



**STRATEGY
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SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN

BY

JAMES McKIM SYMINGTON
Central Intelligence Agency

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by

JAMES McKIM SYMINGTON
Central Intelligence Agency

Professor Douglas V. Johnson
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James McKim Symington

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The purpose of this Strategic Research Project is to explore the roles that Special Operations Forces (SOF) play in the Commander-in-Chief's Theater Engagement Plan (CINC's TEP) and specifically how SOF can help provide the situational awareness and Indications and Warning (IAW) essential to the "CINCdom's" security. This SOF contribution is also looked at in terms of how to work these issues in the interagency world in which the CINC must compete. We will discuss the uniqueness of SOF skills and the concept of "Global Scouts" as well as SOF's use in Regional Engagement. Lastly we will discuss SOF in the interagency world and the cultural and organizational implications of interagency liaison work.

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN THE THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN

The involvement of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) of a Commander in Chief (CINC) has never been more important. This is the case because SOF have unequaled access to persons and organizations of local interest to the CINC. A great deal of thought has gone into the roles that SOF play or can play in the Theater Engagement Plan. In order to maximize SOF's involvement, however, we should look into ways that SOF can work in the interagency world, which also affects the TEP.

UNIQUE SKILLS OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

For their relative smallness in number and unit size, SOF can have a disproportionately large effect on the TEP, especially in the more peaceful end of the TEP's continuum from peace to war. In this regard SOF's skills range from unconventional warfare to those of psychological operations. These are skills that entail qualities of maturity, above average intelligence, and most importantly seasoning and judgment. Those skills that put SOF personnel into close proximity with indigenous personnel in the CINC's Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR) are the ones I believe can pay real dividends as the CINC works to shape his AOR through the TEP, based on my reading of SOF literature as well as my own experience as a soldier and an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency with a number of years' experience working with SOF at home and abroad.

Shaping the AOR involves American military bilateral interaction with host nation entities ranging from high military and government officials on down to the company and platoon level indigenous soldiers, or "indig," whom SOF train worldwide on a daily basis. The warfighting skills of the SOF--Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Information Operations, Counter Terrorism, and Counter WMD--are invaluable in full combat. Additionally, these skills are all arguably part of the package that the CINC's Special Operations Commander (SOC) can bring to the fight unilaterally when and if deterrence fails. But these skills come into play long after the "shaping" or influencing phase of engagement has given way to the more coercive actions of warfighting. The SOF skills of Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) place our seasoned professional SOF face-to-face with indigenous personnel. This physical and professional closeness to our foreign military counterparts can pay real benefits as the CINC works to shape his AOR by working with those counterparts.

UW and FID, for example, are two edges of the same sword. In UW, our SOF personnel train guerrillas or irregular troops who may or may not fight as insurgents. In FID, the SOF train regular foreign troops or paramilitaries to fight in the internal defense of a foreign government with which we are formally or informally allied. In both cases we are training foreigners in a role that gives SOF day-to-day proximity to foreign personnel in a manner which is unknown to virtually all other American personnel in the CINC's AOR. More than instilling tactics, techniques, and procedures, this teacher-student relationship affords SOF an opportunity to instill American values as we express those values in the way we make war. Likewise, CA operations enable the CINC to showcase the core value of civilian primacy over the military as SOF medics do MEDCAPs and perform other humanitarian operations. PSYOPS enable the CINC's SOF elements to propagate American values through "white propaganda," promoting those goals that the CINC wishes amplified as he shapes his AOR. Similarly, PSYOPS can be run in a combined fashion, enabling one-on-one collaboration with foreign counterparts. In short, all these SOF skills enable the CINC's SOF personnel to get to know the AOR and people within the AOR in a way that is unavailable to virtually any other American "in country."

What, the CINC might ask, is the real "hard edged" payout of all this closeness? That is, what does the CINC's ability to command and win derive from closeness to the locals? The answer lies in situational awareness and indications and warning (IAW), both crucial to readiness. IAW come from a variety of sources, some beyond the scope of this paper; they are an essential aspect of the CINC's TEP and can result directly from those relations that arise from SOF's work within the TEP. All of the military-to-military relations in which SOF engage on a daily basis give the CINC invaluable ground truth, which is just another word for IAW.

