

**THE FIRES AND EFFECTS COORDINATION CELL:
THE EVOLUTION OF A COMMAND SYSTEM IN
RESPONSE TO A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT**

A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT

This monograph explores the possible evolution of a command system, specifically the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell, within the Interim Brigade's staffs organization. The purpose of this examination is to determine if the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell in the Interim Brigade's staff organization will increase effectiveness for planning urban operations. First, the monograph begins by examining the new operational environment and the US Army's response. Then the monograph demonstrates the evolving nature of an asymmetrical threat in an urban environment. The goal is to understand the origin, definitions, goals, desired effects, and possible tactics of asymmetric warfare. The assessment indicates that the effective use of the components of information operations would enhance the effect of combined arms throughout the full spectrum of operations in an urban environment. Next, the monograph examines current and emerging MOUT doctrine and Draft FM 3-0. The goal is to determine if current doctrine is correct and current concerning today's environment and whether contemporary doctrine explains the application of combat power, including the components of information operations, to achieve the desired effects desired in an urban environment. This analysis showed an apparent void in current MOUT doctrine, but demonstrated that emerging doctrine addresses today's environment. With the apparent void in current doctrine, the monograph then analyzed ways in which a commander can use components of information operations to shape and isolate an urban environment with an asymmetrical threat. A modern case study is used to demonstrate lessons learned using the components of information operations in an urban environment against an asymmetrical threat. The case study is the Russian involvement in Chechnya, specifically Grozny, in 1993-1995. The monograph then investigates the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell concentrating primarily on the nonlethal aspects. This investigation demonstrated the process of assessing the threat and urbanized terrain as a system and having the capabilities to understand and influence the sub-components of that system. The monograph concludes with recommendations for effectively and efficiently incorporating the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell in planning tactical operations in an urban environment. The monograph recommends that doctrine needs to address the components of information operations and provide a path for analyzing the parts of the complexity of an urban environment. Along with doctrine, training needs to be reexamined and refined to meet the current environment.

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ABSTRACT

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By Major Dale S. Ringler, USA, 53 Pages

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

An urban operation of the future may begin with a massive information operations effort that attacks not only systems but also souls. Air and space forces isolate the city electronically and through fires, imposing barriers between urban sectors with an electromagnetic wall. Army robotics parachute in to secure airfields and landing zones, followed by air-delivered troops with light armored vehicles to expand the lodgment. The next wave includes heavier ground systems and additional personnel delivered by air. Robotic systems push deeper into the urban area, followed by armored reconnaissance, delivering firepower, and dismountable forces. Electronic Warfare actions veil the movement of armored vehicles, remotely exploding mines as the vehicles move forward. Behind the fighters, military police and intelligence personnel process the inhabitants, electronically reading their attitudes toward the intervention and cataloging them into a database immediately recoverable by every fire team in the city. The city is secured and pacified.¹

This future urban battle demonstrates the increasingly complex demands made by modern forces and by modern warfare in an urban environment. The need for a command system arises from, and varies with, the size, complexity, and differentiation of the forces involved. The evolution of a command system is partly a response to a changing environment. This monograph explores the possible evolution of one component of a command system, specifically the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC), within the Interim Brigade. The development of the FECC was in response to the complexity of the urban environment against an asymmetrical threat. The monograph answers the research question “Will the Fire and Effects Coordination Cell in the Interim Brigade’s staff organization increase the effectiveness of urban operations planning?”

The author has determined two criteria to examine the applicability of the components of information operations at the tactical level. Joint doctrine writers have proposed a sequence for developing a MOUT plan; shape, isolate, penetrate, exploit, consolidate, and transition.² Operational fires, which includes lethal and nonlethal effects, can be most effective in the shape, isolate and penetrate phases in operations conducted in non restricted terrain. Nonlethal fires are most effective in the shape and isolate phases.³ Therefore, the shape and isolate phases will be addressed as criteria to identify the areas in which the FECC enhances the staff in the identification, planning and coordination of the objectives in urban terrain concerning nonlethal effects.

In the *Draft Joint Operational Concept for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain* MOUT manual written at the operational level, the commander's concept for shaping an area of operation in MOUT is similar to preparing for operations that are more conventional. Shaping is accomplished by determining essential elements through intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. In much the same way as in open battle space, the draft manual's approach to MOUT shaping relies on Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) to accomplish objectives before hostilities. The commander evaluates the urban battlespace and determines the implications for military operations.⁴ There are a number of key objectives that should be accomplished in this phase but this monograph describes the objectives as those actions taken to shape or alter the area of operations to create a more favorable climate for the commander. They include unhinging the enemy's decision cycle, lowering or destroying the enemy's will to resist, facilitating further collection of information and triggering an enemy response.⁵ Using the criterion of shaping, we can assess the FECC's capability to accomplish, or play a role in attaining, objectives in urban operations.

The second essential phase is isolation. FM101-5-1 defines isolation as “a tactical task given to a unit to seal off (both physically and psychologically) an enemy from his source of support, to deny an enemy freedom of movement and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. An enemy must not be allowed sanctuary within his present position.”⁶ An enemy’s critical vulnerabilities are numerous in an urban environment and can range from their dependence on the urban infrastructure to support received from outside the urban area of operations. The concept of isolation recognizes the complexity of physically isolating the enemy from non-combatants. Therefore, in addition to precision fires, psychological operations must be incorporated into, and synchronized with, the isolation plans. The potential drawback is that the desired effect of psychological operations may take more time than is anticipated or available. This criterion assesses the FECC’s capability to isolate enemy forces in urban terrain.

The monograph is organized into six chapters. The first chapter examines the new operational environment that has potentially caused the evolution of a command system, specifically the FECC, within the Interim Brigade’s staff organization. Following chapters examine asymmetrical warfare in an urban environment and how the threat can use this environment, current and emerging doctrine, analysis of the incorporation of information operations into a MOUT environment, and the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell. This monograph will conclude with recommendations for effectively and efficiently incorporating the FECC in planning tactical operations in an urban environment.

The author defines effective as the FECC’s ability to sufficiently link intelligence operations, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and civic action in urban combat efforts. The term efficient refers to the FECC’s ability to get the effects wanted without wasting effort by adding an additional element within the staff’s organization. The Fires and Effects Coordination Cell’s ability to incorporate nonlethal effects into tactical MOUT planning indicates that the U.S.

Army is preparing to counter asymmetric warfare against adversaries with power bases in urban centers. Before describing asymmetrical warfare and the challenges of the urban environment, the monograph examines the new operational environment and the U.S. Army's response.

The Brigade and Army XXI Battlefield

The global proliferation of technology and the increasing refinement of asymmetric techniques, coupled with economic, social and demographic factors, are changing the threat to the United States. These factors indicate that the U.S. military must be prepared to counter asymmetric warfare against adversaries with power bases in urban centers. While this seems daunting, effective use of intelligence, civic action, psychological operations, and population protection will enhance the effect of combined arms operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict. However, division and brigade organizations currently lack doctrine and training to sufficiently link intelligence operations, psychological operations, and civic action in urban combat efforts. This is one of the challenges facing our Army as we prepare for the next century.

The Interim Brigade is the Army's response to satisfy 21st century requirements for effective full spectrum strategic responsiveness demands against the evolving threat. The brigade is designed to leverage the power of information and human potential, combining the advantages of both light and mechanized forces, across the full range of military operations. It is designed primarily for employment in small-scale contingency operations (SSCO) in complex and urban terrain, confronting low to mid range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The Interim Brigade will be equipped, manned, and trained to conduct operations in an urban environment.⁷

The FECC has been added to coordinate the Interim Brigade's shaping activities. The FECC obtains the guidance from the commander concerning the effects desired in time, space, and purpose within the battlespace. The FECC then plans, coordinates, and achieves the desired

effects using organic and non-organic means in a responsive way that achieves the commander's desired effects.⁸

Effects based fires is an approach that realizes the potential of nonlethal capabilities and their relevance to the changing nature of the threat and today's operational environment. According to the Organizational and Operational concept for the Interim Brigade, the application of nonlethal effects is essential in confronting an asymmetric threat.⁹ The menu of nonlethal capabilities includes information operations, electronic attack, psychological operations, public affairs, and civil affairs. Applying the effects of all these assets at the appropriate place and time is critical to combined arms in urban operations.¹⁰

World Urbanization and the Implication for U.S. Forces

The current operational environment continues to be dynamic, multidimensional, and increasingly interconnected globally. Urban environments with civilian population and infrastructure are becoming key terrain and therefore required areas of operation. Several important indicators further support the premise that U.S. forces will be required to conduct operations in urban environments. First, increased urbanization decreases the amount of rural terrain to conduct military operations. Additionally, as cities grow, resources become more scarce, tensions rise and civil unrest can ensue. In some cases, this chaos may warrant outside intervention.¹¹ Over the last decade, nearly every military operation conducted by the U.S. Army has had an urban component.¹² U.S. forces must be prepared for this trend to continue.

