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THESIS

**CHINA AND INDIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR REGIONAL
MARITIME SUPREMACY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND
INDIAN OCEAN**

by

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SUPREMACY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN**

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The expanding economic and political power of China and India have led each country to extend its naval operations into the other's region of influence in order to safeguard economic/national interests. This expansion has led to suspicion and increased tension between the two countries. The thesis postulates that the continued operational expansion of China and India's naval forces into each other's claimed maritime domain is likely to trigger alliance formations and a naval arms buildup between the two countries which could lead to confrontation and conflict in the near future. This thesis is supported by evidence of active naval modernization programs initiated by China and India as well as the pursuit of security relations with countries in each other's respective regions. Conflicting strategic cultures, a history of antagonistic relations and differences in long-term strategic objectives warn of the possibility of a coming confrontation, which may now have a maritime dimension. The volatility of the situation could have an effect on not only the maritime security climate, but on the security of mainland Asia itself and has implications for future U.S. security policy in the region.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the likelihood of conflict between China and India as each country continues to expand its naval forces and maritime operational reach. The political and economic growth of China and India has led each country to extend its naval operations into the other's region of influence in order to safeguard economic/national interests. This expansion has led to suspicion and increased tension between the two countries. The thesis postulates that the continued operational expansion of China and India's naval forces into what is claimed by each to be its maritime domain is likely to trigger alliance formations and a naval arms buildup between the two countries which could lead to confrontation and conflict in the near future.

This thesis is supported by evidence of active naval modernization programs initiated by China and India as well as the pursuit of security relations with countries in each other's respective regions. Both China and India have undertaken significant naval modernization programs in order to create forces more capable of power projection. These programs include the acquisition and production of aircraft carriers, naval aviation and submarines along with advanced weapons technology. Both countries are actively pursuing security relations in what has traditionally been the other's area of influence. China maintains close ties to Pakistan and is courting relations with Myanmar in what appears to be an effort to acquire the use of Myanmar's port facilities in the Bay of Bengal. China has recently conducted naval exercises with the Myanmar Navy in the Bay of Bengal. China has been facilitating these relations and others through the substantial sale of arms to countries in the Indian Ocean region. Likewise, India has been

courting relations with the countries of Southeast Asia as well as Northeast Asia, many of which are seeking to balance growing Chinese influence in the region. India maintains close ties to Vietnam and continues to improve relations with Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. India recently conducted naval port visits to China, South Korea and Japan as well as participating in multilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea.

Adding to the seriousness of the situation are the conflicting strategic cultures of China and India as well as a history of antagonistic relations and opposing long-term strategic objectives. Chinese strategic culture reveals a nation that is unwilling to accept a challenge to its regional authority. Similarly, Indian strategic culture looks at its immediate neighbors as enemies. Differences in Chinese and Indian national interests have led to conflict in the past (the Sino-Indian War) and antagonistic relations have fueled India's drive toward a deterrent nuclear arms capability. Both countries' increasing emphasis on naval capability and desire to extend into each other's maritime domain have opened up a new avenue for conflict between the two regional powers.

The volatility of this situation could have an effect on not only the maritime security climate, but on the security of mainland Asia itself and has implications for future U.S. security policy in the region. Increased naval activity in each other's claimed maritime domain means an increased chance of contact between the Chinese and Indian naval forces. Any increase of naval activity in the other's maritime domain in the context of either an Indo-Pakistani conflict or Chinese territorial conflict with a member of ASEAN in the South China Sea is sure to fuel tensions. Any type of meeting engagement at sea could easily carry over to the mainland. As China and India remain at

odds over their disputed border area as well as nuclear intentions, any confrontation has the potential to escalate.

These developments can have an impact on future U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean region. As the United States has an inherent interest in stability in what has become the largest market in the world (the Asia-Pacific region), a significant threat to that stability may ensure a sustained U.S. presence, even as anticipated events such as Korean unification and an expanding Japanese security role in the region question the future need for a sustained U.S. military presence. Similarly, the increasing volatility of Indo-Pakistani relations and increased Chinese presence in the region along with the need for unhindered access to the Persian Gulf may lead to an increased U.S. commitment in the Indian Ocean.

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I. INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Indian naval port visits to China, South Korea and Japan as well as participation in naval exercises in the South China Sea in September through October 2000 signified an expansion of India's naval operational capabilities.¹ This encroachment into an area that the People's Republic of China claims as its maritime domain caused alarm and concern in Beijing.² Although China has had to contend with powerful U.S., Russian and Japanese navies over the past several decades, it now faces the prospect of an increasingly capable Indian naval presence. India's expansion into the South China Sea follows China's own expansion into the Indian Ocean, viewed by India as its maritime domain. India's actions can even be viewed as a reaction to increasing Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean, which include negotiations for the use of naval port facilities in Myanmar and the reported establishment of a Chinese observation station in the Cocos Islands, located between the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea.³

Accompanying increased presence in each other's maritime domain is what appears to be naval buildup as a component of each country's larger defense modernization program. In particular, more emphasis is being placed on force projection, which is a departure from each country's historical focus on coastal defense. There also seems to be an increase in coalition building as well as the signing of security agreements

¹ Indian Naval News, September 2000, <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/News/00-Sept.html>, 1-12.

² Ashley Tellis telephone interview with author, August 18, 2000.

³ Ibid.

by China and India with the other's neighboring countries. The increasing importance of protecting territorial claims and maintaining open sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) such as the Malacca Strait has increased the need of China and India for a naval force that can project itself beyond its coastal territory. As the need to protect maritime interests continues to expand, the possibilities for confrontation between the two largest regional powers on either side of the Malacca Strait rises accordingly.

This thesis explores what appears to be escalating naval operations by both China and India. The thesis postulates that the continued operational expansion of China and India's naval forces into each other's maritime domain is likely to trigger alliance formations and a naval arms buildup between the two countries which could lead to confrontation and conflict in the near future. Such a critical development has the potential to change the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions and may affect not only the maritime security climate but also the security of mainland Asia itself. This is of especially great concern to the United States and countries in the region that want to ensure stability and freedom of navigation. The nuclear potentials of both China and India make this situation even more menacing.

There is reason to believe that confrontation and conflict between China and India is likely to happen in the future. The strategic cultures of both China and India support the possibility of conflict. Sinocentrism and Kautilyan logic put these two great regional powers at odds. There has been a history of antagonistic relations between China and India dating back to the Sino-Indian War, creating an atmosphere of "one upsmanship" or escalating behavior. The burgeoning economies of these two giant states makes protection of SLOCs critical to their economic development. As mentioned above, this

has led to the need for naval operations into each other's maritime domain, which increases the likelihood of conflict. With economic advancement has come increasing defense budgets. Both China and India have devoted a considerable amount of funding to naval modernization. A renewed emphasis has been placed on creating a "blue-water" capable navy, which would increase operational capability as well as international prestige. At the same time this development opens another avenue for confrontation. Lastly, as U.S. presence in Korea and Japan comes more and more into question along with a desire for a declining role in Southeast Asian affairs, a decrease in U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions in the future remains a possibility.⁴ A decrease in U.S. presence could create a power vacuum, which countries like China or India may move to fill, and threaten the currently stable environment.

Evidence to support this thesis is abundant. There is a historical precedence for conflict between China and India. A border dispute between China and India erupted into the Sino-Indian War of 1962. China attacked Indian forces in the disputed area in order to control the Aksai Chin area, through which it earlier had built a strategic highway linking Xizang and Xinjiang autonomous regions. Although the conflict was short, it resulted in an embarrassing defeat for India. This conflict demonstrated that China would go to extreme lengths to protect its strategic interests. It also contributed to the suspicion and tension which has characterized Sino-Indian relations ever since. In addition, China's development of a nuclear capability was the crucial factor for launching India's nuclear weapons program, which India justified as appropriate defense from the Chinese threat. As these two countries industrialized and their economies began to

⁴ STRATFOR, "U.S. Influence Retreats from Southeast Asia," July 12, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 1.

expand, each has become increasingly dependent on sea lanes of communication to transport critical natural resources and facilitate foreign trade. The recent expansion of their naval forces has created another avenue for possible confrontation and conflict where one did not previously exist.

Both India and China have continued to devote resources to expanding their naval forces as components of their larger defense modernization. Although the naval branch of the armed forces has historically received the least amount of attention in both countries, defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP remain high, which will make more funds available for shipbuilding and procurement. Naval development has moved away from a traditional emphasis on coastal defense to a focus on enhancing force projection capabilities. To augment India's existing aircraft carrier *Viraat*, the Indian defense ministry is finalizing negotiations for the purchase of the Russian carrier, *Admiral Gorshkov* and has approved plans for the domestic production of another carrier. China has contracted the Russian Nevskoye Design Bureau to construct an aircraft carrier at the Dalian Shipyard facilities.⁵ Both China and India have plans to update and increase their submarine fleets as well.

With enhanced naval capabilities, both China and India have begun to expand their spheres of maritime operations. The Chinese Navy has conducted exercises throughout the Asia-Pacific region since the 1980s and has made port calls as far away as Hawaii and the western coast of North and South America. The Indian Navy has conducted numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises reaching from the Indian Ocean

⁵ Richard Sharpe, *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*, (London, UK: Jane's Information Group Limited, 2000), 120.

to the South China Sea throughout the 1990s into the year 2000. It has conducted exercises with Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and France and conducted port visits as far away as Israel. Chinese naval forces have conducted exercises as well as a number of port visits in the Indian Ocean since 1985. Chinese port calls in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan were a cause of great concern in India, which perceived itself as getting squeezed from all sides. Of more concern to India is a possible negotiated plan for the use of naval facilities in Myanmar. Indian participation in naval exercises in the South China Sea in October was cause for alarm in China. Both countries now feel the need to project their naval forces to each other's respective side of the Malacca Strait in order to safeguard their economic and security interests. These actions also enhance the probability of confrontation. For a situation map of China and India's naval presence in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean see Appendix A.

There seems to be a high degree of coalition building and alliance formation on either side of the Malacca Strait. China has long standing security ties with India's primary enemy, Pakistan. This has been a constant source of concern and animosity between India and China, as India fears the possibility of a two-front war. China has also been cultivating relations with Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand as well as Nepal and Bhutan since the 1980s, tightening a noose around India, according to some Indian perceptions.⁶ Fear of a continuing Chinese naval presence in Sri Lanka prompted India to coerce Sri Lanka into signing the Gandhi-Jayewardene agreement of 1987, which gives India the right to veto any use of Sri Lankan port facilities to any force that it deems

⁶ J. Mohan Malik, "India," *Asian Defense Policies: Great Powers and Regional Powers*, ed. J. Mohan Malik, (Victoria, AU: Deakin University Press, 1994), 159-162.

a threat to Indian security.⁷ Most disturbing to Indian officials however, is China's relations with the military junta in Myanmar (Burma). China's arms transfers to Myanmar from the mid-1980s to the present, total over 1 billion US dollars.⁸ China has also purportedly assisted in the construction of naval bases (most notably in Sittwe) in addition to funding road construction of a route linking Kunming (in China's southern province of Yunnan) to the port of Bhamo in Myanmar.⁹ In return, China has supposedly been permitted to construct an observation station in the Cocos Islands, off of Myanmar's coast and is negotiating for the use of naval facilities.¹⁰ India has reciprocated with its own efforts in Southeast Asia. After attempting to cultivate a special security relationship with Vietnam (China's adversary) throughout the 1980s, the two countries signed a security agreement earlier this year apparently directed against China.¹¹ India has also opened a security dialogue with Japan, South Korea and Australia, as well as members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the purposes of balancing what many Asians view as a rising China, as well as combating piracy in the Malacca Strait.¹²

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following the brief introduction to the topic of Chinese and Indian naval expansion and a review of the thesis' main conclusions and methods, Chapter II examines Sino-Indian relations from the founding of the People's Republic of China to the present. It suggests that elements in each country's respective

⁷ Ibid., 151.

⁸ Daniel L. Byman and Roger Cliff, *China's Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).

⁹ Denny Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1998), 174.

¹⁰ Ashley Tellis telephone interview with author, August 18, 2000.

¹¹ *The Indian Express*, "India, Vietnam Sign Defense Pact," March 29, 2000, 1.

¹² STRATFOR, "India Challenges China in South China Sea," April 26, 2000
<http://www.stratfor.com>, 1-2.

strategic culture makes conflict between the two more likely. In addition, it clarifies perceptions and positions that have led to antagonistic relations since the Sino-Indian War and suggests why conflict may be more likely in the future. Chapters III and IV take an in-depth look at China and India's naval forces from their establishment after independence to the present. These chapters explore each country's naval capabilities and deficiencies and focus on periods of modernization that have led to increasingly "blue-water" capable navies. Chapter V discusses the current issues that threaten each country's maritime supremacy in their respective maritime domain and why this may lead toward confrontation and conflict between Asia's two great regional powers. It specifically looks at naval developments in the South China Sea, Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean. Chapter VI looks at emerging security trends in these regions. It specifically looks at security alliances and coalition building as well as the role of regional and international organizations in averting or increasing the likelihood of conflict. Chapter VII discusses U.S. relations with China and India, its interests in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, and the implications for continued U.S. presence on Sino-Indian naval competition. Chapter VIII offers a conclusion based on the facts and analysis in the thesis, namely that China and India's naval capabilities are increasing, that they are expanding into each other's areas of interest, and based on past antagonistic relations, that this unstable environment could lead to conflict. In this chapter, I also hedge my conclusions with the belief that conflict is not inevitable and explore evidence that would make naval confrontation less likely.

B. METHODOLOGY

This thesis applies qualitative and quantitative analysis to research data derived from primary and secondary source materials. This thesis argues that the operational expansion of China and India's naval forces into each other's maritime domain is likely to trigger alliance formations as well as a naval arms buildup between the two countries, which could lead to confrontation and conflict in the near future. In this thesis I contend the independent variable (the continuation of the operational expansion of China and India's naval forces into each other's maritime domain) affects the dependent variables (alliance formations and modern naval arms buildup), which may further lead to confrontation and conflict. The theoretical framework for these conclusions reflect three theories of International Politics: political realism, balance of power theory, and deterrence theory.

The suggestion that China and India are seeking to expand their naval operational capability in order to protect their national interests and increase their international prestige is based on the theory of political realism. According to Henry Kissinger, the best way to understand current international relations is to study the Realpolitik of the 18th and 19th centuries. The elements of Realpolitik are: The state's interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state's interests, success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state. Realpolitik indicates the methods by which

foreign policy is conducted and provides rationale for them.¹³ Applied to the present topic, it is assumed that China and India are expanding their naval operational capability (as a component of a larger military modernization) in order to assure their own survival in an anarchic international system. According to political realism, a state is compelled within the anarchic and competitive conditions of international relations to expand its power and attempt to extend its control over the international system. If the state fails to make this attempt, it risks the possibility that other states will increase their relative power positions and will thereby place its existence or vital interests in jeopardy.¹⁴

The suggestion that China and India will engage in alliances and coalition building to balance the perception of the other's rising power is based on balance of power theory. The belief that states form alliances in order to prevent stronger powers from dominating them lies at the heart of traditional balance of power theory. States choose to balance for two main reasons. First, they place their survival at risk if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. Second, joining the weaker side increases the new member's influence within the alliance, because the weaker side has greater need for assistance.¹⁵ Based on the assumption that U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific is diminishing, many countries in East and Southeast Asia perceive a rising China as a threat to stability in the area. To counter this threat, many are seeking security relationships with the next largest regional powers, India and to some extent Japan, in order to balance Chinese strength. Similarly, in the Indian Ocean, several South and

¹³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (San Francisco, CA: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1979), 117.

¹⁴ Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 86.

¹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17-27.

Southeast Asian states have established or are seeking security relations with China in order to balance India's rising power in the area.

The argument concerning a naval arms buildup between China and India, along with the possibility of confrontation and conflict between them in the future is based on deterrence theory. According to this theory, in order to avoid aggression from another state, the status quo state must demonstrate its willingness to wage war.¹⁶ The failure of appeasement by the Nehru government towards China in the events leading up to the Sino-Indian War demonstrated the inappropriateness of a "spiral theory of conflict" in explaining Sino-Indian relations. Since that time, the strengthening of Indian land forces in the border region and later the development of a nuclear weapons program were undertaken to deter Chinese aggression. Currently, the naval buildup of both China and India is principally designed to project power to protect national interests by deterring the other from interfering with those interests as well as gaining some degree of international prestige with a "blue water" navy. An increase in naval arms as well as naval operations increases the likelihood of these two navies coming into contact with each other. As deterrence theory predicts, issues of little intrinsic value become highly significant as indices of resolve.¹⁷ Antagonistic relations increase the likelihood that these contacts, however seemingly insignificant, will turn into confrontation and conflict.

This description of the theoretical framework is detailed in order to provide insight into how facts were interpreted, why certain assumptions were made, and how conclusions were determined. These theories will not be further explained in the thesis,

¹⁶ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 58.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

but further insight into them may be gained through the works of Gilpin, Jervis, Walt, and Waltz cited in the thesis bibliography.

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II. CHINA-INDIA RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Chinese and Indian relations have deep historical roots. As ancient centers of civilization, people from China and India spread throughout Asia and intermixed with indigenous populations, forming many of the Asian populations today. Early trading expeditions by both countries spread cultural traditions stretching back several thousand years as well as religious beliefs throughout Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia. Both countries experienced Western imperialism, though China was never directly colonized, and both were able to free themselves of foreign domination shortly after World War II. Their enormous populations make them the two most populous countries in the world. The vast diversity of language, ethnicity and cultural heritage within each country creates problems of keeping their countries unified. China and India are both troubled by unification issues (Taiwan, Tibet and Kashmir). The attention of the international community to these issues is viewed by each as outside interference in its internal affairs. Today, China and India are recognized as regional powers in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Their relations are highlighted more by distrust and conflict rather than friendship and cooperation. Their size, volatility, and destructive potential have made Sino-Indian relations a concern of not just Asia, but the entire international community. Evidence of this conflicting relationship can be identified in each country's strategic culture as well as foreign policy.

B. STRATEGIC CULTURES

The term strategic culture is often used to describe consistent and persistent historical patterns in the way states think about the use of force for political ends. These strategic preferences are rooted in the early military experiences of the state and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and state elites as these develop through time.¹⁸ It is often believed that understanding a state's strategic culture will provide some indication of international behavior particularly the likelihood of using force to achieve national goals. The examination of Chinese and Indian strategic cultures indicates opposing views that place these two regional powers in rival camps. If any relevance is afforded to these opposing views, it may predict future confrontation and conflict.

1. China

Confucianism and the writings of military strategist Sun Zi have played significant roles in shaping Chinese strategic culture. There is, however, disagreement on how to interpret their influence on strategic culture. There is an ongoing debate as to whether Chinese strategic tradition is uniquely antimilitarist or whether it more closely resembles Western political realism. Those who advocate the former believe the Chinese tradition demonstrates a preference for stratagem, minimal violence and defensive wars of maneuver or attrition and stresses indirection and manipulation of the enemy's perceptions of the structure of the conflict as opposed to the concentration of maximum

¹⁸ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1.

momentum at a decisive point.¹⁹ Those who advocate the later believe that China like many Western states has felt compelled in an anarchic and competitive international system to expand its power and control to ensure its continued existence.

Although there is evidence to support both views, empirical studies of Chinese use of force do not substantiate the argument that Chinese policy has been notably pacific.²⁰ Therefore, a strategic culture that resembles political realism seems more plausible. While Confucian tradition seemed to place more emphasis on the virtue of the ruler rather than military capabilities in determining the strength of the state, it also reinforced sinocentrism. Confucian rhetoric, while elevating nonviolent methods of statecraft, also tended to see those who refused to submit to "benevolent" Chinese rule as immoral, if not subhuman.²¹ This often led to the use of force to subdue the barbarians. Thus, China relied on force more than it would have had it followed less "Confucian" policies.²² A similar argument could be made regarding the influence of Sun Zi. Although many of Sun Zi's precepts appear to imply a denigration of force and combat in favor of nonviolent methods of achieving victory, it must be recognized that the bulk of his famous work *Art of War* deals with actual combat.²³ Sun Zi undoubtedly understood the burden that war places on a nation, however, he clearly identified that fighting is at

¹⁹ Alastair Iain Johnston as quoted in Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence From History and Doctrinal Writings*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 79.

²⁰ Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence From History and Doctrinal Writings*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 86.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 83.

²² *Ibid.*, 84.