CURRENT USE OF SOF SKILLS

As the U.S. has seen in recent military engagements, the timeliness of movement to contact can be managed in two ways: start early or get there fast. Being there early or starting earlier is easier than getting there fast. Arguably, no one expects to fight another war like Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Saddam Hussein and the rest of the world—friend and foe alike—saw what we could bring to the battle when we had six months' time to get ready. As one speaker at the U.S. Army War College stated, "Saddam is going to be the last fool to challenge America face-to-face symmetrically." In the future, we probably won't have the luxury of the six months of lead-time.

For his part, the Army Chief of Staff has a very expensive, but utterly necessary plan to get us to the fight fast, thereby enabling us to thwart the ambitions of another Saddam. His plan,

called "Army Transformation," essentially redraws the Army in a way that it can travel light and fast while still arriving with enough armor to survive and prevail. But as we buy time by making ourselves more mobile, we can also buy time with early IAW and enhanced situational awareness.

And for his part, the CINC must be ready to preclude an enemy as ambitious as Saddam Hussein, but one who—unlike Saddam--- may not give us six months to get ready for the fight. To counter this challenge, the CINC must be engaged in a way that shapes his AOR and gives him IAW. SOF professionals doing UW, FID, CA, and PSYOPS can give the CINC the vision that he needs to see the bad guys coming in his AOR. For the CINC, SOF on the ground can be as beneficial for readiness as all of costly Army Transformation, because in so many instances SOF is already there.

SOF skills contribute to the CINC well beyond the "shaping" part of the TEP. In their entirety they act through peace, war, and back to conflict resolution. For example, Direct Action and Strategic Reconnaissance are activities more suited for war than they are for the CINC's peacetime shaping goals. Similarly, Counter Terrorist and Weapons of Mass Destruction operations are arguably more "in extremis" than the more commonplace SOF activities that bolster the TEP on a daily basis. Likewise PSYOPS and IO are valuable, contributory skills in the continuum from peace to war. They are not, however, the skills which place SOF next to their indigenous counterparts in the AOR. Working with the "indig" is where, I believe, the CINC can really advance the shaping leg of the TEP. Further, the physical closeness that SOF establish on a daily basis in shaping the CINC's peacetime environment have an irreplaceable payout as the CINC moves from peace to war and then back to conflict resolution.

UW, FID, and CA place SOF elbow-to-elbow with their local counterparts in the AOR. CA enables SOF personnel to work with local government infrastructures, enabling our personnel to convey our national values in the best way possible, by actual example. CA missions vary but embedded in these activities is our core national contention that the military works for the government and not the other way around. FID and UW missions reflect the teaching nature of SOF. SOF personnel can take on UW missions, but their direct involvement in these missions is like eating the seed corn—a last resort course of action. SOF officers and enlisted personnel are teachers, inculcating their counterparts in accomplishing UW and FID missions vice undertaking those missions themselves. The bottom line is that a member of a small SOF contingent such as a Mobile Training Team is going to get to know his counterparts in a way that very few--if any--other members of the "CINCdom" can possibly claim.

This intimacy with local counterparts has always been valuable. My experience as a straight-leg Light Weapons Infantry advisor to the Vietnamese during the war taught me that those of us “on the ground” knew more of what was happening in our District than any of the Americans back at Province headquarters. More importantly, we knew more ground truth than the seemingly enormous American maneuver battalions that rumbled through our area from time to time. Time and again our proximity to the indig paid dividends.

This former soldier will never forget the afternoon when the locals barely perceptibly began to filter out of our valley, away from our outpost whose very presence was intended to instill confidence that the government could protect them from the Viet Cong. Someone who did not actually live in this locale would have missed the subtle changes entirely. By nightfall, as the usual cooking fires of the local civilians failed to appear, our team leader was gratified that we had noted the earlier gradual departure of our neighbors and that he had already plotted and called in Defensive Concentrations (DEFCONs) to the nearest artillery firebase. Later that night and early in the morning, the Viet Cong probed us in force and we didn't have to fire a shot—105 mm. VT fused airbursts stopped their attack before it could really begin. That was the longest night I've ever lived through, but I did live through it because of good local IAW.

And this truth has not changed: it has only become more so. Why is this proximity to the indigenous counterpart especially valuable now? The answer lies in the fact that the asymmetric threats we face today may not afford us the luxury of a long run up time. Regardless of how magnificently General Schwarzkopf's troops coalition troops performed, we took a long time to get ready. If this lesson was clear to Saddam and our enemies, it was also palpable to our post-Desert Storm planners. We have always needed good IAW, but this becomes more critical to our success when our AORs are spread out around the world and time is of the essence if we are to deploy and fight successfully. We need to know what's going on. What better way for us to know what is happening in a given CINCDom than to have good one-on-one, military-to-military connections? Personal, intra-AOR, military-to-military connections of this kind are a natural outgrowth of the teaching missions of SOF—UW, FID, and CA.

At the highest strategic level, the CINC should incorporate SOF's involvement “down in the weeds” with the letter and spirit of the words of our Draft National Security Strategy for 2000:

The elements of engagement—adapting alliances; encouraging the reorientation of other states, including former adversaries; encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development; preventing conflict; countering potential regional aggressors; confronting new threats; and steering international peace

and stability operations--- define the Nation's blueprint for its strategy of engagement. These elements support three strategic concepts for engagement: shaping the international environment, responding to threats and crises, and preparing for an uncertain future. ⁱ

The shaping, responding, and preparing begins with the CINC's SOF soldiers who are on the ground in the CINC's AOR. As the NSS says clearly, "Forward-deployed forces permit us to identify emerging security problems, and then facilitate a swift response, if necessary... Our policies bring our country's strengths directly to international politics, governments, and militaries."ⁱⁱ In other words, our SOF forward presence helps us be aware of ground truth and, at the same time, lets us lead and influence our hosts and counterparts by our example. This aspect of leadership by example is a trait that is uniquely American: the Draft NSS notes that other powers have used military force to advance their values, but few nations have advanced those values through the power of their example instead of through the might of their military.ⁱⁱⁱ

GLOBAL SCOUTS

How then do we want to look at these SOF personnel in the CINC's AOR? Former Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command, General Peter J. Schoomaker, calls them "Global Scouts," citing the fact that at that point in 1998, SOF were in 71 countries and on average more than 5,000 SOF personnel were deployed each week, which was a three-fold increase since 1991. Schoomaker asserted that these personnel were all working to make the international security environment more favorable to U.S. interests by focusing on shaping, responding, and preparing.^{iv}

In coining the term "Global Scouts," General Schoomaker gets at a concept that is both valuable and forward thinking. The concept is valuable because it helps us focus or refocus on the contribution that SOF make as DoD immerses itself in worldwide strategic involvement. It is forward thinking because it takes tried and true SOF ideas and reminds us of their continuing centrality into the future. The idea of Global Scouts is not new, but, instead, is a new and more useful way of looking at SOF and their role in the changing environment abroad.

The Concepts and Capabilities Division of the Army Special Operations Battle Laboratory is out in front respecting the future role of Global Scouts. At the United States Army John Fitzgerald Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWSC), known familiarly as "the School House," they have taken the idea of Global Scouts further than any other thinkers in DoD. A white paper drafted at the school deserves more exposure in part because it

is unique in citing some of the real world limitations of the interagency world that challenge the realization of Global Scouts. According to the white paper:

An enduring requirement for peacetime engagement is derived from the emerging global strategic security environment and mandated by the National Security Strategy. Regional engagement represents a concept for military participation in the interagency activity of peacetime engagement. From a military perspective regional engagement makes six important contributions to national security. These are avoiding war, informing policymakers, maintaining forward presence, facilitating decisive operations, facilitating conflict termination and securing victory...⁵

The draft USAJFKSWCS paper is candid about the need for and the difficulties of obtaining interagency cooperation. Practicality led the SWCS authors to limit their concept of SOF in Regional Engagement to the military sphere because no mechanism exists to move the SOF concept into the interagency field. The authors state that it is useful for the military to work the problem, even independently, as the National Security Strategy itself has called for a multi-disciplinary approach to engagement, i.e. diplomatic, informational, economic, and military.⁶

