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*Framing Compellent
Strategies*

Gregory F. Treverton

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National Defense Research Institute

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Framing Compellent Strategies

Gregory F. Treverton

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

MR-1240-OSD

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Preface

This project began in the puzzle of recent U.S. efforts to compel states and groups abroad to cease their misbehavior. Those efforts have generally succeeded, but they have raised questions for policy, strategy, and force planning: Why is Saddam Hussein still ruling Iraq a decade after Desert Storm? Why is Slobodan Milosevic still in power a half decade after Dayton? The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in Strategy and Threat Reduction (S&TR) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked what the United States could learn from recent instances to improve future endeavors.

The project began with three categories, each with a celebrated case in point: compelling major regional adversaries (Iraq); compelling would-be nuclear weapons proliferators (India); and compelling in circumstances rife with ambiguity, involving U.S. stakes, who was to be compelled, and how much control the targets had over their own forces (Haiti). In the course of the project, we discovered inherent limitations of the categories, ascertained other methods for delving into the compellence task, and found that some factors emerged as central. In particular, we found it expedient to examine efforts to compel Milosevic, a case that in terms of U.S. interests appeared to straddle the Iraq and Haiti categories. The pertinence of this case was increased by the Kosovo campaign, which occurred while we conducted this research.

This report should interest both civilians and military personnel who seek to shape international policies and strategies. We focused on the strategic needs for compelling adversaries or others through threats of military force or sanctions alone. The report also has implications for those who design and deploy forces and, particularly, for those decisionmakers who can use an understanding of U.S. adversaries' needs, desires, and interests to best advantage when framing compellent strategies.

This research was conducted for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy) within the International Strategy and Defense Policy Center of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI). NDRI is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies.

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Summary

The United States occasionally seeks to compel or coerce others, either nations or nonstate actors. To do so, it threatens use of force but, ideally, wants to prevail without actually using force. The analytic language surrounding "compellence" focuses on point outcomes. However, most cases of compellence turn out not to have point outcomes, but instead have been campaigns. For example, the United States was still dealing with Saddam Hussein almost a decade after Desert Storm.

In recent experience, the task of compelling has seemed to vary across three broad categories, each with a celebrated case in point: compelling major regional adversaries (Iraq); compelling would-be nuclear weapons proliferators (India); and compelling in circumstances rife with ambiguity, involving such considerations as U.S. stakes, who was to be compelled, and how much control the targets of compellence had over their own forces (Haiti). Efforts to compel Milosevic appeared, in terms of U.S. interests, to straddle the Iraq and Haiti categories; moreover, the Kosovo campaign was conducted as our research proceeded, and so it was added as a fourth case. Other cases were examined in less detail in each category.

The Challenge of Compelling

Regarding compellence, four clusters of factors, all intertwined, are especially worthy of consideration: who is to be compelled, how important U.S. stakes are, what threats or inducements are relevant, and who is doing the compelling. Fundamental background factors, such as whether the United States has overwhelming military force, do not become unimportant—they simply remain in the background. In all cases considered, the United States had or could assemble overwhelming force. The question then became whether that force could be credibly applied to the American purpose, even as a threat.

Who was to be compelled mattered along dimensions of autocrat-to-democrat, friend-to-foe, and state or nonstate. In compellence strategy, it is important to recognize that the power base of autocrats is concentrated; for instance, Saddam responded to threats against Iraq's elite military units, those necessary to defeat insurgents and suppress coups. By contrast, the power of a democratic regime is dispersed. India's population generally favored nuclear weapons, or was susceptible to nationalist appeals about them, and so convincing the Indian

government not to test nuclear weapons was difficult. For friends, the menu of instruments to compel is limited. Military threats against India were never contemplated, although military inducements were employed. The United States could do what it did to ally Britain over the Suez in 1956—threatening to sink the pound sterling—only because that threat was technical and the episode was quickly over.

Compelling states is a very different task from compelling nonstate actors; the differences are especially relevant in the category of ambiguous contingencies. As in the case of Haiti, the United States may know what it wants but be unclear whether the state's leadership has the ability to comply with U.S. demands. Nonstate actors, such as terrorists, are difficult to identify and extremely hard to target with the conventional instruments of compellence. Diplomatic initiatives founder because the real leaders cannot be identified, or because those who can be identified do not have the power to control "their" forces. Military force is also problematic because terrorists are often dispersed, with no large and obvious targets. The U.S. cruise missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998—punishments intended to compel terrorist groups to cease targeting U.S. territory or citizens—destroyed their targets, but it is unclear whether they destroyed anything of critical value to the terrorist groups.

What is at stake for the United States is inevitably a critical consideration. Demonstrating the importance of stakes, however, is easier said than done. They are easier to characterize in major regional crises, which involve high stakes almost by definition. In such cases, U.S. credibility and domestic support are likely to be higher than in cases that are less critical to core U.S. concerns. For instance, in compelling Iraq, U.S. stakes were clear during the period immediately following the Gulf War. The United States and its allies had just fought an air and ground war to protect their interests in the free flow of Gulf oil. The United States also had large forces in the region and readily deployed more troops when it was necessary to demonstrate more credibility. As time progressed, however, the U.S. stakes in Iraq became less clear, reducing U.S. credibility, inviting increased provocations by Hussein, and making compellence more difficult.

Conveying stakes is harder in cases of would-be nuclear weapons proliferators, especially if they are *not* also major regional adversaries. India, for instance, knew of the general U.S. nonproliferation stance but believed that the United States had a variety of stakes in India, including private investment and trade in military and technical goods. When push came to shove, India expected the U.S. response to its testing to be limited.

In the category of ambiguous contingencies, the task of demonstrating stakes divides. If the target is a state and the purpose is humanitarian intervention, building democracy, or promoting human rights, U.S. stakes will initially be perceived as relatively weak. If, however, the threat is from a terrorist group, the United States has proven itself willing to risk both lives and money to combat such a threat.

In the end, what matters is the relative stakes of the United States and its intended target. Compelling is harder than deterring, because if the target has committed to an action in front of its people (not to mention the world), backing down entails at least a loss of face. Labeling Milosevic a war criminal and establishing the means to try him surely was helpful in building support for the campaign against him, both at home and abroad, and he probably deserved it. But, to the extent that complying with U.S. demands meant not just losing power but losing freedom as well, the label and process gave him all the more incentive to hold out. If complying becomes tantamount to dying, then fighting to the death hardly looks worse. By contrast, having condemned Cedras in Haiti somewhat less, the United States was prepared to offer him the incentive of comfortable exile if he stepped down.

What threats and inducements are relevant? Diplomacy is part of almost every compellence campaign. It was so central to the denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus following the breakup of the Soviet Union that it strains language to say that those nations were *compelled* to relinquish their nuclear weapons; they were *persuaded* to do so.

Economic sanctions are also part of almost every campaign of compellence, despite the now-conventional wisdom that views them as ineffective and the accumulating evidence that they inflict pain on relatively innocent civilians. The burden of the argument for their use rests with those who are *for* sanctions. Moreover, the United States uses sanctions more readily against nondemocratic and adversarial regimes, such as Iraq and Haiti, which are more resistant to sanctions because their leaders insulate themselves from the sanctions. When sanctions are imposed, the prospect of lessening them serves as an inducement to comply with U.S. demands. For instance, the allied victors in the Gulf War were willing to reduce sanctions in exchange for continued cooperation with international goals as implemented through the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).

Military threats and actions typically move up a ladder of escalation: from limited air strikes to more aggressive strikes to, in some cases, ground presence or operations. Small-scale strikes, such as those against the terrorist facilities in

Sudan and Afghanistan, try to change the future behavior of adversaries or their supporters by demonstrating that the United States does have an interest in the issue. The problem with such strikes is that, like the attack on Sudan, they may invite international condemnation and convey a message precisely opposite to that intended, both to the target and the international community. Instead of raising the ante, the strikes may suggest that the United States is looking for an exit.

Why Milosevic yielded to NATO's air campaign in 1999 is, in the end, unknowable. Surely NATO's unity was impressive. Almost no one would have imagined, five years earlier or even two, that NATO would sustain its cohesion through months of bombing that took the alliance's warplanes to the skies over Belgrade. Adroit diplomacy helped as well, because Russia ultimately was persuaded to stop supporting him. In this respect, it also helped that he was his own worst enemy: Imagine if, when the bombing started, he had not accelerated his ethnic cleansing but visibly stopped it and begun to withdraw his troops. It is hard to believe that, in those circumstances, NATO would have sustained support for the air campaign.

The final clutch of pieces is still more suggestive about what compels. NATO had begun to put at risk what mattered to Milosevic. The prospect of a rejuvenated Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) offensive meant that the Yugoslav army might have to come out and fight, thus making itself vulnerable to NATO air power. Milosevic had to take threats to degrade his army seriously because it was his main support. The press accounts of NATO planning for a ground war magnified that threat. Finally, as long as the bombs were falling on Kosovo, they were not of much account to him, even if they hit military targets. Like Hussein, he did not much care about human suffering or even many military targets. Yet once the bombs began to fall on Belgrade, their impact must have been greater. They were no longer abstract; they had become a daily topic of conversation, hitting the factories of his cronies.

Who is doing the compelling? Almost all cases involved coalitions, and so will future campaigns. Even if the United States does not need either the bases or the forces provided by coalition partners, it will want the sanction of broader coalitions. Larger will be better than smaller; the more partners, the more legitimacy will be conferred. Yet the political requirements of coalition building run directly against the operational needs of the compellence campaign. Not only is it harder and slower for coalitions to plan and generate forces to back military threats, but coalitions limit options and make their actions transparent to adversaries. NATO could bomb Belgrade in March 1999 but not in March 1998, because it first had to demonstrate to the wavering among its members—not to

mention critical nonmembers such as Russia—that more limited steps had failed before it could move more assertively. NATO was locked into a very rigid, and very transparent, ladder of escalation. It could not jump steps to shock its opponent.

There is no escape from this policy dilemma. Sometimes when U.S. stakes are important or, conversely, the scope of the conflict is limited, the United States may act unilaterally; in other cases it may prefer smaller “coalitions of the willing” despite the lesser legitimacy they confer. In an ideal world—one approximated by the first years after the demise of the Soviet Union, when Russia was very cooperative—the United States would seek broad UN authorization, with subsequent implementation left to NATO or to the United States alone. Perhaps Kosovo will be a limited precedent for “regional” authorization when the UN is paralyzed. The United States might come to rue that precedent if either Russia or China one day came to construe regional authorization by its own definition. But trying to give NATO decisions legitimacy in the eyes of most of Europe seems a partial response to the downside of broader global coalitions. For part of the Haiti campaign, the Organization of American States performed a similar role for the Americas, initially on the argument that the stakes at play were of interest mostly to Haiti’s neighbors.

Framing Compellent Campaigns

Recognizing compellence as a campaign requires asking, first, the inconvenient question: What if the target does not fall in the wake of utter military defeat? What if Milosevic is still around in five years? What if India continues to be tempted to test nuclear weapons for the next generation? Will the United States and its partners be left with dry powder, or will their credibility be diminished, along with their ability to up the pressure the next time around? The questions amount to the injunction to conceive, at the beginning, a series of what-ifs and interactions between U.S. threats and target responses.

Not thinking of compellence in terms of campaigns has made handling an adversary’s countermeasures more difficult. The United States often does not have a good idea of what countermeasures the adversary is likely to try and has not thought through the campaign enough to envision a response. For instance, it was hard for NATO to imagine that its three-phase campaign in Kosovo would not bring Milosevic to the table. Worse, thinking through the options that would be necessary if these phases were unsuccessful risked breaking apart the coalition

1. Introduction

This report begins by defining *compellence* and its kin, *deterrence*. It then sets out a template of questions to frame the cases. The third section provides thumbnail sketches of the lead cases, and the appendix reports the evidence from those cases in more detail, organized as responses to the questions. The cases themselves are available separately, in published form for Iraq and in draft for the others. The fourth section looks across the three cases and their categories, again within the framework of the questions. To extend the reach of the analysis, this comparison also makes use of other cases the project looked at in less detail in each of the three categories. The final section draws out the lessons and recommendations from the analysis.

Categories, Cases, and Terms of Reference

For starters, it is useful to think of the cases in which the United States confronts choices about compellent strategies in three categories:

- *Compellence in major crises.* The United States has important interests in several regions of the world. When crises arise, those interests can be threatened, and U.S. action is likely. The United States may seek to intimidate states or leaders to prevent or reverse aggression in both civil and interstate conflicts. If regional adversaries are truly strong enough to threaten U.S. interests and other states in the region, they almost certainly have military forces employed for these purposes. Therefore, the United States will probably need to make military threats and deploy military forces. The U.S. campaign against Iraq from the 1990–1991 Gulf War until the present exhibits many of the problems inherent in trying to compel a state in this category. Other cases in this category include Suez, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Such states will, like Iraq or North Korea, often be potential nuclear weapons proliferators, and so fit into two of the categories.
- *Compelling would-be proliferators.* While the technologies, information, and materials needed to create weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have become increasingly widespread, the United States has maintained a strong interest in preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery systems. The United States seeks to prevent programs from maturing and to keep mature programs from testing. Compellence tasks in this category

include convincing states or nonstate actors (1) not to test; (2) to give up weapons, materials, or technology; or (3) to allow inspections of its production sites to ensure compliance with agreements such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). From 1974 to 1998, the United States tried to persuade India not to test its nuclear capability again. India was unusual in this category, for it was a friendly state, surely not a foe. Other cases of trying to compel would-be proliferators include North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan.

- *Compelling nonstate or ambiguous actors.* In these contingencies, the ambiguities may be either *strategic*, about how important the case is to the United States, or *tactical*, about the local situation, and usually are both. Preponderant U.S. force may not be worth using, or usable, or compelling. The necessity of calibrating government actions to what the U.S. body politic will think justified will be especially hard, and public support will be brittle and susceptible to swings if casualties mount.

These operations will, almost by their nature, be multilateral, so understanding coalition partners will be imperative. This category thus puts a premium not just on tactical intelligence but on mindsets in evaluating would-be friends, foes, or those in between. The press tended to refer to the various faction leaders in Somalia as warlords or thugs, and to some extent policymakers understood them as such. But some of them had been involved in a lifetime struggle for power, one that began before the United States arrived and would continue long after it left. What compelling them required had to be seen in that light. Compellence tasks in this category include limiting humanitarian disasters, stopping genocide or ethnic cleansing, replacing regimes, or combating terrorism. In Haiti in 1994, the United States had to confront a new and unfriendly military dictatorship, compelling it to step down using the threat of force. Other compellence cases that fall within this category include Somalia and Libya.

The project looked in detail at an example from each category. We examined each in the context of emerging hypotheses about lessons that also grew out of less-detailed reviews of other cases to provide some validation of the conclusions that emerged from the lead cases. The categories are artificial, and some cases, like Iraq, belong to several; a large part of the U.S. campaign regarding Iraq was centered on controlling its ability to proliferate. Other cases fit the categories awkwardly. The project looked at coercing Milosevic, for instance, precisely because Kosovo did not quite match Iraq in the nature of U.S. stakes, and it also had some characteristics of the ambiguous category. Yet it seemed a far cry from Haiti.

The purpose of the project was to draw implications for U.S. strategy—particularly its military strategy, its military instruments, and force posture. The three lead cases are important by themselves, so their particularities are important. Thus, the cases were assessed as exemplars of the categories, and Section 3 draws comparisons across those categories. As is always true when the number of cases is small, providing rigorous proof of hypotheses is not possible. Rather, the project's premise is that while the particularities of the cases matter, it is still useful to derive some rules of thumb. Many of those rules are best expressed as "if, then" guidelines: If the case at hand is X, then beware of Y.

The cases were examined within a roughly common set of questions, one that grew out of the framework for thinking about compellence, as enriched by the hypotheses about lessons:¹

Who was to be compelled? How good was the understanding of *who*? How important are distinctions among types of regimes—between friend and adversary, and between governments and nonstate actors? Understanding the target's sources of power or legitimacy, its motives and mindsets, and its strengths and weaknesses will be important.

To do what? How clearly was the purpose understood? Did goals change over time?

With what stakes and instruments? How important were U.S. stakes in the outcome? How clear were they? What options were available, especially military? Which military instruments were missing, and why?

In what context? Did the United States start in a strong position—one based on preponderant force, history, or reputation?

With what partners and politics? How difficult was building support and conveying signals, both internally and with regard to would-be supporters or coalition partners? How much did that matter?

How good was the analysis? How well were the target and its power base understood? How rich was the analysis of alternative strategies, possible countermeasures, responses, and systemic effects—and specific responses to these consequences? Was there an understanding of how long the campaign might last? This evaluation will be subjective and elusive.

¹For a similar framework, as well as a rich discussion of closely related issues, see National Research Council, *Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), p. 13.

2. Terms, Concepts, and Questions

Defining Compellence

This report uses *compellence* and *coercion* more or less interchangeably.¹ In principle they are distinguished from *denial*, *brute force*, or other actual military operations because they involve threats, including military ones, that the would-be compeller hopes will never have to be carried out. Compellence and coercion aim to affect the enemy's will rather than its capabilities. Thus, compellence is not narrowly military but rather a politico-military strategy for reconciling a conflict of interest with an adversary; it is a test of wills.

In fact, the reality of the cases defied the neatness of categories—a reminder that the categories and distinctions originally grew out of the conceptual tidiness of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation. The cases were all *campaigns*, not point episodes. In several, force was actually used, and that use became part of the baseline for the next compellence effort, again in the hope of limiting the actual use of force. The cases also cast doubt on the conventional wisdom, which holds that if threats fail and force is actually used, it should be employed in “discrete and controlled increments” to compel the opponent to “revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict,” in Alexander George's words.²

Compellence and coercion are close kin of *deterrence*; this report is really about all three. The distinction between deterrence and compellence turns on whether the party to be influenced must merely refrain from acting or must either stop doing something it is doing or do something that it is not. The distinction can be a fine one, even a semantic one. The task for U.S. policy in the late 1990s was either to deter India from testing or to compel it not to test. In hindsight, with better information, it now appears that, at some point, the task changed: As India's intentions to test became firmer, the desire to deter it from doing something it may or may not have intended turned into compelling it to divert from a course it had set.

¹Some of the literature establishes a broad category of *coercion*, of which *deterrence* and *compellence* are subcategories. In common language, *coercion* usually implies something more active than attempts to reinforce the status quo; we use it here more or less synonymously with *compellence*.

²Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 18–19.

The term *compellence*, in international relations, owes its origins to Thomas Schelling,³ who noted that the problems of deterring an enemy's advance and compelling its retreat were similar yet different.⁴ For him, the difference between the two turned on initiative and timing. A deterrent threat is a promised reaction to an adversary whose potential action evokes a specified response, the timing of which is in principle automatic. A compellent threat, on the other hand, is a more active or "offensive" strategy undertaken on the initiative of the threatener. The timing of such threats is crucial in determining success: Too strict a deadline makes compliance impossible, while one too lenient makes compliance unnecessary.

Hence, compellence is more complex than deterrence, because of the time element and the need to ask, "How much is enough?" in terms of the threatened sanctions. Deterrence is usually easier—but its success harder to judge—because the deterred party need not do anything visible.⁵ Thus, that party does not suffer any loss of face and can simply argue or imply that it never intended to do the thing in any event. For that reason, success *is* hard to judge: Were the United States and the Soviet Union deterred in any meaningful sense from nuclear attacks on each other, or, given the awesome unpredictabilities, did they simply know better and never really intend to strike each other in any case?

