

Putting the RSTA O&O to the Test: Burma 2004

**A Monograph
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

Second Term AY 00-01

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-05-2001	2. REPORT TYPE monograph	3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-01-2001 to xx-05-2001
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Putting the RSTA O&O to the Test: Burma 2004 Unclassified		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) Hopkins, Yvette C. ; Author		5d. PROJECT NUMBER
		5e. TASK NUMBER
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command & General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth , KS 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT A PUBLIC RELEASE ,		

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Note: this version supersedes an earlier version submitted 4/19/01

14. ABSTRACT

At the time of this writing, it is May 2001. A new, strategically responsive, medium weight unit from Fort Lewis, Washington, designated the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is being formed and tested. The IBCT's organic intelligence architecture, the Brigade S2, a Military Intelligence (MI) Company, and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, are also being formed and tested. The RSTA's unique cavalry-type reconnaissance and Military Intelligence collection capabilities are the focus of this study. The study is set in a fictitious Thailand ? Burma smaller-scale contingency scenario in the year 2004 when the IBCT and RSTA are expected to be fully mission capable. At the request of the Thai government, the US National Command Authorities have authorized two Joint Task Forces (JTF) to the region to ?support Thai sovereignty and conduct humanitarian assistance operations.? The IBCT and its organic intelligence architecture are deployed to the area. The monograph specifically placed the RSTA squadron into a worst case scenario ? one with competing humanitarian and possible combat operations, overshadowed by an uncertain threat to determine intelligence planning considerations. Intelligence contingency planners have little to assist them in planning for the employment of the new RSTA squadron. The uncertainty of the Thai-Burma situation required the study to consider: is the intelligence architecture supporting the IBCT capable of full-scale intelligence operations in this complex environment? The study calculated the capabilities of the intelligence architecture in a Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC) Burma ? Thailand scenario to determine how it can fully support complex operations. This monograph used elements of operational design (time, space, purpose, and resources) to specifically analyze and evaluate the capabilities and limitations of the IBCT's intelligence architecture. The snap-shot-in-time analysis highlighted operational-level intelligence key planning considerations for the employment of the RSTA in a SSC: ? Employment of additional HUMINT assets ? Employment of dedicated liaison officers ? Great demand placed on the IBCT for intelligence ? ?Black-Out? Intelligence Coverage

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) ; Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) ; military intelligence ; Thailand ; Burma

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	Same as Report (SAR)	71	Burgess, Edwin burgesse@leavenworth.army.mil International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number 913 758-3171 DSN 585-3171

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PUTTING THE RSTA O & O TO THE TEST: BURMA 2004 by MAJOR Yvette C. Hopkins, US Army, 62 pages.

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- *Employment of additional HUMINT assets*
- *Employment of dedicated liaison officers*
- *Great demand placed on the IBCT for intelligence*
- *“Black-Out” Intelligence Coverage*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	iv
CHAPTER ONE: EXAMINATION OF THE IBCT	1
THE SETTING	1
THE ISSUE.....	2
ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS	3
METHODOLOGY	4
EXAMINATION OF THE IBCT O & O.....	5
CHAPTER TWO: EXAMINATION OF THE RSTA O & O.....	14
HISTORICAL CONTEXT.....	14
PURPOSE (MISSION)	16
RESOURCES	17
BATTLESPACE (ENVIRONMENT).....	20
TIME.....	20
C2 CONSIDERATIONS.....	21
REACHBACK CONSIDERATIONS	23
CHAPTER THREE: ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS	26
DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT.....	26
DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS.....	29
EVALUATE THE THREAT.....	32
DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION (COAS).....	34
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS	37
THE SETTING	37
PURPOSE (MISSION)	38
SPACE	41
TIME.....	41
CONCLUSION.....	44
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION.....	47
APPENDIX A: THAILAND-BURMA (MYANMAR) BORDER CLASH OF 2004.....	50
APPENDIX B: EQUIPMENT.....	55
APPENDIX C: URBAN MAPS.....	61
APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS MATRIX.....	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ENDNOTES	62
BIBLIOGRAPHY	65

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Army Transformation Strategy.....	6
Figure 2: IBCT Design.....	7
Figure 3: Environmental Comparison.....	11
Figure 4: RSTA Squadron.....	17
Figure 5: Recce Platoon.....	18
Figure 6: ISR Platforms	19
Figure 7: The Military Intelligence Company.....	19
Figure 8: System Architecture	21
Figure 9: The Golden Triangle	26

CHAPTER ONE:

EXAMINATION OF THE IBCT

The Setting

The year is 2004 and the balance of power in Asia is tenuous. The United States' 1990's policy of cooperative engagement continues in the region while China increasingly excludes the US from regional diplomacy in a strategic maneuver to dominate the region. Other nations such as India, Japan, and Thailand, vie for hegemony and influence in the region. Distrust, fears, and historical disputes, grievances and ambiguous intentions, fueled by nationalism and ethnic and religious zeal, punctuate the atmosphere in Asia. Recent political and military events have brought two countries, Burma and Thailand, to a high state of tension.¹

In January 2004, a failed Coup d' etat in Burma causes an influx of Burmese refugees in to south east Bangladesh. A United Nations multinational humanitarian contingent, including some US elements, is sent to assist the Bangladeshi government. At the same time, Burmese insurgents intensify operations in the eastern Burma Shan, Kayah and Kayin states, in support of the coup. In response, the Burma government takes revenge against the insurgent groups along the western Thai border, and believing Thailand arms and equipment supported the insurgents, orders units into Thailand to deal with the "Thai aggression."

