Executing Joint Information Operations: Whre Do We Go After Kosovo?
Abstract
Operation Allied Force, the NATO air operation in Kosovo, was the first major operation where Information Operations (I0) was formally implemented, albeit with mixed results. Like many other aspects of this historic operation, I0 affects were prosecuted in piecemeal fashion and far too late to be effective. Alliance problems aside, the joint warfighting team raised many concerns for how I0 affects are integrated into joint and combined operations. While the I0 report card is bleak, it is important to examine what went wrong and take steps to improve I0 during future joint operations. We have far to go as a joint community until we see the full strategic benefit of I0, which doctrine suggests is to "affect adversary or potential adversary decision makers to the degree that they will cease actions that threaten U.S. national security interests." This paper proposes taking two concrete steps to elevate the importance of information by recognizing IO as a unique operational planning and execution function. At the core of my proposal is forming a permanent I0 cell, properly staffed, and led by senior leadership. This cell will develop the precursor for successfully executing I0: a theatre-wide I0 strategy that is fully coordinated with all non-DOD agencies in an AOR. My thesis is generated from the I0 lessons from Kosovo, namely: 1) Make sure people know what I0 is; 2) Start I0 very early in planning; 3) Have a adequately staffed I0 cell headed by senior staff officer; 4) Have an I0 strategy that is implemented during peace and crisis. Kosovo bears out one important point: Joint I0 is not ready for prime time.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 05, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA389521
Entities
People
- Scot D. Mackenzie
Organizations
- Naval War College