In focusing on the military element of national power, the authors further concentrated on how military force could be leveraged by the CINC to accomplish the six goals of engagement enumerated above. First among the six, I would argue, is forward presence, since without it the missions of avoiding war, informing policymakers, accomplishing decisive operations, terminating conflict, and securing victory are both moot and tenuous. Mindful of forward presence or basing, some of the conclusions arising out of the 1998 Army After Next Spring War Game were instructive. Three elemental uses of the military instrument emerged: regional engagement; homeland defense; and warfighting.⁷

SOF AND REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Because warfighting is sometimes seen as merely combat operations, the SWCS authors preferred the term "decisive operations." Combat operations can be as much a part of regional engagement and homeland defense as they are of warfighting. The term "decisive operations" better conveys the coercive and violent nature of this phase of the conflict continuum. The SWCS authors see this continuum as a Venn diagram in which Regional Engagement, Homeland Defense, and Decisive Operations interact and commingle. They have taken General Schoomaker's concept of Global Scouts, adding global shapers and global

transition forces to the roles that SOF can perform in the CINC's TEP.⁸ In short the scouts provide the CINC with situational awareness, the shapers work higher up to shape the CINC's strategy, and the transition forces work the problems of battlespace preparation before decisive operations and restoration or normality in the aftermath of decisive operations.

Respecting homeland defense, threats to CONUS from abroad could originate in a given CINCDom. Overseas situational awareness would help domestic planners meet and understand a threat from OCONUS.⁹ The lynch pin of all this is Regional Engagement. Just as Forward Basing enabled the other desiderata of the NSS, Regional Engagement enables situational awareness, strategic shaping, and battlespace preparation/restoration.

The SWCS paper further reminds us of SOF's global role and heritage by referring to Secretary of Defense William Cohen's thoughts on SOF's dual lineage as "key penetration and strike forces and diplomats who can influence, advise, train, and conduct operations with foreign forces, officials, and populations..", closely aligning SOF with the regional engagement roles of global transition forces and shapers.¹⁰ There is a real symbiosis in that SOF's roles place them squarely in the middle of Regional Engagement. But we are cautioned never to forget where SOF come from—the profession of arms. The SWCS authors state that prevention and deterrence have no meaning without being balanced by the credible willingness to fight. Indeed, there is a holistic interdependence of operations across the continuum of conflict and it would be a grave mistake to focus only on the softer aspects of Regional Engagement at the expense of warfighting and decisive operations.

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND SOF

Despite the conventional wisdom prevalent concerning the value of SOF and Regional Engagement, the issue of interagency cooperation remains problematic. This problem obtains despite the fact that there is an obvious interagency symbiosis that would lend itself to unity of effort if we all just agreed to "get along." The CINC and his forces exist in a world where we compete for resources. Unlike the relatively straightforward competition of the battlespace, bureaucratic competition affects all of us who work to advance America's interests overseas. The SWCS piece argues that doctrine must establish TEP requirements for the conduct of decisive operations during Smaller Scale Contingencies and Major Theater War, but is more cautious about prescriptions for how SOF can work in the current interagency arena overseas. SWCS advise that many plans involve other government agencies (OGAs) and that issues with OGAs must be worked.¹¹

The phrase "must be worked" implies both a challenge and a risk of failure, and we need to recognize both if we are to work through these issues. This can be, I believe, an endeavor which will enrich and empower the efforts of all of us who work in the world of the "interagency." For all of the benign nature of the information that SOF accrues by simple virtue of working with the "indig," there are limits on this information accrual, imposed by policy and law. Policy, law, and even doctrine may be inevitable but are not always helpful, since very few can remember every paragraph, clause, and phrase of a regulation. The SWCS paper even calls for legislation to rationalize sources of authority in hopes of attaining greater unity of effort. Legislation, however, is unlikely to help us through this minefield any more than policy guidance or doctrinal direction from above. What we all need, both SOF and OGA, is a sense of commander's intent that we should all gather and share the information which naturally accrues to us overseas. In other words, rather than doctrine, we should cultivate a customary attitude or spirit that we are navigating the minefield together. The commander's intent should convey that failure lies in not mutually reinforcing one another.