By contrast, conceding to a compellent threat is visible, and usually the conceding side must devise an "excuse," preferably a "rationalized reinterpretation" of its original commitment.⁶ That said, the moral burden, and so the broader public reaction, may be different in the two cases. Often, if the status quo is of long standing, it acquires a certain legitimacy; therefore, making deterrent threats to sustain it will be regarded differently from using coercion to upset it. The would-be compeller may be held responsible not only for upsetting the status quo but for violence or other unpredictable consequences that ensue during the confrontation. It was, for instance, NATO that had to take the initiative in Kosovo to eject Serbian troops. Of course, the would-be compeller may regard a status quo, even one of long standing, as illegitimate and be prepared to act accordingly. That is probably the case in China's view of Taiwan's increasing independence.

³Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69–91.

⁴Schelling notes that J. David Singer made a similar distinction using the terms *persuasion*, where the subject is desired to "act," and *dissuasion*, where the subject is desired to abstain. See J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 17 (1963), pp. 420–430.

⁵Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Peace* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 30–31. Also see Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 44.

⁶Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 34.

Compellence and deterrence share the vocabulary of threats. Both imply punishment in some form. This project focused on military threats and military instruments, but in principle, coercive threats cover a range: from diplomatic words or actions, through political or economic sanctions, to covert or information operations. Similarly, the focus of the project was on sticks, not carrots. But thinking about compellence should include *inducements* as well, and this project did so; inducements can, in principle, help the coerced party to climb down from its commitment.

At both extremes of instruments, the language of threat becomes inapt, and thus the extremes probably should be regarded as at the edges of this report's subject. At one extreme, if diplomacy alone succeeded, more or less without threats, it would be better described as persuasion than compellence. For instance, it is probably fairer to say that Ukraine was persuaded to forgo its nuclear weapons in the 1990s rather than compelled to do so; the United States offered concrete inducements beyond pure persuasion.

At the other extreme, the allies' ground campaign in Desert Storm followed a compellent campaign that had failed; Iraq was not compelled to withdraw from Kuwait by threats but forced to do so by arms. Again, Schelling is eloquent on the transition: "Brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply."⁷

Figure 2.1 displays the range of instruments of influence in a stylized way, along with the general idea that the level of threat or harm goes up across the spectrum.

Points A and B are intended to represent the dilemma of sanctions, which is discussed in Section 4. Economic sanctions are often thought of in the continuum of instruments as more than diplomacy but less than force. In fact, as the cases demonstrate, they can inflict considerable harm—often, unfortunately, on relatively innocent citizens and not on the leaders they are intended to influence.

⁷Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 3.




Figure 2.1—Instruments of Influence

Determinants of Success⁸

Because U.S. compellent campaigns involve threats with regard to places far from the U.S. homeland, the question of credibility looms large. Credibility turns on factors that may be relatively independent of a particular episode. *Reputation* is one: If cab drivers as a group are thought to be aggressive, then any particular cab driver will find it easier to deter other drivers from taking them on and coerce them into submission. In Schelling's words:

Few parts of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves . . . but defending them or running risks to protect them may preserve one's commitments to action in other parts of the world at later times.⁹

This received wisdom sees particular crises as connected tests of reputation, but there are grounds for skepticism about too rigid a view of the connections. Perceptions of the particular instance may matter more than images based on

⁸Compare this list with National Research Council, cited above, p. 21ff; see also the notes on analyzing and modeling processes of deterrence and compellence, p. 36ff.

⁹Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 124.

past behavior in other places; the U.S. failure in Vietnam, for instance, did not seem to diminish U.S. credibility in Europe, at least in Soviet eyes.¹⁰

A general perception of willingness to suffer pain is a second factor bearing on credibility.¹¹ Many coercive threats involve costs to the would-be compeller; the higher the cost, the lower the credibility, and the more reputation matters. For this reason, mad leaders—or political systems that produce unpredictable results—may be more credible because they might just cut off their noses to spite their faces. Conveying the appearance of irrationality can introduce uncertainty in the enemy's decisionmaking calculus by breaking the connection between the would-be compeller's present action and the pattern of past actions in similar circumstances.¹²

Other crucial factors depend on the nature of the case and the strategy. *Will* and *stakes* are two sides of the same coin, so the more important the interest at play is for the compeller—or the more important it can be made to seem—the more credible the threat.¹³ The difficulty for the United States is that beyond the cold war, in Jervis's words, "few imaginable disputes will engage vital U.S. interests," and so the "balance of resolve" is likely to favor U.S. opponents.¹⁴ Worse, if possible U.S. opponents fear big losses in the short run, they may resist U.S. threats or go to war in the hope of making future gains.¹⁵

Thus, compellent strategies attempt to manipulate credibility in a variety of ways. Declarations seek to magnify stakes, and military deployments advertise threatening intentions. "Painting oneself into a corner" or "tying one's hands" are also familiar; the United States may have experienced a little of both in dealing with Iraq (although it did not always like the military corner into which

¹⁰See Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

¹¹Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, p. 17.

¹²See also Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 25–27.

¹³This straightforward conclusion is reflected in, for instance, Paul Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 43.

¹⁴See Robert Jervis, "What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?" in L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazar, eds., *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 130. On the "balance of resolve," see T.V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Shai Feldman, "Middle East Nuclear Stability: The State of the Region and the State of the Debate," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 215.

¹⁵On these issues, see John Arquilla and Paul K. Davis, *Extended Deterrence, Compellence and the "Old World Order,"* N-3482-JS (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992) and Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla, *Thinking About Opponent Behavior in Crisis and Conflict: A Generic Model for Analysis and Group Discussion*, N-3322-JS (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991); Barbara Farnham, ed., *Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995); and Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1992), pp. 283–310.

it painted itself). Nuclear strategists dreamed up "doomsday machines" that would tie the coercer's hands absolutely, or "threats that left something to chance" that would do so probabilistically.

The key to "threats that leave something to chance" is that, although one may or may not carry them out if the threatened party fails to comply, the final decision is not altogether under the threatener's control. The threat is not of the form "I may or may not, as I choose," but has an element of "I may or may not, and even I cannot be altogether sure."¹⁶ The oldest of these is "I cannot guarantee that I will be able to control my troops."¹⁷ Volatile politics may be another instance. Americans may be nearly as uncertain as their would-be opponents whether a given case will turn out to be a Lebanon or a Somalia, which the American public judges a game not worth the risk, or a Pearl Harbor, when stakes lost lead to redoubling.

Timing and sequencing are also crucial, more so than the classic literature suggests. Much of that literature focuses on discrete threats and responses, but recent instances of compellence have been *campaigns*, not single threats and responses. The language of *campaign* is apt not just because it calls attention to the time dimension. It also leaves open the nature of the sequence of actions. To the extent that the classics consider a sequence of threats and responses, the shadow of "controlled or graduated response" is powerful, as is the later "tit-for-tat."¹⁸ Notice George's language cited near the beginning of this section. His ideas are rooted in limiting violence and demonstrating credibility. Vietnam seemed to convey the lesson that graduated response was ineffective; it did so despite some of the U.S. escalations in Vietnam being more massive than graduated.

More recent military operations, from Desert Storm to the intervention force in Bosnia, appear to testify to the value of massive force. As one recent study puts it:

The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force.¹⁹

¹⁶Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, p. 188.

¹⁷See, for instance, William Shakespeare, *Henry V*, 3. 3.

¹⁸On tit-for-tat, see Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

¹⁹Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance* (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996), p. 19.

That force may cow opponents into inaction; if it does not, it still may mean that the ensuing conflict will be so one-sided as to be relatively bloodless for the United States and its allies.

Perhaps, by similar logic, compellence campaigns should contemplate threats of massive, disproportionate violence early on. Such threats would be beset by credibility problems. America's well-known aversion to casualties might, though, be turned to advantage: Adversaries might judge the probability of the threat being carried out as low but also reckon the cost as if it were very high, on the awareness that *any* use of force would be massive enough to shock—and to diminish the risk of U.S. casualties. In any event, controlled response versus overwhelming force is a provocative theme in thinking about compellence.

Finally, *who* is compelling and being compelled is paramount. As Schelling put it a generation ago:

[A]nalogies with individuals are helpful; but they are counterproductive if they make us forget that a government does not reach a decision in the same way as an individual in a government. Collective decision depends on the internal politics and bureaucracy of government, on the chain of command and on the lines of communication, on party structures and pressure groups, as well as on individual values and careers.²⁰

Schelling was writing about the Soviet Union, but his language is apt for the cases in this project. Even in the cases where personalizing the target of the campaign is most tempting, such as Hussein or Milosevic, Schelling's admonition still directs attention to the leader's bases of support. If the leader is an autocrat (an elected one in Milosevic's case), he still has to reckon his stakes in light of his support base and his ability to command.

Two dimensions of who is being compelled are critical, sometimes in surprising ways. One dimension runs from *friend* to *foe*; the other from *autocrat* to *democrat*. On the one hand, compelling friends constrains U.S. options. No matter how concerned the United States was over India's nuclear ambitions, a military strike either to impress New Delhi or to degrade its capacity never was on the agenda. On the other hand, friends may pay more attention to U.S. threats precisely because they place value on the friendship. Targets of U.S. covert action were, for instance, very different in the 1950s and the 1980s. The former, Mossadeq in Iran or Arbenz in Guatemala, did not seek U.S. hostility; they cared how Washington viewed them, and so relatively small threats were magnified. For Iran in the

²⁰Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 86.

1980s or Saddam in the 1990s, however, the United States was more useful as an enemy than as a friend, and standing up to U.S. threats had positive value.²¹

In the present an irony arises, noted by studies of economic sanctions, that democratic countries whose elites care about the United States or world opinion are more easily influenced than authoritarian regimes less affected by the opinions either of the world or their own citizens.²² Sanctions had an effect on white South Africa because it was a democracy, albeit a circumscribed one, and, more important, because those whites cared what the world thought.

The *who* issue applies with equal force to compelled and compeller. Compellence, for the United States, is carried out in the context of domestic politics. Domestic politics affect all foreign policy, but the effect is sharper in this realm because threat-making is signaling; would-be targets will read not just the words of the U.S. government but also the public music behind the words. The deliberate, transparent decisionmaking process in democratic countries creates a disadvantage in bargaining because the opposing side knows the limits of the commitments that the democracy can enter. Conversely, the limits can sometimes add credibility to a bargaining position.²³ The U.S. executive mostly disdains the automatic sanctions Congress sometimes favors, but those represent a form of tying one's hands.

Moreover, many compellent strategies depend at least on international approval, as registered by the UN or a coalition broad enough to confer legitimacy, if not the cooperation of a group of partners. At a minimum, the costs and benefits of unilateral American action have to be reckoned not just directly—in money, lives at risk, and lost commerce—but in the lesser tangibles of whether the United States might be perceived as ceding the moral high ground even if it achieved its proximate objectives.

The requirements of speaking to these different audiences will conflict. This feature is also shared by much of foreign policy but perhaps carries more weight here because words count, but only for their portrayal of stakes and willingness to bear costs. Building support for compellent strategies at home may lead, as in

²¹See Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 191ff.

²²See, for instance, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "Sanctions-Happy USA," *International Economics Policy Briefs*, Institute for International Economics, July 1998. Recent assessments of sanctions have all been dim. See for instance, Richard Haass, "Sanctioning Madness," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1997), pp. 74–85; and Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90–136.

²³Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, p. 22. "These tactics . . . rest on the paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself; that, in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent."

the case of Iraq, to overselling what those words can achieve. Strong language directed at those to be compelled may frighten or arouse domestic opinion, and it may scare off would-be supporters or coalition partners in a kind of twist on the Duke of Wellington's famous line that he hoped his troops would frighten the enemy because they surely scared him.

A first checklist of propositions about success would concentrate on who is being compelled; on stakes and motivation; on what instruments are being employed; on who is doing the compelling; and on how the campaign is conducted.

Success is more likely when:

- the foe is hostile, not friendly
- the foe is nondemocratic
- the adversary regime is isolated from its own population, and its policies are perceived to promote narrow regime survival interests rather than "national" interests that command broad support among the population
- the specific bases of the regime's power can be identified accurately and threatened with unacceptable damage without harming the population as a whole
- the intrinsic stakes at issue are more important to the United States than to the adversary, thus the "balance of resolve" is in the American favor
- the status quo is clearly defined and accepted
- previous U.S. actions involving the adversary have demonstrated resolve, credibility, and a high valuation of the stakes at issue
- the adversary's compliance with U.S. demands are clearly visible, not subjective and arguable
- the U.S. interests are narrow security stakes, rather than broader goals like the protection of democracy or human rights
- the United States acts with broad domestic support
- the United States acts—ideally—unilaterally, rather than multilaterally, except when the territory of U.S. allies or coalition partners is directly at risk
- the threats employed are direct, unambiguous, and visibly proportional to the stakes at issue
- U.S. policy is conceived as a campaign, not as an episode, with emphasis on continuity.

Testing and extending these propositions is the purpose for examining the cases.

3. Iraq, India, and Haiti

This section provides thumbnail sketches of the three lead cases. The next section makes comparisons across these and others in the three categories.

Iraq

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was an attempt by Saddam Hussein to move Iraq into a stronger position in the Middle East by both increasing its power and dominance and by taking control of the Kuwaiti oil fields. Given U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil, Washington saw Hussein's invasion of Kuwait as a threat to one of its crucial interests. This major regional crisis led to the Gulf War and the beginning of a coercion campaign that has stretched across many issues and many years. The campaign has included both successes and failures. This history suggests lessons about how to compel Iraq in the future and, more generally, about compellence in major regional crises.

In all, the United States and its allies attempted to compel Iraq eight times between 1991 and 1998:¹

- At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, a thumping defeat of Iraq's military forces in both a protracted air campaign and then a short but decisive ground war led Hussein to accept allied terms—including inspections of potential weapon facilities by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Hussein's subsequent refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspectors forced the United States and Britain to threaten air strikes. In both March and September 1991, the United States strengthened its forces in the Gulf to make its threats apparent. These shows of force compelled Hussein to accept UNSCOM inspections again.
- In 1991, Hussein's Baath regime struck the Kurds in northern Iraq to suppress an antigovernment insurgency. The allies intervened and created a safe haven for the Kurds, sending large numbers of forces to the region and compelling Hussein to withdraw his forces.

¹This list of compellence attempts is drawn from the study completed for the project by Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War*, MR-1146-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000).

- In 1992, the United States created a no-fly zone in southern Iraq to protect the area inhabited by Shi'a Muslims after they had been attacked by Iraqi forces. The U.S. forces put in place to protect this area compelled Hussein to withdraw his forces from there as well.
- In 1993, Iraq defied both the UNSCOM inspection regime and the no-fly zone but backed down after allied forces conducted several air strikes against Iraqi military facilities.
- Hussein did not implement a contemplated 1994 invasion of Kuwait in the face of a rapid U.S. deployment of forces to the area.
- In 1996, Hussein intervened in the Kurdish war in the north, defying the restrictions on entering the safe haven. Again, when faced with U.S. cruise missile strikes on his military facilities, Hussein withdrew his troops.
- From 1997 to 1998, Hussein refused to comply with UNSCOM inspections, backing down only when directly threatened by U.S. bombings.
- Finally, in 1998, the United States launched air and cruise missile strikes to compel Hussein to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections, although the campaign failed to reinstitute the inspection regime.

Despite Hussein's repeated defiance, the compellence campaign in Iraq was a success in achieving U.S. goals. Iraq's regional influence remains limited, and Hussein has not been able to field a nuclear arsenal. To be sure, Iraq's long-term goals have not changed, and so a continued U.S. compellence campaign will be needed to contain this major regional adversary.

What was striking about the Iraq campaign was how much U.S. objectives changed over time, without explicit explanation to or understanding by critical publics, especially in the United States. The first objective was obvious: Get Iraq out of Kuwait. The second flowed from the first but was stubbornly difficult, i.e., getting rid of Iraqi programs for WMD. With that objective partly achieved but partly frustrated, U.S. objectives turned toward ridding Iraq of Hussein, an objective considered at the beginning of the campaign but then rejected as perhaps a remedy worse than the disease.

India²

In 1974, India carried out its first nuclear test. Following this so-called peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), the United States began a campaign that spanned more

²This discussion is based on an unpublished case study conducted for the RAND project by Chris Fair and Ashley Tellis.

than 20 years. It varied between more general deterrence and more specific compellence, depending on whether India seemed to have little or great immediate intention to test.³ The main U.S. goal was inducing India to ratify the NPT and give up any intention to obtain a visible, proven nuclear arsenal.

From 1974 to 1983, the U.S. campaign was one of more general deterrence, relying on persuasion backed by both sticks and carrots, and it was successful. The United States sought to deter India from testing in circumstances where India apparently had made no specific decision to test. This approach relied on both legislative and diplomatic instruments to create a general climate of Indian-American relations in which New Delhi would see it in its interest not to test. The United States had passed laws that, in addition to international agreements such as the NPT, threatened to impose costs on India in the form of economic sanctions and reduced cooperation should it go through with any tests. At the end of this period, the United States also added several carrots to its compellence efforts by recognizing India as the "leader in South Asia" and taking steps to increase technology sharing with it.

Despite these benefits, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi apparently contemplated testing in the early 1980s, on the calculations that became sharper in later years. The 1974 explosion had not given India sufficient data to build its arsenal without further testing. A test would also underscore that India was the leading power in South Asia and a country with technological prowess on a par with that of developed nations.⁴

Moreover, there were domestic political arguments for testing. Nuclear weapons were hardly the issue atop Indians' minds, but when pressed, public opinion

³This distinction parallels that made by Patrick Morgan and used by Byman, Waxman, and Larson in their study of coercion: "General deterrence involves preventing an action, whether it is planned or not; general deterrent threats are always present to some degree. Immediate deterrence focuses on a specific, planned event." Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson, *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*, MR-1061-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), p. 11. On this terminology, see Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Library of Social Science, 1977). As with other distinctions, this one, too, is best thought of as a continuum, not a dichotomy. General deterrence applies more broadly, over time, perhaps against ambiguity about whether the target actually plans to act or not, while specific deterrence or compellence applies in a sharper, shorter crisis period when it is clearer that the target may act.

⁴From the 1960s on, leading scientists and strategists in India made statements about the importance of going through with nuclear tests both as a technological achievement and as a demonstration of India's power. After the 1974 PNE, R.V.R. Chandrasekhara Rao wrote that "... there can be little doubt that India's prestige in fact increased. As with France and China, the initial inveighing against the acquisition of nuclear capability will be followed by the respect that power always attracts in this world." See Rao, "Proliferation and the Indian Test," *Survival*, Vol. 16, No. 5 (1974), pp. 210-216. In 1990, Dr. Kalam, the head of the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), stated that "Strength respects strength. When a country is technologically strong other countries will respect it." See Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, *Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation*, Adelphi Paper 313 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997).

from the 1960s through the 1998 test remained in favor of building the bomb.⁵ In addition, the Indian armed forces, as well as a coalition of pro-nuclear scientists, bureaucrats, and strategists, kept significant pressure on the ruling party to test.⁶ This pressure had induced Gandhi to demonstrate India's nuclear prowess with the 1974 PNE when her popularity began to wane after the 1971 war with Pakistan, and it led her again to consider a nuclear test when faced with domestic pressures.

