



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

National Security Dialogues on the 21st Century

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This document, produced under IDA's Central Research Program, collects the comments relative to national security made by a series of conference panels at various locations across the United States. These panels were drawn from a wide cross-section of American citizens. The objective was to hear from people with extensive backgrounds in national security policy making, as well as citizens who had little or no experience in the area, but who could articulate the views of the general public. Comments arose from discussions under six topics: The 21st Century Security Environment; National Will in the 21st Century; Traditional versus Non- Traditional Missions; Force Composition Size and Quality; Materiel and Equipment; and Leadership, Doctrine, and Character.

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PREFACE

This document, prepared under Institute for Defense Analyses' Central Research Program, records the collected suggestions for a debate on future national security. The suggestions were put forward at a series of conferences held in several locations around the United States during late 1999 and early 2000. These debates were sponsored by various organizations for the purpose of bringing together people with varied backgrounds and views, both political and military, who could express their opinions on any of several topics related to defense policy. The objective was to hear from people with extensive backgrounds in national policy making, as well as citizens who had little or no experience in the area, but who could articulate the views of the general population.

We are grateful to several organizations, not otherwise directly associated with IDA or the defense establishment that was of inestimable help in sponsoring the discussion groups. These included the National Security Forum, Chicago, Illinois; the Silicon Valley Manufacturers Association, San Jose, California; and Moravian College, Bethlehem Pennsylvania.

NATIONAL SECURITY DIALOGUES ON THE 21ST CENTURY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Introduction.....	1
B. Summary of Insights.....	2
C. Debate Questions.....	3
 I. INTRODUCTION	I-1
 II. DEVELOPING THE METHODOLOGY	II-1
A. Background and Description	II-1
B. The Debates	II-2
1. The 21st Century Security Environment	II-3
2. National Will in the 21st Century	II-4
3. Traditional versus Non-Traditional Missions.....	II-5
4. Force Composition Size and Quality	II-5
5. Material and Equipment	II-6
6. Leadership, Doctrine, and Character	II-6
 III. ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES.....	III-1

Appendix A – Creating the Debate Framework
Appendix B – October 1999 Conference Results
Appendix C – January 2000 Conference Results
Appendix D – February 2000 Conference Results
Appendix E – March 2000 Conference Results
Appendix F – May 2000 Conference Results

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. INTRODUCTION

The turn of the century finds the U.S. as the sole superpower, but with its national security organization trying to build on the practices and habits that won the Cold War in order to embrace the evolving security environment. During the last several years, the defense establishment has undertaken many efforts to address the complexities that will be associated with security planning in the 21st Century. The goal is to provide information to policy planners to help them determine the most prudent course for the U.S. to pursue in maintaining security, protecting our interests, and continuing as the world leader. For the most part, these efforts have addressed the wide range of opportunities and potential problems facing the nation in a fairly traditional context, focusing on the situation at hand but paying only marginal heed to situations that might occur. In order to obtain a crosscut of the opinions of Americans on a variety of national defense topics, the IDA team set out to find a selection of people to engage in an open discussion of their views on how national security planners might address the changing world.

Rather than duplicating or echoing the useful efforts that have already been done, we began a modest extension of the debate to emphasize the various new dynamics that will or might face our military and defense structures in the coming decades. Using an IDA-sponsored monograph to introduce the possible new dimensions of 21st Century conflict and employing facilitation techniques refined over the past five years by IDA in Eastern Europe and the CIS states, we have organized conferences from diverse groups at various locations throughout the country.

These conferences have added a new dimension to the national security dialog by spotlighting attention on those key issues that, for reasons of inconvenience, misunderstanding, or difficulty, do not get all the attention they deserve. Additionally, by reaching out to the local leadership in areas as diverse in outlook as Chicago and the Silicon Valley, the insight gained is broad and national. The completed conference schedule to date has included:

- *20 October 1999, Alexandria, Virginia – Opening Conference at IDA*

- *6 January 2000*, Chicago, Illinois – Sponsored by the National Strategy Forum
- *8 February 2000*, IDA – Defense Science Study Group
- *8 March 2000*, San Jose, California – Sponsored by Silicon Valley Manufacturers Association
- *2 May 2000*, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania – Sponsored by Moravian College

B. SUMMARY OF INSIGHTS

The discussion that emerged from the various meetings and conferences has provided us with a wealth of insight. As we digested the input of the participants, the following issues worthy of serious attention have emerged:

- **Use of the military:** By and large, participants expressed little concern about using the military for numerous non-traditional deployments around the world so long as the intent was to support U.S. values and critical national interests.
- **Forward Presence:** There is reasonable comfort level with U.S. forward presence, since the perception is that our economic interests are supported by a strong military presence and that we are a benign power.
- **Superpower leadership:** There is debate about whether the U.S. truly has a world leadership role or is merely the world's police force. At the center of the issue is choosing what is necessary to support U.S. values and interests.
- **Casualties:** The political and military leadership is too sensitive concerning losses in combat. As long as the leadership clearly explains the risks involved, that some risks are prudent, and does not go to the well too often, the people will support policy decisions. The public understands that combat is dangerous. If a major U.S. interest is at stake, some casualties will be tolerated but probably not indefinitely, or for foolish reasons.
- **Leadership:** There is concern that the selection process for senior leadership in the Services might be too traditional, and will not be able to adapt rapidly enough to the new age.
- **National consensus and cohesiveness:** There is concern, particularly outside the Washington Beltway, that internal, cultural, and ethnic diversity will increasingly hamper future efforts to forge a commonly supported national security policy and strategy.
- **Isolation of the military from the mainstream of the society:** This is causing a lack of common understanding between military and civilians. It might also increasingly be excluding the most talented pool of young citizens from service.

- **Inability of the military to compete for talent across the board:** The groups tend to attribute this growing trend to economic and societal factors rather than internal service policies. They also support measures that would allow the military to compete for talent more effectively, and have suggested several specific measures to alleviate the problem.
- **Management structure:** There is concern as to whether the military can, will, or even should adapt its hierarchical system to the “flat” techniques that are propelling the successes of the new information age in the U.S. Most believe that radical changes to simplify the 23-grade structure of the military must be made.
- **Threat definition match with resource allocation:** There appears to be a consensus on the increasing peril of non-conventional threats, including rogue missiles. Resources appear to be primarily focused on support of the traditional two Major Theatres of War (MTW). Many participants believe that resource allocation should be more closely tied to threat, and that military planners might be too wedded to the past.
- **Public indifference:** Prosperous economic times and the absence of immediate discernible threats will continue to hamper leaders’ efforts to engage outside our borders to defend vital strategic interests. Energetic and enlightened national leadership appears the only way to break this cycle of lack of concern.
- **Education:** There was concern that the public is not well-educated concerning evolving national security issues. The focus on maintaining economic prosperity overshadows other aspects of security.
- **Jointness:** Many feel that the military is too stovepiped and needs to be more integrated among the Services, as is the current direction in the business community.
- **Acquisition:** There was a consistent theme that the acquisition system worked satisfactorily for the Cold War but probably is not appropriate for the situations the military will face in the Information Age. (Note: this includes all aspects associated with a new system – requirements, funding, R&D, production, and fielding.)

C. DEBATE ISSUES

To date, a variety of debate issues have taken shape. These issues are arranged according to the workshop topics, and are written in classic debate form, i.e., hypothetical statements for affirmative/negative debate. The objective is to collect those topics that the members of the several conferences believed to be the most important. They could

then be used in different arenas to stimulate discussion and debate about the future direction of national security planning.

These issues are intended to provoke thought, not to place bounds on workshop discussions. Some have no answers, or at least no simple answers. For others, lively discussions could readily lead to entirely new questions, definitions, or discussions.

- **The 21st Century Security Environment**

- Resolved, the future of U.S. security in the 21st Century rests with vigorous enforcement of a “benevolent hegemony.”
- Resolved, economic globalism and humanitarian interventions will lead to the erosion and weakening of the nation/state.
- Resolved, reliance on alliances will supplant unilateralism and “Fortress America.”
- Resolved, the U.S. security structure is poorly prepared on the domestic front to handle the anti-democratic dynamics that could occur in the aftermath of an act of homeland megaterrorism.
- Resolved, the dialog between the U.S. security apparatus and the public is inadequate to build a credible, consensus-based policy.
- Resolved, strategic power and effectiveness in the post-industrial age will be determined largely by decision superiority.
- Resolved, current security and military structures are not well designed to meet the challenges of the post-industrial age.
- Resolved, there is a need to revamp our resource allocation for defense.

- **National Will in the 21st Century**

- Resolved, the Gulf War and the dramatic rescue of Scott O’Grady redefined the level that the United States is willing to suffer in terms of casualties.
- Resolved, the American people have a good understanding and appreciation of the catastrophic threats facing the homeland in the 21st Century.
- Resolved, with leadership, a national consensus can be built to support the sacrifices necessary to ensure security.
- Resolved, national resolve is more than adequate to protect democratic institutions in the event of a catastrophic terrorist homeland attack.
- Resolved, the country is comfortable with an increasingly overarching role for the military in all aspects of security.
- Resolved, the military and civilian populations have increasingly divergent views on national security and national will.

- **Traditional versus Non-Traditional Missions**

- Resolved, new threats in the 21st Century will require radically new force capabilities.
- Resolved, the U.S. military will be required to play an increasing domestic role in homeland protection, including police and constabulary functions.
- Resolved, the organization and priorities of the Reserve and National Guard require drastic changes to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
- Resolved, our strategy should focus more on preparation for non-traditional threats than on meeting the requirements of two major regional contingencies.
- Resolved, non-traditional missions will dilute force motivation and purpose.
- Resolved, CINCs in the 21st century must play an increasing regional “proconsul” role.

- **Force Composition Size and Quality**

- Resolved, the size of the force in the 21st Century has to be tailored to meet necessary missions, not an arbitrary fiscal target.
- Resolved, the current recruiting system for the all-volunteer force is inadequate to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
- Resolved, there is an increasing gap on essential values between the civilian populace and the uniformed military.
- Resolved, the necessary changes in force composition resulting from new technologies are not being implemented.
- Resolved, significant issues on quality and competence of the force are being treated on an *ad hoc* basis rather than with fundamental new approaches.
- Resolved, the senior officer corps is unjustifiably large in relation to overall force size.

- **Material and Equipment**

- Resolved, the research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) system is a failure in terms of its ability to provide the fighting systems we need for today’s world.
- Resolved, the U.S. RD&A system is inadequate to provide the fighting systems we need for tomorrow’s world.
- Resolved, RD&A should be placed under a single DoD authority with the capability of deciding how to spend and where to distribute the required materials and equipment.
- Resolved, more extensive outsourcing will resolve many of the current problems in the material and equipment procurement process.

- Resolved, today's U.S. defense industry is fully capable of meeting today's needs, and adapting quickly to meet tomorrow's.
- Resolved, the current military leadership is too attached to the weapons of yesterday to meet tomorrow's challenges.
- Resolved, expensive weapons are being effectively measured on a cost-effective basis.
- Resolved, our efforts to streamline the national security infrastructure must be even further divorced from the political process.

- **Leadership, Doctrine, and Character**

- Resolved, the senior military is unable to lead the junior military.
- Resolved, character in the force is and will remain the critical component of Leadership and Doctrine.
- Resolved, education will become more important than training in the information age force.
- Resolved, future military leaders will necessarily require broad-based political skills, an understanding of economic forces, and a true commitment to "jointness."
- Resolved, the current system of selecting top leadership from command-oriented generalists remains viable and adaptable for the 21st Century.
- Resolved, effectiveness of the force must take precedence over socially oriented goals.
- Resolved, our strategic evolution is in lockstep with our nation's post-industrial technical evolution.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

This project began in 1997 with a desire on the part of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to obtain a better view of the world that IDA analyzes. For forty-five years, IDA has been charged with the task of providing to the Secretary of Defense and senior American military leaders analyses of the most important questions and challenges facing defense policy formulation and the effectiveness of military force structure and warfighting options. This effort grew from IDA's work with the Marshall Center in Garmish, Germany. The Marshall Center is a U.S. European Command / German Ministry of Defense partnership dedicated to the furtherance of European security. Work with the Marshall Center has involved meeting with leading policymakers and government executives of many newly independent countries in structured discussion groups. The objective has been to assist these leaders in broadening their world views and decision-making skills to prepare them for the intricacies of representative government and the responsibilities of national leaders who will be accountable to elected legislative assemblies. The IDA team has sought to focus the thinking of these national leaders on how the changing world is affecting them, how they should consider these changes, and their effects on national, regional, and international affairs.

We began the series of 21st Century Conflict Conferences in October 1999 with three goals in mind: (1) to determine our capabilities to help foster a national debate on challenges facing our nation in a new security environment; (2) to evaluate the ability and effectiveness of the learning model that our IDA team evolved in working in Eastern Europe and former CIS states under Marshall Center and OSD sponsorship in this process; (3) to use insights gained from U.S. participants to add substance and balance to a draft manuscript titled *New Powers versus Old Strengths* whose précis served as an introduction for the conference participants.

In the October event, we confirmed that our learning model focusing on facilitation and self-generated results worked well with sophisticated U.S. participants. Modifications that reduced the duration from five days to one day, with smaller groups than in our overseas experience, and that extended time for individual workshop sessions were effective. Participants stated that they had "had their say," and that they were well served by the experience.

The October conference led to four more conferences. The later participants added insights and made considerable contributions to the desired security dialog, providing a national scope to our effort. As noted in Appendices B through F, which summarize the positions of the conference's participants, much has been gained from our efforts thus far.

We believe that this endeavor has continuing future value:

- These conferences could serve as a vehicle to gather information for potential research projects and for insights that could be of interest to our sponsors. As we move further into the information age, IDA will need to remain attuned to complex issues that have an impact on national security.
- Debates using the topics outlined in Chapter II could assist with finding innovative approaches for the future. Few other efforts looking at the potential for significant changes in the national security environment that lies ahead for the U.S. have been seen as questioning or far reaching.

These conferences are a demonstrated vehicle to inform influential groups concerning national security issues. Even with the types of audiences that participated (except for the October 1999 conference), not all of the participants initially felt comfortable discussing national security issues. Despite this, there was unanimity on the need to include opinion makers and others outside the Beltway on national security debates.

