



**STRATEGY
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**SANCTIONS – AN INSTRUMENT OF
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2001



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Sanctions—an Instrument of National Security Policy

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Sanctions--an Instrument of National Security Policy

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 April 2001

PAGES: 24

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The United States government uses sanctions in a variety of forms to influence the actions of other governments. While the use of sanctions is not explicitly discussed in our current National Security Strategy document, their use to further our interests is implied. We use sanctions as a tool to further our interests in every major policy area from arms control and nonproliferation, technology export controls, to promoting democracy and human rights. Sanctions are considered a powerful tool in the hands of American decision makers to compel other states to comply with our wishes. This study focuses on economic sanctions and explores the historical background of their use. It analyzes their effectiveness and compares and contrasts the use of sanctions against South Africa and Iraq. The study concludes with a discussion on the role of sanctions in a global economy and the realities facing policymakers as they consider the use of economic sanctions as tool to further our National Security Strategy.

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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS—AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy, and there will be no need for force. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.

— President Woodrow Wilson, 1919

The “War to end all Wars” with its catastrophic loss of life inspired world leaders to look for solutions other than war to solve problems. An optimistic and perhaps idealistic President Wilson envisioned a “League of Nations” that would forswear war and use international economic sanctions to force nations to comply with the will of the international community. Prior to World War I, sanctions were normally a prelude to war. Neither the “League of Nations” nor sanctions ended up being the means to world peace. Despite President Wilson’s best efforts, the United States Senate never ratified the treaty for participation in the League of Nations and without our involvement the League of Nations could not succeed. Sanctions, on the other hand, although they never reached the level of success that President Wilson envisioned, have become an important instrument of national security policy.¹

The United States government uses sanctions in a variety of forms to influence the actions of other governments. This study focuses on economic sanctions and explores the historical background of their use. It analyzes their effectiveness and compares and contrasts the use of sanctions against South Africa and Iraq. The study concludes with a discussion on the role of sanctions in a global economy and the realities facing policymakers as they consider the use of economic sanctions as tool to further our National Security Strategy.

DEFINITION OF SANCTIONS

Sanctions can either be economic or non-economic. Economic sanctions range from denying exports to a targeted country, stopping imports into the United States, or restricting the flow of capital. Non-economic sanctions focus on reducing government-to-government interaction (such as ending diplomatic contact, canceling meetings, or ending military to military contacts or programs) or civil contact (such as cultural or sporting events like the Olympics).²

Sanctions are basically actions taken by a sender country against a target country “in response to wrongdoing by a state, such as an act of aggression against another state or pursuit of a racial policy that is considered wrong from the perspective of international law or

moral standards.”³ While sanctions tend to be punitive in nature, they are usually not imposed as punishment but rather as a tool to coerce a change in the target country’s behavior.⁴

US POLICY

While the use of sanctions is not explicitly discussed in our current national security strategy document, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, their use to further our interests are certainly implied throughout the document. We consider the use of sanctions as a tool to further our interests in every major policy area from arms control and nonproliferation, technology export controls, to promoting democracy and human rights.⁵ Further, the most recent National Military Strategy identifies sanctions enforcement as one of many “smaller scale contingency operations” that could require the use of force.⁶ Jeffrey R. Barnett in an article in *Parameters Magazine*, *Exclusion as a National Security Policy*, states,

When US security is challenged, it is the defacto policy of the United States to signal resolve, punish, coerce compliance, or mitigate adverse affects by excluding the challenger from sources of wealth and power. Exclusion is a “collective policy of containment,” prosecuted by withholding normal relations through sanctions. It anticipates using force as the last resort.⁷

The United States enforces sanctions primarily through the power of economic pressure and not the use of the military. Barnett in the *Parameters* article states, “Since the economy of the United States constitutes 22 percent of the world economy and the world economy is increasingly interdependent, exclusion [sanctions are] is considered a powerful tool in the hands of American decision makers.”⁸ Further, sanctions have added value in that policy makers can apply them in varying degrees and increase or decrease the sanctions over time.

