety of the convoys, though, was definitely a problem for Logtbat. In certain periods almost all soldiers experienced dangerous situations such as shootings at their convoys. Many times they realised they had been very lucky indeed to escape from a situation without injuries or casualties. Under such conditions it is very difficult for superior commanders to give autonomy to their subordinate commanders (the platoon and group commanders). A second requirement for MC is that orders are based on **clear objectives**. The higher commander should explain the objectives to be met and why. For both Logtbat and Dutchbat this proved to be a problem. Both the nature of the conflict and the objectives to be met were unclear. This provided the units in Bosnia with a very ambiguous situation to which they could only react afterwards. One of the biggest problems for both battalions was to keep the right balance between the performance of the (sometimes very frustrating) tasks and the safety of the soldiers. Logtbat and Dutchbat were supposed to perform their tasks under "acceptable" risks. What "acceptable" meant was unclear so that different commanders interpreted it differently. Furthermore, the perception of risk could change rapidly as a consequence of certain events. Under those conditions friction could easily arise between commanders at different levels. On the one hand, subordinate commanders could take too many risks; "thrill seekers" in the perception of higher commanders. On the other hand, subordinate commanders could take too few risks. Furthermore, there were feelings of frustration because of the lack of success. In these complex circumstances it was very difficult to meet this second requirement of MC.

A third requirement for the successful implementation of MC is **mutual trust** between commanders of different hierarchical levels. They have to know of each other that they are up to their tasks. Because of certain conditions, however, mutual trust was impeded within both battalions we studied. For example, Logtbat used a personnel rotation system in which one third of the battalion was replaced every two months. Attached to this rotation system is the disadvantage that commanders and sub-commanders do not know each other very well. Such an individual rotation system also works against the growing of the necessary shared implicit intent between commanders. Furthermore, mutual trust was impeded because junior commanders were all inexperienced with their role as a neutral third party in a conflict. Also, the chain of command was changed in both Logtbat and Dutchbat as compared with the usual chain of command, leading to conflicts between commanders who should trust each other. The lack of mutual trust led higher commanders to give very precise orders. Their justification for that was that very small mistakes could have drastic consequences. This means that the requirement of mutual trust was also not met in these battalions.

Our study shows that in the Dutch battalions which served in UNPROFOR hardly any requirement of the system of MC was met.

3.2 Operation IFOR

At the end of 1995 the warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed an agreement for peace: the Dayton agreement. The Dayton agreement settled for two autonomous regions within Bosnia: The Republika Srpska for the Bosnian-Serbs in the northern part and a Muslim-Croatian Federation in the southern part. Furthermore, the agreement settled for a phased withdrawal of military forces to their barracks, a dissolution of the armed forces, the setting up of elections and a return of refugees to their homes. The agreement also settled for NATO-forces to enforce the implementation of this agreement (Implementation Force, IFOR). The Netherlands contributed to IFOR an armoured battalion and a logistic battalion. For this armoured battalion with its enforcing mission the operation initially contained many uncertainties, because anything could happen: the former warring parties could comply with the agreement; they could continue fighting each other as they had done before; they could try to prevent IFOR from performing its tasks; et cetera. So, the battalion had to be prepared for many possible scenarios.

The Dutch armoured battalion was split up into three teams of equal components (infantry, cavalry, military engineers, medical units, et cetera), of about 150 soldiers each. One team was located in the Republika Srpska, the other two teams in the Muslim-Croatian Federation.

We studied the first rotation of IFOR with respect to, among other issues, leadership¹⁶. From the interviews we learned with respect to **autonomy of action** that each team had a broad assignment: each team was responsible for the implementation of the Dayton agreement according to the official schedule within its assigned territory. The battalion only provided some extra means and co-ordination if necessary. This was MC in optima forma: each team had been assigned an area and a forward base in that area. Each team commander (with the rank of major) had to decide for his own how to take care of his mission. In practice this resulted in completely different methods of operating. One of the team commanders developed a style of operating in which he tried to cover the area as much as possible by means of patrolling with mixed platoons (soldiers of infantry and cavalry together). Each patrol was performed with a different composition of soldiers. The patrols were led by the most experienced persons: a platoon commander or a deputy platoon commander. These patrols often took more than one day. Another team commander developed another style of operating. He decided that in the mountainous area for which he was responsible it would not be sensible to mount many patrols. He decided to check the borders of the area as much as possible. In this way he would know what persons and material went in and out of his area. These checking tasks were performed by group commanders with their men. The platoon commanders got separate assignments. The third team commander again operated differently. He decided that one platoon would be permanently located at a post at a two hours' drive away from the forward base. The platoon had to perform its patrols from there. The other platoons had to patrol from the forward base. So, it could be argued that the team commanders had much autonomy at the start of the mission. When the former warring factions withdrew to the barracks and handed in their weapons halfway through the mission a different situation began and new regulations emerged. The battalion commander ordered for instance that most of the routes from then on were too dangerous because of the ever-present mines. IFOR was not allowed to patrol there anymore before these routes would have been cleared by the military engineers. This decision was not readily accepted

because it concerned the same routes which soldiers had taken a number of times before without problems. This was a tremendous limitation for team operations.

At team level, the commander had much autonomy. At platoon or group level, the situation was sometimes different. With the exception of the platoon that was located at a separate post, the team commander took decisions about the kind of patrols or the other tasks that should be performed, and also who should do what. The team commander had his greater plan in mind and told his sub-commanders on a weekly, or sometimes daily, basis what they were expected to do. However, within these assignments the platoon commanders or group commanders had relatively much autonomy of action: they had to prepare all aspects of the patrol, brief the soldiers, perform the patrol itself and write a patrol report. They had to organise most things by themselves with respect to the tasks to be performed. With respect to safety aspects, some team commanders were more restrictive than others. One team commander gave restrictions for the assignments that were performed under his responsibility: he ordered not to take roads that were not reconnoitred; he ordered that situations should always be treated on a worst-case scenario basis; et cetera. But, these restrictions may be seen more as the commander's intent than as specific instructions. The overall finding is that many platoon commanders experienced much freedom in the performance of their tasks, especially in the beginning of the mission. As one platoon commander remarked in our interviews: "When IFOR started we had to find out everything for ourselves. When we went back home after our tour for half a year, many regulations had been written down about proper clothing, scheduling, how to perform patrols, et cetera."

The above results about the autonomy of action have also been reported by Frusch¹⁷. In his study he questioned commanders and sub-commanders of IFOR about the level of autonomy and mutual trust. He concluded that there was a relatively high level of autonomy, and that leaders did not check their followers constantly in the performance of their tasks. They relied on their followers' capacities. On the other hand, he also found that there were relatively many limitations for participation. This matches with our finding that the team commander controlled the plan of operations.

My conclusion is that IFOR team commanders were rather autonomous. For the platoon and group commanders there were some differences between the teams. However, in general platoon commanders and group commanders were assigned tasks, but they were left free to organise the performance of those tasks by themselves. There were some restrictions with respect to safety.

The question is why sub-commanders were granted so much autonomy of action?

The most important reason that was mentioned in the interviews is that the mission and the resulting objectives were very clear to higher commanders and sub-commanders alike. The most important aspects of the mission were: to guard and patrol the zone of separation between the former warring parties; to see to it that the Dayton schedule for withdrawal of the former warring factions was met; et cetera. Commanders and sub-commanders had an *aide memoire* in which these tasks were described. And - what was very supportive for the clarity of the mission - the former warring factions kept to the agreement. They met the schedule of the Dayton agreement without causing too many

problems. If the factions would have kept on fighting on a large scale, and IFOR would not have been able to suppress it, the situation would probably have been far from clear.

Also, the means were thought adequate for IFOR. At the start of the mission IFOR was certainly considered a military mission in which NATO would show its force to the former warring factions, in this way preventing them from violating the agreement. The teams drove as many patrols and built as many checkpoints as they thought necessary. Furthermore, they gathered as much information as they could. Because the situation stabilised, IFOR was considered successful. Furthermore, IFOR was robust enough to withstand small attacks and provocations. The only problem for task fulfilment was the ever-present mines. There was hardly a soldier who had not driven through mine-danger areas¹⁸. The soldiers, therefore, had to be protected against these dangers. As has been said before, most restrictions and regulations for sub-commanders were focused on this aspect.

Because the mission was clear and the means were thought adequate, **mutual trust** between commanders of different hierarchical levels were considered less important for granting autonomy of action to subordinate commanders. However, if the situation had been different, the initial level of mutual trust could have caused some problems in the operations. The team commanders were rather experienced commanders. Contrary to other missions they all had the rank of major (two infantry majors and one cavalry major). This could guarantee that they would know how to lead a team. Below this level, however, there could have been some problems. As has been said before, the teams were composed of different units: cavalry, infantry, military engineers, et cetera. The composing units hardly ever worked together before IFOR started. This resulted in a number of problems with respect to mutual trust. Firstly, team commanders and platoon commanders did not always understand each others' intentions very well. For instance, according to the cavalry team commander some of his infantry group commanders operated too provocatively, and according to one of the infantry team commanders his military engineers platoon commander was too careful and therefore too slow with route clearing in his area. And secondly, infantry team commanders did not know exactly how to use cavalry units, vice versa. This lack of mutual trust resulted in some communication problems between team commanders and sub-commanders. Therefore, the team commanders had to be actively concerned with building a team during the mission.

The conclusion may be that there was relatively much autonomy of action at all hierarchical levels. The reason for this was the clarity of the mission in relation to the behaviour of the former warring factions. Furthermore, because the operation was new, few fixed procedures had been developed.

3.3 Operation SFOR

At the end of 1996 IFOR was replaced by a somewhat smaller Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The former warring factions had withdrawn to their barracks, peace had returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina and normal life had resumed its course a bit, but there was only a slight beginning of the refugees returning to their homes. Furthermore, it was felt that when NATO would leave Bosnia, the fighting would start again within months. Therefore, it was felt that a military force had to stay in Bosnia: SFOR.

The Dutch army contributed and still contributes to SFOR an armoured battalion. The area for which the Dutch battalion is responsible, has been divided into two parts, each covered by one team: one in the Muslim-Croatian Federation and one in the Republika Srpska. We interviewed 26 soldiers (from private to lieutenant-colonel) of a Dutch contingent which served in Bosnia in the first half of 1998.

The situation for SFOR is different from that for IFOR. Because of the relative rest in the area, the mission of SFOR changed from a purely military mission into a more or less police mission. The teams had to patrol in the area, gather information about possible hostilities between the parties, monitor elections and the return of refugees to their homes. Furthermore, they had to inspect sites in which the weapons and the ammunition of the former warring factions had been stored and to check military moves in the area. Also, they had to support all kinds of activities to restore roads, public buildings, et cetera. Although the situation was mostly very peaceful, sometimes the situation changed suddenly and became very tense, such as when war criminals were arrested by SFOR, or when SFOR was involved in an accident, or when SFOR noticed that one of the former warring parties did not keep to the agreement. The situation also became tense when refugees, thinking they would be supported by SFOR-soldiers, started provoking the other party. These possible abrupt changes in the situation meant that SFOR-soldiers had to 'walk on eggs'.

In SFOR the team commanders, and the platoon commanders and group commanders within the teams, had less **autonomy of action** than sub-commanders of IFOR. They were bound by many regulations and standards. The team commanders were responsible for the performance of routine tasks within their area, such as gaining information, patrolling, monitoring refugees, and inspection of sites. However, when things were getting out of control - such as when local inhabitants and returning refugees would start to fight each other - the battalion commander would take over command with the means the battalion possessed, such as a Crowd and Riot Control platoon or a Reconnaissance platoon. Furthermore, the work within the teams was very routine and bound by many rules and regulations. Each patrol was planned by the opsroom, which also gave specific instructions about which information should be asked for. Patrol commanders got detailed information lists. It was also ordered that patrol commanders would keep in touch with the opsroom on a regular basis. When something unexpected happened, it should always be directly communicated with the opsroom. The opsroom then gave instructions about what to do, because the opsroom possessed descriptions about how to handle those situations. One opsmanager said in his interview that for half a year nothing had happened for which the opsroom did not have the procedure. There were also many rules about how to perform site inspections and what should be done in a situation in which shortages or surpluses of weapons and ammunition were found. Furthermore, there were many restrictions regarding the safety of the soldiers. Team commanders felt a huge responsibility for the safe homecoming of their men. Therefore, they tried to restrict the behaviour of their men during the patrols and other activities as much as possible. They did not want them to run any unnecessary risks. So, they tried to prevent the patrols from driving or walking on roads that had not been officially cleared from mines. Also, there were many safety rules about the handling of weapons inside and outside the encampment. Furthermore, they did not want any contacts between potentially dangerous locals and SFOR-soldiers.

There were a number of reasons for the restriction of autonomy of action. The first reason is that **the objectives were not unequivocal**. What exactly did SFOR have to do? Did SFOR have to gather as much information as possible and run some risks in this process, or was the safety of the soldiers priority number one? From the interviews we noticed some diverging opinions about this subject. Team commanders were very careful, whereas patrol commanders sometimes decided to take routes that had not been cleared officially, just because these routes would produce some more information. This difference of opinion caused team commanders to be very prescriptive for the patrols under their responsibility. Another aspect which contributed to the restriction of autonomy was that SFOR did not want to have any unnecessary problems with the local authorities or the local population. It was felt that a small incident could cause big problems. Therefore, SFOR-soldiers had to follow strict rules: for instance, sub-commanders were instructed not to transport a wounded local in their vehicles, because that would cause problems if the person were to die. Also, when a platoon commander established a surplus or a shortage of weapons or ammunition, he was not allowed to negotiate about it but had to report it to the battalion opsroom and wait for assistance.

In this operation the **means were adequate** for MC. But something more may be said about the means. Because the operation was very slow-paced and communication means were good between opsroom and patrols, it was possible to centralise command. From the opsroom many instructions could be given to patrol commanders during their patrols.

In this operation **mutual trust** was not very high. There are a number of reasons for that. Firstly, team commanders had the rank of captain instead of major. In this way, they certainly had less experience than the team commanders of IFOR. Therefore, in a number of situations their orders had not been taken seriously by everyone in the battalion. For instance, staff officers followed their own plans and did not always honour the requests of the team commanders. Secondly, in one of the teams a change in hierarchy took place. The company commander gave direct orders to patrol commanders (group commanders). The level of platoon commander and deputy platoon commander was left out. This resulted in some communication problems between the different levels. Thirdly, different units had been merged to fill the battalion. This resulted in many differences of culture between different units who had to work closely together. Fourth, we learned from the interviews that there had been many 'last-minute' changes of personnel in the teams. People who had been trained together until the last weeks before departure, were in some cases because of many reasons replaced by other persons. One team commander remarked that after this experience he would rather prefer vacancies than 'last-minute' replacements.

4. THREATS TO DECENTRALISATION OF COMMAND

From the analysis in section 3 it may be concluded that different missions generate differences in the degree of autonomy of action for sub-commanders, which may be seen as a key variable in the system of MC. In the analysis the measure of autonomy of action is related with other variables in the Dutch system of MC. On a general level it may be concluded that the level of autonomy of action is impeded if the objectives are unclear or equivocal, if the means are inadequate or if there is a lack of mutual trust between commanders of different hierarchical levels. However, a closer look at the data add some other elements to the analysis. We will elaborate these factors which tend to reduce the decentralisation of command in this section.