CHAPTER II
DEVELOPING THE METHODOLOGY

II. DEVELOPING THE METHODOLOGY

A. BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION

Members of IDA's staff sought to use a series of discussion groups similar to those that have been employed in support of the Marshall Center to stimulate and gauge national consensus on security in the 21st Century. The idea was to try to explore where to go, how to get there, and what America's priorities ought to be. The staff set out to obtain the views first of senior, experienced national security policy makers and commentators, then to expand the effort to elicit the opinions of a broad-based section of Americans from several places around the country. The conferences that ensued explored the idea that current threats have shifted from primarily regional, focused on the Soviet Union and nuclear standoff, to global considerations of state-sponsored terrorism using information warfare (or cyber-warfare) and threats of biological or chemical attack on selected targets. In sum, the thrust was to challenge conventional wisdom and instill broad national interest in security matters. The goal for the discussion groups was to stimulate debate to help define the appropriate global role of the United States in the new century, the roles, missions, doctrine, structure, manning, and equipment of the armed forces, and the other national entities necessary for security.

There have been several meetings sponsored by various groups to discuss the needs of warfare in the next century. The first meeting was sponsored by the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia. On the completion of that meeting, several groups around the country offered to sponsor similar discussions. In Chicago, the National Security Forum acted as host in January 2000. The following March, The Silicon Valley Manufacturers Association invited IDA to conduct a discussion for participants from San Jose and the Silicon Valley. Then, the president of Moravian College sponsored a meeting in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania in May. For each of these discussions, the various sponsors invited as participants a broad range of people from many walks of life.

Held in October 1999, the first meeting in the Washington area consisted primarily of defense and national security experts from around the country, but what one could still refer to as an Inside the Beltway group. Another forum, also at IDA in early

February 2000, included a number of newly tenured academics, primarily in the physical sciences, drawn from American universities coast to coast. A January meeting in Chicago was built around a cross section of business people from that region, but with professors in the humanities and members of the judiciary as well. In Silicon Valley, the participants included a high school history teacher, members of the faculty of San Jose State University, representatives from several established major companies and a number of new companies interested in new fields of endeavor such as computer hardware and software manufacturing and services. The meeting in Bethlehem was aimed at obtaining the observations and opinions of middle-class Americans who live and work in an older, longer established economy, what has been called by some the rust belt, but now living side-by-side with the Lehigh Valley resurgence.

Prior to each panel gathering, every participant received a précis, a discussion of changes that might be expected in the 21st Century, as a background for the discussions. At the meeting, the members divided into groups to discuss each of six basic topics. A research staff member from the Institute for Defense Analyses facilitated the discussions of each panel, but did not lead the groups toward any particular conclusion or opinion. The comments and suggestions of the various panel discussions became the basis for developing the debate questions as well as for the observations that we present here.

B. THE DEBATES

Debates at each forum opened with a short plenary session that described the day's events and divided the participants into three working groups. These groups then met to discuss their appointed topics. Following the discussion, the plenary reformed, and each group's elected leader described the outcome and the points suggested by the group for future debate. The groups then reformed for another discussion of the final three topics, again followed by a short plenary period where the elected leaders described the agreed points of the members. Following each leader's briefing, the conclusions of his or her group were the topic of general debate by the entire group.

Panel discussions at the various forum locations explored primarily six topics:

- The 21st Century Security Environment
- National Will in the 21st Century
- Traditional versus Non-Traditional Missions
- Force Composition Size and Quality
- Material and Equipment

- Leadership, Doctrine and Character.

In order to promote a reasonably far-ranging set of discussions, the IDA staff first prepared a series of general issues for each of the six overall topics, called strawmen. These issues could be used to facilitate conversations and lead toward some conclusions or recommendations from the members, but the members were free to address the strawmen topics in any manner, even to disregard them or create new ones. The strawmen for each of the six areas of discussion are depicted in Appendix A.

From that first meeting in October 1999, the staff then distilled the following set of topics that could be used as the basis for a series of national debates. It is important to bear in mind, however, that these discussion points were taken from the views and opinions of the panelists. They were intended to promote debate of various points of view, and they have no particular answer. In fact, in some instances there may be no answer, or at least no simple answers. Our goal was to have the participants provide as broad a collection of ideas as could be done in the time allowed.

1. The 21st Century Security Environment

1. Resolved, the future of U.S. security in the 21st Century rests with vigorous enforcement of a “benevolent hegemony.”
2. Resolved, economic, globalism, and humanitarian interventions will lead to the erosion and weakening of the nation/state.
3. Resolved, reliance on alliances will supplant unilateral action and “Fortress America.”
4. Resolved, the U.S. security structure is poorly prepared on the domestic front to handle the anti-democratic dynamics that could occur in the aftermath of an act of homeland mega-terrorism.
5. Resolved, the dialogue between the U.S. security apparatus and the public is inadequate to build a credible, consensus-based policy.
6. Resolved, the rate and intensity of interaction among the players on the world stage are such that traditional, linear policy-making approaches are inadequate at best and, at worst, predisposed toward the wrong solutions.
7. Resolved, current security and military strategy structures are not well designed to meet the challenges of the post-industrial age.

8. Resolved, strategic power and effectiveness in the postindustrial age will be determined largely by decision superiority and implementation agility.

2. National Will in the 21st Century

1. Resolved, the Gulf War and the dramatic rescue of Scott O'Grady redefined to a severely low level what the United States is willing to suffer in terms of casualties.

2. Resolved, the American people have a good understanding and appreciation of the catastrophic threats facing the homeland in the next century.

3. Resolved, with leadership, a national consensus can be built to support the sacrifices necessary to ensure security.

4. Resolved, national resolve is more than adequate to protect democratic institutions in the event of a catastrophic terrorist homeland attack.

5. Resolved, the country is comfortable with an increasingly overarching role for the military in all aspects of security.

6. Resolved, the military and civilian populations have increasingly divergent views on national security and national will.

7. Resolved, increasingly, the elite spokesmen of American foreign policy are exaggerating the precision with which the military tool of statecraft can be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.

8. Resolved, unwillingness of the American public to accept combat-related casualties has been exaggerated, particularly as the professional military becomes more embedded in our culture.

3. Traditional versus Non-Traditional Missions

1. Resolved, new threats in the 21st Century will require radically new force capabilities.

2. Resolved, the U.S. military will be required to play an increasing role domestically in homeland protection, including police and constabulary functions.

3. Resolved, the organization and priorities of the Reserve and National Guard require drastic changes to meet the challenges of the next century.

4. Resolved, our strategy should focus more on preparation for non-traditional threats than on meeting the requirements of two major regional contingencies.
5. Resolved, non-traditional missions will dilute force motivation and purpose.
6. Resolved, CINCs in the 21st century must increasingly play a regional “pro-consul” role.

4. Force Composition Size and Quality

1. Resolved, the size of the force in the 21st Century has to be tailored to meet necessary missions, not an arbitrary fiscal target.
2. Resolved, the current recruiting system for the all-volunteer force is inadequate to meet the challenges of the next century.
3. Resolved, there is an increasing gap on essential values between the civilian populace and the uniformed military.
4. Resolved, the necessary changes in force composition resulting from new technologies are not being implemented. Information, rather than explosive force, will be queen of battle in the 21st Century.
5. Resolved, significant issues on quality and competence of the force are being treated on an *ad hoc* basis rather than with fundamental new approaches.
6. Resolved, the senior officer corps is unjustifiably large in relation to overall force size.
7. Resolved, a major challenge in the 21st Century involves laying the groundwork for command and control over some American military forces by non-U.S. authorities.

5. Material and Equipment

1. Resolved, the research, development, and acquisition system is a failure in terms of its ability to provide the fighting systems we need in today’s world.
2. Resolved, the U.S. research, development, and acquisition system is inadequate to provide the fighting systems we need for tomorrow’s world.

3. Resolved, RD&A should be placed under a single DoD authority with the capability of deciding how to spend and where to distribute the required materials and equipment.
4. Resolved, more extensive outsourcing will resolve many of the current problems in the materiel and equipment procurement process.
5. Resolved, today's U.S. defense industry is fully capable of meeting today's needs, and adapting quickly to meet tomorrow's.
6. Resolved, the current military leadership is too attached to the weapons of yesterday to meet tomorrow's challenges.
7. Resolved, expensive weapons are being effectively measured on a cost/effectiveness basis.
8. Resolved, our efforts to streamline the national security infrastructure must be even further divorced from the political process.

6. Leadership, Doctrine and Character

1. Resolved, character in the force is and will remain the critical component of Leadership and Doctrine, including mission.
2. Resolved, education will become more important than training in the information age force.
3. Resolved, future military leaders will necessarily require broad based political skills, and understanding of economic forces and a true commitment to "jointness."
4. Resolved, the current system of selecting top leadership from command oriented generalists remains viable and adaptable for the next century.
5. Resolved, effectiveness of the force must take precedence over socially oriented goals.
6. Resolved, our strategic evolution is in lockstep with our nation's post-industrial technical evolution.

CHAPTER III
ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES

III. ASSESSING THE OUTCOMES

As the discussions developed over time and around the country, there came to be distinct differences in the conclusions that the various panels reached on the six primary topics. The panel members' opinions fell into three basic groupings. Inside the Washington, D.C. Beltway, the national security experts who met at the first forum in October 1999 expressed what now seem to be rather conventional, approaches to new warfighting needs and requirements. Those forum members who came from outside the Beltway viewed many matters in differing lights. For some things, the groups developed issues specific to themselves; at other times, issues, conclusions or opinions cut across all the groups.

Forum members who discussed *the 21st Century Security Environment* were generally of the opinion that the impact of globalization will affect warfare in varied, even unforeseen ways. Panel members from all around the country acknowledged the need to engage in new ways of thinking within the terms of the Information Age, as opposed to some outdated styles that are found in the defense establishment. In particular, panel members believed it important that our actions for homeland defense match the possible new threats of globalization. In addition, the groups questioned whether or not the traditional hierarchical national defense structure can adapt, in the absence of a forcing factor such as a major conflict, to the organizational flatness seen in new companies and increasingly in established businesses today. Some panel members questioned if such changes were necessary or desirable, except for certain specific situations. Many panel members were not convinced that we as a nation understand the nature of the threats that we might face.

Comments from panel members on the *National Will* segment were particularly interesting, falling most readily into the Inside the Beltway versus Outside the Beltway distinctions. People who came from outside Washington were much more ready to use military force if needed, but they cautioned against trying to use force too often or foolishly, or the country will begin to resist. This line of thought extended to the employment of preemptive force. Outside the Beltway opinions were that it is fine to preempt a threat if necessary, but whoever does it had better be right in doing so. In addition, people from outside the Washington, D.C. area understood that serious

casualties might be unavoidable in conflict. These people believed that if there were a good reason for taking casualties, and in a winning cause, the American people would accept them. They argued that the problems associated with casualties revolved around the question of unnecessary loss of life – don't lose people stupidly. In contrast, the prevailing opinion from the Inside the Beltway participants was that we must prevent casualties at all costs, that the American people, Congress, and especially the news media, simply will not accept them. Moreover, the Outside the Beltway people expressed surprise at the extent to which we go to protect forces in the field; they contrasted our actions in the Balkans to those of the French who billeted their troops in or near villages. This raised the question of whether or not the populace, the military, and the leadership perceive missions and casualties in the same light.

Discussions about *Traditional versus Non-Traditional Missions* resulted in some rather clear agreements. Virtually all of the groups believed that the United States must retain the ability to meet both types of requirements. There was some difference of opinion on the issue of whether or not it is necessary, or affordable, to try to meet the demands of two major regional contingencies at once or in close proximity. Most participants opined that we cannot now deal with two contingencies, and they doubted that the country would want to bear the much higher cost of actually organizing forces and preparing for two contingencies. The various groups also were in agreement on the need for using the National Guard and Reserve. The Inside the Beltway experts dwelt to a much greater extent on the issue of force structure for the reserves, as they were familiar with these intricate questions. The panels from outside Washington tended to focus on the need to spell out specific reserve missions, to properly equip and train these forces, and, most importantly, to employ these units with care to ensure that we do not place too heavy a burden on them so as to cause difficulties with families and employers.

All of the participants recognized the complex problems related to *Force Composition, Size and Quality*. The time available for this topic was not sufficient to allow for extensive discussions, but the panels agreed on several points. The defense establishment should change from the traditional hierarchical organizations to follow the lead of modern business and use flatter, networked structures. Where promising, military teams should be created based on the special skills needed for given tasks. Several participants noted that the Special Forces now do this, and suggested that other units might benefit from similar structures. The issue of obtaining the right (and the brightest) people to meet the military's needs would continue to be difficult. Most of the panels suggested greater outsourcing of combat support functions. In a similar vein, many panel

members noted that military monetary compensation never would match much of what is available in private business, especially where incentives in growing businesses offer substantial opportunities. Suggested solutions to the compensation issue included the need to review both money and job challenge/satisfaction with the aim of creating interesting duty assignments and adequate pay and allowances.

The most difficult area for the panelists to consider was that dealing with *Material and Equipment*; this was the case for both Inside the Beltway and Outside the Beltway participants. All agreed that the defense development and acquisition processes are the result of highly political maneuvering in Congress, that it is complex, slow, and often produces systems that are not needed or are not optimal. None of the members could recommend ways by which these problems could be resolved or even largely alleviated. Of course, nobody else has been able to do so over several decades despite the empanelling of many blue ribbon study groups. The Inside the Beltway participants tried to suggest options, some at least as complex or unworkable as those now in use. The Outside the Beltway panelists took a more pragmatic view. These latter people were of the opinion that the old procurement system works for major warfighting weapon development and procurement. Although wasteful at times, it has resulted in material that won several major wars and will continue to do so: leave it as is. The business people and others from around the country strongly recommended as much use of off-the-shelf purchasing and contract support as possible as the way to acquire the best of an ever-changing panoply of goods and services needed for extraordinary or fast changing defense requirements.

National *Leadership, Doctrine and Character* issues created surprisingly different opinions between the Washington-based participants and those from outlying regions. Washington area panel members recognized the problems with the current leadership, but soft-pedaled the whole thing, saying that with a new commander-in-chief these would largely go away. Panel members from around the country, however, offered a much more stringent view. These people, both those who professed to be conservative and liberal, expressed sharply critical comments about the morality and ethical behavior of the current administration. Some in Chicago, for example, believed that the neither the president nor the vice president were fit to serve, and no problems related to the military's view of them would be resolved as long as they and many of their appointed officials remained in office. The issue, in their eyes, was so contentious that the administration has little credibility and can ill afford any further alienation of the military or the country.

Appendix A, which follows, depicts the strawmen topics provided to the individual panels. These strawmen were guides prepared largely to initiate discussions on each topic.

Appendices B through F contain summaries of the panel discussions at the conferences held around the country. These summaries were prepared from the presentations of each panel's elected leaders and from notes taken by the IDA facilitators during the panel discussions. The several panel members have reviewed these summaries and conclusions put forth by their respective panels at the closing preliminary sessions and have noted that they reflect the tone and direction of conversation. In preparing these summaries, we have intentionally left them as much as possible in the words of the panel participants so as to avoid inadvertently changing their meaning and intent.

