



**STRATEGY
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**ARMY RELEVANCY THROUGH A STUDY OF REQUIREMENTS
AND NATIONAL STRATEGY**

BY

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20010514 050

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Army Relevancy through a Study of Requirements and National Strategy

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC Thomas D. Vail
TITLE: Army Relevancy through a Study of Requirements and National Strategy
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 1 April 2001 PAGES: 26 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper will define Army relevancy by reviewing the national requirements, threat and strategy for employment of the Army and provide recommendations to ensure relevancy in the future. The threat, requirements and strategy together provide focus and purpose; they are the parameters for building and maintaining a relevant military. Specifically for the Army, we build a Landpower force to promote and protect our nation's interests. In past instances, our Army has arrived on the battlefield unprepared for combat. The significance of applying these lessons, during periods of peace, is dyed in our history. The strategic lessons of our past condemn us to pay considerable attention to the posture of the Army. When misunderstood, externally and internally, the Army fails as it did at the outset of operations in the Korean conflict, in Vietnam and in Kosovo. For the Army, the endstate is a desired level of training and combat readiness based on requirements and threat rather than budgets and capabilities alone. After defining the requirements and threat for a more lethal and flexible Army, I will show some possible solutions in terms of structure and concept.

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PREFACE

Our Army is experiencing an identity crisis. The perplexing challenge of understanding the institution's purpose, after the Cold War, is clouded by lack of a defined threat, peacetime laurels, budgetary friction and political ambiguity. In addition, the affluence of senior leaders who experienced a large standing army, focused training and globally positioned forces may not see how far we are from there. It is normal to downsize during peacetime, but it is the strength and power that keeps us at peace. Prior to Desert Storm, the Army was over 700,000 soldiers strong with a definable enemy and less ongoing missions. The present and future environment is ambiguous for the military. As senior leaders grapple with an Army of almost half the amount of soldiers and units, the vision is seemingly tougher to project and define. A view shrouded by the readiness reporting procedures and tainted by current missions. The common relevant picture of who we are as an Army is blurred. Certainly, the future is always hard to define, but our destiny is grounded by the parameters set in our strategy. We define ourselves through a strategy of requirements and threat.

The question of "threat" versus "capabilities" based Army is posed for shaping our force. I would rather define the Army as a requirements and, threat-based force. A requirements based force ensures all missions, in the full spectrum, will be accomplished and drives us toward the proper operational concept to determine the future. Also, the Cold War may be the paradigm we are in need of as the single world power. The idea that a large standing Army will deter, shape and respond with overwhelming force could prevent a conflict. It has certainly worked in the past. If we downsize too much and base our Army primarily out of CONUS, we may create a peer competitor and lack sufficient influence in the world to stabilize regional conflict.

When the Chief of Staff of the Army visited the Army War College and spoke to the students in the fall of 2000, I tried to understand the essence of the CSA's term "Army relevancy." The Army Transformation plan was constantly used to highlight the solution, but never quite made it through the logic filter. If the objective force was undetermined and the Interim force was "under construction," how could we be solving our problem? After further thought it is easy to see that the CSA has created conditions for change. He welcomes innovative thought and recommendations by announcing the Objective force is yet to be defined. General Creighton Abrams, Sr. faced a similar opportunity in 1974, when the Army was restructuring from the Vietnam era. Once again Congress was looking to downsize the force from its current 13 division force. As the Chief of Staff, he used mission and enemy in a very basic way to convince Congress to authorize three more divisions.

He tasked his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, along with an appointed officer, Col Astarita, to form a committee. The committee would submit a secret report to determine force structure and strategy. Though lacking a defined doctrinal method or concept, they used the current threat and requirements to see this change through. Ultimately, the report provided the groundwork for General Abrams to persuade Congress to proportion the Army in accordance with missions, strategy and threat. In this paper, I will attempt to define our identity or relevant force with, generally, the same parameters he set.

