The Dardanelles Campaign - Failure Through Strategic Indecision

Abstract

At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States faces a strategic paradox: as our national strategy relies increasingly on military engagement and intervention, our forward basing and presence is decreasing. This reality, combined with shifting of populations and centers of gravity to the littorals and proliferation of anti-access strategies, makes power projection and operational maneuver from the sea a strategically relevant capability. As we prepare for the eventuality of projecting power from the sea, the lessons of the Dardanelles campaign during World War I offers invaluable insight on the feasibility of the employment of amphibious forces in pursuit of current strategic goals. Using a cause and effect model, this study examines the impact of strategic decisions on the national, theater, and operational level during the Dardanelles campaign. It also explores the campaign's influence on subsequent amphibious doctrine and the implications for Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM).

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 10, 2001
Accession Number
ADA389114

Entities

People

  • Thomas L. Cariker

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • C4I
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Ammunition
  • Amphibious Operations
  • Artillery
  • Artillery Ammunition
  • Boats
  • Landing Craft
  • Landing Forces
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Naval Operations
  • Naval Warfare
  • Navy
  • Ridges
  • Terrain
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Environmental Remediation and Restoration.
  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Systems Analysis and Design