Urban terrain offers a number of features that an adversary may leverage to create an advantage over U.S. forces. For example, urban terrain negates sophisticated weapons capabilities and provides easier access to the media for the enemy. It also allows the threat to exploit the confusion created by civilians on the battlefield, and provides greater access to cultural, financial, political and social assets.¹³

Finally, due to limited overseas presence, U.S. forces will deploy to contingencies through ports and airfields in or adjacent to potentially hostile urban terrain. Unfortunately, the enemies we are likely to face through the rest of the decade and beyond will not be the disciplined Euro-American soldier but a threat that displays an erratic primitive shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. The U.S. Army will fight this threat far more often than it fights nation-state soldiers in the future. This does not mean that the Army should not train to fight other organized militaries, for they remain the most lethal, although not the most frequent, threat. However, it would be foolish not to recognize, study, and prepare for this evolving threat.¹⁴

CHAPTER 2

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

There has been a great deal of discussion by senior government officials, members of the academic community, and military leaders regarding the likelihood that the United States military will face a multitude of asymmetric challenges in the 21st Century. We as an Army, must understand that our new threats may not resemble the more conventional model. This chapter demonstrates the evolving nature of an asymmetrical urban threat. By understanding the origin, definitions, goals, desired effects and possible tactics of asymmetric warfare, one will understand how to maximize combat power to decisively win across the full spectrum of warfare. The first step is to understand the origin to demonstrate that asymmetrical warfare is not a new phenomenon.

When reviewing current statements and literature concerning asymmetric warfare, one gets the sense that this type of warfare is a new phenomenon. However, with the exception of the use of nuclear weapons, all of the generally accepted asymmetric threats facing the United States have an historical precedent. In 500 BC, Sun Tzu wrote,

If the enemy is superior in strength, evade him. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared. Appear where you are not expected.¹⁵

Asymmetric warfare has been written about and taught to military leaders for over 2,500 years. A successful asymmetric tactic that allows one adversary to prevail on the battlefield is always a concern to a military commander.¹⁶ An essential variable to understanding the complexity that asymmetric warfare in an urban environment presents is understanding how and why they develop their warfighting doctrine.

In February of 2000 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command published *Future Operational and Threat Environment: View of the World in 2015*, which provided insights on how America's adversaries will develop warfighting doctrine. America's adversaries will develop warfighting doctrine based on their perceptions of our strengths and weaknesses. Common perceptions outside the U.S. are that we are unwilling to accept heavy losses and are risk adverse. The Balkan strategy reinforced the perceptions that the U.S. avoids close combat and relies on standoff technologies and air superiority. In addition, our adversaries have identified our difficulties in applying current operating systems in complex terrain and urban settings.¹⁷ These perceptions indicate that for the near future, there is a high likelihood that opponents will capitalize on urban terrain to obtain an advantage or offset the advantage of an U.S. force. Weaker belligerents have used asymmetric methods during conflicts with stronger or technologically superior forces throughout recorded history.¹⁸ The next step is to understand the definitions used by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Definitions

Before discussing the goals, desired effects and possible tactics of asymmetric warfare, it will be useful to provide some definitions of asymmetric warfare. There are numerous definitions presently being used to describe asymmetric warfare, however, this author has chosen to utilize

the definitions currently used by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The DOD and CIA definitions of asymmetric warfare are presently the two most widely accepted and used definitions throughout the U.S. defense establishment.¹⁹ The definitions help reinforce the idea that asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon. By understanding that asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon, current and future military leaders will be better prepared to understand the complexity associated with an asymmetric threat. Military leaders can study how other commanders have dealt with the complexity of an asymmetric threat.

The following is the DOD definition of asymmetric warfare, established by the Joint Staff: “attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of operations.”²⁰ The CIA defines asymmetric warfare as the use of innovative strategies, tactics, and technologies by a ‘weaker’ state or sub-state adversary that are intended to avoid the strengths and exploit the potential vulnerabilities of larger and technologically superior opponents. This includes the selective uses of weapons or military resources by a state or sub-state group to counter, deter, or possibly defeat a numerically or technologically superior force and the use of diplomatic and other non-military resources or tactics by a state or sub-state group to discourage or constrain military operations by a superior force.²¹ The three themes in DOD and CIA views of asymmetric warfare include pitting one’s strengths against selected enemy weaknesses, using unexpected, unconventional, or innovative methods of attack or defense and asymmetric threats can be either technologically or culturally based.²²

Threat Goals and Desired Effects

A threat using asymmetric warfare against the U.S. may have two primary goals. The first is to raise the level of risk to prevent the United States from intervening militarily in a

situation, or once intervention has begun, to cause us to disengage due to unacceptable losses or financial costs.²³ The second is to force a change in U.S. foreign policy.²⁴

There are numerous effects that a future threat may desire to achieve with asymmetric warfare. A few of these effects include degrading U.S. military effectiveness, especially by limiting the application of superior technology before or during combat. A second effect is to cause a significant psychological impact on an enemy through actions which will shock or confuse them, causing them to lose the initiative, freedom of action, or will to fight. Finally, a third effect is to cause a disproportionate amount of casualties or financial losses through attrition.²⁵

By understanding the desired effects of the threat using asymmetric warfare, we are closer to understanding how to counter or defeat it. The next step is to understand the possible tactics used.

Asymmetrical Urban Warfare

Urban areas have always been attractive to adversaries seeking to apply asymmetric operations. The social, physical and material densities of urban areas magnify the effects of small actions. Urban areas are conducive to an economy of effect. That is why urban areas are an attractive venue for asymmetric operations.²⁶

Urban areas offer reduced levels of social control over individuals, large pools for propaganda and recruiting efforts, mobility and crowds, making it easier to contact friendly foreign governments and like-minded domestic groups to share ideas and obtain aid, increased access to food, money, equipment, and other resources. Urban areas are well suited for the defense, while offering a wide range of offensive targets. The civilian population provides cover and concealment against government firepower. The buildings, large numbers of people, and street patterns provide more hiding places and means of escape than are often found in areas outside of urban areas. As one researcher noted: “Insurgents and other groups recognize cities as cultural,

political, social, and economic hubs of [the] nation. They are lucrative targets. Press attention is also easier to get in cities.”²⁷

There are many advantages to fighting in urban areas for an asymmetric foe. First, the enemy is likely to have a base of support among the local population who can provide assistance and sanctuary. This was illustrated in Mogadishu, Somalia when Mohamed Farah Aideed ambushed US forces on the crowded streets. In the ensuing firefight, local population provided assistance and sanctuary. Aideed’s troops also attempted to use human shields as a means to deter the US Rangers from identifying and destroying specific targets.

Second, high technology equipment may be less effective in urban areas. Urban areas reduce the effectiveness of some weapons and line of sight equipment, i.e. communications, radars, and imaging equipment. Urban areas can aggravate vulnerabilities of specific weapon systems. Large armored vehicles and helicopters may not be able to operate effectively in all urban areas. A study by the US Army Infantry School found special dangers exist for helicopters in a city.

One of the major problems facing aviation operations in combat in cities could be the difficulty in eradicating sniper and antiaircraft fires. The city affords ideal cover and concealment for both snipers and small antiaircraft weapons in the vicinity of rooftops where helicopters would be operating; the availability of large landing zones in a city could be a major problem.²⁸

The above passage was written in 1972 and is still applicable today, in light of the damage done to US helicopters by ground fire during the fighting in Mogadishu, Somalia October 1993.²⁹

British operations in Northern Ireland provide significant lessons when dealing with asymmetric threats. First, a military force inserted into a hostile situation will quickly become the target of hostility. Acts beneficial to one side of the dispute will be seen as hostile to the other side, regardless of the original motivation of the actors. This has implications for the legitimacy for the government, and makes maintaining law and order, reducing tensions, and increasing normalcy

in neighborhoods more difficult. Actions with the best intentions can increase local hostilities to government control if a good understanding of local customs and conditions does not precede actions. Second, military forces, when operating within the borders of their own country, will normally be considered outsiders by the local inhabitants. This puts the Army at a disadvantage against an indigenous force that has the support, or at least the tolerance, of the civilian population. This highlights the need for the military to establish and maintain relations with both the local police and the civil population. Useful intelligence can only be gained through good human intelligence collection.³⁰

There are a number of writers on urban warfare who stress the importance that native populations have in determining which side has the advantage in urban fighting. As the ability to overwhelm the threat with firepower is more tightly controlled because of concern with collateral damage, the ability to gather human intelligence about the threat while denying human intelligence to the threat becomes critical for mission accomplishment. One method for securing the cooperation of the population is to assist in providing for their survival needs (food, water, shelter) and security.³¹ The best way to provide security is the Army's ability to show strong and effective presence.³² Although *FM 90-10-1* concentrates on the tactical level, it does recognize the need to consider the military's relationship with the local population:

The local population's support to the enemy may either be forced or given willingly. The friendly force commander must be observant and sensitive to the local population's concerns before the population may be willing to help the friendly forces.