ARMY RELEVANCY THROUGH A STUDY OF REQUIREMENTS AND NATIONAL STRATEGY

In the last few years, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, posed the question, "How can we make the army more relevant?" He has initiated the Army Transformation process with this question in mind. Basically, Army relevancy is meeting our part of the military responsibilities to defend the United States of America and blueprint the force to execute missions successfully. Army core competencies, as addressed in FM 1, begin with our ability to conduct sustained land dominance¹. To declare that the Army will dominate the land and perform all other missions is extremely strong language for ten active divisions. Then, to sustain the effort in a protracted conflict demands even further scrutiny. If we place the Army at risk, then morally we must review the force in terms of threat and requirements, along with technology and funding.

" Due to the hard work of Army soldiers and civilians, coupled with the support of the Administration and Congress, The Army is meeting its responsibilities as the decisive component of U.S. military capability, but with risk in some scenarios. This risk does not mean that U.S. Forces would not prevail; however, achieving our objectives could require a larger expenditure of our national treasure."²

General Shinseki's words are a warning. The Army is under scrutiny and now challenged by a complete military review by the new administration. To begin the process, we must revisit or review the requirements and threat to make the Army relevant.

This paper will define Army relevancy by reviewing the national requirements, threat and strategy for employment of the Army and provide recommendations to ensure relevancy in the future. The threat, requirements and strategy together provide focus and purpose; they are the parameters for building and maintaining a relevant military. Specifically for the Army, we build a Land power force to promote and protect our nation's interests. In past instances, our Army has arrived on the battlefield unprepared for combat. The significance of applying these lessons, during periods of peace, is dyed in our history. The strategic lessons of our past condemn us to pay considerable attention to the posture of the Army. When misunderstood, externally and internally, the Army fails as it did at the outset of operations in the Korean conflict, in Vietnam and in Kosovo. These parameters are strategic in nature. But, as we develop the doctrine, operational concept, training and equipment, our plan ensures the operational and tactical levels of the military are addressed. It is a normal building block process. Most organizational experts agree that the goals and objectives or strategy cause effectiveness. In addition, the organization has a common understanding and vision of the product or endstate. For the Army, the endstate is a desired level of training and combat readiness based on requirements and threat rather

than budgets and capabilities alone. After defining the requirements and threat for a more lethal and flexible Army, I will show some possible solutions in terms of structure and concept.

RELEVANCY

Relevancy seems to bridge the gap between ways, means and ends. To justify the word in terms of proper English, I turn to the Webster dictionary. The Webster unabridged dictionary defines the word relevant as:

“Affording evidence tending to prove or disapprove the matters at issue or under discussion”³

It further explains the synonyms as “pertinent, proportional, germane and applicable.” The “evidence” is our operational concept, structure and readiness. And, the “matters at issue” are the requirements and threat. We become more relevant as the evidence is more germane to the matters at issue. The relevancy of the army is to meet the task of defending the nation, in the worst-case scenario, with the least amount of risk.

Due to cycles of peace, we are tricked into a false sense of security. In the last 220 plus years, we are always convinced that each war is the last. So, we go through the cycle of peace determining our relevance. We, generally, cut and move forces back home. Time heals the last conflict and domestic issues dominate the national scene. A new peer competitor arises and we surge to meet the challenger. This is our pattern. But now, there are two major differences.

First, we did not have armed conflict with the Warsaw pact countries because of an overmatch theory of military power. The cold war paradigm worked and our combination of the elements of power elevated our country to the single most powerful nation. This leads to the second point. Never before were we the most powerful nation. We must come to grips with our ability to sustain that position. Combining the deterrence of a powerful military and our obligation to use it over the full spectrum is relevant, only if you consider the adversary and purpose of national defense. Our military ways and means are dependent on the ends. Our country may be challenged in many ways, but ignoring the potential threat and national military strategy is certainly irrelevant to the purpose of the Army.

