Transformation in the Post Civil-War Period: Insights for a Peacetime Army
Abstract
The experiences of the American Army in the post-Civil War period, and the impacts of those experiences on the Army's performance in the Spanish-American War, are analyzed to gain insights for the provisioning of a peacetime Army. The Army's post-Cold War experiences, to date, are then examined to determine how well those insights were applied to the provisioning of today's peacetime Army. Examination reveals that many, if not most, of the mistakes that were made in the latter half of the nineteenth century were repeated in the 1990s. Neglect, as evidenced by insufficient resourcing and over-commitment to operations other than war impeded the Army's ability to adequately fulfill its overarching purpose during an inter-war period: preparation to fight and win the nation's next war. Army leadership, just as in the late 1800s, failed to effectively engage and garner the support of the public and the Congress. The consequences of Congressional neglect and leadership failure was an unready, unmotivated and unhappy Army. Unlike the post-Civil War experience, leaders within the military establishment and on Capitol Hill have taken notice of these consequences and have initiated corrective actions before the nation finds it necessary to send the Army off to war ill-prepared, as it did in 1898.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 10, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA390511
Entities
People
- Bruce E. Brydges
Organizations
- United States Army War College