Soldiers must remember the political and psychological impact of their actions if they use force. The local population may be neutral or have lukewarm support for the friendly forces, but excessive use of force will cause the local civilians to support the enemy.³³

Control of the population provides a significant advantage while fighting in an urban environment. There are other factors involved and must be considered when planning operations in an urban environment. Effective use of intelligence, civic action, psychological operations, and

population protection would enhance the effect of combined arms throughout the full spectrum of operations in an urban environment. The planner must understand how to enhance the combined arms throughout the full spectrum of operations. A useful place to start may be with doctrine.

CHAPTER 3

CURRENT AND EMERGING DOCTRINE

As a starting point for a description of MOUT doctrine, one must first understand what doctrine is. According to U.S. Army *FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics*, doctrine is the set of “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.”³⁴ Doctrine is critical to the effective and efficient application of military force. An armed force is trained to act in accordance with doctrine, and doctrine serves as a basis for how to think about combat in the future. Two questions need to be answered in this chapter. The first is whether current doctrine is correct and current concerning today’s environment. The second is whether contemporary doctrine explains the application of combat power to achieve the effects desired in an urban environment. This monograph examines current and emerging MOUT doctrine and Draft *FM 3-0*. The examination of these doctrinal manuals helps determine if the FECC in the Interim Brigade’s staff organization increases effectiveness for planning urban operations.

To understand the essence of military operations in urban terrain, one must first understand the doctrinal definition of urban terrain. U.S. Army *Field Manual 90-10* defines urban terrain as that terrain “which is constantly being modified by man to meet his needs.”³⁵ Military operations in urban terrain are doctrinally defined to “include all military actions that are planned and conducted on complex terrain where manmade construction impacts on the tactical options available to the commander.”³⁶ These definitions are stating that urban terrain is

essentially cities and the purpose of MOUT doctrine is to describe methods of planning and executing successful military operations in cities.

To provide a framework for planning MOUT operations, the U.S. Army has published two manuals on the subject. The oldest, *FM 90-10*, written in 1979, attempts to merge individual skills, tactics, and operations in an attempt to describe possible solutions for victory in the urban environment. The focus of the manual is fighting at the battalion level and higher. The manual reinforced creating combined arms teams capable of overwhelming the enemy with firepower. It also announced that the environment discussed was exclusively based on Western Europe. This is the first MOUT manual that included details about the enemy, his organization, doctrine, and capabilities. The enemy discussed was modeled after the former Soviets.

The publication date of the manual provides an indication of the value to the present Army. First, the manual was written before the Airland Battle Doctrine was developed in the 1986 version of U.S. Army *FM 100-5, Operations*, so the lexicon does not coincide with overarching U.S. Army doctrine. Second, the Army was very Euro-centric in its focus and unwilling to consider operations other than those against the Warsaw Pact nations. This manual was designed to give guidance on the next great conflict on the European continent. Nearly the entire focus of the U.S. Army has changed since the last update of *FM 90-10*.

The second of two doctrinal Army manuals on the topic is *FM 90-10-1*, entitled *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Urban Areas*, produced in 1993. This is a manual at the tactical level designed to describe tactics, techniques, and procedures for understanding and successfully fighting in urban terrain at the battalion level and below. The focus of the manual is on the platoon down to the individual soldier. This manual does a better job of describing the urban environment by eliminating the Euro-centric focus. It attempts to describe the common urban peculiarities of most other parts of the world, but continues to concentrate on the former

Warsaw Pact countries as the model for the threat. The manual virtually negates any guidance for planning and executing battles outside the framework of heavy destruction to all sides and the urban surroundings.

The third manual is the 1998 draft for the *Joint Operational Concept for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*. In October 1998, the Joint Chiefs of staff J8 22nd Joint Doctrine Working Party decided to develop a separate joint MOUT publication. Although acknowledging the requirement for joint urban warfare doctrine is a step in the right direction, the doctrine today remains in draft form.³⁷ This publication provides guidance for the conduct of MOUT at the operational level. The evolving JFC MOUT concept takes the essential elements/phases of warfare and constructs a framework from them. The proposed framework for developing a MOUT campaign plan is shape, isolate, penetrate, exploit, consolidate, and transition.³⁸ The JTF conceptual doctrine does not clearly define urban operational fires. However, it does imply that urban operational fires are the application of lethal and non-lethal fires to achieve the desired effects of a campaign or major operation.

The purpose of urban operational fires is not specifically addressed in the Joint Operational Fires Concept for MOUT. Operational fires can be used to accomplish a single or several purposes. Optimally, operational planners will focus on a specific purpose to be achieved by conducting operational fires within a given period. In conventional warfare, operational fires are planned to accomplish operational objectives. However, the Joint MOUT Concept restricts the use of operational fires to the supplementary role of isolating the battlefield.

Strengths of MOUT Doctrine

The strength of current MOUT doctrine lies in certain principles that appear to be unchanging. Those still relevant are the phases of conducting urban operations to defeat an opponent. These phases are isolate, assault, and clear.³⁹ This framework appears to be useful

regardless of the threat. Applying the effects of the nonlethal capabilities at the appropriate place and time within each phase is critical to combined arms in urban operations.

Weaknesses of Current MOUT Doctrine

Although U.S. Army MOUT doctrine focuses on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, it argues that the threat is irrelevant to the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the employment of forces.⁴⁰ With the exceptions of phasing by isolating, assaulting and clearing existing MOUT doctrine is no longer applicable in many modern MOUT scenarios. The specific weaknesses of MOUT doctrine are threefold. First, the significance of fighting an asymmetric force on its native terrain is not addressed. Second the over simplification of the complexity of the MOUT environment and failure to view the sub-components of urban complexity as a system provides an incomplete path for analyzing the urban environment as a system to a planner. Third, current MOUT doctrine fails to address the components of information operations (IO) in an urban environment.

The initial weakness of current MOUT doctrine relevant to this monograph is that it fails to provide any guidance on how to assess the situation with regard to the threat and then with respect to oneself. Urban operations are complex, but current doctrine restricts itself on the nature of the complexity. Doctrine labels an urban environment complex because of a significant third dimension. The third dimension is the subsurface (basements, subways, sewers, etc.) and super-surface (rooftops, upper levels, etc.) component. Other complexities are mentioned, but the doctrine fails to fully describe and state the importance of each topic individually and how they relate to the situation. A partial list of other complexities includes failure to address the issues of population control, precision guided munitions (PGM), lasers, psychological operations, civil affairs, and rules of engagement, as they affect MOUT. MOUT doctrine fails to view the sub-components of urban complexity as a system.

The second weakness of MOUT doctrine is the inability to provide a path for analyzing the urban environment as a system to a planner, or analyzing the parts of the complexity of an urban environment. MOUT doctrine provides limited direction on viewing the environment as a system. It does not consider the interface between the physical environment of the urban terrain, the threat, the friendly force, and the urban population. The U.S. Army uses two acronyms as a means to do a rudimentary assessment of the area of operations. The acronyms METT-TC and OCOKA do not assist the friendly force in thoroughly assessing oneself or assessing how the enemy views the friendly force, in relation to the terrain. If the urban environment was viewed as a system, one could then break the system down to its constituent parts for a thorough analysis.

The third weakness of current MOUT doctrine is the failure to address the components of IO in an urban environment. *FM 90-10* and *FM 90-10-1* do not support the use of IO in shaping operations and isolation. The apparent void in the ability to analyze the complexities of urban terrain and the interface of opposing forces in urban terrain prevents current doctrine from supporting the use of IO in shaping operations and isolation. For example, *FM 90-10*, reinforced creating combined arms teams capable of overwhelming the enemy with firepower. It also announced that the environment discussed was exclusively based on Western Europe. This is the first MOUT manual that included details about the enemy, his organization, doctrine, and capabilities. The enemy discussed was modeled after the former Soviets. These apparent voids can be filled through the addition of elements of operational design to current MOUT doctrine. The start point for filling these voids is changing the Army's keystone doctrine to address full spectrum operations. *FM 3-0* may establish the Army's keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations when and if approved.

Draft FM 3-0

FM 3-0 will provide the doctrinal direction for the conduct of full spectrum operations. This publication understands the complexity of the operational environment and tries to identify the path for analyzing the operational environment as a system to a planner, or analyzing the parts of the complexity. The manual will be the first Army manual to address effects based operations in relation to applying combat power.

In relation to complexity, the manual will recognize the complexity of the operational environment through six dimensions. The six dimensions are threat, political, unified action, land combat operations, information, and technology. Each affects how Army forces combine, sequence, and conduct military operations.⁴¹

Fm 3-0 will aid the planner and the commander further by identifying operational considerations. It states: “Army forces execute full spectrum operations in complex operational environments. Each operation is different in circumstances and challenges.”⁴² The manual then addresses four complex operational environments.⁴³ This monograph is concerned with three of them. They include local populous and displaced personnel, unconventional threat, and an urban environment. Concerning planning, the manual addresses the urban environment as a dynamic entity that includes hostile forces, local population, and infrastructure. Planning requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the three dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social structure of the population. The manual is beginning to portray the complexity of the urban environment.