In the end, though, the costs of testing in the early 1980s were still too high. India was deterred from testing by fears of international condemnation, a potential downturn in Indo-U.S. relations, and direct U.S. reprisals through economic sanctions in accordance with nonproliferation legislation that had recently been tightened.⁷ Shafts were constructed at the Pokhran test site in 1982 and 1983 in preparation for resumed testing, but tests were not again seriously contemplated during this period.⁸ India "reached an understanding with the U.S. that India would refrain from further tests."⁹ By the end of 1983, however, it became clear that the United States was not restraining Pakistan from moving forward with its own nuclear program as it had promised.¹⁰

⁵According to a 1994 survey, the nuclear issue was not the leading issue for the Indian population (only 6 percent of respondents ranked it as the most important issue facing India). However, when questioned about the nuclear issue directly, the majority of Indians were pro-weaponization. The Indian Institute for Public Opinion repeatedly asked whether the Indian population supported building the bomb. In 1968, 73 percent supported weaponization, followed by 68 percent in 1970, and 75 percent after the PNE in 1974. Of those surveyed in 1987, 53 percent favored weaponization if Pakistan went nuclear, and 56 percent were pro-nuclear in 1992. Cited in Thomas W. Graham, *India's Nuclear Program: A Briefing*, unpublished background paper for The Asia Society, New York, 1994. In 1994, 57 percent of the Indian elite favored the government's current policy of neither confirming nor denying India's nuclear capabilities. Thirty-three percent of respondents wanted to see India go overtly nuclear, and only 8 percent were opposed to pursuing a nuclear capability. This survey of elites was taken by the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame. See David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., *India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 11. Cortright and Mattoo also indicate that a less sophisticated poll by *India Today* was taken in 1995 in which 62 percent of those surveyed favored "[exploding] an atomic bomb today." See David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, "India and the Bomb: A Post-Election Status Report" (May 1996) at <http://208.240.90.149/coalition/india.htm>. An informal 1998 India Forum poll registered 89 percent supporting India's decision to test.

⁶See Sidhu, pp. 28–29, and Stephen Philip Cohen, "Nuclear Neighbors," in Stephen Philip Cohen, ed., *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 9.

⁷"Slow March," *India Today*, May 25, 1988.

⁸Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, *Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparation in the Rajasthan Desert: A CTB Verification Regime* (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia Laboratories, 1996).

⁹Sidhu, p. 51.

¹⁰The Indian quid pro quo was a specific exchange of their promise not to proceed with their nuclear program if the United States would curtail Pakistan's program. There was a companion agreement between the United States and Pakistan in which General Zia ul-Haq promised to cease Pakistan's program in exchange for economic and military assistance from the United States. See M.Z.I. Cheema, *Indian Nuclear Strategy: 1947–1991*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of London (1991), p. 216; and Virginia Foran and Leonard Spector, "Application of Incentives to Nuclear Proliferation," in David Cortright, ed., *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), p. 40.

Notwithstanding what seemed to India a broken bargain, the U.S. compellence campaign was also successful from 1984–1990 in keeping India from testing again. During this period, India began to reap the benefits of the technology-sharing provisions implemented earlier. And the United States sweetened efforts to improve Indian-American relations and wean India away from Soviet influence with a 1984 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Sensitive Technologies, Commodities and Information. The MOU was significant because it allowed more U.S. military equipment and other technologies to be transferred to India.

However, by 1990 internal debates within the U.S. government over what the MOU covered and what types of materials would be transferred to India had limited what India actually received.¹¹ Moreover, India's test launches of *Agni* and *Prithvi* missiles had made it much more difficult for the United States to sustain its technology-sharing initiatives. By 1989, both Pakistan and China traded more with the United States than did India.¹²

Beginning in the early 1990s, the United States became more explicit in articulating its goal of eliminating India's nuclear program. Despite its disappointment with the MOU, India was relying more on U.S. technology due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the United States sought to increase Indian stakes in bilateral cooperation. It targeted India for direct investment and expanded commercial contacts. In 1991 it also implemented the Kicklighter proposals which, although not intended to directly affect India's nuclear posture, did deepen military cooperation between the two countries.

On the "stick" side, in 1994 the United States enacted the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. While much of the act simply restated law dating back to the 1970s, it restricted the president's discretion in waiving sanctions against states that violated U.S. proliferation policy. In December 1995, in the run-up to India's elections, there was evidence of increased activity at the Pokhran test site. Prime Minister Rao either may have been prepared to test to steal the nationalists' clothes or may have hoped the preparations alone would give him a boost in the elections. In any event, the U.S. ambassador showed him satellite photos of the site and argued that now-mandatory U.S. sanctions would do grave damage to the economy and thus to Rao's electoral prospects. Rao promised not to test but then lost the elections.

¹¹These debates took place between the U.S. Department of State and the Defense Technology Security Administration. See Satu P. Limaye, *U.S.-Indian Relations: The Pursuit of Accommodation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 207–209.

¹²Thomas Raju, "U.S. Transfers of 'Dual-Use' Technologies to India," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 1990), p. 840.

In 1995, to India's surprise, the NPT was indefinitely extended, and the next year the CTBT was signed with promises of entry into force by September 1999. The two treaties put a significant deadline on India—its government believed that, once in effect, they would make testing prohibitively costly by requiring the signatories to institute comprehensive sanctions against India.

India perceived that its security environment was deteriorating, given developing Pakistani weapon programs, the looming Chinese threat, and decreased confidence in the United States as a strong ally. Worse, cooperation between China and Pakistan was more and more apparent, leading to Pakistan's test of the *Ghauri* missile. The United States had relaxed just those sanctions against China that had been imposed when that country violated the U.S. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by exporting missile technologies to Pakistan.¹³ The Pakistani test launch in April 1998 provided an immediate rationale for India's nuclear testing; India decided to test only two days after the *Ghauri* launch.¹⁴

The final factor was domestic politics. The Hindu nationalist BJP had come to power in 1996 but fell after only 13 days. It returned to power again in March 1998 on a platform that strongly favored testing and building nuclear weapons. Thus, to ensure its own security against present and future threats, India went through with the 1998 tests. What looked to the United States like a campaign that had been modified through several instances of immediate deterrence by updating and clarifying its threats seemingly appeared to Indians as a general deterrence campaign that had never singled India out to be a "critical non-proliferation case."¹⁵ To Indian leaders, the costs of *not* testing had gone up.

¹³The United States had imposed sanctions on China for its trade in missiles and missile technologies to Pakistan and Syria in 1991. Later that year, the United States convinced China to agree to abide by the MTCR, and sanctions were lifted. However, China transferred M-11s to Pakistan in 1992, and sanctions were reimposed. U.S. sanctions were lifted by the end of 1994 and have not been reinstituted despite clear evidence that trade between China and Pakistan on critical missile technologies has not stopped. See <http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/mpakpos.htm>.

¹⁴The Prime Minister's Principal Secretary claimed of India's test, "We had to show a credible deterrent capability not only to the outside world, but to our own people." See Manoj Joshi, "Nuclear Shock Wave," *India Today*, May 1998.

¹⁵Tellis and Fair, p. 2.

Haiti¹⁶

In September 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, elected president of Haiti only nine months before with 68 percent of the vote, was overthrown in a military coup and forced to flee the country. A junta led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras took power and began immediately to suppress Aristide supporters. It instituted a wave of repression that killed as many as 3,000 Haitians and forced approximately 200,000 others into hiding.

In addition to the brutality of the Cedras regime, Haiti's extreme poverty was exacerbated by economic sanctions, which the Organization of American States (OAS) called for almost immediately in response to the Cedras takeover. For its part, the United States suspended foreign aid to Haiti and froze the regime's foreign assets. These two factors led to a massive refugee movement from the country: In the first six months of Cedras's reign, more than 35,000 Haitians fled the country by boat, hoping to reach safety in the United States.¹⁷

The United States initially offered asylum from persecution for qualified Haitians but was soon overwhelmed by the sheer number of refugees. President Bush began to repatriate Haitians forcibly. As a presidential candidate in 1992, Bill Clinton seemed to give Haitians hope for expanded asylum, but the State Department estimated that hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Haiti's 6.4 million people would flee to the United States if they could. When he took office, Clinton continued repatriating refugees until the sheer magnitude of the suffering, along with domestic pressure, induced him to grant asylum to more Haitians. This change again set loose huge waves of refugees, again provoking a crisis in American policy. Therefore, U.S. policy changed once again: Haitian refugees would no longer be granted asylum in the United States, although they would be considered for resettlement in third countries.

The refugee crisis, plus the widespread suffering in Haiti and the overthrow of democracy, drew both U.S. and worldwide attention to Haiti. Forcible repatriation of the refugees was both morally and politically untenable, and the Clinton administration began to seek a negotiated solution to the crisis. Immediately after the first economic sanctions in February 1992, the OAS

¹⁶The background in this summary is drawn from S. Paul Kapur, "Might and Rights: The Operational Culture of Humanitarian Military Intervention," unpublished dissertation, Chapter 4, University of Chicago, 1999; and a draft case completed for the project by Tanya Charlick-Paley and Michele Zanini, "Haiti 1991-1994: A Case Study of Asymmetrical Compellence Under Strategic Ambiguity," unpublished draft (RAND).

¹⁷Iain Guest, "Refugee Policy: Leading up to Governors Island," in George Fauriol, ed., *Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995) p. 77.

negotiated an agreement between Haitian legislators and Aristide; known as the Washington Protocol, it called for eventually returning Aristide to office. It failed, however, when Haiti's legislature, controlled by Cedras, ultimately failed to ratify it in December 1992.

Over the next year and a half, the United States tightened sanctions and became more explicit about its goals. A UN/OAS mission in January 1993 sought a political compromise but without a clear timetable for Aristide's return. When, in April, a UN/OAS envoy told the military leaders that they must cede power in return for promises of amnesty from Aristide, he was rebuffed. The next month, the envoy and a special advisor to Clinton offered to send UN monitors to train a new Haitian police force and military trainers to professionalize the army. The Haitian military rejected both as tantamount to foreign intervention.

In response, in June 1993 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 841, imposing OAS-recommended sanctions on oil and arms. Finally, under UN and U.S. pressure, the two sides signed the Governors Island Agreement in July 1993. This plan laid out a schedule for Cedras to step down and restore Aristide to power; in support of it the UN suspended sanctions and authorized 1,200 police and military monitors to support the transition. However, when the USS *Harlan County* arrived in Port-au-Prince on October 11 carrying the first U.S. and Canadian monitors, it met small boats and pistol-waving men, and the crowd rocked the car of the U.S. chargé d'affaires. The ship stood off, then was ordered to withdraw from Haiti, perhaps the low point of the U.S.-Haiti campaign. Eighteen GIs had recently been slaughtered in Somalia, so the Pentagon was wary of any confrontation. But neither the UN nor the OAS—nor, apparently, the U.S. embassy—was consulted in the decision, and the embassy later cabled its assessment that the ship could have docked peacefully if given one more day.

In this context, the administration, unwilling to abandon Aristide, moved reluctantly to consider military threats and instruments. The Pentagon expanded the planning that had been going on since the spring of 1993; the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) created a planning cell to assess options. By the spring of 1994, the Department of Defense had begun to compare Haiti to potentially similar operations in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia.¹⁸ Several exercises ostentatiously mimicked a Haitian intervention, and by summer the United States had deployed considerable force to the region.

¹⁸Margaret Daley Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti, A Case Study* (Washington, D.C.: Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996), p. 4. See also John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1994–1997* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).

In December 1993, the United States issued an ultimatum to Cedras and his colleagues: Unless they stepped down by January 15, 1994, the embargo on trade in fuel and arms would be expanded. When that deadline passed without action, the UN approved, at the Clinton administration's initiative, a near-total trade embargo in May; the only exceptions to the embargo were humanitarian aid, medicine, foodstuffs, and propane gas.

By the spring of 1994, the status quo was becoming untenable, both politically and on the ground in Haiti. Clinton was under pressure from his traditional allies in Congress, labor, the African American and Jewish communities, and human rights groups, who were unhappy with sanctions alone. Moreover, forced repatriation of refugees continued, and in June 1994 the U.S. Coast Guard was picking up several thousand Haitians a day. However, Aristide's own past was controversial, and there was little enthusiasm on the Hill for using force to restore him.

By summer, a majority of OAS allies had quietly told Washington that they would support military intervention, with Haiti's Caribbean neighbors the strongest supporters. Yet there was still argument at home. Congressional Republicans were almost all opposed to a military intervention, and Democrats were divided. So was the administration, with the defense secretary, William Perry, arguing against an intervention, and the secretary of state, Warren Christopher, stating publicly in July: "The U.S. is not decided on whether U.S. interests warrant invasion."¹⁹

The Washington argument was pushed to a point when, in late July 1994, the Haitian regime began to organize an election in November to choose a new president, an election that might have undermined Aristide's claim to legitimacy. At month's end, the United States sought and received UN authorization for "all necessary means" to restore Aristide and disarm the Haitian military.²⁰ A multinational contingent began training in Puerto Rico. On August 31, the deputy secretaries of state and defense, Strobe Talbott and John Deutch, portrayed the administration's united front, issuing a statement that "the multinational force is going to Haiti under permissive or contested circumstances," plainly implying the arrest of military leaders.²¹ On September

¹⁹Elaine Sciolino, "Top US Officials Divided in Debate on Invading Haiti," *New York Times*, August 4, 1994, p. A1.

²⁰S/RES/940 (1994), July 31, 1994.

²¹Ruth Marcus, "US Finds Itself Stuck in the Middle," *Washington Post*, September 24, 1994, p. A1.

15, Clinton gave a public address on the situation in Haiti, and a specific warning to Cedras either to step down or to face international military action.²²

With the force already deployed in the Caribbean, the United States made one last attempt at negotiating. On September 17, former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and retired General Colin Powell left for Haiti. Their mission succeeded but only after the U.S. 82nd Airborne Corps was already in the air bound for Haiti. The next day, in return for amnesty, the military leaders agreed to step down by October 15, to the unopposed entry of U.S. forces, and to the restoration of Aristide. U.S. forces did enter Port-au-Prince on September 19 without opposition; Aristide arrived back in Haiti on October 15; and the United States turned over command of the Haiti operation to the UN in January. A credible compellent threat had succeeded, at long last.

²²See "Text of President Clinton's Address on Haiti," *Washington Post*, September 16, 1994, p. A31.

4. Looking Across the Categories

This section looks across the cases to test the hypotheses about what is likely to create success, concentrating on who is to be compelled, how important U.S. stakes are, what threats (or inducements) are relevant, and who is doing the compelling. The individual cases are analyzed in more detail in the appendix. It is not as though the fundamental background factors, such as whether the United States has overwhelming military force, become unimportant; they simply remain in the background. In all cases, the United States had or could assemble overwhelming force. The question then became whether that force could be credibly applied to the American purpose, even as a threat.

Figure 4.1 compares the cases in a summary way, with regard to the propositions about success set out in Section 2.

Who Is to Be Compelled

The targets divide along three dimensions—democrat to autocrat, friend to foe, state to nonstate. These distinctions are continuums, not dichotomies, and where a particular target fell on the continuum was subject to some manipulation as the case proceeded. India was hardly an enemy, for instance, but neither was it a friend in the class of Canada. Milosevic had been elected and so his government was formally democratic, but he hardly was so regarded by the world; he came to be seen as an elected autocrat. Of the three, the last dimension may come closest to being a dichotomy, although the category of ambiguous actors includes states or statelike groups that have incomplete control of their territory or subjects.

Reduced to dichotomies, these three distinctions would yield, in theory, eight separate kinds of targets, as in Figure 4.2. Some of the cells, though, are empty or nearly so. Neither nonstate targets of compellence nor those in major regional crises are likely to be friends. The United States does not have many autocratic friends these days, although that cell is not entirely empty and has been fuller in the past: Saudi Arabia qualifies as one, and the United States tilted toward Iraq during its war with Iran. Suharto's Indonesia probably would have been counted as a friend and described as autocratic.

Propositions about success	Iraq	India	Haiti
Stakes more important to the United States	 → 	 → 	 → 
Status quo clearly defined and accepted	 → 	 → 	 → 
Previous U.S. action showed resolve status	 → 	 → 	 → 
Foe unambiguously crosses U.S. "line"	 → 	 → 	 → 
U.S. stakes narrow, and security not broad	 → 	 → 	 → 
Foe hostile	 → 	 → 	 → 
Foe nondemocratic	 → 	 → 	 → 
Foe regime isolated at home	 → 	 → 	 → 
Foe power bases can be identified and targeted	 → 	 → 	 → 
U.S. acts with domestic support	 → 	 → 	 → 
U.S. acts unilaterally	 → 	 → 	 → 
Threats are direct and proportional	 → 	 → 	 → 
Foe's compliance is easily seen	 → 	 → 	 → 
U.S. policy conceived as campaign	 → 	 → 	 → 

 Yes
  Maybe
  No

Second grading indicates progression over time

Figure 4.1—Comparing the Cases

RANDMR1240-4.2




Figure 4.2—Nature of the Compelled

Autocrats Versus Democrats

Regime type clearly divides the targets. Autocratic states and military dictatorships call for different compellence instruments than democracies. Compelling requires threatening what decisionmakers value. The target of compellence is usually an individual or a small group of leaders. The power center usually lies in the military forces that both protect them physically and suppress opposition, as well as in the political support that legitimizes their rule. In general, autocratic leaders and military dictators "have created closed societies that maximize political freedom of action for leaders and minimize political accountability to others."¹

These types of regimes constitute a large portion of U.S. adversaries, and virtually all those in major regional crises. Hussein in Iraq and Milosevic in Serbia are individuals the United States attempted to compel. In both cases it was critical to identify carefully the power base of each. For instance, Hussein earlier

¹Byman, Waxman, and Larson, p. 59.

had bowed to outside pressure, and he did so in this case. In 1975, Iraq met Iranian demands over the disputed Shatt-al-Arab waterway. After the Gulf War, Hussein accepted the "no-fly zone" and the de facto U.S. protectorate in northern Iraq; in 1993, he temporarily stopped his interference with UNSCOM inspections; and in 1994 he backed down over a second invasion of Kuwait.

Why did he back down? He was not blind to military reality and would reduce his goals if faced with utter defeat. He also appeared particularly sensitive to threats of generating internal instability and so responded to threats against Iraq's elite military units, those necessary to defeat insurgents and suppress coups. For similar reasons, he feared dispersing his military, seeing that as increasing the risks of a coup, but that fear also opened possibilities for coercive threats against concentrated, and so more vulnerable, military targets. Creating a viable insurgency would also threaten him. By its very existence, it would be a constant thorn in the side of Hussein and place broader regime concerns in jeopardy.

Why Milosevic yielded to NATO's air campaign in 1999 is, in the end, unknowable. Milosevic may have been a poor poker player, and thus a fortunate opponent—one who folded when he still held the high cards. His response to the onset of NATO's bombing suggests as much. And Serbia's declarations continued to imply that forcing NATO to wage a ground war was the country's best option. NATO unity might have cracked, or U.S. and other domestic support might have fractured had there been substantial casualties in the early fighting.

Yet surely NATO's unity was impressive, even to long-time students of the alliance. Almost no one would have imagined, five years earlier or even two, that NATO could sustain its cohesion through months of bombing that took the alliance's warplanes to the skies over Belgrade. Adroit diplomacy helped as well, because Russia ultimately was persuaded to stop supporting him. In this respect, it also helped that Milosevic was his own worst enemy; his behavior was odious enough to induce his former friends to rethink their support. Imagine if, when NATO started bombing, Milosevic had not accelerated his ethnic cleansing but temporarily stopped it and begun some token withdrawal of his troops. It is hard to believe that, in the circumstances, NATO would have sustained its unity.

NATO had begun to put at risk what mattered to Milosevic. The prospect of a rejuvenated Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) offensive meant that the Yugoslav army might have to come out and fight, thus making itself vulnerable to NATO air power. Threats to degrade the army had to be taken seriously because it was the mainstay of his support. The press accounts of NATO planning for a ground war magnified that threat. Finally, as long as the bombs were falling on Kosovo,

they were not of much account to him, even if they hit military targets. Like Hussein, he did not much care about human suffering or even many military targets. Yet once the bombs began to fall on Belgrade, their impact must have been greater. They were no longer abstract; they had become a daily topic of conversation, hitting the factories of his cronies.