4.1 On line information and communication systems

An extensive and good working information and communication network within the theatre of operations creates the possibility to follow subordinate units closely, even when they operate at a large distance from the base. When the opsroom is constantly manned, contact between the opsroom and the patrols is possible on a frequent basis. In some cases we found that when the means for communication were introduced, commanders started to interfere in the decisions of their sub-commanders while they were doing their patrols, whereas before that time these sub-commanders would be very free to decide for themselves. So, if a higher commander possesses the means to follow his sub-commanders closely, he may feel compelled to do so and even interfere if he thinks it necessary. It may seem quite human, but it is certainly not very logical that decisions of sub-commanders should be interfered with only because the commanders have the communication means. It may be better to use the communication means for other purposes, such as supporting the sub-commanders in their decision making.

4.2 Static operations or slow pace of operations

The SFOR-operation which has been described in section 3, developed very slowly. In most cases there were less than ten patrols, and mostly even fewer, going on at the same moment, most of them requiring little attention. In this way, information overload at the central level is not very likely. Nelsen¹⁹ describes that initiatives at lower hierarchical levels are very necessary when the battle field is characterised by speed, chaos, and ever changing conditions. In these situations initiatives of sub-commanders are necessary to make use of the situation and surprise the enemy. Furthermore, sub-commanders may adapt their actions to the changing situation. In situations with a lower pace, on the other hand, it is always possible to discuss situations on the radio. Moreover, it may be good to discuss a situation on the radio, if it is possible, but it may be wrong to give precise instructions about what to do from the central location, because the exact situation may always be misinterpreted from there. It is always hard to describe what is exactly happening and what are the immediate threats. Furthermore, giving precise instructions discourages the taking of responsibility by the local commander.

4.3 Developing routines

When a mission continues for a longer period of time, routines about how to deal with different situations will develop. Later rotations of military personnel will learn from earlier rotations and will follow their procedures. All kinds of standards or procedures about how to act in many kinds of situations will be laid down in documents. This development of routines should be stimulated because it is very inefficient to 'invent the wheel' each time again. On the one hand, commanders may have an aid from these lessons learned from earlier rotations. On the other hand, it is certainly not possible to know all accumulating standards by heart and it is also not possible for a commander operating outside the base to have all procedures with him and look up the correct procedure if something happens. Furthermore, the situation a patrol commander is confronted with, may always be a little different from what the rules or regulations are constructed for. If he or she is then just instructed to follow exact orders or rules, he or

she will not be able to deal with 'surprises'. Therefore, the routines and the accompanying rules and regulations should be considered as means to reach the goals and not as the goals themselves. This means, for instance, that the principle should be that it is better to stimulate the sub-commanders to take decisions which are as good as possible following the commander's intent and not only the procedures. It must mean, however, that the sub-commander takes full responsibility for his actions²⁰.

4.4 Accepting no casualties

When force protection has top priority in the operation, commanders feel an enormous pressure to take their men safely back home. Commanders should always make a trade-off between mission and safety. On the one hand, it is certainly not acceptable to endanger seriously the lives of soldiers who have insufficient means for protection or if the tasks to be performed are not worth risking the lives of the soldiers. On the other hand, the military force has the obligation to stay credible by not avoiding any risks.

It would seem logical to find that during dangerous missions which have to be performed, the instructions about safety would have been much greater than during relatively safe missions. From our findings, however, another conclusion may be drawn: the safer the mission, the more the commanders feel the pressure to prevent any risks for their men and the more they try to prescribe what is allowed and what is not. Commanders of SFOR - the safest mission of the three described missions - had been very watchful not to lose one soldier because of a mistake or some unnecessary risk-taking by their soldiers. In the other missions, more risks have been taken.

4.5 Need for control

Because of many reasons other than the prevention of casualties, commanders may feel a need to control the behaviour of their men. One of the reasons may be the political sensitivity of the actions of the soldiers. For example, if some refugees think they will be defended by the soldiers who are monitoring their return to their houses, they may try to provoke the other inhabitants of the village. Such a situation may escalate. Therefore, many rules have been developed for monitoring such visits. Or, if soldiers have many good contacts with one part of the local population but not with the other, the other may feel discriminated. In such cases the neutrality of the peace force may be put at stake. Therefore, higher commanders may feel it necessary that each party in the conflict receives the same attention. This may be achieved by regulations about contacts with the population. Furthermore, commanders may try to prevent any unnecessary trouble with the local population, the local authorities, the police, the former warring factions, or with local criminals. Therefore, they may try to restrict these contacts as much as possible.

4.6 Sub-conclusion

The aforementioned threats to decentralised command may be considered a reason to leave the system of Mission Command if these threats are present. If the means are not appropriate for the operation, if the objectives are far from clear or far from unequivocal, if there is an extensive and good working communication network, if each

patrol can be followed, if detailed routines have been developed for every possible situation, or if the unit cannot afford any mistakes with respect to the safety of the soldiers or with respect to the political sensitivity, the system of MC could be set aside with the higher commanders taking over control. It may make the higher commander feel more comfortable. However, it may be argued that this is the wrong way. It may lead to less commitment or feelings of responsibility of subordinate commanders. It may also lead to the loss of leadership and initiatives of these sub-commanders when it is somehow needed.

Therefore, it is essential to invest not only in control mechanisms, but also in the building of mutual trust in the military organisation. These mechanisms should complement each other. In the next section, the aspect of mutual trust will be elaborated.

5. TOWARDS A TRUSTING ORGANISATION

Trust may be defined as "*...a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of the other*"²¹. This definition implies a dependency on other persons, in which trust and vulnerability go together. Trust is especially needed in situations in which one person is unable to fully control or enforce the behaviour of the other. This means that mutual trust is necessary in MC because in a system of decentralised command commanders at higher hierarchical levels depend on their subordinates' initiatives, and subordinate commanders depend on their superior commanders' capacities and integrity. In military operations trust is built on several dimensions. Each of these dimensions has an important role in a system of MC.

The first dimension of trust which may be considered as basic to mutual trust, is that soldiers of different hierarchical levels know, understand, and respect each other. This dimension may be considered at a personal level and at a functional level. At a personal level it means that soldiers who are dependent on each other in stressful situations know each other's background and also know what keeps them busy, so that they are able to help each other through hard times, if necessary. This aspect may create cohesion, which is necessary for groups to be successful during battle²². At a functional level it is important for soldiers of all hierarchical levels to know each other's tasks and responsibilities. For instance, it is important for a subordinate to know what to expect from a commander, and vice versa. It is also important to know what to expect from other units. These expectancies may be partly based on formal role descriptions, but more so on the experience of working together and discussing each other's lines of thinking. In this way, subordinates will learn their commander's intent. Ideally, a certain amount of respect for each other's position and line of thinking will grow.

A second dimension of trust is loyalty towards each other. On the one hand, a commander giving an order is dependent on the benevolence of his subordinates to fulfil his order to the best of their abilities and according to his intent. He must be convinced that his subordinates will not give up too easily. Also, he must be convinced that they will stay within the boundaries set up by his conditions and pursue the same goals. If a commander thinks that his subordinates have different goals, e.g. taking risks which he considers unnecessary, he will be less inclined to decentralise command. On the other hand, subordinates must be convinced that their commander gives orders in which their interests have been valued as much as possible, especially when assignments contain much danger in them. If subordinates notice that their

commander is careless or gives inoperable assignments, they will lose confidence in their superior. Furthermore, a commander who seems to think only about his own career, will lose trust from his subordinates.

A third dimension of trust is based on the perception of each other's capacities. Commanders and sub-commanders are not only dependent on each other's loyalty, but also on each other's capacities. A commander giving an assignment to his subordinates assumes that his subordinates understand what is expected of them, that they are able to make their own plans, to communicate them to their followers and to motivate them for the execution of these plans, and by this reaching the final objectives without too much trouble. If the commander has serious doubts about one of these aspects, he will not be too willing to delegate much authority. On the other hand, sub-commanders have to rely on the decision making capacities of their commanders, especially when the resulting orders imply that tasks have to be performed in dangerous situations.

A fourth dimension of trust is built on the perception of the integrity of each other. The use of violence may imply that norms and values are under pressure, even when units officially have to act according to the international laws of war. The units run the risk of violating norms when they feel frustrated about the mission. In their frustration they may start to act in an illegal way. In many operations, frustrations have led to many serious violations of international war laws, not only during war, but also during peace support operations²³. In these circumstances commanders have to trust each other's integrity. Higher commanders have to refrain from explicit or implicit illegal orders and subordinate commanders should deal with frustrations and the resulting negative emotions in a professional way²⁴.

The fifth dimension of mutual trust is based on transparency, openness, and honesty of commanders towards each other. It is important that on both sides one has the feeling that all information that should be passed, is actually passed, without holding back crucial facts. If people see that information is usually passed through to them, they will have more understanding for the fact that now and then some information has to be withheld. In many instances, commanders reason the other way round: sub-commanders should be given only that information which they need for their operations. It may be argued that such an attitude decreases mutual trust, because people may feel manipulated.

It is important to promote the building of mutual trust by strengthening each dimension of trust during the preparation for a mission as well as during the mission itself. This requires a number of measures. One of the most important measures is that personnel in the units which have to work together closely during the mission are able to get used to each other by training together for a reasonable time before deployment. In this way commanders should get to know each other's working styles. Furthermore, seeing each other working in the same direction, loyalty towards one another may be built in this process. It is helpful when this training is realistic with respect to the expected situations and problems with which the units have to deal with during deployment. Training realistically and discussing the possible ways of handling the situations help to get to know each other's line of thinking. In this training process and by the resulting evaluations the units may obtain unity of effort. Furthermore, it may help less experienced officers to learn from their more experienced colleagues. In this way their capacities may grow. In the training process successes as well as mistakes should be discussed, no matter if they have been made by an NCO or by an officer. This creates the necessary openness which is relevant for creating commitment and loyalty towards one

another. It also shows the strengths and weaknesses of the different commanders. A unit may use this knowledge of both strengths and weaknesses of different commanders to its own advantage during deployment.

It may be clear that this process of building trust takes a lot of valuable time. However, a certain level of mutual trust is indispensable for a system of Mission Command to be able to flourish. Therefore, the time for building trust should be taken if the Dutch army really wants to implement their policy of mission command.

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LEADERSHIP FOR CHANGE

THE DANISH PERSPECTIVE

Henning Sørensen

INTRODUCTION

This report consists of reflections and data on changes in the concept and conduct of Western military Leadership (ML) seen from the Danish perspective. Three areas of change are introduced:

- first, changes in the **military leadership functions** caused by the new national security situation for most Western societies after the end of the Cold War.
- second, changes in the **military leadership decision-making process**.
- third, changes in **military leadership values** and their relationships: ethics, morale, law and norms.

These mostly theoretical observations are tested against the empirical results of an in-depth interview with thirty-five Danish officers with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and above who have served in IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia. Their answers are structured along three themes: **Strategy and Tactics, Management and Leadership, and the Corporate Culture**.

The report concludes that no matter how military leadership is seen whether as a function, a process or a value, it has, for external reasons, expanded. Influenced by forces outside the armed forces, the gap between military and civil leadership has been reduced, thereby making military leadership almost no different from other types of leadership except for the values attached to the former. Actually, these values are probably best understood as a pair of glasses through which officers' conduct and performance are measured.

1. **Changes in Military Leadership Functions Caused by the New Security Situation**

The changed national security situation for Western societies since the end of the Cold War has already manifested itself in major changes of their armed forces such as the downsizing of regiments and garrisons, the reduction of military budgets, the scrapping of equipment, the recomposition of personnel with fewer conscripts and civilians, acceptance of homosexuals, female conscription, women in combat positions, and so on.

A closer look at the new security situation for Western nations reveals fundamental changes in the leadership task. Here, four new security conditions and their consequences for the functioning of ML are introduced.

1.1 **Changes in warrior task**

A basic change in international politics after the end of the Cold War has brought more peace among nations. Many indicators support the impression of a more peaceful world. Today, we have almost 200 nations in the world, a generation ago around 160. In spite of this increase of nations by 20 %, the number of wars between them has not risen accordingly. Today, as then, the India-Pakistan controversy on Kashmir is still the only registered international war. Moreover, many of the thirty internal wars in the world at that time were substituting conflicts for the ideological confrontation between the East and the West. These

civil wars have now come to an end and, consequently, most countries feel less threatened today than they did in the Cold War period.

However, the number of combat areas around the world has increased from the around thirty up to sixty depending upon definition. These "wars" are now waged more for ethnic or religious reasons than for political-ideological causes. They are fought by some four million men, often neighbours, loosely organized in armed gangs, shooting at one another occasionally. Therefore, we are far from the large classic battles of WW I and II between well-defined enemies. To Alvin and Heidi Toffler, the change in industrial production from mass production to flexible specialization is reflected in the change in warfare from mass production warfare to "demassified war-fare"¹⁾.

But the increase of combat areas has to be seen in the light of growing ethnic and cultural self-consciousness among the more than 2000 different cultural ethnic groups to be found confined in 200 nations. So only 5 % - 10 % of all nations can identify themselves as nation-states where language/culture/ religion and border coincide such as in Scandinavia²⁾. The many more combat areas moreover can be compared to the increased democratization of many former dictatorships. Since 1979, around thirty nations have become democracies without the use of violence and by peaceful democratic means alone such as words, demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. So, citizens inside a country have demonstrated a potential for internal peaceful improvements.

These changes have influenced the former warrior task of Western military leadership. The work of Western officers has expanded from warrior to mediator/humanitarian worker in local combat where neighbours sometimes exhibit outrageous violence against one another, use unorthodox weapons, and decline compliance with the Western military "rules of the game". In short, Western military leaders have experienced fundamental changes in their warrior "job" and the conditions under which they perform.

1.2 Changes in the Number of Missions and Participating Nations

Another change for Western military leadership is based on the shift for Western nations from collective to selective security policy. Based on the presence/absence of enemies or allies any country can be placed in one of four security positions: A country with neither enemies nor allies has independent security. A nation with enemies, but no allies has isolated security. A country with enemies and allies at the same time is in a collective security position. Finally, a country with no enemies but allies is in the best of all security positions, that of selective security, (Figure 1).

Figure 1. The Four National Security Positions

		Enemies	
		-	+
Allies	-	<i>Independent Security</i>	<i>Isolated Security</i>
	+	<i>Selective Security</i>	<i>Collective Security</i>

Figure 1 shows how the NATO - and former Warsaw Pact - countries have moved from collective to selective security and how the neutral Western countries such as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have shifted from isolated to selective security. The new selective security position has improved the possibility for smaller nations to intervene in world politics, in particular in incidents such as starvation, natural catastrophes, riots, refugees, civil wars with ethnic cleansing, and so on. So today, even smaller nations make a difference and do play a role in world politics by their individual selection among a number of foreign policy issues to pursue. For instance, Denmark was asked by the UN to deploy soldiers to Bosnia and did so, but declined the UN invitation to do the same in Somalia, while Germany did exactly the opposite. Both to Denmark and Germany, security is now perceived as a moral investment. They may sacrifice the lives of some of their soldiers by deploying them "out of area", but do so for a higher moral purpose.