As stated in chapter one, the premise of effects is a revolutionary approach that realizes the potential of nonlethal capabilities and their relevance to the changing nature of the threat and today’s operational environment. Chapter four of the manual explains how Army forces use the operational framework to arrange their forces in time, space, purpose, and resources to

accomplish the mission. It concludes that Army forces can tailor combined arms teams able to mass complimentary and reinforcing effects across the range of military operations. The next step is to examine how *FM 3-0* compares with the *Draft Joint Operational Concept for Urbanized Operations*.

Both future doctrinal manuals support the use of IO in an urban environment against an asymmetrical threat. *FM 3-0* and the *Draft Joint Operational Concept for Urbanized Operations* address the urban environment as a dynamic entity that includes hostile forces, local population, and infrastructure. Planning requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the three dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social structure of the population. They both portray the complexity of the urban environment and they both specifically mention information operations. Additionally, both manuals use the term shaping, but in significantly different ways. *FM 3-0* describes shaping as an operation that creates or preserves the conditions that allow the force to maintain the momentum and exploit success. While the *Draft Joint Operational Concept for Urbanized Operations* uses shaping as a phase within the framework for planning urban operations. This distinction is essential for one important reason concerning this monograph. That reason is the term isolation. The Joint manual describes isolation as a phase within the framework of the MOUT environment. *FM 3-0* would say that isolation is part of shaping operations to support the decisive operation.⁴⁴

Doctrine is critical to the effective and efficient application of military force. An armed force is trained to act in accordance with doctrine, and doctrine serves as a basis for how to think about combat in the future. Examining current and emerging MOUT doctrine and *Draft FM 3-0* two questions were answered. The first is current MOUT doctrine is not fully applicable to today's environment. The emerging operational doctrine does address today's environment. The

second is the emerging doctrine explains the application of combat power to achieve the effects desired in an urban environment.

After examining asymmetric warfare and MOUT and emerging doctrines, these factors indicate that the U.S. military must be prepared to counter asymmetric warfare against adversaries with power bases in urban centers. While this seems daunting, effective use of intelligence, civic action, psychological operations, and population protection will enhance the effect of combined arms operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict. The following chapter discusses separate components of IO and how they effect the system consisting of an urban environment with an asymmetric threat. The chapter then illustrates the lessons learned by the Russians concerning IO during their experience in Grozny.

CHAPTER 4

HOW TO INCORPORATE IO TO AFFECT THE MOUT SYSTEM

This chapter serves two purposes. First, it discusses ways in which the components of IO could be used to shape and isolate an urban environment with an asymmetrical threat. The shape and isolate phases will be addressed to identify the areas in which the Fire and Effects Coordination Cell enhances the staff in the understanding and influencing of the objectives in urban terrain concerning nonlethal effects. The purpose of the second portion of this chapter is to analyze a contemporary urban fight against an asymmetrical threat. The analysis will demonstrate the lessons learned from this urban fight concerning IO. The modern operation will be the Russian involvement in Chechnya in 1993-1995. This operation is used because it supports the use of IO to help shape and isolate certain sub-components within the system of an urban environment with an asymmetrical threat. The next step is to examine how the components of IO aid in influencing shaping operations.

Shape

This monograph describes the objectives as those actions taken to shape or alter the area of operations to create a more favorable climate for mission accomplishment. This includes unhinging the enemy's decision cycle, lowering or destroying the enemy's will to resist, facilitating further collection of information and triggering a desired enemy response.⁴⁵ Does the components of IO provide the means to aid the commander to shape the area of operation by selecting objectives for the separate components of IO? The answer is yes, because the components of IO provide analytical expertise in the form of PSYOPS, civil affairs, public affairs, electronic warfare that can help the commander understand sub-components of the urban system. These components of IO also enable the commander to influence sub-components of the MOUT system. By understanding shaping in an urban environment it is possible to discuss a technique to determine the shaping operations required during a particular mission.

A technique to determine the shape of the battlefield before hostilities is to reverse the viewpoint of the analysis to that of the enemy. This allows a planner to determine the purpose or the objective of the enemy and how the friendly force would be an obstacle to the enemy ability to achieve its objective. Using the concept of decisive points, a planner and the commander might determine the approach the threat would take to achieve its objectives. A prudent planner would therefore understand his own vulnerabilities and might be in a better position to protect those vulnerabilities. If the commander and planners understood the purpose or the objective of the enemy, they could plan and execute several options consisting of the components of IO. Military deception is one component of IO that enables a commander to shape the urban area.

Military deception can mislead an adversary by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying evidence concerning friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations. The goal is to cause opponents to act against their own interests and to benefit the friendly position. Deception, when

performed as offensive IO, causes threat commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly forces, waste intelligence assets, or fail to use other resources to their best advantage.

The use of PSYOP to trigger a threat's response is a method that can be employed to shape the battlefield. By using PSYOPs an adversary may be influenced in less direct ways. PSYOP can trigger a threat's response through the minds of the supporting governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in the population or members of armed forces. Psychological operations can influence the population's emotions, attitudes, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior to benefit the friendly mission and hinder the opponent's mission. This is very important when confronting an asymmetric threat in an urban environment. Another component of IO that can enhance a commander with maintaining relations and providing information back to him is civil affairs.

Civil affairs (CA) personnel are prime sources of information for a commander. CA will help the commander in establishing and maintaining relations with both the local police and the civil population. Useful intelligence can only be gained through good human intelligence collection.⁴⁶ The daily encounter with people, institutions, and documents enable them to collect information. After the information is collected, civil affairs personnel conduct assessments in order to target their relief effort or stabilize the civilian environment. In turn supporting the commander's information operations and ensuring mission accomplishment for the unit. Public affairs are another component of IO available to aid the commander in shaping the battlefield.

Public affairs (PA) convey information for influencing populations. PA transmits public information through the news media. The dissemination of this military information is consistent with security. Defensively PA disseminates information to counter adversary deception and propaganda.⁴⁷ This is an essential component of IO to assist the commander in influencing the essential component of asymmetric warfare in an urban environment.

The Fire and effects Coordination Cell enhances the staff in helping the commander influence and understand the objectives in urban terrain concerning nonlethal effects for shaping operations. Effective use of intelligence, civic action, psychological operations, and public affairs delineates valid effects that mandate the employment of IO in an urban environment with an asymmetrical threat to aid the commander in shaping the battlefield. The next question is if the components of IO can aid the commander in isolating the objective.

Isolate

FM101-5-1 defines isolation as “a tactical task given to a unit to seal off (both physically and psychologically) an enemy from his source of support, to deny an enemy freedom of movement and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. An enemy must not be allowed sanctuary within his present position.”⁴⁸ An enemy’s critical vulnerabilities are numerous in an urban environment and can range from their dependence on the urban infrastructure to support received from outside the urban area of operations. The concept of isolation recognizes the complexity of physically isolating the enemy from non-combatants. Therefore, in addition to precision fires, psychological operations must be incorporated into, and synchronized with, the isolation plans. The next step is to examine what components of IO can isolate for the commander.

The commander and staff will seek to isolate the threat from its leadership and its supporting infrastructure. The commander uses maneuver combined with firepower and information operations to isolate the battalion’s objectives. The first responsibility of the staff when planning for the principal of isolation is to determine how much isolation of the objective the units forces can accomplish, and how they can accomplish it. After the staff determines and targets the objectives for psychological isolation, the next step is to determine the assets required. Psychological isolation can be accomplished by PSYOPS and by interdicting critical C2 nodes,

sources of sustenance and transportation networks.⁴⁹ PSYOPS can also be used to physically isolate the enemy from non-combatants.

Isolating the population from the threat is the most complex task for the commander. As with the shaping phase, PSYOPS may be the only method available to accomplish this objective.⁵⁰ A technique is to use PSYOPS teams to deliver pamphlets directing the civilian populace to move to a designated safe area. There are drawbacks to this technique. By itself, PSYOPS is seldom decisive. It takes time to become effective and its effects are difficult to measure until after the actual attack. It is essential to have a cell or identified group that assesses these effects for the commander. Assessment then helps identify possible new targets for interdiction. The interdiction of the critical C2 nodes will also help isolate the objective.⁵¹

If the threat is dependent on a computerized form of C2, surgical isolation methods could be used to disrupt it. First, in the shaping phase, the staff could determine the requirement to locate the sensor and reconnaissance units to identify the C2 nodes that need to be isolated. This corresponds to the decide phase of the targeting process. Second, in the isolation phase electronic warfare (EW) could be employed. EW attacks the threat by means of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, and antiradiation weapons. The EW attacks are intended to isolate the threat from the command and control of their leadership. The next section examines a contemporary urban fight against an asymmetrical threat. The analysis will illustrate the effects achieved and key lessons, when a modern army uses the components of IO in an urban fight.

Chechnya

The next step is to analyze the most current urban fight against an asymmetrical threat. The vignette used is the Russian intervention in the Republic of Chechnya between 1994 and 1996, with particular focus on the urban component of combat operations, specifically Grozny. This situation will help identify the importance and effects achieved using the components of IO in

a MOUT environment against an asymmetrical threat. The author understands that the Russian intervention in Chechnya is a campaign, and that the Interim brigade will not be responsible for planning operations on this scale. However, the author believes that Grozny offers an appropriate environment to discuss important lessons concerning the components of IO. The components of IO used at the tactical level against an asymmetrical force in a MOUT environment will enhance the Interim brigade's combat power. This vignette will describe the historic context of the conflict, the situation that led to Russian intervention, the military intervention, and the outcome. The author will then develop essential lessons from the Russians concerning IO during this campaign.