In contrast to more-autocratic regimes, the power of a democratic regime is dispersed, lying with the people. It often seems necessary to compel the entire nation to put pressure on the government to change its policy. At a minimum, the government needs to be led to believe that its people will be seriously dissatisfied if national policy is not changed. The case of compelling India is a good example of the difficulties in trying to compel a democracy. The BJP was elected on a platform that included building nuclear weapons, and the Indian population tended to support nuclear testing. When the target state's population opposes the action that the compeller wants it to take, that target will often go forward with its own policy and suffer the costs threatened by the United States rather than suffer the greater costs by bowing to the compellence demands. These differences among regime types are important because they also affect the types of instruments that will be effective against them.

Friends Versus Foes

Whether the United States is trying to compel a friend or a foe makes a big difference. For friendly regimes, available instruments are often limited because domestic opinion in the United States will not have much tolerance for actions against a friendly state. U.S. stakes need to be large to engage in a compellence campaign. A state that has been on good terms with the United States for a long time will have domestic supporters. Business interests in the state will have developed through trade, as well as through direct and indirect investment. U.S. businesses and trade are damaged when sanctions are imposed on a state with which these economic ties run deep.² American citizens also form bonds with friendly states through travel and through contact with U.S. immigrants or relatives from those states. The United States could do what it did to Britain over Suez in 1956—threatening to sink the pound sterling—only because that threat was technical and the episode was quickly over.

If the state or actor is a foe of the United States, there are fewer limits to the types of instruments that can be used. It is also usually easier for the U.S. government

²In fact, one of the arguments for maintaining a U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf is that even a regional war that did not engage the United States might disrupt the flow of oil to this country.

to rally domestic support for a campaign against adversaries. Relatively few Americans will have stakes in the country that the United States is attempting to compel. Indeed, from Washington's perspective, the initial key to the campaign may be to portray the foe, for domestic and international audiences, as quickly and compellingly as possible as an "autocratic enemy." Thus, the demonizing of autocratic leaders is hardly uncommon during compellence campaigns. The UN instituted warrants for the arrest of Milosevic and other war criminals from the war in Kosovo well before the campaign was finished. During the Gulf War, popular support for the campaign was both reflected and bolstered by such items as t-shirts with a photo of Hussein in the middle of a bulls-eye.

States Versus Nonstates

Finally, compelling states and nonstate actors represents different tasks, an especially relevant difference in the category of ambiguous contingencies. The United States may have an idea of who it is that it wants to compel but be unclear whether that leadership has the ability to comply with U.S. demands or even whether the target has a firm hold on power at all. For instance, when the United States sought to compel Cedras to step down from leadership in Haiti, it was unclear whether the military that supported Cedras would continue to fight against Aristide once he was reinstated as president. Even if Cedras agreed to a peaceful transition, Washington could not be sure that he was capable of guaranteeing the peace.

Another target that was unable to comply with the compellence demands was Lebanon in the 1970s. Although Israel succeeded in compelling the Lebanese government to agree to rein in terrorist activity operating across the border, that Lebanese government had no way to control cross-border attacks because they had no leverage over the Palestinians.³ Diplomacy backed by threats of force succeeded in theory but failed in fact.

Nonstate actors, such as terrorists, are difficult to identify and extremely hard to target with the conventional instruments of compellence. Economic sanctions are not useful because the target cannot be isolated; sanctions will only cause suffering to a population that is weakly related to the behavior that the United States is trying to change. Diplomatic initiatives are difficult because it is often hard to determine who are the leaders of a nonstate group. The leaders who can be identified to participate in negotiations to resolve the conflict may not have

³Byman, Waxman, and Larson, p. 53.

enough control over the group's actions to stop them: witness the Lebanese government.

Military force is also problematic in compelling nonstate actors; consequently, so are threats to use that force. Terrorists are often dispersed, with no large and obvious targets against which military force can be used. The U.S. cruise missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 were punishments intended to compel terrorist groups to cease targeting U.S. territory or citizens. The attacks destroyed their targets, but it is unclear whether they destroyed anything of critical value to the terrorist groups that Washington was attempting to compel. The attacks risked showing the difficulty of compelling these actors. In addition, because terrorists are U.S. foes, attacking them can help their cause by creating martyrs and drawing supporters. Without a better idea of who these nonstate actors are, what they value, and whether they even have the ability to comply with U.S. demands, compelling terrorist groups is a risky enterprise.

The Primacy of Stakes

Generally speaking, if U.S. stakes are great, then the United States has a wider and stronger range of instruments available to use during the campaign. The U.S. populace probably will support the campaign, loosening constraints on actions that domestic controversy otherwise might impose, and thus threats will carry greater credibility. Yet to gain the credibility that comes with high stakes, the United States must ensure that the target of the compellence sees them clearly. The United States will find it hard to compel a state or actor that perceives that U.S. stakes in the campaign are weak.

Demonstrating stakes, however, is easier said than done. It is easier in major regional crises, which involve high stakes almost by definition. In such cases, U.S. credibility and domestic support are likely to be higher than in cases that are less critical to core U.S. concerns. For instance, in compelling Iraq, U.S. stakes were clear during the period immediately following the Gulf War. The United States and its allies had just fought an air and ground war to protect their interest in the free flow of Gulf oil. The United States also had large forces in the region, and it readily deployed more troops when showing greater credibility was necessary. As time progressed, though, the U.S. stakes in Iraq became less clear, reducing U.S. credibility, inviting increased provocations by Hussein, and making compellence more difficult.

Conveying stakes is harder in cases of would-be WMD proliferators, especially if those states are *not* also major regional adversaries. Washington has interests in the global nonproliferation regime and thus has a stake in deterring all states

from acquiring arsenals. For instance, India was well aware that both the United States and the global community sought to have India sign the NPT and then uphold the mandates of the CTBT. However, India also knew that the United States had a variety of stakes in India—including private investment and trade in military and technical goods—and believed that these interests would reduce the political and economic fallout from any nuclear tests. India thought that its status as a friend of the United States would help guard it against retaliation—a valid conclusion. Although the United States imposed some economic sanctions on India, they were mostly limited to restrictions on lending. The United States did not follow through with the entire range of sanctions that had been threatened through legislation, and the trade sanctions that were imposed were minimal and short-lived.

U.S. stakes in WMD proliferation are likely to be perceived as much greater in the weapon status of nefarious states because these states visibly can threaten U.S. interests. North Korea, for example, was ready in August 1999 to test its *Taepodong II* missile, with a range predicted to reach Alaska or Hawaii. Its *Taepodong I*, tested in 1998, already could reach regional U.S. allies South Korea and Japan.⁴ For the first time, a corrupt state would have had the missile technology necessary to hit U.S. territory, let alone threaten key U.S. alliances with both South Korea and Japan or broader stability in Asia. In this case, the United States, South Korea, and Japan demonstrated stakes by offering inducements to keep North Korea, a foe, from attaining a nuclear arsenal—building two light-water reactors and supplying billions of dollars worth of heavy fuel oil to the state.

In the category of ambiguous contingencies, the task of demonstrating stakes divides. If the target is a state and the purpose is humanitarian intervention, building democracy, or promoting human rights—all goals central to America's self-image—U.S. stakes will initially be perceived as relatively weak. The United States is usually unwilling to risk high costs in lives or treasure in these contingencies. The lower the cost, the more likely the United States is to get involved and the more credible its threat to do so. However, if the target state can credibly threaten to impose high costs on the United States, it is likely to deter the United States from intervening. The United States gives the impression that it is unwilling, or at least extremely reluctant, to use force against armed, organized resistance on behalf of humanitarian interests.⁵

⁴See William Drozdiak, "North Korean Pledge Eases Fears of Missile Test," *Washington Post*, September 13, 1999, p. A1.

⁵Kapur, cited above, makes a strong case that the United States has a distinct aversion to using force for humanitarian purposes in (at least) the cases of Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia.

Dealing with nonstate terrorist groups is very different. The United States sees terrorist acts as a severe threat to its people and territory and has stepped up efforts to counter both domestic and international terrorism, proving itself willing to risk both lives and money to combat this threat.⁶ It has imposed sanctions on several states that have supported terrorist activity, including Sudan, Syria, Iran, and Libya.⁷ In the case of Libya, the United States directly targeted the state and its leader, Qadhafi, in response to the 1986 bombing of a Berlin nightclub filled with U.S. soldiers. The cruise missiles that targeted alleged terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan presented low risk to human lives but were costly in money; the United States used nearly 80 cruise missiles at \$750,000 each.

The Iraq case highlights that stakes can be acquired in the course of a compellence campaign. After the United States had set up a safe haven for the northern Kurds, it had inadvertently redefined its mission to include protecting the Kurds and thus acquired stakes in protecting them. Then, when Hussein attacked the Kurds, the United States had to respond or risk having all its subsequent threats be seen as less credible. The United States had no interest in safeguarding the Kurds as an absolute goal but believed that a failure to protect them would cause Hussein to believe that the United States no longer found Iraqi aggression contrary to U.S. interests. The United States was still defending the no-fly zones around both safe havens and conducting military reprisals for Iraqi violations of the zones well into 1999. In maintaining the goal of limiting Iraqi power, the United States feared that Iraq would see an abandonment of the Kurds as a sign of U.S. weakness, thus encouraging further aggression.

In the end, what matters are not just U.S. stakes but the relative stakes of the United States and its intended target. This juxtaposition of stakes is the reason deterring is easier than compelling. If the target is merely contemplating an action and is not known to be committed to it, the target will lose little face if it abstains. Indeed, few could tell whether it ever actually intended to take the action. In contrast, if a target has committed to an action in front of its people (not to mention the world), it has developed stakes in the action and will lose face. For some targets, the loss may mean that the leaders will not be reelected; for others, it will mean acquiring a reputation as willing to back down on important issues. But some adversaries have reason to fear for their lives if they back down in the

⁶Support for counterterrorist actions by the U.S. public is typically high. See, for instance, Mark Z. Barabak, "U.S. Raids Get Broad Support: Clinton Issues Not Significant," *Los Angeles Times*, August 23, 1998.

⁷See Hufbauer, cited above.

face of U.S. threats. The cost of backing down becomes high, and no matter how great the U.S. stakes, it becomes difficult to compel the target.⁸

Consideration must also be given to the sharp trade-off between the requirements of compelling, on the one hand, and those of coalition- or public support-building (or justice) on the other. Labeling Milosevic a war criminal and establishing means to try him was helpful in building support for the campaign against him, both at home and abroad, and he probably deserved it. But it gave him all the more incentive to hold out because complying with U.S. demands meant not just losing power but losing freedom as well. If complying becomes tantamount to dying, then fighting to the death hardly looks worse.

By contrast, having demonized Cedras somewhat less, the United States was prepared to offer him the incentive of comfortable exile if he stepped down. The endgame in pushing President Marcos of the Philippines from power was accompanied by comparable generosity. It can be valuable to offer the target a way out. In trying to compel an adversary to stop doing something that it has already committed to, it is often helpful to offer carrots or an open "excuse"—Schelling's "rationalized reinterpretation" of the original commitment.⁹

The temptation to demonize opponents may have grown after the cold war. The American predilection for seeing the world in Manichean terms, good versus evil, remains. Now, though, the absence of the Soviet Union means that enemies have to be justified on their own terms, not just as allies or clients of the Soviet Union. Moreover, compellence campaigns are now carried out in the full glare of international cooperation. Would-be partners may be rallied by arguments about crimes against humanity but be wary of intervening to right any lesser wrong.

What Threats (and Inducements) Are Relevant

Diplomacy

The essence of compellence is diplomacy backed by threats of harm, usually force. Thus, all the cases involve communicating with foes or targets, if not negotiating or using other methods more properly labeled diplomacy. Plainly, diplomacy is less immediately risky than military action, and so the American public tends to support military action only when all diplomatic options have

⁸See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 841–844.

⁹Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, p. 34.

been exhausted.¹⁰ The United States usually offers diplomatic solutions to crises long before military action is authorized. The crises in Iraq,¹¹ Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo were all brought to negotiations at least once before military action was used. However, in each of these cases diplomacy failed in the early stages, and military force or the threat of it was necessary.

In some cases, diplomatic means carry significant weight. For instance, India had a strong interest in being recognized as a leading power, in Asia if not in the world, even a permanent member of the UN Security Council. China, too, has an interest in being seen as a responsible world power and so has modified its behavior in some areas to gain international support, especially on economic issues. In the Asian financial crisis, China resisted devaluing its currency and used its press to stress that it was stabilizing its currency because it was a leader in Asia that hoped to help bring the region out of crisis.¹²

Diplomacy was central to the denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus following the breakup of the Soviet Union—so central that it strains language to say that Ukraine was *compelled* to relinquish its nuclear weapons.¹³ When the Soviet Union dissolved, the former Soviet republics were left with portions of the Soviet nuclear arsenal within their own territories. Ukraine, in particular, initially was tempted to maintain its inherited nuclear arsenal as a guarantee of its security, especially given that Russia had nuclear weapons. Ukraine also wanted to be a friend of the United States and the West; it sought Western aid and investment.

Ukraine came to see the advantages in giving up its nuclear weapons. Security would come through closer ties with the West. The United States used the opportunity to press Ukraine to join the Partnership for Peace, raising the prospect of eventually joining NATO. This prospect, plus the sense that, even though Ukraine was outside the NATO alliance, it nevertheless could count on its relationship with the United States as a deterrent against aggressors,

¹⁰Byman, Waxman, and Larson, p. 72.

¹¹The Gulf War has been blamed in part on diplomatic error made by U.S. Ambassador April Gillespie, who suggested to Hussein that the United States had no interest in the fate of Kuwait. In fact, what she said represented U.S. policy, and the United States made only relatively small naval movements in response to Saddam's preparations. Moreover, almost no one in Washington believed Saddam actually would invade. See Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla, *Detering or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons for the War with Saddam Hussein*, R-4111-JS (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991).

¹²In a press conference in February 1998, Chinese Vice-Premier Li Lanqing linked China's responsibility in maintaining the value of its currency to its hopes to join the World Trade Organization in 1998. See "China 'Will not Add Fuel to the Flames' of Asia Crisis," World Economic Forum Press Release at <http://www.weforum.com/>.

¹³This discussion is based on unpublished casework completed for the project by Timothy Smith, RAND.

constituted powerful political incentives for agreeing to U.S. demands that it relinquish its nuclear arsenal.¹⁴

Visibility of Compliance

If compellence is to succeed, the compeller must be able to recognize whether the adversary is complying with its demands. This recognition is a special problem when compliance is more subjective. Iraq either did or did not withdraw its forces from Kuwait; compliance was visible. By contrast, such goals as constraining a target's WMD are more subjective; they are matters of degree. Especially in tit-for-tat agreements, the United States may end up giving concessions, such as a reduction in sanctions, without having proof that the adversary is completing his "tat." This allows the adversary to take advantage of the United States behind Washington's back. By the time the violation is discovered, the adversary may have benefited, while the United States has lost credibility and bargaining power.

For instance, the United States made good on its 1994 promises to North Korea on the assumption that Pyongyang was abandoning its nuclear weapon program only to find out five years later that North Korea was not acting in accordance with U.S. expectations. Similarly, Hussein partially complied, on and off, with UNSCOM inspections for seven years. No WMD materials were found, but the Iraqi weapon program was suspected to be still under way. However, neither the United States nor the UNSCOM inspectors were able to prove that Iraq had violated the agreement to abandon its weapon program. Not until members of Hussein's family defected to Jordan was there any proof that Hussein had continued his program to manufacture biological weapons.¹⁵

Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions are almost always used as an early step in the campaign. Imposing sanctions is mandatory by U.S. law in cases of nuclear proliferation, and sanctions have been used as the initial move in compellence campaigns against both major regional adversaries and ambiguous states. The goals of U.S. sanctions are as diverse as the states on which they are imposed. In 1998, U.S. sanctions of some sort were in place against 26 states, which accounted for more

¹⁴Ukraine agreed to denuclearize in the Tripartite Accord between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, signed in Moscow on January 14, 1994.

¹⁵General Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law, defected to Jordan in August 1995 and exposed the extent of Iraq's weapon program. This forced Saddam to turn over documents and materials that Kamel had detailed to the West.

than half of the world's population.¹⁶ Sanctions have been attempted to compel states to stop regional aggression, to convince them not to pursue nuclear arsenals, to deter them from supporting terrorist activity, and even to improve their human rights records.

However, sanctions have seldom successfully compelled an adversary.¹⁷ That is now conventional wisdom, and as general guidance, it is on the mark. The burden of the argument rests with those who are *for* sanctions. Moreover, the United States uses sanctions more readily against nondemocratic and adversarial regimes, such as Iraq and Haiti, that are more resilient to sanctions. Their leaders insulate themselves from the sanctions, continuing to get the supplies and amenities that they require while their populations suffer.

In contrast, democratic states are more tempting targets.¹⁸ Their leaders must be elected. A democracy is more vulnerable because sanctions hurt the people, who then can pressure the government to change its policy and appease the compeller to stop the sanctions. Furthermore, the open media in democratic states are more likely to keep the domestic public aware of the reason sanctions have been imposed and what policy change is necessary to have them removed. Still, sanctions are a double-edged sword. Milosevic's Yugoslavia was not quite a democracy, but for most of their duration, sanctions served as an external enemy around which the regime could rally domestic support; the sanctions made opposition to Milosevic an unpatriotic act.

Plainly, the effectiveness of sanctions also depends on how many states impose them. When the United States threatens or imposes unilateral sanctions, the target state can turn to other providers of the goods that have been restricted. When the sanctions are broader, circumventing them is harder and more expensive. The choice between suffering from the sanctions or giving in to the compellence demands becomes sharper.

¹⁶See Hufbauer, cited above.

¹⁷For arguments on the ineffectiveness of sanctions and why they do not work, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990); Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90-136; Kimberly Ann Elliot, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 66-77; Elizabeth S. Rogers, "Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer 1996). See also Haass, "Sanctioning Madness," cited above.

¹⁸See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, *Washington Post*, July 12, 1998, Outlook Section, for the argument that democracies are more vulnerable than autocracies or dictatorships to economic sanctions because the democratic leadership is vulnerable to public opinion and international pressure.

Iraq highlights two further dilemmas that arise in using economic sanctions. First, while the United States is often prepared to impose sanctions indefinitely—sanctions against North Korea have been in place since 1950—most other states are not so inclined. The sanctions imposed against Iraq were initially almost global, perhaps the most severe sanction regime ever to be instituted,¹⁹ but eventually the coalition began to fracture. France, China, and Russia criticized the United States for its commitment to sanctions. Their opposition prevented the reimposition of an inspection program in September 1999. By that point, a group of U.S. congressional staff members was prepared to visit Iraq on a humanitarian mission.²⁰ The publicity of this trip ran the risk of suggesting to Hussein that even the U.S. government might be starting to believe that sanctions on Iraq were too severe. He could thus continue to berate the West for imposing cruel and inhumane sanctions while resisting giving in to U.S. demands that might soon weaken.

Second, states can often find ways to get around the sanctions. The “oil-for-food” program that allowed Iraq to sell some oil was intended to reduce Iraqi suffering while still limiting Hussein’s resources for rebuilding his war machine or his WMD program. However, instead of passing goods on to his people, Hussein was caught in 1999 shipping such items as baby supplies elsewhere to be sold on the black market for cash that could then fund his military, his propaganda campaign, or his comfort and that of those close to him.²¹

The Suez crisis of 1956 is one of few cases in which threats of unilateral economic sanctions worked. When the United States threatened a financial war against the pound sterling, the threat was credible given American dominance of international finance at the time. Despite its interest in maintaining possession of the Suez Canal, Britain acquiesced.²² Sustaining the pound was critical to Britain’s view not just of its own economy but of its residual empire. The threat was so imminent that Britain had to decide quickly. That the crisis was over quickly, plus the fact that Britain’s political establishment already was divided

¹⁹1999 *Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Survey*, UNICEF (July 1999), <http://www.unicef.org/reseval/>.