This increase in military intervention since the end of the Cold War can be found in almost all Western countries as exemplified by the US and Denmark. "Over the last few years, US forces have participated in more than 20 non-combat operations" ³⁾ and the US have, moreover, headed many war operations such as Desert Storm in Iraq in January - March 1991, the air attack in Bosnia in August-September 1995 resulting in the Dayton agreement, the multinational air strike against Iraq in November 1998, and the "Allied Force" air campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999.

In the same period, Denmark has deployed around 20.000 soldiers in UN/OSCE/NATO-missions abroad, the equivalent number of its present Army. So on average, every Danish officer, NCO or enlisted soldier will every 30 months be deployed abroad in multinational military missions. But this increased participation in military missions takes place even if the national security of neither the US, nor Denmark, nor any other Western countries for that matter is at stake.

So, a basic change for the functioning of Western military leadership is its increased involvement in multinational missions for less threatening reasons than

in the Cold War era but it is nevertheless tested more directly, broadly and severely today than in the previous fifty years.

1.3 Changes in the Role of Military Leadership

Another change for Western ML is its new roles. Based on the presence/absence of combat missions and formal armed enemies any nation can identify four ideal types of roles for its military personnel deployed in conflicts around the world: Humanitarian worker, peacekeeper, war preventor, and warrior. (See Figure 2)

Figure 2. The Role of Military Leadership

		Formal Armed Enemies	
		-	+
Combat Missions	-	<i>Humanitarian worker</i>	<i>War Preventor</i>
	+	<i>Peacekeeper</i>	<i>Warrior</i>

The four roles in figure 2 can be exemplified by US military intervention in the last decade. The United States deployed soldiers in the Andrew Relief operation, the UNOSOM, and in Somalia bringing food from Mogadishu to the starving rural population in 1992/1993. Here, US soldiers served as humanitarian workers. The USA contribution to the IFOR/ SFOR missions in Bosnia in the conflict between the three ethnic groups - Serbs, Muslims, and Croats - illustrates another soldier role: **Peacekeeper**. This role is, in general, characterized by the intervention of formal organized military troops in the most different kind of combats situations including operations against terrorism and drugs, and in particular, in the many complex UN -, OSCE -, and NATO missions preserving peace among local combatants. By definition, peace still prevails as no external national organised enemy or threat is identified even though combat/shooting incidents may occur.

The third role is **war prevention**, ie. to keep the formal armed forces of one or more countries from using violence either against its own population or other nations by threats or use of military forces. The US deployment of armed forces in Europe in the Cold War period to stop any USSR/WAPA aggression is an example of this type of military role. Another is the US military presence in Macedonia and Albania, the air attacks on the Bosnian Serbs in August-September 1995 resulting in the Dayton Agreement, the air strike against Iraq in November 1998, and the air strike campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999. The security situation is, by definition, more dangerous than that of peacekeeping as the armed forces of two or more countries stand hostile against one another.

The fourth role is **warrior**. Here, formal armed forces of two or more countries


meet in combat on the battlefield as in operation "Desert Storm" against Iraq in January-March 1991 where US soldiers served as warriors.

A basic reason for this downward expansion of the soldier role towards the use of a minimum of force is the perception of war and violence as uncivilized. Less than a century ago in WW I, war was a goal in itself. It would strengthen morale in the armed forces and educate young men later serving their country. During WW II war needed a cause. Today, war is less justified by its cause than by its performance. A good cause for military intervention is to try to stop the sufferings of human beings inflicted upon them by their political leaders. They are the reason for their sufferings, but their removal is not the goal. It is, of course, the accomplishment of the task but even more so it is the minimum of violence used. We saw that in the Gulf War of 1991 when the US and its allies withdrew their troops instead of taking advantage of the situation to destroy the political system of Saddam Hussein and his armed forces. So, the justification of multinational military intervention is damage-management and performance, not cause-elimination as documented by the NATO air campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999. It is defined a military success because NATO had no casualties, the Muslims can resettle, and the destruction of Serbian military and civilian targets was executed by use of a minimum of violence while the removal/replacement of president Milosevics was no criteria of success. In short, the military leadership role has expanded from warrior to humanitarian worker, from manager of violence to mediator, from commanding soldiers to instructing craftsman to reestablish water facilities, electricity, and gas-pipelines, to assist in local elections, to monitor the local population living in or visiting (former) hostile territories, and so on.

1.4. Changes in the time for of Intervention

The point in time at which Western countries intervene militarily has shifted, as well. Based on the time when the challenge of an aggressor is met by the defender, three different response-strategies can be identified. If the defender reacts, he waits for the aggressor to attack before he responds. If the aggressor is stopped during his military build-up, the defender acts. If the aggressor is stopped even before that, (cf. The Clint Eastwood remark: "Don't even think about it"), the defender pre-acts. (See Figure 3)

Figure 3. The Time for Military Leadership to Intervene

Aggressor's initiative	<i>Attack</i> +	<i>Risk</i> +	<i>Threat</i> +
			
	*	*	*
Defender's answer	<i>React</i>	<i>Act</i>	<i>Preact</i>
NATO answer in	1950-60	1980s-1990s	1990s
Challenge	<i>Massive Retaliation</i>	<i>Double Track Decision</i>	<i>Intervention in Albania</i>

In Figure 3, NATO's response-strategy for the last fifty years for when to meet a challenge, is illustrated. NATO has pursued all three strategies. In the early days of the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance considered its security to be at stake only after a direct military attack by the USSR/Warsaw Pact, as in the Grand Strategy of nuclear retaliation in the 1950s even in case of a minor military attack by the communist alliance. Later on from 1967, NATO changed its strategy to Flexible Response, adapting its action to that of the attacker. Consequently, NATO told the USSR to have its middle range missiles withdrawn or NATO would deploy the same type of missiles in Western Europe, the so-called Double Track decision of the 1980s. Today, the mass media and public opinion in Western countries often demand anticipatory intervention, ie. preaction, to avoid even minor security risks to exploding into international crisis or humanitarian catastrophes, as was the case in Rwanda in 1994, but avoided in Albania in 1997 as the European NATO-countries decided to deploy soldiers in Albania to stop the riots from escalating into a civil war. The NATO air strike campaign against Serbia in March-June 1999 had - as said - the same humanitarian purpose of enforcing Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing and allow the resettlement of the Muslim population. These missions demonstrate not only the new NATO strategy of humanitarian intervention but also the expedition of military intervention from reaction via action to preaction, even if no national security issue is at stake for any of the intervening countries.

From the point of the aggressor, it means that there is less time for manoeuvring than before and even more so for Western military leadership. In fact, Western officers are caught between public demand for anticipated military intervention to rescue human beings and public expectation of non-casualty-operations. Otherwise, Western countries will withdraw their military forces as the US did in 1982 from Lebanon and in 1993 from Somalia. In short, contemporary leadership in Western military establishments has to act faster, and argue better for less important national security missions than they once did.

To conclude, the improved national security situation of the Western world of neither enemies nor military threats, but with more combat areas around the world has fundamentally influenced military leadership. The task has become less violent, but more varied with the participation of more nations, for new reasons, and by faster intervention than before. Politically, military leadership will play a more active and exposed role in society than before as many of its decisions have increased (foreign) political content. Financially, this leadership gains economic support as much for its performance in low level conflicts and humanitarian missions as in war prevention and war operations. The old discussion of "guns-versus-butter" is now one of "butter-for-guns"- debate. Western armed forces receive more readily heavy weaponry and air/sea lift material for intervention in humanitarian missions than in cases of national defence. Militarily, Western military leadership cannot rely on its combat merit, alone. It has to reconcile contrasting objectives: Alleviation and violence, international and national presence, military and humanitarian goals, fast intervention and deliberate non-commitment. All this demonstrates the expansion of military leadership in the West.

2. Changes in the Military Leadership Process

Having focused on the expansion of the functions of military leadership as a consequence of the new security situation for Western countries, changes in military leadership seen as a process can be identified.

In the classic decision-making process an actor A (platoon leader to General or Admiral) commands B to do Y. So, the leader A causes B to perform Y instead of Z as B would have done, had it not been for the influence of A. In other words, the outcome Y is related to the qualities of A, his social and educational background, carisma, former performance, and so on.

Problems can be identified with this definition. First, it perceives the leadership process as a one-way relationship between A and B. B is the passive recipient of an order from A, unable to think or act on his own. So, B's behavior demands the presence/influence of A. Second, this model presupposes clear orders, objectives, and methods, which are impossible to foresee; in particular, in complex alleviation and peacekeeping missions. Third, A is hiding the intended goal for B instead of sharing/defining it together with B. Fourth, the potential of A is overlooked: an officer defending a post with only 10 soldiers against 1000 for two hours is most certainly a better leader than he who wins that battle. Fifth, it is difficult to prove that A caused B to do Y; maybe B would have done Y on his own initiative. Sixth, A is not influenced by B, even if we know that A will normally adapt X to anticipate the reaction of B.

This criticism is by and large met in the new military leadership process model, (see **Figure 4**) where the classic decision-making process is illustrated by full-drawn lines and the new aspects by dotted lines.

Figure 4. The Process of Military Leadership




Figure 4 illustrates the expansion of the decision-making process starting with a common understanding and agreement between A and B of the intended goal. Next, military leadership is seldom a "one man show" but is better perceived as a team effort. Then, the potentials of A and the influence of B on A are included. Any leader will adapt his order X to B depending on the present status of B. So, the new model accepts B's influence on how to accomplish the intended goal.

Finally, feed back is needed to evaluate the compability of the intended and the accomplished goal, ie. the rate of success.

All these observations lead to a new tentative definition of military leadership as a "phenomenon when A agrees with B on, and how, to perform a goal".

So, the perception of leadership has expanded. From an individual, consensual, and instrumental concept to a leadership as "collective", ie. symbiotic relation between leaders and followers, "dissensual", ie. with-out conflicts we will be trapped in a false utopian dream, and "causative", ie. leaders can invent and create ideas, institutions, memories that can empower followers to satisfy their needs as suggested by Burns⁴.

This definition applies to all kind of leadership, civil and military alike. The characteristics of **military** leadership appear when the values of this specific leadership are presented. To conclude, military leadership as a process is less military and less rank order dominated and more general and follower-oriented than before.

3. Changes in ML as a Value

Both the expansion of the functions and decision-making process have contributed to the more positive evaluation of the concept. Today, military leadership is almost as much an "in-word" as "democracy". Some generations ago during the Vietnam War, the concept of military leadership gave only negative associations.

The positive evaluation of military leadership within the armed forces is confirmed by a study of the attitudes of Army cadets in nine European countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Switzerland, Sweden, France, Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands) to their profession and organization. More than every second cadet pointed at "leadership" as the most "*essential characteristics for a "good" officer*" among eighteen suggestions such as self-control, responsibility, expertise, patriotism, bravery, and cooperativeness, etc.⁵ A main problem, however, in defining contemporary military leadership is its expansion in function and process as presented above. Another, is its relation to much broader values such as morale, ethics, and norms. So, the disagreement on how to define the concept is also caused by disagreement on how to define more basic concepts.


In order to come to grips with the concept of military leadership as a value, a shared understanding of these concepts is needed. Here, military leadership is related to four terms: ethics, morale, law and norms. Underlying these are four different actors - the individual person, ie. the officer, the military organization, politicians, and societies, ie. citizens/the officer corps.

Ethics is individually determined. It is a self-imposed behaviour. Morale is an overall code for all members to be followed in situations within a well-defined context, often an organization. Morale values are loyalty, trust, brotherhood, tradition, and honor. "Law" is the specific messages to be followed in a precise situation, and norms are decided by society telling all people/members of a group how to behave.

The key word of military leadership is **morale**. It will normally refer to three important aspects of the soldiers life: Job (jobsatisfaction, self-esteem, selfimage, motivation), the

unit (platoon relations, body-system, group cohesion, esprit de corps), and finally the Armed Forces (its legitimacy, civil military relations). Morale is moreover important because it serves as a means to promote/control a specific behaviour by followers in the armed forces and because leadership sometimes has to balance contrasting morale values, for instance the morale of the unit versus that of the organization, while contradictions in laws and norms are less often observed. **Figure 5** offers a framework for the understanding of military leadership related to the four values, the sanctions given if they are violated, and the changes it has undergone.

Figure 5. The Values of Military Leadership



First, **Figure 5** illustrates the reduced influence of morale and law and the benefits of increased importance for ethics. This means that the individual officer is given more responsibility for his/hers decisions. The changes within the morale element is that unit morale has expanded at the cost of less influence of the higher formal system. The changes of military law reflect its reduced importance, as well. As the armed forces have become more civilianized, the need of a specific military sanction system has been reduced. In fact, in Denmark capital punishment is abandoned and the number of arbitrary disciplinary sanctions have diminished.

4. Military Leadership Defined by Danish Senior Officers

This part of the article is based on empirical studies. It introduces results from an in-depth interview with thirty five senior Danish officers, (Lieutenant-Colonels and above) on their interpretation of their military function and leadership role after having served for six months in IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia. Their answers are presented to confirm the

more theoretical changes just described in the function, decision-making process, and values of military leadership referred to above (section 2). These answers are structured along three themes:

- Strategy and tactics
- Management and leadership
- Corporate Culture.

4.1 Strategy and Tactics

The noted basic change in the function of military leadership was its job -, mission - and role -expansion, together with faster intervention. More results from the Danish study confirm this expansion with respect to less use of violence and the need for broader skills; the allrounder is now better than the specialist.

The first question put to these officers was: *"Characterize your role in your military organization (in Bosnia)"*. All responded "professional soldier" (100 %). Other responses were: "ambassador" (58 %), "mediator" (50 %) , and "humanitarian worker" (33 %), but only 17 % as "citizen soldier" and 8 % as "policeman". The acceptance by Danish officers of the expanded civilian functions of their job would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

Another way of illustrating the modern tactics and the leadership process in Denmark is the instruction of Danish soldiers by use of "Auftrags-taktik" instead of "Befehlstaktik". **Befehlstaktik** means that the officer dictates for the soldiers not only what job to do, but prescribes moreover how to do it, which way to go, for how long time, what tool to use, and so on. **Auftrags-taktik** only defines for the soldiers what task to accomplish. Then, the platoon is expected to know how to do so. The instruction of Danish soldiers in **Auftragstaktik** increase their sense of responsibility, and self-esteem, and make them more engaged in doing their job.

The complexity of the job and the need for fast intervention is illustrated by responses to another question.

"An incident with a local woman and her child caught in a car in a crossfire situation between local soldiers. Describe the reaction of soldiers from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, UK, and the USA".

