Strategy in Regional Conflict: A Case Study of China in the Third Indochina Conflict of 1979
Abstract
In February 1979 a very violent and strangely limited 28-day war between Asian communist combatants occurred in the remote northern border region of Vietnam. The purpose of this campaign study is to historically examine the People's Republic of China's (PRC) application of strategy in regional conflict and assess the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) operational performance during the Third Indochina Conflict. China's enduring policy of containing Vietnamese hegemony in Southeast Asia ultimately led the PRC leadership to select a carefully limited military response supported by other elements of national power. This integrated national strategic campaign achieved most of its political objective of punishing Vietnam, but the lack of early, conclusive battlefield success by the PLA cost the PRC prestige and negotiation leverage. PLA inadequacies in 1979 at the operational/joint level of war and in offensive tactical organization, doctrine and material have limited study of this event. This approach fails to recognize the Third Indochina Conflict as a recent and overall successful instance of Chinese strategic management of regional conflict and military campaigning in limited warfare. Finally, the conflict's results help explain China's late-20th century military reforms and remain relevant to understanding future PRC military potential and strategic/operational style.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 08, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA390560
Entities
People
- John M. Peppers
Organizations
- United States Army War College