Every United States Embassy overseas has a "country team." The team is headed by the Ambassador and consists of every section head in the Embassy. Depending on the issues in a given country, the composition of the country team may vary, but the team is consistently the embodiment of the interagency world. The military man who reports to the Ambassador is the Defense Attache. The military man in country who reports to the CINC is the Military Group commander, usually shortened to MILGROUP commander. A case can be made that where there are SOF personnel in country, the country team should have the benefit of their area knowledge and situational awareness.

The SWCS paper elaborates that Global Scouts can engage in three levels of information accrual.¹² In ascending scale of intrusiveness they are incidental observation, passive reconnaissance, and active collection. Because they are first and foremost soldiers, Global Scouts can supplement the situational awareness picked up by an American diplomat at a reception or a Public Affairs Officer as he makes his rounds. In fact, being a soldier, the Global Scout can spot information the significance of which would be lost on a diplomat. Further, since many foreign elites are composed of military men, Global Scouts are in a position to glean information in the course of simply doing their jobs as trainers. Whether formally or informally, SOF Global Scouts should have input to the country team.

While the country team will probably not be interested in the nitty gritty information picked up by the Global Scouts as they incidentally observe or passively recon such sites as Landing Zones, Drop Zones, Beach Landing Sites, and Air/Sea Ports of Disembarkation, the

Ambassador can take comfort in knowing that such sites are being noted, analyzed, and recorded. Even should the country team be unaware of such reconnaissance, if the Ambassador ever needs to order a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), he will be grateful for the situational awareness latent in the role of Global Scouts. And, should SOF trainers tumble upon rumors of, for example, coup plotting or other indicators of instability as they work with their counterparts, the country team will be grateful indeed for the early warning.

The key to the Global Scouts' being able to support the country team lies not in legislation, regulation, or doctrine—it lies in the common sense view that it is the commander's intent that Americans overseas need to know what is going on around them. Or, as stated above, failure lies in not mutually reinforcing one another in the interagency world. The need for situational awareness cannot be expressed simply in terms of Essential Elements of Information (EEI). It can be expressed in the common sense spirit that each member of the country team brings their own optic to the world around them. The friendships that soldiers naturally make with their foreign counterparts are an invaluable part of the TEP. Unfortunately, overzealous concerns about force protection can isolate the very soldiers whom we send overseas in service of the TEP.

After participating in a CENTCOM Field Training Exercise (FTX) overseas some years ago, I concluded that the entire FTX could have been done in CONUS with all the realism that we were allowed to experience OCONUS. We were supporting the training goals of the 5th Special Forces Group, a unit well and favorably known to my colleagues and myself. We kept a low profile, living in a house in town, grocery shopping and moving in and out of town freely, but our SOF friends were "locked down" at the local international airport, sleeping in hangars and living behind barbed wire. It was difficult even to free several of our SOF companions to come to our house for a cookout. One can only speculate what the locals thought of their American counterparts, who could not leave the airport to accept a friendly invitation home to meet the wife and the kids. For all the good it did the CINC's TEP in-country, the entire FTX could have been conducted at Fort Campbell.

CULTURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACTS ON SOF

The real story here is that organizations—even organizations from the same country posted overseas are driven by different imperatives and are the product of different corporate cultures. This is as true for SOF as it is for CIA and the rest of the OGA world. I believe the first step in surmounting our differences in the interagency world lies in recognizing that these differences exist. Some differences are superficial, stemming from a difference in the way we

use the same language. These differences are the simplest to span, simply by taking the time to hear what the other person is actually saying. Other differences are deep and real, reflecting the fact that organizations grow and evolve independently. When two independent organizations must get together to accomplish a common goal, their differences can make collaboration difficult.