The date is April 2004, and at the request of the Thai government, the US National Command Authorities have authorized two Joint Task Forces (JTF)

Bengal and Stilwell to the region to “support Thai sovereignty and conduct humanitarian assistance operations.” A relatively new, strategically responsive, medium weight unit from Fort Lewis, Washington, designated the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is alerted to deploy to the area.

The IBCT’s higher headquarters will consist of the 25th Infantry Division Headquarters (HQ), from Hawaii, and I Corps HQ, from Ft. Lewis. They are designated Army Forces (ARFOR) and Combined Joint Task Force components respectively.

The IBCT’s organic intelligence architecture consists of the Brigade S2, a Military Intelligence (MI) Company which is subordinate to the S2, and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, a 400 man unit with both cavalry-type reconnaissance capabilities, as well as MI collection capabilities. The IBCT intelligence architecture will be further defined in chapter two.

The Issue

Contingency planners assess the Burma –Thailand situation. The uncertainty of the situation requires G2 contingency planners to consider: ***is the intelligence architecture supporting the IBCT capable of full-scale intelligence operations in this complex environment?***² The purpose of this study is to calculate the capabilities of the intelligence architecture in a Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC) Burma – Thailand scenario to determine how it can fully support complex operations. To examine the intelligence architecture, planners ask the following questions: Can the IBCT’s organic intelligence architecture, manifested in the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target

Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, the Brigade Military Intelligence (MI) Company and the Brigade S2 cell, support this scenario? If so, at what point will the RSTA Squadron capabilities become over extended and unable to complete its intelligence tasks? Finally, what, if any, reachback capability gaps exist? The planners must also consider intelligence operations within a joint or combined command structure as well as implications of an early entry scenario.

At the time of this writing, there have been discussions on the capabilities of the RSTA, but little on the operational level considerations for the employment of the RSTA in a complex environment.

Assumptions And Limitations

Capability calculations are determined by essential elements of operational design.³ For this study, the methodology design uses time, space, purpose and resources to address the research questions. However, before describing the methodology, it is necessary to consider the assumptions and limitations that are critical to the study.

Three assumptions are key to the effort. First, that the IBCT and RSTA are effective organizations and used for the purposes described in the IBCT Operational and Organizational Concept (O&O). Second, that the scenario used by the Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint and multinational Operations while not likely, is representative of the type of operation the IBCT would be employed (See appendix A - Scenario). Third, that the intelligence assets described in the O & O are available and functioning.

Three limitations were imposed to restrict the scope of this effort. First, the study does not examine the RSTA in a Major Theater of War (MTW)

scenario. It is recognized in the O & O that the IBCT and RSTA can fight in an MTW when properly augmented, and the subject is worthy of examination, but it is beyond the scope of this study. Second, the study is confined to the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater. While the intent of the IBCT is to be strategically responsive anywhere in the world, the scope of this study is restricted to USPACOM, which provides a unique set of challenges, discussed later in chapter three. Third, the study is viewed from an operational level G2 planner perspective versus a tactical or strategic level.

Methodology

This monograph uses the elements of the operational design (time, space, purpose, and resources) to analyze the capabilities of the IBCT's intelligence architecture. The evaluation criterion are consistent with Draft FM 3-0, Operations. FM 3-0 states the operational framework consists of the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation. The operational framework is used to focus combat power, or in this case, maximize intelligence support operations.

Methodology Criteria

- **Purpose:** The activity, aim or mission of a unit
- **Resources:** Assets and capability of a unit
- **Battlespace:** Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions commanders must understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, and the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest.
- **Time:** The time dimension of battlespace is duration with respect to both current and future operations.

The application of this model on the RSTA portion of the O & O will help determine the strengths and weaknesses of the RSTA squadron in a complex environment in the US Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The monograph specifically evaluates the RSTA squadron in a Thailand – Burma scenario, seeks to identify any linkage gaps in the RSTA operational framework and suggests measures for future operational deployments.

Examination Of The IBCT O & O

To understand the operational character of the RSTA squadron, it's best to first understand the unit it will support. What is the IBCT? Examination of this medium-weight combat team involves briefly identifying the historical and developmental factors that initiated and guided the development of its concept. Next in order is a description of its operational character by way of the aforementioned methodology. Using the methodology provides an understanding of the expected manner in which the IBCT will be employed and thus, the manner in which its intelligence arm – the RSTA Squadron – will be employed.