²³ *Ibid.*, 84.

times a necessity. Additionally, it can be argued that his reference to nonviolent methods best explain ways to set pre-combat conditions to ensure success once combat begins.²⁴

It seems evident that Chinese people developed a concept of political unity early on. They viewed their people as unique and highly cultured, while those people surrounding China were viewed as barbarians or uncivilized peoples. China's predominance over most of East and parts of Southeast Asia up until the 19th century created a deep-rooted belief in the geopolitical centrality of China to the region.²⁵ This belief has played a significant role in shaping Chinese strategy and policy over the years. As China's power increases, this view could lead the Chinese to reestablish what they feel is their rightful place as the pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific region. The implications of this include challenges to global powers such as the U.S. in the region, challenges to regional powers such as Japan and India in order to establish supremacy, and the forceful seizure of territorial claims such as Taiwan and islands in the East and South China Seas.

2. India

Like China, India's strategic culture has been shaped by a number of factors. Of these, Hinduism and Kautilyan logic figure most prominently. These two factors also illustrate the disparity between India's view of the world and China's.

Although a wide variety of religions and beliefs exist throughout India, Hinduism is predominant. Hinduism is an amorphous body of beliefs resting on a few basic tenets. Most Indians emphasize the importance of performing one's duty and leading a moral

²⁴ Ibid., 84.

²⁵ Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 3.

life, which will be rewarded with better future lives. Although this view may be seen as a practical approach to life, it can also lead to a passive, almost fatalistic acceptance of life. Hindu belief in the cyclical patterns of life makes the future appear uncertain and less subject to manipulation than linear views held by Westerners. The acceptance of life as a mystery and the inability to manipulate events impedes preparation for the future in all areas of life, including strategic planning.²⁶ Although, most intellectuals realize the need for planning and preparation for the future, conflicts of interest still arise. This lack of preparation was clearly demonstrated with India's humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian War as well as early conflict with Pakistan.

Throughout the 1990s, the Hindu-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which supports "Hindutva" (an India based on Hindu culture), continued to win an increasing amount of seats in Parliament. BJP-led demonstrations have led to riots resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people (mostly Muslims). The BJP was elected to government in 1998 and secured a majority through a coalition of 13 regional parties and numerous independents, most of which do not share BJP's Hindu nationalist outlook.²⁷ These loose coalitions challenge the stability of the government. This is because the BJP and its supporters take the most hard-line positions on center-state relations and foreign policy. They constitute a formidable challenge to the more moderate, secular and relatively more liberal vision with which the Congress was associated.²⁸

²⁶ George K. Tanham, *Indian Strategic Thought: As Interpretive Essay*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), 17.

²⁷ Barbara Leitch LePoer, "India-U.S. Relations - 1998," <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/crs93097.htm>, 6.

²⁸ Maya Chadda, *Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), 121.

It has been debated whether Indian prime ministers have adhered to the strategic principles declared in the mandala by Kautilya in his *Arthashastra*. Kautilya was a Brahman advisor to the Mauryans in the fourth century B.C. who used the mandala concept in describing the nature of interstate conflict and alliance relationships. According to this concept, a nation's contiguous neighbors are always seen as enemies or potential enemies and its outer neighbors as friends, in a series of circles. One may surmise that India's continued conflict with Pakistan and China, as well as its positive relations with the Soviet Union conform to Kautilyan logic.²⁹ Indian leaders, however, deny basing foreign policy on this theory, although, it is impossible to ignore the similarities (see table 1). According to some scholars, it is Kautilyan strategy that explains India's ruthless crushing of the communist challenge, the forced integration of Hyderabad and Kashmir into the Indian Union, the war over Bangladesh and the intervention in Sri Lanka and the Maldives.³⁰

²⁹ Raju G.C. Thomas, *Indian Security Policy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 16.

³⁰ Chadda, 9.

**Table 1. Conflict Postures and Alignment Tendencies as Predicted by
Kautilyan Logic.**

<u>CONFLICT POSTURES</u>		<u>ALIGNMENT TENDENCIES</u>
China & India	China & Soviet Union	India & Soviet Union
China & India	China & Vietnam	India & Vietnam
China & Soviet Union	China & Vietnam	Soviet Union & Vietnam
India & China	India & Pakistan	China & Pakistan
India & China	India & Bangladesh	China & Bangladesh
India & Pakistan	India & Bangladesh	Pakistan & Bangladesh
Soviet Union & U.S.	Soviet Union & China	U.S. & China
 <u>GROUP ALIGNMENT TENDENCIES</u>		
GROUP 1: China, U.S., Pakistan & Bangladesh		
GROUP 2: India, Soviet Union, Vietnam		

Source: Raju J.C. Thomas, *Indian Security Policy*, 12.

C. POST-WORLD WAR II RELATIONS

1. China's Foreign Policy

Throughout the first half of the 20th Century, China experienced a significant amount of internal conflict. This internal conflict culminated with China's Civil War (1945-1949) which resulted in the defeat of the Nationalist Forces (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek by the Chinese Communists (CCP) under Mao Zedong. Although the KMT received a substantial amount of aid and support from the United States, it failed for many reasons. Chiang lacked the ability to unite the numerous cliques in China against the communists, corruption was widespread within the KMT ranks, the Nationalists

lacked the ability to reform and modernize their military, but most of all, the KMT could not garner the popular support of the people.³¹ The CCP on the other hand, supported by the Soviet Union, was well organized, extremely efficient and won much popularity among the Chinese peasantry due to an effective land reform campaign.

The communist forces proclaimed the People's Republic of China in Peking on October 1, 1949, which was soon followed by the defeat and withdrawal of KMT forces to Taiwan. Mao soon began to consolidate his gains on the mainland, execute counterrevolutionaries and reorganize the government structure. The new regime moved quickly toward the construction of a new collectivist agrarian system as well as a "shift to the cities" based on the Soviet example of industrialization³². In February 1950, the PRC signed a "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" with the Soviet Union. This treaty, which was to remain in effect for a thirty-year period, pledged mutual military assistance in the event of conflict with Japan or any country allied with it (i.e. the United States).³³

2. India's Foreign Policy

At the close of World War II, India remained under British rule. Anti-imperialist sentiment in Great Britain, coupled with an Indian independence movement led by Mahatma Gandhi, ultimately caused the British to relinquish their control and agree to Indian independence. Before their departure however, the British conceded to the pressures of the All-India Muslim League led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and agreed to

³¹ Edward L. Dreyer, *China at War, 1901-1949*, (New York, NY: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., 1995), 356-357.

³² John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, rev. ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1989), 943-945.

³³ "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China," February 14, 1950.

the partition of India along religious criteria.³⁴ Independence was achieved on August 15, 1947 and, with it, the division of Muslims and Hindus between Pakistan (including both East and West Pakistan) and India. Pakistan remained a dominion of India for the next nine years until it was proclaimed an Islamic Republic on 23 March 1956.³⁵ The partition of India created a constant source of conflict between India and Pakistan that resulted in three wars and continuing border disputes.

The first war erupted shortly after independence. During the process of separating Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India, millions of refugees moved from either side of the newly created borders. Ethnic and religious tensions ran very high, and the resulting conflict caused a substantial loss of life. Hostilities over the northern territory of Kashmir, claimed by both Pakistan and India, began in 1948. Although the majority of the indigenous population was Muslim, the maharajah was Hindu and acceded to Indian demand to join India during the partition. The conflict ended in a stalemate and Kashmir remained disputed territory divided by a heavily defended Line of Control where since 1948, United Nations Observers have investigated reported violations.³⁶

India adopted a foreign policy based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and disarmament, which was highlighted by its involvement in the nonaligned movement. To India, nonalignment was based on the desire of Indian nationalists to make India into a strong, independent modern nation-state. Nonalignment was meant to free India from entanglements (limiting threats to security), promote its economic and technological

³⁴ Salamat Ali, "Pakistan," *Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1975 Yearbook*, (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd., 1975), 247.

³⁵ A. Hariharan, "India," *Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1975 Yearbook*, (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd., 1975), 195.

³⁶ FAS, "Threats - Pakistan," India Intelligence, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/threat/pakistan.htm>, 1.

development and provide India with maximum freedom of action to pursue its national interests.³⁷ Conflicts with Pakistan and China, along with economic stagnation would soon prompt closer ties to the Soviet Union.

3. Sino-Indian Relations

In order to legitimize itself and de-legitimize the defeated Nationalist regime occupying Taiwan, the PRC sought recognition from the international community. In an effort to avoid involvement in Cold War politics, India was the first non-communist country to recognize the newly founded PRC in 1950. In October of that year, communist troops moved into Xinjiang and Tibet in the north and southwest in order to consolidate their rule and unify the country. Upon the PLA's entrance into Tibet, the McMahon Line (fixed by the 1914 Simla Treaty), which designated the border between Tibet and India, came into dispute with the Chinese.³⁸ Instead of challenging China, Nehru sought to appease the Chinese in order to foster good relations and allay any suspicions with regard to India's strategic motives. Relations steadily improved and in 1954, the two countries signed an Agreement on Trade Between India and Tibet. In the agreement, both governments agreed to adhere to Panchsheel (Five Principles). The five principles of peaceful coexistence consisted of:

- *Mutual respect for each other's integrity and sovereignty.*
- *Non-aggression.*
- *Non-interference in each other's national affairs.*
- *Equality and mutual benefit.*
- *Peaceful coexistence.*

³⁷ Chadda, 46.

³⁸ Library of Congress, Area Handbook Series – China, "India," [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+cn0393\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+cn0393)), 1.

Prime Minister Nehru placed much more faith in Panchsheel than the Chinese ever intended to. Chinese strategic interests differed from India's, especially in the disputed border area, and Mao had no intention of letting this agreement prevent him from fulfilling his objectives, namely to ensure China's security at all costs. Sino-Indian relations began to sour in 1959 when under Chinese persecution, the Dalai Lama, religious leader and historical ruler of Tibet, fled to northern India. There he established a "government in exile" and gained the sympathy of Nehru. Shortly afterward, frictions would soon escalate in the disputed area between India and the region of Tibet now firmly under Chinese control.

E. THE COLD WAR

1. China's Foreign Policy

From the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet Union and the PRC in 1950 to the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s, the PRC was closely aligned with the Soviet Union. Although ideology played a key role in this linkage, the alliance served more practical purposes for the Soviet Union as well as the PRC. The Sino-Soviet alliance was particularly pragmatic for the PRC as it sought to balance the rising regional influence of the U.S. in Asia, which was increasingly anti-communist and therefore anti-Chinese. Although the PRC characterized global relations as an ideological struggle between the East and West, this was more clearly a depiction of a state-based power struggle with an ideological face painted on it.

The strength of the Sino-Soviet alliance was first tested during the Korean War in 1950. As the Korean People's Army began to falter during the early stages of the Korean War, Mao was determined to intervene on their behalf. His decision was based upon

feeling a special obligation to the North Koreans for their sacrifices during the Chinese Revolution, a desire to continue the revolutionary struggle, enhance his control in China and promote China's international prestige.³⁹ However, Mao's primary concern was to safeguard the Chinese-Korean border, now threatened by the northern push of U.S. led U.N. forces. The objective was to deter U.N. forces from threatening China by making it extremely costly to do so. In this regard the Chinese efforts were largely successful. China gained international recognition for its ability to drive back UN forces. The war also solidified China's relationship with the DPRK and taught China that it could not rely on Moscow to ensure its security interest.⁴⁰

The PRC soon found itself in conflict again, as the Cold War heated up in Asia. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954 and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 were predominantly issues of territorial sovereignty. The occupation of Taiwan by KMT forces continued to be a source of tension for Mao and his desire to unite Taiwan with the rest of China. In both cases the PRC took action in order to counter ROC troop movements and reinforcement of Quemoy and Matsu islands. Nuclear brinkmanship carried out by the U.S. and the Soviet Union (in the second crisis) heightened tensions and helped end the conflicts.

The Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s ushered in a new period of PRC foreign relations. Improved relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union brought about by Khrushchev's acknowledgement of the mutually assured destruction of nuclear war,

³⁹ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of Sino-American Confrontation*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), xi.

⁴⁰ George T. Yu, "China's Response to Changing Developments on the Korean Peninsula," *The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle*, ed. Tong Whan Park, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998), 259.

alienated the PRC and led to allegations of Soviet "revisionism." Also during this period, the PRC began to focus inward as the Cultural Revolution was initiated within the People's Republic. Although ideological factors played a significant role in the shaping of PRC foreign policy during this time, it was also shaped by a struggle for power and influence on the part of Mao, domestically as well as internationally. The PRC now sought a unified front involving Socialists and the Third World to challenge the Imperialists (led by the U.S.) and the Social Imperialists (led by the Soviet Union). Once again, this depiction was more indicative of a state-based power struggle than the ideological drama that China used to characterize these events.

Increasingly poor relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC fueled by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Sino-Soviet border skirmish in 1969, and threats of pre-emptive nuclear strikes on Chinese strategic weapons sites brought Beijing to the realization that the Soviet Union was the biggest threat to its national security. These events, coupled with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, paved the way for a strategic alignment between the U.S. and the PRC focused against the Soviet Union. The PRC attempted to characterize the new global relationship in 1974 by describing a power struggle between the First World (U.S. and Soviet Union), which could only be challenged by the united effort of the Second World (NATO and Warsaw Pact) and the Third World (developing states including China).⁴¹

Soon after the deaths of Mao and Zhou Enlai in 1976 came changes in PRC foreign policy. Deng Xiaoping's leadership of the PRC brought new focus to the

⁴¹ Notes from H. Lyman Miller's lecture on Chinese Foreign Policy given at the Naval Postgraduate School, October 18, 2000.

attainment of national objectives, particularly economic modernization and considerably less emphasis on ideology. The conservative leadership of the U.S. under President Reagan, coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, resulted in the PRC's belief that both the Soviets and the U.S. were threats to world stability. As neither country posed an immediate threat to Chinese national security, the PRC maintained cordial relations with both countries but decided not to side with either. It was during this period that the PRC established its independent foreign policy. China dropped the use of "united front" terminology as well as past characterizations of global relations into differing worlds. The focus was now on modernization and not class struggle. It clearly decided to further national interests at the expense of the propagation of Marxism.⁴²

Deng's new focus was made clear during the Third Indochina War in 1979, which placed China in direct conflict with its communist neighbor, Vietnam. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the unification of the country, Vietnam-China relations turned sour as Vietnam sought a closer alignment with the Soviet Union. Following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, China opted for direct military intervention. Although the Vietnamese put up a staunch defense, China was successful in fulfilling its national interest by asserting regional dominance and deterring continued Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia as well as Soviet involvement in the conflict.

From the late 1970s to the end of the Cold War, the PRC's focus on economic development and reform met with incredible success. The PRC adopted a policy that encouraged international economic relations in order to further the modernization of the country. Reforms led to average annual GDP growth rates of nearly 10% throughout the

⁴² Ibid, October 23, 2000.

1980s. Rural per capita real income doubled. After a short period of inflation in the late 1980s, China's economy regained momentum in the early 1990s. Throughout this period output prices accelerated, investment outside the state budget soared and economic expansion was fueled by the introduction of more than 2,000 special economic zones and the influx of foreign capital. The Chinese economy continued to grow at a rapid pace until the late 1990s, where it showed signs of slowing down (China's GDP growth rate for 1998 was 7.8).⁴³

2. India's Foreign Policy

India continued to practice a foreign policy based on nonalignment and peaceful coexistence throughout the Cold War. From the outset, the Soviet Union supported India's nonalignment policy. Professing to maintain a nonalignment policy themselves, the Soviets encouraged any country that sought to steer clear of any alliances with Western countries, particularly the United States. Nehru's "Five Principles" for good relations were also supported by the USSR.⁴⁴ However, India looked to the United States to provide support for the country, which continued until the Second Indo-Pakistani War in 1965.

The 1965 war began as a series of border flare-ups along undemarcated territory at the Rann of Kutch in the southeast and soon spread to the cease-fire line in Kashmir.⁴⁵ Although the Rann of Kutch conflict was soon resolved by British sponsored arbitration, the tensions in Kashmir escalated. Infiltration of the border region was perpetrated by Pakistani irregular forces who attempted to stir up rebellion amongst the Muslim Kashmir

⁴³ The United States-China Business Council, "China Economy," <http://uschina.org>, 1-2.

⁴⁴ Ranjan Goswami, "India-US Relations: A Conflict-Ridden Past, A Cooperative Economic Future," *The Yale Political Quarterly*, Volume 19, Number 4, October 1998, 2.

⁴⁵ FAS, 2.

populace. However, the Kashmiris were not very sympathetic to the Pakistani cause. Fighting continued in the border regions and culminated with a full scale Indian invasion of Lahore in September. Due to the fact that the United States and Britain agreed to cut military supplies to both Pakistan and India, the two countries were unable to sustain the war effort.⁴⁶ As a result, the Soviets were able to broker a truce which was held in Tashkent in 1966.

Since the Second Indo-Pakistani War, India leaned increasingly upon Soviet assistance. Relations with Pakistan, as well as China, continued to dominate India's national security agenda. United States military and economic support to Pakistan in order to seal off Soviet expansionism caused India to perceive a significant threat to its national security. The opening of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China in 1972 only fueled its fears. India was therefore further compelled to cultivate relations with the Soviets. The Soviet Union, which saw in New Delhi a useful counterweight to the United States and China, was more than willing to oblige.⁴⁷ In 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, which pledged mutual support against antagonistic powers (i.e. the US and China).⁴⁸ Close Indo-Soviet relations became critical during the Third Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, as the Soviet Union was able to keep China out of the conflict.

When the ethnic Bengalis of East Pakistan won an overwhelming political victory for the establishment of an autonomous party in 1971, it created a rift between the authorities of West and East Pakistan. Political unrest and postponement of the National

⁴⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁷ Malik, 145.

⁴⁸ Goswami, 2.

Assembly fomented by Yahya Khan, army chief and president of East Pakistan, pushed the Bengalis over the edge and demanded separation from Pakistan. Strengthened by West Pakistani forces, the separatists were cruelly suppressed and the crackdown resulted in the flight of nearly 10 million refugees into India over six months.⁴⁹ Although the army was successful in quelling the movement, Indian support of anti-government Bengalis known as the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) began to shift the balance. Indian troops intervened directly in December, which led to a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. Indian forces achieved swift victory and Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to India in mid-December. Pakistan had little choice but to accept the breakup of the country and the country of Bangladesh was created in former East Pakistan.⁵⁰

India's close relations with the Soviet Union acted as a deterrent to China, while the Soviets viewed India as a bulwark against Chinese expansion and American domination of South Asia.⁵¹ Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was not only India's superpower ally in its conflicts with China and Pakistan but also its biggest trading partner and supplier of military hardware. The agreement to build the Bhilai steel plant in 1955 marked the beginning of economic cooperation between India and the Soviet Union.⁵² Economic assistance in heavy industry, petro-chemicals, mining, pharmaceuticals soon expanded to substantive trade relations. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, India was one of the Soviet Union's biggest trading partners (among developing

⁴⁹ Ibid., 2.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁵¹ Ibid., 44.

⁵² Jagjit Singh Anand, *Indo-Soviet Relations: A More Glorious Future*, (New Delhi, IN: Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1979), 31.

countries) with a total turnover of Rs 3,720 million yearly.⁵³ The Soviet Union was also the largest importer of Indian goods. However, instead of paying for Indian imports in hard currency, the Soviets provided long-term credit and low interest rates. By the 1980s, some Indians argued that they might be better off exporting to other countries in exchange for hard currency.

India's economic prosperity enabled it to be the largest importer of arms in the world throughout the 1980s, of which the Soviet Union was the principal benefactor.⁵⁴ The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a deeper involvement between the U.S. and Pakistan, which in turn brought India closer to the Soviet Union. India's massive buildup of its armed forces during the Cold War was primarily to counter the Pakistani threat. Its missile and nuclear programs, however, were primarily to deter China from utilizing its nuclear capability. Although the Soviet Union was a proponent of non-proliferation in South Asia, it seems likely that they were involved to some extent with India's nuclear program.

3. Sino-Indian Relations

After a decade of tension in the border region, events began to come to a head between China and India. Disputes over the Bara Hoti grazing ground in the border region along with the discovery of a Chinese-built road increased troop deployment levels and led to direct confrontation. China attacked with massive artillery barrages and blitzkrieg tactics in October 1962. China's main objective was to control the Aksai Chin area, through which it had earlier built a strategic highway linking Xizang and Xinjiang

⁵³ K. Neelkant, *Partners in Peace: A Study in Indo-Soviet Relations*, (New Delhi, IN: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1972), 62.

⁵⁴ Malik, 143.

