



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**ARMY SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND
THE INHERENT READINESS CHALLENGES**

BY

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Army Support To Peacekeeping Operations and The Inherent Readiness Challenges

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ABSTRACT

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The Army OPTEMPO in the peacekeeping arena is creating a significant readiness challenge. The Army must be able to respond in peace and war to support the nation's vital interests. Our Army leaders are not afforded the opportunity to "pick and choose" the missions it receives. It is therefore necessary to be trained, equipped and ready to take on all assigned missions. This will have to be done as a total Army within greatly constrained budgets.

It is a fact that the recent tremendous pace of operations has caused the Army great concern over relevancy, which in turn has caused the organization to attempt to accomplish too much with too little. The Army leadership must look for revolutionary approaches that at a minimum streamline training processes and set up an organization totally capable of serving over the full spectrum of conflict.

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PREFACE

I would like to expressly thank Dr. John Goss and Ms. Karen Slusser for their support and effort in assisting me with the OPTEMPO survey.

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ARMY SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE INHERENT READINESS CHALLENGES

OVERVIEW

It must be realized that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more uncertain of success, or more dangerous to manage than the establishment of a new order of government; for he who introduces it makes new enemies of all who derived advantage from the old order and finds but lukewarm defenders among those who stand to gain from the new one.¹

—Machiavelli, *The Prince*

Peace support operations have arguably been the primary mission of the U.S. Army since the end of Desert Storm, yet we continue to want to focus on what may be an archaic two Major Theater of War (MTW) concept at the expense of readiness. There is a strong correlation between support to peace operations and the decline in readiness. The joint chiefs, before a senate committee first revealed the readiness problems in 1998. Further, two Army divisions that recently reported C-4 were involved or just relieved from Balkans duty.

According to Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific command there are seven areas of readiness assessment.² The areas he suggests are:

- **Qualified people:** For each unit we count the number of specialist on hand- pilots, infantryman, mechanics, etc.-and compare those numbers to the numbers each unit needs.
- **Combat capable hardware and technology:** We compare the capabilities of U.S. military hardware-ships, tanks, aircraft, etc. to those of potential adversaries.
- **Appropriate levels of maintenance, supplies and spare parts:** We track the extent in which hardware is in a "ready to go" maintenance status. In simple terms are we ready for sea, can the aircraft fly, can the tanks shoot and are the adequate supply and spare parts on hand?
- **Training:** We track the amount and types of training our forces have received.
- **Tactics, techniques and procedures:** We ask ourselves, "do we have the tactics, techniques and procedures that fully exploit the capabilities of our hardware and our people?"
- **Transportation and communication:** We ask ourselves if we can move our forces in a timely manner to wherever they might be needed and if we can communicate with them once they are deployed.

- **Infrastructure:** We track the extent to which our bases, hangars, maintenance depots, fuel farms, training ranges, etc., are in an “up” status, lest we erode our ability to do maintenance, train our forces and keep our forces supplied.

Though all areas influence our response to peace support operations, this project focuses on the areas of readiness, Army culture and mindset, training and on how the Army must be totally engaged. The readiness challenges in these areas are some of the most discussed in the Army today. This is where the dilemma of doing more with less comes into play. This is where decisions must be made to train on one task vice another due to time constraints. This is where units find out that the military specialty they have is in short supply throughout the Army and is needed in a peace operation.

The Army has struggled too long searching for relevance since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. It is past the time for a revolutionary overhaul of Army culture, training and structure. The Army seems to be evolving vice revolutionizing which may prove fatal if a contingency arises it is not prepared for. Certainly it is inconceivable that the nation will be lost due to the current dilemma, but it could cost soldiers’ lives, as well as, national treasure and prestige. Changes in this study’s focus areas could lead to proper readiness preparation, assessment and reporting so we are able to execute all missions in accordance with our National Security and National Military strategies.