REQUIREMENTS

This section will outline the Army’s requirements to defend our nation. The Army derives its requirements from many sources. Some in the form of published guidance, and indirectly, from implied intent or assigned missions. Both provide guidance and purpose for the structure, training and employment of the Army.

The most important document for understanding the basic requirements for the Army is the National Military Strategy. Our National Military Strategy centers on the premise that the Army be able to shape, respond and prepare to defend our nation.⁴ The first concept of shaping communicates three, out of many, tangible requirements for the Army. To shape the international environment, the Army must conduct exercises to promote stability, position forces and equipment strategically and rapidly project power to deter hostilities.⁵

The Army continually conducts Joint exercises at all levels to promote stability, as well as, train to increase readiness. It is how the theater CINC "shapes" and rehearses the Joint force. Paramount to the exercise program is the frequency, missions and planning time. The Army OPTEMPO and budgetary strain on any division can lessen the amount and frequency of the exercise program. In addition, the exercises should be planned far in advance to maximize preparation, adhere to the unit training rhythm and ensure all resources are available. With only ten divisions to choose from, the Army consistently fails to have predictability and full participation considering the peacekeeping obligations, force size and budget constraints.

The magnitude of these exercises has decreased in scope. For instance, the army once conducted Operation Team Spirit and Reforger to conduct combined and joint operations at Division level. Those are now conducted as Warfighter exercises in a simulated environment. This process loses significant visibility of deployment execution and lessens the scope of the exercise as a deterrent. Still, the point is that we must conduct exercises, at all levels, to deter our adversaries and permit a pre-planned frequency that lessens the friction of execution.

The next requirement is to position our Army strategically to provide force presence and minimize deployment timelines. In the past 15 years, the Army has moved back to the continental United States and downsized our forces. It is time to assess the forward location of our present day forces and reposition them. This will enhance our level of regional conflict deterrence, cut initial airlift requirements, show National resolve and strength and provide a viable force for the appropriate geographical CINC.

The last requirement is for the Army to rapidly project power. As the sustained Landpower component for the nation, the Army must react strategically and sustain decisive maneuver at all levels. Certainly, the two parts demand an operational concept different than Desert Shield/Desert Storm, where we had a lengthy operational pause. The pause allowed for little confrontation with our initial airborne, light forces and then, gave us time for a buildup. In the future, the Army may not have the luxury of time to build up forces. Not only does our current strategy expose troops and require months to project power, it has a cumbersome command and control architecture. A flexible and quick response allows the National Command Authority

to exercise resolve and military power abroad. Recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army has announced this as one of our challenges. The current solution is the Interim Brigade at Fort Lewis. With a mix of lethality and agility, the Interim Brigade deploys over 500 light armored vehicles and 2500 soldiers in a combat arms configured outfit. As usual, the problem seems to be strategic lift and logistics. It is not only those issues but also a larger one. The Army needs to transform its concept and institution first.

Just providing an experiment, exclusive of a major operational blueprint and complete force structure, is dangerous. General Myer, a former Army chief of Staff, required the same type solution in the early eighties and the High-Technology Light Division (HTLD) was the strategic disaster.⁶ It never made it into our force design. All due to a low-level, tactical force development change without an Army institutional change.⁷ The IBCT will encounter the same issues as it performs in a vacuum. Though the enormous dedication and leadership involved will highlight the enterprise, it can be saved by quickly making it part of a tangible and structured operational concept.

The next document for requirements is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This is where we find the basic premise of the two Major Theaters of War (MTW). Though disputed at times,⁸ the two MTW concept communicates clear requirements to execute military operations in two theaters simultaneously. This enormous undertaking requires more forces, forward positioning and lift. However, the important point is that as the sole superpower, with a multitude of global threats, deploying in two separate theaters is not an unlikely scenario.

Within the Unified Command Plan, each geographical CINC submits a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) and an Integrated Priority List (IPL). Both documents lay out in detail the further requirements for the Army. As force provider and key budget source, the Army uses these requirements to fulfill the CINC's operational desires. Both strategic planning tools can clarify the Army role and future employment standards.