The United States government increasingly uses sanctions as a tool to influence the actions of other governments. USA Engage, an association of American manufactures, stated the following:

Of 115 unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States since World War I, 60 have been imposed in the last 5 years...By any measure there has been a major proliferation of U.S. unilateral sanctions. A Congressional Research Service of January 1998 lists 125 measures authorizing U.S. unilateral economic sanctions. In 1997, the President’s Export Council (PEC) listed 73 countries subject to some form of U.S. unilateral sanction.⁹

DO SANCTIONS WORK?

While the use of sanctions has grown, their success rate as a tool for policymakers is questionable. In fact, just defining success has been a significant study topic for academicians.

One major study from Brown University states, "Much depends on the goals of sanctions, the context in which they are adopted, and the manner in which they are implemented. Evaluation of effectiveness can benefit from generalizations that have emerged from empirical research in recent decades; these provide the major categories for reviewing political expectations and results."¹⁰ Most sanction studies have concluded that the measured "success" rate for sanctions is less than 50%. Further, they find that sanctions are seldom an effective means of forcing or coercing a government to act in the manner that we desire. Sanctions appear most effective as "slap on the wrist...[but] a major change in change in public policy [is] harder to come by."¹¹ Robert O'Quinn in his analysis of economic sanctions for the Heritage Foundation stated that,

Historically, economic sanctions have a poor track record. Between 1914 and 1990, various countries imposed economic sanctions in 116 cases. They failed to achieve their stated objectives in 66 percent of those cases and were at best only partially successful in most of the rest. Since 1973, the success ratio for economic sanctions has fallen precipitously to 24 percent in all cases.¹²

At the same time, the success of sanctions must be considered against wider policy goals. Governments send signals to other governments with sanctions. Larry Minnear et al. in a Brown University study argued:

Sanctions serve multiple purposes, each requiring separate assessments. Beyond officially declared purposes, other objectives can be identified: establishing deterrence, demonstrating resolve to allies or domestic constituents, sending symbolic messages, and enhancing respect for international norms. These objectives are often more easily accomplished than changes on the ground. When sanctions are meant as a signal of international disapproval of a particular regime or its abusive behavior, for instance, leaders can cite the solidarity of the states imposing the sanctions as a signal of success¹³.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In today's global economy, policy makers must consider several key factors before applying sanctions. If one assumes that we can enforce the sanction, the first consideration is whether the sanction will change the behavior to our satisfaction. For example, the sanctions that the United States government applied on Cuba are extremely restrictive, but they have failed in their main objective of bringing about a change in government. In fact, many would argue that we are punishing the people of the country while not affecting the leadership. Further, the United States government imposed significant economic and diplomatic sanctions on both Vietnam and Burma (also known as Myanmar). The sanctions against Vietnam stemmed from the fall of South Vietnam and remained in place until President Clinton

normalized relations. The sanctions on Burma were a result of a military coup in the early 90's. The sanctions on both countries had little visible effect because they were not particularly concerned with diplomatic relations and conducted almost no business with the United States.¹⁴

The second consideration in the imposition of sanctions is whether they will be effective without support from other countries of the world. Other countries might take advantage of the situation to increase their own trade interests. This occurred when President Carter imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan. Every major western country joined the United States in its condemnation of the invasion, but none joined in the embargo. As a result, the embargo failed.

...The embargo was unilateral, reducing U.S. grain exports to the Soviet Union from an expected 25 million metric tons to 8 million metric tons (the amount required under pre existing commitments) in 1980. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was able to expand its total grain imports from 31 million metric tons in 1979 to 40 million metric tons in 1982 because Argentine, Canadian, and European exports to the Soviet Union grew from 9.4 million metric tons to 23 million metric tons over the same period.¹⁵

Finally, policy makers must consider second and third order effects of sanctions – primarily how they will effect our economy. In the case of the grain embargo, American farmers lost an estimated \$2.3 billion in grain exports to the Soviet Union. Further, sanctions or the perceived threat of sanctions can put American companies at a competitive disadvantage as they seek international business. Even after sanctions are lifted, this competitive disadvantage can remain since other suppliers might have stepped in as in the case of grain sales to the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Sanctions have the potential to damage the U.S. economy. For example, in a study conducted by the Council of Competitiveness, their findings indicated that “eight specific sanctions cost the U.S. economy \$6 billion in annual export sales and 120,000 export related jobs.”¹⁷

