

The IBCT Search for Relevance in Stability and Support Operations

**A MONOGRAPH
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14. ABSTRACT

The Army has begun to adapt to perceived changes in the national security environment. One element of the adaptation is the creation of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). While many argue that the IBCT will be faster and more lethal little attention has been paid to the IBCT's suitability for stability and support operations. The research was intended to answer that question. Several political and military sources were consulted to provide a general concept. From the political sources, Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss, Controlling Small War, discussed some of the political decision maker's requirements in stability and support operations. Next, Brian Bond's, Pursuit of Victory, discussed the components of decisive victory in stability and support operations. Then, John Hunt's OOTW: A Concept in Flux addressed the reasons for the absence of a general theory for OOTW (operations other than war). Finally, Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende's The political Component: The Missing Element in US Intervention Planning presented current opinions of the significant capabilities required for stability and support operations. From the military sources, The USMC Small Wars manual presented a doctrinal approach to linking tactical military action to operational objectives in stability and support operations. FM 3-0 presented the Army's doctrinal approach for linking Army actions to joint, interagency, and multinational operations. By combining the political and military dimensions, a general concept of stability and support operations emerged. The general concept is that the goal of US military forces in stability and support operations is to influence the political, civil, and military environments. Influencing the three environments means military forces must administer limited government, providing national assistance, and use or threaten the use of lethal force. At the tactical level battalions and brigades must influence the political, civil, and military environments in order to link tactical actions to operational objectives. The requirements for stability and support operations provided a basis with which to compare the planned organization for the IBCT and that of an existing Army organization, the Armored Cavalry Regiment ? Light. The comparison with an existing Army organization was necessary to determine whether the proposed IBCT was providing any new capabilities not found in the existing force. The comparison of the two forces was quantified in terms of the battlefield operating systems (BOS). There are seven BOS but only three require significant change in stability and support operations: maneuver, intelligence, and command and control. When the comparison was completed, three things were discovered. First, the IBCT is optimized to influence the military environment. Second, the IBCT is superior to the existing force ACR-L. Finally, the IBCT lacks the required capabilities for effective execution of stability and support operations.

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ABSTRACT

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The Army has begun to adapt to perceived changes in the national security environment. One element of the adaptation is the creation of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). While many argue that the IBCT will be faster and more lethal little attention has been paid to the IBCT's suitability for stability and support operations. The research was intended to answer that question. Several political and military sources were consulted to provide a general concept.

From the political sources, Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss', *Controlling Small War*, discussed some of the political decision maker's requirements in stability and support operations. Next, Brian Bond's, *Pursuit of Victory*, discussed the components of decisive victory in stability and support operations. Then, John Hunt's "OOTW: A Concept in Flux" addressed the reasons for the absence of a general theory for OOTW (operations other than war). Finally, Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende's "The political Component: The Missing Element in US Intervention Planning" presented current opinions of the significant capabilities required for stability and support operations. From the military sources, The USMC *Small Wars* manual presented a doctrinal approach to linking tactical military action to operational objectives in stability and support operations. FM 3-0 presented the Army's doctrinal approach for linking Army actions to joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

By combining the political and military dimensions, a general concept of stability and support operations emerged. The general concept is that the goal of US military forces in stability and support operations is to influence the political, civil, and military environments. Influencing the three environments means military forces must administer limited government, providing national assistance, and use or threaten the use of lethal force. At the tactical level battalions and brigades must influence the political, civil, and military environments in order to link tactical actions to operational objectives.

The requirements for stability and support operations provided a basis with which to compare the planned organization for the IBCT and that of an existing Army organization, the Armored Cavalry Regiment – Light. The comparison with an existing Army organization was necessary to determine whether the proposed IBCT was providing any new capabilities not found in the existing force. The comparison of the two forces was quantified in terms of the battlefield operating systems (BOS). There are seven BOS but only three require significant change in stability and support operations: maneuver, intelligence, and command and control.

When the comparison was completed, three things were discovered. First, the IBCT is optimized to influence the military environment. Second, the IBCT is superior to the existing force ACR-L. Finally, the IBCT lacks the required capabilities for effective execution of stability and support operations.

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CHAPTER ONE

I. INTRODUCTION

In October 1999, the 34th Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, publicly stated that the Army Force structure was not relevant to the post-Cold War strategic environment.¹ The Army's inability to rapidly deploy and conduct decisive military action is the issue.² The Army's experience in Desert Shield and Somalia demonstrates this point. In Desert Shield, the Army deployed an Airborne Division in less than two weeks. The airborne force represented a political statement versus decisive military force to defend Saudi Arabia from invasion. Fortunately, the political posturing worked and allowed the Army six months to deploy adequate combat power. In Somalia, a Light Infantry Division was unable to execute the rescue of a special operations unit that was fighting a desperate battle in the streets of Mogadishu. As a result, eighteen soldiers were killed and many wounded.³ The "gap" in Army capabilities between rapid deployment and decisive military action lasted for ten years.

General Shinseki's solution was a change to doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers.⁴ The intent of General Shinseki's program was to field a new organizational structure. The Chief called the new structure the "Objective Force". By design, the Objective Force will be responsive, deployable,

¹ The Army Vision, <http://www.army.mil/armyvvision/default.htm>, Accessed 7 December 2000.

² Decisive military action is action that achieves the political end state in the shortest amount of time.

³ John Omicinski, "Shinseki Presses Transformation," *Army Times*, vol. , iss. (August 2000): 18.

⁴ CSA Planning Directive # 1, <http://knox-www.army.mil/center/mwfi/planningdir1.htm>, Accessed 7 December 2000.

agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.⁵ The Chief intends to build a single force designed for rapid deployment and decisive military action. Decisive military action is defined as action that directly accomplishes the task assigned by the higher headquarters. The CSA believes achieving the future force may lie in exploiting technology to field smaller brigade sized combat teams based on the division structure. The drivers of the new force are mobility, information processing capabilities, and a digitized command and control architecture. The Chief calls the process, Army Transformation. Transformation consists of three-phases.

Phase I occurred in October 1999. Phase I required the Army to organize, train, and equip an interim force structure, while maintaining the current force structure. The new force structure is the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). The IBCT is a digitized-mobile-combined arms brigade combat team. Currently the IBCT is conducting situational training exercises of the most recent small-scale contingency operations conducted by US forces.

Phase II is forecasted for January 2001. Phase II will be the operational employment of the IBCT. During phase II, the IBCT will be required to deploy in 96 hours and conduct military operations. The IBCT will also test and validate emerging technologies, organizational structures, equipment, and doctrine to facilitate transformation to phase-three. Phase III is forecasted for 2006-2007. Phase III is the fielding of the Objective Force. In phase III, the Objective Forces will be fully digitized divisions. One Objective Division will be capable of deploying in 120 hours and five Objective Divisions will be capable of deploying in 30 days.

⁵ CSA Planning Directive #2, <http://knox-www.army.mil/center/mwfi/planningdir2.htm>
Accessed 7 December 2000.

The Army projects improvements in the near-term with the operational employment of the IBCT. It is not clear that the IBCT will bridge the gap in capabilities between rapid deployment and decisive military action. The purpose of this monograph is to assess the IBCT capability for stability and support operations. To assess the IBCT it is necessary to define the requirements for stability and support. Then compare the requirements to the IBCT capabilities.

Assessing the capabilities of the IBCT for stability and support operations was not simple. First, there was no accepted theory of stability and a support operation hence; there is no common standard by which to determine the requirements. To develop a standard for assessment it was necessary to identify a general concept of stability and support operations. The general concept was approached along two dimensions: political and military. Because stability and support operations are an adjunct of diplomacy and international political efforts, it was reasonable to explore the expectations of the general political environment. Next, because the operations are military it was useful to identify the Army's current doctrine and the Marine Corps past doctrine and experiences. The Army's current doctrine provides at minimum an internal military set of requirements and expectations. The Marine Corps experience and doctrine provides a set of well-defined historical examples. Together these sources provide insight into political requirements, past military expectations, and current Army expectations for a force designed to provide stability and support.