Autonomous Regions. China had a vital military interest in maintaining control over this region, whereas India's primary interest lay in Arunachal Pradesh, its state to the northeast bordering Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet).⁵⁵ Hostilities ended one month later when China terminated the conflict and withdrew its forces north of the MacMahon Line, with the exception of its forces at the actual line of control in Ladakh.⁵⁶ The immediate Indian reaction to the shock of military defeat was to seek arms from the West, especially the United States and Great Britain. In the months following the war, there were some suggestions that India might consider joining the network of Western military alliances.⁵⁷ Although it soon became obvious that India needed the Western powers to provide air cover against the Chinese threat, the government continued its nonalignment stance. The Sino-Indian War was a humiliating defeat for India and conflicting border claims continued throughout the Cold War.

India learned three major lessons from its border conflict with China. First, India's military forces were sorely lacking and in need of modernization. Second, Nehru's vision of a nonaligned independent India as a leader in world affairs was dealt a heavy blow, and India began to a search for security relationships. Third, China was a real threat to Indian security, and Indian strategy had to be developed accordingly. In the period shortly after the Sino-Indian War, India embarked on a military modernization campaign, sought out relationships to ensure its security, and developed a national

⁵⁵ Library of Congress, Area Handbook Series – India, "China," [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdv:@field\(DOCID+in0393\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdv:@field(DOCID+in0393)), 1.

⁵⁶ Lorne J. Kavic, *India's Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947-1965*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967), 182.

⁵⁷ Thomas, 26.

strategy to guard against the threat of land invasion, not just from the west (Pakistan) but from the north as well.

Indian-Chinese antagonistic relations throughout the remainder of the Cold War were largely a product of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. Fear of Chinese expansionism was the second most determining factor (Pakistan being first) in Indian foreign and defense policy throughout this period. The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s brought India closer to the Soviet Union and ensured that China and India remained in rival camps. The detonation of China's first atomic bomb in 1964 was also a significant event for India. Instead of dealing with strictly a land threat from China, it now had to contend with the possibility of conflict with a nuclear power. China's detonation of a hydrogen bomb in 1967 convinced Indians of the need to accelerate their own nuclear weapons program. In 1968 India rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), citing its concern with China's new status as a nuclear power.⁵⁸ India detonated its first nuclear device at Pokhran in 1974, bringing with it status as the world's sixth nuclear power.

The 1970s-1980s were a period of growing distrust and antagonism between China and India. During this period, U.S.-India relations also took a turn for the worse. U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan in order to contain Soviet expansionism led India to tilt toward the Soviet Union to counter the spread of U.S. and Chinese influence in South Asia. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1971 led New Delhi to sign the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Moscow to counter the perceived threat from the Sino-U.S.-Pakistan axis in the then looming war with Pakistan.⁵⁹ India's

⁵⁸ Ming Zhang, *China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests*, (Washington: DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 10.

⁵⁹ Malik, 145.

military buildup during the 1980s, especially its naval power and guided missile and nuclear capabilities, owe a great deal to Sino-Indian rivalry.⁶⁰ China's role in supplying arms and nuclear technology to Pakistan has been viewed with suspicion and anger by India. India's attempts to develop a special security relationship with Vietnam since 1975 are a direct result of Chinese-Pakistani ties, and indicate a spillover of Sino-Indian conflict in Southeast Asia.⁶¹ It also reinforced the Kautilyan principle that states, "An enemy of my enemy is my friend."

Although several rounds of talks were conducted since 1981 regarding disputed border claims, the issue failed to be resolved. Tensions again ran high in 1987, but were later calmed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988. During this visit the two countries established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary question in order to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. The end of Cold War bilateral alliances created a new opportunity for Chinese and Indian rapprochement in the 1990s.

E. THE POST-COLD WAR

1. China's Foreign Policy

Throughout the post-Cold War period China continued to follow an independent foreign policy, formulated in 1982. China began to foster modernization and development through its participation in multilateral organizations in the region and globally. China became a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC), the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) and is presently

⁶⁰ Ibid., 159.

⁶¹ Ibid., 43.

lobbying for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Access to the United States and U.S. allies' economies have been a significant benefit to China (in 1998 Japan and the U.S. were China's top trading partners, closely followed by South Korea and Taiwan).⁶² China currently believes that positive relations with the U.S. are absolutely essential to carry out its modernization program. In addition, the stability provided by U.S. military commitment to the Asia-Pacific region has allowed China to modernize its military at a moderate pace without placing an undue burden on its economy.

China claims to follow a foreign policy of cooperation and peaceful coexistence in its international relations.⁶³ However, there are goals of the PRC that complicate further development of positive international relations and threaten stability in the region. First, China is not satisfied with the current international arrangement, which prevents it from unifying Taiwan with the mainland as well as consolidating its territorial claims in the East (Diaoyu/Senkaku islands) and South (Spratly and Paracel islands) China Seas. China realizes that it is not currently in a position to fully realize this goal, but sovereignty remains a long-term objective. Second, China is committed to the retention of its current system of government. It seeks to open up its country only to the extent that will allow modernization, but strongly rejects outside interference with its political system. China's insistence on retaining the communist system pits it against the United States, which would like to see the eventual democratization of the country. Lastly, some analysts believe that China will eventually attempt to seek a more prominent position for

⁶² The United States-China Business Council, "China's Foreign Trade," <http://uschina.org>, 3-4.

⁶³ China, "Foreign Policy," May 31, 2000, <http://www.china.org>, 1-2.

itself in the international order.⁶⁴ The historical basis for regional hegemony lends credence to this conclusion. Any attempt at regional hegemony would inevitably place China into conflict with the United States, which has an inherent interest in the stability of the region.

China presently pursues a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, in which it acknowledges the differences in each country's political system and agrees to work towards cooperation for each country's mutual benefit and development. The PRC adamantly resists any interference on the issue of reunification with Taiwan, which it sees as an internal matter. In addition, China claims to adhere to policies of nuclear non-proliferation, bilateral joint development of disputed territories in the South China Sea, and opposition to any nation's attempt at regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.

2. India's Foreign Policy

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a tremendous blow to India. The Indo-Soviet Treaty signed just days before the abortive coup in Moscow in 1991 was rendered useless. Besides being India's principal trading partner, India was dependent on the Soviet Union for economic assistance as well as the supply of military equipment. Soviet military hardware constituted 60 to 70 percent of India's military capability. The disrupted supply of military parts essentially put the Indian army and air force out of action.⁶⁵ More importantly, India lost the promise of political support in its adversarial relationships with neighboring China and Pakistan (the Soviet Union was a key supporter

⁶⁴ Zalmay M. Khalilzad...[et al.], *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 6-11.

⁶⁵ Malik, 154.

of Indian policy in the UN Security Council).⁶⁶ Moscow is currently at odds with India on the issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and has publicly lent its support to the Pakistani proposal for a South Asian Nuclear Free Zone.⁶⁷ This policy stands in contrast to USSR-Pakistani relations during the Afghan invasion, which were strained significantly.

With the end of the Cold War, India soon came to the realization that its policy of nonalignment was rendered pointless. Although nonalignment was intended to limit security threats, it never protected India from Pakistan or China. This main criticism along with the irrelevance of nonalignment in the post-Cold War era pushed India in the direction of multilateralism (although India retains its membership in the nonaligned movement). Policy makers have sought increased international cooperation to enhance economic development and serve as a counterbalance to threats from China and Pakistan. India has primarily sought improved relations with the United States to fill in the void created by the Soviet Union. In addition, Japan, Germany, Italy, Israel and Taiwan have come to occupy a prominent place on the Indian foreign policy agenda.⁶⁸

Since the close of the Cold War, India has found its position in the UN expanding. Although not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, India has been elected periodically to fill a non-permanent seat, as it did in 1991-1992. New Delhi has supported reform of the UN in the hope of securing a permanent seat. India also remains actively involved in Commonwealth of Nations affairs and has pushed for forums to voice its concerns on matters such as race relations, citizens rights and economic

⁶⁶ LePoer, 3.

⁶⁷ Malik, 154.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 157.

assistance under the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific.⁶⁹

India's post-Cold War compulsion towards multilateral endeavors led to active participation in ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. It was in this environment that India articulated its growing interest in security in the Asia-Pacific region and expressed a desire to join the region-wide economic cooperation effort.⁷⁰ Although not one of the original seven dialogue partners, India applied and gained entry to the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996. Similarly, it later applied and gained entry into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The ASEAN countries have recently begun to seek expanded trade relations with India, due in part to the dissipation of India's military buildup (no longer regarded as a threat), as well as a possible counterbalance to Chinese aggressive claims in the South China Sea.⁷¹ Today India realizes the importance of maintaining close relations with ASEAN and the other Asia-Pacific countries. It continues to strive for an integral role in the economic prosperity and security of the region.

India has also tried to enhance the effectiveness of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was formally inaugurated in 1985. However, the SAARC has thus far failed to live up to its potential as an organization that fosters regional cooperation and stability. This is mainly due to the distrust between India and its neighbors and to India's insistence that contentious bilateral issues be excluded from the agenda. The reluctance of India and other South Asian countries to turn SAARC into

⁶⁹ Roxane D.V. Sismanides, "India's Foreign Relations," *India: A Country Study*, fifth ed, first printing, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 557.

⁷⁰ Kripa Sridharan, *The ASEAN Region in India's Foreign Policy*, (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996), 233.

⁷¹ Sandy Gordon, *India's Rise to Power: In the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1995), 295.

a forum for resolving major regional disputes hampers SAARC's ability to deal with many of South Asia's economic and political problems.⁷²

India's significantly improved economy and nuclear capabilities have earned it the attention and guarded respect of its neighbors and the world. As India continues to grow, reform its old systems and open up to the international environment, it assumes a position of greater and greater importance in regional and world affairs. The future will most likely see a continued improvement in U.S.-Indian relations and greater participation in multilateral organizations.

3. Sino-Indian Relations

Both China and India emerged from the Cold War as regional powers in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean. Economic growth and enhanced prestige of both countries offered the possibility of improved relations by the end of the Cold War. Relations between the two countries began to improve somewhat in the 1990s, when high level visits were conducted to each other's country. In 1991 Prime Minister Li Peng was the first Chinese PM to visit India in thirty-one years. During his visit, Li Peng agreed that India and China should work together for regional peace, stability and development.⁷³ In 1996 PRC President Jiang Zemin signed a series of confidence building measures with regard to the border dispute, which included troop reductions and weapons limitations.⁷⁴ Although relations were again strained following India's nuclear tests in 1998, they began to improve in 1999 after Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited Beijing, as both India and Pakistan sought to gain China's support on the Kargil Conflict in the area

⁷² Sismanides, 559.

⁷³ Tanham, 38.

⁷⁴ U.S. DOS, "Background Notes: India," <http://www.state.gov>, 12.

of Kashmir. Although Chinese leaders declared their neutrality on the issue, they seemed to tilt toward India in regard to the conflict.⁷⁵ This was undoubtedly aided by India's attempts to smooth relations between the two countries by disavowing the assertion (earlier made to justify India's nuclear tests) that India considers China a threat. China proposed establishing a "security dialogue mechanism" with India for addressing regional and global concerns.⁷⁶ China's tilt toward India was also influenced by its concern over the growing Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan. China seeks to discourage Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban, which trains Kashmiri separatists and render assistance to Uighur separatists in China's western Xinjiang region.⁷⁷

Further high-level visits were conducted between the two countries in the first half of 2000. The joint secretary in charge of disarmament affairs from India's Foreign Ministry, Rakesh Sood, traveled to Beijing in March to meet with Director General of China's Foreign Ministry Asian Department Zhang Jiuhuan.⁷⁸ Talks were geared toward renewing a security dialogue between the two countries in preparation for a visit by India's President. In May, Indian President Narayanan visited Beijing and gave an address at Beijing University calling for harmonious relations between India and China and an effort to work toward a stable and peaceful world order.⁷⁹ China reciprocated with a visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan in July to New Delhi and later to Islamabad. For a chronology of significant events in Sino-Indian relations see Appendix B.

⁷⁵ STRATFOR, "China Tilts Toward India on Kargil Conflict," June 16, 1999, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 4.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁷⁸ STRATFOR, "A Shift in Chinese-Indian Relations," March 9, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 1.

⁷⁹ *China Daily*, "India, China Should Work for New Global Order: Indian President," May 30, 2000, <http://www.china.org>, 1.

China-India relations have been aided by participation in regional and international organizations as well. China and India are both members of APEC and ASEAN ARF, where representatives often meet to work out problems and concerns. On the NGO level, academics of the neighboring regions of Northeastern India and Southwestern China met in New Delhi in November 1998 to discuss regional development in India and China. Another delegation of Chinese and Indian academics met in New Delhi in January 1999 to participate in Sino-India Track II dialogue.⁸⁰

Trade between the China and India has continued to grow. In 1998 bilateral trade reached close to US \$2 billion, a 5% increase from 1997. In addition, India-China border trade in 1998 conducted through Lipulekh Pass and Shipki La Pass reached Rs 51.7 lakhs.⁸¹ Regarding security matters, Moscow has urged China and India to join Russia in a three-part alliance aimed at counterbalancing U.S. global hegemony. While Russia maintains strong bilateral ties with India and with China, disparate strategic interests have made it impossible to complete the triangle.⁸² However, recent developments in rapprochement may make this more possible in the future.

Regardless of improvements in relations, tensions still exist between the two countries. The Chinese Navy's port visits to South Asian countries, China's growing naval presence in the South China Sea, and Beijing's close security ties with Rangoon have convinced India's naval planners of an imminent Chinese challenge to India in the Bay of Bengal via the Malacca Strait.⁸³ Sino-Burmese relations are increasingly worrisome for India. Thus far China has supplied Burma with billions of dollars worth of

⁸⁰ Library of Congress, Area Handbook Series – India, "China, 1-2.

⁸¹ Ibid., 1-2.

⁸² STRATFOR, "China Tilts Toward India on Kargil Conflict," 5.

⁸³ Malik, 159-160.

arms including fighter aircraft, naval patrol boats, heavy artillery, tanks and anti-aircraft guns.⁸⁴ China has also assisted greatly in the development of a Burmese naval base in Sittwe as well as financing the construction of a road leading from Rangoon to the base at Sittwe. More worrisome yet, is the establishment of a Chinese Radar Observation Station on the Cocos Islands at the mouth of the Irrawaddi River, off the coast of Burma.⁸⁵

Although both China's and India's economies have slowed down dramatically since the early-mid 1990s, military expenditures have steadily increased (see tables 2 & 3). In an era where most countries in the world are reducing their military expenditures, these two countries feel compelled to increase theirs. Although a direct cause and effect relationship between China and India's view of each other as a perceived threat would be difficult to establish, one may easily infer that these threat perceptions have contributed to this type of spending.

Table 2. GDP and Growth Percentage in Billions of US\$.

Country		1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
China	GDP	469	599	547	711	834	918	963
	Growth %	14.2	13.6	12.7	10.5	9.6	8.8	7.8
India	GDP	272	286	331	376	398	431	437
	Growth %	4.2	5.1	7.2	8	7.4	5.5	5.6
Japan	GDP	3,719	4,275	4,689	5,137	4,595	4,190	3,798
	Growth %	1	0.3	0.6	1.5	5.1	1.4	-2.8
U.S.A.	GDP	6,244	6,558	6,947	7,270	7,662	8,111	8,511
	Growth %	2.7	2.3	3.5	2.3	3.4	3.9	3.9

Source: *U.S. and Asia Statistical Handbook 1999-2000.*

⁸⁴ Malik, 160.

⁸⁵ Ashley Tellis telephone interview with author, August 18, 2000.

Table 3. Military Expenditures and as a Percentage of GDP (1995 constant \$).

Country		1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
China	U.S.\$Bil	13.8	12.7	12.2	12.5	13.7	14.9	16.9
	% of GDP	2.7	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9
India	U.S.\$Bil	6.8	7.7	7.8	8.0	8.2	9.1	9.8
	% of GDP	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5
Japan	U.S.\$Bil	48.8	49.4	49.6	50.1	51.1	51.3	51.3
	% of GDP	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
U.S.A.	U.S. \$Bil	331.3	313.8	296.2	278.9	263.7	262.2	251.8
	% of GDP	4.9	4.5	4.2	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.2?

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 1999.*

G. CONCLUSION

Although it seems in the short term that China and India are putting their differences aside in order to concentrate on economic development, a large degree of volatility remains in their relationship. The underlying rivalry between these two regional powers, conflicting world views, self-images as great powers and centers of civilization and culture, and their tendency to checkmate each other's influence and power in their respective spheres of influence (South Asia and Southeast Asia) continue to drive them to support different nations and causes, which will find them in rival camps.⁸⁶ Each country's size, power, and interests in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions make the possibility of conflict in the long term a distinct possibility. The expanding naval capabilities of both China and India are creating a new venue for conflict. It is here that we now turn our attention.

⁸⁶ Malik, 159.

III. CHINA'S NAVY

A. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution, The People's Republic of China has developed a naval force that is evolving into one of the most powerful in the world. From a small fleet of ragtag ships to an impressive coastal defense force and to a blue water capable navy, China sees its naval forces as an essential part of its national security. The power projection of China's naval forces plays a significant role in the security of the Asia-Pacific region. With the end of the Cold War, there exist new possibilities for power struggles in the region. As the United States seeks to scale back its forces in the Asia-Pacific, the fear of Chinese hegemony in the region encompasses Northeast and well as Southeast Asian countries. But what exactly is its capability and what threat does it pose to its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region? China has demonstrated a willingness to use its naval forces to secure its territorial claims in the past, which has encouraged a continued American presence. However, it is becoming obvious that the future security of the region will be more and more dependent on a balance to China's naval power by countries within the region itself.

B. EARLY NAVAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT

Following the Chinese Communist Party victory at the end of the Chinese Revolution, Mao Zedong asserted that "to oppose imperialist aggression, we must build a powerful navy."⁸⁷ In response, the Chinese Naval Academy was established in 1950 at

⁸⁷ US Department of the Army, "Chinese Force Structure," in *Army Area Handbook*, 1994, [gopher://gopher.umsl.edu:70/00/library/govdocs/armvahbs/aahb9/aah90098](http://gopher.umsl.edu:70/00/library/govdocs/armvahbs/aahb9/aah90098), 4.

Dalian. Its staff was primarily comprised of Soviet instructors. The PLA Navy was officially established in the same year by consolidating regional naval forces under General Staff Department command. Senior ranking officers were taken from the PLA and reassigned to the Navy. They started out with a various assortment of vessels acquired from the Chinese Nationalists that were in a serious state of disrepair. The Naval Air Force was added to its force structure in 1952. By 1954 an estimated 2,500 Soviet naval advisors were in China, and the Soviet Union began providing the PLA Navy with modern ships.⁸⁸ The first of these ships included 4 destroyers, 13 submarines, 12 large patrol boats, two mine-sweepers and approximately 50 torpedo boats.⁸⁹ The Soviets also assisted the Chinese with shipbuilding projects until the Chinese were able to produce their own vessels, although still using Russian designs.

In this early stage of development, the PLA Navy was powerless to intervene to any serious extent in the Korean War.⁹⁰ The PLA Navy played only a minor role in the two Taiwan Straits crises. However, the impotence felt in the face of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the ROC Navy convinced many Chinese of the need to modernize their naval forces.

C. CHINA'S NAVY MODERNIZES

Initial attempts at modernization were severely hampered by the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s. In 1959 Soviet advisors and technicians were withdrawn from China. Since the Soviets no longer provided technical assistance or equipment, the Chinese were forced to continue producing modified versions of existing outdated ships. Another

⁸⁸ Ibid., 3-4.

⁸⁹ Hugh Lyon, "China's Navy: For Coastal Defense Only," in *The Chinese War Machine*, ed. Ray Bonds (London, UK: Salamander Books Ltd., 1979), 150.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 154.

factor hampering modernization was Mao's Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966. During this period of internal purges, the country focused inward so that Mao could re-establish absolute control of his base of power. More significantly, the 1971 death of Defense Minister General Lin Biao in a plane crash and subsequent renunciation as a traitor by Mao resulted in substantial military cutbacks that lasted until 1975.⁹¹

The modernization of the PLA Navy was influenced by many factors and events that turned the country away from its traditional continentalist philosophy to one which was decidedly more maritime in nature.⁹² The first of these factors was China's decision to revise its foreign relations with the West. With the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the ease of Cold War tensions with the Soviets, the Chinese were eager to make contact with the United States, which they saw as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. This normalization of relations led to U.S. recognition of the People's Republic as the legitimate government of China in 1979. Following this event, the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which continued unofficial relations and support for Taiwan, but diplomatic recognition was withdrawn.⁹³ The second factor was the transition of power following Mao and Zhou Enlai's deaths in 1976 to Deng Xiaoping, who won out as paramount leader in 1978. Deng's emphasis on the "four modernizations"-- in agriculture, industry, science and technology and the military -- led to vast improvements throughout China. The third factor was China's economic prosperity beginning in the 1980s with Deng's "open" policy for foreign trade and

⁹¹ Ibid., 154.

