XIX Tactical Air Command and Ultra: Patton's Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in France
Abstract
During World War II, General George S. Patton Jr. was one of the most successful and feared commanders in the European Theater. Clearly, his August-September 1944 rapid drive across France can be considered one of Patton's greatest campaigns. Early histories detailing Patton s campaigns frequently attributed his successes to his outstanding tank corps and interesting stories of his sixth sense. The declassification of ULTRA intelligence, XIX Tactical Air Command reports, and post-war German interrogations provide additional contributing factors to his victories. These documents support a more plausible justification for Patton s apparent omniscience and the rationale behind many of his decisions. Students of history, who stood in awe of Patton s sixth sense or wondered in amazement of his ignorance/disregard of logistics and flanks, or marveled at his ambitious offensive drives, may find this study thought-provoking. This paper shows that Patton s chances and risks may have been a little less sixth sense or ignorance and disregard and a little more ULTRA intelligence and tactical airpower. The intent of this paper is to shed new light on Patton s generalship and to show how the Third Army successfully integrated airpower, intelligence and ground scheme of maneuver within its overall strategy. These three elements formed a force-enhancing trinity that mutually supported the other elements, and created a momentum that took Third Army and XIX TAC from the beaches at Normandy to within fifty miles of the German border in less than a 45 days. The August 1944 campaign in France demonstrates how Patton made fine judgments between opportunity and risk, and how the above elements helped him to exploit the former and mitigate the latter.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA391789
Entities
People
- Bradford J. Shwedo
Organizations
- Air University