At its core, the Army’s readiness challenges stem from a mismatch between mission requirements and forces.³ Certainly the Army has been negatively affected by downsizing and budget cuts, but it seems the focus has been lost on the future because it must be more concerned with keeping its heads above water in a high OPTEMPO environment. We have not given up any missions, but have added missions seemingly exponentially. With this said the two MTW or any MTW concept allows the Army leadership to keep “its head in the sand.” This “head in the sand,” syndrome causes the Army to pay lip service to modernization and transformation by continuing the focus on “old world order” tactics, techniques and procedures. This is shocking in that since 1989 our Army has been involved in over forty- five contingencies. This is in relation to sixteen between 1947 and 1989.⁴ Figures 1 and 2 graphically display the increase in missions between then and now. The bulk of these latter contingencies have been Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), specifically peace support operations. We have been using a band-aid approach in providing support to these missions. Our initial forces receive on the job training, while follow-on forces receive one-year ramp-ups to conduct the mission at the expense of all else.




FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2

Before the Army can determine if it is ready, it must first determine what it needs to be ready for. The answers are complicated, but exist. The full spectrum of conflict is our readiness template. The Army must be prepared for everything from homeland defense, as it is known today, to high intensity war. In this author's estimate the Army has provided a good, but disjointed effort in preparation. The Army must now play catch up to remain a relevant force in our nation's defense. The Army must embrace and prepare for small-scale contingencies, while remaining prepared for war.

READINESS

The good news is that the U.S. Army has not sunk to a level of readiness that allowed "Task Force Smith" in 1950. Though one author suggests the following bad news: The Army is seeing its equipment deteriorate, reduced standards, its culture attacked, its forces employed increasingly in peace operations at the cost of training for war. Units are not manned appropriately. Often they cannot conduct training above company level. Armor and mechanized units do not have the dollars to maneuver. Light forces have found a scarcity of training ammunition. Everyone has people deployed on missions elsewhere and every unit is trying to secure the most important resource of all, time. Moreover, what used to be routine levels of live training are now migrating more and more towards simulations deficient in the human aspects of combat. Insights from the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center aptly demonstrate the impact: What once was the super bowl of combat training is now a preseason camp.⁵ While readiness definitions and criteria may make good presidential campaign material the Army must closely investigate some of the above anecdotal evidence to determine how much of a readiness problem we have.

To the Army, "readiness" specifically refers to a qualitative assessment of its ability to provide sufficient trained and ready ground combat forces to successfully execute **all** of the requirements of national military strategy.⁶ This then implies that it must be prepared to deploy and operate within the full spectrum of conflict. This accomplish all assigned missions dilemma is as old as the Army itself. Across its history the Army has been called upon to support operations from total war to disaster relief and forest fires. Reduced budgets, fewer forces, modernization competition and increased deployments today exacerbate the problem.⁷ This means that the Army must force itself into some type of balance in missioning our forces, albeit through a rotation schedule (this will be discussed in the total Army involvement section) or reduced contingency support. The latter is for all practical purposes impossible. Throwing a few billion dollars at the problem is also not the answer because it would not be sufficient unless

it could buy active duty force structure. There will have to be a concerted whole force effort (refer to total Army involvement section of this paper) to achieve readiness balance.

Modernization needs to be taken into account in increasing readiness because the Army will not continue to be relevant or competitive if it continues to rely on current equipment. Therefore, while the Army operates in the full spectrum, resources must still be placed towards Army modernization.

U.S. ARMY CULTURE AND MINDSET

Studies have maintained that the military typically resists identifying itself with a police role and tends to think of police activities as less prestigious and less honorable tasks.⁸

What has been occurring since 1989 is not tremendously new for the Army. In General Wickham's total Army readiness report in 1984 he stated, it is a fact that while heavy forces may be a great deterrent to our enemies the actual nature of conflict since World War II has been mid to low intensity.⁹ The international environment is no longer dominated by great empires and the world, which has roughly two hundred separate states, is globally interconnected.¹⁰ Increasingly, traditional conventional war is no longer a paying proposition-even for the victor.¹¹ The United States now finds itself in a world with defense obligations to forty-seven countries and personnel of the United States Armed forces deployed to one hundred forty-four countries. It has millions of our citizens who regularly travel abroad and millions who live and work abroad.¹²

While attitudes of our soldiers, specifically our leaders have softened towards peace support operations (there are new studies to support this), there still seems to be a cultural bias against them. This seems especially true in the combat arms branches. One study suggests that officers in the combat arms branches do not believe their specialties will allow for career enhancement in peace support operations.¹³ In the same study, officers reserved the highest appropriateness ratings for traditional missions associated with fighting a world war or regional war.¹⁴ While these studies point out these pertinent thoughts I have discovered a slightly different attitude in some informal interviews. I discussed the topic of how peace operations are viewed by our Army with several War College classmates. All had commanded battalions that deployed to peacekeeping duty areas. They all agreed that the morale was extremely high during the preparation and conduct of the operation. The decline in attitude occurred upon return to home station once mundane post support missions were picked back up. They also stated that the unit OPTEMPO actually increased due to the pressure to increase readiness to deployable status in what was viewed as an unrealistic time line. Though this could be another

SRP topic the Army should research further of how to eliminate mundane tasks that do not lend themselves to the mission.