⁹² Bruce Swanson, "Naval Forces," in *Chinese Defense Policy*, ed. Gerald Segal and William T. Tow (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 85-86.

⁹³ Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, 973.

investment.⁹⁴ The opening up of special economic zones in coastal cities led to modernization of shipping and port facilities. Additionally, the discovery of oil and natural gas deposits in China's territorial waters also greatly influenced China's modernization of merchant shipping as well as the need for a greater naval force projection to protect its claims.

The principal military and strategic impetus for naval expansion however, was the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960's. Now viewed as an adversary, China not only expanded its naval capability to meet the threat, it supported the U. S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region and encouraged the development of Japanese defense forces in order to counterbalance the perceived Soviet attempt at hegemony. Foremost of China's concerns was possible Soviet domination of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in Southeast Asia, linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

During the early 1950s, the PLA Navy was organized into three major fleet commands, the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet. Throughout the period of modernization the force structure and number of naval bases steadily continued to grow. The North Sea Fleet, headquartered in Qingdao, protects Beijing and the strategically critical northeast plains from attacks through the Yellow Sea and Po Hai Gulf. In addition to Qingdao, it has bases in Jiaonan, Dalian, Huludao, Weihai and Chengshan, as well as 9 coastal defense districts. Its forces include 2 submarine squadrons, 3 escort squadrons, 1 mine warfare squadron, 1 amphibious squadron and approximately 325 patrol and coastal combatants. The East Sea Fleet, headquartered in Shanghai, defends the Shanghai industrial area and the contested Taiwan Strait. In

⁹⁴ Ibid., 980.

addition to Shanghai, it has bases in Wusong, Dinghai and HangZhou, as well as 7 coastal defense districts. Its forces include 2 submarine squadrons, 1 mine warfare squadron, 1 amphibious squadron and approximately 270 patrol and coastal combatants. The South Sea Fleet, headquartered in Zhanjiang, guards commercial Canton and China's insular flank in the south. In addition to Zhanjiang, it has bases in Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai, Huangpu, outposts on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, as well as 9 coastal defense districts. Its forces include 2 submarine squadrons, 2 escort squadrons, 1 mine warfare squadron, 1 amphibious squadron, approximately 320 patrol and coastal combatants and 1 cadre division of marines.⁹⁵ The extensive force structure of the South Sea Fleet reflects current Chinese strategic focus.

Although many of China's national goals now have a maritime dimension, coastal defense is still of great concern to the Chinese. The PLA Navy's strategy for coastal defense conforms to the People's War doctrine and is based on attrition as well as guerrilla tactics. China's 1,500 km coastline is protected by its fleet of submarines, forming the outermost ring of security. Inside this ring lies a secondary ring of surface combat ships consisting of destroyers and frigates armed with anti-ship missiles, depth-charge projectors and guns up to 100mm. Any invader penetrating the destroyer and frigate protection ring would be swarmed by any of the approximately 900 fast attack craft at the innermost ring. In support of these vessels are coastal defense forces operating naval shore batteries backed by ground force units deployed in depth.⁹⁶ Their objective is to over-saturate an opponents warship's various weapons systems and

⁹⁵ Rosita Dellios, "China," in *Asian Defense Policies: Great Powers and Regional Powers*, Book One, new ed., ed. J. Mohan Malik, (Victoria, AU: Deakin University Press, 1994), 115.

⁹⁶ US Department of Army, 4.

neutralize the threat before it can reach the coast. Chinese naval strategy has now expanded to include a strategic nuclear deterrent. When deployed, China's sea launched ballistic missiles gives it a second strike capability in retaliation to attack. Additionally, China adheres to what can be termed "guerrilla nuclear warfare" (GNW), which represents a delayed First Strike against advancing forces at an unexpected time or place within the theater of operations. As the PRC continues to shift its direction of perceived threat from the north to the southern and eastern maritime approaches, GNW will constitute China's major deterrent against a formidable enemy at sea.⁹⁷ By 1987 the PLA Navy was ranked as the third largest navy in the world. With the allocation of approximately 20% of the defense budget to the navy since the 1970s, improvements have been vast. During the course of fifteen years (1972-1987) their conventional submarine forces nearly tripled, the number of missile-carrying ships rose ten-fold and the number of support ships increased to meet the need of a navy with growing capability toward force projection. Nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) were introduced as well a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).⁹⁸ China was finally on the way to developing a naval force that would enable the PRC to carry out its economic policies such as the protection of sea lanes of communication and the safeguard of projects to obtain natural resources from its territorial waters, as well as military strategies such as sea based nuclear capability. For the PLA Navy, opportunities to justify naval expansion would soon appear in the South and East China Seas.

⁹⁷ Dellios, 117.

⁹⁸ US Department of Army, 4-5.

D. CHINA'S NAVY TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE

1. China's Naval Forces Today

Today the PLA Navy is comprised of approximately 268,000 personnel. This includes 28,000 regional coastal defense forces, 25,000 naval air force personnel and 7,000 Marines (28,000 in time of war).⁹⁹ Combined, the three naval fleets have 61 combat surface ships, comprised of 20 destroyers led by two Luh-class vessels armed with 100mm guns and carrying the equivalent of France's Dauphin attack helicopters and 41 frigates. Backing this up, they have 318 fast attack craft and 21 patrol craft as well as 95 amphibious vessels and mine warfare craft. There are currently 64 active submarines, but only one, the Xia-class submarine, is currently known to have nuclear missile capability¹⁰⁰. Other key submarines include 4 Kilo-class vessels, believed to be armed with Russian "wake-homing" torpedoes. The remaining vessels have a tactical short-range capacity and can only remain at sea for limited periods of time.¹⁰¹ In 1996 Beijing announced plans to develop two 45,000-ton aircraft carriers within the next decade in order to enhance their force projection capability.¹⁰² For further information on Chinese naval assets see Appendix C. China's navy continues to extend its reach. From March to May 1997, Chinese naval vessels made port calls to the U.S., Mexico, Chile, Peru,

⁹⁹ Sharpe, *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*, "China," 115.

¹⁰⁰ According to *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*, the Xia is currently under refit and is expected to be fully operational sometime this year.

¹⁰¹ BBC News, "World: Asia Pacific: China's Military Might," July 20, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/asia%2Dpacific/newsid%5F399000/399239.stm>, 1-4, and *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 2.

Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia.¹⁰³ In September 2000, Chinese ships were invited to visit Hawaii as well as the west coast of North America.

2. Current Deficiencies

Despite many improvements to its naval force structure, China still lags behind in a few crucial areas:

a. Weapons and Electronic Systems

The PLA Navy still lacks an adequate surface-to-air missile system for its destroyers and frigates. A contractual agreement with two British defense firms for the procurement of Sea Dart SAMS for installation aboard Luda class destroyers was canceled due to budgetary constraints in the early 1980s. Resumption of negotiations are expected in the future. Additionally, serious propulsion problems aboard its nuclear submarines have led to delays in the test fire of underwater missile systems from nuclear powered submarines (the Chinese successfully launched an underwater missile in 1982 from a diesel powered submarine). Lastly, naval electronic systems are antiquated in comparison to their western counterparts.¹⁰⁴

b. Anti-submarine Warfare

The Chinese currently rely on vintage 1950 Russian anti-submarine technology and it is believed that their sonar is equally primitive. However, they recently acquired Mark 46 MOD 2 anti-submarine torpedoes from the United States.¹⁰⁵

c. Mine Warfare

China has failed to adequately prepare for the possibility of mine warfare.

¹⁰³ Chinese Culture, "International Cooperation," <http://chineseculture.com>, 2.

¹⁰⁴ Swanson, 92-94.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 92-94.

Aging mine sweepers coupled with inadequate training currently make the Chinese coast susceptible to mining.¹⁰⁶

d. Naval Aircraft

Chinese naval aircraft are old and currently have little ability to carry out anti-submarine or anti-ship operations. They are also in need of maritime patrol planes which can extend their current short-range surveillance and intelligence horizon.¹⁰⁷

e. Personnel and Training

Although the PLA Navy has vastly improved personnel technical standards, they are not yet at western levels of proficiency. An increase in computer-assisted training as well as education is also needed.¹⁰⁸

3. Future Trends

The PRC's official defense budget has expanded every year since 1989, for an increase of 141 percent with over 20% of the budget being dedicated to the navy.¹⁰⁹ RAND estimates that the 1998 budget represents a real increase of 54 percent since 1991.¹¹⁰ This equates to substantial improvements in equipment, weaponry and technology, as well as the development of improved naval tactics. Smarter, more electronic and more lethal systems will be the basic development trends of the coming Chinese naval-warfare arms.¹¹¹ The director of the Research and Development

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 92-94.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 92-94.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 92-94.

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Cox, "Communist China's Taiwan Invasion Threat," February 1, 1996, <http://209.207.236.112/news/china/1996/960201-china.htm>, 2.

¹¹⁰ RAND, "Rand Analysts Urge Major Shift in US-China Policy," September 10, 1999, <http://www.rand.org/hot/Press/china.9.10.html>, 1.

¹¹¹ CAPT Shen Zhongchang, LCDR Zhang Haiying and LT Zhou Xinsheng, "21st-Century Naval Warfare," in *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, ed. Michael Pillsbury, rev. ed., (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 266.

Department of China's Navy Research Institute in Beijing, Captain Shen Zhongchang, foresees the following trends in Chinese naval warfare:

- In land-sea combat, naval surface ships, submarines, carrier-based aircraft and possibly other new service arms will generally have the capacity to conduct strategic offensive attacks in great depth and against intercontinental land-based targets.
- In sea-air combat, electronic warfare and missile strikes, particularly long-distance strikes by warships, their carrier-based aircraft and aerial fighters will become the essential forms.
- In surface-undersea combat, as submarines resolve technically the obstacles to very deep operations, their higher capability in very deep communications and ability to monitor and reconnoiter submarines and surface ships will sharpen surface-undersea confrontations.¹¹²

China sees the submarine as the most important vessel in future naval warfare and continues to direct its energies in undersea developmental technologies. Recently the PLAN has been pushing for greater recognition of its institutional viewpoint in the senior levels of the PLA leadership, with significant success. Specifically, the PLAN leadership has been the major proponent of the creation of a technologically sophisticated, operationally versatile blue-water force.¹¹³ Not surprisingly, a substantial amount of the PRC's military modernization has been focused on maritime concerns.

¹¹² Ibid., 262-263.

¹¹³ Michale D. Swaine, "The PLA and Chinese National Security Policy: Leaderships, Structures, Processes," in David Shambaugh and Richard Yang, eds., *China's Military in Transition*, 116.

The current commander of the People's Liberation Army Navy is Admiral Shi Yunsheng. Admiral Shi is a navy pilot who commanded the naval air forces of the South Sea Fleet during the Nansha (Spratly) Island conflict in 1988 and played an integral role as the PLAN's deputy commander in the naval coordination of China's exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. He assumed his present duties shortly thereafter. He is credited with developing the PLAN's first aircraft carrier naval air training corps, which simulated carrier conditions on land and at sea, and initiated the first course for aircraft carrier commanding officers. He also was responsible for developing carrier-borne helicopter troops and improving the airlift and seaplane capacity of the Southern Fleet.¹¹⁴ It is a safe assumption that Admiral Shi's pioneering work in naval force projection and rapid response capability will undoubtedly be emphasized and expanded upon during the tenure of his command.

E. CONCLUSION

China's naval capability has come a long way since the end of the Chinese Revolution. From its initial growth with Soviet assistance, through setbacks experienced by the Sino-Soviet split and Mao's Cultural Revolution and movement towards modernization and blue water capability, Chinese naval forces have evolved into the third largest navy in the world. The PLA Navy has at least a limited capability to carry out government policy and strategy beyond its coastal waters. Although it lacks the capability and the sustainability of the United States Navy, Chinese forces are superior to any country in the Asia-Pacific region, with the exception of the former Soviet Union

¹¹⁴ David Shambaugh, "China's Post Deng Leadership," in James Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., *China's Military Faces the Future*, 27.

(See Appendix E). With United States desire to decrease its forces in the area the balance of naval power may shift in China's direction. Disputed territorial claims between the Chinese and their Asian neighbors heighten the probability of increased tension and conflict in the region. Unease over rising Chinese ambition has prompted countries in the region to seek a balancing power in Asia. That country increasingly seems to be India.

IV. INDIA'S NAVY

A. INTRODUCTION

India's navy has also come a long way in the last 50 years. It has evolved from the most neglected arm of the military after independence from Great Britain to a respectable fighting force that has contributed to India's military capability. This was achieved largely through the assistance of the Soviet Union, India's main benefactor, throughout the Cold War. The impetus for naval expansion has been to enable India to exercise control over what it claims to be its maritime domain (the Indian Ocean region to include the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea), enhance the country's overall deterrent capability, and give India status as a world power. Although India has largely achieved this with a navy that is now approximately the seventh largest in the world, its fleet is aging. Loss of Soviet assistance at the end of the Cold War combined with budgetary problems put plans for further naval expansion in the 1990s on hold. However, as naval capabilities continue to increase among India's neighbors -- China in particular -- India's navy is seeking to expand its horizons to meet what it views as a possible challenge to its defense. As we enter a new century, a new period of naval expansion appears to be taking place in India.

B. EARLY NAVAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT

In anticipation of independence and the separation of India and Pakistan, the British government in India planned the partition and reconstitution of Royal Indian Navy (as well as the other branches of the armed forces). This was accomplished by the naval sub-committee of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee (AFRC). This

Subcommittee allocated 33 ships to the Indian Navy and 16 ships to the Pakistani Navy (roughly a proportion of 2:1). Since India has a considerably larger coastline, it was given four of the six sloops; in addition it was granted two frigates, twelve fleet and four motor minesweepers, four trawlers, four harbor defense motor launches, a corvette, a survey ship, a motor launch and a small number of landing craft. The Pakistani Navy was allocated two sloops, two frigates, four fleet minesweepers, two trawlers and four harbor defense motor launches.¹¹⁵ This partition of ships was soon followed by a partition of personnel on the basis of territorial considerations, which once again was heavily weighted toward India.

Although India received its independence, the Indian Navy continued to be directed by the British, apparently due to a lack of naval prowess among the Indian naval staff. British Chief of the Indian Navy, Rear Admiral J.T.S. Hall, prepared a ten-year expansion plan for 1948-1958 which aimed to; protect merchant shipping, obtain a position of strength and pre-eminence in the area, as well as move to a position of leadership among the nations of Southeast Asia.¹¹⁶ However, due to lack of funding and ability to acquire foreign warships, this plan was soon abandoned. The next plan was a ten-year comprehensive naval replacement program, formulated by the new British Chief of the Indian Navy, Vice-Admiral Mark Pizey, in 1954. This plan emphasized a shift in the role and composition of the Navy from one capable of air, surface and sub-surface operations to one devoted primarily to defensive anti-submarine warfare.¹¹⁷ This new

¹¹⁵ Jaswant Singh, *Defending India*, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), 113.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 114.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 115.

strategy reflected British Cold War interests to defend the Commonwealth and allies against a Soviet/Chinese threat.

The fact that the Indian Navy was largely run by the British Admiralty and shaped to fulfill missions in the British interest helps explain the absence of an early coherent Indian naval doctrine. It also explains a lack of preparedness for limited war against its neighbors, which would soon become all too apparent during the war with Pakistan. During the 1950s, the Admiralty agreed to supply a second cruiser and an aircraft carrier to India (in terms of its ASW functions). The cruiser, commissioned the *INS Mysore*, arrived in 1956. The aircraft carrier was actually an escort carrier which lacked a long-stroke catapult, which the Indians tried to persuade the British to modify in order to increase its capability. Although the British refused to make modifications, the Indian cabinet agreed to recondition the "Hercules" aircraft carrier in 1957 and commissioned the ship the *INS Vikrant* four years later.¹¹⁸ In 1958 Vice Admiral R.D. Katari took over as Chief of Naval Staff -- he was the first Indian to hold that billet. By the early 1960s, the Royal Indian Navy had accumulated a force structure of one medium aircraft carrier, two cruisers, three destroyers, thirteen frigates, and thirty-two smaller crafts. Throughout the 1960s, India added submarines to its fleet and increased its compliment of frigates to seventeen.¹¹⁹ This period, the first period of Indian naval expansion, also signified a shift in naval vessel and weapons acquisition from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union, now India's main benefactor.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 121.

¹¹⁹ Vincent Quidachay, "Can the Indian Navy Respond to a Growing Chinese Fleet?" NPS Thesis 1995, 28-29.

1. Liberation of Goa

During the Indian liberation of the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961, the Indian Navy was involved in its first large scale combat action. Confined to a predominantly supporting role, the Navy still contributed to the Indian victory. The Navy's main tasks were to gain control of the seaward approaches to the bays of Marmagao and Aguada, prevent interference by Portuguese naval units, occupy Anjadip Island, and provide fire support for the army.¹²⁰ During the military action, the INS *Delhi* sunk a Portuguese vessel in November and supported the army's advance on Diu. In December three Indian ships engaged the Portuguese frigate *Afonso de Albuquerque* in harbor and sank the vessel. In addition, a naval assault party landed on the island of Anjadip and eventually took the island, which was heavily defended by the Portuguese. The Indian Navy had earned a great degree of respect from its country for its perceived heroic action.

2. Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

The Indian Navy's success in the Goa Operation was soon forgotten when war broke out with Pakistan in 1965. During the war, the Indian government seriously curtailed naval activity in an attempt to limit the scope of the war because of a lack of confidence in the Navy. The Navy was forbidden to take any offensive action against Pakistani forces at sea or operate beyond a range of 200 nautical miles from Bombay or south of the parallel of Porbandar.¹²¹ The only exception was in the pursuit of Pakistani naval forces. During the conflict, the Navy failed to prevent Pakistani naval units from bombarding Dwarka Point on India's western coast and was harassed by threats from

¹²⁰ Indian Navy Webpage, "Indian Navy," <http://armedforces.nic.in/>, 2-3.

¹²¹ Singh, 125.

Sukarno that the Indonesian Navy was going to take over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.¹²² This had a considerably debilitating effect on the Navy's morale. However, funding for limited expansion, as part of the overall strengthening of the armed forces was to come out of the war, which soon led to the acquisition of Soviet submarines.

3. Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

During early December, 1971, war broke out once again between India and Pakistan, this time over the status of East Pakistan, which was declaring its independence. The day that hostilities began, two ships from the Indian Navy leaving Vishakapatnam harbor detected a Pakistani submarine by sonar. They deployed depth charges, which destroyed the Pakistani submarine *Ghazi* (originally acquired from the United States). The Indian aircraft carrier *Vikrant* also played an essential role in providing air support in East Pakistan, as well as gaining air superiority in the east. The Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet established total control of the waters in the Bay of Bengal and intercepted numerous Pakistani ships during the conflict.¹²³ The Indian Navy's greatest accomplishment, however, was the missile boat attack on Karachi harbor. During this conflict, the Indian Navy proved itself as an essential arm in the nation's security strategy. However, U.S. show of force with the aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* into the Bay of Bengal at a critical stage in the war, outraged the Indians and convinced them of the need to plan for the task of sea denial--keeping non-regional navies well away from Indian waters.¹²⁴

¹²² Malik, "India," 150.

¹²³ Indian Navy Webpage, 4.

¹²⁴ H. McDonald, "Slow Speed Ahead," FEER, 22, as ref in Malik, 151.