Requirements are also derived from the alliances our nation has with other allied countries. Without going into detail, most of our involvement in wars has derived from assistance to our Allies. In both world wars, America committed our national treasure to defend allies. Currently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is just one alliance that requires our ability to support other nations militarily. The overall premise of the NATO charter is to protect any member who is threatened.⁹ Our presence in Bosnia and Kosovo is owed to this plan. Our military must be ready to fulfill treaty and alliance obligations overseas.

THREAT

To frame the study, this section examines the Post Cold War threat assessment. The “threats” are forces that will deliberately endanger our interests and sovereignty. As we naively rest on our Cold War laurels, the paradigm that brought us to this point is still applicable. We tend to look away from the incredible influence of superiority as a means to deter conflict. I assert that the Cold War paradigm is just as effective now as it was then. Actually, the threat has grown. It is more dynamic, to include asymmetrical forces and natural resource challenges. Certainly, the increase of factors and pressures coupled with our uncertainty should create an increased sense of urgency in America.

In this section, I will first look at the major powers that pose a danger to our nation. Then, I will summarize the future threat to the United States using the Global Trends 2015, published by the Central Intelligence Agency under direction of the National Intelligence Board.¹⁰ The combination of both assessments in time will overlap and exacerbate the regional strife, competition and relative deprivation.

Our two Major Theaters of War (MTW) scenario is based on the threat in Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia.¹¹ In a recent Michael O’Hanlon article, he sees a change in the future for this strategy, but accepts it for now. Some may consider one theater of less importance than the other. Well, there is no doubt we are committed to stability in both those spheres of influence. Geopolitically, the United States will also have interests in Europe and the Far East, due to natural resources and protection of our Allies. These regions add to the complexity of the assessment, but still our primary threats are the countries that frame the Two MTW scenario. So, we are tied to both scenarios and it remains the basis for the primary warplans.

The Global 2015 study focuses on drivers, countries and trends that will shape the world and cause conflict.¹² When we overlay the study on top of the current threat, the picture becomes even more volatile. This unclassified study portrays a fluid and dramatic environment where a given population, culture or government can erupt depending on the severity of the problem and the balance of force in the world or, specific region.

The first area of the study explores how drivers or major factors can apply pressure to a particular region or country. Though vague in some aspects, the drivers give perspective and “hooks” for examination. It allows for a contextual approach first, then the normal nation-state analysis.

The key drivers for the study are:

- (1) Demographics.
- (2) Natural resources and environment.

- (3) Science and technology.
- (4) The global economy and globalization.
- (5) National and international governance.
- (6) Future conflict.
- (7) The role of the United States.

In examining these drivers, several points should be kept in mind:

- No single driver or trend will dominate the global future in 2015.
- Each driver will have varying impacts in different regions and countries.
- The drivers are not necessarily mutually reinforcing; in some cases, they will work at cross-purposes.¹³

The study reports that the future conflicts will involve three types of threats; asymmetrical, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regional, large military forces.¹⁴

Continuing with the 2015 study, the authors contend there are four basic globalization affected scenarios. Without going into the details of each separate scenario, the commission determined a few commonalities in all scenarios:

- Countries negatively affected by population growth, resource scarcities and bad governance, fail to benefit from globalization, are prone to internal conflicts, and risk state failure.
- The effectiveness of national, regional, and international governance and at least moderate but steady economic growth are crucial.
- US global influence wanes.¹⁵

In Paul J. Smith's recent article on transnational security, he reinforces the effects of globalization on our country.¹⁶ Mr. Smith shows how crime, disease, migration and terrorism are the drivers, which apply pressure to regional balance. So, in viewing the existing war planning threat, drivers, future conflicts and globalization it is evident the full spectrum for applying military power is enlarging. As the single leader in this dynamic world, our ability to apply pressure with military ways and means is becoming more complex and urgent. To stand back and think the environment will adjust to the United States in a positive manner is naïve. It is our prerogative to sustain balance and stability through military strength. The threat and world order requires a larger, more ready and lethal Army.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