Four answers were listed:

- intervene
- call for help
- call for instructions
- ignore

The answers indicate a scale of potential response from "intervene" (high) to "ignore" (low). The difference between "call for help" and "call for instruction" is that in the first case the platoon has already defined the situation as one where back-up is needed while soldiers in the latter expect their superiors to do so. It is understood that the platoon were not under command of an officer. Even if some of the Danish top officers hesitated before answering they all agreed (100 %) that a Danish platoon would "intervene", 83 % expected soldiers from the UK to do the same, while 58 % believed so for soldiers from Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Most surprisingly, all Danish officers (100 %) expected the US soldiers to "call for help/instruction".

These answers are no Danish criticism of the US Army tactics in Bosnia, but they illustrate the broad range of possibilities of action for the same incident and the many unforeseeable elements in alleviation and peace-keeping missions.

4.2 Management and Leadership

Consequently, no military leadership can anticipate all of them. This is particularly the case in complex alleviation and peace-keeping operations. Here, we mostly find "ad hoc-leadership". It proves the theoretical statements above that military leadership as a process is team oriented, accepts the involvement of soldiers defining the intended goal, allows soldiers to influence how to accomplish it, and lets them have a say when the success of the task has to be evaluated.

Another theoretical statement was that military leadership is almost defined as civil leadership. It is confirmed when looking at the Danish Manual for all soldiers "*Ledelse og Uddannelse*" ("*Leadership and Education*"). In chapter 4 "Leadership", p 310 - 379⁶, only two pages of the more than seventy pages are devoted to Military Leadership, because "...no major differences seem in principle to exist between the socio-psychological and group dynamic factors in the civil and the military organisation", p 343. The civil-oriented definition of military leadership is, moreover, found in the answers of the Danish senior officers to the question: "*Please describe the concept of 'good military leadership'*". Danish officers define "good military leadership" by referring to civil factors such as "get results, cooperate with others, responsibility, and good personal qualities"; no one mentions military qualities such as bravery, honor, and tradition. Here is a contradiction: Danish senior officers define military leadership mostly by civilian values, but include military values when they define themselves as professional soldiers. Nevertheless, in Denmark military leadership is almost just leadership.

4.3 The Corporate Culture

The expansion of personal ethics at the cost of a decline in the importance of organizational morale and the reduction of disciplinary sanctions is also found in Denmark.

The corporate culture of an organization can be pictured by asking the managers their opinion of the employees. In the Danish study senior officers were asked: "*Which are the qualities of Danish soldiers (Contracted and enlisted*

personnel)". The answers can be structured around four themes. Their arguments included:

- result-orientation: "Danish soldiers feel responsible for the accomplishment of a task".
- social behaviour: "Danish soldiers perceive themselves as human beings", "I know that my soldiers may question my orders or have them explained for what reason I anticipate their questions and thereby I improve my order", "Danish soldiers act socially",
- social background: "Danish soldiers are rather well-educated from elementary school", "Due to conscription, we still get soldiers with a good social background", "We educate them well"
- decentralized military structure: "There are only a few steps from the soldier on the ground and to his Commander (COL)", "Easy for the soldier to get in touch with his superiors".

The Danish corporate culture reflects the new leadership functions and decision-making process as it accepts the influence of B, B's good relation to A, and B's individual responsibility.

This culture is taught and established in a number of ways. All Danish army officers are educated together across regiment/weaponry lines (infantry, cavalry, artillery,) at least twice, before they meet for the third time at the general staff course (VUT II) at the War Academy. Moreover, Danish officers do operate across these lines, they know each other's function and the corporate culture within each of the three services. Therefore, the values of military leadership are rather easily learned, accepted, and internalized, even if differences in culture for the three Danish services can be documented ⁷.

The reduction of military disciplinary sanctions is also found for Denmark. Partly, it is demonstrated by the discussion of the reduced relevance of the **Danish Military Law** for Danish uniformed personnel. Partly, it is statistically documented by the fall of military verdicts for the violations of its statutes from over 4000 in 1994 to 3.800 in 1995, 3.250 in 1996 and around 3.000 in 1997⁸.

CONCLUSION

No matter how military leadership is seen: a function, a process, or a value, it has expanded, for external reasons, ie. influenced by forces outside the armed forces and thereby the gap between civil and military leadership has been further reduced. What distinguishes this from other types of leadership are the values attached to it and it is probably best understood as a pair of glasses through which officers' conduct and performance are measured. In short, military leadership is a state of mind when observing the world. The theoretical changes here presented have been empirically confirmed by the Danish study. This is not to declare "nothing ain't rotten in the state of Denmark" as more problems can be identified.

Decision-making under pressure and the inclusion of an uncertainty factor ought to be a specific subject at the military academies. Instead, military cadets are given plenty of time to study and do

their thesis. Moreover, the leadership structure has not changed even if the process has. Conflicts between structure and process and between the different levels of the armed forces (unit versus organization) will continue to stir corporate culture. A third problem is the lack of a clearer definition of the military leadership function when Danish soldiers serve in UN, OSCE, or NATO missions "out of area". Some may blame the officers for this. But on the bottomline, society is to blame for it is obliged to define for the officers what military leadership should be. Therefore, society more owes the professional soldier a clearer definition of his/her function and role identification rather than the other way around.

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THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

J. L. Soeters

INTRODUCTION

As in business, military life is internationalising at a rapid pace. The British Falklands expedition in 1982 may have been one of the last unilateral military actions in the western hemisphere. Nowadays, even the larger western nations, like the USA, need to form broad multinational coalitions before engaging in military actions such as Operation Desert Storm or the operations in the former Yugoslavia. The main reason for this way of behaving has to do with legitimisation purposes, but, increasingly, there are also budget-related arguments involved. Especially in western Europe, the many national armed forces are facing substantial budget cuts, which force them to co-operate more closely with each other.

Only by means of cross-border military collaboration may it be possible to maintain critical mass and a strategically adequate range of weapon systems and functions. In this way national armed forces may profit from economies of scale and scope, and may thus compensate for each other's technological or manpower-related weaknesses. It stands to reason, however, that military organisations wanting or being forced to work together are looking for so-called "win-win" situations.¹

International co-operation may take various forms: from loosely coupled temporary units to more permanent joint ventures which may even result in a degree of integration not far removed from a complete merger. The German/Netherlands Army Corps and the Eurocorps - consisting of military units from Germany, France, Spain and Belgium - are just two examples of this strong tendency towards the multinationalisation of the armed forces in Europe.² The German Bundeswehr, as a matter of fact, as a whole, has been divided in such a way that all its constituent elements are part of a multinational unit together with either the Dutch, the French, the Danish or the Americans and, in the near future, the Polish and, perhaps, in the distant future, other eastern European armed forces.

This multinational co-operation poses specific managerial problems. This has been acknowledged for quite some time in the business sector. Every national organisation is steeped in specific cultural traditions and characteristics, which are fairly stubborn and which may be particularly far-reaching in their consequences.³ These national characteristics are not easy to change and must be handled with care in situations of multinational co-operation. In multinational military forces and operations, commanders at all levels are confronted with the cultural aspects of their job. To illustrate this I will give three examples of commanders facing multinationality within their span of control. At the strategic apex this applies to top and higher ranking commanders of and within standing multinational units such as the 1 GE/NL Corps or the Eurocorps; at the intermediate level commanders of and within international temporary HQs, such as in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Vicenza, have to deal with varying cultures within their organisation; and at the lower level even company commanders have to deal with this phenomenon, like the British captains of the UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus who command companies consisting of British and Dutch soldiers. There have been signals indicating that Dutch soldiers experience difficulties when being confronted with the unequivocal discipline-oriented way of leadership among British commanders. And this is only one example of culture-related friction on the operational level.

All commanders of multinational military operations and forces have to be aware of the cultural aspects of their jobs and responsibilities. This short paper aims to contribute to this "cultural awareness"; in addition, it attempts to provide some simple, but important, recipes for action.

NATIONAL CULTURES AND THE ARMED FORCES

As mentioned above, the importance of cultural aspects of multinational collaboration was acknowledged first in the business sector. On the basis of the value-orientations of more than 100,000 IBM employees in more than sixty countries the Dutch social scientist Geert Hofstede detected four - and later five - dimensions of national cultures. These orientations relate to individualism, hierarchy, rule orientation, toughness and time perspective. In general, these dimensions have proven to be rather stable over the years.⁴ The impact of culture on international business life has remained undisputed since the publication of these striking results. Application of Hofstede's work in the military sector has produced remarkable results as well.

It was found, for example, that, compared to the business sector, the armed forces in some twenty countries exhibit an overarching international military culture which is relatively bureaucratic-hierarchical and institutional or parochial in nature. The latter feature refers to a relatively high degree of *inner-directedness*. At the same time, the exhibited cultural heterogeneity of the various national armed forces was at least as large as in the business sector. For example, the Belgian armed forces display international-military characteristics as well as typical Belgian features.⁵

These findings may be of importance since these national cultural features hardly change over time. This is well-known in cultural theory but it has been demonstrated specifically in a study done at the NATO Defence College in Rome.⁶ Twice a year this College organises a course for some 65 participants, being senior military officers and civil servants from the various NATO countries. This course takes six months and its multinational classroom system provides excellent learning opportunities for interaction in multinational situations. One of the most interesting results of this study, however, was the stability of basic values - the core of national culture - whereas at the same time opinions and attitudes on all kinds of other issues changed in all directions during the course. Hence, simply bringing people together in a multinational classroom does not help in blunting the sharp edges of national cultural characteristics. This we already knew from elementary social psychology: direct contact between people, who differ on one or more observable traits, may indeed lessen mutual stereotyping; but - depending upon the context and content of the interaction - direct contact may also produce more negative, prejudicial interaction and may correspondingly worsen relations between groups.⁷

The Rome findings, however, did not say anything about the implications of cultural characteristics for real action. Nevertheless, one can safely assume that these implications have to be taken seriously in real military life. They may be recognised by national variations in military doctrine, in ethos and morale, in the orientation towards military discipline, in the ability to communicate and in general military capabilities.⁸ Some Dutch officers, for instance, starting work in international HQs, experienced a real culture shock when they were confronted with the degree of *micromanagement* in these HQs. They were not used to this when training and working in the Dutch armed forces.⁹

Besides these participative observations, clear evidence of cultural impact on real military action up to now has only been demonstrated in military aviation. It has been shown, both theoretically and statistically, that in some air force cultures so-called "total losses" of aircraft are more prevalent than in other air forces.¹⁰ National military cultures which are less classical-bureaucratic and less inner-directed seem to be more safe in this respect than others. This analysis shows that "soft" cultural features may indeed have fairly "hard" consequences. This may be even more true when different cultures start to interact.

On the basis of all these findings one does not jump to conclusions therefore when assuming that cultural characteristics form full part of what has been called the "organisational iceberg" of military operations.¹¹ What can be seen above the surface level is the result of the operation: this overall result is virtually always considered and declared to be a good one. Beneath the surface and hence not or hardly observable, however, there are power struggles, policy violations, confidence crises, unresolved moral dilemmas, communication problems and "groupthink" symptoms to be found. This "organisational iceberg" - as depicted by Swedish researchers - reflects the dynamics of one single unilateral operation of the Swedish armed forces - albeit in the more general international context of a UN operation. Having armed forces really interacting with one another, which occurs in true multinational military operations, will undoubtedly increase the suboptimal organisational dynamics beneath the surface.

The suboptimal performance of multinational military forces may even be magnified by other operational aspects, of which the frequent rotation of commanders, officers and soldiers may be the most important. Especially this aspect could lead to a situation in which multinational forces lack "institutional memory". This memory, if present, can be of great help in decision-making processes and during the implementation of commands.¹²

WHY DON'T THEY "FIGHT" EACH OTHER?

Given all these problems it is somewhat surprising that multinational military forces really are able to do their job, albeit it probably less effectively and successful than theoretically possible. During the Gulf War and in the former Yugoslavia - especially after UNPROFOR - as well as during various UN peacekeeping missions, such as the one in Cyprus, multinational military forces indeed have performed adequately. This observation has led three Israeli researchers - Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari - to look for an answer to the question: Why don't they fight each other?¹³

This is, of course, an ironical question since the various contributing armed forces do not really fight each other. But in relation to the cultural variation we just observed it might very well be conceivable that the different national parts of the multinational unit or operation do "fight" each other in terms of struggle about competencies, "bureau politics", informal thwarting of each other's intentions or simply not being willing to "understand" each other, and all this on the basis of possibly negative mutual stereotyping. This is - as we saw earlier - the unobservable part of the "organisational iceberg". However, despite these processes and problems, most multinational military forces and operations do perform more or less acceptably. How is that possible?

In their attempt to answer this question Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari¹⁴ assumed that in multinational military operations at least some degree of trust between the various contributing parties must and in fact does evolve. To explain this, they first of all pointed to the common international military culture which we already observed earlier. Despite national variations there seems to be something like a core military professionalism and culture, consisting of bureaucratic-hierarchical control and an overwhelming orientation towards military life itself. These features, as well as a sense of military "uniqueness", seem to typify armed forces all over the world and enables military (wo)men to cooperate adequately.

This may especially be the case if the tasks involved are technical, specialized, standardized and functional and if they can be dealt with in the *lingua franca* of our times: the English language. The more specialised and technical their military training is the more efficiently soldiers and officers conform themselves to the procedures and manners involved in multinational operations. Their

specialised training enables them to adopt well-defined role-based instead of person-based behaviour, which will make them trust each other more easily.¹⁵ It is more likely that nation-related friction will occur among general line-commanders than it is to occur, for instance, among specialised meteorologists. This is similar to what happens in business organisations where the amount of organisational politics is highest among the marketing staff, board of directors and sales managers and lowest among R&D, accounting and production personnel.¹⁶

Secondly, there are integrating mechanisms related to the structural set-up of the operation. The first point in this respect is perhaps somewhat paradoxical. There may be integrating effects stemming from the most common division of labour within multinational forces: the geographical *separation* of units along national lines. The engineering unit, for instance, is formed by nation X, whereas the infantry unit comes from nation Y and is located in a different area from the second infantry unit coming from nation Z. As a consequence of this division of labour the interdependency between national units is neither very high nor very low. According to Meyerson, Weick and Kramer¹⁷ this situation is likely to facilitate the evolvement of mutual trust. Obviously, this integrating mechanism may only be applicable in certain circumstances.

In addition, there may be other integrating mechanisms related to the organisational structure of a multinational force and its operation. Co-ordination and information flows, in which senior national liaison officers are involved, are highly important in this respect. In multinational HQs and command posts these senior officers work closely together with colleagues from other nations. At the same time they channel the information flow towards their home countries and their own national troops. It is important for national troops in a multinational operation to have "their man in HQ". Obviously, this "man" should have a formal rank which is high enough to be taken seriously in these international arenas.

Thirdly, there is the integrating effect of the mission itself. In western civilisation notions like peace, human rights and international justice are highly esteemed. These values may provide a UN or NATO banner behind which all troops - including the troops from non-western countries - may unite. This enables them to identify to some extent with the overarching goal of the mission.