There must be a revolutionary mindset shift starting at our highest leadership levels. We must truly change from the way we think about fighting and winning the nation's wars to preventing conflict first and then if necessary, fight and win the wars that cannot be prevented. Currently America has the luxury of not having to fight a war of necessity and being able to decide upon wars/operations of choice.¹⁵ This is a perfect time to make the necessary cultural and thought changes.

Figure 3 shows what this author believes are new and proper focuses to our national security strategy. Our Army should focus on the three highlighted elements to begin our change. These focuses alone dictate to a new way of doing business.

Former Focus	Current/Future Focus
National Defense	International Security
Unilateral Action	Coalition Diplomacy
Threat Based Policy	Objective Based Policy
Control	Adaptation
Capabilities	Intentions
Domestic Politics the Key	International Politics the Key
Force Application	Statecraft and Negotiation
War Preparation	Peace Preservation
Win by Out-producing foe	Win by Outwitting Foe

TABLE 1¹⁶

The first focus of international security goes hand in glove with the *shape* portion of the United States national military strategy. The days of protecting the nation from direct conventional attack are behind us.

In this world made smaller by communication and transportation technologies, more problems that could have been once viewed as someone else's take on a new context. Would the U.S. really have considered the problems in the Balkans as a threat to national security during the cold war? If we are going to connect to a world economy the United States may find itself in places that were unthinkable in the past. Not reacting to a vital threat to a valued trading partner could effect U.S. business development and damage relations with the affected nation. Further, an assumption of our national security strategy and national military strategy is that the

United States will employ force only as part of a coalition.¹⁷ If we do not support our coalition partners in their interests they may not be so keen to support us when a true vital interest is threatened.

The Army must also focus on intentions as well as, capabilities of our nation's potential adversaries. It is impossible to try to control the pace, nature, intensity, scope and outcome of every state actor.¹⁸ We should configure and train to be adaptable. The current Interim Brigade Combat Team concept is being designed along these lines. Intentions are predictive in nature, but can give us ideas of what is important and what is not. The diplomatic element of power is the main effort in determining what a nation is thinking. We truly need to know what a potential adversary really wants. It is a tremendous waste of resources to have U.S. leadership run out and develop a capability to match an enemy when we really aren't sure it would be needed. We need to negotiate and open lines of communication with adversaries and potential adversaries. Do the Chinese really want a military standoff or are they going to be happy to be part of the world order of commercial prosperity and peace? I cannot prescribe a way to get into potential adversaries' minds, but certainly learning why they believe we are a threat and how they think will take us a long way in ascertaining intent. The other part of determining intention is if the nation desires to create mayhem, we should have an idea of how they may accomplish their goal. For example, if an adversarial nation intends to shoot at us with ICBMs as soon as they get the chance, than it may be a good investment to build a national missile umbrella.

The Army has a tremendous role to play in peace preservation. We are committed today more than any other service. Not only as a deterrent force of power, but fully involved in statecraft, diplomacy and negotiation.¹⁹ This means possibly choosing to put resources against partnership for peace exercises over one more training center rotation. This is going to take major rice bowl tipping and aggressive thought that is truly outside the box. Finally, Army leaders must get on board without slogans and sound bites, but through the conviction of proper execution. We must acquire the mindset that the entire Army should be prepared for both peace and war. The one sure way to do this is through training.