For example, my organization, the CIA, is comparatively small and managerially flat, while the military is multi-layered and hierarchical. Working often as singletons, CIA officers are rewarded for being disciplined loners who can work alone and often without feedback or guidance for extended periods. The military's hierarchy, on the other hand, seems to be a natural feedback generator. One area in which these differences manifest themselves is in how meetings are conducted and presentations are made. In the military, the more important the issue, the more people show up to discuss that issue at a meeting. At CIA, because of an organizational bias towards compartmentation of information, it is the opposite. For presentations at meetings, CIA considers making briefing slides labor-intensive and hierarchical in its requirement for layers of professional slide makers and briefing preparers. This perception, besides the desire not to leave papers around, leads to the average CIA officer's devotion to minimalist note cards to structure presentations. This can seem irritatingly casual to the soldier who comes from the world of military courtesy, but does not really mean that CIA officers are less respectful of authority—only that the culture is different. The sooner we recognize that the differences won't change, the sooner we are going to be able to do the liaison work that is the key to dispelling the interagency confusion that gets in the way of mission success in the CINCDom.

LIAISON WORK

If we cannot achieve liaison success through legislation or regulation, perhaps the simple expedient of a written memorandum of agreement between the parties is the way to convey the Commander's Intent that we all pull together. Such agreements are staffed up to the highest levels of the signatory organizations and reflect the wishes of top management and leadership. The best virtue of this art form lies in the fact that it conveys the sense and the spirit of what two or more organizations can do for each other. The best agreement captures the intent and the goal of mutual cooperation without naming every detailed step and procedure of how to accomplish the Commander's Intent. If the agreement can communicate what the respective leaders want to be accomplished, the men and women who work for that Commander should be able to fill in the details.

Such an agreement exists between CIA and DoD, the value of which lies in what drove it to be written and manner in which it was written. Despite several difficult starts, and cultural differences that led to misunderstandings, the end result was an agreement that said, essentially, "You help us where you can and we'll help you where we can. In both instances, if one side can't help the other, it would decline ASAP so that help could be sought elsewhere. This agreement, crafted at the working level, was signed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. The DCI and the SecDef endorsed the agreement because it reflected the intent of both "commanders" in a spirit of teamwork and collaboration. The working level drafters knew the commander's intent and the inherent value of the mutuality of the agreement. This is an example of liaison work at its best.

At the working level in Somalia, liaison and collaboration between CIA and CENTCOM were worked out on a common sense basis which helped both outfits produce the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) needed by our forces in Mogadishu.¹³ Colonel Ronald Davidson headed the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) from 7 September 1993 until 28 March 1994. In addition to the usual Order of Battle and Force Protection information, Davidson's Intelligence Element became focused on Somali clan leader, Mohammed Farah Aidid. Davidson says:

The CISE basic mission was to support the U.S. Forces commander with intelligence...and to assist the UN U-2 in their effort to support the UN forces...One player that had its own idea on how to collect information on the whereabouts of Aidid was the Central Intelligence Agency...This is nothing out of the ordinary because they have elements anywhere we have State Department activities. My particular heartburn was the manner in which CIA conducted the(ir) information gathering operations...The [local CIA officer in charge] was responsible for HUMINT in country and did not want the CISE HUMINT capability to compete with his operation.¹⁴

Davidson goes on to describe how competition for information on Aidid led to circular reporting as the information was passed to and vetted by the Task Force Ranger J-2. When an informant is selling the same information to two or more consumers, i.e. the CISE and the Agency, it appears that the report is independently confirmed when, actually, the report has been sold twice affording the report bogus circular confirmation. To eliminate this circular HUMINT problem, Davidson and the Agency elected to collocate Agency officers and the CISE

HUMINT control element in a formation known as the JOSE of the Joint Operation Support Element. The division of labor in the JOSE enabled the CISE people to focus on Force Protection issues while the CIA officers in the JOSE would go after Aidid-related information. As Davidson says, "With the cooperation of the HUMINT elements the continued search for Aidid progressed with renewed vigor."¹⁵

In his Personal Experience Monograph, Davidson really captures the spirit and the flavor of the differences between the CIA and his own Intelligence Element. He is frank about the cultural differences between us Americans, but his actions and those of the CIA officer in charge completely reflect the reasonableness of the broad-stroke commanders' intent of both DoD and CIA to get on with the job.

