Is There a Place for Operational Deception in the Age of Information Warfare?
Abstract
One of the principle tenets of Operational Art concerns Operational Deception as a tool for the Commander to use in affecting success on the battlefield. The age of information warfare, as a new concept linking networks toward more effective war fighting and denying one's adversary the capability to do the same, must still encompass the Operational Art of War tenets. Embracing the concepts of information warfare without adequately planning for Operational Deception, shortchanges the Commander in his ability to utilize all of his capabilities to defeat his adversary. Operational Deception still plays a critical role as a force multiplier and continues to contribute to military and political victory. Information operations and information assurance with regard to information warfare deal with denying an adversary access to our networks and the critical information that flows across these links. Operational Deception calls for misleading an adversary by deceiving him with false or ambiguous information and causing him to act in a way that is to our advantage. By denying him access to our networks and "locking out" his ability to use his networks, the Operational Commander causes a dilemma in not being able to effectively utilize Operational Deception. The paradox concerns providing a means for the enemy to receive the deceptive information and our ability to monitor him for effective evaluation of the deception's success. Despite the challenges, a Commander would be remiss not to plan for and execute Operational Deception to gain victory in the age of information warfare.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 05, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA389561
Entities
People
- Richard M. Schmitz
Organizations
- Naval War College