Finally, there are the effects of uncertainty, "foreignness" and the shared fate of being away from home. It has been shown in social science that mutual trust - so highly needed in military operations - is more likely to develop and to mature when there is a certain degree of uncertainty, the generation of activities is valued and there is some degree of (perceived) risk.¹⁸ Besides, the feeling of foreignness and other perceptions of shared fate may create ingroup and outgroup feelings; in these sociodynamics the military personnel of the multinational force will tend to consider themselves as members of an ingroup being confronted with mutual enemies, warring parties or indifferent locals. The latter, obviously, will be considered outsiders. However, when there is no risk, no danger, little uncertainty and little activity, in sum: when there is only boredom during the operation, trust is not likely to develop and in and outgroup processes may occur *within* the multinational force. Risk taking and the development of trust are circularly interrelated.

All in all, multinational military operations face serious problems due to the national cultural differences of the contributing countries. These differences may be reflected in different training procedures - especially regarding the so-called "soft" issues - as well as in variations in doctrine, rules of engagement, military discipline as well as in communication and leadership styles. These culture-related variations may hamper collaboration in multinational military operations to a

considerable degree. However, there are also opportunities which create possibilities for integration. The difficulties and opportunities are shown in summary in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Integration Difficulties and Opportunities when Commanding Multinational Forces and Operations.

Difficulties	Opportunities
International heterogeneity as to:	International integration due to:
* orientation towards hierarchy and rules;	* one international military core ideal and "life";
* leadership styles;	*organisational structure relating to separation, information flows and co-ordination;
* military discipline;	* shared values like peace and human rights;
* rules of engagement and doctrine.	* commonness of being away from home, foreignness, risk, danger and general activity.

The opportunities for integration relate to the existence of a common international military core-culture, the existence of several common features with regard to the organisational structure and to feelings of commonness; these opportunities for integration may indeed enhance the effectiveness of multinational co-operation.¹⁹ Hence, there are problems of multinationality to cope with - and preferably to minimise - and at the same time there are gains to be won in the game of multinationality. In their attempts to improve the performance of the multinational unit, commanders can win or lose, depending on how successful they are in decreasing the number of difficulties and in profiting from the available opportunities.

COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

What then, if anything, should the commander of a multinational operation do in order to turn the operation into a success?

First of all, he or she - but most frequently, still: he - will have to be *present*. This is as simple a recipe as it is an important one. As Pfeffer²⁰ has pointed out, many organisational processes fail due to 'lousy implementation skills' which more often than not has to do with invisible leadership. Absent leadership - recognisable by symptoms of over-delegation of tasks, only paying attention to events outside, stressing ceremonial leadership and avoiding decisional roles²¹ - creates space for all kinds of diverging, centrifugal elements within the organisation. Therefore Pfeffer advocates "management with power" as a general recipe for improving organisational performance and simply "getting things done". It seems that this recipe is even more relevant in multinational organisations and operations.

Managing with power does not mean the abuse of power; that much should be clear. On the contrary, it means recognising that there are varying interests and opinions within the organisation. It furthermore means that one should understand this variation in points of view of colleagues and subordinates as stemming from their cultural (!) background and position in the organisation. It finally implies that one should not be afraid of eventually using the various strategies and tactics of power. These strategies and tactics may relate to the use of information, of timing, of interpersonal influencing and the (re-)framing of perspectives.²² Needless to say that management with power not

only involves top-down but also horizontal and bottom-up decision-making and implementation processes.

In no way does this mean that mission command - when soldiers are told what to do and not necessarily how to do it²³ - should be avoided. Given the increasing complexity of military operations, traditional command styles, relying solely on obedience to specific orders, will probably become obsolete. However, experiences from multinational military co-operation seem to indicate that this way of command is confounded by all kinds of cultural influences, leading even to new forms of old-style micromanagement.²⁴ Management with power, at the very least, implies that one understands these sociodynamics, but it also implies that one knows how to deal with these national culture-related organisational politics.

Management with power may also come to the fore in another way. Giving more decisional autonomy to lower leadership levels requires the infusion of the organisation members with central values regarding preferred behaviour, decisions and communication. In this infusion process central leadership - and for that matter: emotional and committed leadership - is indispensable. This may seem contradictory but modern military leaders have to be able to cope with and to synthesise contradictory demands.²⁵

Having said this, commanders in multinational military operations should stress - ostensibly and emotionally - some central issues.²⁶ First, in addition to the permanent clarification of the mission goals, commanders will have to emphasise the *joint* character of the mission. The mission as such may have an integrating effect as we saw earlier, but this will only happen if this jointness is continuously stressed by all people in charge as a superordinate goal for all people involved. Commanders will have to be personally committed to the mission and will have to show it. This naturally also implies that commanders transcend their own nationality whilst emphasising the multinational character of the mission.

Secondly, it is important to emphasise the equal status of all units involved in the multinational operation. If the status of some contributing forces, from Third World countries for example, is relatively low and if ingroup 'virtues' become to be seen as outgroup 'vices' within the multinational force, it is the commander's responsibility to boost the status of the members of the low-status group. Furthermore, the commander should make his (or sometimes her) decisions and judgements in such a way that every representative of a nation can maintain his dignity, hence preventing the "loss of face" in specific circumstances. As to punishments and other legal affairs, commanders should display a strictly neutral attitude, following standardized rules and regulations.

In addition, the creation of cultural awareness by means of cross-cultural training (see table 2) as well as the organisation of events to enhance mutual acquaintance and to facilitate interpersonal relations seem to be important to create some kind of common esprit de corps. Obviously, these events must be something more than mere "fun", but even then cohesion may develop.²⁷

Table 2: a list of intercultural communication skills ²⁸

the capacity to communicate respect
the capacity to be non-judgemental
the capacity to accept the relativity of one's own knowledge and perceptions
the capacity to display empathy
the capacity to be flexible
the capacity for turn-taking (letting everyone take turns in discussion)
tolerance for ambiguity

Finally, although - as we saw before - it makes sense to structure the work in a multinational force along national lines, it may nevertheless be fruitful to install specific teams consisting of members from the various contributing forces as much as possible. Multinational HQs and command posts are already an everyday reality. But conceivably, on the lower echelons, such teams (e.g. for patrolling) may have a comparable integrating effect. Therefore, commanders should do their best to design and realise these multi-membership teams among the *rank-and-file* of the multinational force.

EPILOGUE

In the first half of the 1990s the Western world has rather enthusiastically intervened in various intra-state conflicts in which ordinary and innocent people were subjected to horrendous acts of violence and aggression. Multinational military forces have been deployed in Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and several regions in the African Great Lake area. Most of these multinational military operations have at best been partially successful. The causes of these partial failures undoubtedly relate to a lack of clear military objectives - well-known as the "vanishing front" - too distant interests and a clash of civilisation levels between the western armed forces and the warring parties. However, the multinationality of these operations certainly also has had its bearing on these partial failures. It is the commander's responsibility to take this into consideration in order to improve this aspect of military performance. The innumerable innocent victims of conflicts all over the world may profit from it.

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IV: TOWARDS A MODEL OF GOOD PRACTICE

In our search for a model of good practice we found that European military establishments were particularly concerned with two major issues:

- Leadership and Management
- Rights and Responsibilities

In the first area, a continuing need is for the identification of the most effective relationship between the doctrine of leadership and theories of management. The latter in recent years have acquired increasing importance in commercial and public service organizations. Within European armed forces there has also been a tendency for personnel, particularly those in positions of authority, to favour a managerial approach which equated that in use elsewhere. The reasons for this are complex; an adherence to the principles of convergence rather than divergence; uncertainty about the effective exercise of hierarchical authority, personal preferences, role confusion and so on. The issue, however, is explored by Spacie in his analysis of what is the best practice in the exercise of contemporary leadership. Drawing both on his practical experience and on his understanding of theory, he stresses that "management is complemented and enhanced by leadership". He goes further to suggest that the two functions are brought together in the concept of **command** which in terms of the functions of a group is best thought of as "command and leadership teams".

In the second area, members of European military establishment, irrespective of rank, are very well aware of the complex intricacies of the rights and responsibilities of service personnel. There are many common problems, though individual military establishments vary greatly in the way in which issues are dealt with. Indeed, it is possible to identify a continuance of response ranging from the priority of rights in a given armed force to the priority of responsibilities in a second. The one military establishment which has paid serious attention to the questions which arise and which has established clear legal guidelines is that of Germany. Accordingly, Fleckenstein in his analysis of German practice, emphasizes the importance during a period of change of the doctrine of **Innere Führung**.

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins.

LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND

Keith Spacie

WHAT IS LEADERSHIP?

Some especially in the business schools, treat leadership as though it were synonymous with management, which it decidedly is not although there is, or should be, a relationship between the two functions (but they are separate functions). In recent decades we have seen the growth – the welcome growth – of management as an applied science and with it an emphasis on system and resource control. But with this growth and emphasis management has tended to subsume leadership. This has happened even in the military, and as a consequence, leadership as a social process has been neglected, especially in the higher reaches, as has the importance of people generally. Only now is the error being appreciated.

Leadership can of course exist in isolation and may not be associated with a management function. Intellectual leadership is one such example. It is also arguable that a person can be an 'effective' leader yet totally inadequate in a managerial sense (although the reverse is seldom true). In practice though most positions involving executive responsibility – and this particularly applies to the military – require both leadership and management, the ratio of one to the other depending on the nature of the task. Perhaps I can quote John Kotter to sum up the relationship. He suggested that 'management complements leadership, it doesn't replace it'. I would go further; management is complemented and enhanced by leadership. Unfortunately there is only one word in the English language that effectively brings the two functions together, and it is a word that those in the non-military sphere find difficult: it is 'command' (We use the term 'governance' in an institutional sense, but that is not the same thing). But command is associated with both functions, and that is why in the British Armed Forces we mainly use the term 'commander' rather than 'leader' (favoured more in some armies). Leadership is part of command, but it is not command per se.

Command and leadership are usually regarded and discussed in individual terms whereas in reality, and particularly in a modern military environment, they are group functions, and we need to think more in terms of command and leadership teams. This of course has considerable implications both in the selection process and in organisational arrangements. It is something I shall return to.

LEADERSHIP, LEADERS, LEADING

There are essentially three dimensions to leadership. The first is leadership, as a concept, what it is. Interpretations of the concept can vary from Dean Acheson's 'successful resolution of problems' to Napoleon's 'dealing in hope', but I would suggest that whatever our interpretation, the concept as such does not change. At its most fundamental it is about people, about influencing others and giving them direction. Implicit is the idea of identifying the way ahead, and a following by others. It is also about helping others to cope with the changes, uncertainties and risks that lie in their path. It can be attributed to groups as well as to individuals, to the Army Board as well as the battalion commander. Indeed, the OED defines it as 'the position of a group of people leading or influencing others within a given context.....the influence necessary for the direction of effort in every undertaking'.

The second dimension focuses on the leader and particularly on the attributes seen as desirable in those aspiring to be effective leaders. This has been the traditional approach by many to the subject but only addresses part of it. A number of lists have been produced over the years. Many of the lists have focussed merely on personal qualities which by their very nature are innate, and I would argue that this approach is seriously flawed because the models used to derive the qualities have mainly been untypical. I myself prefer to list 'attributes' in that although some of the

required characteristics may be qualities, others are skills that are capable of development. My own list shown below. Importantly, I would argue that a defined list of attributes is an essential basis for selection and development. But we do need to know what we are looking for in the first place. I believe firmly that the attributes required by a leader in any particular professional area do not change fundamentally although the relative importance of individual attributes might. Basically in support of my thesis I would quote Field Marshal Earl Wavell who stated: 'The elements of leadership are constant..' But Earl Wavell also went on to say '....but changed conditions may require a different technique' which brings me on to the third dimension, the practice of leadership, i.e. the process of leading. This is the area many scientists have focused on in recent years and a number of models and theories have been produced, which all contribute to our knowledge but none of which provides a complete answer (or more cynically one might quote Warren Bennis' remark that leadership is the most studied and least understood area of human activity). I believe that this is the dimension that we should be focussing most on.

ASPECTS OF LEADERSHIP

Leadership itself is sometimes regarded as having a single aspect, yet analysis suggests that it has at least two. One is concerned with creating a vision or identifying long term goals, and with the development of a strategy for the attainment of the goals. It is further concerned with making important decisions related to that vision and those goals. The other facet is concerned more with the shorter term, with group dynamics and with working within that strategy. To be successful, organisations need both kinds of leadership. And this obviously includes the military.

THE LEADERSHIP ENVIRONMENT

Pursuing Wavell's theme, the circumstances or environment in which leadership is practised may change or vary considerably, as may the factors influencing the environment. Not to recognise and adjust to changed circumstances can lead rapidly to loss of effectiveness or even failure. It must be accepted none the less that some are unable to make the necessary adjustment and this has in the past led to hitherto successful leaders failing to live up to expectations. For example, successful business or military leaders do not always operate successfully in, say, the political field, or a successful leader in one type of company may be a complete failure in another. Or more pertinently, a successful field commander may not be a success as a head of service, or in a politico-military situation. Leadership is about direction which implies change. Leaders need themselves to be adaptable and accept change. It must be accepted obviously that all individuals have their limitations and that some are more suitable to one particular set of circumstances than another. But do we always recognise this, particularly in the military sphere? Are the selection procedures we use sufficiently sensitive to the requirement?

SOCIAL INFLUENCES

Perhaps the most important influences on the leadership environment relate to social and sociological conditions. The period since the end of World War II has seen a dramatic improvement in education and an increased awareness amongst individuals of world and other events – based not least on a revolution in communication technology. This has led to increasing debate over issues, ranging from the highly significant to the most trivial, depending on the point of view of individuals or groups. The desire for involvement in decision-making increases year by year with more and more people demanding accountability in ever increasing detail. The democratic process and detailed involvement has penetrated all aspects of life and work to an extent scarcely imagined ten or twenty years ago, let alone a century. It has also led to a breaking down of social structures, changing attitudes to authority, and in some cases to a challenging of

values. This has presented particular problems for some individuals, especially those whose early experience was in very different circumstances. They feel that the acceptance of such social changes is irreconcilable with their perception of leadership, especially in the military. (There is an enduring misconception amongst some that leadership has to be an authoritarian and insensitive concept. The situation is not helped by a small minority who interpret it that way. Obviously military leadership has strong legal backing, and leaders in some other spheres have powers of economic sanction (for example, leaders who hire and fire freely). In reality, effective leaders in all spheres seldom take recourse to a book of rules or resort to sanction).

Good military leaders, however have always been able to adapt to changed circumstances and have relied on their effectiveness of personality rather than, for example, unchallenged position, on the ability to persuade and influence rather than compel. Regardless of the social changes though, most people still accept that there are occasions when leadership has to be directive and an individual has to make decisions which are not based on consensus, though they still need to be convinced of that decision if they are to respond wholeheartedly.

CULTURE

An influence that can have a marked effect on military leadership is culture (national, regional, organisational and professional). Anyone who has ever worked in an international organisation such as at a NATO headquarters, or in a multi-disciplinary or joint service team, cannot but be aware of the cultural differences that exist, and their impact, even though there is a shared common interest, and especially when pressure is on. It was very evident as a factor in our research into Bosnia. Yet it remains a very under-researched area, although we are being driven increasingly into multi-cultural military arrangements. I suggest that as a subject area it is seldom if ever studied or considered in our leadership programmes, particularly those at higher levels, those at which it is most likely to be encountered.