Historical Context & Developmental Factors of the IBCT

At the time of this writing it is Spring, 2001 and the Army's newest warfighting organization, the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), has been formed.⁴ Two years prior, during the October 1999 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual convention, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric J. Shinseki, announced a new Army vision. This vision signified a paradigm shift in the US Army's role in the world. The statement established an

explicit requirement for the army of the 21st century to transform to a more strategically responsive and dominant force at every point along the spectrum of operations, and to operate in multi-dimensional environments.⁵ Implied in the vision statement was the need for a new intelligence structure to support the transformed force.

This transformation will be accomplished over three axes of advance: 1) the legacy or current force, 2) the interim force, 3) and, the objective force. As of 2001, the legacy force is capable of full spectrum dominance, but is not optimized for strategic responsiveness. However, in approximately thirty years, the legacy force will be completely transformed to the objective force, enabled by yet undiscovered technologies, and strategically responsive in accordance with the army vision's intent.⁶ In the meantime, the second axis, the interim force, is being formed and tested to bridge the capability gap between the first and last axes.





Figure 1: Army Transformation Strategy

The interim force will provide theater Commanders in Chief (CINCs) a rapidly deployable, increased warfighting capability (not currently available in the legacy force) until the arrival of the objective force. The interim force has already established two initial interim brigade combat teams and will follow with the establishment of an interim division (IDIV).

Purpose (Mission)

The purpose of the IBCT is to provide warfighting CINCs decisive contingency response options. The IBCT is specifically designed for employment as an early entry combat force. According to the O & O, the IBCT mission complements our current light and mechanized forces.



**Brigades Will Be Strategically Responsive and Lethal --
-- 96 Hours to Anywhere in the World.**

Figure 2: IBCT Design

“The IBCT is a **full spectrum, combat force**. It has utility, confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environments against all projected future threats, but it is designed and optimized primarily for employment in small scale contingencies (SSC) in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Fully integrated within the joint contingency force (under command and control of a division) the IBCT deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations. The IBCT participates in major theater war (MTW) as a subordinate maneuver component within

a division or corps, in a variety of possible roles. The IBCT also participates in stability and support operations (SASO) as an initial entry force and/or as a guarantor to provide security for stability forces by means of its extensive combat capabilities.”⁷

Resources (Capabilities)

The major fighting components of the IBCT are three motorized, combined arms infantry battalions, supported by additional organic combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations. The IBCT’s unique RSTA squadron is meant to enhance Situational Understanding (SU) of the operational environment.⁸

Space (Environment)

According to FM 3-0, Army forces conduct operations in an operational environment with six dimensions (threat, political, unified action, land combat operations, information, and technology). Each affects how Army forces combine, sequence, and conduct military operations. Commanders tailor forces, employ diverse capabilities, and support different missions to succeed in this environment.⁹

According to the O & O, the IBCT has refined those six dimensions to template its likely future operational environment. Its likely operational environment includes a number of distinguishing features: urban and complex terrain; a weak transportation and logistical infrastructure, an uncertain political situation; coalition involvement; and the presence of an asymmetric threat including mostly mid – but some high-end technologies.

The O & O further identifies future battlespace characteristics within which the IBCT will function.¹⁰ Key variables of the operational environment will include sociological demographics, national will, economics, supra-national

organizations, regional and global relationships. Prevalent characteristics of future military operations will include rules of engagement, presence of media, force protection, information warfare, complex relationships, and a limitation on force capabilities. Characteristics of Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) will include diverse weather patterns, humanitarian issues and inadequate local/regional/and global response capabilities. Finally, the future threat environment will include: pervasive presence of guerrilla, terrorist, paramilitary, and special police, military and commercial used together, limited brigade and division level operations, sustained unconventional terrorist and guerrilla operations, and urban areas as sanctuary.

In summary, the prominent medium the IBCT is expected to operate is complex, urban, and close environments against projected threats ranging from conventional to asymmetric low-end and mid-level threats. It is expected to operate with other US services, as well as coalition forces. In addition, it will fight as part of a higher headquarters.

One such area is the Pacific Command's (PACOM) area of operations. The PACOM Area of Operations (AOR) is challenging in its size (over one-half of the Earth's surface - 105 million square miles), its terrain (dominated by sea, with varied and diverse terrain), and its security implications for the regional, as well as the US. There are historic animosities, coupled with ethnic, ideological, territorial, and boundary disputes. The immense diversity of the AOR exacerbates the potential for regional conflict. Home to nearly three-fifths of the earth's people, populations range from the world's largest, China (over 1.2

billion), to the world's smallest, Nauru (10,000). Economically, the annual per capita incomes vary from \$19,000 in Japan and Hong Kong to less than \$200 in Laos, Bangladesh and many others. The political systems are diverse: from Marxist ideologies in North Korea to Western democracy in Australia. Many of the world's greatest religions – Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity – thrive here. Significantly, the region is home to the world's seven largest armed forces. The PACOM environment is the future hub of military operations, like Europe during the 20th century. Historically, the US has fought four major conflicts, the Spanish-American War, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam; and numerous smaller contingencies, i.e., the Boxer Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection, and Chinese Civil War, up to the latest peace keeping operation in East Timor. In addition, five of the seven of America's formal security alliances are in this region.