The requirements for stability and support provided a basis with which to compare the planned organization for the IBCT and that of an existing Army organization, the Armored Cavalry Regiment - Light. The comparison with an existing

Army organization was necessary to determine whether the proposed IBCT was providing any new capabilities not found in the existing force. When that comparison was made, it was discovered that the IBCT was superior to the existing ACR-L but still lacked the required capabilities for effective execution of stability and support operations. The IBCT and ACR –L were compared because the force structure and mission statements are very similar.

CHAPTER TWO

II. STABILITY & SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Stability and support operations are military operations intended to influence three environments: diplomatic, civil, and military. Influencing the three environments enables military forces to impose their will and link operational objectives to tactical military action. Because the redesign of the force is intended to meet future stability and support requirements, it is best to begin a discussion of those requirements that meet the needs of political decision makers.

The Political Dimension

Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss have identified some of the political decision maker's requirements in stability and support operations by placing military action in the context of the political process. In their book, *Controlling Small War* is found a conceptual model for visualizing the political – military relationship in stability and support operations. Although the term “small wars” is used, in today's terminology the authors are referring to stability and support operations. Their work surveys stability and support operations between 1940 and 1969.

Bloomfield and Leiss state that conflict consists of five distinct phases:

- Phase I: Dispute, pre-hostilities, and pre-military
- Phase II: Pre-hostilities, but seen in military terms
- Phase III: Hostilities
- Phase IV: Post-hostilities, but military option remains
- Phase V: Post-conflict, but dispute remains

S: Settlement of dispute⁶

Phase I is a dispute in the absence of conflict and military force. They contend that the diplomat's foremost aim in phase I is to settle the dispute. In theory, settling the dispute will meet the national strategy objective of deterring conflict. In 1969, the diplomat achieved conflict deterrence by influencing three environments: economic, social, and political. Bloomfield and Leiss' research determined that between one third and one half of all violent conflicts occurring between WWII and the 1960s could have been settled by a conflict control measure targeted at the three environments referenced above. The problem according to Bloomfield and Leiss is a conflict between US national interests and regional crisis. "Statesmen and diplomats do not usually take notice of a potential conflict until it has been perceived by at least one party in primarily military terms and begins to frighten people."⁷ The reference to "frightening people" is a description of a conflict that has the potential to affect national interests or already has. A prime example was US intervention in Haiti from 1915 to 1934. From 1911 to 1915 Haiti was experiencing political unrest. Haitian internal problems were not a US concern. The fact that the Panama Canal had just opened in 1914 and the US feared German and French expansion into the country made Haitian instability a national security crisis for the US and grounds for intervention.

Phase II is low-level conflict before the introduction of military force. In phase II, several things occur. First, diplomacy is failing to resolve the dispute. The crisis is heading towards a military conflict. Next, military force is required to deter conflict,

⁶ Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969: 16.

salvage, or leverage the diplomatic situation. Diplomacy and military force work together to keep or make peace during phase II. Critical military capabilities in this stage are the use of decisive force to deter conflict. If the diplomatic efforts and military attempts to deter armed conflict fail the conflict enters phase III.

In phase III, the object of the military is to use decisive force to resolve conflict. Military force must set the conditions for a peaceful settlement. Politicians want decisive military force that brings the diplomats back to negotiations. In phase III, military force is viewed as decisive in shaping the political process for favorable peace settlement. Phase III ends when hostilities end.

The end of hostilities does not resolve the dispute. Phase IV is post-hostilities.

Diplomats are working towards a solution and military presence is still required. In phase IV, Bloomfield and Leiss argue US military force is needed to support the political process but they fail to identify specific military action.

Phase V, the post conflict, phase begins when the diplomats agree that military force is no longer a viable option. The diplomats are close to reaching an agreed settlement to end the dispute. Military force is no longer required and a phased withdrawal of US military forces begins. Phase V ends with the official signing of appropriate peace accords.

Bloomfield and Leiss tell us several things. First, stability and support operations are ongoing process that begins as disputes. Second, the dispute can progress from non-violent conflict to armed conflict. Third, in most cases when a dispute reaches the armed conflict stage it triggers calls for US military forces. Next, to meet the needs of political decision makers US forces must resolve armed conflict and support the settlement process. Conceptually the idea that military force is an extension of policy is easy to understand. The idea that the role of the Army is to fight and win the nation's wars is

⁷ Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969: 33.

accepted. The concept that is far more difficult to understand is how the Army achieves directed national objectives once armed conflict has been resolved. Yet, military's ability to accomplish this task can mean the difference between tactical and strategic defeat.

Brian Bond's, *Pursuit of Victory*, reviews the concept of decisive victory or lack of it from Frederick the Great to Saddam Hussein. In the process Bond, discovers that decisive victory consists of two components. The first component is defeat of the enemy on the battlefield. The second component is a negotiated settlement. The settlement must produce enduring peace that is advantageous to both parties.

[Advantageous is defined as a peace that the winner selects to support political interests and the loser accepts.] A victory is decisive if it produces long-term peace. Bond argues that in recent history, military victory has been achieved but political victory has been allusive. Political victory has alluded the military victors because the military was unable to influence the diplomatic settlement process once the conflict has ended. Cultural bias to peacekeeping operations and an inability to appreciate the significant role that the military plays in post-hostilities is part of the problem.

Bond tells us several things. First, the work stresses the importance of military support throughout the phases of conflict identified by Bloomfield and Leiss. The first priority is to defeat the enemy. The second priority is to obtain a negotiated settlement. Next, Bond defines success. According to Bond, success is characterized by peace or stability. If the ultimate objective of the settlement process is long-term peace or stability and military support is critical throughout all phases of the conflict, then what is missing from Bond's discussion is a discussion of how the military influences the diplomatic settlement process.

John Hunt's "OOTW: A Concept in Flux" is an article that addresses the absence of a general theory for OOTW (operations other than war). Hunt states that a partial reason for the lack of a general theory for OOTW is the inability to gain a consensus on terminology.⁸ (The term, stability and support operations evolved from the term operations other than war.) Hunt based his assessment on a review of OOTW doctrine from the 1960s to the 1990s.⁹ Hunt contends that OOTW doctrine was developed in two phases: the Cold War and Post Cold War. Cold War OOTW doctrine focused on insurgency and counter-insurgency operations. The goal was stabilizing pro-democratic governments and destabilizing communist's ones. The Post Cold War doctrine represented action to stop human suffering and to provide regional stability. Hunt contends that in both cases US national strategic goals were the same. The goals were to maintain the international status quo on terms favorable to US strategic interests. Hunt also contends that the means to achieve the status quo have not changed. The means are the ability to influence the political, civil, and military environments.¹⁰ Failure or less than desirable results are achieved when US military forces only influence one or two elements without understanding the impact or consequences to the third. The problem according to Hunt is that US OOTW doctrine does not stress the necessity to influence the three environments in stability and support operations.

Hunt's work clearly articulates how US military forces support the diplomatic settlement process in the stability and support environment. According to Hunt, US

⁸ In the 1960s, the terminology was stability operations and operations short of war. In the 1980s, the terminology was low intensity conflict. In the 1990s, the terminology was operations other than war. Hunt's article was written before the current term of stability and support operations.

⁹ The term operations other than war are equivalent in meaning to the term stability and support operations.