TRAINING

This one facet seems to be the main cause of the Army's prepare for peace support or train to fight schizophrenia. With time being the resource most impinged upon, it is incumbent upon Army leadership to come up with the right mix of training in order to be all we must in support of this country's national security. One point here before moving on; training distracters must be eliminated to the greatest extent even with the proper training mix. Fighting wars and

carrying out political reconstruction are two very different things requiring different tools and skills²⁰, but just how different? Though the Bradley fighting vehicle is not maneuvering in a peace support operation, it is being used and maintained. It is also not out of the question that maneuver training cannot be accomplished given training land in the area of operation. So while it can be argued successfully that the skills are different, a thoughtful training analysis followed by a solid, executable training plan can ease the transition from a peace support operation back to war fighting. Unit commanders must start by giving their units' credit for training accomplished. Repeating training because it is titled under war or peace is inefficient. Today's fast paced world does not treat inefficiency well.

There are many training tasks similar to war fighting tasks (refer to figure 4). They differ only in their use and intensity in combat and OOTW operations. For instance, rules of engagement training for peace support operations teach restraint, while rules of engagement for combat are intended to destroy and kill. Therefore, in a well thought out training plan it is conceivable that a unit can accomplish peace engagement and war fighting training in the same event. The Combat Maneuver and Training Center in Germany conducts Individual Replacement Training (IRT) for USAREUR soldiers deploying to the Balkans. Almost all tasks trained have a relation to a combat task.

Though the Army has come a long way in assisting units with recovery upon return from other than war missions, it must do better. It is time to look at overall training doctrine. How much time should it actually take for a unit to be trained on all of its peacekeeping and war fighting skills? How many Mission Training Planned (MTP) tasks are duplicated in both areas? Why should the training cycle take so long given new technology and combat systems? How can units do a better job training while deployed in a peace support mission? This study will not answer these questions, but pose them as avenues to be studied further so the Army is prepared to accomplish any mission, anytime, anywhere in peace or war. If these questions are researched, analyzed and answered then many of the Service's dollar, time and OPTEMPO problems could be solved. Including peacekeeping as a mission essential task will allow units to focus in this direction consistently vice when preparing to deploy. As units incorporate the principles of war into their training, they must also incorporate the principles of peace support operations. The training plan should include events allowing the practice of legitimacy, perseverance and restraint. Principles such as objective, security and unity of command apply equally to combat and non-combat operations.²¹ These principles are already attended to in units' war fighting training.

INDIVIDUAL REPLACEMENT TRAINING

Day 1. Inprocessing.

- Media awareness briefing
- Mine detonation demonstration
- Rules of engagement briefing

Day 2. Round Robin Classroom instruction and practical exercises.

- Mine awareness
- Countermine awareness
- First aid
- Convoy operations
- Environmental threat
- Situational awareness
- Force protection

Day 3. Two Situational Training Exercises.

- **Force protection**
- ❖ Patrolling
- ❖ React to sniper
- ❖ React to indirect fire
- ❖ Evacuate a casualty
- ❖ Negotiate trip wires, mine fields and booby traps
- ❖ Interact with Host Nation personnel
- **Situational Awareness**
- ❖ Media interviews
- ❖ Vehicle search
- ❖ Personnel search

TABLE 2²²

One of the greatest problems is a unit's inability to train on perishable collective tasks.²³ The mechanized infantry armor and heavy artillery soldiers are not able to operate their equipment in peace support operations, as they would in maneuver warfare. It also goes without saying that any type of maneuver training is impossible. In addition, it is extremely difficult to conduct training above squad level. This is where simulations may be necessary to cut the training recovery time upon return to home station.

While these training challenges exist in peace support operations areas, there is also a tremendous positive effect, which the deployed unit can gain. It is proven again and again that cohesiveness increases in units that actually deploy and conduct real world missions. Cohesive units are better at adapting, thereby gaining the important flexibility to operate across the spectrum of conflict. It is also arguable that these units would be able to more quickly be refreshed in their war fighting skills if transition to a war zone was necessary.

The significant increase in deployments to smaller scale contingencies is a primary reason that unit training suffers from a lack of mission focus throughout the Army.²⁴ We must stem this tide by answering questions at the beginning of this section and by also including more of the Army.