My conclusion centers on the fact that our Army lacks the amount of forces to provide the National Command Authority the dominant, sustained Landpower force to handle the full

spectrum of missions required.¹⁷ As the global superpower, we have entered a new age of supremacy never before realized. Our ability to recognize our responsibility to global stability is the first step. Then, react in proportion militarily to maintain the balance. In a recent strategic research paper, COL D'Amico makes an interesting parallel with the Roman Empire.¹⁸ Over 2000 years ago, Augustus, emperor of the Roman Empire, downsized the legions and began to reap the dividends of peace. He explains the irony, as the Germans defeated the Roman legion at Teutoberger Wald in 9 A.D.

Having won the big war and seeing no peer competitor, the political tendency is to minimize the threat, reduce the budget, and downsize the armed forces...Rome would preserve her empire at the frontier with a forward deployed smaller army, thereby reaping the peace dividend and reducing the threat to his regime. His military structure was determined by his political and economic strategy.¹⁹

Without the necessary means to exercise the power to influence, our country may go the way of the Romans. In a military sense, our worst case is the protracted conflict in two theaters of operation.

To keep itself relevant, the Army must develop an operational concept for the objective force, increase intra- and inter- theater lift, increase the Army training and exercise program, position forces globally to deter international aggression and provide adequate strategic reaction time. While we incrementally evolve as an Army, the problem of national security looms. Army transformation awaits tangible guidance, operational directives and real change.

I will now address the recommendations in the above areas of operational concept, force structure, lift, training, exercise program and force projection and provide some solutions and ideas addressing our future force.

For the Army to orchestrate its enormous capability for full spectrum operations, a new operational concept is needed. Using Joint Vision 2020 as our military blueprint can provide some direction and principles for the new concept.²⁰ Some argue Joint Vision 2020 is limited in scope. Most criticisms of Joint Vision 2020 are concerned with the employment and structure piece. Andrew F. Krepinevich, executive director of the Center of Budgetary and Strategic Assessments is worried that the force design is short sighted and does not address the myriad of environments and threat scenarios.

Krepinevich argues that the Army should be experimenting with a number of different force designs, tailored to the kinds of conflicts the army is likely to encounter in the future – one for urban warfare, another for deep strike missions using precision artillery and attack helicopters, and perhaps a third operating in an environment where the enemy has cut the logistics tail.²¹

Dr. Krepinevich sees the potential, but awaits further clarity from the Joint Staff²². Until revised, it is enough information to go forward with an Army concept. Currently, Joint Vision 2020 entails full spectrum dominance through the use of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, full dimensional protection and information superiority.²³

To align with the Joint Vision 2020 operational construct, the Army needs to fight deep, and focus fires and troops on battlespace. The linear battlefield is no longer the predominant space for waging battle. With the responsiveness and accuracy of intelligence, the available information and standoff for fires, the battlefield is dotted with battle areas or battlespace with a relative value for effects. The concept of conducting an operational ambush or strategic raid provides protection to the majority of our systems, reduces the vulnerability for exposure of troops and causes an effects-based targeting doctrine – better return on the investment of our military power.

The point is that our operational design must have flexibility to defeat different enemies and, once again, meet our core competencies.²⁴ An excellent example of a flexible concept is Col Douglas A. Macgregor's operational concept.²⁵ In his book, "Breaking the Phalanx," he determines the Army must lessen its vertical command structure, organize in combat groups, enhance C4ISR at the group level, adapt to the Joint environment and fight battlespace.²⁶ In addition, I propose we leverage manned and unmanned systems, vertical envelopment, reduced footprint allowing the Army to become more lethal and protected.