At the same time, policymakers must consider the moral and political message that sanctions send. Eliot Abrams states, “Even when sanctions are mostly symbolic, they are still important, for they show that we take seriously what the regime in question is doing.”¹⁸ The signal we send can be more important than the effectiveness of the sanction or the cost to American businessmen. He argues further, “But with rare exceptions, American economic sanctions have a moral and economic impact – the target regimes deeply resent and are hurt by both.”¹⁹ He cites as evidence to support his argument the significant amounts of time and money spent on lobbyists by targeted countries in effort to convince Congress to remove the sanctions. Both Abrams and Rossignol argue that sanctions offer the government an element

of power more significant than just mere diplomacy but less painful than war.²⁰ Rossignol states,

When a state commits a delinquent act or maintains an unacceptable policy, sanctions may seem the only course of action because 'world leaders often find the most obvious alternatives to economic sanctions unsatisfactory – military action would be too massive, and diplomatic protest too meager. Sanctions can provide a theatrical display, yet avoid the high costs of war.'²¹

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

The government of South Africa's use of racial separation or "Apartheid" to control blacks and deny them basic civil rights began soon after World War II when the country gained independence from Britain. Apartheid allowed the white minority to establish and control the government of South Africa while offering a façade of a democracy. The African National Congress (ANC) with Nelson Mandela as its leader fought these oppressive policies. In 1964, Nelson Mandela was convicted of "crimes against the state" and jailed for life. The successful civil rights movement in the 1950's and 60's in the United States and the end of colonial rule elsewhere in the world allowed the ANC to court public opinion and support on stages throughout the world to include the United States and the United Nations.²²

As public condemnation for Apartheid grew, the world's leaders came under increasing pressure to take action. The major oil exporting countries in the region banned the export of oil to South Africa in 1973. The United Nations banned the exports of weapons to South Africa in 1977. The government of South Africa mitigated these sanctions by developing alternative energy sources and indigenous weapons manufacturing. At the same time, the ANC pushed for greater economic sanctions and disabused governments of the notion that sanctions would only hurt the black majority. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu said in a speech to one House sub-committee, "We don't want our chains made more comfortable. We want them removed."²³ By the mid 1980's, the large western governments to include the United States instigated wide ranging economic sanctions through the auspices of the United Nations. Further, widespread public protest against corporations that did business with the government of South Africa led to even greater divestiture of the South African assets and investments. Individual states passed laws forbidding the investment of capital from pension funds with business that conducted business in or with South Africa. In fact, many major corporations sold assets at a significant loss to avoid public condemnation and/or association with South Africa.²⁴

While the government of South Africa continued to take steps to mitigate the sanctions, the economy suffered tremendously. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported the following:

GAO estimates that \$10.8 billion flowed out of South Africa from January 1985 through June 1989, including \$3.7 billion in loan repayments to banks, \$7.1 billion in other debt repayments, capital flight. GAO report also notes that most US banks appear to have stopped providing even short-term trade credits to South Africa ; reasons cited include "the absence of Export-Import Bank guarantees, the combined economic and political risks in South Africa, the increase in laws at the state and local level in the United States directing government businesses and pension plan investments away from companies and banks dealing with South Africa, and the growth in public sensitivity on the Apartheid issue."²⁵

In 1990 ANC leader Nelson Mandela was released after 27 years in jail and in 1991, the government of South Africa repealed the laws on Apartheid. Between 1991 and 1994 the ANC and the government negotiated for a new constitution and multi-racial government. In April 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected President of South Africa and declared victory over Apartheid.²⁶

While opinions on the sanctions against South Africa vary, most experts view them as successful—in the end they accomplished their political objective. The government of South Africa mitigated the economic effects of sanctions for almost 20 years and resisted the most severe sanctions for 6 years before they abolished Apartheid. Michael Rossignol in his report to the Canadian government stated, "The sanctions in South Africa worked to the extent that they helped persuade a delinquent state to change policies unacceptable to the international community; they were not effective in provoking immediate compliance."²⁷ Nevertheless, the sanctions against South Africa offer several important lessons learned:

- Consensus from major industrial countries for significant UN sanctions took more than 10 years to develop.
- Concerns about humanitarian suffering were mitigated by the fact that the ANC (the sufferers) pushed vehemently for additional sanctions.
- The government of South Africa resisted the economic pressure of significant economic sanctions for 6 years and of lesser sanctions for almost 20 years.
- Worldwide public sentiment and commercial sector condemnation added significant pressure.

SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ

Iraq's attack and occupation of Kuwait the first week of August 1990 were quickly followed by almost worldwide condemnation and economic sanctions that literally shut down all exports and imports less food and humanitarian supplies. Further, the UN mandate for sanctions gave

the US and other countries permission to use military force as required to enforce the sanctions. Although effective, these sanctions and the threat of military force did not persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and an American-led coalition subsequently used military force to expel Iraq in January 1991 (Operation Desert Storm). At the time, critics of the use of military force argued that the sanctions required additional time to work and could be successful in their objective – withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. At a minimum the sanctions and enforcement of them signaled the considerable resolve of the UN and US to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. Further, they offered Saddam Hussein and the Government of Iraq an opportunity to withdraw his forces without further bloodshed. Rossignol in his report states, “The debate on whether or not the UN should have shown more patience in using diplomatic rather than military means will likely continue for some time; however, there is no guarantee that sanctions would eventually have worked.”²⁸

At the successful conclusion of the war against Iraq, the UN retained sanctions against Iraq as a tool to force compliance with Security Council resolutions demanding the destruction of all weapons of mass destructions and their production facilities. These resolutions also called for Iraqi recognition of the re-drawn borders between Iraq and Kuwait and an end to human rights violations. Further, coalition forces retained the right to use force to enforce the sanctions. US military forces remain in the region today enforcing “no-fly” zones over much of Iraq and checking commercial ships for the import or export of goods in violation of the sanctions. In the mid 1990’s the sanctions were modified to allow Iraq to sell up to \$4 billion dollar worth of oil per year to pay for humanitarian supplies (such as food and medical supplies). The UN controls the funds and approves all expenditures. Further, much of the cost of UN weapons inspections and sanction enforcement are borne by the Iraqi government as part of this modification.²⁹

One expert speaking on the financial costs to Iraq stated that the “An economy that had advanced to the front ranks of the developing world has been rapidly relegated to a pre-industrial state...Total value of lost oil revenues from the seven years of sanctions [1991-1997] has been estimated at more than \$130 billion.”³⁰

The success of these sanctions has been a source of significant disagreement. Although all agree that the sanctions have almost stopped the Iraqi economy from functioning and slowed their capability to rebuild the Iraqi military, they have not forced Iraq to comply with all of the UN resolutions. Larry Minnear et al., argue that the sanctions have met with some limited success:

Comprehensive sanctions remained in place after the war, without any noticeable effect in diminishing Saddam Hussein’s power. Yet sanctions have some limited

impact in pressuring Baghdad to comply at least partially with UN demands. Rolf Ekeus, head of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, judged the sanctions "very important" in pressuring Baghdad to accept some of the commission's demands. In November 1993, Iraq accepted the provisions of Security Council resolution 715 and consented to the stationing of a permanent UN weapons inspection team on its territory. A year later, the regime formally recognized the redrawn borders....these important concessions were brought about in part by Baghdad's desire to have sanctions lifted.³¹

On the other hand, David Cortright and George Lopez in an article for the Fourth Freedom Forum argue that the objectives for the sanctions in Iraq have changed or suffered a version of mission creep and that compliance with the UN resolutions may no longer satisfy the US and some of our coalition partners.³² He states:

The political goalposts have been moved. Resolution 687 stipulates that the ban on Iraqi exports will be lifted when Iraq complies with UN weapons inspections. The Secretary of State has declared, however, that the United States does not agree with this position. The larger objective has become to impose political and military containment on the regime of Saddam Hussein. This is implicit in the many statements from U.S. officials that the sanctions will not be lifted until Saddam Hussein is removed from power. In November 1997 President Clinton remarked that 'sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as he [Saddam Hussein] lasts.'³³