This survey noted that child mortality in Iraq increased by a factor of three during the Gulf War and that malnutrition has doubled since sanctions were imposed (p. 3). According to Wright, UNICEF places the majority of blame on Hussein for greatly restricting the basic necessities available to the needy population but also blames the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. See Robin Wright, “U.S. Nearing Key Juncture in Iraq Policy,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 29, 1999, p. A1.

²⁰These staff members worked for five members of Congress. The purpose of this trip was to determine the effect of economic sanctions on the Iraqi population. It was organized despite objections by the State Department. See “U.S. Congressional Staffers See Iraqi Official,” *Washington Post*, September 1, 1999, p. A1.

²¹Toni Marshall, “U.S. Calls Saddam a War Criminal; Says His Excesses Deprive All Iraqis,” *Washington Times*, September 14, 1999, p. A12.

²²Unpublished casework by Timothy Smith, RAND.

over the Suez invasion, meant that not much anti-American political backlash arose in Britain, although it did in France.

Applying Preponderant Force

U.S. forces were superior to those of the targets of all recent compellence attempts, but threats to bring that force to bear were not always easy to make compelling. Military force is most compelling in cases of major regional adversaries. By definition, major regional adversaries can challenge other states in the region with military force. Therefore, to drive the adversary's costs high enough to compel it to bow to U.S. demands, credible military threats are usually necessary.²³ Moreover, U.S. military assets and procurement, both still somewhat grounded in the cold war, are best suited to engaging major adversaries such as Iraq and North Korea, which have large ground-based armies with Soviet-style weaponry.²⁴

Military preponderance is awkward to wield in confronting threats from would-be proliferators. In fact, the threat of military force can have a perverse effect. Among the reasons why would-be proliferators seek WMD is to deter other states from attacking them (even as they carry out aggressions of their own).²⁵ Thus, threatening such states is likely to validate their belief that they need WMD for their own security. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus gave up their nuclear weapons only when they were convinced that they would actually be more secure without them. While Ukraine and Kazakhstan faced potential threats from Russia if they held on to their arsenals,²⁶ Belarus was prepared to fall back under the Russian sphere and was willing to give up its weapons in exchange for Russian protection.

Although taking out a potential proliferator's nuclear facilities with military strikes is theoretically an option, this strategy carries real risks. The Gulf War showed some of them. The United States had identified three targets that were central to Iraqi weapon production and successfully took them out in the air campaign. However, after the war was over and the United States had gained

²³ Although some argue that economic sanctions alone can compel major regional adversaries, sanctions have historically failed to do so.

²⁴ See Bradley Graham, "Pentagon's Wish List: Based on Bygone Battles?" *Washington Post*, August 25, 1999, p. 3.

²⁵ On the motivations of proliferators, see John Arquilla and Paul K. Davis, *Modeling Decisionmaking of Potential Proliferators as Part of Developing Counterproliferation Strategies*, MR-467 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994).

²⁶ These arsenals were also lacking a secure command and control system in addition to having aged to near the end of their life span. For any of these states, holding on to a secure arsenal would have been very costly.

access to locations throughout Iraq, more than 20 similar facilities were discovered.

As Desert Storm showed, targeting nuclear weapon facilities with a high degree of confidence is difficult, and the risk of overlooking even one site can be great; doing so can put a proliferating state in a use-or-lose position with its weapons. If a state believed that its burgeoning nuclear arsenal was integral to its security, it might prefer using one of its weapons to losing them all to a U.S. preventive strike. Therefore, inaccurate information about the state of a potential proliferator's arsenal may invite unpredicted retaliation.

As the India case indicated, many states view the United States as a nuclear hypocrite. India has called the U.S. position "nuclear apartheid." The United States has not made its commitment to disarmament clear despite its NPT pledge to eliminate all its nuclear weapons. Therefore, many states see the United States as the aggressor when it attempts to prevent others from proliferating. This perception would surely follow if the United States were to use military force.

Preponderant force is also not always useful when dealing with ambiguous states and actors. For starters, the U.S. military is still largely organized for major theater combat, and its forces are heavier than would be ideal for peacekeeping and peacemaking.²⁷ Not just new concepts but also new configurations of force are required for these missions. Moreover, these situations also involve some degree of humanitarian purpose, and so employing large, heavy forces might appear contrary to the ethos of the mission.²⁸

In addition, ambiguous states and actors may use conventional terrorism and cyberterrorism.²⁹ Labeled by many, including Secretary of Defense William Cohen, the greatest modern challenges to U.S. defense, these terrorist threats are extremely hard to combat with conventional forces.³⁰ Cyberterrorists are difficult (if not impossible) to locate, and it would certainly be overkill to target them with massive force. Furthermore, by the time the terrorist was located, the damage

²⁷The Army has recently openly admitted that its force structure is designed for fighting large-scale land battles rather than the current types of deployments that require the ability to "deploy quickly to remote places to fight, or keep the peace, without support bases." This disparity has caused the Army to rethink its future procurement demands. The Army's top two officers—General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, and General John Keane, the Army Vice Chief—both advocate modernization (e.g., lightening) of the Army's forces to accommodate the current Army role. See Bradley Graham, "For the Tank, a New Tread of Thought: Army Redesign Proposal Meets Resistance in Armored Ranks," *Washington Post*, November 6, 1999, p. A3.

²⁸See Kapur, cited above.

²⁹John Deutch calls cyberterrorism one of the three new aspects of terrorism. See his "Terrorism," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1997), pp. 10–22.

³⁰See William Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," *Washington Post*, July 26, 1999, available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990726-secdef.html>.

likely will already have been done. Preventive measures are difficult to come by, even in concept. Conventional terrorists, even if they are possible to locate, are also difficult to target. If a precise location is known, it is still necessary to target them within a state whose precise connection to the terrorists may be unclear.

This dilemma was present in the 1998 bombing of the alleged chemical weapon facility in Sudan. Most chemical plants can produce chemical weapons; the resulting ambiguity, plus difficulty linking Sudan and the plant directly to the terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden, produced some global sympathy for Sudan and some backlash against the United States and its actions as the "world policeman." Targeting terrorist groups can backfire by creating a martyr for the cause and coalescing hatred against the United States, even when support for the group was originally minimal.

Military Instruments

Threats of force are essential in compellence campaigns. The threats, and the uses, if needed, cover a wide range. They also vary with the stakes that the United States has in the issue. In general, the higher the threat to the United States, the greater the stakes in the issue, and the more credible the use of stronger levels of force tends to be.

When U.S. stakes are low or ambiguous, military instruments comprise movements, presence, and exercises. Small-scale military interventions or deployments to the area of interest are used to advance several types of missions, including policing, state-building, peacekeeping, and humanitarian aid. These missions are designed to create a more stable state in accordance with U.S. interests. This establishment can involve creating a stable government, training police or military forces, or helping to distribute aid to stop a humanitarian disaster. The threat is usually, though not always, in the background, conveyed by the presence itself: Don't dare interfere (or, as in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords, don't dare do it again). In these cases of low or ambiguous stakes, the United States usually seeks to limit the number of troops deployed and to have a specific timetable for their withdrawal while still accomplishing its goals.

Yet limiting the length of involvement, like predicting how long campaigns will last, is easier said than done. As of 2000, U.S. troops were still deployed in Bosnia to keep the peace, and these peacekeepers are believed by many to be the only thing holding the new state to the Dayton Accords and keeping Bosnia from returning to a civil war. U.S. troops were removed from Haiti in 1999 despite their having done little during their five-year deployment to either create a stable state or reduce the poverty level of the Haitian citizens. Thus, the U.S. mission

failed to reduce significantly the humanitarian disaster that helped to produce such large refugee flows.

Moving military forces into position, or beefing up deployments already in place, underscores stakes. This emphasis was a feature of almost all the cases. In Iraq, sending additional forces was intended to drive home to Hussein the extent of U.S. interests. In Haiti, the United States first moved more forces into the area, then ostentatiously undertook exercises mimicking an invasion of Haiti; both measures were designed to make U.S. threats more credible in a case of ambiguous U.S. interest.

Sometimes, establishing a military presence is itself the extent of the intended U.S. military action. These missions aim to deter action by the target state or otherwise influence its behavior. In 1996, for instance, the United States deployed an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Straits after China had launched missiles toward Taiwan in an attempt to intimidate Taiwanese voters not to vote for the pro-independence candidate. U.S. policy in the conflict was deliberate "strategic ambiguity." The United States attempted to show its interest in a continued peaceful relationship between China and Taiwan, trying to restrain both parties without pledging a specific commitment of forces to the region.

Tensions over the status of Taiwan flared up again in July 1999 when President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan declared that China would be treated as a separate state in future relations. China would not accept this declaration, holding to its "one China" policy.³¹ The United States again maintained strategic ambiguity and declared that it was highly interested in a peaceful resolution of the crisis without pledging that it would come to Taiwan's aid with military force or stand by and let China forcefully reincorporate Taiwan.³² The United States demonstrated its interest in the conflict by sending two aircraft carriers to conduct exercises in the South China Sea.

For cases that are deemed important enough to U.S. interests to require direct intervention, small-scale military strikes are typically the first threat or action. Small strikes are the military measures most often used to compel nonstate actors. Because it is difficult to target nonstate actors, and because they are housed in a country that may or may not be linked to the adversary's actions,

³¹See Seth Faison, "Taiwan President Implies His Island Is Sovereign State," *New York Times*, July 13, 1999, p. 1.

³²The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act did not promise that the United States would come to Taiwan's defense, only that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a matter of "grave concern" to the United States. See Helene Cooper, "Defending Taiwan: How Far Would Washington Go?" *Wall Street Journal*, August 23, 1999. Statements from the United States were ambiguous about the specific commitment Washington held with regard to Taiwan.

large-scale military operations are usually undesirable.³³ Even small-scale attacks infringe on state sovereignty and are often viewed as illegitimate. These complications are why covert actions are so often preferred over overt uses of force. The United States has never received UN backing for its retaliatory military operations against terrorist activity, although the UN did agree that the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 was a product of state-sponsored terrorism and imposed sanctions on Libya starting in 1992.³⁴

However, the United States has turned to military operations to combat terrorist activity on several occasions. The 1986 raid on Libya in retaliation for the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin filled with U.S. military personnel was extensive because Washington believed that the Libyan government actually directed the attack. The United States attacked targets that directly contributed to Libya's ability to export terrorism.³⁵ Among the targets hit was the home of Qadhafi, who Washington held personally responsible for the terrorist incident. Qadhafi's daughter was killed in the raid. Two years later, Pan Am Flight 103 was bombed over Scotland, an act suspected but never proved to be a direct response by Libya to the U.S. strike.

The United States also used small-scale strikes against the terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan to try to change the future behavior of adversaries or their supporters. Strikes are most often used as part of a longer campaign. In these cases, the United States wants to increase its chances of compellence success by committing itself to the theater of interest and therefore increasing its stakes in the issue by openly declaring its goals. Engaging in small-scale strikes also demonstrates that the United States does have an actionable interest in the issue.

However, unilateral strikes carry costs and risks. Such strikes may invite international condemnation and actually reduce the credibility of future threats. The United States used small-scale strikes against Iraq throughout the latter half of the campaign that started with the Gulf War. Although in some instances the strikes looked like attempts at punishment, the larger goal was to condemn

³³The United States has named Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as states that have sponsored terrorism and has instituted sanctions against them in response. See Thomas J. Badley, "U.S. Anti-Terrorism Policy: The Clinton Administration," *Security Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (August 1998), pp. 50-70. It also follows that the United States would be more likely to use force against nonstate actors in these states because the states themselves are involved in the terrorism.

³⁴See "Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter" at <http://www.un.org/News/oss/sanction.htm#Libya>.

³⁵Stephen E. Anno and William E. Einspahr, *Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid*, Air War College Research Report, No. AU-AWC-88-043, Air University, United States Air Force, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, p. 48. Accessed at http://131.84.1.34/doctrine/jel/research_pubs/p112.pdf.

certain repetitive Iraqi behaviors and to compel Hussein not to attempt similar actions in the future. The problem in such contexts is that small-scale strikes may convey precisely the opposite message of that intended, both to the target and the international community. Instead of raising the ante, the small strikes may suggest that the United States is looking for a way out.

For high-stakes issues, such as the rise of major regional adversaries, the United States is willing to use most of the measures in its arsenal. Sanctions are almost always imposed as a first step, but the United States usually moves on to military measures. The first step in a military campaign against a significant adversary usually is the threat of air strikes, or even the launching of an all-out air war. The United States can inflict damage on a target without actually risking significant losses to U.S. military personnel or assets. Therefore, the United States is able to employ significant firepower while still being cautious about U.S. casualties. This "air first" strategy was followed in both Kosovo and Iraq.

However, air power alone rarely can compel the adversary.³⁶ Kosovo was an exception, and arguments about it will continue. Identifying and hitting concealed and mobile targets without ground troops is difficult, and such targets are likely to be precisely those of most value.³⁷ This fact especially bedeviled campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the adversary could take advantage of foliage and mountainous terrain, as well as the restricted visibility for air forces caused by poor weather.

Moreover, many appealing targets in air campaigns do not greatly affect the ability of the adversary to carry out its actions. For instance, in the Gulf War, the United States hit the Iraqi communications grid hard, but Iraq also relied on messages carried by couriers rather than by long-distance radio. This inability to identify targets of real merit surfaced during the air campaign over Kosovo when senior U.S. commanders argued over targets. Gen. Wesley Clark, the supreme allied commander for Europe (SACEUR), disagreed with his top Air Force officer, Lt. Gen. Short. Clark argued for hitting tanks and artillery in Kosovo, actions that might prevent the Serbians from continuing the aggressions in the field. Moreover, assembling a consensus within NATO was easier for such targets. By contrast, Short felt that such targets were too expensive for the value they added; instead, he argued, NATO should try to "cut off the head" of the

³⁶See, for instance, Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

³⁷"Holes in War's Strategy," *Los Angeles Times*, September 25, 1999, p. 14.

invasion force by threatening, then carrying out, attacks on strategic facilities in Serbia.³⁸

If air power alone is insufficient and if American stakes are great enough, the next step is the threat of ground war. In Bosnia, and later in Kosovo, the threat of ground war was enhanced by the presence of a parallel or allied ground campaign already under way. In Bosnia, for instance, although NATO did not send in forces for a ground war, the air war was eventually coordinated with a ground attack by Croatian and Bosnian forces. This combined attack forced the Serbian surrender and led to the Dayton Accords of 1995.

In Kosovo, three months of air strikes had not broken Milosevic's resolve, despite the fact that NATO had bombed so much that it was literally running out of targets. Was it the leaks of information about NATO plans for a ground invasion that moved Milosevic finally to comply? Surely, the prospect of a renewed KLA offensive made the threat of a ground war much more credible to Milosevic. He surrendered only three days after the United States approved Gen. Clark's plan for preparing an invasion.³⁹

Inducements

Using carrots in compellence campaigns is rarer than using sticks, but inducements are used, usually in two similar circumstances. One use is simply sweetening the offer when diplomacy backed by force has run into a dead end. These carrots are aimed at the target directly. The other use of inducements aims at the politics of the target. The target may be reluctant to give in to the compeller's demands because other actors within the state or institution are opposed. If the target feels that his position, even his life, is in jeopardy for complying with the United States, compliance is unlikely. By offering the target

³⁸Dana Priest, "The Commanders' War: The Battle Inside Headquarters," *Washington Post*, September 21, 1999, p. 1.

³⁹Some argue that Milosevic received intelligence that NATO had created plans for the full invasion of Serbia, known as Plan Bravo Minus. This invasion had political backing and was to be led by the British and the Americans if the air war had still failed to bring Milosevic's surrender by early autumn. Gen. Wesley Clark, the NATO SACEUR, supported this argument. See Patrick Wintour and Peter Beaumont, "Revealed: The Secret Plan to Invade Kosovo," *London Sunday Observer*, July 18, 1999; Peter Beaumont and Patrick Wintour, "Leaks in NATO—and Plan Bravo Minus," *London Sunday Observer*, July 18, 1999; and Patrick Wintour, "Milosevic Quit Kosovo 'To Avoid Greater Defeat,'" *London Sunday Observer*, July 25, 1999. However, the counterargument was made by Lt. Gen. Sir Mike Jackson, NATO's commander in Kosovo, who believed Milosevic surrendered because of the Russian decision of June 3 to back the West's position in demanding that surrender. With Russia no longer in his camp, Milosevic felt that his campaign was unlikely to succeed. Jackson also believed that the air war did little significant damage to the Serbian forces or infrastructure. See Andrew Gilligan, "Russia, Not Bombs, Brought End to War in Kosovo, Says Jackson," *London Sunday Telegraph*, August 1, 1999.

something positive to take back to his state or supporters, which could reduce jeopardy for the target, that target can sometimes be convinced to cooperate.

When sanctions are imposed, the prospect of lessening them serves as an inducement to comply with U.S. demands. For instance, the allied victors in the Gulf War were willing to reduce sanctions in exchange for continued cooperation with international goals, including the UNSCOM regime. In this case, the carrots worked, although only temporarily. Hussein's power was dependent on support by Iraqi elites and Baath party officials who strongly opposed giving in to Western demands, making it extremely difficult for Hussein to accept U.S. terms. In fact, the influence of these elites was so great, and the stakes in pro-Arab and anti-Western action so high, that Hussein often took actions that he knew would invite U.S. retaliation.

The negotiations with North Korea are an intriguing example of the use of inducements. In the Agreed Framework of 1994, the United States, Japan, and South Korea offered aid, fuel oil, and two light-water reactors in exchange for North Korea ceasing the production of nuclear materials and a promise to eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities in compliance with the NPT.⁴⁰ On its face, the inducements package was surprising, for North Korea was the most closed and implacable of foes. Nothing else, though, had worked. Moreover, while the inducements were politically controversial, it may have been possible to offer them precisely because North Korea was so closed and so strange. Its leader, Kim Jong Il, was portrayed in the media of the United States and its allies more as a caricature than a demon. Whatever the atrocities he and his regime had committed, they had not been demonized in the same way that Hussein or Milosevic had been.

The risk of carrots is that the target can renege on the deal that has been made after the carrots have been received or comply only partially, leaving the United States and its allies to decide whether to take further action. This problem ran through the campaigns against Iraq and North Korea. There was, and continues to be, a sharp debate among the allies over whether sanctions against Iraq should be lessened until Hussein is in full compliance with inspections demands.⁴¹ North Korea initially complied with the demands of the United States and its allies, but later began to take actions that threatened the agreement. U.S. satellite

⁴⁰Regarding the Agreed Framework, see <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/chronology.html/>.

⁴¹Specifically, the United States and Britain sought a high level of compliance with inspections and disarmament requirements before sanctions were removed in any part (in fact, the United States wanted no sanction relief until the full list of requirements was met) while France, China, and Russia were willing to "concede too much financial relief in exchange for too little cooperation." See "Breaking the Iraq Deadlock," *New York Times*, August 15, 1999, p. A1.

imagery picked up signs of an underground "suspected nuclear project" in North Korea in 1998,⁴² and Pyongyang has made preparations to test a new missile that may have the capability of reaching parts of the United States.