The Russian intervention in the Republic of Chechnya really began more than two centuries before. Russian armies led by the famous commander Alexander Suvorov first made contact with their Chechen cousins during the reign of Catherine the Great. Since that time fear, hatred, and war generally characterize relations between the two peoples.⁵²

The disintegration of the Soviet Union again focused the Kremlin on Chechnya. Two days after the failed August 1991 Russian coup, opposition elements within the Russian Republic of Chechnya launched a revolt of their own. Chechnya declared its independence from Russia on 6 September 1991.⁵³ In November 1994, a botched Russian covert operation failed to remove the elected president from power. By December 1994, mounting political pressure in Moscow demanded swift and decisive action. The action was intended to re-establish firm political control of the region to ensure protection of the crucial railways and pipelines in the Republic. On 11 December, in his third year of power and responding to pressure to stave off further disintegration of Russia, President Boris Yeltsin ordered Russian forces into Chechnya resulting in a full-scale military intervention to regain control of the rebellious republic.⁵⁴ In addition to the Russian intervention, the Chechen government had to deal with growing internal strife.

Concurrently with the Chechen/Russian conflict, there was an equally dismal domestic situation occurring in Chechnya. Reports indicate that by the time the Russians overtly invaded Chechnya in December 1994, there was virtually a state of lawlessness in Chechnya. A large portion of the populace that was not involved in criminal activity was living close to if not below the poverty level.⁵⁵ The internal turmoil occurring in Chechnya was one of the key elements overlooked in the Russian planning.

The military purpose of the operation for the Russians was to disarm those forces loyal to Dudayev and restore peace in order to re-establish firm political control of the region and to ensure protection of the crucial railways and pipelines in the Republic.⁵⁶ The initial plan was to invade Chechnya with a three-pronged attack into Chechnya from the north, east, and west with the task to isolate the capital city of Grozny. The plan envisioned a bold attack from the march to quickly seize critical Chechen communication nodes, the presidential palace, and the railroad station. All of these objectives were located in the city center. The endstate was to stabilize the situation and turn control over to internal troops.⁵⁷

Analysis of Russia Military Operations in Chechnya

Shape

The actual invasion of Chechnya began on 11 December 1994. The Russians began their shaping operations on 19 December. The shaping operations began with the Air Force destroying the TV tower in Grozny, and on 21 December the last satellite link was cut that finally eliminated local phone communications.⁵⁸ Other infrastructures were attacked or damaged collaterally. By 25 December, eighty percent of Chechnya was without electricity and fifty percent was without gas.⁵⁹ The intent for the shaping operations were to focus on the assets that would unhinge the enemy's decision cycle to neutralize or reduce the enemy's command and control infrastructure.

The Russians accomplished this shaping solely with destructive fires with the intent of inflicting enough damage to personnel or systems to the extent that they could not function or be restored to a useable condition. Although not clearly stated in any of the readings, this author believes the Russians did this for two reasons. First, the Russians believed they could use overwhelming combat power to physically and mentally destroy enemy capabilities. The Russians also believed this would lead to a quick and decisive victory. Secondly, as part of defensive IO, physical attacks were used to block Chechen's ability to conduct offensive IO. The Russian planners neglected the nonlethal aspects of the components of IO to accomplish the same objectives.

The Russians learned many valuable lessons from their mistakes in planning and execution concerning the components of IO. One of the essential lessons learned and later implemented in the second battle of Chechnya was that the Russians neglected the psychological factor of warfare in shaping operations. Using leaflets, Russian psychological operations could have tried to convince the civilian population in Grozny to leave.⁶⁰ The leaflets could have also portrayed a theme that reinforced their safety and encouraged them to help in identifying and locating the rebels. The effect from this could have excluded the population from inhibiting the assault into Grozny.

Another valuable lesson concerning shaping was the ability to facilitate further collection of information. The Russians had almost no information about the situation in Grozny, especially from human intelligence sources.⁶¹ Useful intelligence can only be gained through good human intelligence collection.⁶² The daily encounter with people, institutions, and documents enable them to collect information. During the second battle for Chechnya, the Russians used Chechen combatants friendly to the federal cause that could talk to the local population and get intelligence on the rebel positions and dispositions.⁶³

The third lesson learned concerning shaping was the use of public affairs. The Russian government lost the propaganda war.⁶⁴ The Russian government lost the war with their populace. Members of the Russian mass media pointed out that it was nearly impossible to report from military bases because they could not go anywhere and their cameras and film were confiscated, whereas the Chechen rebels helped reporters. This resulted in the “one-sided” reporting from the Chechen perspective, in the journalist opinion.⁶⁵ The Russians attempted to solve this problem in late January 1995. In a round table on media reporting, it was noted that a legal mechanism needed to be created so that society could receive reliable information about parties at war.⁶⁶ Public affairs convey information for influencing populations.

PA transmits public information through the news media. During the second Chechnya campaign, the President of the Russian Federation created the Russian Information Center whose job it was to filter information before providing it to the mass media and to control the dissemination of foreign information. The Russian military concluded that they had to first play out the information war against the Chechen resistance, as in their opinion the Chechens had succeeded in morally disarming public opinion in Russia.⁶⁷ The Russian strategy for reprogramming the mass consciousness became their main mission in their struggle against the Chechen separatism. Interviews with or about top Russian and Chechen military leaders continued. The interviews provided information to shape public opinion.⁶⁸ The next step is to examine the lessons learned using the components of IO for isolating the objective.

Isolation

On 31 December 1994, ground forces began an invasion on Grozny. The intermediate objective was the railway station. The final objective was the presidential palace with a key task of isolating the city. The palace was not seized until 19 January 1995 and the city was not isolated until 22 February 1995. Isolation of the city and attainment of the presidential palace did not

equate to controlling the city or lead to the intended purpose of the operation. The Russian planners neglected an important aspect concerning an asymmetrical threat in an urban environment. This aspect is apparent in a quote from *The Second Chechen War: The Information War*.

It is possible that Russian military leaders have indeed learned something from the previous war. However, they have surely not learned one most important lesson--in a guerilla war, controlling a territory does not mean victory. It is not the territory that must be won, but the confidence of the people. On what forces in Chechnya can federal troops rely for support?⁶⁹

Although the city was surrounded and Russian forces were in the city, they were still strongly opposed by the remaining Chechen forces.⁷⁰ By May 1995, Russian forces controlled the main Chechen cities and towns, but the fighting had merely moved into the mountains. The Chechens would not surrender.

The appreciation for the principle of isolation was apparent in the Russians planning. The original plan revolved around the isolation of the capital of Grozny, and therefore the armed enemy within it. The Russian plan centered on physical attack to accomplish isolation. However, it took significantly longer to physically isolate Grozny than expected. The component of physical destruction was expected to separate the enemy physically and psychologically from his support base. There was no mention or example of an attempt to isolate the rebels from the population using any components of IO. The Russians failed to assess how to appropriately isolate the Chechens from the local populace. This is a very complex task, but the Russians have learned that PSYOPS can be used to accomplish this objective.

The Russians understood the time and complexity of isolating the populace from the rebels, but made the IO campaign priority during the second campaign for Chechnya. Grozny had 20,000 to 30,000 residents still in the city. Reportedly, about 4,000 Chechen fighters remained in the city.⁷¹ To isolate the populace from the rebels the Russian used psychological operations to

depict the defenders as Muslim fanatics and agents of an international, fundamental terror network. The Russians wanted to achieve the effects of cutting the support of the local populace before they began their assault into the city to destroy the rebels.

The Chechens used foreign communication devices for C2. They particularly favored the Iridium satellite system handset produced by Motorola. First, and in the shaping phase, the Russians needed to determine, during the decide phase of the targeting process, the sensor and reconnaissance units to identify the C2 nodes that need to be isolated. Again, the Russians plan centered on physical destruction of the repeater stations. Second, in the isolation phase electronic warfare (EW) could be employed. EW attacks the threat by means of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, and antiradiation weapons. The EW attacks are intended to isolate the threat from the command and control of their leadership. To date, there is no mention or examples of EW being used in Chechnya by the Russians.

This chapter was intended to discuss ways in which a commander can use components of IO to shape and isolate an urban environment with an asymmetrical threat. The shape and isolate phases were addressed to identify the areas in which the components of IO enhances the staff in the understanding and influencing of the objectives in urban terrain concerning nonlethal effects. The Russian involvement in Chechnya 1993-1995 was used because it supports the use of IO to help shape and isolate certain sub-components within the system of an urban environment with an asymmetrical threat. The next step is to examine one of the Army's responses to satisfy 21st century requirements for effective full spectrum strategic responsiveness demands against the evolving threat.