APPENDIX A

CREATING THE DEBATE FRAMEWORK

CREATING THE DEBATE FRAMEWORK

(1) 21st Century Security Environment (from U.S. Perspective)

Globalization Dynamic

Fast Economic

Slow Political/Security

Post-Industrial Impact

Informational

Non-linear

Nation/State Evolution

Limitation on sovereignty

Confused role of ethnicity

Threat Change

Asymmetric

Homeland

Demographic Shifts

Aging haves

Exploding 3rd world

North/South Tensions

Wealth

Opportunity disparity

International Norms

Absolutism

Relativism

(2) National Will (Confidence, Credibility, and Consensus)

- Communications between security apparatus and people
- Willingness of national political leadership to become involved in “unpleasant potentials” of security
- Public understanding of security and threat
- Belief in no-casualty war
- Public indifference to megaterrorism, violence, and/or war
- Shock of megaterrorism
- Public’s desire to identify and punish an aggressor
- Ability to “pick up the pieces”

(3) Missions

Traditional vs. Non-Traditional

- **Most likely real threat to territorial U.S.**
- **Residual nuclear “traditional” threat**
- **Common national strategy**
- **Leadership’s (political and military) willingness to commit to non-traditional**
- **Political perils of military leadership in non-traditional**
- **National organizational capabilities of dealing with non-traditional**
- **Proportionality between forces and resources**
- **Role and capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard assigned non-traditional**
- **Considerations in recruitment, training, and selection of leadership and personnel**

(4) Forces

<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Doctrine</u>	<u>Character</u>
• Definition • Education • Grooming • Selection • Talent pool	• Definition • Situational reality • Roles and missions • Adaptability to information age • Technological Supportable	• Within Force • Within Government • Within U.S. Society • Within Alliance

(5) Forces

<u>Composition</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Quality</u>
• Societal mirroring	• Current model • Full jointness	• Current model • Full jointness	• Intellectual caliber
• Significance of social factors	• Radical change • Reserve model	• Radical change • Reserve model	• Technical skills • Education • Motivation
• Recruiting base			• Units vs. individuals
• Broadening			
• Retention			

(6) Forces Materiel and Equipment

- **R&D - Effort, resources, and commercial integration**
- **Selection - Process, lead time, sophistication, mission match, personnel match, and training match**
- **Procurement - Process, resource commitment, equipment composition, and industry role**
- **Production - Contracting, cost control, and national or multi-national**
- **Maintenance - In-house, out-sourcing, and resource commitment**
- **Logistics - Outsourcing, just-in-time, and redundancy**
- **Infrastructure - Basing/deployment, C3, intelligence, ownership, and training**

Workgroup Products

- Formulate and draft the 3 to 5 most significant debate questions, which must be addressed as part of the effort to stimulate a vigorous, broad-based national dialog on U.S. security in the 21st Century
- Time permitting, develop some alternative answers for these debate questions and suggest possible forums for the debate

APPENDIX B

**OCTOBER 1999 CONFERENCE RESULTS,
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA**

APPENDIX B

OCTOBER 1999 CONFERENCE RESULTS, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

The following sections summarize the concluding thoughts and ideas of each of the six panels.

A. 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WORKING GROUP

This working group had hoped for a logical summary, but ended up with a plethora of questions. One clear consensus was that there are many core issues associated with the rate of change and the degree of instability in the world. There is something historically unique about the current rate of change that inevitably will drive security. This uniqueness, however, is so difficult to fully characterize that even naming the current era is difficult. The defining event may already have taken place, and the characteristic of the era is such that it is simply hard to see. Getting the American public to support new and complex policies will be difficult until we have a clear vision to present.

The Rothrock draft monograph, *New Power versus Old Strengths*, knocks us off the horse of traditional straight-line projections, but it also points out the difficulties of alternative thinking. It was easy to find agreement in this group that the current security environment is one of unrelenting change and instability, with new, asymmetric challenges. But complicating the problem of dealing with the asymmetrical forces of the 21st Century is the residual momentum of 20th Century events. Today, there are enormous forces of inertia in China, Russia, and the United States. We need to understand that China is still thinking about sovereignty issues and land resources, that Russia is heavily burdened internally with debilitating inertial forces, and that the preeminence of the United States is based on past performance, and not necessarily on tacit acceptance by the rest of the world that we are best suited to lead for the future.

We also broadly agreed that the environment will include a 19th Century, state-sovereign industrial system sharing the world stage with 21st Century, post-industrial states, and that this will foment new security issues. We are seeing the nation-state being

questioned, but nation-states are still the primary actors. There is a clear, non-isolationist view in the land that the United States is so unique as a benign hegemony that it should be allowed to sit outside the rules of others. Many people believe our power is so benign that we should be able to make and break rules; others believe that a hegemonic strategy is wrong, and it is not clear whether the United States' leadership role should be based on unilateralism or multilateralism. Do we need an ability to act alone and unfettered? Should we set up norms and regimes, but act above them? On issues like nuclear control, we probably should do exclusively what is in our best interest, but that could lead to ever more asymmetric challenges from the people who are left out. The increasing roles of non-state, non-governmental actors only exacerbate the problem of finding overarching solutions.

If, as seems inevitable, the United States is going to be more interdependent with other countries, we must decide whether to look at international issues in a domestic or international way. The President has said that wherever there's a human rights violation, the United States will get involved, but is it true that we will do that? Why were we not in Rwanda? Post-inspection there reveals that 5,000 troops could have saved 500,000 lives. We have a tendency to look at broader pictures in terms of domestic interests. Is there any way to understand the future given such inertia in the international arena?

There is also an unfinished job regarding internal security. One important debate will be how the United States prepares for "threats without enemies." The cyberthreat with which we are beginning to deal is an example. The Presidential Committee on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) indicates that nationwide our disaster response and law enforcement infrastructure resource is becoming as important as the military. But what are the various agencies and their roles in the event of terrorist attack? Are they even defined on paper? The threat is more diffuse and complex than any previously faced. How does one talk to the public about security in those terms?

Civilian and military leaders also must come to grips with how defense and security money should be spent. In California, discussions with politicians and industrial leaders indicate support for the military, but also raise a lot of questions as to how the security budget should be shaped. The American people are very concerned about the economics of security; 18 months ago, the Asian economies were very worrisome to them. At the same time, they are unaware that we're spending \$5.9 billion per bad guy on the F-22, and \$12 billion for Crusader. Lack of cognizance by the American public on how badly the money is being managed will come home to roost. Americans don't want to project expensive power overseas in times of peace.

B. NATIONAL WILL IN THE 21ST CENTURY WORKING GROUP

Discussion in this working group focused on the dialogue about the country between the leadership and the people. Most believed that communication between the leadership and the populace has not gelled. Sporadic efforts by various security and military leaders have been made, but the connection to the people has not yet occurred. And if the will of the American people is supposed to be embodied in its leadership, Washington of late can only be said to be in complete disarray.

How far will the people support the United States in a role as world security leader? Will support extend only to areas key to our national interest, or will broader humanitarian goals be included? Americans have a proud humanitarian legacy to uphold, but awareness that there could be a serious price to pay for being the world's leader has not yet sunk in.

What will be the response to serious attacks on the homeland by terrorists? The threat of massive carnage is increasingly serious. The need for a measured response, particularly in regard to the preservation of democratic institutions, remains essential. Preparations to deal with such situations are being made, but slowly and with uncertain effect.

People must understand that they have a stake in national security. National will at times entails a capacity for deprivation and suffering, but there is little evidence that the collective national will is ready to tolerate great sacrifices for abstract concepts of security. To see this, one needs to look at declining U.S. support for international aid efforts.

The elimination of the draft and establishment of an all-volunteer force has led to an increasing schism in attitudes between the uniformed military and society as a whole. Creation of a national service with civilian and/or military service might solidify the national will, but such an effort might too closely resemble a draft and return us to the internal conflicts of the 1960's and 1970's over these issues.

As an alternative, the concept of a "militia" in all of its various permutations was discussed, from the utility (and potential danger) of localized militia in times of disorder to the radical concept of force assignment to a United Nations constabulary. This led to an evaluation of public views on an overarching role for the military. With more of the populace and its political leadership viewing the military as the resource of choice for dealing with a widening range of threats and issues, from drug interdiction to the preservation of domestic order to homeland disaster relief, the danger of unrealistic

demands on the military becomes increasingly evident. Ironically, these demands coincide with increasingly unrealistic expectations of conflict without casualties.

C. TRADITIONAL VERSUS NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS WORKING GROUP

This panel initially explored a number of issues in trying to decide the best way to approach this topic. To begin the discussion, they raised the question of why one must think in terms of traditional or non-traditional missions. Is it necessary to do so, and if so, what is a traditional mission? Why not instead approach the problem as a spectrum of missions that would employ to a greater extent than at present the Reserve and National Guard forces, and that might use the active forces in new or different organizations? One panelist saw the future of warfighting for United States forces as more of a reversion to traditional interwar missions, albeit with new technologies incorporated into planning, training, and operations. Another panel member observed that the United States has consistently sought unencumbered commerce and trade with the world; the military has been used often to protect such trade and the safety of American citizens. Is the “new mission” to differ from the past in ways other than degree? Is the final mission still to defend America, or to police the world? The military is supposed to be the last resort, but in the last decade it seems to have become the vanguard.

Several issues formed themselves into threads that recurred in the early discussions and led to a foundation for the remainder of the workshop period. Of great concern to the panel members was the problem of understanding those things that the military should be doing that are within the framework of the Constitution and the strictures of law, the federal *Posse Comitatus* Act in particular. Such laws, based upon the fundamental limitations on our national government, must be considered when revising missions and assigning new tasks to the military that require acting in peacetime within the United States. Traditional constraints on the employment of federal forces, or the National Guard when in federal service, must be observed so as to maintain a balance between the authority of elected civilian officials, those appointed to administer or enforce State and local laws, and the ability of the national government to provide intelligence and emergency response capability. In short, seeking new missions for the military must not bring the defense establishment into conflict with the rights, liberties and lives of the American people.

The panelists concluded that an overriding question centers on the need to avoid a change of mission and organization so radical that it would preclude recovery from the

wrong choice. The issue is not just one of the military leaders choosing the wrong option of force alignment and organization. Rather, the problem centers on having the nation decide how the military should be organized and employed in the absence of a single, well-defined threat, but not deciding so conclusively that we could not recover from a bad decision or change should a new threat arise. The idea of using national debate as the foundation for choosing among potential alternatives is complicated by the absence of an outside forcing event that would draw interest to the discussion.

Several panel members opined that it is necessary to use the capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard, possibly realigning these organizations to meet modern threats. Nobody, however, knew of any extensive work to define the true scope and depth of these threats. In general, the panel thought that enemy states or non-state organizations could use terrorist activity, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and electronic tools of theft and disruption (or cyberwarfare). But absent a clear understanding of the sources and extent of such dangers, most members believed it would be difficult to organize a productive debate, if one could be organized at all. Attempts to find the political will to engage the Congress and the public in an examination of revising the laws or reorganizing our active and Reserve military forces for fighting an unknown enemy of uncertain capability would likely be overshadowed by more immediate issues. An added problem is the difficulty of convincing the National Guard of the need to alter its outlook and change its structure so that the country could employ it in new roles. Panel members were of the opinion that increased use of the Reserve and Guard would require more full-time positions providing supervision for a 24-hour per day response capability.

A number of practical issues must be faced. The Congress that appropriates money for the military is very reluctant to provide funds to develop capabilities for which no clear threat or danger exists. Although many people see the development of new capabilities as the main task of the leaders going into the 21st Century, few can say how to convince legislators of the practicality of a planning, programming, and budgeting system based on new capabilities alone.

Another difficulty is understanding the extent to which the United States faces the same dilemma as the British government did before 1914 and between the wars. That is, to what extent ought the military be an imperial police force or an armed force? Between the wars, Great Britain used its small military as economical peacekeepers to control the empire. In that role, the Royal Air Force became a small expeditionary unit capable of being dispatched to locations around the world to quell rebellions and insurrections, and

at relatively low cost. In many cases, this worked well and fostered an air capability that the British sorely needed in 1939. Will the American people be willing to think in similar terms? And to what extent can the military serve as a constabulary and retain its ability to meet its primary mission of warfighting?

The final topic the panel discussed was the need to devise a shaping strategy that would lead to the understanding of changing roles and missions. This would include the priority ranking of perceived threats, an understanding of what we wanted or needed most to protect, and a clear view of the desired capabilities for a 21st Century American military. Once this strategy has been developed, we will need to invest time and money in converting the strategy into the appropriate operational capability. The outcome of all this is uncertain, and is complicated by the question of how one can deter shadowy enemies, or if deterrence as we have understood it for 40 years will be a factor. How, for example, do you change the goals and perceptions of non-state actors who seek no reward in this life? How do you measure or determine the effects of a policy of deterrence against the use of threats that may be amorphous or dispersed among several relatively weak countries or organizations that may or may not act in concert?

The panel summarized its discussions in several questions that it believed should be addressed in the coming months:

- The term “non-traditional mission” is probably not a good one for the American people, and would not be a sound basis for organizing a debate about future warfare capabilities. How can we define this subject to bring it to debate in Congress and with the public?
- How has the threat versus the capability to meet it changed? Can we devise a deterrent against the new threats?
- Can or should the military function in a new role as a police force or constabulary, and if so, how and under what conditions may it be employed in that role? How must it be reorganized to fulfill that role?
- How do we reshape the active, Reserve and National Guard force to the demands of the 21st Century? What are the priorities to be considered in the reshaping process?
- What are the threats to be faced? In what priority? And is the standing policy of being able to deal with two major regional contingencies realistic?
- How will non-traditional warfighting missions detract from the ability to meet more traditional conflicts that may arise? How, for example, will military commanders and the political leadership train and motivate a military for operations other than war that may center on delivering rations, shelter, and

(limited) medical care? Will young people of America find it a worthwhile task to act for an indeterminate period as a barrier between two or more groups who are intent on killing each other?

- Is it appropriate to consider the theater commanders-in-chief to be regional political-military proconsuls, charged with leading other nations and regions to change their goals and objectives or their lines of national development?
- With technologies that are able to reduce casualties, a “willingness to kill” versus a “willingness to die” mentality is evolving. However, the traditional American military mission has always had firm moral roots in the latter precept. Can new mission roles find sufficient moral grounding in only being willing to kill?