¹⁰ John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," *Military Review*, vol LXXVI, no. 5 (September-October 1996): 6.

military forces must influence the political, civil, and military environments. Success or failure of US force is contingent upon how well US forces influence each environment. Failure to address each environment without assessing the impact can lead to US forces not achieving the desired endstate. The argument presented by Hunt is reasonable from the perspective that stability and support operations involve the people of the affected area. Therefore, the military must engage the people whether the people are part of the ruling government, the mass public, or a military force. Hunt's work tells us what to influence but does not provide the conceptual tools to assist in planning or executing a stability and support operation.

Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende's "The political Component: The Missing Element in US Intervention Planning" presents current opinions of significant capabilities for stability and support operations. The authors address four points. First, the authors make a bold assumption that nations fail because of humanitarian disaster, political unraveling, and military conflict.¹¹ The authors cite examples in Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda to support their assumption. Next, the authors' set conceptual ground rules for future military intervention in stability and support operations. The initial priority in stability and support operations are the victims of societal breakdown. Clarke and Gosende expound upon this idea by specifying military action in the form of humanitarian assistance. Third, the authors' support the concept of military forces providing limited government. The concept is associated with situations in which the governing process has failed and anarchy prevails. In this situation, US military force provides governmental services to allow the host country time to foster the governing

¹¹ Walter Clarke and Robert Gosende, "The Political Component: The Missing Vital Element in US Intervention Planning," *Parameters*, vol. XXVI, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 37.

process in accordance with local customs and traditions. Limited government is defined as necessary governance to support the mission. A better definition is military government that is limited to supporting the commander's intent.

US Somalia operations are an example of stability and support operation. The ARFOR supported the United Nation's humanitarian assistance effort in Somalia. The operation had four phases: lodgment, secure humanitarian relief sites, expanded security operations, and transition to United Nations control. The military endstate was the transfer of responsibility from the military to the UN. The decisive point of the operation occurred when the flow of relief supplies to the civilian population was uninterrupted. A decision point for the ARFOR commander was the method for securing humanitarian relief supplies. Local clan groups interdicted humanitarian relief convoys by erecting roadblocks along the lines of operation and communication, and extracting payment for safe passage. The commander had to decide whether to use US military forces or host national assets to secure the route. The commander chooses to use host nation assets. The decision to use host national personnel placed the Army in an administrative role. The military provided the resources, training, and equipment for a Somali police force. Effectively US forces were relieved of the mission to provide security for humanitarian relief supplies. The decision was consistent with the required endstate. The military use of a Somali National Police force did not inhibit US forces from transferring the mission to the UN. Finally, military force was required for several reasons: to stop the fighting and to safeguard the political process and national assistance activities.

Clarke and Gosende make several important observations. First, military forces influence the diplomatic environment by administering government. In Post Cold War

military operations, the US has failed to anticipate the need to provide limited government. The US fails to anticipate the need to provide governmental services because it wants to avoid the perception of US hegemony, associated costs, and responsibility for nation building. The US may not be able to avoid administering government if the US endstate is long-term stability in a country or region. The requirement to temporarily govern occupied areas is an implied task under the Army strategic mission essential task to “conduct sustained land operations.”¹² Second, military forces influence the civil environment by providing national assistance. In national assistance, the goal is to provide for the basic needs of the people: food, clothing, and shelter. Finally, military forces influence the military environment through the use or threat of lethal force. The use or threat of lethal force is the military’s means to achieve compliance through coercion. Together these capabilities enable military forces to support diplomatic negotiation. Thus far, the discussion has been about the requirements of the political decision makers. A review of doctrine is necessary to provide an internal military set of requirements and expectations.

The Military Dimension

The USMC *Small Wars* manual written in 1940 represents over 100 years of expeditionary involvement in stability and support operations. The Marines developed the manual from operational lessons learned in Central America and Asia. The manual was written for an earlier time but is still relevant today. The term small wars are consistent with the contemporary definition for stability and support operations. The manual presents a doctrinal approach to linking tactical military action to operational

¹² Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000: 1-5.

objectives in stability and support operations. The manual identifies five stages of stability and support operations. Each stage corresponds to military action in terms of limited government, national assistance, and use of lethal force. The manual begins with a definition of small wars that indicates a clear understanding of the relationship between national policy and military action.

“Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation.”¹³

Over fifty years ago, the Marines recognized the political nature of stability and support operations and the need to address non-military environments in order to achieve success.

Listed below are the five-phases of military action found in the *Small Wars* manual:

Phase I: Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard
Phase II: The arrival or reinforcements and general military operations in the field
Phase III: Assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies
Phase IV: Routine police functions
Phase V: Withdrawal from the Theater or Operations¹⁴

Decisive military actions are key actions in phases I and II. In these phases, the military acts to seize the operational centers of gravity. In most cases, the country’s capital was seen to be the operational center of gravity. Stressed in these phases is intelligence. The Marines required intelligence on the regime’s sources of power. Specifically, the Marines stressed the importance of knowing the political, economic, and psychological make up of the country in addition to information about the enemy. The Marines used

¹³ Department of the Navy, *Small Wars Manual*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1987:1-1.

¹⁴ Department of the Navy, *Small Wars Manual*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1987: 1-5.

the intelligence to determine the quickest means to seize the country's capital. Once the capital was seized and hostilities terminated the Marines moved to phase III.

The manual describes phase III as the absence of conflict in the capital but fighting continues in the countryside. The ultimate goal in phase III was to set the conditions for political negotiations. The Marines set the conditions for negotiations by conducting three simultaneous actions. First, combat operations to pursue the opposing forces in the countryside until they surrender or were destroyed. Second, the military forces administered limited government. The administration of government was a serious issue. The senior commander made the decision. The commander based his decision on an assessment of the local authority's ability to maintain order, protect life, and property in accordance with US interests. "Whenever it becomes known or can be foreseen that territory is to be occupied, the commander of the military forces that are to occupy it will no doubt be called upon to formulate beforehand his plans for administering the military government."¹⁵ Factors influencing the commander's plan were the military, political, economic, and psychological conditions of the country. The Marines established basic governing institutions such as civil-military administrations, police, courts, public works, utilities, and sanitation. These activities were administered even-handedly.¹⁶ Finally, the military provided national assistance.

The manual defined the necessity to provide limited services such as food, fresh water, clothing, and shelter. The manual specified a force structure no larger than a battalion or brigade. The force was usually limited in specialized capabilities. As a

¹⁵ Department of the Navy, *Small Wars Manual*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1987: 13-7.

¹⁶ Department of the Navy, *Small Wars Manual*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1987: 1-29.

result, adhoc organizations were quickly established. The manual advocated at the operational level that the commanding officer administer government from the capital. At the tactical level company commanders administered government from their respective areas of operation. Usually, the task of providing civilian-military administration was an additional duty for unit commanders. The Marines also influenced the military environments by training constabulary forces. The manual stressed that transition to phase IV occurred when hostilities were terminated.

Phase IV was the peace settlement. During Phase IV, combat forces were no longer required. The Marines initiate a phased withdrawal. A host nation constabulary force replaced marine combat troops. Phase V was complete withdrawal of marine forces from the theater of operations. The State Department decided when military presence was no longer required.

The Marine makes several noteworthy observations. First, battalions and brigades can influence the diplomatic, civil, and military environments. Second, battalions and brigades influence the diplomatic environment by administering limited government. Marine battalion and brigade commanders administered the limited military government by establishing liaison teams that co-located with local governments and provided civilian-military administration. The OIC was usually an officer with civilian law experience. An essential element of the limited military government was the establishment of law enforcement agencies and judicial system. Third, battalions and brigades influence the civil environment by providing national assistance. National assistance has two components: nation building and humanitarian assistance. Nation building is limited to public works, utilities, sanitation, and public health. The OIC

would contract labor among the civilian population and begin the process of limited public works activities. Humanitarian assistance was limited to providing basic needs: food, fresh water, and shelter. Fourth, battalions and brigades must use decisive force to influence the military environment. Finally, in order for US forces to withdrawal from the country the operation must be transferred to a military force or appropriate agency. The value of the *Small Wars* manual is a succinct discussion of how battalions and brigades support the diplomatic settlement process. The *Small Wars* manual was written over fifty-years ago. What is needed is an example relevant to today's operational environment.