As an example of a particular cultural baseline let us consider the British army, and where it is coming from. Some aspects are shared with other armies, some are perhaps unique to the British.

First and foremost we recruit from a North European cultural grouping, people who are generally pragmatic in their approach to problems, phlegmatic, steady and quiet under pressure. We have a long military tradition, stemming from colonial rather than continental soldiering, with a strong regimental system that in its way also reflects regional cultural differences. The British Army has traditionally been small and fully professional other than during the world wars and the immediate post-war periods (We have now had no conscripts for 40 years). The officer corps has enjoyed a high social as well as professional standing. Unlike most other armies, there has been a continuum of operational involvement since World War 2, across a wide variety of operations. There is therefore a body of experience particularly of lower level operational experience. Within the Army the focus is on the unit and unit command: more than in any other army. I believe, it's 'where the buck stops'. Fundamentally, the Army believes it has to and can be flexible and able to adjust to any type of military operation and that the training for the higher levels of conflict are good preparation for the lower. It does not believe that today's soldiering requires a completely different kind of Army, a suggestion being put forward by some nations. Like other institutions it tends to be conservative by nature, unlike other Services it has been relatively slow to adjust to technological change, like other armies it faces a conflict in leadership terms between the requirements of operational and non-operational leadership. And finally it has become firmly doctrine-based in its approach.

EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY

Improvements in technology particularly in the field of communications, have an impact that both helps and potentially impedes. On the one hand, technology can affect information flow and decision-making and greatly facilitate control. On the other hand it increases the ability to interfere and to demand an instant reporting of events, developments few at any level can afford to ignore.

Technology also enables organisational structures to be changed. In the non-military sphere this has led to flatter structures and decentralisation of decision-making and many of the other leadership functions. It is almost certain that military organisations will follow suit – despite a desire to keep traditional hierarchical structures not least because of the demands for ‘answerability’.

ROLE, TASK AND TEAM

Organisations and organisational structures are obviously influenced too by role, as is the type of leadership required. There is a marked difference in the style of leadership required in for example a four-man specialist patrol, to that required in a training or support organisation, or a static headquarters, and it need be no reflection on the quality of a young officer who shows promise as the leader of a rifle platoon or tank troop but is unsuccessful commanding an SAS patrol – or vice versa.

Leadership is also affected by the task faced by a group, by the composition of the group itself and by the personality and sex of the group leader. Crisis management demands a different leadership style and the use of different techniques to those required in routine tasks. Military people, quite rightly, tend to be selected for their ability to lead in crises or adverse circumstances. However, many of the situations they face in leadership terms are of a non-crisis and non-operational nature – but they often tackle them as if they were. Failure to adapt to such changes in circumstances must indicate a lack of leadership capacity and perhaps raise questions about the selection process. This is not to gainsay the need to identify leaders who are particularly good in crisis situations and place them where their aptitude can best be utilised.

Any organisation or team is comprised of a number of (often markedly) different personalities. The individual team members and team leaders are changed from time to time, and the individuals themselves change in their reactions to different situations. Thus the collective personality of each team is different and ever-changing. To be effective a leader must be able to recognise and react to these differences and changes and to the different needs of the individual components.

LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP

The demands on leadership vary also according to the level at which it is being practised. The suggestion was made earlier that leadership has two facets. When these are applied to what might be described as the spectrum of authority, it is obvious that the requirement at the lower end of the spectrum will be more for practical and pragmatic leadership, at the higher end more (but not entirely) for that of a visionary kind. It is important to recognise this, and the differing demands, in the selection and development process.

Leaders at the lower levels usually have a much more direct relationship (physically and organisationally) with those they lead. It is they who tackle the day-to-day (and hour-to-hour)

problems, and their preoccupation is more with the short term than the long. Leaders at this level are often inexperienced, or until recently were one of the led.

Leaders further up the spectrum may be one or two layers removed from direct control and usually have to adjust to working through others, which in itself some find difficult. They have responsibility for more than one team, possibly involving different disciplines, with competing and sometimes conflicting demands. The leader's problems are often compounded by physical and geographical separation. They are still concerned with day-to-day affairs, but have to consider more the longer term. Arguably, in leadership terms, the middle of the spectrum is the most critical level – and one that gives most problems (in industry certainly it is regarded as the area giving most cause for concern). There is a tendency for those at this level to be resistant to change (although they are usually those responsible most for implementing it), to feel most pressured, and for them to become administrators rather than leaders.

At the more senior levels leaders have to take a wider view and their preoccupation is with the longer term, although there is still a need to monitor the present and sometimes to focus on the shorter term. They are often faced with conflicts in priorities and are answerable for performance – in President Truman's phrase, *'it's where the buck stops.'*

Those at the very top of the spectrum are the ones who create the vision, establish the objectives, and set the standards by which the organisation is to operate. They are generally removed from day-to-day concerns, yet may still be answerable for current activity or performance. They have a need to communicate regularly with all members of their organisation without undermining the intermediate structure, but are often inhibited from doing so by formalities that can become barriers. Leadership at the top has also an added dimension in both a political and civic representational sense. In commercial life leadership at the higher levels is often shared between a chairman (concerned with the longer term and external dimensions) and a chief executive (concerned more with the day-to-day). The Armed Services have yet to follow suit in peacetime (although there are good historical examples in war).

THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS

One of the basic characteristics of the military scene is the uncertainty as to the types of operation the Army is likely to be called upon to undertake, and in which physical environments. There is often strong political pressure to get rid of capabilities that appear at a given point of time to be irrelevant: for example the requirements to carry out amphibious assault operations, to fight an armoured battle, to be able to operate in desert and jungle conditions. These have all been questioned at one time or another. And in all fairness, who would have predicted the Falklands or Gulf Wars, or Bosnia? The enduring lesson is that given our commitments and the role we aspire to in the world, we must be prepared to operate across the whole spectrum of conflict, from so-called peacekeeping (or more realistically monitoring) to major conventional warfare. And, given the small size of our forces, the same people must be prepared to undertake all. In a small professional army, there is little scope for role specialisation, and little desire to be dependent on others!

In spite of this uncertainty however it is safe to make a number of assumptions:

- Future operations are more likely to be combined arms and joint-service. They are also more likely to be multi-national, the UK forces operating as part of an alliance or coalition;
- Operations are likely to be of an expeditionary nature, with all that that implies;

- There will always be a requirement for forces to be able to respond rapidly;
- Units and individuals will have to be multi-skilled and multi-roled. Forces will need to be flexible with utility throughout the spectrum of pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations, requiring a balance between the combat power of heavy forces and the deployability of light forces. This demands a broad base of training that can only be undertaken realistically by an all-regular Army (albeit backed up by specialist reservists on short-notice commitments);
- The mental pressures (of uncertainty, isolation etc.) and the physical pressures (the 24 hour/day battle) are likely to be greater;
- Technological advance will have an increasing impact through improved communications (thereby facilitating interference), increased accuracy and lethality of weapon systems, and on the tempo of battle.
- We are in an era of increased accountability;
- And, finally, we are in an era when the media increasingly drive military events, and at the same time are a major constraint (for example, the bodybag effect).

GEARED TO THE FUTURE?

The British Government completed last year an in-depth strategic defence review, the first real such exercise in decades. The outcome has been a blueprint for the UK's defence forces for the future taking into account likely scenarios, commitments, roles and tasks. In many ways it builds on initiatives by the previous administration especially in the areas of joint operations and readiness. Generally the review sets the stage for future military leadership.

All three of the Armed Services have developed operational doctrines focussed on likely future deployment scenarios. In the Army's case this is based on a manoeuvrist philosophy inherent in which is the concept of mission command and delegated decision-making and an acceptance of rapidly changing circumstances. Some might see a conflict here with the realities of life in situations such as Northern Ireland where there are considerable constraints on soldiers' actions, where even minor incidents can have considerable political impact, and there is an ever-present danger of over-command. But this is to misunderstand the doctrine, which seeks to change the approach to military problems, to the way of thinking. It does in fact apply to all types of operation, but its effectiveness depends to a large extent on education in the philosophy and training in its practise. It has been interesting to note the change in officers' attitudes from the days of the Gulf War, when the dogma was still quite new, and unfamiliar to many, a number of officers, mainly brought up in the prescriptive BAOR Cold War environment, were uncomfortable with the delegated decision-making aspect. Those in Bosnia and Northern Ireland on the other hand appeared quite comfortable with it – although some still interpret it as a dogma. Ironically, perhaps, those of us who served in counter-revolutionary operations in the days of dispersed low level deployments and poor communications, accepted delegated decision-making as a matter of course.

But whilst doctrine and also force structures may have changed, thinking about leadership structures has been slower to adapt. One of the problems is that leadership and command tend to

be viewed in individual terms, which ignores the reality of both effective leadership as a concept and the demands of modern warfare with the potential for a 24-hour fighting day. Unlike other armies, the British Army has not readily accepted the need for deputy commanders or the use of them as such. Similarly there has been a reluctance to think in terms of group leadership (although we are finding the term 'command team' gaining increased acceptance). This means that the appointment of a deputy is not really viewed in command terms, and commanders and their supporting teams are not considered as a unit in selection terms.

There is also a seeming reluctance to accept that leadership changes in its application, that different levels and different appointments may require different types of people. To many, leadership, is leadership, is leadership. This is reflected in a failure still to assess objectively individual potential against future job needs, to accept that good performance at one level or in a particular environment may not be transferable to another.

The British Army also clings to the 'generalist' or 'allrounder' approach and insists on individuals alternating in command and staff appointments right to the top. Whereas logically, and after a certain time, those who excel in certain fields of leadership should be retained in them.

The way in which leaders are developed, trained and generally prepared for the future is of obvious importance:

- Their education in socio-politico-military terms;
- Their development as agents for change;
- Their exposure to possible future scenarios through training;
- Their practice in manoeuvrist thinking, mission command, and delegated decision-making
- The development of their understanding of leadership.

It is impossible to go into detail in such a short discussion on all these aspects, but I shall try to give a balanced assessment of the British Army as I see it.

The structure of career training has changed considerably in recent years. Importantly, all command and staff training is now done within a joint-Service context, although there is some debate as to whether this is appropriate at the more junior levels given the different operating environment of the three Services, the particular nature of land operations, and the need in the early days to acquire mastery of one's own Service. At the more senior levels there is a long tradition of tri-Service training, and of training with members of other nations. Importantly also, a new higher command and staff course, focussing on the operational level, was introduced some years ago. This has, I believe, been a great success. Both the senior and higher command and staff courses have wide-ranging curricula, covering all types and aspects of operations. And there has been a welcome blurring of the distinction between 'command' and 'staff', an acceptance that staff officers are by extension members of the command/leadership teams. But I have some personal reservations still:

- There is still it seems to me a preoccupation with orderliness and neat solutions; whereas life generally and soldiering particularly is more about uncertainty – and this applies especially –

and this applies especially in the modern world. It is not about giving textbook answers but about developing the individual's approach to tackling situations.

- The people aspect generally and leadership as a discrete area are given relatively little attention. In fact, the only level at which leadership is studied as a subject in its own right is during the foundation year at Sandhurst.
- Decision-making, arguably the core function in leadership and command, is underplayed. The pre-occupation is with procedures (which are important but not to the exclusion of decision-making.)

Training at the unit level and on the operational leadership side is good. The British Army is still able to train around the world in a variety of terrain and climatic conditions, and increasingly with other nations. And considerable emphasis is placed on the leadership development of junior officers through adventurous training, which by its nature must contain an element of risk. Field training has been enhanced considerably in its value by the use of modern simulation technology.

Technology has also enhanced the training of command leadership teams, although the potential of this medium is not fully exploited because of the cultural problem of 'face', the fact that leaders are reluctant to be exposed to meaningful criticism of their performance.

There is a danger of over-focussing on operational leadership, whereas most leadership is practised in a non-operational environment. The extent to which officers are prepared for this non-operational leadership is varied: good at the lower levels, poor at the higher. In my research I was intrigued to discover that in 1950 an officer had to undergo an 8-week period of preparation before assuming command of a battalion. Today, he or she gets 10 days.

Two particular areas merit mention. The first relates to technology.

Although leadership must not be governed by technology, it is very much affected by it. Yet there is a tendency still for Army officers to ignore technology, or at least its implications, and leave it to specialists. Consequently, they fail to utilise fully what it offers in leadership support terms, or become artificially constrained by it. But I am encouraged that research programmes such as 'ADP command' have now been initiated.

The second is related to the first in that its impact has increased considerably with new technology. That is the role of the media. The media are a fact of life, and many officers are trained in handling the camera team and the TV interview. Yet we fail to educate officers as to the nature of the media – with the result that we see often senior officers suffering as a consequence.

I have tried to give an honest assessment of how the British army appears to me to be facing up to the future. On balance, it is facing up well, but there needs to be a change of emphasis and approach in some areas. I am encouraged not least by the research we have been allowed to undertake, which essentially is about leadership in a modern and changing military environment, an acknowledgement that it is an area that we need to focus on.

INNERE FÜHRUNG IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

Bernhard Fleckenstein

INTRODUCTION

Laying the foundations of Innere Führung and proving that it works are part of the success story of the Federal Republic of Germany. National defence had almost been completely omitted from the Basic Law of 1949. Constitutionally, however, the Bundeswehr is not an element alien to the Basic Law. From 1955 to 1957 the constitutional legislators managed to bring civic order and defence order into a well-balanced relationship to each other. Although the military laws have been frequently amended since then, in substance they have remained as unchanged as the basic principles of Innere Führung. To this day, they have both remained strong pillars of modern armed forces in a democracy.

Rearming Germany after it lost World War II was first mooted in 1950. At the invitation of the then German chancellor *Konrad Adenauer*, 15 former Wehrmacht officers, among them 10 generals/ admirals, went into seclusion at Himmerod Monastery for talks and wrote a memorandum of the meeting. In their so-called *Himmeroder Denkschrift*, the "Magna Charta" of German rearmament, great importance is attached to the internal structure of the new German armed forces.

From the beginning, spirit and basic principles of the internal rebuilding were to be designed for the long term, and the memorandum also stated that the preconditions for this new formation were so different from those of the past

"that today something essentially new must be created that does not follow the example of the structures of the old Wehrmacht." 1)

The memorandum, however, not only contained modern approaches to the soldier's profession but also traditional views of it, and both often existed side by side in an unconnected fashion. Only later military legislation created the modern image of the soldier and placed the Bundeswehr constitutionally and socio-politically on a new basis. It should be mentioned here, however, that the initiative for breaking new ground was taken by former Wehrmacht soldiers. The basic ideas of what was later called Innere Führung were not imposed on the Bundeswehr by civilians with no knowledge of the military. They are the defeated Wehrmacht's legacy to the new German armed forces.