D. FORCE COMPOSITION SIZE AND QUALITY WORKING GROUP

New technologies and their changing roles are having a fundamental effect on force composition. This impact, combined with significant new roles for the Armed Forces, has generated a need to reevaluate the make-up of the active military, its reserve components, and its supporting infrastructure, including the industrial base.

Discussion group members noted that a basic shift away from a massive ground force made up of heavy tanks and mobile artillery towards more air-deployable and air-supportable forces will drive the need to seek new systems that give commanders appropriate options to react to emerging threats. Panel members foresaw that, counter to this change, the inertia that currently characterizes the DoD procurement system will make any major innovations difficult. One panel member noted the continued purchase of the Crusader artillery system as an ongoing example of this difficulty. Others saw the F-22 high performance air-to-air fighter as a similar example. If true force composition restructuring is to take place, then a true revolution, not evolution, is required. If this is to be a truly radical change then what timeline will be pursued, and at what cost? Several discussion group members noted that no matter how the problem is attacked there is a monetary and subsequently an institutional cost associated with true radical innovation.

All panel members agreed that the size of the force needs to be matched to the missions required and not to some arbitrary fiscal target. Several members pointed out that past reviews have produced politically driven, budget-constrained, false recommendations that did little to really change the nature of the military forces, producing only smaller versions of the same force structure. One panel member pointed out that as a result of those efforts we now have a smaller force more ill equipped to do more things that it is not designed to do. Another mentioned the apparent disconnect

between the uniformed military and the civilian administrators who create both roles and missions and the policies and procurement guidance for the force. That panel member went on to discuss the perceived gap between the values of the uniformed military and the civilian population at large and the long-term, worrisome implications implied by that gap. Other members of the panel countered that the disconnect between the military and the civilian population of this generation may be here to stay, and is manifesting itself in recruiting shortfalls. Several members countered that the current concern is transitory and perhaps a product of the current Presidency. While one member doubted that the military would ever accept a tarnished Commander-in-Chief, another countered that the majority of Presidents had assumed office with no active duty military experience, and it has only been since World War II that a perceived requirement for a military background in the executive office has developed.

Several panel members thought that there was a legitimate debate between recruiting the “captain of the football team” or the class “computer nerd.” The former selection represents the traditional recruitment target, yet the latter might be the more valuable commodity in an age of technological warfare. While both approaches might have merit, there was a general feeling that the overall recruiting effort was missing its mark.

Discussion shifted to the heart of the military manning system, with a fundamental challenge to the 1947 manpower system. One panel member vigorously stated that the entire system needed to be overhauled, creating a force with fewer officers, more assignment stability, and more cohesion. Other members supported an overhaul of the individual Services’ manning systems that would allow, for example in the case of the Navy, for longer tour assignments afloat and ashore. All agreed that the senior officer force is unjustifiably large for the force structure that it purported to support.

A general discussion on the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols act followed the conversations on force manpower overhaul. While all agreed that the legislation was needed at the time it was enacted, many believe that a re-look of the situation is now warranted. The relative authority and access to the Commander-in-Chief of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff needs to be reevaluated. Several of the panel members envisioned a sort of co-secretariat being developed with the JCS having equal authority with the Secretary of Defense. The relative diminishment of the Service secretaries was seen to be a worrisome development. Several panel members believed that this created an environment that enhanced the opportunity for Service in-fighting.

E. MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT WORKING GROUP

Organizing, training, and equipping the military is the basic reason for existence of the individual Services and the military departments. If the United States is to exercise successful strategic agility and decision superiority in a future conflict, the material and equipment that the military develops and acquires, and the way that we go about obtaining it, are the foundations on which that success will be achieved.

Panel members noted a number of difficulties related to the entire acquisition process. First is to know the identity of and dangers posed by potential enemies. Who these enemies are and the weapons they might use were very unclear to the panel, yet the threat must be framed in reasonable terms before we can profitably invest in design, development, and acquisition for the next generation military. Related issues are the methods by which we would engage in co-production arrangements with allied countries, and how the Services would solve, or design to preclude the creation of, problems with incompatible equipment.

The present acquisition system is too slow to produce the systems needed, and has too many restrictions to be flexible and cost effective. Moreover, the acquisition system is intolerant of attempts to change it, and often will not accept the cancellation of projects that are not needed. An illustration of the latter problem is the V-22 tilt rotor aircraft that was twice cancelled, yet is now in production. Another example is the F-22, an aircraft so expensive that we cannot afford to build it and meet other needs at the same time.

Determining the amount of infrastructure that will be needed in the early part of the new century will be important. How many bases we need and where they should be located must be decided, along with the question of how bases can best be administered. Additionally, we need to decide who should provide training. Several panel members mentioned outsourcing as being a partial solution to this issue. Outsourcing means having certain functions performed by civilian contractors instead of military or civilian civil service personnel. This practice is in wide use today, but presents many questions, including the extent to which privatization might be used (privatization being the sale or other transfer of DoD assets to new owners who would then use the property to provide services to defense agencies or operations). Contract performance and privatization of certain functions has received a great deal of attention in recent years, and may hold the key to substantial savings. On the other hand, these options often have proven less than effective, with eagerly anticipated savings never being realized because expectations were inflated or based upon faulty planning projections.

The potential advantages inherent in creating weapons and support platforms demanding minimal infrastructure support became an integral part of the discussion. Long range weapons, such as the B-2 bomber, that need little theater support and that could reduce the requirements for expensive and time consuming forward movement were cited as examples. Another area that might yield cost and time advantages was the use of civilian contractors to deliver basic flight training and similar elementary instruction. Contracting for delivery of basic military training was ruled out, since this is too important a cultural issue, demanding direct Service presence in and control of the process of forming new recruits into competent soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines.

Next under discussion was a grand overhaul of the entire acquisition system, with spending authority and design control vested in a single DoD-level official. This would require changes to the current Title X authority of the Services to organize, train, and equip their respective forces. Such a change might demand the creation of a centralized threat determination agency and abolition of competitive bidding for production contracts. In place of the competitive bidding scheme used today, some members advocated switching to what might be called “private arsenals,” whereby certain companies provide specific weapons or material and do so on a continuing, as-needed basis. The advantage might be the ability to close numerous government-owned facilities for which there is no current or anticipated need. One example cited was the many facilities able to build combat fighter aircraft, but which now stand idle because we have a total output demand sufficient to keep only two such factories in production in the foreseeable future.

Another important item discussed by the panel was extension of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In this case, the entire federal government would be required to reorganize interagency coordination and cooperation to achieve lower cost operation and more effective performance. A suggestion in this case was to dedicate 30 percent of the defense budget to the State Department, with State having responsibility to decide how to use it regionally. Having such responsibility, along with a presumed cap barring additional funding, and the need to weigh carefully how the assets are used, would force the State Department’s policy makers to be much more demanding in how they formulated policy and proposed programs. Once policy goals and objectives had been set, the theater CINCs would pursue their accomplishment, the Services would actually spend the money under theater direction. Another idea of the panel members was to dedicate 25 percent of the U.S. military to control of the United Nations. The UN would then be able to employ

these forces in international peacekeeping efforts, but would have no additional claim on American military resources.

In general, the panel concluded that to effectively pursue questions of what to design and buy, we must decide first on the basic military force we need. Among the considerations is that the force should be value-based, retaining a strong moral authority for its operation and position. The military should be adaptable so that the country can achieve an agile response when needed. Defense policy needs to be based on a well developed strategic concept, and the Defense Department needs leadership that understands and recognizes the need for change. Leaders must understand as well that the next 20 years will not be like the past 20 in terms of force structure and the contingencies to which the force is committed.

The panel recommended that the following questions be considered in the continued debate:

- The research, development, and acquisition system is a failure in terms of its ability to provide the fighting systems we need in today's world. How do we fix it?
- Is it possible and practical to place RD&A under a single DoD authority, and have that office decide how to spend the money and where to distribute the material and equipment it produces?
- Since it is not possible to change the system without the support of the Secretary of Defense and of the President, how can they be made aware of the problems and interested in their resolution?
- The military is increasingly in need of highly educated people. Can the military get and hold the educated people it needs, and is the military recruiting the right people and in the right places? How can the Services make better use of younger and older members? How will the age and rank distribution ratios affect the force structure?

F. LEADERSHIP, DOCTRINE AND CHARACTER WORKING GROUP

The military in the 21st Century faces the challenges of new technologies and new defense requirements. Both place new demands on leadership and doctrine. With new technology comes an increasing need for new technical skills. These skills, moreover, are increasingly likely to be needed in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), for which traditional training is only now beginning to adapt, and which place non-traditional demands on character. Leadership in this kind of environment is fundamentally different from that required in the past.

Leadership training might have been adequate for the Industrial Age, but it must now place a premium on analytic talent. In the past, promotion to a leadership position was strongly weighted by warfighting and command experience. But as forces become more reliant on high technology and information dominance, leaders will need to demonstrate technical competency in order to command the respect of soldiers. Leaders will also need to be well-versed in a variety of disciplines, including economics and decision analysis. Even the lowest end of the leadership spectrum must be refocused. Decisions once reserved for general officers potentially can now fall to sergeants, with the possibility of impacting national policy overnight.

The great difficulty here is having to provide both heavy, expeditionary-style forces able to win a major regional contingency, while also providing light and medium forces for OOTW and peacekeeping. Emphasis on heavy forces shortchanges peacekeeping requirements, and there is real tension between the “expeditionary” aspect of the Army versus the need to go “high tech.” All soldiers, especially those in ground roles, must be trained to be expeditionary in organization and discipline. They must know how to put up showers and stop bleeding. But there will be an increasing need for technical and analytical talent, and DoD must figure out how to attract and retain it. Potential leaders are walking away from what previously would have been considered as plum assignments.

The military, however, is not starting from zero. The Services have great adaptability built in. SOCOM and the USMC have been undertaking non-traditional missions for years, and there are examples such as waterway and forest management by the Corps of Engineers. We already know how to do many types of OOTW; we just need to do them better, while still being ready for a major war. The key might be in the ability of leadership to make the OOTW missions as attractive ideologically as traditional missions have been.

The Panel worried about whether the military still mirrors society, or is becoming separate from it. This has an impact on both recruitment and the character of future leaders. Character is crucial to everything, including mission. By definition, the armed services require the kind of person who is self-sacrificing, soldiers in the past have been value based individuals, believing in duty, honor, and country. To creating value-based, agile forces adaptable to the Information Age, leaders must be prepared for a time of transition as they deal with a cadre spread thin and in turmoil because of changing societal norms.

This panel posed the following questions for future discussion:

- What should be the proper direction of armed forces leadership, and how does it differ from that of society at large?
- How does the next century's force prepare officers for joint command?
- How does the political and military leadership inculcate adaptability as part of the ethos of military service and operational functioning?
- How must the Services prepare their leaders for a time of change and turmoil?
- Training delivered great benefits to the military of the Industrial Age. Moving into a post-Industrial Age, we now have a premium on education and learning. What must the Services do to differentiate between training and education, and how can an experimentation process be put into place that will foster breadth of learning?
- In terms of integrity and values, how should the military adjust to reflect society-at-large, or should it change?

List of Participants

Fenster, Herbert	Attorney, McKenna, Cuneo law firm, specializing in military/industry Issues
Hoge, James	Editor of Foreign Affairs
Marsh, John	Former Secretary of the Army
Mathews, Jessica	Formerly Council on Foreign Relations; now Chair of Carnegie Endowment
Oettinger, Anthony	Harvard Professor; directs Harvard Research/Teaching program on Info Age
Owens, Mackubin	Naval War College Professor; former editor of Strategic Review
Perkins, Dr Charles	OSD Deputy Assistant under Secretary of Defense
Reston, James	Social Commentator
Ricks, Thomas	Senior Wall Street Journal National Security Affairs Correspondent
Rokke, Irvin Lt Gen	Lt Gen, US Air Force (Ret.); Former President, National Defense University
Rothrock, John	Institute for Defense Analyses
Rubright, Earl W	Science and Technology Advisor/U.S. Central Command

Sennewald, Robert GEN	GEN, US Army (Ret.); Head of Capstone Program; former CINC USFK
Stewart, John MG	Former J2, Desert Storm
Train, Harry ADM	ADM, US Navy (Ret.); Former CINCLANT
Welch, Larry Gen	Institute for Defense Analyses, President
Wilson, George	Former <i>Washington Post</i> senior correspondent for military affairs

APPENDIX C

**JANUARY 2000 CONFERENCE RESULTS,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS**

APPENDIX C

JANUARY 2000 CONFERENCE RESULTS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

The following sections summarize the concluding thoughts and ideas of the six panels.

A. 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

This panel chose a broader focus than simply the military. They strove to develop a “big picture” regarding the 21st Century. They discussed culture, demographics, economics, political leadership, technology, and national strategy. They concluded that they wanted to see a robust security environment that defends the nation. Then, they played this back on society and culture. The major themes included: What are the threats? How will they play out domestically? What will we do about terrorism in U.S. cities? They spent much time evaluating U.S. culture and the importance of rule of law and domestic and financial stability. They felt that America needed to ensure a strong society at home to better underpin stability in the rest of the world.

The panel believed it would be revealing to consider the parallels between 1900 and 2000. No major threat loomed on the horizon at the beginning of either century. We were taking huge steps forward in modernization both then (Industrial Age) and now (Information Age). In the early 20th Century, the citizenry were concerned with rights, rising expectation, and entitlements. Americans were looking inward. A major similarity is that then, as now, there was no well-defined threat.

The major changes between then and now are the scale of operations, the technology, the miniaturization, and the high speed exchange of information. The world today is a dangerous place where threats can develop quickly. There were few border crossings 100 years ago, and daily challenges to sovereignty were unheard of. Now, members of a threat cell can interact in cyberspace. Threats needn’t even be actual. A perceived threat can cause significant problems, as we just witnessed in the preparations for New Year’s Eve in major US cities. The New Year’s Eve celebration could have

gone badly if those people attempting to smuggle explosives into the country had not been apprehended at the Canadian border.

There was a sense of authority and pecking order for much of the 20th Century that doesn't exist today. The degradation of authority and the increase of "entitlement" has caused differences in public behavior. The nature of men and governments changes more quickly, and things become more unstable worldwide faster. How should we respond to rapid instability that rocks either single or multiple countries?

The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of democratic, social, and global consciousness are key, but there are many other factors. All of these are converging with information technology and immediate communications. We must deal with regionalism and nationalism. If people wanted to tap in properly with these, this could generate more positive effects.

Rising democratic, social, and global consciousness has lead to greater stability wherein people trust their government. The new environment is weakening strongmen who can succeed only if they suppress information. Instabilities arise when we lack positive vectors. We need more analysis at individual, country, and global levels.