As outlined in Macgregor's book, replacing our current brigades with a variety of combat groups is the new model.²⁷ I deviate from his arguments at the need for an Army Corps. It is extreme to take away both the Corps and Division structure. A standardized Corps-based Army with the associated combat groups is the model for the new concept. Our force design will combine the Corps and Division capabilities for Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). By omitting the division and linking the Corps to the Army headquarters under the CINC, the organizational efficiency, C4ISR and information operations increase significantly. As we employ the combat groups, each will require operational support for logistics, C4ISR and lift to ensure sustained combat operations. Also, a standardized Corps allows for a common set for resourcing, budgeting, training and doctrine. A set of Army Corps' is aligned with a geographical CINC to provide even better focus for Joint warfare and training readiness cycles. As Macgregor emphasizes, the most important aspect is the Joint battlefield. Each Corps must be prepared to operate as a Joint Task Force and interface effectively with other components. I recommend a total of eight standardized Corps units; Two Corps aligned with Pacific command, Central command and

European command and the other two are shared between Southern command and Joint Forces command.

First, I'll define a proposed Corps structure which is similar to Macgregor's Corps based JTF model.²⁸ Each Corps would have a close, deep and rear command. The deep would have an Air Defense Artillery group, a rocket group and an aviation group. The close combat command would be comprised of a heavy-recon strike group, a light-recon strike group, an airborne-air assault group and three heavy combat commands. The rear command would comprise of two support groups, an engineer group and a C4I group. Eventually, the army will integrate unmanned systems and increase vertical lift capability within the groups. Currently, we structure our Corps based on a region. With every Corps completely different in structure the ability to chop forces back and forth poses a huge C2 and logistics dilemma. In addition, the Corps' ability to interoperate with Allies and in the Joint world is far too confusing. Since we will tailor the force in accordance with the CINC's plan, there is more value in standardizing a Corps so that when the command relationship of a group is changed it is easier to absorb and support. The last point is that the Army has no standard set for budgeting. A standard Corps set would be the standard. It will lessen the inconsistent and turbulent process of cutting small units or soldier by soldier.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton recently reemphasized, in an article in Army magazine, the necessity for Jointness within our military.²⁹ He cites the myriad of future missions and the agility and flexibility of the Army. Also, the Goldwater-Nichols Act provides legal and institutional basis to enhance this concept. The standardized Corps JTF provides the opportunity for exploiting C4ISR, preparing for probable JTF assignments, allowing the Army to become increasingly interoperable during Joint operations and, most importantly, meets the Chairman's guidance.

Army Transformation has not defined the Objective force, but this structure could be the way ahead. As we close in on the relevancy of that force, we must continue to prepare our Corps and Groups to operate in the Joint battlespace. This means, not only, to conduct C4ISR in a Joint environment, but also provide Group level exportable units.³⁰ As we change and shift Joint command relationships, the standardized Corps JTF will be able to keep pace and lend to continuity. The objective force will be a Joint variant. So, transforming the Army outside this world will inhibit our ability to perform dominant maneuver and focused logistics in the near future. Progress and relevancy are defined by our ability to operate with our sister services.

The concept of conducting Corps JTF operations is becoming the norm. Certainly, the frustrations and lessons are many, but looking away from this opportunity to structure, train and

operate, as a standardized Corps JTF is shortsighted. The army conducts Joint operations daily in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait and other locations. The Marines have already tackled this challenge as the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) forms the Marine Air Ground Task Force. We have conducted JTF operations in Somalia and Haiti with the nucleus of the task force coming from an army division.³¹ Reluctantly, the division was chosen based on the small amount of Corps' available and the obligation of each as an apportioned force to a geographical CINC. The challenge was molding the remainder of the necessary combat power and staff to manage the Joint battlefield. Simply put, we have already attempted the method of a division based JTF and it struggled or required enormous support from other commands.