Andrew W. Marshall, the director of the Pentagon's futuristic Office of Net Assessment, stated in his "Asia 2025" report that, "Most US military assets are in Europe, where there are no foreseeable conflicts threatening vital US interests . . . the threats are in Asia."¹¹ Thus far the focus on Asia is mostly conceptual, not physical. It is now a common assumption among national security thinkers that the area from Baghdad to Tokyo will be the main location of U.S. military operations for the next several decades. "The focus of great power competition is likely to shift from Europe to Asia," said Andrew Krepinevich, director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.¹² The world economy shift to Asia has caused US. interests to focus on that region. Furthermore, retired

Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni further suggested the shift is partly due to the changing ethnic makeup of the U.S. population.¹³

According to the Washington Quarterly, the political and security character of the region is highlighted by historical distrust and antagonism. Countries have no expectations of peaceful change, and negotiation and compromise are interpreted as weakness.¹⁴ Habits of regional cooperation are only rudimentary and the natural tendency for conflict resolution is to look for short-term, unilateral gain.¹⁵ A quick comparison of the environment the IBCT is expected to operate (per the O & O), and the PACOM environment demonstrates the importance of this selected geographic area for study.

	O & O	PACOM Environment
Environment	1. Complex 2. Urban 3. Weak infrastructure 4. Uncertain political situation 5. Coalition 6. Asymmetric threat 7. Socio-demographic variables	1. Vast expanse of water & jungle to desert terrain 2. World's largest population centers 3. Many 3rd world countries 4. Limited habits of cooperation 5. World's largest armed forces 6. "no expectations of peaceful change" mindset 7. • World's great religions • widely varying economies • historical distrust & antagonism

Figure 3: Environmental Comparison

Time (Duration of Operations)

The final criterion is one of the most defining characteristics of this new force. According to the O & O, the IBCT, "...pre-configured in ready-to-fight

combined arms packages ...can deploy within 96 hours of 'first aircraft wheels up' and begin operations immediately upon arrival at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD)."¹⁶ Once committed, the IBCT can sustain operations for up to 180 days without relief.

Other Considerations

Another consideration that describes some of the pertinent conditions relating to the operational use of the IBCT is Command and Control (C2). The O & O intent is for the IBCT to operate under a Division HQ or a Corps HQ.¹⁷ It is expected to operate in a joint command structure, complement and be compatible with Air Expeditionary Forces, and the US Marine Corps. The IBCT is also expected to operate in a combined command structure and frequently be the only US maneuver command.

According to the O & O, the IBCT normally operates under a division. The IBCT can also fight under the direct control of a Corps headquarters, which will likely be designated as the ARFOR and, possibly, the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and/or Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ, within a joint or combined command. In order to accomplish assigned mission sets, in the types of environments where it will likely be employed, the IBCT must be fully integrated into the higher HQ structure for all planning and synchronization activities.

When deployed as part of a light division, the IBCT extends the tactical mobility available to the division commander and increases the organic firepower available to support dismounted infantry assaults. As the most mobile, lethal,

and survivable element within a light division, the IBCCT is likely to be employed as the main effort within the division.

When deployed as part of a heavy division, the IBCCT will almost certainly be the first brigade to deploy, facilitating the arrival and prompt RSOI of the remainder of the division by consolidating and extending the security of APODs and SPODs. With its high tactical and operational mobility and proficiency in urban/complex terrain, the IBCCT adds depth to the capabilities of the heavy division.

This brief examination of the operational framework of the IBCCT provides the foundation for exploring the operational framework of its intelligence arm, the RSTA squadron. This paper examines the limits of the intelligence architecture in a year 2004 complexity-based scenario.

CHAPTER TWO:

EXAMINATION OF THE RSTA O & O

According to the IBCT's Operation and Organizational (O & O) concept, three factors; high mobility, decisive action and Situational Understanding (SU) influenced development of the IBCT.¹⁸ The IBCT commander has at his disposal, a Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadron (RSTA) to provide the information and intelligence needed to help achieve SU. What is the RSTA Squadron? Examination of the RSTA involves identifying the factors that initiated and guided development of its concept, describing its physical and intangible characteristics and examining the manner in which it is expected to be employed through the operational framework described in chapter one.

