Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America's Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions
Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army has largely been operating in a "come as you are" format, responding to one major regional war and a series of crises around the world with equipment and doctrine optimized for that earlier Cold War era. In some sense, the momentum of the acquisition process is now resulting in a mismatch of capability with respect to emerging needs. Although one perception is that the Army now has more combat capability than it may need, which may result in inefficiencies, another perception is that the Army does not have the right kind of capability, which may result in an inability to operate effectively in future contingencies. The fundamental strength of today's Army lies in its ability to fight and win a major theater-level war; and this ability exists through a deliberate intent to field the most capable mechanized force possible. It is easy to argue that the Army leadership succeeded in this intent, since no anticipated enemy force can match the firepower and maneuver capability of a combined arms mechanized U.S. force, equipped with the M1-series Abrams main battle tank, the M2-series Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. Nonetheless, as the world continues to thaw out from the stability once imposed by a bipolar superpower rivalry, the likelihood of major theater-level war is giving way to increased numbers of smaller regional conflicts and crises. New crises and conflicts are continuing to emerge around the world, and as the frequency of such events continues to increase, so does the need to adjust the U.S. capability for direct response to, and intervention within, these situations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA388450
Entities
People
- John Gordon
- John Matsumura
- Randall Steeb
- Russell Glenn
- Tom Herbert
Organizations
- RAND Corporation