C. MODERNIZATION AND CONFLICT

1. India's Navy Modernizes

Following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, India began its second period of naval expansion. Capitalizing on positive relations with the Soviet Union, along with local shipbuilding capabilities, India, obtained the last four of eight submarines ordered from the Soviets. It increased its naval force to a new total of twenty-nine frigates, eight corvettes, and seventy miscellaneous crafts. It also acquired three maritime reconnaissance aircraft and five helicopters from the Soviets, as well as ordering three Kashin 11-class destroyers and three MR planes. From Great Britain, India obtained ten Sea King ASW helicopters.¹²⁵ The most extensive period of modernization, however, occurred throughout the 1980s. During this third period of naval expansion, the Indian Navy increased its principal combatants from 32 in the early 1980s to 44 by the end of the decade. It acquired its second aircraft carrier from Britain, the *Hermes* (later commissioned as the INS *Viraat*), and coordinated a three-year lease of a Soviet nuclear powered submarine.¹²⁶ During the 1980s the naval facilities at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, in the Nicobar Islands, and in Lakshadweep were significantly upgraded and modernized. A new line of frigates, the Godavari class, with ASW capabilities as well as landing platform for two helicopters was manufactured at Mazagon Dock. Plans were finalized for the licensed manufacture of a line of West German Type 1500 submarines,

¹²⁵ Singh, 126.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 126.

the Shishumar class. In addition, India purchased nearly two squadrons of VSTOL Sea Harriers to replace earlier generation Sea Hawks.¹²⁷

India's Naval Headquarters is located in New Delhi. It is under the command of the chief of naval staff (Admiral) with four principal staff officers; the vice chief of naval staff, the vice chief of personnel, the chief of material and the deputy chief of naval staff. The Navy is organized into three regional commands. The Eastern Naval Command is located in Vishakhapatnam on the Bay of Bengal. The Western Naval Command is located in Mumbai (Bombay) on the Arabian Sea. The Southern Naval Command is located in Kochi, also on the Arabian Sea. The Navy also has important bases in Calcutta and Goa. Naval officer training takes place at the Naval Academy in Goa.¹²⁸

2. Operation Pawan

When hostilities erupted in Sri Lanka, at the southeast tip of India, between the legitimate government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) insurgent forces, the Indian Navy played a crucial role in cutting off supplies to the insurgents. India's Eastern Naval Command executed Operation Pawan in October 1987 in support of the Sri Lankan government. A 300-mile long cordon was established in between northern Sri Lanka and the southeastern coast of India. Constant patrol of the area by ship and aircraft resulted in a marked decrease in the amount of resupply available to the LTTE militants.¹²⁹ Indian marine forces also participated in a number of raids against LTTE strongholds. The Operation was considered a success by the Indian government, and Indian Naval units continue to execute a mission of denial to LTTE militants.

¹²⁷ Library of Congress, Area Handbook Series – India, "The Navy." [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/quer/vr?frd/cstdv:@field\(DOCID+in0194\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/quer/vr?frd/cstdv:@field(DOCID+in0194)), 3.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 3-4.

¹²⁹ Indian Navy Webpage, 4-5.

3. Operation Cactus

During an attempted overthrow of the democratically-elected government in the Maldives in November 1988, President Abdul Gayoom appealed for military assistance from India. India responded by landing troops on the islands. This event forced the mercenaries involved in the coup attempt to commandeer a merchant vessel, the *Progress Light*, and take along hostages, to include the Maldivian transport minister. In route to Colombo, Sri Lanka the vessel was intercepted by two ships from the Indian Navy. When negotiations broke down for the release of the hostages, warning shots were fired. The gradual use of force compelled the rebels to surrender.¹³⁰ The hostages were transported to safety and the rebels were taken into custody, ending the crisis.

D. INDIA'S NAVY TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE

1. India's Naval Forces Today

Today the Indian Navy is comprised of approximately 53,000 personnel, which includes 5,000 naval aviation personnel and 1,000 marines.¹³¹ Combined, India's three naval fleets have over 140 ships. This force consists of 1 active aircraft carrier equipped with Sea Harrier strike fighters and Sea King helicopters with advanced air to surface missiles and ASW capability. There are 43 combat surface ships, consisting of 8 destroyers equipped with surface-to-air, surface-to-surface and ASW capabilities as well as carrying 2 advanced light helicopters, 11 frigates and 24 corvettes. In addition, they have 18 various patrol and fast attack crafts, as well as 10 amphibious vessels, 10 landing craft and 18 mine warfare vessels. There are currently 18 active submarines, none of

¹³⁰ Ibid., 1-2.

¹³¹ Sharpe, *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001*, 291.

which are nuclear capable. Indian naval air assets are highlighted 19 Sea Harrier fixed wing attack aircraft, 29 Sea King ASW helicopters as well as fixed and rotary wing patrol craft, totaling approximately 155.¹³² This makes India's navy the seventh or eighth largest in the world. Plans to build an additional aircraft carrier as well as purchase a Russian aircraft carrier to augment the INS *Viraat* (the INS *Vikrant* was retired in 1997) are currently proceeding forward. In March 2000 the Indian government announced its largest ever increase in defense spending, a 28% rise. This substantial increase will undoubtedly assist the Navy's acquisition efforts. For a more detailed list of Indian naval assets, see Appendix D.

Although India's naval doctrine has consistently been poorly articulated for reasons that are not quite clear, it appears that the Navy's principal mission is to control what it believes to be its maritime domain, the Indian Ocean (to include the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, and the SLOC connecting the two). More specifically, naval missions include: coastal defense, protection of SLOCs, deterrence, sea control, naval presence, power projection and monitoring big power navies.¹³³ The Indian Ocean is of vital commercial, political and strategic importance to India. Fifty percent of India's oil and eighty percent of its gas requirements are met from offshore resources, and ninety seven percent of its trade is carried by sea. There are also many shore-based assets, which are vulnerable to attack from the sea, such as power stations and oil refineries.¹³⁴ Senior Indian naval officers have also indicated that the Indian Navy intends to control

¹³² Ibid., 291-309

¹³³ Vice Admiral S.P. Govil, "Indian Navy-Its Shape and Size," *Indian Defense Review*, 9, no. 2, April 1994, 64-65.

¹³⁴ Jaswant Singh, "India's Strategic and Security Perspectives," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. XIII, no. 5, August, 1990, 496.

choke points in the Malacca Straits so as to check the expansion of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean.¹³⁵ Additionally, India also seeks the capacity to destroy the Pakistan Navy and to blockade that country from the sea in the event of war. According to Indian defense officials, the Indian Navy will play a crucial role in future wars in South Asia, especially in the event of a two front war with China and Pakistan.¹³⁶

2. Current Deficiencies

The Indian Navy suffers from numerous deficiencies and limitations. As mentioned previously, the Navy lacks a coherent doctrine, which it attributes to sustained dependence on the British and later Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s meant the loss of India's primary benefactor. The acquisition of ships, replacement parts and training for naval personnel came to an abrupt halt. Budgetary constraints as well as India's increased focus on its nuclear and space programs have put naval desires on the backburner. The 1990s were lean times for India's military. As the Indian Army and Air Force takes precedence over its Navy, naval production and acquisition were especially hard hit. The Indian Navy also faces rapidly declining force levels and limited warship construction programs.¹³⁷ The Navy's single remaining aircraft carrier, INS *Viraat* is scheduled for retirement in the year 2005.¹³⁸ Twelve principal combatants are expected to be decommissioned in the next twenty five years, as the phasing out rate of old ships outstrips the induction rate of new ones.¹³⁹ The Navy also suffers from limited underway replenishment capability, advanced missiles and

¹³⁵ Malik, 151.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 151.

¹³⁷ Singh, *Defending India*, 127.

¹³⁸ Library of Congress, Area Handbook Series – India, 3.

¹³⁹ Singh, 234.

torpedoes are sparse, the amphibious force only has a battalion capacity and force entry capability does not exist.

3. Future Trends

Currently, India has plans for a major modernization program. These plans include the completion of three 5,000-ton Delhi-class destroyers, the building of three 3,700-ton frigates based on Italian Indian Naval Ship (INS-10) design, and the acquisition of four hydrographic survey ships. Additional plans have been made for the building of an Indian-designed warship called Frigate 2001, six British Upholder-class submarines, an Indian-built missile-firing nuclear submarine--the Advanced Technology Vessel--based on the Soviet Charlie II class, and an Indian designed and built 17,000-ton air defense ship capable of carrying between twelve and fifteen aircraft.¹⁴⁰ India's plan for naval expansion has been justified by the Indian government in terms of the Chinese naval modernization program, especially its SLBM capability and its alleged desire to move into the Indian Ocean, by India's extended EEZ and the protection of its offshore facilities, by the presence of extra-regional naval presence in the region, and by an ability to execute maritime intervention.¹⁴¹

E. CONCLUSION

India's navy has evolved greatly over the past 50 plus years. It has experienced numerous periods of expansion as well as periods of stagnation since its inception. Its most recent period of contraction, suffered in the 1990s due to budgetary constraints and the loss of Soviet assistance, seems to be over. A new modernization program seems to

¹⁴⁰ Library of Congress, Area Handbook - India, 3.

¹⁴¹ Malik, 153.

be underway with the start of a new century, as India seeks to protect its expanding interest and safeguard itself from the expansion of others, particularly China. Although it suffers from numerous limitations and deficiencies, as well as lack of priority with regard to national defense, India's navy continues to improve in quality and quantity. As India continues to seek a respectable position in world affairs, it views a strong navy as integral to that goal.

V. MARITIME SUPREMACY AND CONFLICT

A. THE ASIA-PACIFIC

1. The South China Sea

Since the founding of the PRC, China has asserted sovereignty over the South China Sea. Lack of naval capability and a strong U.S. naval presence in the area were the principal obstacles to realizing this goal. With the modernization of naval forces and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia in the early 1970s, China began to assert its influence in the area. China first focused on its claims to the Paracel Islands. The Paracel Islands comprise a group of over 130 islands and reefs located in the South China Sea. They are located 225 miles east of Vietnam. The islands are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam.¹⁴² The PLA Navy forcefully asserted control over the Paracels in 1974 when it deployed forces to dislodge South Vietnamese troops on the island and sunk a Vietnamese patrol boat. The PLA Navy came into conflict with the Vietnamese again in 1988 and sank three Vietnamese merchant vessels, as well as securing six islands in the Spratly group. The Spratly Islands comprise a group of over 400 widely dispersed tiny islands, reefs and shoals located in the South China Sea. They are located 500 km southeast of Vietnam, 500 km west of the Philippines and extend for more than 800 km north to south. The islands (some or all) are claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.¹⁴³ The Spratly Islands area purportedly holds vast quantities of oil and natural gas as well as good fishing. Although the Spratlys lie 1,300 km from the Chinese mainland and the Paracels 165 miles southeast of Hainan, China has

¹⁴² Leifer, 195.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 238.

included both groups in its 1992 "Law of the People's Republic of China on its Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas," which gives the Chinese military the right to repel by force any foreign incursion into the stipulated islands and areas.¹⁴⁴ In 1992, China signed an oil exploration agreement with the US Crestone Energy Corporation for 25,000 square km at the edge of the Spratly group, 150 km southeast of Vietnam. Chinese officials assured Crestone management that their activities would be protected with China's full naval might. Although Vietnam and the Philippines have continued to assert themselves in the area, China reasserted its claim in 1995 when naval forces established a guard-post on Mischief Reef.¹⁴⁵ This post was turned into a naval communications station and upgraded in 1998. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, sovereign rights extend 12 nautical miles from a habitable island, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends 200 nautical miles from one. If China controls both the Spratlys and the Paracels, it will either have economic rights or outright sovereignty to the vast majority of the South China Sea.¹⁴⁶

Although India holds no claims in the South China Sea, it has an interest in this body of water as the eastern entrance to the Malacca Strait, through which much of its growing trade transits. The continued unhindered movement of commercial shipping through the South China Sea is important to India's economic development. India also has a growing security relationship with Vietnam, which occupies the majority of the Spratly Islands (24, as compared with China's 7) and has the most troops stationed on the

¹⁴⁴ LCDR Andrea L. Siew, "China and Japan: Cooperation or Competition?" in *Maritime Forces in Global Security*, ed. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon (Halifax, NS: Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995), 156.

¹⁴⁵ Leifer, 240.

¹⁴⁶ Peter Jensen, "Chinese Sea Power and American Strategy," *Strategic Review*, Summer 2000, 22.

islands (600, as compared to China's 260).¹⁴⁷ India's "tit-for-tat" approach to China has propelled it to respond to China's incursion into the Indian Ocean with its own incursion in the South China Sea. An increase in Indian naval collaboration in the South China Sea with countries like Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia may significantly increase the risk of a naval confrontation between India and China or it may act as a sufficient deterrent.

2. The East China Sea

The 1992 "Law of the People's Republic of China on its Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas" also includes Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands. After two military confrontations with Taiwan in 1954 and 1958, international pressure, particularly from the United States, has kept China from unifying Taiwan with the mainland, although it has not diminished its claim to the island. Since 1979, Beijing has stated that forceful reunification remains an option. In order to demonstrate its ability to reclaim Taiwan by force, the PRC has regularly conducted large scale combined air and naval exercises in proximity to Taiwan. In July 1995, the PRC fired six nuclear capable missiles approximately 100 miles north of Taiwan.¹⁴⁸ In January 1996, PRC's Premier Li Peng stated that in trying to absorb Taiwan as a region of China they cannot promise to give up the use of force. This statement was preceded by comments made to former US Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman by PRC leadership that China was preparing a plan for a sustained conventional missile attack on Taiwan if President Lee refused to desist in his calls for international recognition. These threats against Taiwan were coupled with threats of attack on the U.S. should it seek to protect Taiwan.¹⁴⁹ Although the Taiwan

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴⁸ Cox, 2.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 1.

Relations Act of 1979 implies a commitment of U.S. assistance in the event of foreign aggression, the current U.S. administration has sent mixed signals as to whether it would respond militarily to an attempted takeover by the PRC. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in February 2000, seeks to clarify U.S. commitment to Taiwan.

The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are comprised of five small volcanic islands and three rocky outcroppings with a total land area of approximately 7 sq km. They are located 170 km northeast of Taiwan and 410 km west of Okinawa. They are claimed by Japan, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. Japan claims that it discovered and incorporated the islands in 1895, that they were placed under American administration under Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty as a result of World War II, and that the 1971 Ryukyu reversion agreement with the United States validates its sovereignty. The PRC and Taiwan claim that China discovered the islands in 1372 and incorporated them into China's maritime defenses in 1556. The islands were transferred with Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki (at the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895) and should have been returned after World War II under the provisions of the 1943 Cairo Declaration, 1945 Potsdam Proclamation and Article 2 of the San Francisco Treaty. Although the America's inclusion of the islets in the geographical definition of the Ryukyu Islands supports Japan's claim, the U.S. State Department takes no position on their sovereignty.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ Daniel Dzurek, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute," 18 October 1996, <http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/docs/senkaku.html>, 1-2.

The island dispute first flared up after a 1968 United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East report suggesting petroleum deposits under the East China Sea. This began a dispute involving Japan and Taiwan for rights to the islands. In 1970 Taiwanese protesters planted their flag on one of the islands. In 1988 an ultra-nationalist Japanese Youth Group erected a small aluminum lighthouse on the western shore of one of the islets and built a similar structure on another in 1996 to reinforce Japan's claim. In 1992 the PRC listed the islands as falling under its territorial sea law.¹⁵¹ In response to Japanese actions in 1996, protesters planted PRC and Taiwanese flags on the islands later in the year. Although there have been no military hostilities to date (one Hong Kong protester drowned to death in 1996), sovereignty and jurisdictional issues continue to be debated.

Although India has no claims in the East China Sea, it is working to improve security ties between countries in the region, particularly South Korea and Japan. Stronger bilateral ties are looking more appealing to the countries of Northeast Asia, as China's influence and assertion in the region continue to rise. In an effort to balance Chinese naval presence, naval exercises and port visits between India, South Korea and Japan may draw Indian naval forces further north increasing the likelihood of naval confrontation in the East China Sea.

B. THE MALACCA STRAIT

The Malacca Strait is located between the western coasts of peninsular Malaysia and Thailand and the eastern coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The strait extends over 500 miles joining up with the Singapore Strait, located just south of the

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 1-3.

island of Singapore and north of Indonesia's Riau Islands. Together the linked straits extend for some 600 miles and have provided the shortest and most important maritime passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans since the Suez Canal was opened in 1896.¹⁵² Other, less direct and less trafficked linkages to the Indian and Pacific include the Sunda Strait between the Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Java and the Lombok Strait between the Indonesian islands of Lombok and Bali. From the late 1950s through the 1960s, Indonesia and Malaysia each claimed control of the Malacca Strait. In response to a Japanese attempt to institutionalize international responsibility for safety of navigation through the linked straits in 1971, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore issued a joint declaration maintaining that they alone were responsible for the navigational safety of the straits. Further clarification of control was issued at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982. However, by the 1990s a series of collisions resulting in deaths and oil spills resulted in changes to navigational controls.¹⁵³

The industrialization of Asia has led to increased demands for the import of natural resources and a significant amount of maritime trade. The Malacca Strait has become critical to many of the countries in Asia who count on the free flow of seaborne transportation through this channel to ensure their economic survival. In recent years the growing dependence on the strait has resulted in a global concern over the security of this vital sea lane of communication. Threats to the SLOCs, as outlined by Michael Leifer, include:

¹⁵² Leifer, 159.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 160.

1. Collective failure to confront problems of navigation in maritime narrows.
2. Coastal states restriction on freedom of passage in the interest of national security.
3. Naval blockade by an external maritime power.
4. Acts of piracy.
5. Contention over maritime claims in the South China Sea.¹⁵⁴

To this list, we may also add threats caused by:

6. Domestic instability in a coastal state.¹⁵⁵

The increasing importance of the strait has led to multilateral cooperative efforts in the region to protect shipping. ASEAN has encouraged regional cooperation to this end, but thus far its efforts have been less than satisfactory, as instability among member states such as Indonesia, and a rising threat of piracy continue to threaten safe maritime travel. The inability of ASEAN to solve this problem has led other countries in the region to become more assertive in protecting their economic interests. The Strait of Malacca is a strategic waterway for Japan. Through this strait in 1979 passed 78% of Japan's crude oil imports, 41% of its iron ore imports, 35% of its steel exports, 63% of its cement exports and 38% of its automobile exports and twenty years later the strait remains a vital economic artery for Japan.¹⁵⁶ With piracy problems in the strait as well as the uncertainty presented by the Aceh independence movement, Japan's lifeblood

¹⁵⁴ Michael Leifer, "The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia," *Survival*, Vol. 25, No. 1, January-February 1983, 16.

¹⁵⁵ Bilveer Singh, "Security of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era," in *Asia's Security Challenges*, ed. Wilfried A. Herrmann, (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998), 51.

¹⁵⁶ Charles E. Morrison, *Japan, the United States and a Changing Southeast Asia*, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 40.

becomes more and more at risk. Earlier this year, Japan proposed to send its Maritime Safety Agency to the strait to participate in multi-national piracy patrols.¹⁵⁷ India has also offered to participate, however, China has opted for a unilateral patrolling effort.

India views control of the Malacca Strait as critical to the formulation of its maritime defense policy. Control of the strait means control of access into the Indian Ocean from the east, which is of utmost interest to India. India views China as the principal naval threat coming from the east and has begun to extend its naval operational reach and improve its structural capability in order to counter this perceived threat. India has conducted numerous bilateral naval exercises with Singapore off of the Singaporean coast, the last of which took place between February and March of this year. India has also conducted bilateral exercises in the area with Indonesia and Vietnam and has recently conducted a multilateral exercise in the South China Sea with all three.¹⁵⁸ India is also seeking to enhance its security relations in the area (see Chapter VI).

China, too, places considerable importance on the Malacca Strait. The strait controls access from the west into the South China Sea, an area China claims as its maritime domain. With the incredible success of the Chinese economy has come a substantial increase in the need for natural resources to fuel industrial production and for food supplies to feed its increasing population. It is estimated that by the year 2010, China's oil imports will soar to 3 billion barrels per day, which will require 500 supertanker trips per year, predominantly from the Persian Gulf.¹⁵⁹ It is further estimated that by the year 2020, once the Chinese population exceeds 1.5 billion, there could be an

¹⁵⁷ STRATFOR, "Japan Proposes to Patrol the Strait of Malacca," February 18, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 1-2.

¹⁵⁸ Indian Naval News, September 2000, 12.

¹⁵⁹ Jensen, 20.

annual grain requirement of 285 million tons, virtually all of which must be transported by sea.¹⁶⁰ China's concern with unhindered movement through the strait and concern of naval threats from the west (i.e. India) has prompted China to extend its presence into the Indian Ocean region. The alleged establishment of radar observation facilities in the Cocos, negotiation for base rights and port visits in the Indian Ocean underscore China's concern over access to the strait. It may be that China's ultimate desire is to establish a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean, covering the entrance to the strait.

C. THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Indian Ocean holds an obvious special interest to India. Control of its coastal waters is viewed as critical to India's defense policy. The bombing of Dwarka Point by the Pakistani Navy during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, followed by naval threats from Indonesia and the United States, added emphasis to the need to control its surrounding waters. Sea control is also essential to India's economic interests. Along its 7,500-kilometer coastline, India depends on the unhindered access of 11 major ports and the security of 2 million square kilometers of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 500 island possessions. India relies heavily upon offshore resources to meet its energy needs as well as the free conduct of sea trade.¹⁶¹ Additionally, India's quest for regional dominance in South Asia hinges on control of the Indian Ocean. Sea control is an essential element in India's doctrine of regional primacy, commonly referred to as the Gandhi Doctrine, enunciated in 1983 which is a warning to outside interference in the region.

¹⁶⁰ John Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, March 1996, 130.