In 1999, North Korea announced its intent to again launch a new missile with much greater range than the last it tested. To compel North Korea not to test, the United States again offered a series of inducements, after a serious policy review conducted by former Defense Secretary William Perry. In addition to promises to ease diplomatic relations with North Korea, the United States pledged to lift some of the trade sanctions against the state that have been in place since the Korean War if Pyongyang would abandon its missile tests and give up its nuclear ambitions.⁴³ However, the United States continued to be in an awkward position in seeking to hold North Korea to its pledge. The only recourse that the United States has shown itself willing to use is reimposing sanctions. North Korea thus has nothing to lose by committing to an action it may not intend to pursue, for it might at least extract further aid and concessions from the signatories to the Agreed Framework—or, in North Korea's view, to get those signatories to fulfill commitments they had already made.⁴⁴

The Limits of Military Threats

The United States has declared that it will not use chemical or biological weapons against an adversary, has resisted directly threatening the use of nuclear weapons in most circumstances, and has held to those vows even in cases of aggression by major regional adversaries. Iraq was never directly threatened with nuclear reprisal, although this was purposely never eliminated from the U.S. list of options. If a nuclear attack could not be made credible, it still might threaten such high costs as to make Iraq more cautious.

Nuclear threats might be more credible as deterrents against the use of WMD by an adversary. NATO, after all, continues to have a doctrine that contemplates the

⁴²Satellite photography revealed the large-scale excavation of a site at the Yongbyon nuclear facility where North Korea had amassed weapon-grade plutonium prior to the Agreed Framework. However, the United States admitted that it could not confirm that North Korea had officially reneged on the Framework. "U.S. Has No Evidence North Korea Reneged on Weapons Agreement," Associated Press, August 19, 1998. See http://www.idahonews.com/081998/NATION_/24197.htm.

⁴³See Philip Shenon, "Panel Urges Stepped-Up Attention to Ties with North Korea," *New York Times*, September 15, 1999, p. 1.

⁴⁴U.S. officials have been sensitive to North Korean attempts to extract further aid from the United States and other signatories of the Agreed Framework. In November 1998, North Korea demanded \$300 million in exchange for access to a suspected nuclear site. The two nations failed to reach agreement on the issue. See "North Korea Threatens Attack Unless US Pays Money," *Korea Times*, December 4, 1998, at <http://www.reagan.com/HotTopics.main/HotMike/document-12.4.1998.2.html>.

first use of nuclear weapons.⁴⁵ In almost any imaginable scenario involving a use of WMD, the United States would have more than enough conventional force to retaliate decisively without using nuclear weapons.⁴⁶

And the political inhibitions on using nuclear weapons would still apply. That said, an adversary who contemplated a large-scale use of biological or chemical weapons could not be sure that threats to respond with nuclear weapons were entirely incredible.

The Nature of the Compeller

The starting position of the United States in a given compellence campaign is crucial. Its ability to apply preponderant force, its reputation for handling similar conflicts, and the history of interactions between it and the target all weigh heavily on its credibility and ability to compel.

Reputation and History

When the United States has a reputation for strong and decisive action, compellence is more likely to succeed—again, almost a truism. However, this advantage may obtain in a fairly small percentage of compellence attempts. U.S. action is virtually assured from the beginning of a crisis only in the two cases, Iraq and North Korea, that are the major theater war (MTW) contingencies in U.S. defense planning. Other possible contingencies would require more planning and more decisionmaking time. Moreover, the United States has openly debated its capacity for two MTWs. To foreigners listening, the nuances in the debate about phasing and sequencing can easily be lost, and the open debate in the United States over this issue makes it harder for the United States to compel or deter a second major regional adversary once already embroiled in a different theater.

In dealing with potential WMD proliferators, the United States starts with a distinctly mixed reputation and history. It has not used force preemptively to strike a state's nuclear weapon facilities, and the Iraq case is likely to induce even more caution into U.S. actions. The North Korean case also suggests that the

⁴⁵Although NATO policy now states that NATO relies much less on its nuclear weapons, the nuclear first-use policy is still intact for the defense of both old and new members of the alliance. For more on NATO's nuclear posture, see *The NATO Handbook*, Chapter 7, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/index.htm>.

⁴⁶See Section 5.

United States is hesitant to threaten physically the nascent and potentially vulnerable forces of a potential proliferator.

The United States also has a skimpy history of dealing with ambiguous states and actors. The U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992 was the first major intervention after the end of the cold war.⁴⁷ Although the mission began with only humanitarian goals, it was later expanded to include peace enforcement. By 1993, U.S. objectives included capturing Aideed, the most powerful Somali warlord. On October 3, 1993, the United States sent Army Rangers on a mission to capture Aideed that ended in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and TV broadcasts of the Somalis dragging a dead soldier through the streets of Mogadishu.

Soon thereafter, it became clear that a genocide was under way in Rwanda, yet the United States stood aside. Potential U.S. targets could well draw the lesson from the Somalia case that being able to threaten U.S. casualties is enough to deter U.S. intervention when the United States has weak or ambiguous interests.⁴⁸ It was no accident that, when the USS *Harlan County* arrived in Port-au-Prince, the armed men on the docks were yelling about creating another Somalia for the United States, threatening casualties to U.S. soldiers if the United States were to intervene.

Coalitions

In general, strong coalitions have a much better chance of coercing the target state than loose coalitions. The stronger the coalition, the more likely it is that the adversary will perceive U.S. and allied credibility to be high and thus will see the coalition as likely to follow through on its threats. Furthermore, the U.S. public sees greater legitimacy in actions for which the United States has international support.⁴⁹

Maintaining the coalition is a primary task of compellence campaigns. During the Kosovo crisis, for instance, French concerns over Serbian casualties nearly caused France to break with NATO policy. French President Jacques Chirac was on the point of leaving NATO's Washington summit early, and President Clinton had to reassure him, arguing that an early departure would have been perceived as disunity that could only encourage Milosevic.⁵⁰ In addition, NATO had to take

⁴⁷Based on casework by Timothy Smith, RAND.

⁴⁸The crossing from peacekeeping or humanitarian missions to war has been called the Mogadishu Line since Somalia, highlighting the importance of this case in American thinking.

⁴⁹See Byman, Waxman, and Larson, p. 60.

⁵⁰See Priest, "The Commanders' War: Bombing by Committee," *Washington Post*, September 20, 1999, p. A1.

some options off the table to keep the coalition as united as possible. Clinton asked British Prime Minister Tony Blair to stop talking publicly about a possible invasion because the talk was causing domestic strains for several of the allies, as well as continuing to anger the Russians, who still had a great deal of sympathy for Serbia.⁵¹

The strength of the opposing coalition also greatly affected India's decision calculus over whether to test its weapons in 1998—in this case, perversely, inducing it to advance the tests. India had avoided signing the NPT for the treaty's life of more than two decades and worried that the entry into force of the CTBT would provide a political basis for the United States to put together a strong coalition to compel India not to test or punish it severely for testing. The Indian government thought that such a united front against India would make it prohibitively costly to perform the necessary tests.

An additional benefit of a strong coalition is the ability to use regional bases in allied countries during a military campaign. Especially during long bombing campaigns, it is a distinct advantage to be able to move air assets to the theater or have a home base for ground troops in a country that borders the target state.⁵² During the campaign against Iraq, when the United States lost the support of its regional allies and was denied access to the bases of some, it was forced to use stand-off cruise missile strikes and other assets when Hussein attacked the Kurds and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998.⁵³ In contrast, the strong diplomatic coalition in the war against Serbia greatly aided the campaign. Even states that did not directly take part granted NATO important overflight rights, and many regional states offered their territories for bases and the temporary housing of refugees.⁵⁴

When coalitions are divided, compellence is much more difficult. Immediately following the Gulf War, the United States held together a strong international coalition that included both global and regional allies. As long as this coalition remained strong, Hussein backed down rapidly in the face of allied threats. As time passed and the coalition started to break apart, Hussein's provocations

⁵¹Dana Priest, "The Commander's War: The Secret Plan to Invade Kosovo," *Washington Post*, September 19, 1999, p. A1.

⁵²The Kosovo crisis showed that the U.S. Air Force has the ability to fly missions from the continental United States to far distant theaters. Six B-2 "stealth" bombers flew 45 combat sorties to Kosovo out of Whitman Air Force Base in Missouri. (Public Affairs Office, Whitman Air Force Base.) However, with only 21 of these long-range bombers planned for the U.S. inventory, the United States is far from having the capacity to run an entire air war from its own territory. See the U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet on the B-2 at http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/B_2_Spirit.html.

⁵³Saudi Arabia limited U.S. access to air bases on its territory. Additionally, France and Egypt, traditional U.S. allies, disavowed the campaign, and Russia and China voiced their disapproval. See Byman and Waxman, *Confronting Iraq*, cited above, p. 48, and Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Fighters in Saudi Arabia Grounded," *New York Times*, December 19, 1998, p. A9.

⁵⁴See Priest, "The Commander's War: The Secret Plan to Invade Kosovo," cited above, p. A1.

increased in number. He has still refused to reinstitute the UNSCOM inspections, exploiting the division among the allies over the composition of a reinstituted sanction program and the reduction in sanctions that should be granted if Hussein were willing to allow inspections. Russian and Chinese opposition to Western action in Kosovo allowed Milosevic to exploit this division by claiming that the West was illegally intervening in a sovereign state where it did not belong. Indeed, the shift of Russia to the Western position in Kosovo may be what finally pushed Milosevic to surrender.

The United States has had continued difficulty in putting together a strong international coalition in cases where the objective is to support a subnational group against the "legitimate" national government. Many countries in the world hold territories dominated by a national minority group and are reluctant to accept any outside right to intervene in a civil conflict on behalf of the minority group. It was no accident that Russia and China, each with a rebellious province dominated by a minority group (Chechnya and Tibet, respectively), both vehemently opposed U.S. actions in Iraq as well as in Kosovo. In 1996, when the United States used air strikes to punish Hussein's attack on the Kurds, international support was so weak that regional allies withheld access to bases. Turkey resisted U.S. protection of the Kurds in Iraq because of the Kurdish minority in Turkey itself.

To be sure, both international law and practice are changing. The right and duty to protect people being slaughtered anywhere in the world is more and more accepted. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, for example, claimed that under certain conditions nations have the right to violate national sovereignty against the wishes of a national government. This principle of "just intervention" represents a strong shift in the application of international law.⁵⁵ However, the distance between accepting the principle and implementing it through international coalitions is great, for the question remains of *who* authorizes the coalition. The United States and its allies did not take the Kosovo case to the UN, lest China and Russia veto intervention. As a practical matter, that action was necessary; besides, there was strong support throughout Europe for the action.

UN backing imparts a large degree of legitimacy to the compellence campaign. The support shows the adversary that the United States is not acting alone, but rather that the world supports U.S. actions.⁵⁶ For the most part, acting through

⁵⁵See "What Is Just Intervention?" *Christian Science Monitor*, September 23, 1999, p. 10.

⁵⁶However, the United States' debt of approximately \$1.6 billion in past dues to the UN has hindered U.S. influence in the organization. See Christopher S. Wren, "Albright Says Debt Hinders U.S. Ability to Shape U.N.," *New York Times*, September 23, 1999, p. 1. To be fair, the United States is responsible for 25 percent of the UN budget and 31 percent of UN peacekeeping costs. See the USIA

the UN also allows the United States to share the costs and risks of its missions. Yet, as Kosovo showed, getting UN backing for U.S. campaigns is not always an option. Still, there was a price to be paid for circumventing the UN, the most legitimate international authorizer.

Coalitions are necessary, but the cases also graphically demonstrate their liabilities. Most obvious, organizing and deploying a multinational force take longer than a unilateral force or a force of very few countries: witness Haiti. The United States had prepared a force to invade Haiti and had rehearsed invasion scenarios, but it then sought UN support for using force. The UN quickly authorized the creation of a "multinational force . . . to use all means necessary"⁵⁷ to overthrow Cedras and reinstate Aristide. Although the invasion force was U.S. troops only, foreign troops needed to be incorporated into the subsequent peacekeeping force. Getting agreement within the coalition slowed the invasion. The peacekeeping force required coordination between several different nations to deploy compatible troops to the area.

Just as plainly, the larger the coalition, the slower the decisionmaking. After the war in Kosovo ended, Gen. Clark talked openly about the problem of getting NATO approval for targeting and other actions. Both the necessity of getting approval from several nations for target selections and the degree to which civilian leaders were involved in the details of the bombing campaign slowed down the air war significantly and made it difficult to put forth a strong and cohesive effort.⁵⁸ Although NATO generally did not need to have a consensus on targeting, it still was far from easy to get agreement between the three NATO members that made the majority of the most important decisions: the United States, Britain, and France. France was much more resistant to the targeting of sites that might result in civilian casualties than the other two nations. This reluctance affected Gen. Clark's ability to run the air war in the way that he would have preferred. France also spoke out against the U.S. tendency to act as the world's policeman and its dominance over the NATO alliance, thus using NATO as a way to increase U.S. influence.

Unilateral action lacks the legitimacy of UN or other broad international support but allows the United States to do its own planning and speeds up the process of

Electronic Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, May 1997 at <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0597/ijpe/pj2peace.htm>. The United States often ends up paying more of the costs of missions that it feels are critical, such as Haiti.

⁵⁷S/RES/940 (1994), July 31, 1994.

⁵⁸See Priest, "The Commanders' War: Bombing by Committee," cited above, p. A1.

making a decision.⁵⁹ It lets the United States react to the adversary's countermeasures more rapidly than if the United States had to clear its actions with other powers. Furthermore, if the United States threatens the adversary and is relatively unaffected by the reactions or input of other world powers, U.S. credibility is likely to be greater. Perhaps most important, the need to sustain coalitions both limits options and makes the resulting actions almost entirely transparent. Since U.S. coalitions are collections of democracies, which need to defend their actions before their publics, the actions are all the more transparent.

Coalitions tend to be constrained in their actions to what their weakest members will accept. NATO, which operates on the basis of consensus, has adopted the practice through the years of forbearance by the small countries in blocking the preferences of the large. Still, France's role in limiting targeting during the air war over Kosovo is telling. And the need to bring coalition partners along means that the coalition is virtually condemned to a fixed—thus visible and predictable—ladder of escalation. Throughout the Iraq campaign, the United States resorted to lesser actions than it might have preferred because that was all the coalition could bear. In many respects, the debate between Gens. Clark and Short over targets during the Kosovo campaign was moot, for NATO probably had to exhaust its targets in Kosovo before its members would have supported striking Belgrade.

Domestic Politics

Domestic politics also loomed in all the cases. Contrast Haiti and Iraq. In the former, the body politic debated how important the country was, what means were thus justified, and how reliable Aristide was. In the latter, there had been considerable debate before Desert Storm but hardly any thereafter, which showed the adversary that the U.S. public was firmly behind Washington's threats. In some cases, the openness of the United States—with executive and congressional debate in the full glare of the media—builds credibility. This consequence was certainly the case during and immediately following the Gulf War, when Americans were rallying against Iraq; the United States had near-total freedom of action.⁶⁰

⁵⁹Needless to say, decisionmaking in the American bureaucracy is seldom rapid. However, eliminating the need of reaching a decision in ten democracies rather than just one can be a significant time-saver.

⁶⁰One index of the latitude the government had was the lack of public concern over collateral damage and Iraqi civilian casualties. For instance, 71 percent of Americans polled in 1991 thought that the United States was justified in attacking military targets that Hussein had hidden in areas heavily populated by Iraqi civilians. *Los Angeles Times*, February 15–17, 1991, cited in Byman, Waxman, and Larson, p. 78.

However, in other cases openness hindered U.S. compellence attempts. Not only do domestic disagreements, displayed openly, diminish credibility in the eyes of the adversary, but also the need for the government to publicize its policies to gain domestic support often is at odds with the requirements of compelling the adversary. For instance, on March 24, 1999, the day that NATO went to war for Kosovo, Clinton announced in a TV address to the nation that the United States would not send ground troops to the conflict.⁶¹ This declaration in effect became U.S. policy and restricted the available options.⁶² Washington could not credibly threaten the use of ground troops because it had already publicly disavowed the option.

So, too, when the U.S. government feels impelled to declare its proposed pullout date and how it will minimize casualties, adversaries can design their responses accordingly. They can seek to elevate costs in the coin of casualties, strained alliances, broken international laws or treaties, time or money spent, or morally questionable actions undertaken to an unacceptable level when compared to the benefits the United States expects to receive.⁶³ Increasing U.S. casualties or escalating to a level that risks them tends to pull U.S. domestic support away from the campaign. Although the United States did not pull out of Somalia specifically because of the casualties that it suffered in Mogadishu, many adversaries believe that there was a direct link.⁶⁴

Similarly, threatening to draw out the campaign over a long time also tends to wear away the support of the American people. Domestic pressure to pull out American soldiers from longstanding commitments in places like Haiti and Bosnia has made the U.S. government more conscious of making only short-term commitments in areas where it has low stakes. However, the United States has been willing to extend the supposedly short-term commitments by several years if the goals of the deployment have not been reached. Commitments were

⁶¹Clinton declared, "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war." See Priest, "The Commanders' War: The Secret Plan to Invade Kosovo," cited above.

⁶²However, Samuel Berger, the U.S. National Security Advisor, did get U.N. Secretary-General Solana to authorize Gen. Clark to begin secret talks to develop an invasion plan should one become necessary. Clark was also tasked with building support among top U.S. military leaders for planning a ground invasion. Clark began to put together an invasion plan despite the fact that the Pentagon was never in favor of a ground option. See Priest, "The Commanders' War: The Secret Plan to Invade Kosovo," cited above.

⁶³The factors listed here are those that were given by Americans in a 1988 poll when asked what factors would be important to them "if [they] had to make a decision about using the American military." See *Americans Talk Security*, Vol. 9 (September 7-18, 1988, reproduced in Byman, Waxman, and Larson, p. 71).

⁶⁴The American public supported a withdrawal from Somalia well before the 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed October 3, 1993. See Eric V. Larson, *Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation: Understanding the Role of Casualties in Support for U.S. Military Operations*, RGSD-124 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

extended in both Haiti and Bosnia despite the exit strategies that stipulated earlier dates.

Finally, the U.S. government, and the Pentagon in particular, has become sensitive to casualties, seeking both to avoid missions or campaigns where there is a high risk of casualties and to carry out the campaigns in a manner that minimizes them. Interestingly, it is not clear that this conventional wisdom among political leaders actually reflects public opinion. To be sure, polls show that the public is unwilling to spend lives on fool's errands, to take casualties for weak interests or issues in which the United States has low stakes.⁶⁵ The American people were willing to tolerate casualties for what they perceived were vital interests in Iraq and the Gulf.⁶⁶ Indeed, they expected the Gulf War to last longer and result in more U.S. casualties. The United States also had strong interests in Saudi Arabia at the time of the Al Khobar bombing and therefore did not contemplate withdrawing troops in response to this attack.⁶⁷

The United States runs its missions with sensitivity to casualties. In Kosovo, not only did the United States refuse to send ground troops, but the air campaign restricted NATO's aircraft from flying below 15,000 feet to reduce the possibility of losing aircraft.⁶⁸ The Air Force flew six escort planes along with its bombers to reduce its pilot losses.⁶⁹ Furthermore, although Apache helicopters were deployed to Kosovo because they had high utility for the type of combat that was under way, they were not flown because they were believed to be too vulnerable.⁷⁰

Even if the United States finds a conflict to be important enough so that casualties are not a critical factor, the sensitivity of important U.S. allies can also pose a problem in waging a campaign. During the Kosovo crisis, France feared backlash from its domestic public if large numbers of Serbian civilians were killed during the "humanitarian mission." France was the most likely of the allies to reject certain targets even if they had high military utility.⁷¹ This reticence slowed down the air campaign significantly and made it more difficult for the military to carry out the type of war that it believed would be most effective.

