The Effects of Budgetary Constraints, Multiple Strategy Selection, and Rationality on Equilibrium Attainment in an Information Warfare Simulation
Abstract
Information warfare (IW) has developed into a significant threat to the national security of the United States. Our critieal infrastructures, linked together by information systems, are increasingly vulnerable to information attack. This study seeks to understand some of those factors which affect the ability of an individual to make accurate decisions in an IW environment. The study used game theory to analyze the behavior of decision-makers within an IW simulation. The IW game model is based on a set of games known as infinitely repeated games of incomplete information. It uses the Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept to determine the strategy which a player should use repeatedly in order to maximize his or her payoff. The results of the experiment show that a person faced with increasing numbers of potential strategies, is less likely to make accurate decisions. The results also show that decision makers faced with budgetary constraints tend to pick those strategies which are most expensive. This is regardless of the actual utility of the strategy as long as it is within the decision-makers' budget. Additionally, the study found that the rationality of decisions made by an opponent did not affect a player's ability to find the payoff maximizing strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA389477
Entities
People
- Steven W. Tait
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology