



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**IS THE REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES ARMY
RESERVE (USAR) RETENTION BASED ON INCREASED AND
PROJECTED PERSONNEL TEMPO (PERSTEMPO) UNDER
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)?**

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2001



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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Is the Reduction in United States Army Reserve (USAR) Retention Based on Increased and Projected Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) under Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)?

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The purpose of this paper is to determine whether there is a long-term negative impact on unit readiness of USAR Troop Program Unit (TPU) soldiers continually called to active duty under Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC). My intent is to analyze available information on retention trends to determine the long-term effects on USAR TPU readiness that are likely to occur because of continuous call to active duty. Could reduced retention rates break or significantly impact readiness? What policies are affected by reductions in retention? Are we retaining *lesser-qualified* soldiers to meet end strength objectives due to high Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO)? Can retention be effectively salvaged? Currently, Public Law permits the President to call reserve forces to active duty in support of MOOTW. Further, in order to meet end strength objectives, the make-up of the TPU is not professionally evolving and the leadership is placed in a position of *not* adhering to prescribed policies intended to maintain a highly developed and professional force. Is the current policy of calling USAR TPU soldiers to active duty in support of various MOOTW a viable use of reserve soldiers? Or, should these missions be modified to reduce the current level of mobilizations/ deployments of reserve soldiers. Thus, if the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO were reduced would that alone positively affect the overall war-fighting readiness of the USAR as the strategic reserve for our National Military Strategy?

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PREFACE

This paper expresses a point of view not necessarily held by some of our Army's leadership. I have used personal experience and the thoughts of others to shape what I believe will be a challenging future for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). I am far from being the expert on what effect continuous employment of USAR soldiers will do to retention, and by extension recruiting for meeting the USAR's end-strength. More analysis is required to determine the long-term affects high Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO), Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) and the residual effects on retention and recruiting. There is not a great deal of literature on the subject. However, I have seen what I view as both the rewards and consequences of prolonged active duty for our USAR soldiers. Nevertheless, certain individuals have been outstanding in contributing to my understanding of the subject. Special acknowledgements to my Project Advisor, Colonel Jim Powers, who has the patience of Job, and provided considerable insight to me of those USAR soldiers on the front lines of freedom. I would also like to thank Colonel Hans Mijocevic for turning me in the right direction when I needed an azimuth correction. Both of these officers, as well as many of the Reserve officers I have met along the way gave a little of themselves. I was provided a collection of insights and anecdotes regarding the efforts our soldiers give, ensuring we are mission ready. The USAR is made up of patriotic Americans — citizen-soldiers who make up one arm of our nation's security — and forever relevant.

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IS THE REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE (USAR) RETENTION BASED ON INCREASED AND PROJECTED PERSONNEL TEMPO (PERSTEMPO) UNDER MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)?

My third message was about the importance of the Army and its Reserve components in the emerging strategic landscape, and how effective integration of our Reserve components is imperative. Indeed, I challenged the cadets to be leaders in "tearing down the wall" of stereotypes related to Reservists. These old stereotypes are inaccurate and unproductive for an Army that cannot effectively move, shoot or communicate without the critical skills we have in the Reserve components. ...And, indeed, challenged them when the time comes, to join the Reserves. Our teamwork as an integrated whole is especially compelling since world events will ensure that the U.S. armed forces, along with their Reserve components, will continue to be needed at a pace that was not anticipated when the Cold War ended almost ten years ago.¹

—By the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army, National Security Report: the Army and its Reserve Components


The USAR supports the military element of our national power. As is depicted in the common definition of the term reserves: "they are, as a fighting force, kept uncommitted until the strategic need arises."² The issues presented in this paper will determine if the current use of the USAR supports this definition and is the current level of deployments of USAR personnel in support of MOOTW, related to the reduction in USAR retention. This paper will outline the historical background of the USAR, the laws and policies governing utilization of the USAR for MOOTW and what effect evolving policies are having on both short and long-term retention. Finally, it presents several options for consideration with regard to improving retention of USAR soldiers.

THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE – WHERE HAVE WE BEEN AND WHERE ARE WE GOING

The USAR is facing one of its greatest epiphanies. As a support to the military element of national power, the USAR has made itself perhaps *too* vital. The end of the Cold War and the increased involvement of U.S. forces in a variety of MOOTW across the globe have stretched the USAR to the breaking point. The long-term effects of over commitment reduced readiness through reduced retention and recruitment of qualified soldiers.

The USAR is more relevant today than at any other time in history because it provides over 30 percent of the Army's Combat Support and 45 percent of its Combat Service Support.³ Given this force structure, it is impractical to expect current and future levels of operational commitments to be accomplished by the Army without the USAR.