Some things never change and what Davidson was able to accomplish in the 1990's tracks well with General Bruce Palmer's experience of competing intelligence services when he was in Viet Nam.¹⁶ He writes admiringly of the CIA, saying that the Agency is the sole national level intelligence organization and as such should be directly responsible to the President of the United States.¹⁷ This military man endorses this relationship despite the fact that executive orders and statutes were—and still are unclear—on this account. Early on, Palmer states that in a declared war, the CIA works for the senior military man, or what today we would call the CINC.¹⁸ Palmer then notes the inconvenience of the fact that Viet Nam was an undeclared war, leading to an occasionally awkward liaison cohabitation between the CIA and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) J-2. Palmer says that both intelligence apparatuses cooperated as best they could with occasional duplication. Also they suffered from inevitable confusion stemming from both services interacting independently with Vietnamese intelligence entities. This is Colonel Davidson's Somalia problem of circular reporting writ large indeed.

If the intelligence agencies are forced to cobble together working arrangements on a case by case basis, then perhaps we should accept a certain amount of "ad hocery" between our SOF and our CIA. I would propose our cooperation continue, reinforced and given structure by the very "un-CIA" expedient of jointly exercising.¹⁹ Another cultural difference between the military and the CIA is that the former does exercises and the latter does not. Once trained, a CIA officer can expect infrequent training over the remainder of his/her career. This is not the case in the military where perennial exercises are a frequent fact of career life. This said, CIA should be able to spare the people to practice cooperation with relevant SOF players. Further, I suspect that we are not talking about a great number of CIA personnel for whom this interaction would be productive. A small intermittent mutual investment in personnel would go far in

spanning the cultural gap between these two outfits for which there is nothing but good to be gained in working together.

CONCLUSIONS

Special Operations Forces are an essential actor in the Commander-in-Chief's Theater Engagement Plan and their activity for the CINC will obtain at all points of the spectrum that run from mere engagement up through decisive operations and conflict termination. In addition to the obvious skills that these mature and seasoned soldiers bring to the TEP, they also enjoy a level and variety of access to the locals that is virtually unique. This closeness to the indigenous people gives SOF situational awareness that pays benefits in early Indications and Warning. In fact, SOF's local knowledge has a pay out which complements the need to get forces to AORs faster than we have in the past. One can transform the Army, enabling it to deploy faster, but the benefits of this with arrival can be equally achieved with SOF forward-deployed as Global Scouts, gathering IAW and making friends for America. These and other SOF contributions in the overseas interagency environment can be amplified if SOF and the other government agencies can learn to cooperate effectively. The first step to engendering such cooperation is to establish a modest arrangement of interagency exercises to begin the formation of habitual interagency collaboration and support in furtherance of American policy OCONUS. Such cooperation will improve the performance of both SOF and their other government agency collaborators.

WORD COUNT = 5,651

ENDNOTES

ⁱ William J. Clinton, Interagency Final Draft of Fundamentals of the Strategy, version of 11/28/2000. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, November 2000), 3.

ⁱⁱ *ibid.*, 7.

ⁱⁱⁱ *ibid.*, 4.

^{iv} Captain John Paradis, "Special Operations Commander Outlines Future Threats," Air Force News May 1998: 1-2.

^v U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Regional Engagement: An Army Special Operations Forces Approach to Future Theater Military Operations, June 1999, 12.

⁶ *ibid.*, iv.

⁷ *ibid.*, 3.

⁸ *ibid.*, 14.

⁹ *ibid.*, 24.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 35.

¹¹ *ibid.*, 36.

¹² *ibid.*, 16.

¹³ Colonel Ronald H. Davidson, USA, Somalia-One Soldier's Experience. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013, 15 May 1998. 15.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 15-16.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 16.

¹⁶ General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, KE: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 162.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 195.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, 30.

¹⁹ This idea was the outgrowth of a conversation between the author and his fellow USAWC student, Colonel Charles Cleveland, United States Army Special Forces.

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