Most of humanity has pretty well accepted open, free markets and capitalism. That can be wonderful *if* the rule of law is in place; otherwise, we have gangster capitalism. There are tremendous disparities of wealth with which we must deal.

The U.S. must be able to anticipate problems; this is much more important now than in the past. If we are striving for hegemony, we're going about it in the wrong way. The U.S. thinks sovereignty is great so long as the sovereignty of others doesn't affect us. We lose moral authority when we act in this manner. The U.S. cannot ignore China, and the story of Europe is not yet written. The European Union (EU) could become a very powerful bloc. Sovereignty has almost become a thing of the past.

The West, and especially the US, has lived through a wonderful decade in terms of wealth. People therefore are not paying close attention to what's going on elsewhere. You need a convincing story to impact that blasé attitude. If markets should turn, and paper profits disappear, we'd have a completely different environment. This has an effect on how citizens view their military, especially recruitment and retention.

One panel member changed the conversation by stating that the US might not survive the next 100 years. He noted that we already face regional problems. We will see even more "white flight" in the next few years. We will witness The US of Mexico

(heavy Spanish influence) in parts of the country. We are dangerously close to becoming a fractionalized society because the states are more homogeneous than previously, but the subregions are not. Strong predominances might merge, leading potentially to complete majorities by region. If, 50 years from now, Colorado decided to keep all of its water, how would the rest of the nation react? Now we respect laws, but in the future? The 1973 oil crisis provoked a “Let ‘em freeze!” attitude from some Texans. In addition, there is great ethnic diversity in our major cities. If we move out to 2050, the links with in-laws in foreign countries might impede a national reaction to a nation-state’s terrorist or military activities.

Recent court cases in Florida and elsewhere represent the most profound devolution of government we have ever seen. We struck down the Brady bill, and government is not allowed to keep records on guns. There is a very thin majority in Supreme Court (that could change with the next Administration).

How would we deal with a homeland threat? If someone unleashed a nuclear suitcase on Manhattan or an anthrax weapon on New Jersey suburbs, who would get punished? We’d have to punish somebody, and the military would have to pick up the pieces. How would Chicago react if buildings came down? We went through Homeland training here three weeks ago. *If* the perpetrator were from outside, we’d immediately call for action, and the xenophobia would be terrific. The bombings in France last century might seem like a counter-example, but none of that went “live” to the nation. The European workforce is becoming increasingly Islamic. The U.S., Canada, and Australia think of themselves as relatively homogeneous and less xenophobic than France, but is this so?

How should world events be shaped? Some leaders lead countries to war. If we could develop more effective policy to strengthen democracy, it would greatly undercut the “march to war.” The line between individuals or national actors is a thin one. If an action of terrorists did not have approval of their government, then what would we do? Democracies don’t go to war with other democracies. Multinationals are everywhere, and do not want conflict. Compatible economies lead to a peace benefit. Some panel members feared little from Europe, other than Bordeaux or Caviar Wars.

What about globalization and the free flow of capital, but not labor, a declining Africa and an aging Europe? If we don’t solve the AIDS problem, Africa will disappear.

Why would the fundamental outlook change if the market did a downturn? Rising expectations would cause a reaction. However, falls hurt less than similar drops

did in the 80s. People are conditioned not to take temporary drops seriously. Regarding international relations: You can buy an economic loser off, but maybe only for so long, before he thinks he has a right to your possessions (homes and things). What will we do if things change rapidly in the U.S.? Things that might trigger military action would include oil scarcity, lack of clean water, and heavily polluted air. Societies would become very nervous if suddenly they had no access to something they considered critical. We have a resource allocations issue to address.

The moderator asked “If you were the next “Security Manager,” would you say we need radical change for the 21st Century?” Several panel members thought we needed radical change. One gave a Silicon Valley example. Thought processes have become amoebic in nature (self-organizing) and we need two simultaneous infrastructures – one that treats standard threats, and another that is responsive to the new threats.

As for creative destruction of existing institutions, the young in our culture support it, but military decisions are made at the top, and the organizational structure of the military would not support revolution, only evolution. Moskos and Segal worry about the Military-Civilian cultural gap. People just 10 years younger than we have a very different view of the world, a different sort of bi-polarism. How do you get views of the young plugged in to the establishment properly?

After this free-flowing discussion, the panel then selected its major questions about the 21st Century Security environment (the order does not imply an agreed-upon ranking of importance).

- Quality of Military Intelligence. The recent bombing of the Chinese Embassy provides an example of intelligence gone wrong). It has great impact, right or wrong.
- Domestic Stability. There must be domestic stability, or we cannot deal with other pressing security problems. We need a non-fractionalized, homogeneous society that “stops when the light is red,” even when no one is around to observe. Included in this is public awareness leading to consensus.
- Public Awareness. How do we develop public awareness? It is not as though the information is not put out. When politicians or other government leaders waffle until the right political perception has been developed, this creates public confusion. The American people need to understand the issues in New Power versus Old Strengths, but the draft book needs to be deciphered so that the populace understands. Senior leaders increasingly must be able to develop an American consensus quickly in these fast-paced times.

- Leadership Integrity. The American people expect their leaders to do the right thing. If we lose the concept of rule of law and rule of legislation, we are lost. Change must come through the ballot box, not by men on horseback.
- Broad Alliances. How does the U.S. relate to broader alliances, such as NATO and the UN? What broader role do we see for ourselves? The U.S. public doesn't think that the UN Security Council has teeth unless the President and Congress agree with its decrees.
- Can we be the world's policemen? We must promote democratic and rule of law values around the world. We didn't get those values overnight, and we can't expect that rule of law will take over quickly in fledgling democracies. Yugoslav leaders thought we were expecting too much, too soon. We said, you can take advantage of what took us 200 years to put together. They weren't so sure that would work in their culture. Look at Russia. It's in favor of open markets, but didn't take advantage of democratic capitalism because they had a different history. We can help such countries by pointing out that open rules are better than secret rules. They must choose.
- *Posse Comitatus*. The U.S. has no fear of invasion, but we have other concerns: drugs; violating other nations' sovereignty; and domestic unrest that causes federal or federalized military to be used internally. Several *Posse Comitatus* violations occurred or very nearly occurred on our Southwest borders the last 10 years. What is the fallout?
- One panel member could not bear to think that the military has an internal role. Another asked, "What happens if National Guard can't deal with the Montana Militia?"
- Meltdowns and U.S. Security. We need to keep our fingers on potential meltdowns. We monitor international economic issues, but need to feed the information more efficiently into the U.S. security apparatus.
- Protection of Borders. A 21st Century issue will be the protection of our own borders.

B. THE NATIONAL WILL

As a starting point for the discussion, the panel reviewed the current threat to the United States. Since there is, at present, no clearly defined enemy nation such as the former Soviet Union, and uncertainty as to when, or if, one might emerge, the panel members seemed agreed that terrorism posed the primary menace, with a major theater war a secondary possibility. The terrorism in question could be either domestic or international, and inspired by any of several factors. One member cited the recent hijacking of the Indian Airlines airplane, and posed to the panel the question of how

American national will might affect the outcome of response to a terrorist act, either where hostages were an issue or where a single act resulted in large-scale death or destruction.

Several members were of the opinion that some aspects of the American people's will and resoluteness were an Achilles' heel that a potential enemy could use to advantage. Acts of domestic or foreign terrorism might demand the employment of strike forces, the Delta Force, or severe sacrifices in terms of casualties and costly military expenditures. Not all of the members agreed that we would be prepared to use all the resources at our disposal to resolve the issue in our favor. Cited as an example early in the debate was the question of whether Americans are willing to take casualties. The issue of casualties has been much in the news in past years, and seems to have driven military planning in the Middle East war of 1991, and subsequent actions in the Balkans. The panel began by considering how loss of military personnel or hostages might affect crisis decision-making.

The group decided that the public will is sufficient to accept loss of life if Americans understand the reason why, and if the choices and alternatives are fully laid before them. All of the members agreed that the American people are far more intelligent and sophisticated than most media analysts give them credit. In this light, it is the responsibility of the President and the secretary of defense to articulate the strategy to be used and the options and trade-offs that are available to pursue success. These options require not only depth, but also durability over time so that a continuing course of action can be followed leading to victory.

Panel members then branched out in their discussion to consider the qualities of leadership needed to come to grips with an emergency or crisis. In reviewing the factors, the members concluded that this country's leaders need to have integrity, to display and practice honesty, articulate and espouse principled and moral behavior, and practice inspirational political and public leadership skills in dealing with the media, Congress, and the public at large. Notably, and surprisingly, this panel strongly doubted that the current leaders met this set of standards, and thus they doubted the present administration's ability to pull the country through a difficult and troubled time that demanded sacrifice. The members were apprehensive that we have in this country, as they phrased it, a "USA Today culture" that reflects leadership by public relations aimed at catering to the feelings of the moment. Several panel members opined that the American people are cynical, and for that reason unwilling to respond to crises elsewhere; they questioned what the people have seen that put them in this mood.

Terrorism being the threat uppermost in the panel members' minds, the group then tried to define the skills needed to preempt terrorist attacks. Among these were an adequate intelligence capability able to penetrate, either directly or indirectly, an enemy organization or network. The other main requisite the panel saw was an effective counter-terrorist organization. The members questioned whether either of these capabilities exists to the extent needed.

Terrorism as a global threat brought out several questions aimed at understanding the extent to which American values should be supported around the world, and the effect of our acting in accordance with those values. For example, was it wise and appropriate to extend our values to judging the Serbian government, and leading to the recent action in and over Kosovo? The group agreed that it was. Then how about Rwanda, and why we acted only very reluctantly and after the fact? Of substantial concern to the members was our potential willingness to face China over an issue centering on Taiwan, which many members appeared to believe would be necessary and appropriate in the future. In facing terrorism or a conventional military threat such as in the Middle East, the panel questioned whether we could use our technology, logistic skills, and intelligence capability to give our forces positional advantage. To do so, we would have to exhibit the will to preempt an adversary's possible moves.

Assuming, as the panel did, that the American people will accept losses and sacrifices in spite of media comments to the contrary, is there a lack of credibility in our leadership? And if there is, who lacks credibility, the military, the elected leadership, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the President? The panel concluded that the American leadership fears the media, but doubted this was necessary or appropriate. Can one not use the media intelligently, to get the word to the right places in America?

This panel was very much of the opinion that certain national characteristics are clear and discernable. Americans want to know the truth, and want facts. Americans see themselves as winners, and their history has supported this vision. Americans are sensitive to casualties, but will accept them if the goals and objectives of military action are understood, and are seen as attainable.

In summary, the panel concluded that Americans are far more intelligent and sophisticated than they are generally credited, either by the leaders in the administration, in Congress, or by the media.

The panel reached a number of conclusions:

- National will is shaped by the nation's leaders and the leadership they display. People are too busy with day-to-day needs and demands, and usually do not give serious questions continuing consideration.
- The country must understand the reach and scope of the terrorist threat; it must be defined for the present and into the future. This threat consists of domestic and foreign terrorism using conventional violence and chemical and biological weapons. A secondary threat is a major theater war, but one that would likely be fought asymmetrically to avoid a direct confrontation with our superior technology and conventional warfighting organization.
- We must train for the threat, and train not just medical people, for they cannot always treat victims of chemical or biological agent attacks (sometimes the only option is to segregate those affected). We must develop technological answers to detection and warning of chemical and biological attack. It is necessary to carry our strategy to the heart of the problem, i.e., if the illicit drug trade funds much terrorism and terrorist support functions, then we must get to the heart of the trade, on both the supply and the demand side.
- The American leadership must take the lead in shaping public opinion about the threat we face.
- The American people need to believe in the fairness and honesty of the country's leaders; they need to see honesty in daily actions, and they do not now do so. Moreover, it is incumbent on the leadership to overcome the cynicism of the people.
- Our foreign, diplomatic and military policies must be well crafted and consistent, with a clear understanding of risks and dangers. Our leaders can only go to the well of public support so many times, and if the policies to be pursued are not adequate and implementable, they might not get public and congressional support. How, for example, can we act to get between India and Pakistan if the two countries should move closer to renewed hostilities? How might we deal with a military conflict involving China and Taiwan.

The panel recommends that the following questions be considered for continued debate:

- What should be the plan, to be articulated by the next administration, for dealing with foreign and domestic terrorist threats?
- Given the potential seriousness of this problem, can we move at all before the election, given the moral climate of the current administration?
- When we do articulate a new strategy, what sort of leader will we need: an educator, a communicator, a person of high principle and clear integrity?

- The country needs an extended public discussion of the need for taking risks in defense of our principles and values. How best should this debate take place?
- How best may we prepare ourselves for necessary preemptive action, either to combat terrorism or to meet a more conventional military threat?

C. MISSIONS

This group was asked to discuss “Missions: Traditional vs. Non-Traditional.” In doing so, they concluded that we haven’t dealt with the fact that we still think “nuclear.” We have inherited from the Cold War days a feeling that just preserving, or having as an outcome of conflict, the *status quo ante* is sufficient and desirable. Our objective (and we are working too hard to preserve it) is *stability*. If we are going to commit resources and blood then the outcome should be to our benefit.

We need the capability to do non-traditional tasks, but if we have high intensity warfare capabilities then these capabilities can be adapted and are sufficient to do non-traditional warfare tasks. The military should be designed to support foreign policy goals rather than to confront specific threats. We need to know what we want to do and what kind of world we want. Our most important goals/missions, in order, are:

- Protect the homeland
- Protect our vital national interests
- Humanitarian assistance of both high and low intensity
- Certain wars of independence, e.g., East Timor [But there is no rationale for us to be in East Timor.]
- Force protection
- Border protection. The INS can’t do it; they are 1,000 people short.

We need to be able to do international missions, i.e., with allied involvement. Can we do missions alone? We certainly can’t in Europe or the Middle East. However, the European Union (EU) might be cutting us out. We can’t let this happen. We must take a leadership role since we provide the preponderance of power and resources. And we will have the leadership role if we don’t fritter it away. The EU doesn’t have a common defense policy (yet). Should there be something like an InterNational Guard? What is the role of international corporations in the establishment and carrying out of policy?

Is there a place in Asia where we have a national interest? Taiwan – but is there a coalition to defend it besides just us and the Taiwanese?

The military must be prepared to fight terrorism vice the FBI, CIA, or other civilian bureaucracies. There are over 90 US agencies involved in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). What is the role of the military in homeland defense against WMD?

It was stated that we must retaliate against any WMD attack against the homeland and the military would be expected to carry out the retaliation. The World Trade Center was very nearly a major disaster. If the public had demand retaliation, against whom would it have been?