CHAPTER 5

FIRES & EFFECTS COORDINATION CELL

One of the essential organizational enablers that allow the Interim Brigade to evolve towards an effects-based fires construct is the FECC. This chapter provides an overview of the FECC concentrating primarily on the nonlethal aspects. This chapter will describe the organization, concept of operations, and the targeting process of the FECC.

Organization

The structure of the FECC enables it to perform a Fire Support Element's mission and integrate available nonlethal capabilities into targeting and executing information operations. The FECC is a standing organization within the Interim Brigade that consists of a lethal effects section, a targeting/counterfire section, a nonlethal effects cell (NLEC), and a supporting USAF Tactical Air Control Party (TACP).⁷²

The Interim Brigade's Fires and FECC command group is composed of an effect coordinator (ECOORD) and an assistant. The DS FA Battalion Commander serves as the ECOORD and the assistant is a field artillery captain. The FECC command group is responsible for the training, leading and maintaining of the effects organization. The ECOORD's responsibilities include planning, coordinating, and orchestrating full spectrum fires in time, space and purpose against targets within the battlespace that support the commander's intent. It is the ECOORD's responsibility to obtain the commander's guidance for the desired effects and their purpose. The ECOORD's primary means to plan, integrate, and orchestrate fires and effects is the FECC staff.⁷³

The FECC staff supports current operations, future operations, and planning. The FECC staff consists of twenty-one personnel. This number could increase depending on METT-TC. The Army could augment with an additional Civil Affairs officer and a Space Operations officer.

This number does not represent the joint billets from the Tactical Air Control Party. The NLEC consists of information operations, electronic attack, PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and judge advocate/legal personnel.

Electronic attack, PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, and Public Affairs are capabilities to conduct Information Operations and the majority of these assets are augmented to the Interim Brigade. It is important to understand the capabilities and their relationship to the Interim Brigade. Tactical psychological operation detachments (TPD), consisting of three tactical psychological operations teams, are expected to support the Interim Brigade. They are equipped with loudspeaker and product dissemination operations to influence threat forces behavior in support of the commander's information related activities. If the situation requires it, the TPD would be augmented with the required PSYOP assets to locally produce requested products and make it a self-sufficient PSYOP element. The products could be paper, audio, or visual. Again, depending on the situation, the TPDs are either allocated in a direct support mode to the maneuver battalions, or held in general support and are applied to the Interim Brigade's main effort.⁷⁴

Electronic attack assets may support the Interim Brigade during contingency operations requiring capabilities not in the brigade. The electronic attack assets are placed under operational control to the brigade for the duration of the operation. The electronic assets are placed under administrative control to the military intelligence company.⁷⁵

A civil affairs team B (CAT-B), consisting of three civil affairs teams A (CAT-As), is expected to support the Interim Brigade. They are responsible for influencing relations between military forces, civil authorities, and synchronizing the efforts of non-governmental organizations and international organizations. The civil affairs teams are in direct support of the brigade for the duration of the operation.⁷⁶

The Fires and Effects Coordination Cell is tailored to the mission and is capable of controlling sensors, effects control teams and delivery systems. The NLEC plans and coordinates nonlethal effects in support of the Interim Brigade. The Information Operations officers coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the application of Information Operations. Additionally, the NLEC requests from higher headquarters for support for electronic warfare, computer network attack, special information operations, psychological operations, counter-propaganda, and civil affairs based on METT-TC. The NLEC is responsible to integrate and synchronize the above augmentation assets with reconnaissance and surveillance operations and the maneuver plan.⁷⁷ The next step is to examine how the NLEC helps the commander move beyond a traditional (unidimensional) application of lethal force to integrate other elements that can generate nontraditional combat power.

Concept of Operations

Fires and effects coordination is the continuing process of planning, integrating and orchestrating full spectrum fires and effects in support of the combined arms operation to support the intent and endstate designated by the commander. This process includes the management of delivery assets and sensors, and direct coordination with the commander. Effects based fires for the Interim Brigade focuses on achieving a desired effect against a target for a specified purpose to enable the combined arms operation.

Dealing with asymmetric threats places significantly greater responsibilities on the brigade commander and staff to integrate a variety of military and nonmilitary activities at the tactical level. This integration has two primary goals: first, to divide the enemy's patterns of operations, critical vulnerabilities and decisive points; second, to apply the right combinations of force to affect the threat's perspectives, change his behavior and degrade his will to fight.⁷⁸ The two goals mentioned above resemble very closely the two criterion of isolate and shape. The Fires and

Effects Coordination Cell was introduced into the Interim Brigade's staff organization to help the commander deal with the greater responsibility of integrating a variety of military and nonmilitary activities at the tactical level.

The Fires and Effects Coordination Cell is a result of the effects based fires concept. Effects based fires apply and leverage the synergy created by the employment of full spectrum fires and effects (lethal/nonlethal) to enable decisive combined operations. The objective of effects based fires is to apply a desired effect to achieve a specified purpose in time and space vice simply applying assets against targets acquired.⁷⁹

Effects are the result of the directed application of lethal and nonlethal capabilities to achieve desired purpose or outcome in support of the commander's intent. Effects are a component of the operations plan and must be fully integrated and synchronized with other elements of the plan, particularly the scheme of maneuver. Effects do not include subordinate maneuver forces or the direct fires organic to those forces. When fully integrated, effects and maneuver set the conditions for the tactical success and combine to achieve the commander's intent.⁸⁰

To achieve the greatest effect, all types of military operations at every level of war must include information operations. In the hands of a commander, information operations are a valuable instrument in every national security situation, including peace, pre-crises, crises, conflict and combat, and return to stability and peace.

Information Operations (IO) are designated Information Warfare during crises or conflict. Information Warfare is used to achieve specific objectives over a specific threat. Information Operations must orient on the human element, the most crucial factor in all aspects of war. The ultimate targets of IO are the will and ability of decisionmakers, leaders, and commanders to observe, interpret, reason. Information warfare is used regardless of whether the supported course of action is offensive or defensive.⁸¹

As mentioned above, electronic attack, PSYOPS, Civil Affairs are capabilities to conduct Information Operations and the majority of these assets are augmented to the Interim Brigade. The greatest success in IO comes from the mutually reinforcing, complimentary, and synergistic orchestration of these capabilities. Some of the capabilities, such as physical attack/destruction and military deception, are traditionally fundamental to warfare.⁸² The other capabilities listed above are also traditionally fundamental to warfare at an organizational level higher than brigade. Since the NLEC is responsible to integrate and synchronize the IO augmentation assets with reconnaissance and surveillance operations and the maneuver plan, it is essential to understand how the capabilities can reinforce and produce added effects for the Interim Brigade's concept of operation.

Electronic warfare can support offensive IO by attacking the threat by means of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, and antiradiation weapons. It can support defensive IO by controlling the electromagnetic spectrum to reduce the effects of the threats EW to protect the electronics components of information systems that are essential to the interim Brigade. Electronic warfare adds to the effects of physical destruction and deception.⁸³

Psychological Operations may be effective in influencing a threat through the minds of supporting governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in the population or members of armed forces. PSYOP includes the use of propaganda and other planned operational actions to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence emotions, attitudes, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior to the benefit of the friendly concept of operation. PSYOP supports offensive IO by transmitting information that may degrade the morale and effectiveness of threat commanders and troops. PSYOP supports defensive IO to deny the threats exploitation of the target population.⁸⁴

Civil affairs enhance the relationship between the military and civilian population. This is accomplished by coordinating the restoration of the indigenous communications infrastructure and engages the cultural, social political and economic sectors in theater. This is important when confronting an asymmetric threat in an urban environment. As identified in chapter two, with the British in Northern Ireland, essential to confronting an asymmetric threat in an urban environment is the need for the military to establish and maintain relations with both the local police and the civil population. Useful intelligence can only be gained through good human intelligence collection. Civil affairs collect information and conduct assessments in order to target their relief effort or stabilize the civilian environment. In turn supporting the commander's information operations and ensuring mission accomplishment for the Interim Brigade.

When confronting an asymmetric threat in an urban environment the Interim Brigade's operations assume a broader nature for a variety of reasons. First, centers of gravity and decisive points for asymmetric threats are more difficult to determine. In many situations, military capabilities will not constitute the primary vulnerabilities or best means of influencing the enemy. As a result, the traditional approach of employing lethal effects to degrade or destroy specific enemy capabilities is not sufficient to shape and isolate the battlespace and affect the enemy's will.⁸⁵ The next step is to examine the process the FECC uses to identify and target centers of gravity and decisive points for asymmetric threats.