In the book, *Perspectives on Warfighting: Capital W War* General Zinni recalled his experiences in several stability and support operations. In particular, General Zinni singled out the deployment to Somalia. US forces, in Somalia were to provide security for the international humanitarian relief effort.¹⁷ US forces provided security by conducting combat patrols along the supply routes. Several conditions made achievement of the original US mission difficult. First, Somalia did not have a functioning government. Next, in Somalia as in most places around the world, the majority of people lived in the cities. Finally, the majority of relief operations were in the cities. The lack of a central government, the urban environment, and humanitarian operations created mission creep. The mission quickly transitioned from combat operations to nation building and providing limited government. The expansion of the US role in Somali began after US forces resolved the conflict. Conflict resolution resulted in a temporary peace. The peace was replaced by civil disturbances in the form

¹⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Restore Hope*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Command, 3 December 1992 – 4 May 1993: i.

of low-level crime. Since Somalia did not have a functioning government, vital services like law enforcement were missing. US forces were required to deal with the problem because occupation of a city implied ownership and responsibility. In the case of US intervention in Somalia, responsibility meant providing basic government services. The absence of law enforcement agency was detrimental to US military success. Urban gangs prevented humanitarian relief convoys from reaching their destination. Urban crime had the potential of undermining the US effort. According To General Zinni, US, forces had two choices: provide the service or provide the training.¹⁸ US forces chose to provide the training, and command and control. US military police personnel armed, trained, and equipped a Somali police force. While the training was in progress, no one on the JTF staff thought through the second and third order of effects. Soon after the police were employed, they began apprehending people. To the US military's surprise, the country did not have adequate jail facilities to hold detainees. In reaction, US forces scrambled to build and repair jails. At one point, empty military CONNEXs were used. The lack of planning did not end here. Somalia not only lacked a police force, it also lacked a judicial system. Jails quickly reached capacity. US forces hurriedly brought Somali lawyers and judges out of retirement to try cases.

The Somalia experience teaches three lessons. First, it is import to develop contingency plans for the administration of government and to provide national assistance. Next, there is a high probability military forces will administer limited government because, as Clarke and Gosende suggest, US force is introduced into a region because of humanitarian disaster, political unraveling, or military conflict. Finally,

¹⁸ Joe Strange, *Capital W War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War*, Quantico, VA. Defense Automated Printing Service Center, 1998: 248, 249.

occupation of urban environments implies ownership. Ownership implies responsibility. Responsibility is defined as providing basic services (government and national assistance) that the host government is unwilling or incapable of providing. Thus far, the requirements for stability and support operations have been defined without the benefit of Army doctrine.

FM 3-0 is the Army's keystone doctrine for linking Army actions to joint, interagency, and multinational operations. FM 3-0 is also the Army's primary doctrine for linking tactical military action to operational objectives. FM 3-0 tells us there are four types of military action. The four types are offense, defense, stability, and support operations. Throughout a campaign or major operation, offensive, defensive, stability, and support missions occur simultaneously.¹⁹ FM 3-0 also defines stability operations as actions to promote and protect US national interests by influencing the diplomatic, civil, and military environments. FM 3-0 defined support operations as the employment of Army forces to assist civil authorities during crisis. Army stability and support doctrine is further defined in several manuals: FM 100-19, FM 100-20, FM 100-23, and FM 100-23-1. With the exception of FM 3-0, the other doctrinal manuals are void of a general concept for stability and support operations. Instead, the manuals present discrete perspectives on stability and support operations. For example, FM 100-19 Domestic Support manual discusses interagency roles and missions and provides a detailed discussion of how to influence the civil environment but excludes the diplomatic and military environments. FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict manual discusses insurgency and counter-insurgency operations and provides a detailed discussion of how to influence

¹⁹ Department of the Army, *FM 3-0 Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000: 1-15.

the military environment but excludes the diplomatic and civil environments. FM 100-23 Peace Operations manual provides a detailed discussion on types of peace operations without a discussion on how to integrate limited government activities, national assistance activities, and use or threat of lethal force. FM 100-23-1 Humanitarian Support discusses the types and ranges of operations but has the same shortcomings as FM 100-19.

The Army's new operational manual teaches that all Army missions involve a combination of offensive, defensive, stability, and support actions. Therefore, stability and support operations are a form of war. Although stability and support operations are separate military actions, they occur simultaneously in a theater of operations. The situation on the ground determines the emphasis placed on each type of military action. Next, if we consider stability and support operations as mutually supporting military actions, then we can identify the target audience for both actions as the political, civil, and military environments.

By combining the political and military dimensions, a general concept of stability and support operations can be identified. The general concept is that the goal of US forces in stability and support operations is to influence the political, civil, and military environments. Influencing the three environments means administering limited government, providing national assistance, and the use or threat of lethal force. At the tactical level battalions and brigades can effectively execute stability and support operations if they are properly resourced.

CHAPTER THREE

III. FORCE DESIGN

Force design is not simply a matter of concepts. It involves assessment of the Army's practical experience. Two contemporary case studies provide a basis for determining the force requirements for stability and support operations, Dominican Republic and Bosnia. Force structure is defined in terms of the battlefield operating system. There are seven battlefield operating systems but only three require significant change in stability and support operations: maneuver, intelligence, and command and control. At brigade level units must possess the ability to conduct lethal and non-lethal forms of maneuver to directly engage the political - military, civil - military, and military - military environments. At brigade level units must possess intelligence that is capable of collaborative analysis of the political - military, civil - military, and military - military environments. Finally at brigade level units must possess the communication systems, intelligence systems, and computer networks that allow the commander to command and control (provide unity of effort) of the three environments from anywhere on the battlefield.

Some battlefield operating systems have little application in stability and support operations air defense artillery, combat service support, and engineers. Fires are considered a part of maneuver. The rationale is simple. The US Army expects to conduct stability and support operations as part of a joint, interagency, and coalition team. Each service and agency works together to create synergy and to reduce duplication of effort.

The Air Force and or Navy can provide strategic, operational, and tactical air defense. The Army Materiel Command's Logistic Support Elements will provide technical supply and maintenance support for Army forces.²⁰ The Defense Logistics Agency's Contingency Support Team will provide theater contract services support for food and fuel.²¹ Government, non-government, international, and private relief organizations will provide the resources to conduct nation building and humanitarian relief services. Engineer brigade, LOGCAP, or the host country will repair the infrastructure. At the tactical, level brigades need some means to interface with these agencies, provide unity of effort, and operate over dispersed areas. Resourcing the maneuver, intelligence, and command and control operating systems at the tactical levels enables the maneuver brigades to deter war, resolve conflict, and support the diplomatic process.

The two case studies are significant for several reasons. The intervention in the Dominican Republic represents a peace enforcement operation. The intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents an ongoing peacekeeping operation. The significance is that in the Dominican Republic US forces had to resolve an armed conflict. In Bosnia-Herzegovina US forces had to deter armed conflict. In both examples, deterrence, conflict resolution, and support to the diplomatic process were achieved through lethal and non-lethal uses of military force. Using military force in this way was in essence lethal and non-lethal forms of maneuver. US military forces skillfully achieved positions of advantage at decisive points in the campaign that positively influenced the political, civil, and military environments and supported the diplomatic negotiation process.

²⁰ Department of the Army, *FM 100-7 Decisive Force*, The Army in Theater Operations: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1995:4-10.

²¹ Department of the Army, *FM 100-7 Decisive Force*, The Army in Theater Operations: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1995: 4-10.