¹⁶¹ Jaswant Singh, as ref. in Malik, 152.

Foreign naval presence in the Indian Ocean is regarded by India as a potential threat to national defense. Historically, most concern has focused on Pakistani force movements and U.S. presence in Diego Garcia, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. Improvement in U.S.-Indian relations and the reduced U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean have alleviated Indian concern of a U.S. threat. Of increasing concern to New Delhi is China's growing interest and increased presence in the Indian Ocean.

China has demonstrated an interest in the Indian Ocean region for some time. Since China is the second largest consumer of oil in the world (the U.S. is first), it is relying more and more on imported oil to sustain its economic growth. Much of this oil flows from the Arabian Sea through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. China has thus placed added importance on safeguarding these SLOCs to ensure its economic survival in the future. This has prompted an increased naval presence in the region. Naval exercises brought Chinese forces into the Indian Ocean during the 1980s. Chinese naval vessels made port calls in December 1985-January 1986 at Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports.¹⁶² China also continues to enhance its relations with Myanmar (Burma), which is seen as a focal point for competition between the Chinese and Indian navies. For more than a decade, China has sought to develop ties with the government of Myanmar, supplying equipment and reportedly assisting in the construction of naval bases in Sittwe and several other locations. In addition, the Chinese government is reportedly funding the Irrawaddy Corridor Project which encompasses a transportation network that will facilitate movement by road from Chinese Province of Yunnan to the port of Bhamo, and from there down the Irrawaddy River to Yangon,

¹⁶² Malik, 151.

providing the shortest route to the Indian Ocean from southern China¹⁶³. Freedom to operate in Myanmar's ports would enable China to maintain a presence on both sides of the Strait of Malacca.¹⁶⁴ Increased Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean increases the likelihood of confrontation with Indian naval vessels, which could escalate to conflict on the mainland.

Although India is predominantly focused on control of its maritime domain, as well as denying access to its waters by outside forces, it has interests that go beyond the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy intends to control choke points in the Malacca Straits so as to check the expansion of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean.¹⁶⁵ In response to the increased Chinese presence in India's maritime domain, India has undertaken various initiatives. In order to make Chinese naval expeditions into the Indian Ocean more difficult, India initiated the Gandhi-Jayawardene Agreement of 1987, which was aimed at drawing Sri Lanka closely into the Indian security orbit, thereby denying the Chinese access to Sri Lankan ports.¹⁶⁶ To counter a possible Chinese naval presence in Myanmar, India established a permanent naval presence in the Andaman Islands (located off the coast of Myanmar). India's new Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) based on the southern tip of the Andaman Islands is a key asset in countering a perceived threat from China.¹⁶⁷

In order to track Chinese military movement, India conducts extensive surveillance and intelligence operations in the area. Discussions are currently underway

¹⁶³ Roy, 174.

¹⁶⁴ STRATFOR, "Myanmar: Where the Indian and Chinese Navies Meet," January 27, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 1.

¹⁶⁵ Malik, 151.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 151.

¹⁶⁷ STRATFOR, 2.

between India and Israel for the purchase of Israel's Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), an advanced radar system that would be a tremendous asset in monitoring Chinese (as well as Pakistani) activity. Ironically, Israel intended to sell the AWACS systems to China, until it yielded to U.S. pressure in July 2000 to halt the sale.¹⁶⁸ India has also sought to enhance ties with the Myanmar government. India is the most extensive supporter of Yangon's ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which has been under continuous fire by Western governments for human rights abuses. In January 2000, New Delhi sent both ministerial and military delegations to Myanmar to solidify positive relations.¹⁶⁹

In June 2000, Pakistan opened the Jinnah Naval Base at Ormara in the western province of Balochistan, 150 miles west of Karachi. It was the second major naval base in the country (the first being in Karachi). Pakistan has two additional naval bases, in Gwadar and Pasni, but they are on a much smaller scale. The \$849 million dollar Jinnah base will provide berthing facilities to eight ships and four submarines.¹⁷⁰ It is believed that this initiative is in response to India's effective blockade of Karachi during heightened tensions in 1999 over Kashmir. Pakistan is seeking to spread its naval forces out to allow freedom of maritime movement during peace and conflict. Pakistan is also adding to its fleet strength with Chinese assistance.

¹⁶⁸ STRATFOR, "Israel Arms Transfer to India?" September 14, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 1.

¹⁶⁹ STRATFOR, "Myanmar: Where the Indian and Chinese Navies Meet," 2.

¹⁷⁰ STRATFOR, "South Asia's Tensions: The Dimension at Sea," June 23, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 1.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGING SECURITY TRENDS

A. CHINESE NAVAL POWER AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Although China is not likely to achieve global equivalence with U.S. power within the next half century, it is likely to emerge as a formidable, multidimensional regional power within 15 to 20 years.¹⁷¹ It is possible by that time the PLA Navy could contest for control of the East Asian seas. There is also a fear that China's buildup of naval forces, designed increasingly toward force projection, will create a naval arms race among Asian nations. The question is, should China's naval buildup be perceived as a threat to security in the region or an opportunity for a cooperative relationship that may eventually lead China down a path toward democracy?

If the Chinese buildup of its naval forces is perceived as a threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region then that threat must be countered. The possible introduction of Theater Missile Defense (TMD), to include sea-based operating systems, into the Asia-Pacific region to counter the Chinese and North Korean threat has already won support from Japan and Taiwan. Although the United States, continues to downsize its military presence in the region, its economic interest in what has become the largest market in the world will not allow instability in the region. To this end the U.S. is looking into the re-establishment of a naval base in the South China Sea. The U.S. already maintains the Western Pacific Command Logistics Group in Singapore and U.S. naval vessels have access to Sembawang and Changi Naval Bases. Indonesia and Malaysia allow U.S. Navy port calls, annual naval exercises are conducted with the Royal Thai Navy and a recently

¹⁷¹ RAND, "RAND Analysts Urge Major Shift in U.S. China Policy, 1.

signed visiting Forces Agreement will allow U.S.-Philippine naval exercises to resume.¹⁷² In addition, the U.S. is also courting military-to-military relations with Vietnam, which would include access to the port at Cam Ranh Bay. However, official American desires to stay involved and committed in Asia may not be sustainable if the American people tire of unfair military burden sharing.¹⁷³ Additionally, there is a significant amount of divergence in U.S. interests and the interests of the various countries in Asia. United States influence in Asia is less powerful today than it was during the Cold War. The United States devotes fewer resources to the region than it did in the past, and the Asians are considerably less enamored of "the American way" and quicker to take offense at U.S. intrusiveness in matters of domestic politics than they were in earlier years.¹⁷⁴ Although, no Asian country currently possesses the military strength to counter the Chinese naval threat, there are possibilities for the future.

The best regional prospect to counter Chinese naval domination would be Japan. Although currently an economic and not a military superpower, Japanese naval forces are not far behind China's. Japan has more surface combatants than the PRC, although the PRC has more submarines.¹⁷⁵ In 1990 Japan spent \$28 billion on its Self Defense Forces, which was 4.5 times more than China's public defense budget.¹⁷⁶ Revision of the Japanese Constitution would enable Tokyo to take on a more active role in regional security. An increase in Japan's military capability and a willingness to use it would

¹⁷² Jensen, 26.

¹⁷³ Edward Olsen, "Japan," in *Asian Defense Policies: Great Powers and Regional Powers*, 135.

¹⁷⁴ Gerald L. Curtis, "A 'Recipe' for Democratic Development," *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 8, Number 3, July 1997, 143-144.

¹⁷⁵ Patrick Allen, *Power Projection Capabilities in the Pacific Region*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), 4.

¹⁷⁶ Olsen, 129.

move Japan closer to a truer alliance with the United States. Although still dependent on the American "nuclear umbrella," it can take on a more active conventional security role. There are numerous reasons why the Japanese have been extremely resistant to take on a larger security role in the region: domestic opinion; Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution; and possible economic repercussions from their Asian neighbors fueled by fear of a rebirth of Japanese imperialism, to name but a few. However, as Chinese power increases and if American presence decreases, Japan may seek to counterbalance Chinese power through security agreements with other regional powers.

Other prospective regional powers would be a unified Korea or a strong security alliance among the countries of ASEAN. In both of these cases however, bilateral or multilateral security alliances would need to involve the United States in order to ensure nuclear protection. In the event that Korea unifies within the next ten to fifteen years, it would possess an approximate total of 53 surface combat ships, 23 amphibious ships and 30 submarines.¹⁷⁷ Although still well behind Chinese capability, they could play an active role in a strong security alliance. If ASEAN were to consolidate its naval power, it would possess an approximate total of 34 surface combat ships, 55 amphibious ships and 2 submarines.¹⁷⁸ Although Taiwan possesses naval capabilities comparable to Korea and ASEAN, its involvement as a counterbalance to China's power would only be detrimental to security in the region, as the PRC is not likely to tolerate such arrangements. Therefore, what is needed to counter the Chinese threat is either strong bilateral security alliances between the U.S. and the countries in the Asia-Pacific, where

¹⁷⁷ Allen, 47.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 48-50.

partners pull their own military weight and a "true alliance" is formed, or a multilateral security alliance involving the United States that has the sufficient strength to keep the Chinese in check.

India is also emerging as a powerful naval presence in the Asia-Pacific. Recognizing this, countries in the region are moving closer and closer to a security alignment with this up-and-coming power in order to counterbalance what is perceived as a rising Chinese threat. In particular, stronger security relations appear to be evolving between India and Japan, Vietnam, Singapore and Australia.

B. INDIA'S EVOLVING SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

1. India and Japan

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India in late August 2000 in an effort to improve relations which have been strained since India's nuclear tests were conducted in 1998. Although Mori failed to convince Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that India should sign the CTBT, differences have been eased. Mori announced a new "global partnership" with India which would work toward peace, development and cooperation. Bilateral relations have begun to focus on improving economic cooperation, most notably in the field of information technology.¹⁷⁹ Trade between India and Japan exceeded US\$4.5 billion in 1999. Improved relations with Japan have also crossed over into the realm of security and both have agreed to participate in regional security dialogues. Japan, like India, perceives China as a very real threat and is seeking an expanded military role to safeguard its interests. India has voiced support for Japan's

¹⁷⁹ BBC News, "Japan Seeks Stronger Indian Ties," August 23, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>, 1-3.

proposal to patrol the Strait of Malacca made in February 2000.¹⁸⁰ The growing significance of this strait to transport needed resources (particularly oil from the Middle East), coupled with an increased threat of piracy, have led countries in the region like Japan to realize the need to protect its national interests. Thirty-four Japanese vessels had confrontations with pirates in 1999, including the highjacking of a Japanese vessel in the October 1999. This, combined with civil unrest in the province of Aceh in Indonesia (which has helped foster piracy in the strait) and the alleged association of the PLA with piracy activities, have prompted the Japanese into action.¹⁸¹ Japanese vessels would patrol the straits as part of a multinational force of Asian countries that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and possibly India. China was extended an invitation for participation but has opted to conduct unilateral patrols.

2. India and Vietnam

China's close ties to Pakistan propelled India to seek enhanced relations with Vietnam. Vietnam, whose relations with China following the Third Indochina War remained antagonistic, has sought a regional power to counterbalance Chinese hegemony. Relations between the two countries steadily improved throughout the 1980s. India's East Sea Fleet Commander took two destroyers and a submarine to Vietnam in May 1982.¹⁸² India reacted to Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program by agreeing to help Vietnam with an atomic energy program for "peaceful purposes."¹⁸³ High-level

¹⁸⁰ STRATFOR, "Japan Proposes to Patrol the Strait of Malacca," February 18, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 1-2.

¹⁸¹ Roy, 165-166.

¹⁸² Gary Klintworth, "Chinese Perspectives on India as a Great Power," in *India's Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Power?*, ed. Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 101.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 101.

defense visits were conducted during the mid-late 1980s between India and Vietnam to discuss Chinese military tactics.¹⁸⁴ In March 2000 India and Vietnam signed a wide-ranging defense agreement which included increased military-to-military cooperation, sale of advanced military light helicopters, assistance in repairs and overhaul of Hanoi's mainstay MiG fighters, and the exchange of military information between the two countries.¹⁸⁵

3. India and Singapore

Establishing sound economic relations with successful ASEAN countries like Singapore has been an important Indian interest. As part of its "Look East" policy, which has received additional emphasis since the 1990s, India is seeking regional influence in Southeast Asia. Cooperation aimed at keeping the Straits of Malacca and Singapore safe for commercial shipping and naval transit have brought India and Singapore closer together. The two countries have conducted numerous military exercises together. Most recently, India conducted bilateral naval exercises with Singapore in February through March 2000. The exercises, which were held off of Port Blair, focused on anti-submarine warfare. These exercises were the seventh in a series of exercises off the coast of Singapore.¹⁸⁶ Further exercises are planned to take place later this year. As influential ASEAN states such as Singapore become increasingly alarmed at aggressive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, closer ties to India can be expected.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 101.

¹⁸⁵ *The Indian Express*, "India, Vietnam Sign Defense Pact," March 29, 2000.

¹⁸⁶ *The Hindu*, "India-Singapore Naval Exercise Begins," February 29, 2000.

4. India and Australia

India's relations with Australia were also strained after the nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1998. However, new hope for improved relations emerged earlier this year. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was quoted in March 2000 as saying "India's positive approach to the CTBT has determined Australia to reconsider resuming military ties." However, the final decision on the resumption of military ties with India would be taken after talks with the Indian government.¹⁸⁷ India and Australia both share a common bond as members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Both countries seek to continue their ties to the United Kingdom for defense as well as economic purposes. This mutual affiliation could lend itself to further cooperation, as Australia realizes the potential of the Chinese threat.

C. INDIAN NAVAL POWER AND INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY

In contrast to the destabilizing impact of China's rising naval power on Asia-Pacific security, India's predominating naval power has had a stabilizing effect on Indian Ocean security. The navies of the Indian Ocean states are significantly less developed than those in the Asia-Pacific. The majority of naval confrontations have either been as a result of the Indo-Pakistani conflicts or as a result of Indian assistance to countries in the region such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Although unimpeded transit through the Indian Ocean is critical to U.S. defense policy, it presently does not appear overly concerned with an Indian naval threat. Relations between the two nations continue to improve and the disproportionate naval capability of the U.S. has allayed any concern of naval conflict. By one account, if the whole expanded Indian Navy were put to sea at

¹⁸⁷ *The Hindustan Times*, "Australia Planning to Resume Military Ties with India, March 15, 2000.

once, it could still be destroyed without loss by a U.S. naval force consisting of one Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarine and two Ticonderoga (CG-470)-class guided missile cruisers equipped with Tomahawk anti-ship missiles. The U.S. would not even need to commit a carrier battle group.¹⁸⁸

However, there are countries in the region that are strongly against an increased Indian naval capability in the Indian Ocean. This is particularly the case for Pakistan, whose relations with India continue to be antagonistic. Other countries in the region that maintain positive ties with India are still wary of what appears to be Indian hegemonic influence in the Indian Ocean. Countries like Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, as well as the inland states of Nepal and Bhutan, see definite benefits to maintaining positive relations with China, including arms transfers and economic assistance to keep Indian influence in check.

D. CHINA'S EVOLVING SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Indian Ocean is of great concern to China and figures prominently in its national strategy. China and other countries in the region are alarmed at a growing Indian regional dominance, and many favor a policy aimed at preventing Indian hegemonic aspirations. General Zhao Nanqi, director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, was quoted in 1993 as saying China would step in to prevent what it saw as an attempt by India to dominate the Indian Ocean.¹⁸⁹ China has used the smaller states of the South Asian region as a counterweight to Indian dominance. China has sought to improve

¹⁸⁸ R. Rikhye, "Nobody asked me but...the real Indian Navy," *Proceedings*, March 1990, as quoted in Malik, 153.

¹⁸⁹ Roy, 170.

relations with Nepal and Bhutan. It constructed a road linking Lhasa and Kathmandu in 1988.¹⁹⁰ China has also sold a significant quantity of arms to countries in the region like Nepal and Sri Lanka. In many cases China uses arms transfers to strengthen countries against states that are Beijing's rivals, such as India, and to improve relations with countries in the region.¹⁹¹

1. China and Pakistan

China's relations with Pakistan are its strongest in the Indian Ocean region. China was interested in gaining a strategic regional ally following the Sino-Indian War of 1962 to counter what was seen as an Indian threat. Likewise, Pakistan, which maintained an antagonistic relationship with India, sought a powerful ally to keep Indian attempts at regional hegemony at bay. China solidified its relations with Pakistan in 1964, when Beijing firmly supported Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute. China offered military assistance in the event of an attack by India during the conflict and again during the Kashmir crisis in 1990.¹⁹² China constructed a strategically important two-lane all-weather highway to Pakistan across the Karakoram Mountains in the 1970s. China has been the prime source of nuclear technology for Pakistan. China's Nuclear Industry Corporation provided Pakistan with a mini-reactor and in 1989 agreed to build a 300,000kw nuclear power station in Pakistan.¹⁹³ The threat of a two front war is of utmost concern to India, which it perceives as likely given China's ultimatum to India

¹⁹⁰ Gary Klintworth, "Chinese Perspectives on India as a Great Power," in *India's Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Power?*, ed. Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 98.

¹⁹¹ Daniel L. Byman and Roger Cliff, *China's Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 27.

¹⁹² Roy, 172.

¹⁹³ Klintworth, 98.

during its War with Pakistan in 1965 and its belief that only a Soviet warning kept the Chinese out of conflict during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.¹⁹⁴ It is reported that China is helping Pakistan acquire four ships, probably Jiangwei-II frigates, which are used in anti-submarine operations. It is estimated that China will supply one of the frigates to Pakistan by the end of 2000, and will assist it in building three more.¹⁹⁵

2. China and Myanmar

China has been courting improved relations with Myanmar for over 20 years. China's interests in Myanmar are many. For one, China's arms sales to Myanmar complicate the security planning of China's strategic rival, India. China has apparently received access to Myanmar's Indian Ocean naval bases such as Sittwe and a radar installation in the Cocos Islands in return for arms shipments and technical assistance to Myanmar's navy.¹⁹⁶ The PRC-backed Irrawaddy Corridor Project now under way encompasses a transportation network that will facilitate the movement of people and material by road from Yunnan's principal city Kunming to the Myanmar port of Bhamo and from there down the Irrawaddy River to Yangon. Besides facilitating trade, this network could support PLA naval operations around the important Indian Ocean sea lanes.¹⁹⁷ China is by far the largest supplier of weapons to Myanmar, with arms transfers totaling in excess of US\$1 billion during the last decade. Other reasons for Chinese interest in Myanmar include a growing commercial interest, a desire to limit drug

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 98.

¹⁹⁵ STRATFOR, "South Asia's Tensions: The Dimensions at Sea," June 23, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 2.

¹⁹⁶ Byman and Cliff, 19.

¹⁹⁷ Roy, 174.

smuggling from Myanmar to China, and political support.¹⁹⁸ Myanmar has been seeking closer relations with China in order to counterbalance a rising Indian influence in the region, as well as for commercial and military benefit. Most importantly China provides it arms at below market prices and offers technical and infrastructure assistance.¹⁹⁹

3. China and Bangladesh

China sought to capitalize on India's poor relations with Bangladesh in the 1980s through mid-1990s. During this time, China became a principal arms supplier to Bangladesh providing such assets as frigates, a submarine, fast attack craft, ship missile systems, minesweepers and tanks. China has become the second highest importer of goods to the country, accounting for 9.1% of imports from 1997-1998 (India was the first with 11.6%). The impoverishment of Bangladesh has compelled it to accept Chinese assistance and improve ties. Li Peng, Chairman of the National People's Congress visited Bangladesh in April 1999 to hold discussions on bilateral cooperation and assistance in the construction of an International Conference Center in Dhaka. China is seeking closer relations to create increased opportunities for it in the Indian Ocean. Although Indian-Bangladeshi relations have improved somewhat with the return to power of the Awami League led by Sheikh Hassina in 1996, India has been unsuccessful in deterring growing Sino-Bangladeshi relations. To India, Bangladesh is not only geopolitically important in keeping China out of the region, it is also critical in containing anti-Indian activities in the northeastern states.

¹⁹⁸ Byman and Cliff, 19-20.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 21.

4. China and Thailand

Chinese-Thai relations began to improve following Thailand's normalization of diplomatic relations with China in 1975. China has built a close relationship with Thailand, has strong opinions about Cambodia, and has made inroads into Myanmar and Bangladesh. This may be perceived as an effort by China to cultivate a security belt on its southern flank running through Thailand, Myanmar and Bangladesh.²⁰⁰ China conducts a substantial amount of arms transfers to Thailand with two strategic purposes in mind. In the past, Beijing sought to counter Vietnamese, and by extension Soviet, influence in Southeast Asia. Additionally, arms transfers to Thailand bolster Beijing's political influence in Southeast Asia, giving it a role in determining Cambodia's political future and facilitating the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Indonesia in 1990.²⁰¹ Thailand benefits from improved relations by obtaining weapons at a low cost and by keeping itself in good graces with a China that is growing in regional power and dominance.

