Deadlock Before Moscow
Abstract
This Strategy Research Project intents to offer not a new interpretation of the decisive Battle of Moscow during World War Two, but rather a evaluation of German strategies, their success or failure. Strategy may be defined as conceptual planning tied to options and directed towards success, normally embracing the fields of politics, military activities, economics, and technology. Strategic planning, in essence, offers various possibilities of action based on the concrete evaluation of a given situation, combines calculation with prognosis, and, finally, covers the execution of the plan with a view to achieving the objective. Hitler's decision of 21 August to invade Leningrad and to destroy the bulk of the Soviet Armies in the South has generally been attributed to his one sided preoccupation with ideological and economic objectives. Superficially there was a contradiction between the objectives, on the one hand, of destroying the enemy's living power and, on the other, of capturing his base of raw materials and food supply. More important, however, is the question, that this Strategic Research Project pretends, as to whether the situation in mid-August 1941 was conducive to an immediate offensive against Moscow, or more precisely, whether there was still time to create the conditions for such a decisive attack.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 10, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA390583
Entities
People
- Matias F. Roncero
Organizations
- United States Army War College