To implement the Corps JTF concept, the Army should adjust doctrine, training and structure. These are just a few areas for transition and in no way minimize the enormous effort to implement a Corps JTF-based army. Ironically, the Army provided the doctrinal base for Joint doctrine, so the adjustment from current Army doctrine to Joint doctrine is relatively simple. We are already moving our institutions to Joint oriented instruction. Our career schools are introducing more Joint topics and because of Goldwater-Nichols the assignment process requires Joint knowledge.

The improved training program is based on the "tiered" readiness model with the validation phase at the combined training centers (CTC). Currently, our CTC's focus at the battalion and brigade level using Army planning and operational doctrine. Though there are some exercises involving Army brigades, the Corps staff is rarely trained in the field, let alone as a JTF staff. To prepare for this concept, the Army must increase the standardized Corps training at the CTCs as a JTF, include the groups in the theater engagement strategy exercises for the geographical CINCs and adjust the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) to include JTF training. With the introduction of Millennium Challenge 2002, Joint Forces Command is already looking at ways to experiment and train at lower levels in a rapid and decisive scenario.³² The final step is the validation process for each corps commander. This tiered JTF training idea is similar to the process of the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) in that it provides a structured program for training, assessment and validation.³³ Again, Col Macgregor has explored and found the appropriate rotational readiness solution.³⁴ It allows for a training, deployment and reconstitution cycle.

Currently, strategic Air Force lift is inadequate for meeting the 96-hour deployment criteria with continued intra-theater lift.³⁵ This was determined by a GAO study in August. A more recent Mobility Requirements Study, cited in an article in Jane's Defence Weekly by reporter Andrew

Koch, identifies a shortfall of strategic lift. This equates to an increase of 126 - 176 C-17 aircraft or C5 upgrade equivalents.³⁶

The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05) found that transporting 54.5 million ton miles per day (MTM) will be required to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars and provide lift to high priority missions such as special forces, deploying missile defense systems and supporting other theater commanders.³⁷

The interesting part of this study is that it did include the 96-hour requirement and the Army Interim Brigade. Also, the Civil Reserve fleet (CRAF) is unreliable due to the enemy using weapons of mass destruction in theater.³⁸ The bottom line is that we are completely hamstrung by airlift.

To fix this problem, I would propose an Army intra-theater lift branch. This would allow for organic vertical massive troop and equipment lift. In addition, it will lessen the burden for the Air force, better support the army and CINC exercise programs, and create habitual relationships for real world deployment execution. Combining fixed wing and rotary lift in the theater exploits our vertical battlefield and mitigates terrain.

We are most vulnerable at our points of debarkation along the lines of communication and at our Intermediate staging bases (ISB).³⁹ These locations must become more flexible and, secure which is another reason for rotary and fixed wing, intra-theater lift. The Army needs to plan for floating and land staging bases. The Navy provided this capability during the invasion of Haiti by using the USS Eisenhower. The 10th Mountain Division or CJTF 180, conducted an air assault using rotary wing assets from a sea-based platform. There are many other floating designs for review. This concept only validated the Navy's ability to provide a sea-based platform for conducting staging and support operations for Joint campaigns.

The Army lacks a training "rhythm" to ensure combat readiness. The exercises inside the training model are infrequent and lack continuity. The Army exercise program must increase and become the centerpiece of our training. Our training model is confusing and compressed; it truncates the value of strategic deterrence and continuity for combat readiness. Currently, the Army only trains above Brigade in a simulated environment and rarely as a Joint force. It is axiomatic, to train as we will fight, if we desire increased combat readiness. With our current ten division Army, commanders are not able to train at all levels prior to an exercise. In addition, many combat systems are simulated and decrease realism. When we do train realistically, it is an evaluation with very little time for lower echelon training. With the Corps JTF tiered training concept, the Army can exercise at a level prior to validation. This method orchestrates time, frequency and predictability. It is a doctrinal rhythm of training that gives each commander an

opportunity to assess, prepare and execute. Once all levels are validated, then the Corps can receive validation. Realistic field training at the corps level validates our ability to deploy and fight upon arrival. Not only do we complete the cycle of training, but the subsequent deployment meets the CINCs intent in theater. The effect of a corps or JTF exercise on any theater is deterrence and requires commanders to actually deploy and wage a Corps level fight.