E. COOPERATION TOWARDS REGIONAL SECURITY

To head off instability and conflict in Asia, international organizations, such as the United Nations (of which the U.S., China and Russia are permanent members of the Security Council), and regional organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (of which the U.S., China, Russia, India and Japan are dialogue partners), have sought to foster multilateral security cooperation. However, China has discouraged the construction of a multilateral security framework in the region mostly out of fear that it

²⁰⁰ Klintworth, 97.

²⁰¹ Byman & Cliff, 22.

might facilitate international cooperation against Chinese interests. But with its ASEAN neighbors highly supportive of a multilateral security framework, Beijing may have no choice but to join the consensus, while attempting to anticipate and undercut any moves that might restrict its desired course of future action.²⁰² Thus far, China has attended all ARF foreign minister and senior official meetings, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Council on Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific Region (CSCAP), and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD).²⁰³ India, has encouraged multilateral security cooperation, through the U.N. and ASEAN Regional Forum as well, but thus far has come up short with regional cooperation under SAARC, as evidenced by continued Indo-Pakistani antagonism.

United States, Japanese, Indian and ASEAN support for China's entry into the World Trade Organization has significantly improved relations between these countries and is hoped will eventually stimulate institutional reform. It is hoped that through its integration in the international community, China will fully embrace the peaceful resolution of international disputes, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, military transparency, freedom of navigation and other international norms.²⁰⁴ Closer participation of India in these organizations also lends hope to increased dialogue between China and India and the resolution of conflict. Only time will tell if international and regional cooperation can ensure regional stability in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

²⁰² Roy, 179.

²⁰³ Chinese Culture, "International Security Cooperation," <http://chineseculture>, 5.

²⁰⁴ Mike M. Mochizuki, "Policy Recommendations," in *Towards a True Alliance*, ed. Mike M. Mochizuki (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1997), 199.

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VII. U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA & INDIA AND U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN REGIONS

A. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

The key to stability in the Asia-Pacific has been United States presence and commitment to the region. As the PRC continues to gain economic, military and political strength, it may soon be in a position to challenge U.S. presence and therefore, threaten stability. Since the late 1960s, efforts have been made on both sides to improve relations between these two countries. At the conclusion of President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972, the two countries issued the "Shanghai Communiqué," in which the U.S. and the PRC noted the essential differences in their social systems and foreign policies and agreed that the following principles should apply to their mutual relations: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; non-aggression against other states; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.²⁰⁵ Both countries also pledged to work toward the normalization of diplomatic relations. A U.S. Liaison Office was established in Beijing in 1973 and a Chinese office was similarly established in Washington the same year. Relations were reaffirmed during the Ford and Carter administrations, and the two governments established formal diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979. This change was reflected in a second joint communiqué between the U.S. and the PRC. In this communiqué the U.S. acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and

²⁰⁵ Joint Communiqué between the United States and the People's Republic of China, February 27, 1972.

that Taiwan is part of China. Additionally, it recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China.²⁰⁶

That same year, the U.S. alliance with the Republic of China was replaced with the Taiwan Relations Act. This act created the domestic legal authority for the conduct of unofficial relations with Taiwan. In addition to furthering commercial, cultural and other interaction with the people of Taiwan, the U.S. agreed to make available such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.²⁰⁷ China's concern over U.S. unofficial relations and arms sales to Taiwan prompted a visit by Secretary of State Alexander Haig in 1981, which eventually led to the third communiqué between the U.S. and the PRC. Issued in 1982, this communiqué stated the U.S. intention to gradually reduce the level of arms sales to Taiwan as well as China's proposal to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question.²⁰⁸ High-level diplomatic exchanges continued throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations and positive relations continued until the PRC government's crackdown of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. In response to the obvious human rights violations of the PRC government, the U.S. suspended high-level exchanges and weapons exports from the U.S. to China, as well as imposing a number of economic sanctions. Although some sanctions remained in place, President Clinton launched a policy of "comprehensive engagement" with China in 1993 in order to pursue U.S. interests through high-level dialogue with China. This was followed by President Clinton's re-granting of most favored nation trade

²⁰⁶ Joint Communiqué between the United States and the People's Republic of China, December 22, 1978.

²⁰⁷ Taiwan Relations Act, April 10, 1979.

²⁰⁸ Joint Communiqué between the United States and the People's Republic of China, August 17, 1982.

status to China in 1994 (not conditioned on human rights reform). Relations between the U.S. and PRC were again strained after copyright infringement allegations made by the U.S. against the PRC and again in 1996 when tensions flared up in the Taiwan Straits. In January 1998, China and the United States signed the Agreement Between the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC and the U.S. Department of Defense on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety. In June of that same year, President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton announced that both countries would not target each other with the strategic nuclear weapons under their control.²⁰⁹ Relations between the two countries were further strained after the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. Since that time, the Clinton administration has intensified efforts to improve relations, including support for the inclusion of the PRC in the World Trade Organization (WTO). U.S.-China relations received another setback, from the PRC's point of view, with the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelming approval of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act in February 2000. The bill is designed to reassure Taiwan of U.S. assistance in the event of a serious threat from the PRC, although some claim it is a political maneuver to silence PRC saber rattling. The Chinese have warned that if this Act is passed into law it could bring about serious damage to U.S.-PRC relations.²¹⁰

The policy of the last six administrations towards the PRC has been one of engagement. Engagement seeks to maintain and enhance relations with China as much as possible in various policy realms. Politically, it seeks to maximize bilateral ties while

²⁰⁹ Chinese Culture, "International Security Cooperation," <http://chineseculture.com>, 4.

²¹⁰ Virtual China, "U.S. House Votes 'Yes' on Taiwan Security Act," February 2, 2000, <http://www.virtualchina.com>, 1.

keeping any disputes at as low a level as possible. It tries to bring China into various multilateral organizations to increase the likelihood that it will submit to the international system. Economically, it seeks normal trade relations by granting most-favored-nation trade status and facilitating Chinese entry into international economic organizations like the WTO. Militarily it seeks avoidance of conflict with China by increasing military to military relations and encouraging China's participation in regional security organizations. The rationale of the Clinton administration's current engagement policy is that China's involvement in the international economic and political system will eventually lead to its socialization into international norms while increasing its stake in the system.²¹¹ It is also hoped that this acculturation will eventually lead to the democratization of China, which will in turn, make it less likely to come into conflict with the United States.

There is support for the belief that U.S. engagement policy with China has thus far been effective. First, Chinese behavior on international security issues has demonstrated some moderation, as seen in China's: accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, assistance in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problems, cessation of the sale of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran, and its allied position with the U.S. against nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998.²¹² Second, increased opportunities for trade and investment have been created. Two-way trade between the U.S. and China equaled \$85 billion in 1998, making China the U.S.' fourth largest

²¹¹ Khalilzad, *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications*, 64.

²¹² Zalmay M. Khalilzad, "Sweet and Sour: Recipe for a New China Policy," <http://www.rand.org/publications/RRRRRRwinter00/sweet.html>, 4.

trading partner. Contracted investment from the United States moved up 46% in 1998.²¹³ Lastly, conditions have improved within China itself. Living standards have increased and economic liberalization has led to some relaxation of political control in the country.

There are, however, possible problems with the current U.S. policy of engagement toward China. First, it can be argued that engagement has not produced the results it desires. This is evident in the absence of satisfactory progress on human rights abuses, the continued sales of missiles and nuclear weapons related technology to other states, its continuation of an advanced chemical weapons program and offensive biological weapons program along with the increased number of Chinese missiles deployed across the Taiwan Straits.²¹⁴ Second, it can also be argued that the U.S. currently does not follow its own policy and that the application of engagement has been very inconsistent. Evidence of this can be found in the U.S. threat to impose economic sanctions for alleged Chinese copyright infringement, the positioning of two carrier groups in the region in response to Chinese military exercises near Taiwan in 1996, the continuation of post-Tiananmen economic sanctions and the administration's refusal to sell a communications satellite to a Singapore based company with alleged ties to the PLA in 1999.²¹⁵ Third, it can be argued that engagement is not a policy at all but rather a tactic or means to try to achieve U.S. objectives. It does not consider what should be done when Chinese actions come into conflict with U.S. interests. In other words, there is no recourse for bad behavior on the part of China. Engagement argues that confronting China would inhibit the possibility of political reform; therefore it has no suggestions for

²¹³ The United States-China Business Council, "Foreign Direct Investment," <http://www.U.S.china.org>, 1-4.

²¹⁴ Khalilzad, "Sweet and Sour: Recipe for a New China Policy," 1.

²¹⁵ Khalilzad, *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications*, 67.

dealing with problems besides more engagement. Fourth, engagement rests on an assumption that is far from certain. We cannot guarantee that through engagement China will fall in line with international order and values. Engagement may have the detrimental effect of continuing to support the political, economic and military development of a country that will retain its current system of government and develop an increasing belligerence towards the U.S.²¹⁶ Lastly, even if engagement successfully converted China into the largest democracy in the world, there is no guarantee that China's historical worldview and Sinocentrism would not place it at odds with the United States and other countries of the world.

Other policies have also been postulated. One possible alternative is containment, which seeks to seal China off from the international community in order to prevent any increase in China's power. This policy is based on the assumption that allowing China to expand its influence will not bring it in line with the international system, but rather continue to develop its political, economic and military power and enhance the probability of a confrontation with the United States. As, with a policy of engagement, there are numerous problems and risks involved in containment. Another alternative, would be a policy that combines the best aspects of both an engagement and containment policy, a form of modified engagement or what RAND analysts have termed "congagement," (a combination of containment and engagement) which is a policy that seeks to preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy, deter China from becoming hostile and prepare against the possibility that a strong China might challenge U.S.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 68-69.

interests in the region.²¹⁷ The key to the successful implementation of this policy is establishing the proper balance between when to engage and when to exercise pressure to refocus errant Chinese policy. As with policies of engagement and containment, modified engagement also has its problems, although they appear to be significantly less substantial. It remains to be seen if the outcome of the 2000 U.S. presidential election will hail a change in U.S. policy towards the PRC. However, the Chinese have expressed confidence that they can establish a positive relationship with either candidate.²¹⁸

B. U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS

United States relations with India have run hot and cold throughout most of the Cold War. President Eisenhower's goodwill mission to South Asia in 1959 promised better future relations between India and the United States. The President informed Congress that India, among all developing countries, held singular promise and pledged that the Nehru government would receive a "major share" of U.S. developmental loans.²¹⁹ As a burgeoning new democracy in the Third World and the dominant country in South Asia, relations with India seemed promising. But Cold War tensions soon subsumed developmental interests.

The United States continued its economic support for India up until the war with Pakistan in 1965. After that time allegiances began to shift. United States strategic interest in Pakistan in order to block the spread of communism resulted in significant economic and military support to Pakistan. U.S. dispatch of a nuclear-armed aircraft

²¹⁷ Khalilzad, *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications*, 72.

²¹⁸ *Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao*, "The U.S. Presidential Election Will Not Change U.S. Policy Toward China," as translated in World News Connection, FBIS-CHI-2000-1107, 1-2.

²¹⁹ Selig S. Harrison, *India and the United States*, ed. Selig S. Harrison, (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1961), 1.

carrier (USS *Enterprise*) to the Bay of Bengal in December 1971, at the height of the Third Indo-Pakistani War, appeared to have vindicated Indian policy makers' perception of a Sino-U.S.-Pakistani axis which was inimical to Indian interests.²²⁰

Efforts by President Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski to correct India's tilt toward the Soviet Union by encouraging India to be friendly toward China (in keeping with American foreign policy interests) were perceived as a lack of appreciation for India's security concerns.²²¹ Likewise, the Reagan administration's decisions to supply arms to Pakistan in 1981 and to liberalize the transfer of military technology to China in 1985 not only set back India's improving relations with its traditional adversaries, but also increased Indian military dependence on the Soviet Union.²²² United States-Indian relations did not begin to thaw until the close of the Cold War.

U.S.-India relations received a significant boost with President Clinton's visit in late March 2000. President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee outlined what amounts to a structure for sustained economic relations and strategic links. Among the proposals were: consultation on regional issues, joint efforts with others for "strategic stability in Asia and beyond" and combined efforts to counter terrorism and other security threats.²²³

Although U.S. sanctions imposed in the wake of India's 1998 nuclear tests are still in place, President Clinton has not let differences in non-proliferation issues prevent further cooperation. The U.S. is India's largest market and its largest foreign investor.²²⁴ India's contribution to the computer boom in Silicon Valley highlight India's importance

²²⁰ Malik, 146.

²²¹ Thomas, 111.

²²² Ibid., 34.

²²³ Nayan Chanda, "Coming in From the Cold," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Interactive Edition, March 30, 2000, http://203.105.48.72_0003_30/p22foreign.html, 1-2.

²²⁴ Ibid., 5.

to the U.S. economy. Improved relations between the U.S. and India have not been welcomed by Pakistan however. U.S.-Pakistani relations were complicated earlier this month by New Zealand's Labour led government's cancellation of a contract to lease 28 F-16 Fighters, the proceeds of which, were to go to Pakistan. This was the intended solution to U.S. cancellation of an agreement to provide fighter aircraft to Pakistan in the early 1990s. It is not yet clear how the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections will effect future U.S.-India relations.

C. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN

1. The Asia-Pacific

U.S. interest in the Asia-Pacific is substantial. Its origins date back to early trading expeditions in the Far East, Commodore Perry's "opening up" of Japan and the acquisition of the Philippines following the Spanish-American War. U.S. interests took on new form at the conclusion of World War II. The Asia-Pacific became a key area of control during the Cold War, and the U.S. was willing to fight there to contain communism. The U.S. negotiated security treaties with countries throughout the region, established bases, stationed large numbers of troops and conducted regular naval deployments throughout the region. Although U.S. interest in the region has declined somewhat since the Sino-American rapprochement and collapse of the Soviet Union, it remains significant to national defense strategy and foreign policy. The Asian market is now the largest in the world, and the U.S. has a vested interest in maintaining stability to ensure further economic progress. The U.S. still has security agreements with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand (suspended in 1986). It maintains bases and military installations in Japan, Korea, Singapore and Australia.

The U.S. is a dialogue partner in the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) and a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperative (APEC).

There is some reason to believe that U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific may diminish in the future. Improved relations between North and South Korea create the possibility for rapprochement in the not so distant future, which would bring into question the need for U.S. troops to remain in Korea and Japan as well. Japan's increasing military capability and expanding security role in the region may result in U.S. troop reductions within the country. U.S. influence also seems to be retreating from Southeast Asia. In the U.S. Declaration on the Spratlys and South China Sea, dated May 10, 1995, it was stated that the U.S. takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea.²²⁵ However, the U.S. remains concerned about unimpeded transit through the area. The U.S. took on a minimal role during the conflict and aftermath of East Timor. At a joint press conference with Australian Defense Minister John Moore in July 2000, Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that the U.S.:

“...will look for some leadership on the part of Australia in terms of formulating our own policies in the region.”²²⁶

With pressure to cut the defense budget and a U.S. defense focus on the Balkans and Middle East, a decreasing U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific seems more likely. The increasing economic and military capabilities of the countries in the region have allowed

²²⁵ Statement by the Acting Spokesman U.S. Department of State, May 10, 1995.

²²⁶ STRATFOR, “U.S. Influence Retreats from Southeast Asia,” July 21, 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com>, 1.

them more say in regional security than at any time in the past. There is reason to believe that this will continue in the future.

2. The Indian Ocean

U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean has a long history dating back to the 19th century, as Far East trade took on increased significance. As naval strategy began to be articulated, the Indian Ocean received an added level of importance. At the end of the 19th century, American naval strategist Captain Alfred T. Mahan stated:

“whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is key to the Seven Seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.”²²⁷

The strategic significance of the Indian Ocean was substantially enhanced during World War II, and became critical to U.S. interests during the Cold War. During the Cold War, the major U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean was to prevent its absorption into the communist orbit. After U.S. rapprochement with China, the prevention of Soviet expansionism became the primary focus. Related to this and equally important, was U.S. access to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic fundamentalist revolution in Iran generated increased emphasis on the need to control the Indian Ocean and Gulf access in order to keep the free flow of oil to the West.²²⁸ Access through the Indian Ocean has been essential to the prosecution of U.S. national security policy, as demonstrated during the Gulf War.

²²⁷ Monoranjan Bezboruah, *U.S. Strategy in the Indian Ocean*, (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

²²⁸ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “American Policy in South Asia: Interests and Objectives,” in *The Security of South Asia*, ed. Stephen Philip Cohen (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 120.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s somewhat diminished the importance placed on the Indian Ocean by the U.S. However, other concerns have gained significance to U.S. interests. These concerns include, first and foremost, continued access to the Persian Gulf, followed by the maintenance of regional stability, preventing the spread of nuclear proliferation, and the preservation of economic and commercial interests.²²⁹ Still, the U.S. has never really focused on the Indian Ocean and South Asian security. The vast majority of conflict in the region met with little U.S. involvement such as arms supply to Pakistan and India and the stationing of the USS *Enterprise* in the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The area has been mostly an interest of transit, into and out of the Persian Gulf. There appears to be little sign of that U.S. interest in the region will increase unless stability on a broad scale in the region is threatened.

²²⁹ Ibid., 120.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The evidence to support this thesis is compelling. As China and India continue to reach their economic potentials, they are growing in prosperity and influence. These two Asian giants, which have historically played a significant role in their respective domains in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean, are now pushing outward to broaden the range of their influence and protect their national interests. As they push outward, they are perceived by the other to be encroaching into what has traditionally been the other's domain. This is of great concern to both countries as military capabilities continue to advance, raising the stakes of confrontation and conflict. The realities of the current situation in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions are:

- China and India are both expanding their naval operational reach. China's desire to protect its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea has led it to claim most of the area, which directly threatens other countries in the region with claims in this vital body of water as well as the large percentage of trade and commerce that transit through it. In order to protect the critical entrance into the South China Sea through the Malacca Strait, China has reportedly established a permanent facility in the Cocos Islands and is negotiating for the use of naval facilities in the country of Myanmar. Likewise, India's desire to protect itself from a Chinese advance into the Indian Ocean and to protect the free flow of commerce in the strait has compelled it to extend into the South China Sea, where it also seeks to establish a naval presence.

- China and India are building up their naval forces to adapt to this expansion. In order to meet the demands of projecting naval forces beyond their territorial waters, both China and India are going through a period of naval modernization with the goal of establishing a blue water capable navy. China is purported to be building one (possibly two) domestically produced carriers. India, which has one functioning carrier, is currently negotiating for the purchase of a Russian carrier and has approved the development of its own domestically produced carrier. Both countries are also improving their submarine capabilities as well as major surface ships.
- Alliance formation may be occurring in both the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. China maintains close relations with Pakistan and Myanmar and is courting improved relations with Thailand, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. China's substantial arms transfers to these countries combined with technical and commercial assistance have moved these countries closer to China in order to reap these benefits as well as counterbalance growing Indian domination in the Indian Ocean region. Likewise, India is strengthening ties with countries like Japan, Vietnam, Singapore and Australia in order to reap mutual economic benefits as well as counterbalance growing Chinese domination in the Asia-Pacific region.

These factors, combined with a history of antagonistic relations, strategic cultures that pit them against each other, and a desire for each to find a prominent place in a new world order, increase the likelihood of confrontation and conflict between China and India. Declining U.S. presence in the region and a desire of Asian countries to determine

their own destinies are creating an environment that could lead to a struggle for power between the countries in the best position to assert their influence.

It is imperative to point out that what this thesis predicts is not some enormous Mahanian naval conflict between the Chinese and Indian navies. It merely proposes that an increase in naval assets, coupled with increased activity in each other's claimed maritime domain, increases the likelihood of meeting engagements at sea, which could escalate to conflict on mainland Asia itself. Traditionally, both China and India have emphasized the need for powerful land and air forces due to the primary threat of conflict in their extensive border regions. Indeed, these two countries have some of the largest land armies and total military personnel in the world. Naval expansion is opening up a new avenue for conflict. What is more troublesome is that each country's naval expansion seems to be focused on the other's naval capabilities.