USAR FORCE STRUCTURE



NOTES: These data display the USAR's Military Force Structure in authorizations. It combines Troop Program Unit (TPU) authorizations and Active Guard Reserve soldiers (AGR) assigned to MTOE and TDA units. Just over 69% of TPU force structure is in MTOE units. Of the MTOE force, 60% is in medical, transportation, engineer and quartermaster branches. The largest MTOE force is in medical with 23,975 authorizations. TDA comprises 30.4% of USAR structure, with Institutional Training and Training Support Divisions being the largest piece with 34,671 authorizations or 57.2% of the TDA force. IMA and AGR's authorizations above MACOM add 11,460 authorizations to the USAR's force structure allowance. The FSA in FY01 is programmed at 225,500.

FIGURE 1, USAR FORCE STRUCTURE — FY 2001⁴

The USAR is not structured to support continuous MOOTW. According to a 1999 report published by the Secretary of the Army, the Army is the "principle engine for

executing the National Military Strategy. America's Army has provided more than 60 percent of the people who have participated in 32 of the 36 major military operations since 1989.⁵ The USAR constitutes 20 percent of the Army; therefore, it is of numerical necessity that Reserve forces participate in Army operations.⁶ Figure 1 illustrates the FY 2001 configuration of the USAR force structure. The most significant aspect of this is that the preponderance of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units are in the USAR. Given this array of forces it is not possible for the Army to execute MOOTW without the incorporation of the USAR.

Is the intended purpose of this present-day utilization of the USAR the establishment of a national Reserve force? If so, can the USAR retain highly qualified soldiers in light of the current and projected OPTEMPO? Retention and recruiting statistics indicate that the Army in general and the USAR specifically cannot sustain end-strength objectives. The Army leadership acknowledges this and is exploring options to strengthening the Army's force structure, through realignment and reorganization.⁷

MAJOR USAR HISTORICAL MILESTONES

Since the American Revolution our country has relied on a very small Regular Army and in times of crisis augment it with militia or civilian volunteers. The training and preparedness of these early citizen-soldiers was not consistent or reliable. However, as the nation grew its concern for national security grew as well. The Army Reserve was created in 1908 with the Medical Reserve Corps; and in 1916, Congress passed the National Defense Act. This act created the Officers' Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). With involvement in World War I, the United States mobilized over 89,500 officers from the Officers' Reserve Corps to support our nation's efforts; of these, one-third of the officers were medical doctors. More than 80,000 soldiers of the Enlisted Reserve Corps served, with 15,000 assigned to medical units. In the early 1930s, over 30,000 Organized Reserve Corps Officers served as commanders and staff officers at 2,700 Civilian Conservation Corps camps. Reserve participation in the American defense effort began before the United States entered the war in December 1941. The Army began calling members of the Organized Reserve Corps to active duty in June 1940. World War II saw Reserve participation elevated significantly from less than 3,000 officers in 1940 to over 57,000 officers (29 percent of the Army's officers) and 200,000 enlisted.⁸

More than 240,000 reservists participated in the Korean Conflict and — in the national policy on the Reserve's roles and responsibilities. The Organized Reserve

Corps was reorganized and into the USAR and subdivided into the Ready, Standby and Retired Reserve. Further, USAR personnel were authorized to train both in an inactive and active duty status and the President was given specific authority to call up to one million Reservists from all Services to active duty in case of national emergency. These Congressional actions were directly attributed to the activation, mobilization and deployment of Reserve forces in the Korean War.⁹ As a result, the scope and breadth of the USAR functions became progressively more combat support and combat service support oriented.

The USAR *transformed* from being "A fighting force kept uncommitted until strategic need arises" through to several evolutionary milestones during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s that have continued to today.¹⁰ These milestones contributed to increasing strategic ties in the National Security Strategy between the Reserve and Active Components. The USAR was becoming inexplicably connected in operational plans that required it to reinforce the active Army as part of a Total Force Policy.¹¹

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm led to the largest call-up of the Reserve Components in almost 40 years. This reserve force was mobilized and deployed to support all facets of the nation's Southwest Asia Theater engagement. The employment of the nations' Reserve forces was such a resounding success that it forever changed the way the Nation did business.

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm also brought about a major shift in the employment of the RC to support military operations, and, specifically the partial mobilization directed by the President.

Historically, RC forces in limited numbers have always participated in MOOTW. Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama and Haiti are some examples of where USAR forces were committed to non-permissive environments that were not declared wars by the Congress. However, since Operation Desert Shield/Storm, OPTEMPO is cited as the main catalyst for the RC being called to active duty for MOOTW (under the auspices of Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC). This is also referred to as Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC)).

Currently RC soldiers can be called to active duty for periods up to 270 days as both individual fillers and integrated units. Title 10 USC provides this active duty call-up authority and is depicted in figure 2. This means the President has authority to call-up Reserve assets to support a MOOTW.

Authority. - ...when the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission or that it is necessary to provide assistance referred to in subsection (b), he may authorize the Secretary of Defense...without the consent of the members concerned, to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in section 10143(a) of this title), or any member in the Individual Ready Reserve mobilization category and designated as essential under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, under their respective jurisdictions, to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 270 days.¹²

CURRENT POLICY – CALL TO ACTIVE DUTY

There are a whole host of laws and policy documents relating to how the USAR is to be employed in support of MOOTW. Among these are *Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Sections 12301 through 12304 (figure 2))*; *National Security Strategy*; *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*; and the *Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress*. These documents establish the plan for utilization of military forces. In particular, *Title 10 USC* and the *National Security Strategy* outline specific policy guidance regarding employment of RC in MOOTW.

EMPLOYMENT

Most USAR units employed in MOOTW are Combat Service (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS). Many of the low-density skills in these units are not found in the active Army inventory. Based on the *fixed* number of personnel and the expanding utilization of these low-density skill-level soldiers, the Department of Defense (DOD) is facing significant personnel challenges unlike those faced in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Although we initially were not sure how long Desert Storm would last, military planners knew they would have to establish fixed timelines for employment of the forces similar to that of Vietnam, so that there would be sufficient forces of the right mix to meet mission requirements.

The rising number of MOOTW since Operations Desert Shield/Storm is essentially draining the pool of RC personnel available for these operations. For example, over 40,000 RC personnel have been called to active duty to support missions in the Balkans. The Army can no longer deploy without its RC — because they contain over 50 percent of the CS/CSS assets. The bigger question to be considered, however, is “Does America have the will (or more specifically support of family members and employers) for the never-ending stream of deployments of its citizenry?”

The DOD works vigorously with the legislative and executive branches to address future requirements. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process is the vehicle to determine future force requirements and the resources to support them.¹³ The QDR

process along with the National Defense Plan (NDP) and National Military Strategy (NMS) have not specifically addressed how the Army will incorporate the RC in such initiatives as *transformation* of the military in the 21st century. The intent of the NDP and NMS is to offset Active Component (AC) forces with RC forces to reduce OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO.

In the case of the Army, both our national and military leadership have changed their view of the RC from their participation as a pure *Strategic Reserve*. Now, with the downsizing of the AC and the transfer of the *lion's share* of CS/CSS units to the RC, we have no choice but to *tap* the RC for support of MOOTW. Unfortunately, military leaders assumed both the RC and AC could be treated as interchangeable players. They appear to be *blind* to the long-term effects of treating both the RC and AC as *identical* elements. What is the effect of this cookie cutter approach to the use of the RC? It has the potential to minimize the RC's ability to recruit and retain qualified personnel over the long term, which will certainly impact the readiness for either an MTW or MOOTW.

OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO

DOD adopted "operations tempo" or OPTEMPO as a measure of the pace of an operation or operations in terms of equipment usage — aircraft "flying hours," ship "steaming days" or "tank [driving] miles." Each Service has slight variations in how they measure personnel tempo — "PERSTEMPO" — the time an individual spends away from home station. OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO seem the same because they often rise and fall together, but they don't always parallel each other.

World events, authoritarian regimes and trans-national crime serve to exacerbate the gap between the *haves and have-nots*. These non-state actors cultivate an environment for extremism and the determination to acquire asymmetric capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. Because of this type of new threat to national security, the USAR with over 50 percent of the required military assets positioned in the Reserves, it makes it inevitable that they are an integral part of any national strategy has contributed over 1,780,000 RC man-days in 64 countries at the close of 2000 to support MOOTW (see figure 3).¹⁴ Unless the National Command Authorities can reverse this trend, the USAR can expect to maintain both a high PERSTEMO and OPTEMPO.

The spectrum of likely operations illustrates a need for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational coalitions for a variety of missions stretching from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peacekeeping and peacemaking, to major theater wars.




FIGURE 2, USAR OPERATIONS IN FY1999 ¹⁵

THE RESERVE TRINITY

The *Reserve Trinity* is not an official term, but one that characterizes the relationship among which a reservist's family, military and civilian profession. In the USAR environment, this trinity is understood and often described as the reserve lifecycle management process. Policy guidance regarding reserve professional development is included in various professional documents, i.e. Department of Army Pamphlets 600-3 (officers), 600-11 (warrant officers) and 600-25 (enlisted). These documents outline professional development, expectations and growth patterns for each of these groups. Further articulated by the leadership is the balance between the USAR members' military and civilian professional obligations and family. Unlike AC forces, whose full-time employment is the armed service, reservists divide their time between their civilian occupations, reserve obligation and family — hence the trinity. This is not new news, however, what is different about the equation today is the balance of time devoted to each endeavor. Prior to Operations Desert Shield/Storm, reservists were not activated, on a continual basis, to support MOOTW. However, with the reduction in force structure after Operations Desert Shield/ Storm reservists are continually being called to active duty to support MOOTW.