The White House controls the missions and there is the potential for a change every four years. We shouldn't define policy goals and missions too specifically. If we do then we might be boxed into something we don't want. For example, if we pre-define the rationale for going into a Kosovo, how do we justify not going into a Rwanda or East Timor?

The role of the civilian populace must be a deep concern in any operational plan. This was not always true.

Force protection is very important from the standpoint of the media, and therefore from a political standpoint. Can't technology, for example, unmanned platforms such as UAVs and smart bombs, give us force protection? We only seem to win when we have actual soldiers on the ground. Casualties cause a loss of political will. One result is that we have tried to "outsource our missions." Polls indicate that the American people *will* accept casualties if they understand why.

Forces. We should have integrated forces. There should be no such thing as "Navy only" missions. There might be national goals that can only be accomplished by the Navy, e.g., sea-lane control, but the mission is joint [might involve the Air Force, for example]. DoD seems too interested in social engineering right now. If there are mission changes, what are we looking for: warriors or computer nerds? What role is there for the Reserve and National Guard? Should they take the non-traditional missions? Should they have the computer nerds and logisticians? How do we get the people to do these things? We can do a better job of integrating the reserve and National Guard – they are not being well used. We need a cadre of specialized units. Less conventional roles are important, e.g., defense against biological war and other terrorism. Do we need to set up new government bodies? Do we need to change the laws to allow certain new military

roles in public safety. A lot of “don’t knows” are going to happen in the next 20 years and we need to be prepared for them.

Summary. Our power is unquestioned and we like this. We need/want force supremacy in space, sea, and information domains. We need capability dominance. There seems to be a policy and operations disconnect. The military must be capable of doing the operations that policy requires. We need a core capability plus the capability to do more when needed. Our forces must be adaptable.

We need to increase our defend-and-respond forces to deal with non-traditional roles, especially chemical and biological defense support to cities.

We need to maintain a core warfighting capability and provide for more warfighting capabilities.

We need to connect the civilian and military populations. We might need to return to universal selective service of some sort.

The political process will determine missions and the military will respond.

We need to use technology to achieve a military capability for the full range of responses.

Reserve and National Guard resources should be exploited, especially in technical areas and not necessarily for warfighting. We need to use technology, but also be conscious of the threat to technological capabilities.

We need not so minutely categorize and define missions that we are trapped into doing missions that we don’t want to do.

D. FORCES: LEADERSHIP, DOCTRINE, CHARACTER

Recruiting. The civilian population, as the source of recruits, has little knowledge of, or sympathy for, the military because so few have served. Parents and siblings are not recruiting their children and siblings. A solution might be national service. Service in the military (except the Marines) is not being sold on patriotism. The all-volunteer force is good and the current quality is high but it is suffering now because the economy is good although quality is not a function of money. A corrective action might be to pay more but we don’t want to end up with a mercenary force.

The current force. The majority of the soldiers are from small towns in the Mid-West and the Mid-West seems to identify more with the military than do the elites on

either coast. Soldiers get out because there is not enough training, money, or time. The force is not trained to standard. The leadership is politicized – leaders want to win but also keep the cost low. When downsizing came along, end strength dropped 50 percent, resources dropped 50 percent, but operations increased 300 percent. The military is being run ragged. We must reduce the commitments or spend more. We need to take better care of families. Soldiers want inspiring leadership!

Leadership and money. Budgeting is done the wrong way. What's left over goes to the military. We need to ask what we want to do then pay for it. Those in military planning don't do it right. People at the top are political – they think of defense of their Service, not the defense of the country. Congressional pork also takes money away from the military. Communication is a problem with the public – the public doesn't see a threat (the leadership doesn't articulate it well), so why should they pay for more military?

Kosovo. Were the people proud of the military in Kosovo? They didn't care. The leadership needed to communicate the mission in Kosovo. The objective seemed to be to stop the killing but the strategy was to keep allied personnel from being killed.

Marines. Some soldiers and units do non-traditional missions very well. The Marines do better at motivation than the other Services. Recruiting for the Marines emphasizes service, toughness, and looking good in a uniform. It does not emphasize a high tech approach.

Army. The Army is fractionalized. It advertises pay and high tech careers.

Forces. We need adaptive forces but still need specialization. If the threat is changing and so ambiguous, then we need a new way of organizing and working. The military needs to be able to switch between peacekeeping and warfighting. Do we have a force that is ready to see their fellow soldiers tortured, as in Grozny? The military doesn't train for ambiguity. They can't deal with the fanatical "warrior classes" we find in some parts of the world. We have nice people that must be able to go into nasty places.

The peacekeeping environment. The military provides a secure environment for the activities of non-governmental organizations, such as CARE and Doctors Without Borders. But the military is frequently the first in and, until the environment is secure enough, the military must provide peacekeeping/public safety and humanitarian aid. The non-governmental organizations don't seem well organized between themselves and actually seem to be fighting each other. Many are bureaucracies and not capable of rapid

decision-making and action. When an incident occurs between opposing actors in country, a useful and credible promise must be able to be made and carried out rapidly. A promise of some new tractors to stop a fight is ineffective if the tractors won't be delivered for six months.

Reserve and National Guard. If operational requirements don't change, we need to do more about sharing with the Reserves and National Guard. If you want to do something in 96 hours, it has to be done by the active component. If you have six months to train up and prepare, the Reserve and National Guard can handle it. Use of specialized Reserve and National Guard units is fine, but we must understand the impact of deployment on the local community. We also need to realize that even though civilian employers are required to keep a job available, many have discovered ways around this, for example by "downsizing." Many Reserve and National Guard deployments use volunteers from within the larger unit to fill the deploying sub-unit. It might take a division to deploy a brigade. If our national strategy is to fight two simultaneous major regional conflicts, can the Reserve and National Guard fight the second? The Reserve and National Guard should be heavily involved in domestic terrorism – they are already on the ground in the Chicago area. Local first responders should do most of the work and be trained for it.

Summary. The Army has become highly politicized. The military in general is more politicized, moreso than in the recent past. The quality and sense of commitment of the current force is good, but the Marines are doing a better job with less bureaucracy, less specialization or segmentation, a mission focus, and recruiting of the best – those who want to serve their country.

Readiness and training are the big issues. The military needs organizational change and restructuring, but not tinkering, to cope with a changing threat. There is the dichotomy between heavy and light; Gen. Shinseki's medium force concept needs to be supported. The force needs to be more flexible. Greater inter-Service cooperation is required, as well as the development of small, fast task forces.

Wherever there is a lot of funding there will be politics. Without a war, money is not going to be spent on personnel.

There needs to be more emphasis on the Reserve and National Guard for public safety; just don't break the law.

There needs to be better integration between the military, Reserve and National Guard, and civilian agencies. Military involvement in civic action will reinforce the breakdown of differences between military and civilian activities.

What should the military priorities be? Homeland defense and the capability for one war. Can we fight two MRCs? Korea and Iraq – yes. China and Iran – maybe not.

We need a system of decision-making that fosters flexibility and speed. All that we do now is done too thinly.

E. FORCES: MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

This panel spent considerable time exploring the complex problem of acquisition reform, with a good deal of frustration stemming from the longstanding difficulty of trying to streamline acquisition policy in order to attack the continuing high cost of today's weapon development process. The panel members believed that the current military lacks the capability to meet today's warfighting strategies and national policies, that our military forces have been neglected and used for missions not suited to their design, and that current acquisition policies and practices are wholly unsuited for the military forces of the world's leading power. The members viewed the goal of defense acquisition as twofold: to retain a core warfighting capability able to meet the most demanding of unexpected contingencies, while at the same time dealing with newly emerging threats such as terrorist organizations employing chemical and biological or information technology-based weapons.

The panel members noted that over the past quarter century numerous commissions have been appointed to prepare recommendations for acquisition reform. Although many of the recommendations coming from these study groups have been accepted as reasonable and necessary, few reforms have worked their way into common use, and little has been accomplished. As the panel members saw it, the problem stems from a rigid review and approval process that is committee-based. The acquisition agencies are governed by Service and Agency representatives who are in turn guided by the normal military propensity to make certain that the Services have all of the forces and equipment needed to win in war. This is a very conservative process that leads to slow decision-making, high cost, and excessive purchases. The members were of the opinion that the only way to succeed at reforming the way material and equipment is acquired is through the application of intelligent leadership by the President and secretary of defense.

Members also expressed concern about the high cost of the present defense establishment. Several opined that the all-volunteer military is far too expensive, and that America needs to consider replacing it by a force that is partially conscripted. After considerable discussion, the panel was uncertain how to achieve the goal of mixed volunteer/conscripted forces, but felt with some degree of certainty that the cost/benefit ratio would result in a less expensive military if it could be done.

One way to achieve cost control is to focus acquisition decisions on a high cost/low cost mix using commercially available products and specifically developed, militarily unique weapons. This would require structural changes to decide upon and control the mix ratio, but could yield considerable advantages in costs of purchasing, especially for routine needs.

After considerable discussion, the panel members decided that for the 21st Century the United States military needs a fully revamped acquisition system to replace the current one that is confused, expensive, non-responsive, and in general terms, broken. Changing the way that DoD does business was seen as the only way to cure the situation. The panel offered the final summary comments:

- The passing of time and the rapid changes in technology (at least for computer-related technology) have accelerated the need for acquisition reform; it must be done now rather than later.
- The acquisition problems in the Department of Defense are intractable and frustrating for all who work with the system.
- Any change that the defense establishment accomplishes will be achieved by vigorous, intelligent leadership at the highest level. There was considerable skepticism on this panel relative to the ability of the current administration to achieve any sort of reform because of poor focus on international strategy, and because of misdirected and shortsighted inward focus domestically.
- One way by which change can be achieved is to limit the time for development and acquisition of new systems. This can be done by design and procurement within the bounds of a specific time and money budget, rather than today's practice of letting the budget expand to fill the needs of program managers and acquisition officials.
- Acquisition management by committee needs to cease, with specific people or task forces vested with authority to make acquisition decisions.
- More emphasis ought to be given to design authority at the operational level. To achieve this, theater commanders ought to do limited operational

prototyping for design, and have acquisition authority for certain mission tasks.

The panel members concluded that despite the fact that the acquisition process has been broken for some time, we have nonetheless been able to field military forces that have remained preeminent in war. The question in the minds of the panel members was whether this situation could continue without leading the nation into a situation where it could no longer adequately defend itself. Because of the complexity of the problem and the limited time available for discussion, the panel was unable to decide upon ways by which acquisition reform can be achieved. The individual members contented themselves with a number of recommendations that they hoped might improve the process even though most of the ideas amount to just nibbling around the edges of acquisition reform. At the conclusion of the meeting, the panel members posed questions that they believed would be suitable for further debate and discussion:

- Can we, in fact, organize a mixed volunteer/conscripted force based on some plan of national service? What type of national service might we employ, what mix would be desired, and is the mixed force a politically viable course of action?
- Can the military use just-in-time logistics to its advantage to reduce the cost of acquisition?
- Is just-in-time logistics a good idea for supporting forces engaged in combat, or should this concept be limited to peacetime operations and specific categories of goods?
- If the current acquisition system cannot be reformed, might it be possible to put into place a newly designed system that would incorporate new R&D processes and authority, while retaining the old system until all current projects are completed?
- Should we create incentives to develop high technology-based, inexpensive, non-traditional assets? How might we do this?

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APPENDIX D

**FEBRUARY 2000 CONFERENCE RESULTS,
THE DEFENSE SCIENCE STUDY GROUP,
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA**

APPENDIX D
FEBRUARY 2000 CONFERENCE RESULTS,
THE DEFENSE SCIENCE STUDY GROUP,
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

The following sections summarize the concluding thoughts and ideas of the six panels.

A. 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

This panel had some difficulty trying to forecast the changes in the world's security environment, so they decided to address the topic in a rather straightforward manner. The group decided to formulate its conclusions based on the question: What exists now that will be different in the 21st Century? They concluded that several issues ought to be considered, including:

- Life spans are becoming extended
- Security is about what one fears, but demographics can change. The main point underlying this issue is the question of how people will cope with their individual or collective fears.
- Globalization has increased at a much greater rate in the past decade than has been seen before. This causes difficulties for some countries (Austria, where the Freedom Party has moved into a coalition government based in part on fears of unlimited and uncontrolled immigration, is a case in point).
- What is the changing role of the nation? Or, to what extent is the nation-state changing, and how must we cope with this circumstance?

The group then continued by listing three major areas they believed ought to be points of concentration:

- Of what are people afraid? There are angry people in the world who become terrorists because they do not like what America does or Americans in general (arising from a sort of free-flowing envy). This can result in biological terrorism (where biological weapons are used to inflict damage); cyber-terrorism, where skilled groups attack a nation's information infrastructure;

and nuclear terrorism, where small groups are able to construct a nuclear weapon that can be easily delivered.

- What will happen with certain so-called “Teen-age” nations. Countries such as China/Taiwan will continue to be a difficult problem, and we have no way of knowing what will develop in their rivalry; but we can be fairly certain that we will be involved. India and Pakistan present another clear case of danger; both are or will soon be armed with deliverable nuclear weapons. If they go to war, what will be the position of the United States? Russia is an unstable country with a long history of imperialistic nationalism that has only been obscured temporarily by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Russia has a substantial, but deteriorating, nuclear capability. How will we be able to deal effectively with a country so foreign to our way of life and thought?
- The final potpourri, a mixture of factors, can also present serious dangers. Environmental issues abound in much of the world fueled by the abuses inherent in cultures that lack recognition of civil rights and private property, wherein land users and industrial facilities have no incentive to protect the land, sea, and air since they have no protected, continuing stake in the future. In addition, there are huge demographic changes developing around the world and in the United States as well; how will these changes drive security considerations in the next decades? Finally, with the expansion of wealth and an electronics-based commerce, who will be available to do the less desirable (but nevertheless essential), menial labor.

The group suggested that there might be two strategies for dealing with generalized fears. One is by prevention, possibly better diplomacy to solve problems before they arise to conflict proportions or to strengthen other people or nations. Another method could be the maintaining of sufficient troop strength to ward off trouble or to crush trouble once it arises. The second suggested strategy is that of management. In this latter case, we may find the tactic best suited to combat terrorism. This would require the intelligence community to continue to develop its skills to track potential terrorist acts and developed as well as nascent terrorist groups. The issue of management will also make maximum advantage of the developing technologies to find and deal with threatening tools of terrorists and terrorist characters. In fact the group concluded that taking advantage of new technological capabilities will be essential to the control and management of threats and fears.