Case Study I

The Dominican Republic is located on the island of Hispaniola. The western portion of the island belongs to the Dominican Republic and the eastern portion belongs to Haiti. At the beginning of the 20th Century, US interests in the Dominican Republic stemmed from a desire to keep European influence out of the Caribbean. The Dominican Republic sits astride the Atlantic approach to the Panama Canal. In 1916, chronic financial crisis eventually led to US intervention. President Woodrow Wilson deployed a battalion of US marines to that country to impose order and counter German influence. The strategic objective was to institutionalize peace, democracy, and stability. US occupation lasted until 1924. During the Cold War, US strategic interests in the Caribbean shifted from preventing European influence to preventing the spread of communism in the region.

Crisis

From the 1950s to the 1990s, the US adopted a national security strategy of containing the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. The strategy of containment manifested itself through military action to stabilize pro-democratic governments and destabilize communist's ones.²² The fall of Cuba to communism in 1960 created a general concern in the US government that the Caribbean might fall to communism. That concern turned into fear in the mid-1960s when political instability occurred in the Dominican Republic. The road to war began in January 1963 with the Presidency of Juan Bosch. Bosch was anti-Communist and therefore the US immediately sent economic, technical, and military aid. Within a few months, Bosch alienated the US and most of the Dominican people through mismanagement of government. By September 1963, a

²² Michael Boll, *National Security Planning*, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1988: 47-48.

Colonel in the Dominican military, Elias Wessin, overthrew Bosch. A civilian triumvirate replaced President Bosch. In 1964, Donald Reid emerged as the central political figure in the post-Bosch period. In late April 1963, a military coup unseated Reid. The coup's supporters were communist. The situation quickly turned into a civil war in the streets of the capital, Santo Domingo, between communist forces and loyalist (pro-democratic) forces.

US Response

Fear that the communist forces might win prompted President Lyndon B. Johnson to order US Marines and the 82nd Airborne Division into the country. Using Bloomfield and Leiss' conflict model as a guide, the operation was clearly in phase III- hostilities. The strategic objectives were to restore order, prevent a communist seizure of power, protect American and third country nationals living in the city of Santo Domingo. The strategic center of gravity was the capitol, Santo Domingo. The military mission was to resolve armed conflict and set the conditions for a democratic election. US forces were restricted from using military force unless it was in self-defense. Maintaining US, legitimacy was very important to the administration. President Johnson wanted a gradual response starting with US military presence and escalating to military force if necessary. US endstate was region stability defined in terms of a democratic president in Santo Domingo. From the parameters established by the National Command Authority, the Commander and Chief Atlantic Command (CINCLANTCOM) defined the task of US forces as the establishment of an International Security Zone (ISZ) in Santo Domingo (from the Palace to the US Embassy) to provide a place for the warring parties to come together and settle the dispute. A secondary purpose for the ISZ was to establish a

neutral zone for US residences, foreign Embassies, and noncombatants.²³ CINCLANT assumed that communist forces would not directly engage US forces. The appearance of overwhelming US force and the threat of potentially using it would deter armed conflict and enable the political process to begin. The decisive element was a Marine Expeditionary Unit. The mission of the Marines was to conduct an amphibious assault into the beach of Santo Domingo and establish the ISZ. The shaping element was an Airborne Brigade Task Force. The paratroopers' mission was to land in the adjacent city to the east, San Isidro and prepare to assist the Marines. The Duarte Bridge connected the two cities. The Marines secured the US embassy and established the international security zone without incident.

The political process began but the war between communist and loyalist forces continued in parts of the capital that US forces did not control. Presidential elections were scheduled. The US diplomatic mission in the Dominican Republic assessed that voter preference for a communist or democratic president would be influenced by the outcome of the civil war. Neither the US military nor the US diplomats felt that victory was assured for the loyalist forces. US military human intelligence sources determined that the communist's line of operation and communication ran between the two cities: Santo Domingo and San Isidro. Human intelligence sources were the primary source for gathering intelligence on the opposition party and the people in general. US forces identified the Duarte Bridge connecting the two cities as a critical vulnerability that could be exploited in a manner that would help US forces interdict the communist operations. The Marines and the 82nd extended the ISZ to include the two cities and setup checkpoint

²³ Yates A. Lawrence, Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army CGSC Leavenworth Paper Number 15, July 88: 74.

at both ends of the bridge. The checkpoints allowed civilian traffic to pass but weapons and ammunition were confiscated. The checkpoints essentially disrupted the communist line of operations and communication. Communist forces were unable to mass and logistically sustain operations.

As a result, loyalist forces were able to mount a major attack that defeated the communist in the capital of Santo Domingo. Military force was no longer a viable option for the communist. The communist were forced to negotiate a cease-fire. The linkup of US forces also had a secondary benefit. Communications between the Marines and the 82nd were extremely difficult due to the urban environment and limited range of the tactical radios. The communist now focused their efforts on influencing the up coming elections. The absence of armed conflict transitioned the stability and support operation to phase IV – post hostilities but military force is still required. The diplomats required military force to support the democratic election process. The civil war had resulted in the destruction or damage to critical infrastructure in the capitol. Until the election of a new president, a functioning central government did not exist. By default, US forces were responsible for the health and welfare of the people. The military planned and executed limited government to prevent a humanitarian disaster and maintain popular support of the people. US forces used civic action and civic affairs programs to administer government and provide national assistance. Public services teams supervised garbage disposal, utility, and fresh water services. Public welfare teams removed the numerous bodies littering the streets. Civic affairs teams interacted with government relieve organizations: AID and CARE. US forces set up food distribution sites and limited medical care facilities. PSYOPS teams conducted a mass media campaign

consisting of leaflets, newspaper, and radio to inform the people of nation building and humanitarian activities. These operations were decisive in the election of a pro-democratic president in Santo Domingo. The establishment of a democratic government was the trigger to withdraw US military forces from the country. The US Marines and 82nd Airborne Division transferred responsibility to a peacekeeping force consisting of military forces from six Latin American countries. The peacekeeping force remained in the country until the democratic government was in place and functioning. The operation was a success because military victory produced long-term stability.

Assessment

US military involvement in the Dominican Republic highlights force design requirements for stability and support operations. First, CA teams are effective as a non-lethal form of maneuver to directly engage the civil – military environments. The CA teams can engage both environments by providing services that sustained human life resulting in US forces maintaining the popular support of the people. The outward manifestation of the positive support in the Dominican Republic was the election of a democratic president. Next, tactical mobility is decisive in gaining a position of advantage relative to the enemy. Third, PSYOPS, CI, and HUMINT teams provided the means to acquire political, social, and tactical intelligence. The combined effect in the Dominican Republic was the assessment that the communist's line of operation and communication could be interdicted at the Duarte Bridge. US forces acted on this intelligence resulting in the communist forces being separated from their base of supply and declaring a cease-fire. Finally, CA teams provide a means to command and control or at least provide unity of effort to the civil – military environments. In the Dominican Republic, this occurred through nation building and humanitarian support activities. The

capabilities of Army tactical command and control systems were an identified weakness in the Dominican Republic.

The communications systems could not effectively range units operating in dispersed areas of operation. US operations in the Dominican Republic were over forty-years ago. The requirement for maneuver brigades to be fielded with organic CA, PSYOPS, CI, and HUMINT teams has not changed.

Case Study II

The US containment policy ended with the fall of the Soviet Union. Collapse of the Soviet Union caused internal problems in the Soviet republics. The problems were due to ethnic friction. The outward manifestation of the friction occurred between October 1991 and February 1992 when Bosnia - Herzegovina declared independence and sought through referendum independence from the former Yugoslavia.