To date, the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq have not forced complete compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions nor have they forced Saddam Hussein from power. The regime continues to resist the idea of complying with the remaining requirements for weapons inspections team.³ On the other hand, the Iraqi economy remains a shell of its pre-war standard. The lost oil sales revenue certainly limit the ability of Saddam Hussein to rebuild his military and further develop weapons of mass destruction. Any thought of Iraqi political and military leadership in the region that Saddam Hussein might have harbored has been stymied. The willingness to use military force against Iraq (to include the "no fly zones") to enforce the sanctions and further other policy objectives seem to have reduced the potential for conflict in the region.³⁴

Of greater significance, the consensus and coalition supporting the sanctions is fraying. Several countries have resumed limited commercial air flights into Iraq and have started to push for a lessening of the sanctions for humanitarian reasons. The humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people has been well publicized although differences in opinions on the documentation and causes remain. Much of the data for infant mortality and malnutrition comes from the Iraqi government and its accuracy is questionable. For example, Cortright and Lopez in their editorial

article for Fourth Freedom Forum state, "Sanctions have caused severe human suffering in Iraq. There is no doubt about that. But the scale of the crisis is highly uncertain. Estimates of more than a million deaths—of all ages—are almost certainly exaggerated. The numbers are still horrifying—perhaps in the range of 200,000 deaths, of all ages. This is an appalling tragedy."³⁵

The humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people raises a significant ethical and moral question about sanctions in general. Who is responsible for the suffering (the sender countries for establishing the sanctions or the target country for refusing to comply with the sanctions)? In this case, the Iraqi government and Saddam Hussein certainly bear a larger share of the guilt. The regime has ignored several opportunities to increase the limits on oil sales for humanitarian supplies offered by the UN. Further, the regime focuses its energy and resources on building additional palaces and repressing any internal rebellion rather than reducing the suffering.³⁶

Cortright and Lopez write that:

The United States and its allies bear some responsibility [for the humanitarian suffering] due to their inability or unwillingness to ease sanctions in response to concessions noted earlier [partial compliance with the UN resolutions]. But the greatest ethical responsibility rests with the government of Iraq and its appalling disregard for human suffering. On one level, Baghdad's refusal to utilize the humanitarian safety net provided by the UN casts a long shadow of blame. At a higher level, the government has needlessly prolonged the crisis through its refusal to take steps toward further compliance with UN demands and by obstruction of UNSCOM's work.³⁷

As with the sanctions against South Africa, the sanctions against Iraq offer several important lessons learned:

- Comprehensive sanctions (even when backed up with military force) cannot force change in an authoritarian regime (particularly when it is the regime itself that you want to change).
- Policymakers must beware of changing objectives in the application of sanctions.
- Multi-lateral sanctions can have great impact on an economy but over time, the consensus of the coalition for sanctions will wane.

SOUTH AFRICA V. IRAQ

The sanctions against South Africa have generally been identified as an example where sanctions were successful, while the sanctions against Iraq have been seen as much less successful. A comparison of the two offers some helpful insights into the effectiveness of sanctions.

First, the South African government was democratic (whites only). As the pain of sanctions became more intense, supporters of the white South African government began to

consider compromise with the ANC. Even the actions the government took to mitigate the sanctions gave black workers more rights and better access to jobs as the government attempted to build new industries. Over time, they realized that they would have to cede power to the ANC in any democratically elected government (once they abolished Apartheid). In Iraq, the government is authoritarian—completely controlled by Saddam Hussein. The people of Iraq have no voice and any hint of rebellion is immediately squashed. Hussein uses the sanctions as a propaganda tool to create additional nationalistic support for the government—a fight against the “evil westerners.” It is doubtful that Saddam Hussein would ever consider giving up power to end the sanctions. He will resist the sanctions for the foreseeable future in the hopes that the coalition compromise or lose consensus.

Second, both sets of sanctions were comprehensive in nature. In the Iraqi case, the sanctions were more comprehensive than in South Africa and enforced by the military. The occupation of Kuwait generated significant support and consensus for sanctions. In the aftermath of the conflict, the consensus remained strong enough to retain sanctions until all WMD capability and infrastructure had been destroyed. In South Africa, on the other hand, the sanctions grew over time from oil imports, to arms and finally to full comprehensive economic sanctions. International consensus took a 10-15 year period to coalesce. In South Africa, the sanctions became even more effective when public opinion and protest forced western commercial companies (US companies in particular) to divest investments in South Africa or its industry.