B. THE NATIONAL WILL

The group set out to determine ways by which one might generate a consensus toward a National Will in support of an adequate security environment. They began by

asking the question: “Is creating a national will just a political question?” They concluded that it was largely a political question, but from this followed a number of additional considerations. Shaping of a national will to support a military action or posture is a primary responsibility of the President and other elected leaders. In times of prosperity, where we have an all-volunteer force, the defense establishment must recruit with incentives and with advertising that could at some point backfire. If military service is sold as a job experience (as one member noted, as a type of corporate Outward Bound program), Service members might react badly when faced with stress, danger, and death (their own or that of a comrade); they might ask themselves “Why am I here, I did not get in it for this?” Thus, the question becomes a moral issue rather than an employment issue, and the reaction to an unexpected situation will not allow the member to deal with danger as he or she must.

Out of this discussion came another set of questions centered on the issue of whether America’s tolerance for casualties is low, or whether and to what extent this supposed “low tolerance” is a media-induced state that derives from the Vietnam War. Clearly, there would be low tolerance for actions that produce substantial casualties, but which have a minor or negligible impact on or importance for Americans. One example might be large loss of life in some place like Bosnia. On the other hand, for a just war or cause, the American people would respond as they did during World War II, with determination and a willingness to endure sacrifices. The problem is “How does one identify a just cause?” When we do decide to undertake a conflict or a commitment, how much stress on “force protection” to avoid casualties is necessary and appropriate? Several examples, were cited, one being the intervention in Bosnia that was sold as a no-cost operation, but once in place there came tremendous pressure to protect the forces in the field. Another example noted was of the bombing of a multi-story USAF dormitory in Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, the U.S. installation commander was disciplined for failure to prevent an act in an area not under his control. Moreover, the AF Chief of Staff contended that the loss, however painful, was an outcome of war and that commanders cannot be punished for casualties under such circumstances. In a dispute over the appropriateness of the disciplining of the commander (i.e., his removal from the major general promotion list by the civilian secretary of the Air Force), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force resigned, citing the need to leave military decisions to the military.

One conclusion reached by the panel was their belief that the American public just does not think about the topic of warfighting. Thus, it is difficult to get people to support some things. Bosnia and Kosovo received support, and the members believed

that counter-drug action in Colombia would as well if the people could see the danger from continued drug consumption fed from processing laboratories in that country. Another example would be if this country were to be forced into action by terrorist acts. Then, however, it would be necessary to determine the end points of the action. A side discussion arose over the contrast of democracy versus republic and how the leaders ought to act in view of the fact that the people seem to have opted out of decision making. If we elect them, leaders should just act to do what needs to be done.

What must be done to raise consciousness on national security? First, the public must understand that their well-being is at stake. Then the people must reattach themselves to the function of government. Finally, they must realize that there is a villain afoot, but in that regard the group asked, “to what extent do villains exist and to what extent do we create them?” In summary, short of a threat to our national well-being, the average citizen will defer to the leadership and the military. When matters go wrong, however, trouble ensues.

In view of the fact that there are always some issues needing worry, the group tried to judge how much worry might be warranted against which threat (although they stated that the threat was questionable or unclear to them), and how much we must spend to solve the problem. Is there a need for senior leadership to galvanize the people? And can the senior leadership do much at all absent some forcing act like Pearl Harbor? Without a clear-cut threat or overt attack, how seriously would the people take such calls to combat?

In an effort to answer these questions, the members discussed what it would take to trigger our involvement as policeman to the world. They offered opinions as to the threshold necessary, and how one might know when one reached that threshold. There was little agreement as to how to understand this. Humanitarian considerations seemed even more complex and difficult, and the members tried to define how might one recognize them and act to resolve the underlying problems.

Since the issues of national will were so complex in the absence of a traditional enemy such as the Soviet Union, the panel contended for some time with attempting to answer how much force structure is needed, and how the national leadership would obtain that force structure. Several members offered the opinion that the current leaders might not have the credibility to resolve such a task, or that they might, in fact, not want to resolve it. These considerations were set in the context of needing a tableau of tasks that must be done and then deciding on the priorities needed to do them. The members

percieved a mismatch in that the military might want to prepare for the big stuff, when the immediate problems are diffuse and murky.

In concluding their discussions, the group offered the opinion that we seem to be better at warmaking aimed at victory; that the military is very good at what it does right up until the time it leaves, but that if we try only to settle differences between enemies the problems will remain to fester (Bosnia, Kosovo, and sub-Saharan Africa). So how does one generate the national will to remain and resolve the issues?

This panel could reach no consensus or answers to the questions posed to them. They offered the following closing remarks:

- To develop a national consensus will take better leaders and perhaps better citizens.
- Both leaders and citizens must be able to delineate goals and understand exit strategies.
- A national consensus might not be needed to achieve certain objectives, or if the action is short the consensus might develop after the fact when the people can see why that action was taken. This is post-facto validation.
- We might need three types of militaries, and their employment would call for differing types and amounts of National Will:
 - Homeland defense, requiring better educated people clear about what must be done
 - Peacekeeping, which can be complex and situation dependent
 - Warfighting, where there is clarity as to objectives and exit strategies. Leaders may build consensus and national will after the fact, as with the Gulf War

C. MISSIONS: TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL

The panel members formulated their debate question as, “What are the potential, non-traditional missions that are new and that we need to think about now?”

First, they defined the traditional role of the military: “to fight a war against a well-defined enemy nation, defeat that nation, and impose our will on that nation or region.” Therefore, a non-traditional role is one that is not traditional. In such a case, we might have to fight some group that is not a nation, accept outcomes that are less than total victory, and do other than impose our will (or at least not to the extent we were able after World War II). The Gulf War was traditional, while terrorism with or without

weapons of mass destruction is not. The group believed that Operations Other Than War have been considered non-traditional, but are becoming traditional.

That missions are changing now is new to the current generation, but military missions for the United States' armed forces have changed in the past. We must simply realize the direction that these changes are taking us, and be prepared to meet the new requirements. In order to deal effectively with the changing nature of missions, we must understand the new and evolving threats. The group considered several possibilities, including:

- An anonymous attack against the U.S. Before, we could see it coming. Now we can't see it before the attack occurs.
- Computer network attack. The military anti-hackers need to be closer to the battle area. Do the anti-hackers need to be military? Can the military attract anti-hackers of sufficient ability and in enough numbers to meet the need? How do we certify or assure the integrity of information that we use?

Individuals or groups can pose a significant threat. Advanced technology is available at much lower cost and these groups can develop weapons of mass destruction. The general populace has access to information over the Internet almost as quickly as the military. The general populace also has access to the equipment and methodology needed to prepare weapons of mass destruction, and could use that information to attack the U.S.

- What is the role of the military in situations where the perpetrator is unknown, for example, a biological attack against the New York subway or by means of a small (suitcase) nuclear weapon detonated in the center of Denver? The problem here is information certification; we must know as much about the perpetrators as possible, and we need to be sure the information is correct.

An awareness of America's new roles will be essential. For the moment, since we lack a declared enemy like the Soviet Union, this seems to center on peace keeping and peace making where there are significant ethnic and religious differences. The formerly non-traditional roles are rapidly becoming traditional. Examples are Kosovo, where the U.S. is neutral and is trying to step between two warring groups with longstanding animosities, and, some contend, a moral responsibility for worldwide disaster relief.

In the future, non-traditional roles for the military might include:

- Responding to anonymous attacks on our country or on countries or areas where we have significant national interests.

- Deterring or responding to individuals or groups, for example, Osama Ben Ladin’s terrorist operations. The military should act to contain “old” weapons – biological, nuclear, and chemical – leftover from the Cold War. The responding forces need to be smaller and faster than those used in traditional roles.
- Taking preventative action may be critical, although we understand that it may be hard to develop a consensus for such action.
- The group concluded by listing several questions that the members believed to be important for shaping future military forces and strategy:
 - What is the role of the military in a significant computer attack?
 - In an economic attack?
 - An attack against the electric grid? Or possibly against our natural resources?

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APPENDIX E

**MARCH 2000 CONFERENCE RESULTS,
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA**

APPENDIX E

MARCH 2000 CONFERENCE RESULTS, SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

The following sections summarize the concluding thoughts and ideas of the six panels.

A. 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

For the next century, the United States must set its national objectives. The country's leaders must keep in mind that the sheer magnitude of operating as the sole superpower in the world will require that we minimize commitments and retain balance between the potential need to fight a major war and the need to engage in any of several types of minor operations such as peacekeeping, enforcement actions, and expeditionary warfare as was the case in the Balkans. We must provide moral leadership for the world.

There is a limit to our capability to meet full spectrum operations worldwide, even if we were to greatly enlarge our force structure.

What are the national objectives? They include containment of diverse threats, possibly chemical and biological warfare attacks, or major wars with emerging rivals like China, and terrorist attacks.

The country must decide the extent to which it intends to be a global policeman. We must expend effort to define the realistic threats, both internal and external. In this regard, other countries may overlook the benign nature of the U.S., and feel threatened by American hegemony. How will we deal with such a situation?

United States forces must deal with both traditional and non-traditional threats. Whatever the type of threat, enemies will most likely avoid direct attacks and our potential retaliatory power, instead coming at us in asymmetric ways.

The United States plays a predominant role in world affairs, but its military commitments cannot extend forever. The armed forces might need one set of troops dedicated to one potential type of trouble, another dedicated to other threats.

B. THE NATIONAL WILL

A consensus will be necessary in order to create and carry out foreign policy, especially when military conflict is at issue. This was not done during the Vietnam conflict. In contrast, President Franklin Roosevelt did so at the beginning of World War II. Consensus building for WWII took a long time, and did not reach completion until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the consequent declaration of war by Germany and Italy.

- There are many groups within the nation; they are small and “Balkanized,” but can express their interests and positions.
- Interactivity is a characteristic of the world today. Friends and enemies are all on the Internet, and we must know who they are.

There must be objectives. For World War II, the objective was the surrender of our enemies; since then we have lacked clear objectives, and we remain engaged in Korea, Iraq, and the Balkans.

- We must find a way to act in the world when necessary, even when we are not sure who our enemies are or where they are located (terrorists groups in particular).
- How will we handle a cataclysmic attack (such as might have been the case with the attempt to bring down the World Trade Center) and the consequent desire for retaliation? Was President Carter’s response to the hostage taking correct? Must our action remain short of nuclear? To what extent must we give up elements of democratic traditions (and one must remain aware that this is always an outcome of war)?

The American people must trust our President, even if that President has no military background.

The news media, television in particular, is pervasive. Today television demands so much and can present so much. The President must use the media skillfully and intelligently. The President must respond to opposition and get his story out to the American people if he is to lead in forging a consensus.

The potential for casualties must be addressed, and casualties must be part of policy formulation. The nation must be prepared to suffer losses, and the American people must know why this will be necessary. Americans have accepted casualties in the past for a cause they understood and with which they agreed; they will again for similar reasons.

It is difficult to develop a single policy without a single, clear-cut enemy.

The role of the volunteer force must be reviewed and understood by policy makers and the people—it is now a potential for problems. The National Guard and Reserves have been brought into too many actions, and these resources are being worn down.

C. MISSIONS: TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL

To understand our new missions, we must decide if the major threat we will face will come from within or beyond the country. If necessary, to what extent can we project our capability onto an international stage?

- Whatever administration is in office, it will have too much to do to focus on possible future threats; reaction is likely to guide response.
- How does one handle simultaneous issues? This is difficult to answer, but is an everyday problem.
- Reliance on the military as the solution creates problems and will cause an overweighed policy.
- We must first determine what has and will change, and where we see departures from the past.
- We do not face a thermonuclear threat.
- The 21st century will be more complex, interdependent, and dangerous.

There are new threats not seen in the past, and dealing with them requires a great deal of thought:

- Information warfare
- Biological and chemical weapons that can be used by small, but state-sponsored groups, even by independent operators.
- How must the nation respond? Traditional military force has limitations, and we cannot rely on the military as our sole asset. We must integrate our economic and moral force as an alternative or as a supplement.
- Harnessing private business could be advantageous and fruitful. The world knowledge of the business community has been neglected, but how do we integrate what business knows with what the intelligence community knows?
- Making policy in the future needs more care, and must include more of our wealth and education. We must get beyond the embassies, and get ahead of the need for military force.

D. FORCES: COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION, SIZE AND QUALITY

To shape the forces for the 21st Century, we might see if Silicon Valley companies, particularly start-up companies, can provide lessons.

- Can we abolish routine jobs and make symbolic changes like inclusive decision making. Do Special Forces units do this? How and to what extent?
- Is it even possible to use start-ups as a template for military units?

How must the country organize forces to meet military needs? Are there genuine feelings of disaffection stemming from frequent moves? And how do the moves affect families?

Can we use privatization to accomplish or enhance some military missions? Does this imply the use of mercenary forces? What can such units do? And what do they do when there is no business?

One of the issues that must be addressed is how the military can compete with the allure of business during times of prosperity.

- In a start-up company, people have the desire to get rich soon; the military cannot do this.

Should the military be more like a Silicon Valley start-up, or like a fast food enterprise? And how do the two differ?

What does a 21st Century force need? Some considerations include:

- High power teams able to act quickly in dangerous situations
- Trust in leaders
- Satisfaction with the job being done
- Operating in a classless mode as do some start-ups

Young people have less interest in and desire for military service. To get the people we will need, we must offer them the potential for learning and training.

E. FORCES: MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

There is a great divide in terms of what is needed to fight a conventional war versus an unconventional war.

Around the world, unconventional forces have access to similar equipment, either on the black market or from legitimate sources.

Conventional units can be equipped with more consumer-style goods. The use of commercial, off-the-shelf goods will speed up acquisition. But will the stuff be GI-proof and able to function in remote and difficult locations and situations?

Unconventional Warfare:

- Cyber problems are difficult to do well, for either side.
- Biological and chemical operations offer no good solutions to the equipment acquisition problem because the threat is too diffuse, not attributed to a source, and the changes are too rapid. The biological threat is especially wide and can circumvent many countermoves. So, how does a force acquire ways to deal with it?
- It may be necessary to ameliorate some problems after an attack rather than trying to prevent or protect against them.
- Deterrence may be of greater value than counterattack. This presents the problem of how one acquires and deals with a fast-changing threat that cannot be defined.

Conventional Warfare:

- The traditional acquisition system, even though far from perfect, will work for traditional situations. It is good enough and produces weapons that work.
- Creating skunk works-like organizations able to attack specific problems might be advantageous.

F. FORCES: LEADERSHIP, DOCTRINE AND CHARACTER

We need a national leader more diverse in terms of training, understanding of history, and with a liberal background (in the classic Jeffersonian meaning). The leader must be able to articulate the national role, his role, problems, and answers.

The background of military leaders will move away from the idea of long-term training in the organization.