Crisis

The Bosnian Serbs, supported by neighboring Serbia, responded to the desire for independence with armed resistance aimed at partitioning the republic along ethnic lines and uniting Serb-held areas to form a "greater Serbia." In 1992, a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed to the region to secure delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and protect convoys of freed civilian detainees. Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs started a civil war for control of Bosnia – Herzegovina's destiny. In March 1994, the Bosnians and Croats signed an agreement creating a joint Bosnian/Croat Federation called, The Federation of Bosnia - Herzegovina. The agreement reduced the number of warring parties to two: Bosnian/Croats and Serbs. On 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, the warring parties signed a peace agreement that ended the three years of ethnic civil strife. The final agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The

Dayton Agreement divides Bosnia - Herzegovina equally between the Federation of Bosnia - Herzegovina, and the Bosnian Serb Republic of Serbia. On 21 December 1995, the UN Protection Force in Bosnia - Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) formally handed over responsibility to a NATO led multinational implementation force. The mission of the force was to implement and monitor the military aspects of the agreement referred to as the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).

US Response

The Dayton Peace Accords became the event leading to a US military response. The first 90 days were the most intense because US forces were entering a new environment. The mission to implement the military version of the Dayton Peace Accords, the General Framework Agreement for Peace became the responsibility of the military components of NATO and the US. The NATO and US led operation became the first ground operation in its history and the largest military operation in Europe since the Second World War.²⁴ The strategic center of gravity was the Dayton Peace Accord. The operational center of gravity was implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace signed by the Former Warring Factions – Bosnian/Croat and Serb forces. At the tactical level this meant direct engagement with the Former Warring Factions. Using Bloomfield and Leiss' conflict model as a guide, the operation was clearly in phase IV - post-hostilities but military force is still required to deter conflict and support implementation of the negotiated peace.

²⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Joint Endeavor*, Fort Leavenworth, KS US Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 1996: ix.

The mission of US forces was to conduct peace enforcement operations to compel compliance with the peace accord.²⁵ The objective of US forces was three-fold. First, by D+30 US forces had to establish a zone of separation between the Former Warring Factions (FWF). Next, by D+45 US forces had to supervise the Former Warring Factions removing all weapons from the zone of separation. Finally, by D+90 US forces had to supervise the transition of land between the Former Warring Factions. Engagement of the FWF was critical for mission success in the first 90 days of the operation.

Engagement planning consisted of using non-lethal forms of maneuver. The engagement planning had to be vertically synchronized with the echelons of command to ensure unity of effort between the diplomacy and military action. And horizontally synchronized across the battlefield operating systems, non-government organizations, private volunteer organizations, and international relief organizations to insure unity of purpose. The mechanisms for such a task did not formally exist and had to be created. Tactical organizations accomplished the actual implementation of the GFAP. Therefore, military planners had to devise a way to engage the Former Warring Factions. The solution was to use establish a Joint Military Commission at brigade level. The brigade level was selected because it was the lowest tactical level that facilitated effective implementation and command and control of the GFAP process. Establishment of the Joint Military Commission enabled vertical synchronization between the tactical, operational, and strategic chains of command. The Joint Military Commission also enabled verification of faction compliance to events in the General Framework Agreement for Peace.

Verification of compliance became a measure of effectiveness: marking and removal of

²⁵ Stanley F. Cherrie, "Task Force EagleI," *Military Review*, vol LXXVII, no. 4 (July-August 1997): 64.

minefields, marking of the zone of separation, and removal of all weapons from the zone. The JMC worked by linking a US maneuver brigade to the equivalent sized Bosnian/Croat or Serb force. The establishment of military to military contacts at brigade level ensured compliance at the lowest levels. At brigade level commanders also established civil-military operations cells.

In essence, the JMC became a tool to deter armed conflict and support the general framework for peace. The JMC was organized to promote compliance among the Former Warring Factions. All elements of the battlefield operating system supported this goal. For instance, most effective elements were intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. During Joint Military Commission ISR information was used as a tool to determine compliance or violations.

The JMCs are like battles. If you want to win the battle, you have to set the conditions ahead of time. You have to do reconnaissance, you have to do the mission analysis, and you have to resource. Then when you get the “battle” to go your way you combine a series of JMCs into a campaign.²⁶ The Joint Military Commission had the ability to influence the political and civil environments. For instance, Joint Military Commissions coordinated the safe passage of relief supplies between territories controlled by different Former Warring Factions. Next, the Joint Military Commission’s effort to monitor minefield clearance by the FWF eliminated barriers to movement. PSYOPS and public affairs units supported the Joint Military Commission by establishing a public information network to inform and persuade public opinion. Civil-military operations supported the Joint Military Commission by providing unity of purpose between non-government organizations, private volunteer organizations, and international relief organizations.

²⁶ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Joint Endeavor*, Fort Leavenworth, KS US Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 1996: 88.

Assessment

US military involvement in Bosnia - Herzegovina foreshadows the types of stability and support operations of the future. Future SASO operations will involve complex diplomatic settlements in environments where two separate armies and two separate governments already exist. In these situations, US military forces will influence the diplomatic, civil, and military environments best at the brigade level through military to military engagement. Military engagement will become the preferred means to implement a negotiated settlement between standing Armies. Under these conditions, the lines separating diplomacy and military action will merge. In Bosnia – Herzegovina military action took the form of non-lethal maneuvering to gain a position of advantage relative to the opposition. The JMC was effective because civil affairs, psychological operations, counter intelligence, and human intelligence teams supported it.

The brigades used counter-intelligence teams, psychological operations teams, human intelligence teams, and tactical collection assets in the same manner as Army forces in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic and Bosnian cases differ in that US forces in Bosnia had better access to strategic intelligence resources. The strategic link provided the tactical units with better quality intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The ISR was placed against targeted areas of interest and helped the brigade commander and staff determine FWFs compliance with the GFAP.

Finally, unlike the Dominican Republic, tactical commanders in Bosnia had access to operational and strategic level communications systems. Brigades used the JMC to facilitate command and control of governing activities, national assistance activities, and tactical operations. The JMC achieved this level of influence because the US Army had to confront two standing armies that had mutually agreed to end hostilities.

Both Armies agreed to abide by US military decisions. In the Dominican Republic US forces had to confront one very weak military force that could be coerced with the threat of lethal force.

Required Force Design

US involvement in the Dominican Republic and Bosnia – Herzegovina teaches several lessons about the required Brigade Combat Team force design for stability and support operations. Force design is defined in terms of the battlefield operating systems (BOS). There are seven BOS systems but only three require significant change in stability and support operations: maneuver, intelligence, and command and control.

First, in stability and support operations Brigade Combat Team's require the capability to conduct lethal and non-lethal forms of maneuver. The physical means for Brigade Combat Teams to conduct lethal forms of maneuver is through tactically mobile forces that have organic firepower and protection to terminate hostilities. In the Dominican Republic, the Amphibious Armored Assault Vehicles provided the Marines the tactical mobility, firepower, and protection to assault the beach of Santo Domingo and establish an International Security Zone. In Bosnia, the M1 Tank gave the US Army the credible force to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace.

Second, the physical means for the Brigade Combat Team to conduct non-lethal forms of maneuver is through civil affairs and intelligence support. Civil Affairs operations enable the tactical commander to administer government and provide humanitarian assistance activities during post-hostilities. Civil Affairs operations in effect become a non-lethal form of maneuver to influence the political and civil environments. Intelligence supports the process by acquiring information on the political, civil, and military environments. The intelligence gathering effort focuses on understanding how societies function, who the decision makers are, and what are the value systems.²⁷ Counter-intelligence, human intelligence, and psychological operations specialties provide this capability. The benefit of the intelligence is the ability to gain a position of advantage in each environment. Two examples demonstrate this point. The seizure of the Duarte Bridge in the Dominican Republic by US forces interdicted the

²⁷ Joe Strange, *Capital W War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War*, Quantico, VA. Defense automated Printing Service Center, 1998: 266, 267.

communist force's lines of communication and operation and terminated hostilities. The US led JMC meetings in Bosnia linked military action [implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace] to political policy [execution of the Dayton Accords].