THE MILITARY IN A DEMOCRACY: FUNDAMENTALS AND CENTRAL CONCEPTS

The government policy statement of 27 June 1955 triggered a debate on military legislation in the German Bundestag which would last almost two years. The problems connected with rearmament were considered to be so important that their solution was to be laid down in the constitution. The most significant aspect of this issue was ensuring full parliamentary control over the armed forces, i.e., guaranteeing the primacy of politics. Armed forces are the single most weighty power factor in a state. There is nothing powerful enough to counterbalance them. For this reason, the military must not operate outside the constitutional framework as it did, for instance, in Germany under the Emperor and even to a certain extent during the Weimar Republic. Even today, there are numerous states in which the armed forces have sworn allegiance to a "generalissimo" who is not accountable to parliament, or to a head of state above parliament. Consequently, they represent an indeterminate variable in domestic power politics.

Integration of armed forces into the constitutional framework, which is indispensable in a democracy, is achieved in two ways. The first is by fully incorporating the armed forces into the executive branch, whereby the power of command is vested in a civilian minister. In this way, the armed forces are embedded in the responsibility of the cabinet, i.e., they are subject to the policy-making powers of the democratically elected chancellor or prime minister. This arrangement of supreme command also ensures that the ultimate authority over the armed forces rests with the government and parliament.

The second is by guaranteeing that parliament has the last word in, and therefore control over, military affairs, above all by means of parliamentary control over the defence budget. This means that the defence budget and all budgeting procedures must be open to public scrutiny. Furthermore, control over the defence budget means that armed forces manpower strength and basic organisation are subject to parliamentary review and approval. Moreover, the parliamentary oversight of armed forces received an institutional boost in Germany when, in accordance with the constitution, the defence committee was granted the rights of a parliamentary investigating committee and a parliamentary commissioner was introduced as a guardian of the fundamental rights of soldiers and as a protector of the principles of *Innere Führung*.

According to democratic principles, the employment of the armed forces principally requires the participation of parliament. That was confirmed anew by the Federal Constitutional Court on 12 July 1994 in its ruling on the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad. The provisions of the Basic Law concerning the military ensure a legally relevant influence of parliament on the build-up and deployment of the armed forces. This is meant when we speak of parliamentary armed forces, as is the case with the Bundeswehr. The powers and responsibilities of the Federal Minister of Defence as Commander-in-Chief remain unaffected by that. The checks by the legislative body concentrate on structure and organisation, commitment and deployment of the armed forces. Here, it goes without saying that the mission of armed forces must be defined in accordance with the constitution. The armed forces must not become an instrument that can be used at will. Their deployment is only permissible within the framework of law and order - including international commitments and the rules of international law.

Furthermore, the integration of armed power into the constitutional rule of law continues to entail renouncing exaggerated secrecy. In a democracy, the government has the obligation to keep citizens informed. Information is a debt to be paid to the public. Citizens have the right to know what their government plans and intends, also with regard to the armed forces. As a result of this duty to inform, the Federal Government has published White Papers on security policy and the development of the Bundeswehr since 1969 - the last one in 1994.

THE SOLDIER IN A DEMOCRACY: OBLIGATED BY DUTY; PROTECTED BY LAW

The status of the armed forces in a democratic state represents only one side of the coin. The other is the status of citizens when they serve in the armed forces. Like all other citizens, soldiers - whether conscripts or volunteers - enjoy a number of inalienable fundamental rights. Therefore, the soldiers must not be deprived of their basic civil rights during their term of service. In principle, these rights continue to obtain. Restrictions may be imposed on the exercising of civil rights by those serving in the military, but only where this is required by the

exigencies of keeping the military organisation functioning. In German military history, military order had prevailed over the freedom of citizens. In the new Germany it was to be the other way round: freedom was to have priority. The soldier who had to defend freedom at the risk of his life was to have this freedom in the armed forces to the greatest possible extent. This is the fundamental idea that underlies Innere Führung and it is set forth in Section 6 of the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act:

"The soldier enjoys the same civil rights as every other citizen. In accordance with the requirements of military duty, his rights are curbed by his obligations established by law."

It was this clarification by the legislature which turned the Bundeswehr soldier into a "citizen in uniform". The soldier - whether serving in the armed forces due to a voluntary decision or on account of legal obligations - is not a "means" of the army but rather "member" of it (*Günther Dürig*). Therefore, he has extensive rights of participation and enjoys the protection of comprehensive grievance rights.

If restrictions must be imposed on the exercise of civil rights, legal provisions are necessary in every single case. This means that, in a democracy, the rights and responsibilities of soldiers are, and must be, defined by law. Responsibilities essentially result from the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act. The military superior does not have absolute power. No further responsibilities can be established by orders alone. The military superior may issue orders for official purposes only. In doing so, he must respect his subordinates' human dignity. The aim of all endeavours was to create fully operational armed forces, but by applying only such methods as were compatible with the principles of the constitution and the lifestyle of the civilian society. Therefore, "absolute obedience", a conduct which *Hitler* had imposed on the Wehrmacht and which was still required by the oath of the National People's Army of the former German Democratic Republic, is unheard of in the Bundeswehr. On the contrary, service in the Bundeswehr is based on clear values which both legitimize and limit the soldier's responsibilities. In a directive setting out guiding principles for superiors issued to the German Army on 25 June 1998, the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General *Helmut Willmann* has the following to say on this:

"The two pillars on which leadership rests in the Federal German Armed Forces are intellectual and ethical bonding and the principle of mission-type tactics. ... The professional and humanitarian components of leadership must always be regarded as grounded on fundamental ethical principles. If they are not, what passes for leadership consists in merely giving technical and manual instructions. This would entail the danger of abuse." 2)

The basic value to which all others are subordinate is the inviolacy of human dignity. Article 1 of the Basic Law states:

"Human dignity is inviolable. It is incumbent upon all powers of the state to respect and protect it."

The Bundeswehr is part of the executive, that is, the branch of government which puts laws into effect. Article 1 of the Basic Law therefore also applies equally to the armed forces. Further values which Bundeswehr soldiers are committed to uphold are set out in the Legal

Status of Military Personnel Act. There they are listed as follows: loyalty, courage, obedience, comradeship, truthfulness, discretion as well as soldiers' commitment to preserving the free and democratic basic order (§§ 7-14). Superiors are to set an example for their subordinates both with regard to attitude and in fulfilling their duties and they are accountable for their subordinates' welfare. As military history shows, commanders' concern for the welfare of their subordinates is of decisive importance for soldiers' morale and, therefore, ultimately for the operability of the forces. Concern for the individual soldier's welfare has always been of paramount importance in the German armed forces. The leader does not touch his rations before all his men have been provided with theirs. In the instructions quoted above the Army Chief of Staff has the following to say on this subject:

"Leading soldiers is to be regarded primarily as a moral task, not as a stepping-stone to a military career. Concern for the personal welfare of one's subordinates means first ensuring that they are provided with suitable material and sanitary facilities and conditions. This concern is ultimately shown in humane and accountable leadership which, in the effort to ensure the welfare of subordinates, eschews making excessive and avoidable demands and irresponsibly taking high risks. Moreover, establishing and sustaining cooperation on a humane basis is essential for troop cohesion. Whenever and wherever possible, and this includes combat duty, the military leader engages in dialogue with his men. He keeps his soldiers informed and shares their concerns. Concern for the personal welfare of military personnel reveals the integrity of leadership and attests to a commander's credibility, a quality which it is very easy to lose." 3)

It is the purpose of military law and Innere Führung to bring armed forces operability and the rule of law in their internal structure into a workable and harmonious relationship. Democratic control over armed forces does not imply that the military is in need of "democratization." That is a popular misconception dating back to the sixties. What is needed is not a "democratic army", which would be a contradiction in terms, but an army within and for democracy. What is at issue here are armed forces which willingly submit to the primacy of politics, armed forces in which the rule of law obtains, armed forces whose members not only view themselves as "citizens in uniform," but are also regarded and accepted as such by their civilian fellow citizens.

The term "citizen in uniform" is the core concept of Innere Führung. It implies two things: first, a constitutional and political model and, second, an ideal of soldierly training and conduct. It means that leadership, training, education and conduct in the armed forces are all supposed to induce soldiers to take responsibility for themselves, to obey orders but think about their moral and technical implications and to develop personal initiative and readiness for individual achievement as well as comradesly cooperation. Soldiers thus trained and motivated are the prerequisite for troop leadership based on mission-type tactics. In constitutional terms, the ideal of the citizen in uniform signifies that, when a citizen becomes a soldier, he does not lose his civil rights. The model constitutes an unequivocal rejection of the special status for the military which obtained in the German Empire, earning the Germans of that time, and deservedly so, the reputation of being militaristic. The Bundeswehr soldier, on the other hand, is a citizen among citizens and not the representative of a higher caste. According to Count Baudissin soldier and non-soldier simply represent "two different states

of one and the same citizen": each incurring its own duties but enjoying the same fundamental rights.

REFORM AND REACTION: ENFORCEMENT AND VIABILITY OF INNERE FÜHRUNG

Innere Führung is, so to speak, the Bundeswehr "house rules and regulations". It deals with soldiers' relations with one another and is, for this reason, referred to as "leadership" ("*Menschenführung*"). In other words, Innere Führung applies to the humane aspects of how leadership operates in the Bundeswehr. Its principles are valid everywhere and at all times. A distinction should be made between it and the acts of command subject to changing strategic, operative and tactical conditions, which, taken as a whole, are defined as "troop leadership" ("*Truppenführung*").

Innere Führung is anchored in the constitution and the military laws. A "Handbook of Innere Führung" was issued in 1956 for the instruction of troop commanders. In 1972 it was turned into "Guiding Principles for Superiors: Innere Führung" as set out in the Joint Services Regulation (ZDv) 10/1. The guiding principles were amended several times and, in 1993, entirely rewritten. However the principles underlying leadership and training have remained basically unchanged. The 1973/1974 White Paper contains a good summary of them (cf. Table 1). More recently, *Hartmut Bagger* introduced ten rules of leadership to the 450 participants in the 36th Federal Armed Forces Commanders' Conference in Berlin on 5 November 1997 when he was Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (cf. Table 2). In 1956 a "Bundeswehr School for Innere Führung" was established at Koblenz. In the course of restructuring in 1981, it became the The Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre.

In the debate on Innere Führung, the fact that it is firmly anchored within a legal framework has often been overlooked. The armed forces do not decide on the validity or invalidity of Innere Führung. That is the responsibility of the legislators. Nevertheless, it took almost two decades for the concept of Innere Führung to be firmly established in the Bundeswehr. *Count Baudissin* himself had called the planned redefinition of the soldier in 1951 a "*reformatory activity*", and again even more pointedly in 1968 an "*intellectual revolution*". Many people could not free themselves from the image of the Wehrmacht soldier and remained trapped in the past. The conscious break with tradition which the Founding Fathers of Innere Führung were striving for was simply too difficult for many veterans who had seen wartime service to handle. The ideas of Innere Führung appeared to be too sweeping and unusual. The new leadership methods were disparaged as "soft-line methods".

In the sixties, an entire body of literature arose to attack *Count Baudissin's* conception, which was blamed for having ventured "*into troubled waters*", because it aimed at designing an "*unsoldierly army*" (*Heinz Karst*). The quarrel between traditionalists and reformers lasted well into the seventies. Military superiors had to learn that leadership in a conscript force must also take the social environment into account. It was only in the 1975/1976 White Paper that the Federal Government was able to state

"that Innere Führung, following a great deal of frequently distorted debate, has won through and proved satisfactory as the daily practice of leadership axiomatic in the forces." 4)

Today, Innere Führung is regarded as the distinctive hallmark of the Bundeswehr, both at home and abroad.

Since the political tide turned in 1989/1990, the mission of the Bundeswehr has changed. From being a deterrent force, almost exclusively limited in function to territorial defence, the Bundeswehr has developed into an operational force with a broad range of tasks. Military options now range from disaster relief operations at home to armed combat missions outside the country. Serving in the Bundeswehr now entails more international commitments, but also involves considerably greater risks. The new tasks are making increased demands on the leadership skills of military commanders. This has put Innere Führung to the test again. The 1991 Gulf War triggered the debate anew. The Bundeswehr was accused of being a "fair-weather army" that had forgotten its actual mission, i.e. military combat. And it was claimed that Innere Führung was to be blamed for this. Therefore the "over-civilianizing" of the armed forces had to be corrected at once.

This criticism could not disconcert the great majority of the Bundeswehr and the general public in their fundamental convictions. For them, the "citizen in uniform" has long been the characteristic feature of the Bundeswehr, and the Gulf War has not changed this. On the contrary. A survey by the German Federal Armed Forces Association conducted among 522 active officers from second lieutenant up to general at the end of the 1991 Gulf intervention and published in 1993, showed an impressively positive attitude towards Innere Führung (cf. Table 3): only a handful of respondents was of the opinion that Innere Führung makes "*unfit for war*," but almost 98 per cent of those asked said that Innere Führung and "*rigorous, demanding training*" are not mutually exclusive; an equally large number saw in the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" an appropriate concept for the armed forces of a democratic state. Nine out of 10 officers attribute to Innere Führung the fact that the Bundeswehr could again and again adapt itself to social change; two thirds of those asked were of the opinion that, without the concept of Innere Führung and the "citizen in uniform", the Bundeswehr would hardly be able to recruit sufficient new personnel.

The Bundeswehr is still a conscript force. Its recruits come from a libertarian environment and work world with few norms, and they show a clear aversion to authoritarian behaviour. The cooperative, team-oriented leadership style of the military superior is not gracious kindness but simple necessity. Technocrats and bureaucrats in uniform are considered the greatest threat to the military work climate. Therefore, the first commandment of Innere Führung is: talk to each other!

Innere Führung has made the Bundeswehr compatible with both democracy and society. The importance of the latter aspect is often unjustifiably underestimated. Rapid social change almost turned the social hierarchy of values upside down during the last few decades. The change in educational goals documented for the 1951 to 1991 period is only one example of that (cf. Table 4). The Bundeswehr and society would today subscribe to diametrically contrasting values if modern leadership and civic education as called for by Innere Führung had not constantly ensured an adequate response in the armed forces to societal change. Up to now, the Bundeswehr has been perfectly able to cope with straddling the values of the military and civilian sectors. It is the concept of Innere Führung that has made this possible. From the beginning, social integration has been, together with legitimization of the armed forces and motivation of soldiers, one of the three core objectives of this concept.

NEW THINKING – OLD PRINCIPLES: THE MODERNIZATION OF INNERE FÜHRUNG

From 1991 until mid-1999, more than 50,000 Bundeswehr soldiers have already participated in international missions, and further assignments are in store. All experience gained in this area proves how fundamentally useful, even indispensable, the concept of Innere Führung is for accomplishing expanded missions. This positive finding has been repeatedly emphasized in the debriefings of commanders returning from active duty on such assignments.