The observation that can be made from this new approach is that the Reserves are no longer going to be utilized as proffered in the definition given at the beginning of this paper. But what effect does this have on the *Reserve Trinity* paradigm? Significant ones if you look at current recruiting and retention trends.

Since the Vietnam War, the reserves have been *sold* as *part-time* service to one's country, where a citizen-soldier could participate as a member of the military and develop their civilian profession – and have time for their family.

There is a need to balance this trinity to have effective citizen-soldiers. If the trinity is out of balance and too much emphasis is placed on one leg, then the other two legs will suffer.

Congress, through the passage of laws determines how the RC will be organized to support our National Security Strategy. In the early nineties, General Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) established a Leadership Development Action Plan for Officers, Warrant officers, Enlisted, Civilians and the Reserve Components. His intent was to increase professionalism within the leadership element of each of the categories listed. Specifically with regarding to the RC, General Vuono's intent was to "professionalize" this element of the force, which traditionally had not received the same degree of training and education as their active counterpart.

This initiative, while laudable for it's intent, served to significantly change the balance of the Reserve Trinity. USAR personnel found themselves in a time management crisis trying to manage the *new* Professional Military Education (PME) and assignment requirements being levied on them. These military professional requirements competed with their civilian professional requirements; and, family considerations entered into the time management equation.




FIGURE 3, MILITARY PROFESSION — FAMILY — CIVILIAN PROFESSION TRINITY ¹⁶

WHEN THE WALL CAME DOWN

Since the end of the *Cold War*, senior military leadership has redefined the organization, force structure and mission of its U.S. military forces. The challenges of the nineties and beyond would determine what the forces looked like, given the look of a *perceived threat*. In this futuristic scenario, Army leadership, focused on the *relevancy* of the Army. The Chief, Army Reserve stated: "The Army Reserve is The Army's support force." In a series of *offsite* meetings in the early nineties, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs directed a reorganization of the Army's National Guard (ARNG) and USAR. Eventually, it was determined that most of the CS/CSS structure would be placed in the USAR, and that the ARNG would be comprised mainly of Combat Arms. The effect of this change, in association with the downsizing of the total force (figure 4), *sealed* the process for the USAR, as a major force provider to support future MOOTW.




FIGURE 4, PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS FOR ALL ARMY COMPONENTS¹⁷

CHANGE IN WORLD ORDER

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, at the Fletcher Conference, in November of 2000, stated that we would be fighting a different kind of “asymmetrical” adversary as the norm rather than the exception. In his comments, General Shelton stated the United States will “face clever, adaptive adversaries” who will examine our military capabilities and operations and take stock of our successes and failures. “They will continue to seek and exploit our perceived weaknesses,” he said. “I believe they will use asymmetric warfare to thwart or sap our will.” Asymmetric security threats lend themselves to asymmetrical responses.¹⁸ These comments reflect an understanding that planning for two major theater wars, while still valid, and cannot be the only national military strategy concept for supporting U.S. national strategic security. In order to support both symmetrical and asymmetrical threats, the U.S. will require a different organizational make up of its military forces.

How then does this change in the type of threats facing the US relate to the USAR? It has caused the CSA to consider a force capable of deterring this asymmetrical threat. Much of the force structure required to meet these particular challenges resides in the USAR. MOOTW like humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations require heavier reliance on civil affairs, engineer, and water purification-type units. These units are in higher demand than heavier armored units of the past “Cold War” scenarios.

NATIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Today, our National Military Strategy is founded on a three-pronged approach: it calls on us to shape the international environment, prepare our forces for the future, and respond to crises when and where our interests require. As we embrace this new strategy for a new century, America's National Guard and Reserve are moving to the forefront of our efforts to secure peace, engender democracy, and nurture market economies on a global scale. Reservists are an integral and vital part of America's Total Force, and we will continue to rely on them well into the new millennium.¹⁹

National policy considerations tend to *drive the train* on RC employment. With the change in administration, it is unknown what will happen to the OPTEMPO for reserve forces. However, in 1999, DOD published the Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) Study. This study examined the role of the RC. The report's recommendations were intended to *facilitate* increase RC levels of participation and *improve* its integration into the total force.²⁰ Unless the new administration makes a major shift in policy, then it would seem apparent that most if not all the proposals of the RC Employment 2005 Study would be adopted.

This study was developed because of the FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance. It followed three themes: Homeland Defense, Smaller-Scale Contingencies and Major Theater Wars. Due to its mandate, the RCE-05 Study examined a wide array of issues; and to a broad range of participants from "virtually every organization interested in the future of the total force."²¹

According to DOD, the study "generated a variety of new initiatives that will enhance the role of the RC across the spectrum of DOD missions and strengthened relationships between the AC and RC."²² Follow-on studies resulting from RCE-05 will build on these enhanced relationships, and are likely to generate additional processes to increase AC and RC integration. But what were the tangible effects of the study to date?

Although the RCE 2005 study illuminated the need for greater involvement of the USAR, it did not delve into the effects of over utilization of the RC in support of a continuous flow of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The report did reflect an acknowledgement that "repetitive and extended PSRC tours" could produce an adverse effect on recruiting, retention, and in the final equation — national readiness.²³

Revise the PSRC authority to allow repetitive and extended PSRC tours for reservists and RC units. The study recommends that this item be deferred. PSRC has been extremely timely in the last few SSC scenarios. Allowing repetitive PSRCs could jeopardize military-civilian employer relations and thus negatively affect recruiting and retention. PSRC is not meant for support of peacetime operations; rather, it is a vehicle to support the war-fighting CINC in a crisis response scenario.²⁴

MAJOR SHIFT IN EMPLOYMENT POLICY — HOW DID WE GET HERE

There was an extremely positive outcome to Operation Desert Storm — it demonstrated that the role of the RC was critical to the success of our military. The RC has always been relevant — what changed the paradigm is changing the role of the RC from that of “a fighting force kept uncommitted until strategic needs arise”²⁵ to being part of the *first response* team in any of our nation’s new-founded threats.

Despite the policy of increased reliance on the USAR, employers for the most part have been supportive of their employees serving in the USAR. However, they cannot continue to lose valued employees for extended periods. Employers do not benefit financially from supporting reservists. On the contrary, the loss of an employee to constant deployments causes turbulence and financial loss, especially in small business operations.

Employers feel a sense of national pride and want to maintain a strong national defense, recognizing that the reserves are an integral part of that force. However, their support can never be taken for granted. Employer support is critical to recruiting, retention and the accessibility of the force.

Another aspect of sustaining high OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO is the quality of soldiers retained. Personnel policies are designed to develop and groom future leaders, both commissioned and noncommissioned. Constant deployment of these quality soldiers forces them to make choices that they may not want to make — not to re-enlist or if a new prospect, not to enlist at all.

WHEN WILL THE DAM BREAK?

The continuing trend of over employment of the USAR force has caused leaders to modify their standards for retention of quality soldiers and officers. They have found themselves in a conundrum of retaining soldiers who would normally have been either removed or reassigned to the IRR. Commanders have had to adjust to policies intended to retain only the best, being waived to accept or retain less than the best, in order to meet end-strength objectives. In actuality, soldiers, previously removed through policy, under routine procedures, are now being given wider latitude to meet retention standards.²⁶

WHAT HAS ARMY LEADERSHIP DONE

In 2000, Army leadership decided to reduce overseas deployments of the ARNG and USAR to a maximum of six months. Deployments covered under this policy change

included both peacekeeping and humanitarian military operations. This policy change resulted from the significant response by reservists, their families and, especially, their employers.

Presidential Reserve Call-ups (PRC), routinely places reservists on active duty orders for up to 270 days in support of MOOTW. The Army's decision to reduce the timeline to six months decreases the time these troops will be away from home. This new limit was the first significant acknowledgement by the Army's leadership of the greater dependence on Reserve forces. Not reducing the extensive deployment period would have made heavier the millstone of responsibility on our citizen-soldiers, which would only continue to threaten to undermine a reservists' motivation to join or to stay in their units.²⁷ However, this policy change does not accurately reflect actual circumstances facing RC soldiers activated for deployment. RC soldiers are expected to stay six months *in* the Theater of Operations. What is not advertised is the administrative ramp-up and ramp-down time bringing the soldiers in and out of the Theater. All told, RC soldiers deployed under PRC are routinely on active duty for 7 months, 28 days.

The FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act requires that the DOD track and monitor PERSTEMPO of the armed forces. The Services were directed to establish systems for tracking and recording the number of deployment days for each Service member; and the Service members were to receive a High-Deployment Per Diem Payment when their deployment days exceed defined limits. The Army has agreed with the Congressional definition of "a day away is a day away," which means that soldiers will be appropriately compensated because of their deployment status.²⁸

Current USAR policy is that no unit or activity will place any Service member into a "deployed" status, as defined by the Congressionally approved definition, that will cause the Service member's accrued deployment days to exceed 180 days within any 365 day period. This does not apply if the Service member has been called to active duty under a PRC, partial mobilization, or full mobilization.