The Corps JTF and group Army will need a robust and expeditionary oriented exercise program. It will not only assist with the training and validation of the units, but also provide a Joint focus rather than component flavor. With a total of eight Corps' and their associated groups, the geographic CINCs can enhance the theater engagement opportunities and combined forces operations. Lastly, a more comprehensive exercise plan can assist in projecting power, practicing sustained land dominance and meet the Chairman's guidance.

In conclusion, my recommendations are intended to articulate tangible organizational standards, define the Army's structure and complement the future Joint battlefield. Most of the innovation is due to the genius of Col Douglas A. Macgregor and his combat group concept. But, the most important aspect of the paper is the necessity for a ready and agile Army that answers the question of relevancy. The force is only as relevant as its ability to provide combat power in accordance with the threat and requirements set by our civilian masters. Currently, we are at risk to do this. Our new Army strategy, through Transformation can ensure the National Military Strategy will be met and creates continuity for Joint warfare.

Word Count = 5,156

ENDNOTES

¹ Eric K. Shinseki, The Army, Field Manual -1, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2000), 12.

² Louis Caldera and General Eric K. Shinseki, A statement on the posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 01, Posture statement presented to the 106th Congress., second sess.(Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 1997),ix.

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⁴ John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1997),1.

⁵ Ibid, 12-14.

⁶ Richard A. Dunn III., "Transformation: Let's Get it Right This Time." Parameters 16 (Spring 2001): 27-28.

⁷ Ibid, 28.

⁸ Eliot Cohen, "Defending America in the Twenty-first century." Foreign Affairs, Vol 79, No 6.(Nov/Dec 2000): 43.

⁹ "NATO Handbook." (Brussels: April 1999), 396.

¹⁰ John Gannon. "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts," December 2000. available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html>; Internet accessed 4 January 2001.

¹¹ Michael E. O'Hanlon. "Rethinking the Two War Strategies," Joint Forces Quarterly, (Spring 2000): 11-17.

¹² Gannon, 4

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid, 8.

¹⁵ Ibid, 54-55.

¹⁶ Paul J. Smith. "Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the Military," Parameters, Autumn 2000, 77-86.

¹⁷ Shinseki, 15.

¹⁸ John M. D'Amico. Teutoberger Wald, 9 A.D. – Strategic Implications, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 7 April 2000), 10.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ ²⁰ Henry H. Shelton. Joint Vision 2020 (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, June 2000), 3

²¹ Andrew Koch. "USA Identifies Mobility Needs," Jane's Defence Weekly, (24 January 2001), 4

²² Ibid, 36.

²³ Henry H. Shelton. Joint Vision 2020 (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, June 2000), 3

²⁴ Shinseki, 12.

²⁵ Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), 48-50.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid, 59-89.

²⁸ Ibid, 84.

²⁹ Henry H. Shelton, "The National Military Strategy and Joint Vision 2020." Army (Vol. 51, No. 1, June 2000), p 7-9.

³⁰ Macgregor, 85.

³¹ Operations Restore Hope and Uphold Democracy were conducted by the 10th Mountain Division in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Both JTFs began with Army divisions as their core headquarters and troop units.

³² Ozolek, David. "Millenium Challenge." Defense Daily 209 (6 March 2001): Issue 43, 3.

³³ Kehoe, Nicholas B. "Expeditionary Aerospace Force." The Inspector General Brief 52 (Sep/Oct 2000): No. 5.

³⁴ Macgregor, 152-154.

³⁵ Koch, 4.

³⁶ Ibid, 4.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Wayne M. Hall. The Janus Paradox: The Army's Preparation for Conflicts of the 21st Century. (Arlington, Va: The Institute of Land Warfare, October 2000, No 36.), 4.

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