Targeting Process

The Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess Targeting Process defined in *Field Manual 6-20-10* is integral to effective fires and effects coordination. Targeting is performed as a component of the military decision making process vice a separate process or substitute. Targeting does not stop with planning; it continues throughout the preparation and execution of a mission. Integrating

lethal and non-lethal IO into the targeting process starts by acknowledging the compatibility of conventional and IO targeting objectives.⁸⁶

The decide function begins when target value analysis is conducted during intelligence preparation of the battlefield to identify high value targets. The high value target list identifies the capabilities that are critical to the enemy's success. The results are presented to the commander during mission analysis. When providing guidance and intent following the mission analysis briefing, the commander drives and focuses the decide function by articulating his desired effects against high payoff targets and intended purpose. The battlestaff completes the decide function by determining how and where to detect and track the target, what available delivery asset can best achieve the desired effects, and how to assess the effects delivered.⁸⁷ Targets are selected from the high value target list and re-grouped into target categories on the high payoff target list.⁸⁸

The detect function begins with the intelligence collection plan. The Interim Brigade's strength is the robust human-based sensor capability provided by the reconnaissance troops, tactical teams, fire support teams and forward observers. Electronic and optical sensors ranging from counterfire radar to unmanned aerial vehicles provide redundancy. Civil affairs and psychological operation teams are essential in the detection of asymmetrical targets. The Interim Brigade's full range of sensors are coordinated by the FECC to enable the brigade to focus effects to achieve the commander's desired effects and their purpose.⁸⁹

Delivery assets are determined for each target, once the detection assets are assigned against the high payoff targets, appropriate named areas of interest, and target areas of interest are established. Building an attack guidance matrix develops a prioritization list of this information. The attack guidance matrix provides the target and when and how to attack it with the effect desired for each target.⁹⁰

Targeting assessment is a continuous process to determine if targeting objectives have been achieved and if re-attack is required. The assessment process for traditional and IO targeting is the same, except that while the traditional assessment is objective, IO assessment is often subjective. Overcoming this difference requires a clear understanding of the desired end state as well as the capability to interpretively measure the effectiveness of the attack. Nonlethal effects assessment could include populace perceptions provided by counterintelligence teams and civil affairs teams, delayed reaction in threat's decision making, capture of prisoners of war, lack of adversary electronic signatures, and public opinion.⁹¹

The targeting process used by the FECC helps identify a target at which IO is applied in time and space in order to negate an opponent's ability to continue to prosecute military operations. If a threat at the tactical level has targets whose destruction or control will bring about the prevention of his purpose, one could posit then that preventing the enemy from achieving his purpose should then assist the friendly force in achieving its purpose.⁹² Therefore, the process of assessing the threat and urbanized terrain as a system and having the capabilities to understand and influence the sub-components of that system will enhance a tactical planner's ability to more efficiently and effectively plan an operation within that system.

CHAPTER 6

RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSION

This monograph will conclude with recommendations for effectively and efficiently incorporating the Fire and Effects Coordination Cell in planning tactical operations in an urban environment. Effective is defined as the Fire and Effects Coordination Cell's ability to link intelligence operations, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and civic action in urban combat efforts. The term efficient refers to the Fires and Effects Coordination cell's ability to get the effects wanted without wasting effort by adding an additional element within the staff's

organization. For the Interim brigade's staff organization to be enhanced by the Fire and Effects Coordination Cell, important events need to occur for effectively and efficiently incorporating the Fire and Effects Coordination Cell in planning tactical operations in an urban environment.

First, doctrine needs to be revised to incorporate the use of the components of IO. Doctrine is the foundation upon which to build our training programs, organize our forces, and determine the essential equipment needed to fight and win. MOUT doctrine that fails to address components of IO, which this monograph has demonstrated to be essential against an asymmetrical threat in an urban environment, fails in its intended purpose. *FM 90-10* and *FM 90-10-1* need to support the use of IO in shaping operations and isolation. These manuals need to provide a path for analyzing the urban environment as a system to a planner, or analyzing the parts of the complexity of an urban environment. They need to consider the interface between the physical environment of the urban terrain, the threat, the friendly force, and the urban population.

Additionally, doctrine and emerging tactics, techniques and procedures are incomplete on the specifics of IO targeting and integration of IO into the battle rhythms of conventional planning staffs. The IO community must adopt a clear method for targeting that is consistent with maneuver. Doctrine needs to describe the path that effectively integrates IO into conventional planning cycles that are well understood by maneuver commanders. This is the main solution to reducing the perception of stovepiping. Revised doctrine is essential in allowing the FECC to be more effective.

Next, with updated doctrine in place, and emerging doctrine finalized and approved, TRADOC will have the necessary foundation to update the educational requirements related to MOUT. It is not enough merely to provide information. Leader development is essential, and cannot be sacrificed at the tactical level. The ability of a leader to analyze a system and the interrelationship of the sub-components are essential in the leader's ability on how to direct and

determine effects required to affect that system. There must be realistic tasks, conditions, and standards assigned to MOUT activities that include the components of IO at the tactical level. Assuming no significant change to the Army Training System, the best possible solution is for unit commanders to make MOUT tasks part of a units Mission Essential Task List (METL). The current problem is that MOUT is frequently considered merely a condition. As such is not put on the METL, and infrequently trained and evaluated. Both doctrine and training fail to sufficiently link intelligence operations, psychological operations, and civic action in urban efforts, even though the effectiveness of each type of operation can be multiplied by coordination with the others.

Second, the structure of the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) enables it to perform a Fire Support Element's mission and integrate available nonlethal capabilities into targeting and executing information operations. There is a need for tactical planners to accurately assess the enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities to employ the proper combination of combat power. The FECC with the expertise provided within the separate components of IO helps accurately assess the enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The separate components of IO need to focus the fires portion of the FECC away from numbers and precisely targetable locations and provide a base on understanding and possible means to influence the enemy's psychological vulnerabilities. Is this more efficient for the staff? Currently with the doctrine needing revision and the relatively new role of IO at the tactical level, the FECC does make the Interim Brigade staff more efficient. If doctrine is revised and *FM 3-0* is finalized the FECC may become obsolete then IO components will be incorporated into the S3's area of responsibility. All effects will be developed, organized, synchronized by the commander and S3.⁹³ Maneuver and targeting need to be combined to attain the level of effects required.

In summary, the global proliferation of technology and the increasing refinement of asymmetric techniques, coupled with economic, social and demographic factors, are changing the threat to the United States. These factors indicate that the U.S. military must be prepared to counter asymmetric warfare against adversaries with power bases in urban centers. Effective use of intelligence, civic action, and psychological operations will enhance the effect of combined arms operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict. However, division and brigade organizations currently lack doctrine and training to sufficiently link intelligence operations, psychological operations, and civic action in urban combat efforts. This is due to outdated doctrine and the inability to finalize emerging doctrine. The need for a command system arises from, and varies with, the size, complexity, and differentiation of the forces involved. The evolution of a command system is partly a response to a changing environment. This monograph explored the possible evolution of a command system, specifically the FECC, in response to the complexity of an urban environment with an asymmetrical threat and demonstrated that the FECC will enhance urban operations planning. The expertise provided within the FECC staff allows the commander to better understand and influence the subcomponents of a MOUT environment.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 98-99.
- ² US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Draft Joint Operational Concept for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*. (Washington DC: October 20, 1998), 5.
- ³ Michael E. Langley, *Operational Fires on the Urban Battlefield: An Undeveloped Concept*, (Newport, Rhode Island, Naval War College Monograph, 1999) 7-10.
- ⁴ Ibid, 5.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ Department of Defense, *The Interim Brigade: Organizational and Operational Concept (4.0a)*. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 3-24.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Steven P. Goligowski, *Operational Art and Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*, (Unpublished monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Advanced Military Studies Program, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994), 8-9.
- ¹² Department of the Army, *FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Built-Up Areas*, (Washington D.C.: US Government printing Office, 1993), 1-2.
- ¹³ Steven P. Goligowski, 8-9.
- ¹⁴ Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future*, 40-45.
- ¹⁵ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Edited and translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (New York, New York: The Oxford University Press, 1963), 100-130.
- ¹⁶ Donald J. Wurzel, Kenneth R. McGruther and William R. Murray, *A Survey of Unclassified Literature on the Subject of Asymmetric Warfare*, (Sherman Oaks, CA: Arete Associates, 1998), 1.
- ¹⁷ US Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Future Operational and Threat Environment: A View of the World in 2015*, (Virginia, Ft. Monroe: February 2000) 1-17.

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- ¹⁸ Franklin B. Miles, *Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective*, (Unpublished Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1999), 1-45.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, 2.
- ²⁰ Donald J. Wurzel, 13.
- ²¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *Statement of Work for Asymmetric Warfare Threats to US Interests: Expert Panel Support*, (Washington, D.C.: DIA, 1997), 2.
- ²² Wurzel, 7.
- ²³ Defense Intelligence Agency, *Background Paper for the Quadrennial Review*, (Washington, D.C.: DIA, 1997), 2.
- ²⁴ Miles, 4.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Roger Spiller, *Sharp Corners; Urban Operations at Century's End*, (Unpublished Research Project, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2000), 66-70.
- ²⁷ Russell W. Glenn. Unpublished notes in support of research conducted while a Senior Army Fellow at RAND Arroyo Center.
- ²⁸ US Army Infantry School. *Combat in Cities Report, Volumes I-II*. Fort Benning, GA: US Army Infantry School, 1972, p.155.
- ²⁹ Goligowski, 27.
- ³⁰ David Barzilay. *The British Army in Ulster, Vol. II*. (Belfast, Northern Ireland: Century Printing Services, 1975), 89.
- ³¹ Lawrence M. Greenburg. *United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention*. (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), 42.
- ³² Robert Boyko. "JUST CAUSE, MOUT Lessons Learned" *Infantry*, May-June 1991, p.28.
- ³³ Department of the Army, *FM 90-10-1*, 2-9-2-10.
- ³⁴ Department of the Army, *FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 1-73.
- ³⁵ Department of the Army, *FM 90-10-1*, 1.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 1.