Although the evidence to support this thesis is substantial, the outcomes described above are not inevitable. There are factors that exist that could significantly delay naval expansion in both China and India, and political initiatives may improve relations between the two countries over time. Some of these possibilities include:

- The leveling off of Chinese and Indian economies may inhibit their respective naval expansion programs. Both economies, which significantly took off in the 1980s through the early 1990s are showing signs of slowing down. China's GDP, which had a growth rate of 14.2% in 1992, has decreased every year since then (1998 growth rate was 7.8%). India's GDP, which had a

growth rate of 8.0% in 1995 has declined also (1998 growth rate was 5.6%).²³⁰

A less prosperous economy leads one to assume that less funding would be available for military expenditures. However, in China and India, this is currently not the case. While the vast majority of the world is in the process of reducing their defense budgets and military expenditures, China and India's military expenditures continue to rise despite economic decline. China's military expenditures have increased every year since 1994 (US\$12.2 billion), 1998 defense expenditures reached US\$16.9 billion. India's military expenditures have increased every year since 1992 (US\$6.8 billion), 1998 military expenditures reached US\$9.8 billion.²³¹

- A continued lack of naval focus by both countries may result in military expenditures allocated elsewhere. Both China and India have traditionally emphasized their navies last among their armed services. With significant threats remaining in their border regions, particularly China's west and southwest and India's west and north, it is reasonable to believe that the majority of defense expenditures will be allocated to their armies, air forces and nuclear programs. However, the fact remains that as their military expenditures continue to grow, there will be more funds available for naval modernization.
- There have been signs of improvement in China-India bilateral relations over the last year and a half. Tensions created by India's nuclear tests at Pokhran

²³⁰ John T. Dori, ed., *U.S. and Asia Statistical Handbook 1999-2000*, (U.S.: The Heritage Foundation, 2000), 49&57.

²³¹ *SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 305.

in 1998 were eased in January 1999, when China called for strengthened cooperation between China and India towards regional stability. India's Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh traveled to Beijing in June of 1999 to discuss the Kargil Conflict with Pakistan, to which China for the first time seemed to tilt toward India. Meetings were conducted between the two countries on border issues in November and both countries signed a bilateral trade agreement in February 2000 as part of China's World Trade Organization accession process. In March 2000, India's joint secretary in charge of disarmament affairs traveled to Beijing to hold a security dialogue. This was followed in May by a visit to China by Indian President K.R. Narayanan. Although both countries maintain substantial economic ties with bilateral trade approximating US\$2 billion annually, diverging interests continue to plague relations. Upon his arrival in Islamabad, after departing New Delhi in July 2000, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stated that improvement of relations with India would not come at the expense of Beijing's ties with traditional ally Pakistan.²³²

- Regional organizations such as ASEAN and SAARC may work to establish multilateral cooperation in regional security and assist in conflict resolution. Although ASEAN and SAARC have not presently lived up to expectations as organizations that contribute to regional security, there is hope for a more substantial role in the future. ASEAN in particular, through the use of its Regional Forum and consultation of dialogue partners (which include the

²³² Reuters, "China says India ties will not hurt Pakistan," July 24, 2000, <http://www.cnn.com>, 1-2.

U.S., Japan, China, India and Russia) holds promise as an organization that can foster cooperation and ensure mutual security interests. Although China is against multilateral security cooperation for fear of having its particular interests subsumed, it may be left with little choice but to cooperate more fully in the future. There are however, many obstacles that remain to be overcome in improving cooperation, which especially holds true for SAARC.


- U.S. presence in the region probably will not diminish in the immediate future. The U.S. continues to place a high value on Asia-Pacific/Indian Ocean security and stability. As regions that contain the largest economic market in the world, solid relations and prosperity in the region are critical to U.S. national interests. The U.S. still maintains substantial security obligations with countries in the region, particularly Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia. The possibility of North and South Korean rapprochement has led the North to become more vocal in their desire for U.S. presence to remain in Korea to ensure a stable environment. Similarly, China has also voiced its tacit approval of a continued U.S. presence. Fear of Japanese re-militarization by its neighbors and a substantially reduced military burden on the part of Japan has encouraged the Japanese to retain a U.S. military presence. Most countries in the region feel that a U.S. presence is key to stability and the prevention of a power struggle by countries that may have aspirations toward regional hegemony such as China, India, Japan and Russia. The question is, will U.S. domestic opinion and an increasing financial strain to support an extended military presence continue indefinitely?

Regardless of these factors, the differences inherent in China and India's long-term strategic objectives warn of the possibility of a coming confrontation between these two Asian giants. Even if economic growth and political expansion are delayed, military expenditures may continue to grow. The world is no longer a place where a large power can remain isolated in its own sphere and be assured that its national interests will be safeguarded. The more that countries depend on outside resources for their economic survival, the more that they will extend themselves to protect those interests. China and India are rapidly gaining that capability as manifested through increasingly blue water capable navies. Their competing interests will continue to place them at odds, while other countries in the region move to take sides. China and India's increasing military capability and operational reach, particularly at sea, will increase the likelihood of confrontation and conflict in the future.

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APPENDIX A. CHINA-INDIA NAVAL SITUATION MAP

MAP OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN REGIONS



Source: CIA World Factbook 2000.

KEY

-  - Major Chinese Naval Bases
-  - Myanmar's Port of Sittwe and OF in the Cocos Is.
-  - Chinese Exercises and Port Visits
-  - Major Indian Naval Bases (includes base in the Andaman Islands)
-  - Indian Exercises and Port Visits

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APPENDIX B. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

- 1950 India becomes the first non-communist country to establish diplomatic relations with the newly founded PRC in April.
- China invades Tibet, Sino-Indian border comes under dispute.
- 1954 China and India declare the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Agreement on Trade between India and Tibet.
- 1956 China begins construction of the Aksai Chin road in the disputed western sector of the border region.
- 1958 China publishes official maps depicting 51,000 square km of territory belonging to China that had been traditionally claimed by India.
- 1959 Tibetan uprising results in large influx of Chinese troops into Tibet. The Dalai Lama, under Chinese persecution, flees Tibet and establishes a government in exile in northern India.
- Sino-Indian military confrontation begins throughout the border area.
- 1962 Sino-Indian War.
- Colombo Mediation fails to resolve the dispute.
- 1964 China detonates its first atomic bomb.
- 1967 China detonates its first hydrogen bomb.
- 1971 India signs the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union to counter-balance what is seen as a Pakistan-U.S.-China alliance.
- 1974 India detonates its first nuclear device in Pokhran.
- 1975 China refuses to recognize India's annexation of Sikkim.
- 1976 China-India diplomatic relations restored to ambassadorial level.
- 1980 Deng Xiaoping proposes that the boundary issue be resolved on the basis of Chinese recognition of the LAC in the eastern sector in exchange for Indian recognition of the status quo in the western sector.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS (cont.)

- 1981 First round of border negotiations between China and India are held in Beijing.
- China repeats Deng's proposal regarding settlement on the basis of the LAC.
 - India insists on a sector-by-sector approach.
- 1982 Indian ships conduct a port visit to Vietnam.
- Second round of border negotiations.
- China's proposal outlined 5 principles.
 - India's proposal outlined 6 principles.
- 1983 Third round of border negotiations.
- Both sides acknowledge continued differences.
- Fourth round of border negotiations.
- China accepts India's sector-by-sector approach.
- 1984 Fifth round of border negotiations.
- China accepts McMahon Line in eastern sector and demands some Indian territory in the Aksai Chin region.
- 1985 Chinese ships conduct port visits to Karachi, Colombo and Chittagong in the Indian Ocean (it is the first time Chinese ships have been in these waters since the 15th century).
- Sixth round of border negotiations.
- China changes position and reemphasizes proposal of the first round.
 - India reemphasizes its original position.
- 1986 China protests the establishment of Arunachal Pradesh from the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).
- Chinese and Indian troops have a stand-off in the Sumdorong Chu Valley, as the Indian Army conducts a large-scale military exercise near the region.
- Seventh round of border negotiations.
- Both sides harden their positions based on the incorporation of Arunachal Pradesh as a state of India and as a consequence of the Sumdorong Chu Valley dispute.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS (cont.)

- 1987 After tensions flare between China and India over disputed territory in the China-India-Bhutan border area, China threatens India with an "unpleasant event."
- Eighth round of border negotiations.
- China appreciated India's position on Tibet.
 - India gives up its "boundary settlement or nothing" stance.
- 1988 During a visit to China by Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi, both sides agree to establish a Joint Working Group on the boundary question.
- 1989 Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian visits India to push for improvement in relations.
- First Joint Working Group (JWG) between China and India is held in Beijing.
- Both sides agreed that military experts in the two countries would work out measures to ensure "peace and tranquility" along the LAC.
- 1990 Second JWG Meeting.
- Both sides agreed on the establishment of regular meetings between military personnel in the border areas in order to expand contacts.
- 1991 Third JWG Meeting.
- Both sides acknowledged each other's positions and agreed to keep meeting.
- India renews its Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.
- PM Li Peng visits India, (First Chinese PM to visit India in 31 years).
- 1992 Fourth JWG Meeting.
- Flag meetings between military personnel formally established two times a year in both the eastern and western sectors.
 - Proposal for direct phone lines between local commanders.
 - CBMs such as prior notification of military exercises established.
- Indian President Venkataraman visits China.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS (cont.)

- 1992 Fifth JWG Meeting.
- Both sides acknowledged each other's positions and agreed to keep meeting.
- 1993 Sixth JWG Meeting.
- Both sides agreed on the implementation of measures to ensure greater transparency in the location of forward posts and military activities along the LAC.
- During Indian PM Narashimha Rao's visit to China, the two countries signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas. Both countries also agreed to establish a Military and Diplomatic Experts Group within the JWG.
- 1994 First Meeting of the Military and Diplomatic Experts Group held in New Delhi.
- Second Meeting of the Military and Diplomatic Experts Group held in Beijing.
- Seventh JWG Meeting.
- Both sides failed to resolve differences over reduction of close encounters along the LAC.
- 1995 Eighth JWG Meeting.
- Both sides agreed to a troop pullback from 4 forward posts.
- 1996 Ninth JWG Meeting.
- Both sides agreed to increase military-to-military visits and establish 2 additional meeting places in the eastern sector.
- During Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to India, the two countries signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas.
- 1997 Tenth JWG Meeting.
- Both sides focused on the implementation of the 1993 and 1996 CBM agreements.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS (cont.)

- 1998 India conducts a series of nuclear tests at Pokhran. Indian Defense Minister, George Fernandes and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee portray the threat from China as a motivating factor for the Pokhran II nuclear tests. China criticizes India for its statements, which are viewed as damaging to Sino-Indian relations and the nuclear weapons tests themselves, which are seen as a threat to global nonproliferation. China demands that India and Pakistan unconditionally sign the NPT and CTBT.
- UN Security Council Resolution 1172 sets forth clear and comprehensive objectives for action to address the threat of a South Asian nuclear arms race.
- JWG Meeting cancelled by China after Indian nuclear tests conducted.
- 1999 Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visits Beijing for talks on Kargil Conflict. Although China asserts its neutrality on the issue, comments made by Chinese officials suggest a tilt toward India.
- China criticizes India for its test of the *Agni II* medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).
- In the annual report of the Indian Defense Ministry released in April, India stated that it does not regard China "as an adversary and would like to develop mutually friendly relations with it.."
- Eleventh JWG Meeting.
- Both sides agreed to restore bilateral relations and move forward with CBMs.
- 2000 The Joint Secretary in charge of disarmament affairs from India's Foreign Ministry, Rakesh Sood, met with Director General of China's Foreign Ministry Asian department, Zhang Jiujuan in Beijing for a security dialogue in March.
- Twelfth JWG Meeting.
- Both sides agreed to resume senior military contacts, suspended in 1998.
 - Discussions focused on President Narayanan's upcoming visit to China.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS (cont.)

2000 Indian President Narayanan gives an address at Beijing University in May, calling for harmonious relations between India and China and an effort to work toward a stable and peaceful world order.

Upon his arrival in Islamabad in July after departing New Delhi, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stated that, "improving relations with India would not come at the expense of Beijing's ties with traditional ally Pakistan."

China conducts naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal.

Indian naval vessels INS *Delhi* (destroyer) and INS *Kora* (corvette) conduct port visit in Shanghai, China, while the INS *Aditya* (refueling tanker) and INS *Khuthar* (corvette) visited Pusan, South Korea. The four ships later linked up in Sasebo, Japan. The ships were part of a 40 day long (September – October) eastward cruise that included multilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea.

APPENDIX C. CHINA'S NAVAL FORCE ASSETS

SHIP TYPE	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	ACTIVE [RESV]	BUILDING [PLANNED]
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS			
Russian Nevskoye Design Bureau Contract	PRC		[1]
SUBMARINES			
Strategic Missile Submarines			
(Type 094) SSBN	PRC		[1]
Xia Class (Type 092) SSBN	PRC	1	
Golf Class SSB	PRC	1	
Attack Submarines			
(Type 093) SSN	PRC		1 / [1]
Han Class (Type 091) SSN	PRC	5	
Patrol Submarines			
Song Class (Type 039)	PRC	2	2
Kilo Class (Type 877EKM/636)	Russia	4	[2]
Ming Class (Type 035)	PRC	18	1
MOD Romeo Class (Type 033G)	PRC	1	
Romeo Class (Type 033)	PRC	32 / [8]	
DESTROYERS			
Sovremenny Class	Russia	1	1 / [2]
Luhu Class	PRC	2	
Luda I/II Class	PRC	15	
Luda III Class	PRC	1	
Luhai Class	PRC	1	[1]
FRIGATES			
Jiangwei II Class	PRC	6	2
Jiangwei I Class	PRC	4	
Jianghu I Class	PRC	27	
Jianghu III/IV Class	PRC	3	
Jianghu II Class	PRC	1	
PATROL FORCES			
Fast Attack Craft			
Houxin Class (Missile)	PRC	26	
Houjian Class (Missile)	PRC	6	[1]
Huangfen/Hola Class (Missile)	PRC	30/1	
Houku Class (Missile)	PRC	25	
Shangahi II Class (Gun)	PRC	98	
Huchuan Class (Torpedo)	PRC	15	
Hainan Class (Patrol)	PRC	95	
Haiqing Class (Patrol)	PRC	22	
Patrol Craft			
Haijiu Class	PRC	2	
Haizhui/Shanghai III Class	PRC	15	2
Harbor Patrol Craft (PBI)	PRC	4	

CHINA'S NAVAL FORCE ASSETS (cont.)

SHIP TYPE	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	ACTIVE [RESV]	BUILDING [PLANNED]
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES			
Shan Class (US 1-511 (LST))	USA	3	
Yudeng Class (LSM)	PRC	1	
Yuting Class (LST)	PRC	8	1
Yukan Class (LST)	PRC	7	
Yuliang Class (LSM)	PRC	22	
Yuhai Class (LSM)	PRC	13	3
Yunnan Class (LCU)	PRC	36 / [200]	
Yudao Class (LSM)	PRC	1	
Yuch'in Class (LCU/LCP)	PRC	8 / (30)	
Jingsah II Class (Hovercraft)	PRC	10	
MINE WARFARE FORCES			
T 43 Class (Ocean Minesweeper)	PRC	27 / [13]	
Wolei Class (Minelayer)	PRC	1	
Wosao Class (Coastal Minesweeper)	PRC	8	1
Futi Class (Drone Minesweeper)	PRC	4 / [42]	
OTHER SHIPS			
Training Ships	PRC	2	
Troop Transport	PRC	6	
Submarine Support Ships	PRC	6	
Salvage and Repair Ships	PRC	3	1
Supply & Replenishment Ships	PRC	32	3
Icebreakers	PRC	4	
NAVAL AIR FORCES			
Shipborne Aircraft			
Zhi-8 Super Frelon	France	6	
Zhi-9A Haitun (Dauphin 2)	France	10	
Kamov Ka 28PL/Ka 28PS	Russia	10	
Land-based Maritime Aircraft			
Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker	Russia	95	
Harbin SH-5	PRC	7	
Hanzhong Y-8MPA Cub	PRC	6	
Harbin H-5 (H-28 Beagle)	PRC	45	
Shenyang J-8-I/II Finback A/B	PRC	18/15	
Nanchang A-5 (Fantan A) (MiG-19)	PRC	40	
Shenyang F-6 (MiG-19 Farmer)	PRC	320	
Xian B-6/6D (Tu-16 Badger)	PRC	14	
Xian F-7 Fishbed C/E	PRC	30	

Source: *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001.*

APPENDIX D. INDIA'S NAVAL FORCE ASSETS

SHIP TYPE	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	ACTIVE	BUILDING [PLANNED]
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS			
INS Viraat (Hermes Class)	United Kingdom	1	
Unknown	India		1
Admiral Gorshkov (Kiev Class)	Russia		[1]
SUBMARINES			
Attack Submarines			
Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV)	India		1
Patrol Submarines			
Shishumar Class (German 209 Class)	Germany & India	4	2
Sindhughosh Class (Soviet Kilo Class)	Russia	10	
Kursura Class (Soviet Foxtrot Class)	Russia	4	
DESTROYERS			
Rajput Class (Soviet Kashin II Class)	Russia	5	
Delhi Class	India	3	
FRIGATES			
Talwar Class	India		3 / [3]
Godavari Class	India	3	
MOD Godavari Class	India	1	2
Nilgiri Class (British Leander Class)	India	4	
Arnala Class (Soviet Petya II Class)	Russia	3	
CORVETTES			
Kora Class (Project 25A)	India	2	2
Khukri Class (Project 25)	India	4	
Abhay Class (Soviet Pauk II Class)	Russia	4	
Veer Class (Soviet Tarantul I Class)	Russia & India	11	1 / [4]
Durg Class (Soviet Nanuchka II Class)	Russia	2	
PATROL FORCES			
Sukanya Class	South Korea & India	7	
Vidyut Class (Soviet Osa II Class)	Russia	3	
Super Dvorka Mk II Class	India	2	2 / [15]
Super Dvorka Mk III Class	India	6	2
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES			
Magar Class (LST)	India	2	1 / [3]
Vasco da Gama Class Mk 3 (LCU/LSM)	India	10	
Ghorpad Class (Soviet Polnocny CI (LSM))	Russia	8	

INDIA'S NAVAL FORCE ASSETS (cont.)

SHIP TYPE	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	ACTIVE	BUILDING [PLANNED]
MINE WARFARE FORCES			
Pondicherry Class (Soviet Natya I Class)	Russia	12	
Mahe Class (Soviet Yevgenya Class)	Russia	6	
Unknown (Minehunter)	India		[6]
OTHER SHIPS			
Survey and Research Ships	India	13	
Training Ships	India	4	
Submarine Tender	Russia	1	
Diving Support/Rescue Ships	India	1	
Replenishment Tankers	Russia & India	3	[1]
Transport Ships	India	2	
Support Tankers	India	6	
Water Carriers	India	2	
Ocean Tugs	India		
NAVAL AIR FORCES			
Shipborne Aircraft			
Sea Harrier Mks 51/60/4	Britain	14/3/2	
Sea King Mks 42A/42B/42C	Britain	15/8/6	
Ka-27/28/31 Helix	Russia	13/5/4	
Chetak	India	23	
HAL (Advanced Light Helicopter)	India	6	
Land-based Maritime Aircraft			
Domier 228	India	24	[7]
Ilyushin-38	Russia	5	
PBN-2B Defender	Britain	11	
Tu-142M Bear F	Russia	8	[8]
HAL Jaguar	India	8	

Source: *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001.*

APPENDIX E. MAJOR NAVAL FORCES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN

TYPE	COUNTRIES										
	RUSSIA	USA/PAC	CHINA	JAPAN	INDIA	ROK	ROC	INDO	DPRK	THAI	PAK
CARRIERS	1	11//6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
SUBMARINES	72	73/40	64	16	18	8*	4	2	22*	0	7*
CRUISERS	7	27/13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DESTROYERS	17	54/30	20	41	8	8	11	0	0	0	0
FRIGATES	54	27/21	41	12	11	9	21	17	3	14	9
CORVETTES	50	0/0	0	0	24	28	0	16	5	7	0
SUBTOTAL	201	192/110	125	69	62	53	36	35	30	22	16
PATROL	111	14	338	3	18	90	63	20	500	64	13
MINE WARFARE	78	12	40	31	18	17	12	13	24	7	3
AMPHIBIOUS	24	39	55	4	10	13	19	26	10	8	0
OTHERS	18	19	53	27	32	3	22	25	12	17	6
TOTAL	432	276	611	134	140	176	152	119	576	118	38

This table annotates active ships only. It does not take into account ships under construction, planned or in reserve.

* These figures exclude coastal and midget submarines (ROK: 0/11. DPRK: 22/40, Pakistan: 0/3).

Source: *Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-2001.*

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