Finally, command and control or at least unity of effort of the political, civil, and military environments is essential for mission success. The physical means for the Brigade Combat Team to control operations in the political, civil, and military environments is through Civil Affairs teams and the tactical staff. Civil Affairs teams provide the physical means to synchronize nation building and humanitarian assistance activities with military engagement operations planned by the tactical staff. A graphic depiction of the required force design is contained in table 1 on page 30. The required force design is defined in terms of the battlefield operating systems of maneuver, intelligence, and command and control on the vertical axis and the political, civil, and military environments on the horizontal axis.

Table 1 – Required Force Design

	Political	Civil	Military
	Administration of Government link operational objectives to tactical military action	National Assistance link operational objectives to tactical military action	Decisive Force Link operational objectives to tactical military action
Maneuver	Civil Affairs teams enable civil – military engagement. Operation is a non-lethal form of maneuver – military/political	Civil Affairs teams enable interface with NGOs and government relief organizations. Psychological operations teams enable direct access to the people. Both operations are a non-lethal form of maneuver – military/social	Strategic mobility Operational mobility Tactical mobility Tactical fires Survivable platform. Military to military engagement. Both operations are a non-lethal form of maneuver
Intelligence	HUMINT and CI for political intelligence	HUMINT, PSYOPS, and CI for social intelligence	HUMINT, UAV, and satellite connectivity enable tactical through strategic intelligence
Command and Control	Civil Affairs teams provide C2 of nation building activities, which is a form of governance. Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking	Civil Affairs teams provide C2 over humanitarian relief organizations. Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking	Tactical staff provides C2 of tactical operations. Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking

IBCT Force Design

Armed with some understanding of the stability and support, the operational requirements, and required force design, it is possible now to consider the proposal for the IBCT. The IBCT is a divisional brigade sized unit designed to deploy as an early entry combat force. The bulk of its capabilities come from its major subordinate units. The IBCT is composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Unlike brigades in the current force structure, the combat support and combat service support units are part of the IBCT's permanent structure.²⁸ In many ways, this gives the IBCT organic capabilities similar to a division in the current force structure.

²⁸ Michael Mehaffey. "Vanguard of the Objective Force." *Military Review*, vol LXXX, no. 5(September-October 2000): 11.

The brigade has a standard headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). The significant difference between the HHC structure of the IBCT and that of the current brigade is a digitized command and control system. The system is called the Army Battlefield Command and Control system (ABCS). ABCS consists of four subsystems: the Global Combat Support System – Army (GCCS-A), the Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS), Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), and the Movement Tracking System (MTS). GCCS-A provides a digitized picture of maneuver, combat support, combat service support, and enemy units operating in the IBCT area of operations. CSSCS provides digitized combat service support information. FBCB2 is the support structure that facilitates the transmission of digitized information. MTS provides digitized visibility of convoy movements in the brigade area.

Similar to the current heavy brigade structure, three mounted infantry battalions form the nucleus of the brigade. Each infantry battalion consists of three motorized infantry companies, a mobile gun platoon, and mortar section. Unlike the current brigade structure, each company is permanently task organized as combined arms team.

A major difference between the IBCT and current Brigade Combat Team configuration is the addition of a Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadron (RSTA). The RSTA Squadron is similar in organization and capabilities to a Cavalry Squadron. The RSTA squadron includes three reconnaissance troops and a surveillance troop. The reconnaissance troop includes human intelligence and counter-intelligence experts. The surveillance troop is comprised of an unmanned aerial vehicle platoon, a ground sensor platoon, and a nuclear biological and chemical reconnaissance platoon.

Similar to the current Brigade Combat Team configuration is a Field Artillery Battalion. The battalion is equipped with towed 155mm howitzers. The primary mission is counter-battery fire. The Signal Company in the IBCT differs from the signal companies in the current Brigade Combat Team structure in that it provides interface with Army and Joint communications systems.

The engineer support found in the IBCT differs significantly from the current Brigade Combat Team configuration. In the IBCT, an Engineer Company only provides tactical mobility. Absent from the engineer structure is the capability to conduct counter-mobility and survivability missions.

The Military Intelligence (MI) Company in the IBCT is enhanced. The MI Company possesses organic human intelligence and counter intelligence capabilities and thus, the means to acquire intelligence on the civil and military environments. The company has the capability to interface with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems in the RSTA squadron. The MI Company also has the capability to interface with intelligence systems at division, Army Forces, joint, theater, and national level.

A Brigade Support Battalion provides combat service support to the IBCT. The task and purpose of the BSB remains the same as that of a Forward Support Battalion (FSB) in the current force structure. The organizational structure is different. The BSB is organized with a Headquarters and Distribution Company, A Brigade Support Company, and a Brigade Medical Support Company. The concept of support is also different. The sustainment reach of the IBCT has been expanded from the current

distance of twenty-five square kilometers to fifty square kilometers. Additionally, organic and direct support sustainment are consolidated at the BSB.

IBCT versus the ACR-L

In many ways, the IBCT is similar to the Armored Cavalry Squadron – Light (ACR-L) in mission and configuration. The ACR-L is a combined arms organization capable of rapid deployment by air or sealift. It is designed to operate as an initial entry force and support Army or joint task force operations. It is composed of HMMWV equipped cavalry squadrons, an aviation squadron, a support squadron, and separate combat support companies and batteries.²⁹ Although the ACR-L has mission and configuration similar to the IBCT, it lacks capabilities in three battlefield operating systems (BOS): maneuver, intelligence, and command and control. Under the maneuver BOS the ACR-L is out matched. First, the Cavalry Squadrons are not configured into company teams. The largest direct fire weapon system the ACR-L fields is the MK-19. The HMMWV provides armor protection against weapons calibers up to 7.62 mm. The IBCT's light armored vehicles are designed to provide protection against weapons up to 14.5 mm and protection against artillery airbursts of up to 152 mm.³⁰ The MK-19 is no match for the 105mm gun in each of the mobile gun platoons. In addition, the IBCT's 155mm howitzers out gun the ACR-L's 105mm howitzers. Under the intelligence BOS the ACR-L is not connected to the intelligence systems at division, Army Forces, joint, theater, and national level. Under the command and control BOS the ACR-L does not have the computer network to provide digitized command and control systems. The IBCT appears to be the preferred tactical combat force for early entry operations.

²⁹ Department of the Army. *FM 17-95: Cavalry Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1996: chapter 1.

³⁰ Mathew Cox. “War on Wheels: Light Armored Vehicle III puts Army on Road to Transformation.” *Army Times*, (November 2000): 10.

IV. FINDINGS

IBCT versus the Required Force Design

The goal of the monograph was to assess the capabilities of the IBCT for stability and support operations. To assess the IBCT it was necessary to understand stability and support operations; to understand the operational requirements; to determine the required force design and, to assess the IBCT's capabilities for stability and support operations.

Stability and support operations are operations to influence the political, civil, and military environments. Influencing each environment enables military forces to impose their will and link operational objectives to tactical military action. In stability and support operations military action is subordinate to policy. Stability and support operations consists of five-phases. Phase I is a dispute in the absence of conflict or military forces. Phase II is low-level conflict before the introduction of military forces. Phase III is armed conflict. Phase IV is post-hostilities but the dispute still remains. Phase V is post conflict. The ultimate goal of the diplomat is obtaining a negotiated settlement. The ultimate strategic goal is regional stability.