In 1999, the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) tested a program for reducing the maximum 270-day mobilization period under PSRC to 90-days for certain health care professionals. After the test, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA-M&RA), put this into policy. This policy does not apply to Army Medical Department (AMEDD) RC officers occupying specific leadership positions, regardless of specialty, who will remain for the duration of the PSRC deployment.

WHY RETENTION POSTURE IS A HOUSE OF CARDS

In an October 27, 2000 Congressional hearing, Gen Shelton reported, "more than 120,000 service members are deployed worldwide supporting exercises, theater engagements, forward presence commitments and 20 ongoing operations...Another 200,000 are permanently stationed in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. "Unless we get a handle on increasing long-term commitments, we will continue to face retention and readiness problems across the force."²⁹ These figures demonstrate the need for the National Command Authority along with Theater Commanders to prioritize missions commensurate with established staffing guidelines.

Unfortunately, U.S. engagement around the globe is not being reduced. It is as if with the coming down of the *Wall* and Operation Desert Storm, use of military forces for these *mini-missions* has hit a wellspring of international consciousness. U.S. military readiness and hence retention will be the bill payer over the long-term.

RETENTION

Retention is part of a Service's two-pronged approach to maintaining a quality force, recruiting the second prong to this approach. A significant portion of the volunteer Army is comprised of recruits. However, the USAR's retention program is the *silent partner* and continues to support the overall end-strength objective (figure 5). Retention is the only reason the USAR is meeting its end-strength objectives³⁰

The concern for the USAR should be: How long can retention support recruiting lag currently experienced by the USAR in recent years? Eventually, overall quality will begin to diminish, as well qualified personnel who decide that they cannot continue to sacrifice their civilian profession and quality of life with their family. Personnel policies over the past several years are showing signs of strain. More exemptions to policy are being effected because of the Services' poor performance in maintaining end-strength.³¹

Retaining personnel through exception eventually causes quality soldiers to leave; why put forth the best effort when we retain those who can't or won't? USAR personnel normally *not* retained are being kept in service through exceptions to policy. It may take some time to determine the long-term effect from these practices. Unfortunately, the Army leadership is left in an untenable position. If you cannot sufficiently replenish the qualified pool of prospective soldiers, then you must resort to less than optimum alternatives, unless of course DOD reinstates the draft. The draft is a viable option, but would only be considered under the direst of situations — could we as a nation accept this option?




FIGURE 5, RETENTION RATES FY 92 – FY 98³²

BANDAID APPROACH — ARE CURRENT INITIATIVES ENOUGH?

The CSA announced a new initiative in 2000 called “Army Transformation.” This evolution of the Army to a point in the future (30 years by current estimates) will “fine tune” the Army’s strategic ability to meet both symmetrical and asymmetrical adversaries. The FY 2001 Army Posture Statement outlines where the Army must go as a land force.³³

The world of the 21st century will grow more challenging than the one in which we find the Army fully engaged today. Fundamental differences in the nature of the threat, technology, and the character of operations will require a more strategically responsive, full spectrum Army. The Army has identified enhanced responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability as the force characteristics essential to meet future national security requirements. The new Vision charts the course for the Army to transform itself into a force—the Objective Force—that has these desired characteristics and can sustain dominance at every point on the spectrum of operations.

The CSA also directed the Army staff to establish a Turbulence Task Force. The purpose of the Task Force was to analyze recommended actions by an Army War College study group and develop plans to implement these recommendations.

- Increasing the Present Duty Assignment Reenlistment Bonus from three locations to 11 locations, allowing more soldiers to continue to serve in hard-

- to-fill locations and increasing the number of soldiers to train and work in those units;
- Development of a three-year KFOR/SFOR rotation plan and a web-based deployment tracking system to provide predictability to the force; and
 - Expanding the Korea extension bonus to \$2,000 and examining whether to establish more accompanied two-year tours in Korea. This is designed to help maintain troop strengths in Korea while reducing the number of soldiers moving to and from Korea on an annual basis. The Chief of Staff established goals in an effort to assist commanders to reduce the Operational Tempo of the force:
 - Providing soldiers more stability in their lives by routinely scheduling permanent changes of station (PCS) during the June through August time period for all soldiers with school-age children.
 - Conducting all battalion and brigade changes of command during the June through August time period.³⁴

What have not appeared in the Turbulence Task Force recommendations are any recommended solutions to reduce USAR turbulence. Although the RCE 05 Study addressed problem areas experienced by the USAR, the study fell short on addressing corrective measures.