TOTAL ARMY INVOLVEMENT

The Army continues to draw its contingency forces from the major theater of war force pool. This has caused an inefficient cycle of unit training, shifting from a focus on war fighting tasks to smaller scale contingency tasks for a deployment and back to war fighting after redeployment.²⁵ While this thought fits well into the training section of this study, the point is it is time for the Army to "Circle the Wagons." We have professed a total Army concept and involvement for many years. Today, our doctrine refers to the active, reserve components and civilians as simply the Army. While it is believed that Army leadership embraces this concept, the Army has not done all it could do to operate as such. It is time to include every unit, active and reserve, in conducting operations other than war and specifically, peace support operations. While the Army has begun to include National Guard headquarters in operations, we must go further to include entire units. Concepts proposed in an U.S. Army War College strategy research project portray a Corps level rotation schedule. This rotation schedule allows training and preparedness across the spectrum of conflict.²⁶ The rotation schedule is modeled after the division ready brigade (DRB) concept of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. This author believes this is a viable system and can be made better by adding reserve component units. This will lengthen

the time between unit rotations into present peace support operation areas and provides predictability for training and quality of life. Currently in order to get a brigade ready for peacekeeping duty the impact is felt division wide. While one brigade prepares, one picks up the duties the deploying brigade would be doing. There is also a cross leveling of equipment and personnel. This is a cost of readiness not readily evident and in some cases not reported. In the proposed rotation concept, the Corps would be able to reach further into its own organization to support the deploying unit because the Corps would be in a small-scale contingency cycle. Theoretically the Corps should have a greater resource pool. The Corps rotation concept would also much better align reserve component units with their active component counterparts for training and support. If an active duty Corps commander is now given responsibility for reserve component unit readiness, resource fights between the active and reserve components become history. In the end we have increased force structure with assets available. With rotations to peace support areas spaced longer apart and now predictable, the reserve component units and their civilian employers should accept the absences with a bit more ease.

The U.S. Army has been the service faced with the most serious readjustment because as a study team observed, "as the Army got smaller, the number and types of missions and deployments increased...[and] it literally was called upon to do more with less".²⁷ The Army must realize that they can make this much less of a problem by including the total Army in servicing its mission load.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDENT SURVEY

A survey was administered to the current USAWC class to determine the experiences and perceptions of this segment of our military population. 82% of the respondents were U.S. Army Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels, 10% percent were Air Force officers of the same grade and the remaining respondents were from the Navy and USMC. The largest percentage of respondents were active duty (94%). A majority of those officers surveyed believe that Peace operation tasks should be included in the unit Mission Essential Task List (METL), though responses varied when asked what percentage of war fighting tasks units should give up to train for peace operations. 59% of the respondents had participated in at least one peace operation (34% participated in two or more). There was a wide range of types of peace operations experience, but the largest population had participated in traditional peacekeeping duty (52%). Not surprisingly the units that had the highest population among the class, as participants had been members of combat service support units (27%). More than half of the students

answering the survey answered that their unit's METL did not include peace operation tasks (53%). As far as training for the operation, 69% of the responding officers cited special ramp-up as the training technique to prepare them to deploy, although 60% of the officers felt they were fully trained with minor shortfalls upon deployment. Of interest in the survey was the fact that 47% of the respondents did not have any formal evaluation conducted, such as JRTC, CMTC, etc. Unit commanders did the assessments by conducting mission rehearsal exercises. A small percentage (3%) was not assessed at all. Another interesting fact that of the commander's assessments the greatest portions of them were conducted by the commander one level up, certainly not how our doctrine is written.

The survey queried the students on training in the area of operation. A majority of the responding officers admitted to an increase or the same level of combat related training (64%) once deployed. Conversely they admitted peace operations training dropped off significantly. A majority of the respondents (60%) did not feel a great impact on their unit's ability to conduct combat operations during and after deployment. An overwhelming majority (79%) also agreed that the individual soldier skills were enhanced by participation in the operation. When asked how many of the peace operation tasks replicate the "go to war" tasks, 80% of the officers confirmed that 50% – 75% of the tasks were the same. A majority of the officers also agreed that a 1 – 3 month recovery period after the operation was adequate. When questioned about morale, 95% of the officers admitted increased or the same morale upon completion of the operation. Associated with that is the fact that 70% of the respondents admitted to better reenlistment rates because of the unit participation in the operation.

As this survey has been conducted over a several year period at the War College, there are specific questions that must be analyzed to capture any establishing trends. There is a slight change in the types of missions conducted. In past years the majority of operations were of humanitarian and peace enforcement duties. The majority of this class has participated in traditional peacekeeping. One could ascertain from this trend that because of the long involvement in Bosnia that this is the case. A continuing surprising trend is that of not adding peace operation tasks to unit METLs though the percentage dropped from the previous years, which could mean we are getting the message, albeit slowly. Training readiness for peace operations displayed the same trends as in previous years. The majority of the respondents felt they were C-2 at deployment. There is also a positive trend in training on METL tasks during the operation. This confirms the fact the units recognize that the current OPTEMPO could cause them to immediately redeploy for a combat operation.