⁶⁵See Larson, cited above.

⁶⁶John E. Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 304-305.

⁶⁷Byman, Waxman, and Larson, p. 81.

⁶⁸"Holes in War's Strategy," cited above.

⁶⁹This Air Force requirement reduced Gen. Clark's ability to change the tasking orders easily on short notice and eventually led to the use of naval aircraft over Air Force planes. Priest, "The Commanders' War: The Battle Inside Headquarters," cited above.

⁷⁰Flora Lewis, "Is More Fancy Weaponry Really What the Alliance Needs?" *International Herald Tribune*, September 24, 1999.

⁷¹Priest, "The Commanders' War: Bombing by Committee," cited above.

However, whether U.S. casualties induce the public to favor withdrawal or to become all the more committed to the campaign is a fine line. In some cases, the United States reappraises the value of the coercion mission and withdraws its forces. In other cases, there is a backlash from the American population, which is angered by the targeting of their citizens and soldiers. For instance, when terrorists linked to Libya bombed the nightclub in Berlin, resulting in significant casualties, American resolve hardened. The U.S. population strongly supported the retaliatory raid against Libya in 1986, evidence of strong domestic support for actions against terrorists. When the United States hit suspected terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, 75 percent of the public supported the strikes.⁷²

⁷²See Mark Z. Barabak, "U.S. Raids Get Broad Support: Clinton Issues Not Significant," *Los Angeles Times*, August 23, 1998.

5. Critical Issues and Lessons

The lessons that emerge from these cases are more for strategy and policy than for hardware or options.¹ To be sure, as the United States acquires more precise weapons and ways to locate targets, it will be better able to put at risk things that are valued by the leaders it wants to compel, including their lives. Yet because the targets of U.S. compellence care about their own safety above all else, they will take pains to protect themselves, and targeting them directly will long remain problematic. Targeting their minds will be easier, yet not easy. It will be more possible to get inside those leaders' heads than inside their bunkers. Thus, the lessons are about how the United States conceives compellence campaigns, how it plans them, and especially how it could go about understanding what will move foreign leaders to comply with U.S. demands.

Campaigns Versus Point Outcomes

Time is very important. The analytic language surrounding "compellence" has a discrete flavor to it: The target is or is not compelled to do something. This point outcome framed thinking in most of the cases.

Yet most cases turned out not to be point outcomes. They were campaigns. The United States still faced Saddam Hussein years after Desert Storm and Milosevic years after the bombardment of Dubrovnik. And so a haunting question runs through the cases: How different would U.S. policy and action have been if it had assumed from the start that the campaign might last a long time, that the initial compellent threats would be but the first stage?

The first lessons from the idea of viewing compellence as a campaign are familiar and worthy but hard for governments to implement. The first guidance would be to ask seriously the inconvenient question: What if the first compellent threat does not succeed? Will the United States and its partners be left with dry powder, or will their credibility be diminished, along with their ability to increase the pressure the next time around?

¹For a thoughtful treatment of some of the issues discussed here, see "Special Challenges in Extending Deterrence in the New Era," Appendix G of the National Research Council study cited above.

The questions amount to the injunction, also familiar, to conceive—at the beginning—a series of what-ifs and interactions between U.S. threats and target responses. The questions amount to the injunction to plan for the long haul. They particularly raise the need to ask several awkward questions: What if the target does not fall in the wake of utter military defeat? What if Milosevic is still around in five years? What if India continues to be tempted to test nuclear weapons for the next generation?

Not thinking of compellence in terms of campaigns makes handling an adversary's countermeasures more difficult. The United States usually does not have a good idea of what types of countermeasures the adversary is likely to try and has not thought through the campaign enough to have prepared a response. For instance, in the words of one analyst, in Kosovo "there was no Plan B. NATO did not have a contingency blueprint for a longer campaign."² If it did have such a plan, it was closely held and narrowly military. NATO found it hard to imagine that its three-phase campaign would not bring Milosevic to the table. Worse, thinking through the options that would be necessary if these phases were unsuccessful risked breaking apart the coalition before the war had even begun.

Changing Purposes

In virtually all instances of compellence that became campaigns, U.S. purposes changed. However explicit the government was about the change—and that appears to have varied dramatically—there usually was too little public explanation or understanding of the shift. In Somalia, for instance, successful armed humanitarian relief in the UN United Task Force (UNITAF) turned into unsuccessful nation-building in United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II. It was an example of "purpose creep"—or leap. The presence of overwhelming force, and the willingness to use it neutrally on any party that got out of line, opened the ports and the flow of humanitarian relief. With UNOSOM II, the purpose changed dramatically to nation-building, with General Aideed identified as the main obstacle. The United States ceased being neutral and became a party to a civil war that had been going on for a long time in varying forms.

Iraq is a striking example, in part because the campaign has lasted so long. U.S. purposes first shifted from reversing Iraq's aggression to destroying its WMD programs. The first change was perhaps inevitable because the United States succeeded so dramatically at its first purpose only to discover that Iraq's WMD

²See Priest, "The Commanders' War: The Battle Inside Headquarters," cited above.

programs were larger, deeper-rooted, and more advanced than expected. Soon after, the United States added the objective of preventing Hussein from attacking minority groups in the north and south. By 1998, Hussein's compliance with all these goals was determined to be insufficient, and the United States added the goal of overthrowing Hussein's regime. This "purpose creep" led the United States from a position backed by most of the world to one that risked being seen as interventionist and overzealous. The final goal divided the allies, who had been so united during the Gulf War. Even Britain, usually firmly with Washington, parted company over the goals by 1998, although it continued to actively participate in patrolling the no-fly zones.

The lessons of purpose creep are

- Be prepared to declare victory. UNITAF was a success, and Desert Storm was an enormous one. But UNOSOM II goes down as a disaster and Iraq as a mixed case because of what came later.
- Avoid being beguiled by success and capability. Success makes reaching for more a temptation. So does the possession of great—usually military—capacity near the target. But the expanded purpose usually is harder, and the measures that back the threat, while impressive, may be insufficient or inappropriate for the new, expanded purpose.
- Articulate the purposes, both to the public and for those implementing the campaign. This definition is a specific form of planning for what-ifs during the campaign. As elsewhere in policymaking, the challenge of preparing the argument for public consumption will sharpen the discussion inside the government.

Visible Objectives Versus Subjective Objectives

This is the problem of salami slicing. The simplest form of this lesson is that while, by definition, no compelling goals are easy, some are harder than others. In particular, there is the distinction between those for which compliance is obvious and visible and those for which it is not. "Remove your forces from Kuwait" (or Kosovo) may be difficult to achieve but not hard to observe once achieved (although there might be, in some cases, room for dispute over whether military units had been converted into police).

By contrast, "dismantle your WMD program" is an objective whose achievement is much harder to observe, one that invites salami slicing. Interpretation leaves room for endless arguments about what constitutes compliance and how it is to be measured. Had Hussein been wiser, he would have readily agreed to the UN's

six-month deadline for dismantling his WMD and probably escaped sanctions (and inspections) quickly, leaving him free to rebuild.

There are two further complications with subjective compellence goals. One is that such goals invite dissent within the compelling coalition and offer the target ready opportunities to coerce the weakest-kneed members of the coalitions. If half the Iraqi army still remained in Kuwait, Russia or France could not have asserted that Saddam had "done enough" or "demonstrated good-faith compliance." If, by contrast, the goal is more subjective, such as capping WMD programs or conceding the Kosovars some autonomy, the target has more room to argue that it has complied and members of the compelling coalition more reason to concur. Disagreements among the allies over what demands must be met for sanctions to be lifted have given Iraq the chance to get some of the sanctions lifted in exchange for complying with only a few of the demands.

The second is that a certain amount of ambiguity makes it easier for the target to yield. It can do so with less loss of face. Indeed, sometimes it may be acceptable if the compeller knows for certain that the target has climbed down, but the outcome is more ambiguous for the rest of the world. To be sure, that conclusion risks that the world will draw the wrong lesson, but if the specific objective is important enough, the compeller may be willing to tolerate the public ambiguity. In most of these cases, however, the balance was in the other direction and thus plainly unacceptable: The United States as a compeller had reason to believe that compliance was much less adequate than the targets claimed.

The lesson is to beware of complicated, subjective objectives whose metrics are ambiguous. For instance, the 1994 agreement with North Korea was not specific about how the country's missile program would be affected. The United States felt that missile technologies were included in the agreement, while Pyongyang felt that these were a separate issue, in part because North Korea made a great deal of money from trading these technologies. In ambiguous circumstances, verifying compliance will strain U.S. intelligence capabilities and put pressure on intelligence sharing in ways that were all too evident in the Iraqi case.

Acquiring Stakes

As the campaign proceeds, the United States and its partners acquire stakes that they did not intend and that are not necessary to the original and central purpose. Defending those stakes then becomes a test of U.S. credibility despite their being no part of the original purposes.

This process of acquiring stakes is most obvious in the case of Iraq, where the United States acquired stakes in protecting Kurds and, to a lesser extent, the Shi'a in southern Iraq. Neither was part of original U.S. purposes. Indeed, the United States had explicitly not sought to splinter Iraq, on the long-term calculation that doing so would destabilize the region, in particular leaving little counterweight to Iran.

Yet once these stakes were acquired, their defense took on a life of its own. The United States and its partners were compelled to make threats—and ultimately take action—to reinforce the no-fly and no-drive zones. When, in 1996, Iraq moved into the Kurdish area to clean out opposition, the action was a sharp blow to U.S. credibility; U.S. and allied air strikes appeared as pinpricks.

The lessons, which are both hard to implement, are to avoid acquiring stakes that are not basic to U.S. purposes and not to make them tests of credibility if they are acquired. Achieving this position is particularly hard when visible human suffering is involved. The choice then can become a double-edged sword: Protecting the Kurds against genocide played to universal values and so probably increased broad support for the anti-Iraq campaign but at the same time directly hindered the coalition by generating more unease in Turkey about the ultimate impact of the exercise.

Compelling in Coalitions

Almost all the cases involved coalitions, and future cases seem likely to as well. The reason is plain: Even if the United States does not really need either the bases or forces provided by coalition partners, it will want the sanction of broader coalitions. The more partners, the more legitimacy the coalition will confer.

Yet the political requirements of coalition building run directly against the operational needs of the compellence campaign. Not only is it harder and slower for coalitions to plan and generate forces to back military threats, but coalitions limit options and make their actions transparent to adversaries. NATO could bomb Belgrade in March 1999 but not in March 1998 because it first had to demonstrate to the wavering members—not to mention critical nonmembers, such as Russia—that more limited steps had failed before it could take more assertive ones. NATO was locked into a rigid, and transparent, ladder of escalation.

There is no escape from this policy dilemma. Sometimes, when U.S. stakes are important or, conversely, the scope of the conflict is limited, the United States may act unilaterally; in other cases, it may prefer smaller “coalitions of the

willing" despite the lesser legitimacy they confer. In an ideal world—one approximated by the first years after the demise of the Soviet Union, when Russia was very cooperative—the United States would seek broad UN authorization, with subsequent implementation left to NATO or to the United States alone.

It is too early to tell, but Kosovo may have set at least a limited precedent for "regional" authorization when the UN is paralyzed. The United States might come to rue that precedent if Russia or China one day comes to construe "regional authorization" by its own definition. But trying to give NATO decisions legitimacy for much of Europe seems a partial response to the downside of broader global coalitions. For part of the Haiti campaign, the OAS performed a similar role for the Americas, initially on the argument that the stakes at play were of interest mostly to Haiti's neighbors.

Targeting the Adversary's Mind

The proximate targets of compellent campaigns are states or groups, but the ultimate targets are individuals—leaders in a position to decide. The ambiguous cases are so for just that reason: Who is in charge, and how completely, is unclear. The challenge is to get inside the adversary's head, to threaten or hold at risk what he or she cares most about. This is true for all war, perhaps all foreign policy, but especially when the United States seeks to prevail without using force and without necessarily defeating the adversary in the military sense.

The Bosnia campaign includes one little-noticed attempt to get inside a foe's mind. The bombing campaign began in 1995 in an effort to compel Bosnian Serbs and their Serbian backers to come to the bargaining table and agree to some disposition that would guarantee the safety of Bosnia's Muslims. One small town, of no apparent value, kept appearing on the target list sent from Sarajevo. The recurrence puzzled NATO's commanders in Italy, but they kept hitting it nonetheless. It turned out to be the hometown of Serbian commander Ratko Mladic. The targeteer in Sarajevo was explicit about the purpose: "I wanted Mladic to know that he couldn't protect the bones of his dead grandmother."

The targeting also sought to cut Mladic off from his forces by cutting key lines of communication. At the same time, there was no intention to "decapitate" Mladic by completely cutting him off because NATO leaders knew that they eventually would have to deal with him and that he would be critical in stopping the war. The attacks were meant to be attacks on his mind, making clear to him how vulnerable his communications to his troops were.

The lesson of these episodes, as well as RAND research conducted in the wake of Desert Storm, is to think harder about what opponents value. For instance, attacks on Hussein's regular forces hardly bothered him, for they were Shi'a and of dubious value in his mind. Tasking intelligence to collect what snippets it can that are relevant to the opponent's motivation is valuable, as is serious "red-teaming" for the same purpose. For the latter exercise, enlisting a wide range of experts is imperative. Military experts and concerns dominate targeting but need to be supplemented. Psychologists may bolster thinking about what most concerns an adversary. And politicians are often better at understanding other politicians—even autocratic ones, such as Milosevic and Hussein—than are nonpoliticians. For instance, the technical analysts who knew the most about India's nuclear program were probably among the least equipped to get inside the heads of the Hindu nationalists who came to preside over that program.

Desert Storm stands as testimony to how effective the United States can be in exploiting the military weaknesses of an opponent once it puts its mind to winning the war. Paying comparable attention to what motivates the leaders and elite of those groups or nations, the United States endeavors to compel might more often spare it the need to fight a war to achieve its objectives.

Coda: Applying the Lessons to China-Taiwan

It was tempting, as the project concluded, to draw on its lessons for a case that was far from over—the confrontation between China and Taiwan, then entering a new phase with the election of Chen Shui-bian as president of Taiwan in March 2000 and the ending of the Nationalist, or KMT, party monopoly over political power on the island. These observations are offered as a test of the value of the project.

The first lesson is to pay close attention to who is being compelled and to do what. In particular, U.S. policy has been purposefully shrouded in "strategic ambiguity" about precisely what it would do in particular circumstances. Implicitly, its actions would depend on who upset the status quo. By that logic, a more-or-less unprovoked attack on Taiwan from the mainland would push America to Taiwan's defense, but if Taiwan were itself the provocateur, for instance by proclaiming its independence, it could not count on American support. That policy, however, depended on a status quo that was broadly accepted, that of "one China, two systems."

That status quo no longer has the broad acceptance it once commanded. A new generation has come to power on Taiwan, one that assumes that Taiwan will not necessarily be a sovereign state but that does assume it will be autonomous. With

Taiwan becoming more fully democratic, its claim to self-determination will pull harder on the American body politic.

Thus, the policy question is whether strategic ambiguity is still the right stance. Would more clarity about use of force be preferable, if framed in a way that did not seem to give Taiwan a blank check? Strategic ambiguity also presumed that Taiwan's eventual return to the mainland state was clear; it was left to the Chinese on both sides of the straits to work out the timetable and modalities. But if the United States cannot escape involvement, then perhaps it should begin pressing the exploration for other models, such as confederation or "one nation but several states."

The second and most important lesson is to think about U.S. policy as a campaign. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not likely in the short run not least because China could not accomplish it. But then what? And what if? Careful thinking about what China might do and how the United States might respond, over time, is needed, along with comparable thinking about Taiwan. That thinking needs to be accompanied by attention to *who* is to be deterred or compelled. The cases suggest that a more democratic Taiwan will be more awkward for the United States to influence, and China's own politics are also more complicated during what amounts to a long transition.

The final lesson is about who is compelling and with what instruments. In the short run, the United States has the freedom of near-unilateral action in the China case. Short of a major war, it can make military threats or moves without much attention to allies or coalition partners (although it would still like to have allies or partners). In the longer run and apart from purely military instruments, however, what it can do depends on what others will do. In particular, economic sanctions are unpromising both because of U.S. economic stakes in China and, particularly, those of U.S. allies who almost certainly cannot be persuaded to join in sanctions regardless of what action China takes. Any attempt by the United States to impose sanctions would almost certainly end up looking weak when it has to lift or negate those sanctions.

Appendix

Evidence from the Cases

This appendix provides detailed analyses of the cases, organized by the template questions set out in the introduction.

Compelling Iraq—Analytic Questions

Who? Iraq's government was and is an autocratic regime led by Saddam Hussein. Thus, the objective was to compel Hussein directly by threatening him or his base of power, rather than to threaten the state as a whole. Because Hussein depended upon the Republican Guard to protect him, as well as upon the support of key tribes, Baath party officials, military officers, and other elites to legitimize his rule, these were also relevant targets in the compellence campaign. Iraq was treated as an adversarial state throughout the campaign—a feature likely to be true of states in the category of major regional adversaries.

To do what? The eight compellence attempts might be divided into three types of goals. First, the United States sought to compel Hussein to desist from either regional or domestic aggression. In 1994, the United States compelled Iraq not to invade Kuwait; at three other points, the allies used military force to compel Hussein to cease offensives against the state's minority groups. Second, the United States tried on four occasions to establish or restart UNSCOM inspections intended to dismantle Iraq's WMD programs. A third objective was increasing U.S. credibility, as when Washington used air strikes to punish Iraq for attacking the Kurds. This action was meant to deter Iraq from any such offensives in the future by increasing U.S. credibility in defending the Kurds.

With what stakes and instruments? U.S. stakes varied with the compellence goal. Given its high stakes in limiting regional aggression in the Middle East that might put at risk a significant portion of Gulf oil—stakes plainly demonstrated in Desert Storm—U.S. credibility on that score was fairly clear. So, too, the United States has high stakes in preventing proliferation by major regional adversaries since, by definition, these adversaries threaten vital U.S. interests. WMD proliferation allows states of concern to magnify their threat to U.S. interests greatly. Therefore, the United States had significant stakes in forestalling Iraqi proliferation.

The Iraq case also exhibits how stakes can grow out of the campaign itself. In establishing safe havens in Iraq, the United States developed stakes in the protection of those areas and peoples that went beyond original U.S. intentions. However, once the United States began to protect the Iraqi minorities, its credibility became bound up with preserving the integrity of the safe havens—despite worries that protecting the Shi'a might allow Iran to gain a foothold in Iraq.

Because Iraq was a major regional adversary, there were relatively few limits on U.S. instruments. American domestic opinion was hawkish, preferring if anything a tougher line than that pursued at critical junctures. During the campaign, the United States and its allies used economic sanctions and the promise of lifting them, deployed ground troops in conjunction with air power, deployed air assets alone, and threatened or used air strikes. The United States did not apply much diplomatic pressure because Iraq was relatively immune to such instruments. However, when the UN stepped in to negotiate at one point during the campaign, that act increased the legitimacy of U.S. demands and pushed Iraq to comply with the UNSCOM inspection.

Still, the Iraq case suggests how difficult it is for the United States to accomplish some of its compellence goals. For instance, Washington found that compelling Hussein to give up his weapons program was extremely difficult. The United States had no clear instruments to directly affect Hussein's desire to develop WMD, and so developing better methods to deal with determined proliferators is an important policy goal.