At the tactical level US Army forces support the diplomatic process by administering military government, providing humanitarian support, and use or threaten lethal force. The lowest tactical level capable of executing stability and support operations is the Brigade Combat Team. Brigade Combat Teams do this through tactically mobile forces that have organic firepower and protection to terminate hostilities. Brigade Combat Teams also require enhanced intelligence capabilities to acquire information on how societies function, who the decision makers are, and what are

the value systems. Brigade Combat Teams do this through the addition of counter-intelligence, human intelligence, and psychological operations specialties. Finally, the command and control capabilities of the Brigade Combat Team have to be enhanced to provide unity of effort in each environment. The Civil Affairs team and the staff in the BCT are the means to control operations in the political, civil, and military environments. Civil Affairs teams provide the physical means to synchronize nation building and humanitarian assistance activities with military engagement operations planned by the tactical staff.

According to Bloomfield and Leiss, military involvement in stability and support operations will occur once the operation has reached the hostilities phase. The IBCT force structure is well suited to terminate hostilities. The IBCT is primarily a mounted infantry-heavy organization with high tactical mobility and dismounted assault capability. One of the primary force design requirements for the Interim Brigade Combat Team was tactical mobility, organic firepower, and protection. Each infantry battalion consists of three motorized infantry companies, a mobile gun platoon, and mortar section. Each company is permanently task organized as combined arms teams. The Mobile Gun Platoon is equipped with a 105mm main gun. The Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) provides tactical mobility. The LAV provides adequate protection against the main armament of Soviet type armored personnel carriers. The IBCT's LAVs are designed to provide protection against weapons calibers up to 14.5 mm and protection against artillery airbursts up to 152 mm.³¹ The organic mobility, firepower, and protection enables the IBCT to enter most environments and terminate hostilities.

³¹ Mathew Cox. "War on Wheels: Light Armored Vehicle III puts Army on Road to Transformation." *Army Times*, (November 2000): 10.

The IBCT's limitations are revealed when the operation transitions to Phase IV post-hostilities but military force is still required. The weakness of the IBCT force design is the ability to influence the political and civil environments. The Dominican Republic and Bosnian case studies demonstrated the requirement for Brigade Combat Teams to influence the political and military environments. The brigade is the lowest level capable of directing tactical military action in support of operational objectives. In spite of this revelation, the IBCT force design is not optimized to influence the political and civil environments.

Influencing the political and civil environments requires significant enhancements to the maneuver, intelligence, and command and control battlefield operating systems (BOS). During post-hostilities, the essential task for US Army forces is to administer military government and provide national assistance. The reasons are clearly defined by Clarke and Gosende. Nations fail because of humanitarian disasters, political unraveling, and military conflict. The very nature of stability and support operations indicates that some level of government administration and national assistance will be required. Given this fact, the IBCT does not have organic civil affairs capabilities. Civil Affairs teams enable the IBCT to support US policy by conducting activities to influence the same environment as the diplomat. The effect of such action is the ability to generate support in the theater for foreign policy initiatives. US forces used civic action and civic affairs programs effectively in the Dominican Republic. These operations were decisive in the eventual election of a pro-democratic president in Santo Domingo. In a sense, the use of Civil Affairs teams during post-hostilities provided US Army forces with a non-lethal form of maneuver targeted towards the political and military environments.

Limited changes have been made to the intelligence BOS. The change is the addition of a Human Intelligence team in the MI Company and a Counter-Intelligence team in the RSTA Squadron. The specialties give the IBCT the organic capability to acquire intelligence on the civil environment. The absence of organic Civil Affairs teams makes the new intelligence source meaningless because the IBCT cannot effectively act upon it. The absence of a Civil Affairs team also limits the IBCT's ability to acquire intelligence on the political environment.

Significant changes have been made to the command and control architecture in the form of digitization and connectivity with operational and strategic resources. The architectural changes to the command and control BOS have less to do with improving the IBCT's capability to control the political and civil environments. In effect, the changes are directed towards the IBCT's capability to command and control the military environment. The IBCT lacks civil affairs capabilities specifically tailored to synchronize political and civil actions with military action. Based upon the limitations in the force design the final assessment is that the IBCT is superior to the current Brigade Combat Teams but lacks the required capabilities for effective execution of stability and support operations. A graphic depiction of the IBCT versus the required force design is contained in table 2 on page 38. The IBCT and that of the required force design is defined in terms of the battlefield operating systems of maneuver, intelligence, and command and control on the vertical axis and the political, civil, and military environments on the horizontal axis.

Successful stability and support operations require joint, interagency, and multinational efforts to deter war, resolve conflict, and support the diplomatic settlement

process. The IBCT represents the Army's contribution to stability and support operations. The design of the Interim Brigade Combat Team indicates that its focus is the military environment. This is only two-thirds of the problem. Given the fact that the IBCT is the most deployable medium weight brigade sized unit in the Army the probability is high that it will be used in future stability and support operations. When deployed, the IBCT will be capable of deterring war and resolving conflict but not capable of supporting post conflict resolution without the same level of augmentation required of current Brigade Combat Teams. From this stand point the IBCT does not represent a significant combat multiplier to theater CINCs. The interim design should include Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations teams as a permanent attachment to the force structure.

Since the early 1960s civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities have been associated with the special operations community. The frequency of stability and support operations indicates that the requirement will remain in the near future. The capability needs to become a part of the conventional force structure. The appropriate level to introduce civil affairs and psychological operations into the conventional Army is the maneuver Brigade Combat Team.

Table 2 – IBCT versus Required Force Design

	IBCT			Required Force Design		
	Political	Civil	Military	Political	Civil	Military
	Administration of Government link operational objectives to tactical military action	National Assistance link operational objectives to tactical military action	Decisive Force Link operational objectives to tactical military action	Administration of Government Link operational objectives to tactical military action	National Assistance Link operational objectives to tactical military action	Decisive Force Link operational objectives to tactical military action
Maneuver	N/A	N/A	Strategic mobility provided by USAF. Operational mobility provided by USAF and Army aviation. Tactical mobility provided by LAV. Tactical fires and crew survivability provided by LAV. Capable of military to military engagement. Both operations are a form of non-lethal maneuver.	Civil Affairs teams enable civil – military engagement. Operation is a non-lethal form of maneuver – military/political	Civil Affairs teams enable interface with NGOs and government relief organizations. Psychological operations teams enable direct access to the people. Both operations are a non-lethal form of maneuver – military/social	Strategic mobility Operational mobility Tactical mobility Tactical fires Survivable platform. Military to military engagement. Both operations are a non-lethal form of maneuver
Intelligence	HUMINT and CI for political intelligence	HUMINT and CI for social intelligence	HUMINT, UAV, and satellite connectivity enable tactical through strategic intelligence	HUMINT and CI for political intelligence	HUMINT, PSYOPS, and CI for social intelligence	HUMINT, UAV, and satellite connectivity enable tactical through strategic intelligence
Command and Control	Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking	Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking	Tactical staff provides C2 of tactical operations. Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking	Civil Affairs teams provide C2 of nation building activities, which is a form of governance. Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking	Civil Affairs teams provide C2 over humanitarian relief organizations. Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking	Tactical staff provides C2 of tactical operations. Satellite connectivity enables tactical through strategic communications systems, intelligence systems, and computer networking

GLOSSARY

ACR - L	Armored Cavalry Regiment - Light
IBCT	Interim Brigade Combat Team
BSB	Brigade Support Battalion
CA	Civil Affairs
CI	Counter Intelligence
CINC	Commander in Chief
CSSCS	Combat Service Support Control System
CINCLANT	Commander and Chief Atlantic Command
FBCBS	Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
GCSS-A	Global Command and Control System - Army
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
HUMINT	Human Intelligence Team
ISZ	International Security Zone
JMC	Joint Military Commission
LAV	Light Armored Vehicle
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LOGCAP	Logistics Civilian Assistance Program
MI	Military Intelligence
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MTS	Movement Tracking System
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia - Herzegovina

PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RSTA	Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
SSC	Small-Scale Contingencies
SASO	Stability and Support Operations
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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