Historical context

Several imperatives and constraints influenced development of the RSTA. The RSTA had to provide information as well as intelligence to the IBCT engaged in operations across the full spectrum of conflict, especially SSCs in complex and urban terrain. The RSTA was required to fully deploy within 96 hours of first aircraft wheels up, arrive at an aerial port of debarkation and immediately begin collection operations. The RSTA squadron was developed specifically to satisfy this set of operational requirements. As the IBCT's primary source of combat information, the squadron moves beyond traditional reconnaissance (focused primarily on enemy forces), and seeks to *see, know, and understand the operational environment* in detail, with the objective of creating an umbrella of understanding across the AO.¹⁹

More specifically, Draft FM 17-96, RSTA Squadron Operations, states the following design parameter imperatives:

Imperatives

- Provide all weather, continuous, accurate, and timely reconnaissance and surveillance in complex, close, and urban terrain.
- Gather information about multidimensional threats that range from conventional to unconventional and use asymmetric tactics to include:
 - Regular and irregular forces
 - Special forces
 - Terrorists
 - Political factions
 - Supporting government factions
 - Criminal elements and nongovernmental agencies in small-scale contingencies and stability operations and support operations.
- Rapidly develop the situation over a greater depth of operations by reconnoitering up to six routes simultaneously or conducting surveillance of up to 18 designated areas simultaneously or any combination thereof.
- Highly deployable and mobile unit
- Conduct stealthier ISR operations with reduced chances of detection/compromise. Is able to avoid unplanned engagements by anticipating battlefield events and must provide the same ability to the brigade.
- Accept augmentation in order to perform traditional cavalry operations that will ensure success of the brigade
- Reduce risk to the brigade by assuring survivability through information to avoid contact or achieve force overmatch if contact is necessary.
- Assist in shaping the environment by providing information or directing precision fires to disrupt the threat commander's decision cycle and deny him planned or future options.
- Establish analog and digital information linkages horizontally within the squadron and vertically to the brigade and subordinate command nodes, which facilitates the employment of army or joint fires to achieve the desired effects.
- Conduct quicker planning process that is more integrated with higher and adjacent units; more rapid, efficient orders dissemination
- Act as an alternate brigade command post when necessary
- Conduct target acquisition of the brigade and the brigade effects coordination cell.²⁰

The essential constraint on the development of the RSTA was its force structure and the need to keep the force package small in order to rapidly deploy.

However, a smaller force package limits the equipment and capabilities of the RSTA squadron, and ironically requires augmentation to fix. In an attempt to balance the strategic imperatives and constraints, the Army designed a 400-man RSTA squadron, able to quickly deploy, provide all-source intelligence, and be effective in low-to-high intensity conflict.

Purpose

According to FM 17-96 (initial draft), the IBCT's primary source of intelligence is its organic RSTA squadron. The fundamental role of the RSTA squadron is to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment. It gains situational awareness of the AO in order to provide thorough analysis and intelligence, or SU to the IBCT. The IBCT then gains the situational dominance that facilitates the brigade's decisive operations.²¹

The RSTA Squadron is the "eyes and ears" of the IBCT, the primary intelligence collection and information source required by the commander and staff to plan, direct, assess IBCT operations. It has the following core qualities:

- 1) Perform multi-dimensional reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition in an area of operations as its primary mission.
- 2) Provide all weather, around the clock, accurate and timely reconnaissance and surveillance in complex, close, and urban terrain.
- 3) Rapidly develop the situation over a greater depth of operations by reconnoitering up to nine routes simultaneously or conducting surveillance of up to 18 designated areas simultaneously or any combination thereof.
- 4) Develop a "grass roots" neighborhood level situational understanding of all aspects of the human environment within the AO.

Its other key functions are reconnaissance operations, limited security operations, counter reconnaissance operations, and maintaining contact with a retreating enemy. The method in which the RSTA conducts its missions requires it to operate stealthily, fight for information, and conduct HUMINT operations. In addition, it builds knowledge, provides warning, conducts combat assessments, preserves freedom of maneuver, and shapes the battlefield. In order to provide these capabilities in one organization, a unique force structure was formed.

Resources

The RSTA squadron is designed to serve as the IBCT Commander's primary eyes, ears, and sensors, as well as the IBCT's first line military assessment for information gathered through R & S. As such, it is designed to efficiently direct and execute information collection. The squadron is composed of five troops: headquarters and headquarters troop, three reconnaissance troops, and a surveillance and target acquisition troop.




Figure 4: RSTA Squadron

The RSTA squadron delivers situation understanding through its recon troops and surveillance troop. The recon troops provide combat information for the commander while the surveillance troop employs intelligence collection assets to gather information stealthily. There are three Recce platoons in the troop, each contain four, five-man squads per platoon. Each squad consists of four scouts and one CI/HUMINT soldier.




Figure 5: Recce Platoon

The surveillance troop, commanded by an intelligence officer, has a wide array of reconnaissance assets that enhance its intelligence gathering capability. Among these capabilities are imagery intelligence (IMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) assets. The assets are the Tactical Unmanned Airborne Vehicle (TUAV), Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS), Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR), the Prophet system, and Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance. (See Appendix B – Equipment).