A large majority of officers (64%) surveyed this year believe their unit's combat readiness was enhanced, improved, or not impacted upon because of their involvement in peace operations. This shows a trend towards realistic acceptance of these type missions.

On the subject of level of unit most negatively affected by peace operations, the trend seems to have changed. From crew level to battalion level only a small percentage of respondents felt that peace operations degraded skills. As to recovery periods after operations, units continue to be allowed about the same time to recover (1-3 months). The last two trends that will be addressed are in the areas of unit morale and reenlistment. The numbers align themselves with other, larger studies. The reenlistment and morale of units involved in peace operations continues to be positive.

The overall study shows we are doing better at training routinely for peace operations and keeping a combat edge while deployed. However, there is still much room for improvement.

CONCLUSION

The role of the United Nations as the major international organization chartered to preserve peace and discourage aggression has broadened steadily since the cold war ended. Regional security concerns are concomitantly replacing global ones as the super power stand off fades from the world's stage. The role of the military-particularly the U.S. military is changing both to support United Nations' efforts and to meet a spurt of regional instabilities that could affect U.S. national interests.²⁸ President Bush in his 1992 address to the United Nations General Assembly offered measured support and directed the Secretary of Defense to initiate several actions that included:²⁹

- Training of U.S. combat, engineering, and logistics units for future peacekeeping operations.
- Working with the United Nations to "best" employ U.S. lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities.
- Offering combined simulations and exercises to other nations interested in peacekeeping
- Providing military expertise to the United Nations to help strengthen its planning and operations for peacekeeping.

Bottomline; peace support operations are not going to disappear from the future Army's mission profile. In fact, they may increase even given the new administration's possible stance on U.S. intervention in world affairs. Condoleeza Rice, President Bush's senior national security advisor has hinted that plans are in the works for pulling our troops out of the Balkans operations. Certainly, the easy answer to the readiness dilemma is to cut the number of missions, unfortunately, if the U.S. intends to continue to be a world leader in a globalized, web

connected world, this may not be possible. Being the world's only super power; peace support operations are vital to our international and subsequently national security.

The Army must have revolutionary thought, as well as, action on how to increase readiness to operate across the spectrum. This study has attempted to offer some suggestions on how to accomplish this. A rewrite of the Army's training manuals, an acceptance of peace support operations as viable and important and using all forces available will go a long way in solving the current readiness problems. If the Army does not find a better way of doing business in conducting myriad less than combat operations while continuing to be prepared to fight and win wars, it risks becoming irrelevant to our nation's security.

Word count = 5,071

ANNEX A

OPTEMPO SURVEY USAWC CLASS OF 2001 RESULTS

1. What is your branch of service?

- [51] Army
- [1] Navy
- [6] Air Force
- [4] USMC
- [0] Other
- [62] Total

2. What is your component?

- [59] Active
- [2] Reserve
- [2] Guard
- [0] Civilian
- [63] Total

3. Do you believe that peace operation tasks should be included in unit METLs?

- [44] Yes
- [19] No
- [63] Total

4. Given realistic time constraints, what percent of your war fighting METL tasks are you willing to neglect in order to train on peace operations?

- [9] None
- [7] 1% - 7%
- [6] 11% - 20%
- [11] 21% - 30%
- [7] 31% - 40%
- [2] 41% - 50%
- [0] 51% - 60%
- [1] 61% - 70%
- [0] 71% - 80%
- [0] 81% - 90%
- [0] 91% - 100%

5. Have you ever participated in a peace operation: peace keeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, etc.?