In what context? The context also changed over the course of the campaign. Simply put, the stronger the U.S. position, the easier compellence was. At the beginning of the compellence campaign, the United States had just won a decisive victory in the Gulf War and had large numbers of troops still deployed in the area. The United States had made it clear to Hussein that it had preponderant force and was willing to use it to influence Iraqi behavior. Hence, when the United States redeployed ground troops to establish the Kurdish safe haven, Hussein quickly backed down. Hussein also withdrew his troops from the Kuwaiti border in response to U.S. ground troop deployment.

Although Hussein continued to test U.S. resolve, he backed down in the face of preponderant force. He had no illusions about his ability to defeat U.S. forces after the decisiveness of the four-day ground war in 1991. As time passed following the Gulf War, however, Iraq saw U.S. reputation as increasingly bound up in the strength of the coalition. As the U.S.-led coalition began to fracture, the

allies' preponderant force was discounted as Iraq increasingly viewed the United States as less likely to use it.

With what partners and politics? In this case, as in others, the strength of the U.S.-led coalition was critical in deterring and compelling Hussein. At the end of the Gulf War, the coalition was united and backed by the UN. Iraq clearly was the aggressor in the invasion of Kuwait and a threat to the stability of the region. Furthermore, Iraqi development of WMD was a serious threat to regional allies, to those with interests in the region, and to those with stakes in the integrity of the NPT, further uniting the victorious parties of the Gulf War. This postwar unity and deployed strength left Hussein no choice but to comply with allied demands.

However, this strong coalition could not be sustained. Different pieces of the coalition dropped off, depending on the specific goal in question. The UN backed the U.S. creation of the Kurdish safe haven in northern Iraq, but regional allies were reluctant. Those allies saw the establishment of these safe havens as interventions violating the territorial integrity of Iraq. Turkey was concerned, moreover, that a Kurdish safe haven might develop into an autonomous area within Iraq or even a Kurdish state. This development might encourage Turkey's own Kurdish minority to strive for greater autonomy within Turkey, thus threatening Turkey's own territorial integrity.

When the United States deployed troops to counter Hussein's movement of troops toward the Kuwaiti border, the coalition also fractured. Despite UN support in principle for any defense of Kuwait, both European and regional allies thought that the United States had overreacted. Only Kuwait and Saudi Arabia offered initial support, and they withdrew it when the confrontation persisted.

The coalition also fractured over time in the campaign to maintain UNSCOM inspections. In the first standoff over inspections, the United States, Britain, and France executed a joint air campaign despite active opposition from the regional allies. By the second standoff, Russia's bluster in opposition to the United States bordered on a threat. Washington again started with no regional support but gained some as Hussein's defiance continued. However, the UNSCOM program had to be watered down significantly both to maintain the inspections and to preserve the coalition.

The coalition finally dissolved during the final set of UNSCOM standoffs in 1998. Russia and China protested strongly, as did such long-time U.S. allies as France and Egypt. The United States and Britain went through with their Desert Fox air strikes, but they failed to compel Hussein to return to the UNSCOM regime. Although the United States remained interested in reinstituting sanctions,

reaching agreement proved impossible among the allies about either how much sanctions would be reduced or how much Iraqi cooperation would be required to remove them altogether.¹

How good was the analysis? Without more detailed access to documents, these judgments are speculative. Their intent is only to provoke thought. In the early years of the campaign, the United States did not seem to understand the nature of Hussein's power base thoroughly. The allies and the UN relied on economic sanctions as a coercive instrument throughout the campaign, despite Hussein's suffering little damage by this strategy. Instead of provoking national unrest, the severity of the sanctions, combined with Hussein's firm control over the national media, allowed the regime to use propaganda to coalesce the nation against the United States and its allies, who were portrayed as starving the Iraqi people. These countermeasures to the sanctions were, therefore, quite effective.

With a better understanding that it was necessary to compel Hussein himself and that he was unlikely to submit to the full extent of allied demands, the United States began to support the idea of backing a coup that would overthrow him. The United States hoped to put a new government in power that would be more amenable to U.S. interests, or at least to install a regime that could be more easily manipulated. The United States has not shown that it has a formula for overthrowing Hussein. Despite substantial U.S. funding and the de facto protection of potential challengers to Hussein, a coup has not proven easy to instigate.

Most obvious, the United States also did not anticipate how long the campaign might last. The Iraqi defeat during the Gulf War had been so decisive, and compelling Hussein in the initial attempts following the war so easy, that the United States created short-term policies with the expectation that it could greatly influence postwar Iraq. However, the United States underestimated both Hussein's resolve and his grip on power. There is still no clear end in sight to the campaign against Iraq, and periodic bombings continue to limit Iraqi power.

Compelling India—Analytic Questions

Who? India is an outlier in the WMD category because it was, and is, a democracy and a friendly state, and so U.S. stakes were both important and broad. India's attributes made a big difference in the campaign. Since India was a democracy, the U.S. compellence campaign targeted the Indian government to

¹"Breaking the Iraq Deadlock," cited above.

persuade it not to test its nuclear weapons. The United States did so, however, in the context of Indian public opinion, which generally supported the nuclear option. Moreover, the nationalist edges of that opinion were there to be mobilized in election campaigns.

Because India was a democracy and a friendly state, the United States was not fixed single-mindedly on nonproliferation. In fact, that objective competed with others. During the cold war, the United States had gone to some lengths to woo India away from military reliance on the Soviet Union (and later Russia) by improving exchanges of goods and technology with the United States. The United States was interested in strong future trade with India, and American business and government had significant investment in the state. In addition, other regional stakes—initially those regarding Pakistan but later with China as well—meant that the United States was neither as fixed on or as coherent about the nonproliferation goal as it might otherwise have been.

To do what? The U.S. goal was to get India to sign the NPT and the CTBT, thus abrogating its right either to declare itself a nuclear weapon state or test its nuclear capabilities. This specific goal remained throughout the compellence campaign.

With what stakes and instruments? The U.S. goal of compelling India not to resume nuclear testing was plain enough, but its stakes in the issue competed with other interests. Thus, despite episodes of strong rhetoric against proliferation, the nonproliferation issue did not always trump other goals. Surely India perceived such ambiguity. It now seems apparent, for instance, that U.S. stakes in keeping the door shut to new nuclear weapon states were not obvious to India. India felt that the United States was unlikely to respond forcefully to a nuclear test, given the magnitude of other U.S. interests in India.

The United States used several instruments in its attempt to persuade India not to test. The United States emphasized the importance of both the NPT and the CTBT and pressured India to sign both agreements, using the diplomatic backing and international legitimacy associated with the UN. Throughout the campaign to compel India, the United States relied on economic sanctions as a threat. Congress continually revised the legislation to sharpen that threat. The 1994 law, for instance, reduced presidential discretion in applying sanctions; it was meant to tie the U.S. executive's hands, thus increasing the credibility of the threat.

However, Indians did not see this legislation as more threatening. Rather, they believed that sanctions against them would be either waived or reduced, given the then-current relationship with the United States. Sanctions had succeeded in compelling India not to test under Indira Gandhi in 1982–1983. The change

between success then and failure in 1998 turned on India's goals. In the earlier period, India had a long-term but no immediate need to test. Therefore, sanctions that threatened the Indian goals of maintaining good relations with the United States and strengthening its economy were enough. By 1998, however, the window to test was closing because of the upcoming entry into force of the CTBT, and sanctions were an insufficient instrument. This insufficiency was because Indian stakes in testing were much higher and because U.S. credibility to impose sanctions was lower in the eyes of Indian leaders.

The United States also offered inducements during the campaign. The intent was to underscore and increase the opportunity costs that India would suffer if it went forward with the tests and lost the benefits of cooperation. The United States attempted to buy India's compliance with the NPT (and the CTBT) by increasing technology sharing, encouraging U.S. investment in India, declaring India the leader of South Asia (thus enhancing the state's international prestige), and improving the degree of cooperation between the two militaries, including through joint training exercises.

More-forceful instruments were not considered, again because India was a democracy and a friendly state. At no point did the United States consider using military force or even threats of force to compel India not to test. Although the United States has threatened other would-be proliferators with preventive strikes, these measures were not deemed appropriate for India.

In what context? Although the United States clearly had preponderant military force, this could not be brought to bear against India. As the case began, there were few prior examples of the United States trying to compel would-be proliferators. In terms of reputation, it was apparent that the United States had a strong interest in the global nonproliferation regime and would diplomatically pursue adherence to it. However, how this goal fit in with the other objectives that the United States sought in Indian-American relations was unclear. These factors combined to create an increasing belief in India that, while U.S. interest in the issue might be high, reprisals for testing were likely to be minimal. Even North Korea, a U.S. adversary, had received some benefits from flirting with nuclear weapons. There was little history or U.S. reputation that might effectively deter India from pursuing an open nuclear capability.

With what partners and politics? Both the NPT and the upcoming entry into force of the CTBT backed the U.S. campaign. Therefore, many nations, as well as the UN, supported U.S. goals in a general way—part of the general deterrence effort. However, these treaties lay in the background and brought no additional

partners directly into the compellence campaign. Thus, in practice the campaign was essentially a unilateral initiative by the United States.

It is relevant, however, that India thought that the strength of the nonproliferation-antitesting coalition would grow in the future. The proximate, if not principal, cause of India's resumed testing was the upcoming entry into force of the CTBT. India feared that the United States would be able to build a stronger coalition against nuclear testing that could significantly increase the costs of testing after September 1999.

How good was the analysis? Admiral David Jeremiah's report on intelligence in the wake of the 1998 test was vivid about the analytic failing: Analysts and policy officials alike "acted as if the BJP would behave as we behave."² To a greater or lesser extent, that charge of mirror-imaging seems fair throughout the campaign. Indeed, even the term "proliferation" has a one-sided ring: Those who have nuclear weapons get to keep them, but those who do not cannot acquire them.³ The United States frequently thought that its threats were clear, despite India's failure to read them as Washington intended. India thought it a strong possibility that the United States would not impose sanctions despite the open threat to do so. The United States believed itself much more credible than it actually was.

The United States had no idea how important testing was to India, especially as the actual testing date approached. From the U.S. perspective, India was crazy to test. Without testing, India could have its cake and eat it, too: Its discreet weapon program after 1974 was enough to deter Pakistan and worry China, but it could also get on with its pressing business of becoming richer. Analysts thus mostly dismissed the BJP's open intention to test as language for the party faithful and for the campaign; surely the party would moderate in government, and, besides, it would have to govern in coalition.

Washington also misunderstood Indian perceptions of their relations with the United States. From the Indian perspective, by the late 1990s the MOU was a dead letter and the Kicklighter proposals not much better. Instead, American experts seem to have regarded these agreements as great strides in the relationship between the United States and India that would impel India not to test by creating high stakes in a positive relationship with the United States. Most critically, the United States did not realize how much Indians viewed the entry into force of the CTBT as a deadline for testing.

²Quoted in the *Washington Post*, June 3, 1998, p. A18. See also John Pike, "A Major Intelligence Failure," *Global Beat*, May 11, 1998, at <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/pike051198.html>.

³See Arquilla and Davis, 1994, cited above.

Compelling Haiti—Analytic Questions

Who? The target of the compellence in this case was Cedras and the military leadership. Cedras had to step down to permit Aristide to be returned to power. Given that Cedras was supported by the military, it was preferable to have him relinquish power rather than to overthrow him, which would also reduce the chance that the Haitian military would continue to fight the reinstated democratic government. Cedras led an unfriendly and oppressive regime responsible for a great deal of bloodshed, and so a wide range of U.S. coercion instruments theoretically was available.

The complicating factors were how to understand with precision the political links—among Cedras, his commanders, common soldiers, and police; and between the regime and the traditional elite that had controlled Haiti. That elite, with its own long-standing ties to the United States, felt deeply threatened by Aristide's social revolutionary platform, which called for real redistribution of wealth toward Haiti's poor. These complicating factors made for tactical ambiguity at points during the case; for instance, during the *Harlan County* debacle, were the pistol-waving Haitians part of an orchestrated move controlled by the leadership or, if not spontaneous, something not entirely within the leadership's control?

To do what? The United States and its allies—first the OAS and then the UN—pursued three compellence goals during the Haiti campaign. They sought to reinstate a democratic government, to stop the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, and to staunch the flow of refugees. In principle, ending sanctions and pressure on the Cedras regime might have achieved the latter two goals, but in practice that was impossible, and so the three goals were directly related in that they all led to the same action, replacing the Cedras regime with a democratic government. Repression by the Cedras regime was causing a humanitarian disaster through killing Haitians directly, as well as indirectly by the regime's refusal to comply with UN demands and thus further encouraging the trade embargo. These actions by the junta created conditions that encouraged citizens to flee the state.

The U.S. body politic debated whether the reinstated democracy should be put in the hands of Aristide, whose supporters were largely powerless and whose own record was controversial. In the end, though, the doubts about whether something approaching democracy was possible under Aristide were overcome by the fact that he had been elected so overwhelmingly. The U.S. administration came to the view that, while Aristide might not ensure democracy, there could be nothing approaching democracy without his return.

With what stakes and instruments? Haiti was a case of strategic ambiguity about exactly what and how strong American stakes were. That uncertainty holds almost by definition for this category of ambiguous contingencies. Although the United States had an interest in returning Haiti to a democratic government, how large an interest was not clear. U.S. stakes grew as the case proceeded. They were reinforced in particular by the domestic politics of refugee flows, especially in Florida, as the United States began to receive a large number of refugees and became involved in policing the water. Even the UN defined the refugee flows as a global security problem. Since the U.S. government was unable to find a satisfactory solution regarding the refugees, doing what it took to stop the flow became more expedient.

The U.S. campaign included a wide and changing range of instruments. Given relatively low initial stakes, the first steps were economic sanctions to back diplomatic negotiations. As negotiations failed, sanctions were tightened, although sanctions were suspended with the Governors Island agreement in July 1993 until Cedras's junta reneged on the agreement in October. By May 1994, the UN had instituted a near-total trade embargo, but at the price of some 10,000 Haitians fleeing daily into the Dominican Republic.

The United States then turned to military training exercises, ones that mimicked the forces and situations that would be encountered in an actual invasion of Haiti. These exercises were meant to show Cedras that the United States was engaging in the necessary preparations to carry through with threats to reinstate a democracy in Haiti by force if necessary. This move sought to increase both U.S. credibility and U.S. stakes, as official voices continued to emphasize that the "use of force is not ruled out."

The United States actually deployed forces to the area to improve its credibility and increase the pressure on Cedras to relinquish power. The Inchon Amphibious Ready Group was deployed into the Caribbean to be ready to evacuate citizens from Haiti, a move designed to show that the United States had thought through the invasion scenario and might be ready to use this military option.

Finally, when all else failed, the United States used direct military force as an instrument to compel Haiti. In 1994, while the Carter team's eleventh-hour negotiations proceeded, the U.S. launched its forces ready to invade Haiti. This direct pressure finally forced the Cedras junta to step down from power and allow the return of Aristide. The invasion force was then recalled, and a peacekeeping force was sent to aid in the transition back to democracy.

In what context? The United States plainly had overwhelming force—again a feature common to this category of cases. It could not, however, credibly threaten Cedras with military intervention. In 1991, at the beginning of the compellence campaign, it was unclear just how much Haiti mattered to the United States. Washington certainly favored democracy and human rights, yet it had many issues on its plate with the impending collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The trade embargo to coerce Haiti could be seen as a show of interest in the situation, but a weak one.

Moreover, Haiti proceeded in tandem with Somalia. The United States pulled out of Somalia following the October 3, 1993 firefight, then Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which raised the bar for humanitarian intervention by U.S. troops.⁴ Then, the United States failed to intervene in Rwanda. It is, in the nature of cases, impossible to know what implication Cedras and his colleagues took from this sequence, but it would have been reasonable to see it as a sign of weak U.S. interests in third-world interventions. It is intriguing that when the *Harlan County* arrived in Haiti, the armed men on the docks were yelling about creating another Somalia for the United States. Clearly, U.S. credibility in situations of ambiguous U.S. stakes had been weakened.

On the other hand, many in the administration saw the situation in Haiti as a test of the new foreign policy strategy outlined in PDD 25 and in statements given by the administration. They sought a successful example of this new strategy—a quick and decisive intervention that restored order, stopped the humanitarian crisis, and included a clear exit strategy. The United States pursued intervention options with these goals in mind.

To demonstrate its stakes in the situation, the United States went through several visible stages of planning, especially at the end of the campaign. High-level government officials, including the president, advertised these stages publicly. Both the time spent on planning and the extent to which the possible intervention scenarios had been thought out increased U.S. credibility in addition to increasing the possibility for a successful invasion. Yet they came late, and given the previous context, Cedras was not compelled by threats and plans alone. Only the deployment of troops for invasion during the final diplomatic effort convinced Cedras that U.S. interests were high.

⁴PDD 25, also known as the "Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," was passed on May 3, 1994. See the Executive Summary at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>. For administration statements about PDD 25, see the press briefing by National Security Advisor Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley Clark on May 5, 1994, at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/> (search for "PDD 25").

With what partners and politics? From the start, the United States sought to build a coalition to increase the pressure on Haiti to achieve a diplomatic solution. Given its proximity, the United States and other neighbors of Haiti quickly acquired an interest in the situation there, especially in refugee flows. It was also fairly easy to get other OAS members to agree to a trade embargo in 1991. Once the campaign against Haiti became a UN mission, it was much more difficult for the coalition to act quickly; the UN Security Council needed nearly two years to impose sanctions on Haiti. The invasion in the summer of 1994 had to be delayed to get allied support and to retool the mission to make the force multinational in character. Coupled with the withdrawal of the USS *Harlan County*, the slowness of the coalition in preparing force reduced the credibility of the coalition as a whole and damaged the effectiveness of the campaign. Still, if the price of a coalition was to take more time than a unilateral invasion would have required, its benefit was a significant increase in the legitimacy of action.

Reaching a domestic consensus in the United States also presented a significant problem. While the United States wanted Haiti to return to a democratic government, policymakers divided over two issues. First, could democracy be restored without returning Aristide to power? The large stakeholders in the country, most notably the military, did not support Aristide. If Aristide would not be able to maintain power, then reinstating him would invite another coup or make the job of creating stability more difficult.

Second, there was no domestic consensus over whether Haiti was important enough to justify using force. Haiti's was one of many repugnant governments around the world; thus, why resources should be spent on Haiti and not in other areas was a legitimate question. Moreover, some saw the refugee and immigration problem as one that the administration had created for itself. The debate over Haiti's importance was also one over instruments that should be used in the campaign. Those who felt that Haiti was not a key U.S. interest favored measures such as tightening the embargo rather than invading the country to overthrow Cedras. In the United States' open democratic system, these disagreements within the government over the instruments that would be used in the campaign were public, diminishing U.S. credibility. Thus, it is not surprising that the United States actually had to deploy its invasion troops to compel Cedras to step down.

How good was the analysis? The United States considered a wide array of options, but it generally overestimated both its credibility and the chances for success of its actions. It relied on economic sanctions and continued to threaten them in ever-greater degrees despite their plain failure to do anything but increase the humanitarian disaster for Haiti's citizens. Economic sanctions were directly at

odds with the U.S. goal of stopping the refugee flows. Yet those who opposed force, like Secretary of Defense William Perry, had little alternative to sanctions and so argued for them as the primary instrument throughout the compellence campaign. Because the United States tended to overestimate its credibility, it underestimated the length of the campaign and gave too much credence to Cedras's early promises to step down; he agreed several times but then reneged. The agreement and reneging cycle was an effective countermeasure to U.S. actions because it both bought Cedras more time and lessened the sanctions that were imposed. The United States lacked effective responses to these countermeasures.