Figure 6: ISR Platforms

Although not organic to the RSTA Squadron, the IBCT’s Military Intelligence Company provides analysis and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) integration functions to support the development of the IBCT common operational picture (COP), targeting/effects, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The RSTA squadron also employs organic, HUMINT soldiers to exploit the human dimension of the tactical environment.

Military Intelligence Company




Figure 7: The Military Intelligence Company

The MI Company essentially operates as an extension of the brigade S2 staff for the management of ISR collection assets. The company has the organic

systems necessary to interface with ISR systems resident at the division, ARFOR, joint, theater, and national levels and supports the tactical HUMINT activities required in the SSC environment. At the same time, the robust capability to reach back to external assets supplements the RSTA's ability to maintain situational understanding, particularly during deployment. Overall, the RSTA squadron can simultaneously reconnoiter nine routes or conduct surveillance of 18 designated areas on a continuous 24-hour cycle.

Battlespace

The brigade's operational concept is centered upon the ability to maintain SU throughout its doctrinal 50 x 50 kilometer area of operations. The ability to keep a clear COP throughout the force enables the brigade to develop the tactical situation while out of contact with the enemy. According to the O & O, the RSTA is likely to operate in complex terrain. For purposes of this study, the RSTA will operate in three environments (jungle, mountainous and urban). Each environment has special Intelligence Electronic Warfare (IEW) considerations per FM 34 – 4, Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations. The RSTA will also be able to collect, and analyze against low to high level threats and operate in minor to major military conflicts. Although a tactical level organization, it must also understand the political and diplomatic environment to provide SU.

Time

Time is a significant planning factor driving decision-making. How much time is available and how long events are predicted to take will impact every aspect of military planning: force package development, force flow rate, quality of intelligence preparation of the area of operations, need for forward-deployed

forces and logistics, etc. (Like the Brigade, the RSTA has 96 hours from first wheels up to deploy and begin immediate intelligence operations).²²

C2 Considerations

An operational level planner considering the use of the RSTA in a complex environment must also consider the command structure. The O & O concepts says the IBCT/RSTA will operate under a higher headquarters, in a joint or multinational command structure. The IBCT must be able to collect, analyze, act upon and disseminate information from organic and non-organic ISR assets. In addition, to facilitate the precise application of combat power, complete situational awareness data must be disseminated to all IBCT units as well as higher and adjacent units. As stated in Chapter one, the IBCT can fight under a Division, Corps, ARFOR, JFLCC, or JTF. The RSTA must also understand its relationship in the intelligence architecture of the IBCT command structure.²³



Figure 8: System Architecture

ISR Integration and Coordination Between the IBCT, and the Division, ARFOR (Designated Division or Corps), and JTF

The concept for ISR integration and coordination between the IBCT, and the Division, ARFOR (Designated Division or Corps), and JTF are virtually the same. The division develops and provides tailored intelligence products for the IBCT. These products are derived from an analysis of information on the enemy's capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, and the environment. This includes satisfying tactical intelligence requirements, planning collection activities, collecting relevant information, and processing information to include developing targeting information and the preparation and disseminating intelligence. Additional division functions include situational development, indications and warning, requirements management and mission management, support to IPB, and access to Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP).

Integration Between the JFLCC and the IBCT

The ISR integration between the Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and the IBCT is conceptually identical to the relationship between an ARFOR and the IBCT. Under an organization where a Marine Corps HQ is designated as the JFLCC, integration of the ISR capabilities is key to successful interface between higher and subordinate headquarters.

Integration at the Multinational and Interagency Level

Multinational and Interagency forces have varying ISR integration requirements that can present unique challenges to the Combined Joint Force Commander. Such thing as language, terminology, doctrine, communications,

systems interoperability, and operating standards can hamper unity of effort synchronization across the operational spectrum.

Deployable Support Elements

The Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE), the Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE), and the Corps MI Support Element (CMISE) serve as flexible intelligence teams which bridge between different intelligence producers and consumers. While a quickly deployable element, in concept, it arrives in a theater of operations after the IBCT.

Reachback considerations

The squadron must excel in both the traditional role of reconnaissance and surveillance of enemy forces and in the broader mission of providing SU of the operational environment in all its dimensions—political, cultural, economic, demographic, as well as military factors. The squadron's efforts are complemented by direct access to intelligence and information sources external to the IBCT and focused by the ISR integration and management elements at brigade level.

Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC)

The JICPAC provides all-source intelligence to USCINCPACOM, his staff, component commanders, operators and their subordinate units. The National Military Strategy describes the JIC as "the principal element for ensuring effective intelligence support for combatant commanders in chiefs and theater forces."²⁴

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies is an academic research, conference, and study center which builds on the strong bilateral relationships

between U.S. Pacific Command and the various armed forces of the Asia-Pacific region. The Center focuses on the multilateral approach to addressing regional security issues and concerns. The Center's mission is to foster understanding, cooperation in, and study of security-related issues among military and civilian representatives of the U.S. and Asia-Pacific nations. The Center provides a focal point where national officials, decision makers, and policy makers can gather to exchange ideas, explore pressing issues, and achieve a greater understanding of the challenges that shape the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.

I Corps Sanctuary “Reach Operations”

The forward-deployed commander in a SSC requires immediate access to accurate, relevant and concise information. Internet search engines, web browsers, and repetitive RFIs are insufficient. A dedicated intelligence organization, aware of the commander's intent and anticipating his requirements, works on his behalf and provides him a window to the intelligence community.

At the time of this writing the reachback sanctuary is conceptually located at Ft. Lewis, Washington as a 46,000 square foot Special Compartment Information Facility (SCIF). It is the IBCT commander's reach portal to theater and national agencies such as the Central Intelligence agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the State Department.

Chapter Conclusion

IBCT training vignettes and scenarios to date have been limited. Thus far, the IBCT has trained under a “balkanized” environment, fictitious threat, and a generic C2 and intelligence architecture. In general, the scenarios are deconstructive in nature and deal with one issue or problem at a time.

The intelligence architecture in unilateral service environments is difficult. In a joint environment it is even more laborious, and in a combined environment, more severe. However, what is potentially more difficult is replicating a phased or intelligence-on-the-move architecture in a contingency environment where the RSTA must rely on “reachback” capabilities to fill intelligence gaps.

The scenario presented in this study stretches RSTA squadron capabilities by juxtaposing its O & O concept in a complex Thailand – Burma scenario. The intent is to place the RSTA squadron in a plausible complex, albeit unlikely, scenario and identify its limitations and determine the intelligence gaps.

CHAPTER THREE:

ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

Prior to analysis and evaluation of the RSTA O & O, a concise understanding of the operational environment is needed to provide the context for this problem set. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and the effects of the environment on the unit. This process is essential to decision making and provides the basis for intelligence collection and synchronization. It consists of four steps: defining the battlefield environment, describing the battlefield effects, evaluating the threat, and determining threat courses of action.



Figure 9: The Golden Triangle

Define the Battlefield Environment

Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country never colonized and is one of the most progressive states in the region. It has a large market oriented economy and a pro-Western political ethos. Thailand is a constitutional

monarchy; governed by an elected political system, greatly influenced by its military in both politics and economics, and galvanized by King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

Thailand is a largely mountainous nation about the size of France. It is dominated by its capital, Bangkok – the only major population center in Thailand.²⁵ Its strategic location and economic foothold in South east Asia (SEA) has given it the attention and support of a variety of countries, including a treaty alliance with the US.²⁶

A large plain dominates the center of Thailand, surrounded by mountains in the west and hills in the east. Northern Thailand, the area of operations and the area this study will concentrate on, is a fertile mountainous region watered by the Ping, Wang, Yom, and Nan rivers. The Tannen mountain range, located on the Thai-Burma border in northwest Thailand, commands the area with high summits such as the Doi Inthanon Mountain at 2,565 meters (8,514 ft). This area has become home to several thousands of Burma Kmong and Karen tribes.²⁷

The majority of the population lives in the central and northeastern regions of the country among the rice fields on the plain, the rustic villages in the northern highlands, and in its two major population centers, Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai.²⁸

Thai is the official national language, but Chinese is frequently spoken as a second language. In many northeastern areas Laotian is also commonly spoken. English is widely understood in many urban areas but far less so in rural provinces. Malay is also spoken in some areas. Thailand is predominantly Thetayama Buddhist.

There are three seasons in Thailand: The hot, dry season runs from March to mid-May, with temperatures as high as 104° degrees; the wet monsoon season from June until October, with temperatures averaging 75-90° degrees; and the cool clear season from November to March, with temperatures sometimes dipping down to 50° degrees in the early morning.

The infrastructure is sufficient for military RSOI operations with three international airports (Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Hat Yai), numerous shipping ports, and an efficient railway. However, there are limited roads in Thailand, and many remain usable only in the dry season.

For purposes of the scenario external threats to Thailand include China, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. China's growing military might and predicted super-power status coupled with sovereignty issues (South China Sea) and the fear of Chinese expansionism is causing Thailand to re-assess its geopolitical relationship with Beijing. Thailand's internal threat is posed by ethnic insurgents in Burma and the threat of spillover combat. Burma's armed forces are the largest of any of Thailand's neighbors.²⁹

Burma is the largest country on mainland SEA and has boundaries with Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and Thailand. (It is a strategic buffer between India and China). Burma is run by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), a repressive military junta.³⁰ The SPDC has survived as a result of its large and well-trained army, imprisonment of political opponents, and the fact that it has maintained the most repressive regime in SEA.³¹ In addition, Burma's internal environment includes narcotics, AIDS, refugees, insurgency, and

environmental issues.³² The population is seventy percent Burmese, but there are sizable Karen and Shan minorities. In more than 50 years of civil war, government forces have fought armed factions of all the minority groups. The opium trade and its profits are factors in the country's turmoil.³³