The CSA stated that the Army “will develop the capability to put combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff — in brigade combat teams for both stability and support operations and for warfighting. We will build that capability into a momentum that generates a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.” This will be accomplished through three key program goals:

- Enhance the full spectrum capability of today’s force
- Significantly improve strategic response
- Focus RDA to develop key enablers³⁵

The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) made a clear statement of the USAR’s future to the Reserve leadership, at the Spring 2000 United States Army Reserve Command Commanders’ Conference, when he said “The Army Reserve is no longer a FOR EMERGENCY USE ONLY organization.”

The CAR has outlined that he will prepare the USAR through:

- Modernization
- Improved maintenance
- Improved deployability
- Recapitalization
- Army and Joint experimentation
- Information Operations and Computer Network Defense³⁶

There are many initiatives being attempted by the Services to attain the requisite end-strength. One measure under examination is the creation of a new, fully resourced recruiting organization under the command and control of the CAR. While there could be benefits in accepting this measure, there were a number of “serious risks and uncertainties associated with any immediate decision to create a separate USAR recruiting command. Uncertainty about the resource implications of a decision to create such a command is a major concern.”³⁷

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65, Section 552) directed the Secretary of the Army to conduct a review of the manner, process, and organization used by the Army to recruit new members for the USAR. The United States Army Reserve Recruiting Review — Blue Ribbon Panel Report was an extensive review aimed at identifying corrective actions the Secretary of the Army could implement to improve USAR recruiting. The report was published with the following policy recommendations:

- Panel Recommendation 1: Improve “The Army partnership” by increasing the level of involvement of the Army leadership in efforts to meet the USAR strength mission.
- Panel Recommendation 2: Reduce the USAR recruiting mission through increased emphasis on retention resources.
- Panel Recommendation 3: Implement a “Best of the Best” policy for staffing USAREC.
- Panel Recommendation 4. Increase the integration of USAR personnel into the recruiting force from the command group down.³⁸

These recommendations are bound to meet with some degree of success given the conceptual progressiveness of the recommendations. However, the Blue Ribbon Report, with all its analysis did not delve into the one area that *begs* the question, if the

active force is finding it difficult to attain it's recruiting targets, how does the USAR intend overcome this obstacle. Today's potential recruits are still drawn to service to their country; however, they are also pragmatic and realize that they will eventually disrupt their civilian profession. This disruption if left unattended could lead to an irreversible situation if in their civilian capacity, they are not there to effectively *participate* in what their employers expect them to on a *day-to-day* basis. Employers do not have to *break* any laws to alter the career path of a citizen-soldier.

OPTIONS

REDUCE MISSIONS

Reducing the mission load for high-profile units would certainly ease the tension and potentially improve retention rates. It is taking a substantial sales job to entice future recruits to join a TPU, and those quality soldiers the USAR wants to retain to remain. Can there really be a reduction in missions? Given the current end-strength and force mix, it would require a change in the U.S. strategic policy. If the U.S. does not reduce its worldwide commitments, then this option would not be viable.

INCREASE FORCE STRUCTURE

Increasing force structure to meet mission requirements would be considered idealistic at best. There is a new world order that is filled with a range of possibilities for changing U.S. national military strategy. However, an increase in structure to fulfill both the two MTW plus the small-scale contingencies and humanitarian operations would be more than the nation would be willing to invest in at this time based on the projected costs. Realistically, a significant part of the nation would not support the U.S. being the *world's policeman*.

REORGANIZE CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

The Army cannot expect to increase its force structure without identification of a specific threat; however, it can reorganize to maximize its effectiveness. General Shinseki, CSA, has stated the need to change the paradigm of how we fight our national threats. The CSA proposes that we "lighten" our heavy armored forces to improve lift capability.

The "Objective Force" will provide lighter "Full Spectrum Brigades" capable of getting the right forces, in the right composition, where it needs to be to carry out our nation's objectives. This option makes the best sense given the predictable constraints

of both manpower and financing. However, this recommendation will not reach fruition for approximately 30 years. The Objective Force is intended to distribute the deployment burden between the components; hence, improve retention and recruiting challenges for the force.

Of the options discussed, many have a weakness in not considering the human element too deeply. The Army's leadership — both Active and Reserve, never fully address the PERSTEMPO/ OPTEMPO issues facing the force. Even the RCE 05 Study fails to give more than a superficial *glossing* over of the impact that high PERSTEMPO/OPTEMPO has on the retention and therefore readiness.

It appears we are ignoring some fundamentals of the current environment; that you cannot *overdo a good thing*. What is the *good thing*? — Soldiers. The Army is structured and traditional institution; there are established practices and routines soldiers become accustomed to in the course of their service to country.

Soldiers (and officers) believe they will be trained in their craft and that they will be called upon to defend their country as soldiers not as the *world's policemen*. Yet, today and the foreseeable future MOOTW are becoming the norm and not the exception.