- As with the national leader, the new military leader must be able to articulate the national role, his role, problems and answers, so that people in the unit understand what is needed of them.
- The leader's thinking (especially for senior officers) must be more conceptual
- Compensation of leaders will be a problem. How does one compete with business? Possibly using bonuses for joining and staying. The national leadership must articulate the benefits of the military; seeing new places, gaining new experience, and other intangibles.

The military must devise ways of finding the 6-sigma people, and continue to get the Colin Powells of the country. The group concluded that this capability exists now, and that we need to see it in practice.

Preparation of new leaders:

- Have to have different dimension for them. In terms of professional military education, when do new leaders learn strategic thinking and training?
- ROTC training is important, as it feeds the forces with people drawn from a wide cut of American life, but it is being eliminated at many colleges and universities. Unlike two decades ago, ROTC is accepted, but it is “uncool.”

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APPENDIX F

**MAY 2000 CONFERENCE RESULTS,
BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA**

APPENDIX F
MAY 2000 CONFERENCE RESULTS,
BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA

The following sections summarize the concluding thoughts and ideas of the six panels.

A. CONFLICT AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Security for the 21st Century will be centered on physical and territorial protection; however, the United States is not a fortress. National security concepts must advance the interests of the United States, but reject isolationism; concepts and actions also must support international relations. International economic engagement is not a substitute for national security, but the panel strongly supported such engagement. At present, non-traditional threats are more prominent than those we have seen in the past; these threats are not only military, but technological as well.

Success requires better education of the American people in order to gain public consensus about the needs of national security and its relationship to international peace. The panel concluded that now that we are in peaceful, prosperous times, we have an ideal opportunity to do this. We can expect Russia and China to continue pushing market-based economies, and we must be watchful of the changes taking place there and in the rest of the world. This means that we should continue to seek economic structures based on the rule of law and private property, where business can have a clear expectation of stability and return on investment.

At the same time, the panel concluded that public service should be viewed as a civic duty. In that light, the panel believed that better development of citizenship was necessary. This may extend to some form of limited national service for all, either in military units or in civilian organizations such as the Peace Corps or domestic service. The members sounded a cautionary note that we cannot press the notion of public service to the point of its impinging on the liberty of the people.

In light of the difficulties of getting people to join the military, there appear to be three options: 1) pay them more; 2) inspire them; 3) draft them. Clearly, pay and

allowances are serious problems, but this has always been so and requires continued attention. Of the three, inspiring them to join is appropriate and has potential. How can we do this?

The key seems to be a combination of better pay to lift people in the Services above near-poverty, along with the chance to serve the best interests of the country. In the latter case, the Marines seem to have succeeded for some time by presenting service as a personal challenge coupled with patriotism.

There needs to be a realization that a parallel exists between human and technological capital, and that a combination of both is needed in order to achieve success.

The panel proposed the following questions for future discussion:

- To what extent will we be a safer country if we advance trade with China? Or Russia?
- If we encourage trade with China, or develop a strategic partnership, to what extent will this replace or influence the national security question?
- What is it that we want to secure? For example, ideologies, boundaries, and businesses.
- How do we deal with a non-democratic, totalitarian state (not China or Russia) that has nuclear capability and might be willing to use such a weapon?
- How broad should the military's role be in achieving national security?

B. WILL OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

National Will is a strategic factor, yet we are uncertain what it is. The country needs to have an extended public debate about our purposes and resolve in order to define our vision and our goals for national security and the costs of achieving these goals.

The panel doubted if it were possible to develop a consensus belief in National Will without a crisis as a driving factor.

The American people want to be safe, but do not want to pay for (or pay excessively for) that safety. A crisis might be the only thing that brings together a consensus of National Will, especially in terms of national defense. National Will existed during World War II and the Cold War, but, since then, there seems to be a divergence of viewpoints.

The American people have a tremendous distrust for the leadership and are very cynical about government and related quasi-government institutions. Defining the will of the people has to include recognition of the value of these institutions of national leadership.

We are isolationist by nature, history, and geography, and, if we are going to intervene overseas, we also want to protect ourselves.

As a nation, we favor peacekeeping around the world and the worth of American values. Nonetheless, we still need the military not only to support these stands, but also for offensive power to deal with serious crises. Trade and investment are everyone's roots of prosperity, and must underlie our actions overseas.

There is little popular support for American intervention in other countries, particularly if American blood will be shed. To resolve this, we need to articulate why we need to be involved in an overseas area. Americans are not so concerned about enemy casualties, but they do not want our soldiers to die for vacuous reasons (panelists thought that the "body bag" phenomenon is grossly exaggerated). Americans are likely to accept casualties based on the needs of the mission. Those needs have to be stated, and we have to trust in our political government.

Whatever our National Will is today, it will be challenged seriously in the next 20 years. If we have an educated public, the United States will come together and will survive a crisis forced on us.

The panel proposed the following questions for further discussion:

- What is National Will?
- If we believe that American values are important and that we should pursue them around the world, how do we decide where to go and what to do in this pursuit?
- Given the premise that we have no National Will, what is needed to develop such a concept of will?
- Can a diverse nation like America develop a National Will without a crisis? If so, how does one go about doing so?
- Is the National Will multifaceted? And what makes up the elements that effect Will or National Resolve?
- Is our leadership comfortable with articulating a National Will, absent a clearly perceivable threat?

- Will increased expenditures in the name of defense result in a more stable global society?
- There is a perception that terrorism is a threat to America. If this is true, to what extent and how far should we go to reduce the risks?

C. TRADITIONAL VS. NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS

The most plausible threat to national security is based on terrorism, using chemical or biological weapons, or attacking our information or communication systems and capability. The magnitude of the threat, however, is not clear, nor is the extent to which any existing capability can be broken or rendered unable to carry out its missions.

Most likely, the military cannot solve all cogent threats or crises. In that case, perhaps we need to deal with different issues in differing ways: informational people dealing with informational problems, and biological/genetic people dealing with related problems. Solutions must be innovative and different from resorting solely to military force, but must include the military as the implementation arm. Yet, we don't want this system to be top-heavy or bureaucratic. A possible option is to develop industry-based companies to solve different national security problems.

The military is just one component of some new, broader organization that might control defense in dealing with new threats. Significant pockets of expertise (FBI, CIA, Critical Infrastructure Coordinating Group, local response capabilities) already exist to deal with a variety of threats; they should be used. Americans are leery of allowing the military to get involved in all aspects of defense. In addition, the panel members feared giving one new organization full control (a monopoly) of meeting new challenges.

Ideally, any new organization created to deal with chemical, biological, and IT-based threats should be innovative, flexible, smart, and capable of swift action; it should be organized horizontally, not vertically. It should be unencumbered by red tape and bureaucracy, and be an R&D team. The leader should report to the President, and both need to be held to Constitutional accountability.

Similarly, to press too quickly or in too broad a manner might present threats to the Constitution, to federalism, and to the liberties of the people. Privacy questions are an important consideration, and Americans are probably unwilling to support government (primarily Federal) intrusiveness into lives and businesses.

Problems can arise when we try to defend ourselves because we cannot all agree and mobilize together. This same issue occurred during the Revolution and is based on

the pluralism inherent in American society. We face a related concern: growing loss of credibility in the national government based on Waco, Ruby Ridge, Cuban-Miami situation, and continued scandals.

The panel proposed the following questions for future discussion:

- Are current threats credible for a national response, or are they random threats for which we cannot prepare in advance, that have little place in national policy, and that ought to be left to local capabilities? In other words, should we design methodology to deal with random threats that cannot be anticipated or preventable threats?
- To what extent should the military be a factor in protecting national security?
- Since we do not want to feel invaded by our protectors, how far are we willing to go in order to prevent terrorism or to devise missions for agencies that we expect to protect us?
- Can we develop a model for a very flexible organization of different specialists to which we can delegate missions and responsibilities to deal with problems beyond that which the military can, or should, handle?
- If a new organization is needed and created, with its head reporting directly to the President, how will this affect the Department of Defense?
- How will local organizations that would bear the brunt of many mission responses fit into the new organizational capability? What are the critical skills to be centralized nationally? Which ones are to be left local?

D. FORCES: LEADERSHIP, DOCTRINE, AND CHARACTER

The most important characteristics of leadership are character and integrity, experience, and adequate technical skills; these describe the best leaders of our history. Good leaders need a liberal arts education and must be well rounded. Leaders need interdisciplinary skills based on integrity, intelligence, flexibility, open-mindedness, and ability to communicate, to integrate, to make decisions, and to put the right people into the right jobs.

There is a perception that in the military culture one cannot question authority, cannot analyze, and cannot think too broadly. This perception is true at times and in some places, but members questioned its overall applicability. It is an issue that needs to be addressed.

What are people looking for in military careers? High achievers are not entering the armed forces. Why not? The answer seems to be that they are seeking the companies

that have open-ended positions that allow maximum opportunity for development and advancement at the rate suited for that person. Is this a misperception? Are such positions in civilian life based in good measure on wishful thinking, or do they really exist and are they plentiful enough to draw away much of the best potential talent?

Additionally, there is more need for cross-Service cooperation in leadership development, and potential leaders should move between military and civilian life to gain experience. Service organizations need to be cross-branched, and actions need to cross the system organizations.

An understanding of Service or Joint doctrine is important because it provides the basis for reasoned actions rather than just reaction to situations. It is more important to develop exotic solutions than traditional, possibly hide-bound solutions.

Rewarding leadership success is important, but a difficult problem within the military. Adequate compensation will attract the leaders most desirable for the job (you will get the type of leaders that you reward). Moreover, leaders must be able to spend time doing what attracted them to the Service in the first place (e.g., flying aircraft, driving ships).

In order to have a continuing line of success in developing leaders, it is necessary to raise our expectations of people in the military. In other words, do not accept mediocrity.

The panel proposed the following questions for future discussion:

- Is our current system of choosing military leaders effective, and will it continue to work 30 years from now?
- Will we need the same type of leaders 30 years from now?
- If we look for specialized leadership, we attract a different type of person. Just what do we need in this regard?
- Can, or should, the military Services work as a team to develop the types of leaders needed?
- Will military leaders in the future serve in staff roles to the nation's political leaders? To what extent is this wise?
- To what extent can military leaders move between the military and civilian life, and how can this be arranged?
- Is it desirable to have a uniform type of leadership so that we cannot distinguish between those in different Services? Do we already have this?

E. FORCES: COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION, SIZE, AND QUALITY

In the very complex area of force composition, our military must mirror society in general if it is to gain the acceptance and support of the people. The military must also be a well-educated and well-trained force. In that light, draftees probably would not be effective for many tasks and missions because the short time allowed for service would not put them beyond the training phase. People are attracted to the military for special reasons: honor, desire for public service (sense of duty), economic incentives (compensation), support, and services for their families. Attaining the force we want should take these reasons into account.

The military organization needs to become more mission-oriented, and missions need to be more clearly defined. The reserve forces need to be strengthened, as well. Many people now look on the military reserves (including the National Guard) as secondary, weekend jobs that are of little significance. This needs to change and these reserve forces should be taken more seriously. One option might be to identify more clearly the threats to national security and to do a more effective job of informing the public. The tasks of reserve forces ought to be more closely aligned with these potential threats. The military needs to be mission-oriented in its structure, training, and equipment.

The American people must be educated about the threats and the need for capable military of adequate size. There are at least two reasons, however, that militate against recommending a government marketing effort to inform people in the U.S. of our value system and what we believe: 1) a government that is too effective and that tells them what to do becomes a tyrant, and 2) it is the role of a free press not the government and military to inform the public.

In terms of size and quality, we need more jointness so that complementary capabilities can be used, thus avoiding the need for expanding each Service so each can meet duplicative needs. Force quality must be based on good education and good skills to obtain a higher caliber soldier than we had in the past. The Services must create an image that will attract people.

Congress and the defense establishment ought to consider restructuring the entire military in order to meet the rising new threats and to adjust to the changing nature of warfare.

The panel proposed the following questions for future discussion:

- How do we attract people into the military? Within the group, sentiment strongly favored at least raising the standards as the Marines have done.
- To what extent should we restructure the forces in order to address the new threats such as chemical and biological weaponry?
- Our military does not now mirror society. How do we see to it that the military mirrors society if our all-volunteer forces come predominantly from one segment of that society? How must we alter recruiting to accomplish this?
- Should the military be organized to meet cyberthreats? Might not a new, quasi-public company have the ability to attract the necessary talent to do this better, faster, and more effectively?

F. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL

To obtain appropriately equipped military forces, we must determine the technology that we will need in the future. We must also determine the technology that our enemies have or are able to use against us. Since there are, however, many threats with a huge range of capabilities, we need to design and equip our forces for flexible capabilities in response.

In the past ten years, our forces have fallen in size from 2.1 million to 1.4 million; the Navy has fallen to 300 ships with a submarine force that is antiquated and depleted. As a corrective measure, we must reconfigure our armed forces to deal with threats from smaller countries or organizations while being ready to cope with combat forced on us by more traditional threats. Given the cost of weaponry today, we must determine if we need to continue planning to fight two major wars, who our realistic enemies are, and what type of force we need to do this. We must also come to grips with our logistics capability, especially limited and aging airlift, old air refueling tankers and inadequate numbers of crews to fly them, and the need for fast ships.

We must bear in mind that centralized control of development and acquisition is efficient, but it does not result in creativity in weapon design or in acquisition. There is no inherent reason why each Service branch cannot develop at least some of its own equipment. Clearly, the U.S. armed forces need to bring in the best available technology on the market. Doing so must be encouraged, and we must make use of the marketplace as a source of equipment. We are not putting enough money into research and development, which could hurt us in the future.

We have too many military bases for what we need, and consolidation will yield lower support and operating costs. Savings that might be realized by base closure must not, however, be put back into the existing institutions. To do so, wastes resources and does not invest for the future.

We must not lose sight of the possibility that in 15 years we might need an entirely different Service, what one might call an intellectual army.

During this time of peace and prosperity, we must take prudent risks to find and acquire new technology.

The panel proposed the following questions for future discussion:

- Should we continue to contemplate fighting two major theater wars nearly simultaneously? This is an economic question, but economics drive what we need, how much, and how we get it.
- If we are committed to one war, how can we deter another country from threatening us?
- To what extent must we plan on using manned machines or unmanned systems operated remotely?
- We have a large, inefficient acquisition bureaucracy, each part of which wants its own area of control, and its own leadership. How do we deal with this situation?
- Can competition between the Services result in more creativity and efficiency? How do we foster this?
- Just-in-time supply systems can reduce costs of stockpiling in depots, but can they provide materiel for sustained, intense combat?

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