Clausewitz on Kosovo
Abstract
If strategists do not follow Clausewitz's lead as a critical historian, then they risk failure by founding future policy, strategy, and operations on Kosovo myths. One must ask, was Operation Allied Force a rational use of military power to accomplish NATO s political objectives? This monograph develops and applies Clausewitzian dialectics to test the following hypothesis: If NATO leaders applied their realistic understanding of the war to reconcile their ends, ways, and means and employ effective force to achieve their political objectives, then the use of force would be rational. NATO leaders synthesis of the forces of reason, violence, and chance enabled them to understand the war, but only after it began. NATO leaders underestimated the will of Milosevic and the Serbs to fight for Kosovo and failed to prepare contingency plans in case their assumptions proved false. NATO leaders synthesis of the forces of political primacy and military necessity enabled them to reconcile their ends, ways, and means. NATO leaders synthesis of the principles of overwhelming and proportional force enabled them to employ realistic, effective force to coerce Milosevic. The analysis concludes that Operation Allied Force was a rational use of military power.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 16, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA390468
Entities
People
- Michael W. Johnson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College