Nuclear De-Alerting and the Search for Post-Cold War Nuclear Policy
Abstract
Military and civilian leaders have understandably shifted nuclear issues to the backburner of American national defense since the break-up of the Soviet Union nearly a decade ago. One senior United States Air Force (USAF) officer was even overheard comparing strategic nuclear weapons to the "gum stuck to the bottom of the Air Force's shoe... you just can't seem to get rid of it." While no longer the predominant defense issue, many still grapple with the strategic nuclear issue, wondering what we need to do with our "Cold War" nuclear arsenal. One of the most recent attempts to deal with this apparent dilemma has surfaced in the debate concerning the removal of US strategic nuclear forces from their alert posture, a process now popularly known as de-alerting. Many feel de-alerting is, if not the solution, certainly a step toward solving this post-Cold War nuclear dilemma. This study examines the de-alerting issue in an effort to see how de-alerting might contribute to United States (US) post-Cold War nuclear policy and force structure. Specifically, this study is divided into two main sections. The first portion of the study is devoted to an examination of the nuclear alert force itself. The purpose of this examination is to establish whether a decade after the end of the Cold War, nuclear alert forces have a place in the defense of the US. This first section begins by establishing that leaders have an obligation to constantly re-evaluate status quo military capabilities to determine if or when their benefits become overshadowed by their inherent costs or risks. To make this determination for the US nuclear alert force the nature of the nuclear alert force itself is explored to determine the inherent costs or risks associated with alert forces in general.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1999
- Accession Number
- ADA391824
Entities
People
- Michael E. Fortney
Organizations
- Air University