Soldiers did not anticipate continuous rotations or long-term separations from their families and their civilian professions. If we do not reduce the high level of OPTEMPO/ PERSTEMPO, it is quite possible that the Services and the USAR in particular will not meet readiness objectives for our national security.

The current review of the military roles and missions by new administration gives the Army the opportunity to articulate the role performed by the RC in meeting future challenges. The Army leadership continues to address both the relevancy of its forces, consistently validated, and the retention challenges that will continue to face the Reserve Components. This problem will not resolve itself overnight.

The current and sustained level of deployments of USAR personnel in support of MOOTW can only exacerbate the selective pool of eligible recruits. Today's and tomorrow's potential recruits, departing soldiers and officers can be selective in making career choices. They don't feel obligated or compelled to sacrifice their families and civilian professions in light of the solid economy.

CONCLUSION

As you can see, the problem facing us, is the combination of a reduced military force, increased mission tempo (and mission creep) and over utilization of the USAR.

Solutions to this very complicated issue can only come when the national leadership, which includes both the Executive and the Legislative branches of government, and military leaders recognize that there is indeed a monumental problem facing the nation; and that we cannot wish it away. If the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO of our USAR are not reduced to a manageable level, then when you really need the USAR, they won't be there in the numbers and skill sets required. The Nation will not easily accept the alternative to an all-volunteer force — the Draft.

The Reserve Components are a complex entity, indeed a trinity, and equal to the sum of its parts — military profession — civilian profession — family. General Plewes, in an astute comment from the *USAR General Officers Smartbook*, spoke of the people who make up the USAR. As all leaders must and do recognize, it is the people who support our nation's defense and we must take care of them.

There's no question that The Army today is undersized. It is operating at a wartime pace with a peacetime force structure. New missions, expanded missions such as joint and combined operations keep coming. The Army needs all its current forces. Further reductions make no sense, not for the Reserve Components and not for The Army. Our leaders know this...Not only can we not afford reductions; emerging force requirements dictate that we expand our force. To expand or even to remain where we are now requires the same thing: people. General Creighton Abrams told us that the Army is people. That is an absolute, fundamental truth. We cannot afford to lose people. We also cannot afford to not get people to join us.

—Major General Thomas J. Plewes, Chief, Army Reserve, September 2000³⁹

WORD COUNT= 6609

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⁵ Louis Caldera and General Dennis J. Reimer, Army Posture Statement FY00 (Washington, D.C., Office of the Secretary of the Army, February 1999). Available from < <http://www.army.mil/aps/00/aps00.htm#page19> >; Internet; accessed 3 December 2000. 37.

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⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Ibid

¹² 10 U.S. Code, United States Armed Forces, § 12304 (2000).

¹³ William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1997), 11.

¹⁴ Plewes, The Army Reserve General Officer Smartbook, 19.

¹⁵ Ibid, 15.

¹⁶ The phrase — *Reserve Trinity* is a term formulated by the author. Specifically, it is related to the life-cycle management process, which encompass all three aspects of the *Reserve Trinity*: family — military profession — civilian profession. These elements of the *Reserve Trinity* are considered in the developmental processes of reserve personnel throughout their association with the USAR.

¹⁷ Plewes, The Army Reserve General Officer Smartbook, 29.

¹⁸ Jim Garamone, "Shelton Looks to Military Strategy of the Future," American Forces Press Service, November 2000. Available from < http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2000/n11172000_200011172.html >

¹⁹ United States Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Reserve Component Programs, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, March 2000), ii.

²⁰ William S. Cohen, Final Report of the Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study — ACTION MEMORANDUM, 11 June 1999. Available from < http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.htm >; Internet; accessed 25 March 2001.

²¹ Ibid

²² Ibid

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Dictionary.com.

²⁶ For the past several years, there has been a significant increase in supporting exceptions to policy for the retention of soldiers who would otherwise be placed or retained in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

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²⁹ Linda D. Kozaryn, "Shelton, Chiefs to SASC: Optempo, Limited Funds Erode Readiness," American Forces Press Service, 27 October 1999. Available from < http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/n10281999_9910282.html > Internet, accessed 25 March 2000.

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³¹ Ibid, 8. OCAR Exceptions to policy regarding retention more prevalent over last 5-7 years and fewer Selective Retention and Qualitative Retention Boards conducted.

³² Plewes, The Army Reserve General Officer Smartbook, 31.

³³ Army Posture Statement FY00.

³⁴ Gary Sheftick, "Shinseki sets measures to reduce 'turbulence,'" Army News Services, 17 October 2000. Available from < <http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Oct2000/a20001018turbulence.html> > Internet, accessed 25 March 2000.

³⁵ Plewes, The Army Reserve General Officer Smartbook, 7.

³⁶ Ibid, 12.

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³⁹ Plewes, The Army Reserve General Officer Smartbook, 7.

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