³⁷ It is, arguably, this long-term gap of joint urban doctrine that has stymied service efforts to develop coherent and relative MOUT doctrine---especially at the operational level.

³⁸ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Draft Joint Operational Concept for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*. (Washington DC: October 20, 1998), 5.

³⁹ Department of the Army, *FM 90-10-1*, 2-1-2-4.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 2-1.

⁴¹ Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations (DRAG Edition)*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), 1-7.

⁴² *Ibid*, 6-17.

⁴³ *Ibid*. Army forces execute full spectrum operations in complex operational environments. Each operation is different in circumstances and challenges. These environments include-Operations in NBC environments, Local populace and displaced persons, Unconventional threats, Urban Operations.

⁴⁴ The author understands the difference in theory behind the two manuals and for the purpose of this monograph has decided to examine isolation as a phase within the framework for planning within a MOUT environment. The author explores isolation as a tactical task where the use of IO could have a significant impact on the sub-components of a complex system.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

⁴⁶ Barzilay, 89.

⁴⁷ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *A Strategy for Peace The Decisive Edge in War: Information Operations* (Washington DC: March, 1999), 15.

⁴⁸ Barzilay, 89.

⁴⁹ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Draft Joint Operational Concept for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*. (Washington DC: October 20, 1998), 7.

⁵⁰ Michael E. Langley, *Operational Fires on the Urban Battlefield: An Undeveloped Concept*, (Newport, Rhode Island, Naval War College Monograph, 1999) 15.

⁵¹ Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations (DRAG Edition)* 2-21. Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

⁵² Brian A. Keller, *Intelligence Support to Military Operations on Urban Terrain: Lessons Learned from the Battle of Grozny*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2000) 8. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Muslim leader Iman Shamil waged a holy war against Russian forces ending with his capture in 1859 and the

expulsion of five hundred thousand Chechens to Turkey. Peace remained elusive as no less than eighteen revolts occurred in the twenty years after Shamil's capture. Following the October 1917 revolution, the Soviet era saw a renewed tragedy for the Chechen people. Forced famine brought about by collectivization, mass arrests, killings, and deportations fueled the hatred. Later, during the "Great Patriotic War," Chechen anti-Soviet guerrillas stepped up attacks against Soviet forces as Hitler's army raced towards the Caucasus. In February 1944, responding to the Chechen "betrayal" to the Motherland, Stalin deported to Central Asia every Chechen in the region, including a one-year old named Dzokhar Dudayev, resulting in a great loss of life. Today, Chechens mark the deportations as an official holiday, and Dudayev remains a martyr after his assassination by Russian forces in 1996 while serving as the Chechnya president.

⁵³ Timothy L. Thomas, *The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya, Part One, Section One: From Intervention to the Outskirts of Grozny* (Military-Political Events from 11 December to 31 December), (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1995), 3.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*.

⁵⁶ Timothy L. Thomas, *The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya, Part One, Section Two: Military Activities of the Conflict During 11-31 December 1994*, 8-9.

⁵⁷ Gregory J. Celestan, *Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya*, (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996), 3.

⁵⁸ Timothy L. Thomas, *The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya, Part One, Section Two: Military Activities of the Conflict During 11-31 December 1994*, 8-9.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 14.

⁶⁰ Thomas, Timothy L., "Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned," *Military Review*, July-August 2000. 51.

⁶¹ *Ibid*.

⁶² Barzilay, 89.

⁶³ Thomas, Timothy L., "Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned," *Military Review*, July-August 2000. 52.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 52.

⁶⁵ Timothy L. Thomas, *The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security: The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya, Part One, Section One: From Intervention to the Outskirts of Grozny*, 14.

⁶⁶ Thomas, Timothy L., "Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned," *Military Review*, July-August 2000. 52.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 53.

⁶⁹ Emil Pain, "The Second Chechen War: The Information Component," *Military Review*, July-August 2000. 62.

⁷⁰ Celestan, 4.

⁷¹ Ibid, 51.

⁷² Department of Defense, *The Interim Brigade: Organizational and Operational Concept (4.0a)*. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), 8-9.

⁷³ Ibid, 8-8.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 8-11.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Department of Defense, *The Interim Brigade: Organizational and Operational Concept (4.0a)*. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), 8-9.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Department of Defense, *The Interim Brigade: Organizational and Operational Concept (4.0a)*. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), chapter 8.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 8-1.

⁸¹ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *A Strategy for Peace The Decisive Edge in War: Information Operations* (Washington DC: March, 1999), 7. Offensive Information Operations focuses on decisionmakers and commanders of opposing forces. This includes their information and information systems. The goal of offensive IO is to exploit, corrupt, disrupt, degrade, or destroy the information, information systems, and human will. Offensive IO has three prime targets: the human decisionmakers, information and information systems to make decisions, and information and information systems used to implement decisions.

Defensive IO protects and defends information and information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access. Defensive IO also denies adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems. The goal of defensive IO must be to

protect those critical organizations, resources, and actions upon which the force depends to conduct operations

⁸² Ibid, 10. Military deception can mislead an adversary by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying evidence concerning friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations. The goal is to cause opponents to act (or not act) against their own interests and to benefit the friendly position. Deception is a critical aspect and objective of classical movement and maneuver. Deception, when performed as offensive IO, causes threat commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly forces, waste intelligence assets, or fail to use other resources to best advantage.

Physical Attack/Destruction is also a valuable instrument to execute offensive IO. For example, destructive fires may inflict enough damage to personnel or systems to the extent they cannot function or be restored to a useable condition. As part of defensive IO, physical attacks may reduce or block a threat's ability to conduct offensive IO.

⁸³ Ibid, 11.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Department of the Army, *Military Review*, (Ft. Leavenworth KS, Army Command and General Staff College, Volume LXXX, 2000), 12.

⁸⁶ Instead of well-defined military targets, such as multiple rockets launchers, air defense artillery sites and motorized rifle divisions, the high-value targets and high-payoff targets facing the Interim Brigade commander in a MOUT environment against an asymmetrical threat are not well defined. His targets may be the intentions of government leaders, attitudes of the local populace and influence over various social and political groups.

FM 6-20-10 describes targeting objectives that limit, disrupt, delay, divert, destroy or damage the threat. These same terms are applicable to IO targeting, although the descriptions must be refined from both the conventional and IO perspectives to reflect the focus of IO targeting. The focus of IO targeting includes adversary decisionmakers, information structures, and decision making process.

Since targeting and IO share the same endstate of altering the threat capabilities to a level specified by the commander and friendly capabilities protected, it logically follows that the process to achieve that outcome should be similar. Using parallel, non-integrating planning process is an inefficient use of limited planning time and produces sub-optimal results.

⁸⁷ Department of Defense, *The Interim Brigade: Organizational and Operational Concept (4.0a)*. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), 8-4. Development of the high payoff target list is the primary objective of the decide function of targeting. Targets are selected from the high value target list and re-grouped into target categories on the high payoff target list. The target categories are adversary capabilities and functions. Within each category, individual targets are rank ordered by sequence of appearance, importance or other criteria that satisfy the targeting objectives. In this way, the targeting process ensures the selected targets support the commander's intent. This process was also taught in A 311 for the Interim Brigade in academic year 2000.

⁸⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Steven Curtis, Captain Robert A.B. Curris, Major (retired) Mare J. Romanych, "Integrating Targeting and Information Operations in Bosnia." *Field Artillery*, July-August 1998. P. 31-36. Targets on the high payoff target list are confirmed and refined in the war-gaming process. Prioritization of the high priority targets may differ between phases of an operation, but the target list should remain the same and include all critical targets. Once the entire target list is finalized, the assignment of delivery means follows the traditional targeting process.

⁸⁹ Ibid. Additionally, descriptive target selection standards frequently are required to identify IO targets. Unlike traditional target selection where the enemy is known to possess specific types equipment, against an asymmetrical threat, target identification is often unclear. For example, not everyone carrying a cellular phone in a hostile crowd is an agitator and not all buses in the AOR are transporting reinforcements. Thus, descriptive criteria are required to help the attacking systems determine valid targets. Examples of this could be patrols or traffic control points.

⁹⁰ Ibid. In Operation Joint Guard, non-lethal delivery systems include Task Force Eagle commanders and staff conducting face to face bilateral discussions with entity leaders and target groups; PSYOP print, radio and television media products; CA contacts with the local populace; and PA press releases and conferences.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Pure symmetry of the objective of red versus blue is considered the norm especially at the tactical level. Since we are dealing with the tactical level in this monograph, we will consider it that way.

⁹³ Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations (DRAG Edition)*, Chapter 4. This manual indicates that we are transitioning to effects based operations. If this is the case the commander and S3 should be responsible for the application of combat power to achieve the effects desired.

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