Transnational and civilian disaster relief operations have long been part of the tradition of the new German armed forces. The history of the Bundeswehr makes it easier for its soldiers to accept foreign commanders in multinational operations and to minimize the use of military force. The denationalization and demythologization of the military, which were a determining factor in reshaping the armed forces in the fifties and led to a redefinition of the soldier's profession, gave the Bundeswehr an advantage in organizational modernity. It thus became a "trendsetter" in the development of armed forces. In the Bundeswehr, the issue of what military service means has always been discussed in far greater detail than in other armies. Its readiness to engage in critical discourse on its own activities has prevented the Bundeswehr from developing narrow-mindedness and fossilized structures. This makes it easier for its soldiers to take over the new role of actively building peace without the need of extended resocialisation processes. Still, changes in leadership training are necessary for improving commanders' practical leadership skills and enhancing overall leadership performance. Any measures implemented affect both leadership qualities and leading troops in the field although the distinction between the two is blurred in any case.

National contingents for joint NATO or UN peace-keeping and enforcing operations are generally not very large. They usually have only company or battalion strength. This results in competence, authority and responsibilities shifting to the lower and middle command echelons in the military hierarchy. Captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels bear the main burden of leadership responsibility "on site" in multinational operations. They are therefore the target group for leadership training, which has been intensified since 1996, and which is complemented by a programme for enhancing soldiers' physical fitness. In future, company and battalion commanders are to remain in their respective assignments for a minimum of three years. The Bundeswehr is also turning, via the Internet, to reservists, especially those in command functions. They are being offered additional training courses at schools and exercises at army combat-training centres. They may prepare on their own for these training courses by sending for a programme in tactics. Role play and instruction are available to help commanders handle stress situations which can be expected to arise together with their soldiers. Among these are coping with being taken hostage and being made prisoners of war as well as dealing with wounds and death. Language training is being further improved. The new virtues that are required today are: empathy, tolerance and open-mindedness towards the distinctive characteristics of other armed forces and cultures. Among the leadership skills in demand are, first and foremost, "diplomatic" capabilities, i.e. the level-headed superior who weighs the pros and cons and has a talent for mediation. However, the legal aspects of leadership in multinational assignments have not yet been sufficiently clarified. National sovereignty and differences in military culture and codes of conduct are impeding deep integration in multinational forces. Specialists in national and international law still disagree

on how command and control in multinational operations should be structured. Harmonisation of the legal framework is furthest advanced in the German-Dutch Corps.

Intercultural competence as well as communication and negotiation skills will be among the qualifications demanded of officers in future. For quite some time now, the Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre has been instructing and training officers more intensively in these skills. At the same time the Centre has been working on models and concepts for leadership coaching and leadership consulting. Further, new methods of presenting *Innere Führung* as an overarching concept are in the pipeline. "Mediagenic" approaches to the principles of *Innere Führung* will make training livelier and more practice-oriented. In order to handle this new task load, the teaching staff at the Centre has been enlarged. This circumstance is remarkable at a time when downsizing seems to be the rule and has indeed affected all Bundeswehr institutions. Just how highly the Bundeswehr values thoroughly grounded leadership training is shown by this measure.

The military leader who also thinks politically is becoming more important than ever before. Therefore, soldiers' knowledge of history and politics is to be further improved. Knowledge in these fields is being furthered by thorough training and education which the Bundeswehr provides for its officers, not least through advanced university studies. The German armed forces probably have the most highly trained and educated officer corps in the world. All officers serving for at least twelve years (except for jet pilots) also receive an academic education leading to degrees which are fully accredited in the civilian sector. Students can choose from fifteen university and three technical college courses in the humanities and social sciences, economics, engineering, and science. The Bundeswehr command élite, regular officers serving on the general or admiral staff, have completed more than two years of advanced training at the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College and have also taken academic degrees after three and a half years' study at one of the two Federal Armed Forces Universities (Hamburg or Munich). In autumn 1998 the two Bundeswehr universities celebrated their twenty-fifth anniversary. At that time they embarked on implementing a reform programme to ensure that they remain in the top group of German universities in the next twenty-five years.

Viewed historically, the strong emphasis placed by the Bundeswehr on a thorough education for its officer corps is not at all unusual. The monocled officer of late 19th-century *Wilhelmine* Germany, a lowbrow if there ever was one, is the exception rather than the rule in German military history. The Prussian military reformers *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Boyen*, *Grolman* and *Clausewitz* were all highly educated men. *Helmuth von Moltke*, the creator of the German General Staff, was an extraordinarily well educated officer and, in addition, possessed considerable talent as a writer. In his memoirs *Moltke* tells of attending a Berlin University lecture on Goethe in the winter of 1828/29 at which Prussian officers made up one third of the audience. The German General Staff officer evolved from this type of *Kantian*, who was also steeped in the classical languages and literature. And even after Germany had lost World War I, General *Hans von Seeckt*, who made the Reichswehr into a highly professional fighting force and was himself a well-rounded and broadly educated man, insisted on the officer corps receiving a sound education and continuing further training.

While the expanded mission of the Bundeswehr requires only a few adaptation measures in the field of *Innere Führung*, a change of paradigms is taking place regarding the conduct of operations. In brief, the Bundeswehr is returning to a concept of troop leadership which

characterised the quality of the Prussian-German army, i.e. the art of "operating freely". The concept of forward defence with fixed combat zones in close proximity to the border, in which the allies (with the exception of France, which had withdrawn from this commitment) were lined up shoulder to shoulder for defensive operations, has been rendered obsolete by the end of the confrontation in Central Europe. Commanders must again learn to move smaller forces over larger areas, i.e. to become active themselves, to react flexibly, to seize and maintain the initiative and to hit the enemy where they are superior to him. In this connection the factors of space and information attain paramount importance. What is needed are excellent reconnaissance capabilities and state-of-the-art information technology. Consequently, defence procurement measures are concentrated in these areas.

The German doctrine of troop leadership was shaped chiefly by *Clausewitz*, the older *Moltke* and *Count Schlieffen* ("Cannae"). It aims primarily at mobile conduct of operations with a strong emphasis on the element of surprise. Mobility makes it possible even for forces inferior in equipment and manpower strength to take the initiative. This is shown by the successes scored by the Wehrmacht in the early years of World War II. However, the longer the war dragged on, the more frequently *Hitler* interfered in the conduct of operations. From autumn 1944 the upper echelon of command was left virtually without any scope for freedom of operations. The self-appointed "Leader" had jettisoned all tried and tested principles of military leadership.

The classical principles of troop leadership in the German military tradition are distinguished by the following characteristics:

1. Mission-type tactics (only the goal and the means are prescribed!).
2. A great deal of scope for independent decision-making and autonomy at all levels of command.
3. Freedom from prescribed scenarios (war does not follow the script!).
4. Concentration of forces.
5. A strong emphasis on surprise, mobility and improvisation.
6. Leading in the frontline (rather than from the rear!).
7. Concern for the welfare of the troops and for the preservation of fighting power.

In future, this set of seven basic principles will play a bigger role in the education and training of military leaders and soldiers.

In its coalition contract of 20 October 1998, the red/green federal government which has been in power since the autumn of 1998 agreed on the appointment of a defence structure commission. In May 1999, what is known as a "Future Commission" ("*Zukunftskommission*"), consisting of 21 members and chaired by the former president of the Federal Republic, *Richard von Weizsäcker*, began work. On the basis of an updated threat analysis and an extended security concept, it is to review the mission, manpower strength, training, and equipment of the armed forces as well as the form national defence is to assume. Options for the future structure of the Bundeswehr and political recommendations for changes should be before the Defence Minister by 15 September 2000.

Innere Führung will not be reviewed by the Commission. Although adaptation measures are necessary, and in particular amendments to laws, regulations and directives, it is widely accepted as the leadership and management philosophy for the future. Its normative notions

of the soldier as a "citizen in uniform" and the principles of "modern leadership" continue to be valid. In the future, too, Innere Führung will be used as a leadership model.

In his afore mentioned address at the Federal Armed Forces Commanders' Conference in autumn 1997 in Berlin, the then Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces was already advancing the following arguments for retaining the principles of Innere Führung:

"We know that it was the concept of Innere Führung which helped the Bundeswehr to find its place in society during the years of rearmament. However, it was also this foundation - strengthened and further developed over the years - which ultimately enabled us to meet what was probably the greatest challenge confronting us: building up an Army of Unification. Each day of deployment in Bosnia proved anew the worth of Innere Führung. This all goes to show that the concept which has been tried and tested over the past decades also has future potential. As a result, we have no reason at all to doubt its viability in the face of further challenges. 5)

The Defence Minister who took office after the change of government in 1998, *Rudolf Scharping*, chose to give his inaugural address to the Bundeswehr at the Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre in Koblenz. On 9 November 1998 he told instructors and training course participants:

"We do not need to reinvent the Bundeswehr. In the concept of Innere Führung, which has been underpinned by parliament, society and the Bundeswehr for decades, we have a philosophy of leadership which has future potential. Let us join forces in revitalizing its dynamism." 6)

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POSTSCRIPT

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins

From this preliminary study of the exercise of leadership in contemporary Western European military establishments, we can draw two conclusions:

- Firstly, military leadership (command) can be sharply distinguished from civilian leadership (management); and,
- Secondly, the unique characteristics of the culture of armed forces are a major determinant of the successful exercise of military leadership, particularly in multi-national operations.

ZERO DRAFT: ZERO TOLERANCE

Traditionally, a primary distinguishing feature of military leadership in comparison with the exercise of management in civilian organizations, was the uniqueness of the environment in which armed forces operated. A near monopoly of arms, an above-average exposure to risk, the expectation of total commitment to task fulfilment to the exclusion of other considerations, a willingness to subordinate self to service and a preference for high moral standards suggested, singly, and in combination, a considerable **divergence** from a civilian milieu. Today, however, none of these characteristics, with one notable exception, is unique. On the one hand, external developments in technology have given to many groups a military functional capability reserved in the past for the regular mass army; on the other hand, a preference within armed forces for an occupational rather than a professional set of immediate rewards, has produced a remarkable convergence of civilian and military roles. Consequently, as Sørensen notes in his review of Danish experience, it can be argued that "good" military leadership is related to:

"civil factors such as 'get results, co-operate with others, responsibility and good personal qualities'; no one mentions military qualities such as bravery, honor and tradition."

The one exception to this tendency towards the convergence of roles, however, is the extent to which armed forces continue to impose on their members a moral standard higher than that associated with the behaviour expected from members of other professional groups. Military life is seen, in Ficarrotta's words, to be one with a special moral status, special moral problems and special moral demands.¹ These are the strict requirements of the military role which continue to shape the ideal-type pattern of leadership that is a feature of most contemporary Western European military establishments.

The problem is that an expressed preference for the establishment and maintenance of these standards is subject to considerable external and internal criticism. Within the parent society it is argued that the individual is not only a soldier but is also a citizen, a parent, a partner and a person. Pressure groups strive to ensure that military personnel are not disadvantaged in these respects in comparison with their civilian counterparts. Our previous research has shown that this is particularly noticeable with regard to issues of race, gender and equal opportunities.² Within the European military, the immediate question therefore, is whether contemporary leadership in the armed forces can effectively contain the interplay between the rights of the individual soldier as a citizen and the responsibilities of that soldier as a member of a disciplined purposive organization. No single answer is readily forthcoming, not least because the comparative analysis of experiences in multi-national operations shows that national reactions to this dilemma vary considerably. An outstanding example of a positive policy with concomitant leadership strategies is that adopted by the Bundeswehr with its adherence to the principles of **Innere Führung**. Although these principles originated in the conscript army of West Germany, they can, as Federal Defence Minister Volber Rühe commented in 1996, be a model for and set a standard for the reformation of all armed forces.³

Whether these principles, however, together with associated strategies such as the establishment of a **Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces**, are readily acceptable to other military establishments is a matter for debate. The Commissioner is answerable solely to Parliament, and every soldier, regardless of rank, is entitled to refer issues directly to the Commissioner, without fear of any subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Indeed, any superior who treats a soldier unjustly because the latter has petitioned the Commissioner, is in breach of the law. The contrast with this policy is seen in the adoption of an alternative leadership strategy in which, as has been noted, greater emphasis is placed on the high moral standards expected from service personnel. Instead of placing an emphasis, in designing leadership strategies, on the **rights** of the soldier as a citizen, the alternative policy stresses the **responsibilities** of the individual. An outstanding characteristic of this is the stress placed on the adoption of a military ethic which in terms of the self-image of armed forces, is seen to embrace standards higher than those of contemporary civilian society. The overt expression of this preference for the conservation of a particular moral and ethical standard is seen in the official adoption of a policy of **zero tolerance**. Any breach of the rules and regulations designed to maintain high moral standards is punishable under military law. The latter imposes penalties which, by the standards of contemporary civilian society, are draconian. They are justified by the need to establish good order and discipline so as to ensure goal attainment. Irrespective of the logic of arguments advanced to support the **convergence** thesis, the policy of zero tolerance begins from the premise that armed forces, by virtue of their role and function, are different from civilian organizations. The exercise of leadership, in consequence, is to be reinforced by the adoption of **zero tolerance** with its emphasis on rules and regulations. The need to adhere to the latter without exception is the basic characteristic of this policy.

Frequently, an insistence on the exercise of a policy of zero tolerance encounters considerable opposition. Outwith the military establishment, public opinion is often highly critical of a policy which seemingly sets the armed forces apart from the rest of society. More significantly for the development of effective leadership, group reaction **within** the military frequently sabotages a policy of zero tolerance. As the media has been quick to point out, a deliberate attempt to retain the customs and practices of a traditional culture can lead individuals, irrespective of rank, to condone breaches of discipline. This, in itself, endangers the exercise of effective leadership in a period of change. In addition, individual motivation can be materially affected, particularly where the existence of dual standards favours one part of the military against another. This may occur with regard to rank, gender race or occupational specialisms. Zero tolerance to be acceptable must be universal – not selective.

THE MILITARY CULTURE

Armed forces, in common with all organizations, possess a unique and identifying culture. Traditionally, this has been contrasted with the culture of the non-military organization thereby creating a "Them" and "Us" dichotomy, the contrast and sometime conflict between which have received considerable media attention. Increasingly, however, enhanced co-operation between national armed forces in multi-national operations, reminds us, as during the Second World War, that there are major differences between the cultures of individual armed forces.

Some of the characteristics of these cultural differences refer to the visible attributes of an armed force – the **symbols** for example, such as peculiarities of uniform. Some reflect less visible but still concrete features, such as the **rituals** and the **heroes**. The interplay of these three levels of the "onion-skin" of culture creates difficulties for the exercise of leadership in a multi-national operation. They may appear to be peripheral and of minor importance when contrasted with the

achieved uniformity of technology or common user operational techniques, but they can still create leadership problems. The latter moreover become more substantial when cultural incompatibility or cultural conflict is derived from basic differences in values. These are the very core of a unique military culture, their effect upon the exercise of leadership varying in accordance with whether they are held at the levels of **imitation** or **identification** (limited effect) or **internalization** (major effect).

In the light of these difficulties, it is essential for the effective exercise of leadership that individuals have a high degree of cultural awareness. In the **Final Technical Report**, we have begun to look at some aspects of this on the basis, as Soeters points out, that "cultural characteristics form full part of what has been called the 'organizational iceberg' of military operations". More research, however, is required if we are to understand more fully the effects of culture on "real military action".

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