Third, the objective of the sanctions in South Africa always remained simple and clear—the end of apartheid. In Iraq’s case, the objectives of the sanctions seemed to have changed over time. The demands of the sender countries—the United States primarily—grew from destruction of all WMD capability and production to include the complete overthrow of the regime. Certainly if Hussein believes that the sanctions will not be lifted even if he completely complied with the UN resolutions, he has little reason to compromise.

Fourth, the humanitarian suffering caused by economic sanctions seems self-evident. The poorest suffer worst. One might argue about the degree that they suffer but all agree that they suffer. In the case of South Africa, the ANC and black population that suffered the most almost demanded that the pain and suffering continue until apartheid ended. Policymakers who argued that economic sanctions hurt black South Africans more than the white minority ended up with no ground to debate and no propaganda tool when the ANC and prominent blacks like Desmond Tutu argued that no pain was too great when the cause was freedom and democratic rights. In Iraq, on the other hand, there is no opposition group similar to the ANC to advocate

for additional sanctions and the humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people has become a wedge or propaganda tool for those who would end or limit the sanctions.

Finally, sanctions do not work quickly. In the case of South Africa, the South African government resisted the full economic sanctions for 6 years. They mitigated other sanctions for almost 20 years. The sanctions in Iraq have been in place for 10 years with only minimal compliance with the UN resolutions and no end in sight.

CONCLUSION

Richard Haas of the Brookings Institute stated, "Sanctions are a means to an end, not an end in themselves."³⁸ In the case of Iraq, the sanctions may have become the end and not the means. We seem to have no other recourse or policy to pursue. Larry Minnear et al., argue,

Sanctions also stand to benefit from being understood in the context of carrots-and-sticks diplomacy...by themselves they have limited power and usually cannot force major changes in the policies of targeted regimes. As part of a broader diplomatic effort, however, they can make a difference. Too often, as in the case of Iraq, sanctions have become a policy unto themselves, a method of applying unrelenting coercive pressure even in the absence of meaningful dialogue or an overarching political strategy.³⁹

In the final analysis, sanctions are only another tool that policymakers should consider as they apply the elements of national power. Clausewitz in On War states, "We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."⁴⁰ The same can be said of sanctions, they offer policymakers an alternative more powerful than diplomatic language but less painful than war. Sanctions in and of themselves do not provide solutions—seldom will they succeed by themselves.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Sanctions are a significant tool to compel other states or actors to comply with the wishes of the United States government. In most cases, they have been used without the application of the military force as an enforcement mechanism. The key to enforcement has been the use of multi-lateral sanctions. In those cases where we have convinced a significant number of other countries to join us in applying the sanctions, we have seen the greatest success. At the same time, policy makers must keep in mind that sanctions, while signifying our resolve or that of our friends to act, may not compel compliance with our wishes. Sanctions have not forced changes in government in either Cuba or Iraq. In both the cases, the hostile government has used the sanctions as a propaganda tool and disregards any hardships that the sanctions have caused.

Strategists should consider three key criteria before applying sanctions. First, are we willing to use military force to ensure the effectiveness of the sanctions? We have the military capability or power to enforce sanctions but typically we have used force only as a last resort when other options have failed and our national or vital interests are threatened. Second, short of military force can we unilaterally enforce sanctions against a country by using our economic power? When we have a strong competitive advantage in an industry or commodity, we can effectively enforce the sanctions by either stopping imports or exports. Unfortunately, seldom do we have this competitive advantage. Third, if we can't enforce the sanctions unilaterally, will our friends and allies around the world follow our lead and join in the sanctions? If they won't support us, then the sanctions may make a moral statement (we've done the morally just thing by applying sanctions such as in the case of the unilateral sanctions against Burma) but have little other effect. The key to sanctions becomes the enforcement mechanism. When we aren't willing to use force, and in most cases we aren't, we must have the support of the international community to enforce the sanctions.⁴¹

Finally, while the use of sanctions has become popular as a tool for national security policy makers, their effectiveness remains questionable. Sanctions have the best chance for success when the behavior or actions that we are trying to change are of lesser importance to the offending nation. Seldom have sanctions by themselves forced change when a leader or government's survival is at stake.

WORD COUNT = 5111

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⁴¹ O'Quinn, 1-22.

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