- [11] YES, one
- [10] YES, two
- [5] YES, three or more
- [0] No, but I joined a unit just returning
- [18] No, never participated

5a. Operation type:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| [6] Humanitarian assistance | [4] Domestic support |
| [14] Traditional peacekeeping | [1] Other |
| [2] Peace enforcement | [27] Total |

5b. Type unit:

[6] Combat (heavy)	[0] Special services
[5] Combat (light)	[1] Health services
[1] Combat support	[6] Other
[7] Combat service support	[26] Total

5c. Unit's normal basing:

[17] CONUS
[12] Europe
[0] Other
[29] Total

6. Did your unit's METL include tasks required for peace operations?

[16] None
[10] Few
[1] About half
[3] Most
[0] All
[30] Total

7. Did the peace operation require critical tasks not listed on your METL?

[15] No
[9] Yes
[24] Total

8. How did your unit primarily train for critical peace operation tasks?

[4] Normal METL training
[18] Special ramp-up
[2] OJT on location
[2] Other
[26] Total

9. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training readiness in peace operations?

[5] Fully trained
[15] Trained (minor shortfalls)
[4] Significant shortfalls
[1] Untrained
[25] Total

10. How was your pre-deployment METL training assessed?

[0] ARTEP or standardized service training evaluation
[8] Combat training center rotation
[6] Exercises
[1] BCTP or automation/simulation evaluation
[10] Commander's assessment
[3] Other
[29] Total

11. Which commander did the assessment?

- [10] Commander of deploying unit
- [12] Commander one level up
- [5] Commander two levels up
- [27] Total

12. Compared to home station training, METL task training during peace operations were:

- [3] Much greater
- [7] Greater
- [6] About the same
- [6] Less
- [2] Much less
- [1] Non-existent
- [25] Total

13. Did your unit conduct other training (non-METL or peace operation specific training) during the peace operation?

- [7] Not at all
- [6] Once or twice during the deployment
- [6] Occasionally (about monthly)
- [5] Routinely
- [24] Total

14. Did your unit specifically address common task skills such as weapons qualification, PT and NBC training during the peace operation?

- [2] Not at all
- [3] Once or twice during the deployment
- [8] Occasionally (about monthly)
- [12] Routinely (about weekly)
- [25] Total

15. Assess the overall impact of the peace operation on your unit's combat training readiness:

- [4] Substantially improved
- [6] Improved
- [6] No impact
- [5] Minimally degraded
- [4] Substantially degraded
- [25] Total

16. Your individual skills were (choose from one) by the peace operation:

- [19] Enhanced
- [3] Degraded
- [2] Unchanged
- [24] Total

17. Your crew's skills were (choose one from below) by the peace operation:

- [11] Enhanced
- [7] Degraded
- [6] Unchanged
- [24] Total

18. Your squad's skills were (choose one from below) by the peace operation:

- [14] Enhanced
- [4] Degraded
- [5] Unchanged

19. Your platoon's skills were (choose one from below) by the peace operation:

- [13] Enhanced
- [5] Degraded
- [5] Unchanged
- [23] Total

20. Your Company's skills were (choose one from below) by the peace operation:

- [10] Enhanced
- [7] Degraded
- [6] Unchanged
- [23] Total

21. Your battalion's skills were (choose one from below) by the peace operation:

- [8] Enhanced
- [7] Degraded
- [8] Unchanged
- [23] Total

22. To what extent did your peace operation tasks complement and/or replicate your critical "go to war" tasks?

- [0] Not at all
- [5] To some degree (25% or less match)
- [9] To some degree (50% match)
- [10] To a great degree (75% match)
- [24] Total

23. During the peace operation, were normal reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness?

- [13] Yes
- [7] No, we used different standards
- [4] No, we were not required to report
- [24] Total

24. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's dedicated recovery period? That is how long did your higher headquarters allow you to provide leave time for your soldiers, service your equipment and train to your service's established standards on your "go to war" tasks before assessing your readiness or declaring you were ready to go to war?

- [1] No recovery
- [1] 1 week
- [4] 2 weeks
- [5] 1 month
- [2] 2 months
- [6] 3 months
- [5] Over 3 months
- [24] Total

25. Was the time allocated sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following category? PERSONNEL

- [13] Yes
- [10] No
- [23] Total

26. Was the time allocated sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following category? EQUIPMENT

- [15] Yes
- [8] No
- [23] Total

27. Was the time allocated sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following category? TRAINING

- [11] Yes
- [12] No
- [23] Total

28. How was your unit's METL training readiness assessed after recovery?

- [1] ARTEP or service standardized training evaluation
- [10] Combat training center
- [4] Exercises
- [1] BCTP or automated/ simulated evaluation
- [5] Commander's assessment
- [2] Other
- [1] Pre-deployment readiness was not assessed
- [24] Total

29. Which commander did the assessment?

- [5] Commander of deploying unit
- [9] Commander one level up
- [7] Commander two levels up
- [21] Total

30. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MTW prior to the time you listed above, do you think the impact in training readiness shortfalls would have resulted in:

- [0] Mission failure
- [2] Mission success with significant casualties
- [5] Mission success with moderate casualties
- [15] Mission success with few casualties
- [22] Total

31. After the peace operation, did you notice a measurable impact with your unit's physical fitness?

- [1] Large improvement
- [2] Small improvement
- [6] No impact
- [11] Small decrease
- [1] Large decrease
- [21] Total

32. How did you measure the change in the level of physical fitness?

- [12] Service standard fitness test
- [4] Informal assessment
- [5] Subjective assessment
- [21] Total

33. What is your assessment of the impact of the peace operation on unit morale?

- [7] Greatly improved
- [9] Slightly improved
- [4] Remained the same
- [1] Decreased slightly
- [0] Decreased greatly
- [21] Total

34. Is your assessment on morale based on a command climate survey?

- [10] Yes
- [11] No
- [21] Total

35. What is your assessment of the impact of peace operations on unit reenlistment?

- [7] Greatly improved
- [7] Slightly improved
- [5] Remained the same
- [1] Slightly decreased
- [0] Greatly decreased
- [20] Total

36. What is your assessment of the impact of the peace operation on junior officer retention?

- [2] Greatly improved
- [8] Slightly improved
- [5] Remained the same
- [5] Slightly decreased
- [0] Greatly decreased
- [20] Total

ENDNOTES

¹Grant T. Hammond, "Time for a Revolution: The Transition From National Defense to National Security," in Organizing for National Security, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 231.

²Joseph W. Prueher, "Measuring Readiness," in Joint Processes and Landpower Development, (Carlisle Barracks, 2000), 411.

³Mark E. Vinson, "Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness," Parameters 30 (Summer 2000): 19.

⁴*Ibid.*, 23.

⁵Bill Hix, "A Matter of Perspective: Readiness Depends on You Came of Age," in Joint Processes and Landpower Development, (Carlisle Barracks, 2000), 414.

⁶Mark E. Vinson, "Structuring the Army for Full Spectrum Readiness," Parameters 30 (Summer 2000): 20.

⁷*Ibid.*, 21.

⁸Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, "The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale and Retention," Armed Forces Journal 27 (Fall 2000): 58.

⁹John A. Wickham, Total Army Readiness, Posture Statement presented to the U.S. Army. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1984), 3.

¹⁰Grant T. Hammond, "Time for a Revolution: The Transition From National Defense to National Security," in Organizing for National Security, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 135.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*, 136.

¹³Deborah Avant and Richard Hayes, "U.S. Military Attitudes Toward Post-Cold War Missions," Armed Forces and Society 27 (Fall 2000): 50.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁵Grant T. Hammond, "Time for a Revolution: The Transition From National Defense to National Security," in Organizing for National Security, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 145.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 149.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 150.

¹⁹Ibid., 151.

²⁰George Melloan, "It Is Indeed Time to Review How to Use U.S. Troops," The Wall Street Journal, 24 October 2000, sec. A, p. 27.

²¹Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, "The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale and Retention," Armed Forces Journal, 27 (Fall 2000): 60.

²²Mark Stammer, "Peace Support Operations Rehearsals at the CMTC," April 1998; available from <http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/98-11/sasoart1.htm>; Internet; accessed 26 September 2000.

²³Joseph P. Simpson, Should We Use Our "911" Forces to Conduct Peacekeeping Operations: What Are the Implications on Readiness, Operational Tempo and Leadership, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2000), 5.

²⁴Mark E. Vinson, "Structuring the army for Full Scale Readiness," Parameters, 30 (Summer 2000): 23.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Scott T. Forster, Army – Full Spectrum Relevance and Readiness, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2000), 6.

²⁷Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, "The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale and Retention," Armed Forces Journal, 27 (Fall 2000): 61.

²⁸William H. Lewis, "Peacekeeping: Whither U.S. Policy?," in Peace Support Operations and The U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (National Defense University Press, 1994), ix.

²⁹Ibid., 16.

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