Describe the Battlefield Effects

Climate, vegetation, and rugged terrain are the primary considerations of operations in northern Thailand. These factors constrain intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations and sustainment capabilities. Due to restrictions on ground mobility, intelligence systems such as GSR and REMBASS will have to dismount.³⁴ Jungle terrain and dense vegetation will degrade the TUAV and other IMINT systems. Cloud cover and precipitation will conceal targets. Some radar systems may be unable to penetrate the jungle depending on the density of vegetation and type of system used. Although the infrared TUAV is capable of camouflage penetration, it is not as effective in bad weather. Jungle operations require increased daily operator maintenance of equipment due to a high incidence of rust, corrosion and fungus caused by high jungle moisture.

Mountain operations reduce ranges for line of sight collectors such as PROPHET, canalize vehicle mobility along valley floors, and increase the need to conduct collection operations from dominating heights. Mountainous areas would be considered severely restricted terrain if intelligence systems are mounted. Therefore, the use of dismounted or portable IEW systems is needed to exploit the advantages of higher terrain. The irregular terrain patterns in this AOR create dead space, which reduces the effectiveness of EW and degrades C2.

The mountain ranges in Thailand are oriented north to south with major roads running between them. In addition, increased altitudes in mountain combat will affect soldier's mental alertness as well as cause dehydration and sickness.

Military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) is very complex. The effects on the population and warfighting systems can be traumatic. MOUT is characterized by shorter engagement ranges, structural obstructions to visual and electronic line of sight and the addition of a new vertical dimension provided by subterranean structures such as sewers and buildings. The urban environment restricts the effectiveness of AM and FM communications. Direction finding (DF) operations, particularly those by PROPHET, are impeded because signals reflect off structures.³⁵ Placement of PROPHET will have to be on high ground or configured on a tall structure or building, but it cannot be near metal objects. Urban operations also increase the requirement for linguists in non-English speaking countries due to the increased interaction with the indigenous population. The urban areas (see Appendix C – Urban Maps) in this AOR include:

- Chiang Mai, the third largest city in Thailand with a population of 150,000, twelve hours from Bangkok by vehicle or train. The Ping River divides the city into east and west halves. The eight bridges connecting the two halves are key terrain. Burmese insurgents have moved into the border areas west of Chiang Mai. In response, Burmese light infantry forces operating in platoon, company and battalion strength infiltrated Chiang Mai to conduct raids and “mopping up” operations against insurgents. The Thai 41st Air Wing is based near Chiang Mai.
- Chiang Rai, four hours driving distance north of Chiang Mai, is the most northern urban area in Thailand. Burma borders on the north and Laos on

the north and northeast. Burmese insurgents have moved into areas north of Chiang Rai. Burma light infantry forces operating in platoon, company and battalion strength infiltrated Chiang Rai to conduct raids and “mopping up” operations against insurgents. In addition, Laotian forces armed by China, and reportedly with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) advisors, are believed to have moved into Thailand east and south of Chiang Rai.

- Lampang, an hour and a half southeast of Chiang Mai is the second largest town in the north and an important historical site, which houses a significant number of Buddhist temples. It is also where the UNHCR has set up a temporary office. The Thai Seventh Army sub region command is based in Lampang.
- Uttaridit, a small urban area is located 120 kilometers north of Phitsanulok
- Phitsanulok is situated on the geographic and administrative borderline uniting the central and northern regions of Thailand. Third army region and the 46th Air Wing are based in Phitsanulok.
- Phayao situated one and a half-hours north east of Chiang Mai. It is an ancient town situated on the banks of a lake.

The effect of weather on IEW operations in the hot season is based on the extreme heat and humidity that can not only erode systems, but also degrade performance of the intelligence operators. In addition, in this environment, during the hot season, water sources may be identified as key terrain. During the rainy season, vehicle movement will be restricted to the limited hardball roads.

Key terrain are those villages which provide east west mobility (Mae Chan, Mae Suaj, Mae Taeng), the high ground surrounding Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai (Doi National parks,) and Burma border crossing points (Tachilek/Mae Sai, Tha Ton, Arunothal/Nong Ouk, Mae Aw).

Evaluate the Threat

Burma Military

Burma's military, particularly its Army, is the fastest growing military in the region.³⁶ Both its Navy and Air Force have upgraded and modernized its equipment. The army dominates Burma's large 425,000-strong military. The Burma army retains few traces of British colonial doctrine, relying instead on the local development of military practices learned from the Japanese during their occupation of Burma in 1942-1945. This includes strict discipline, direct assaults and a disregard for casualties.

The Burma Army is well-trained in counter-insurgency but has very limited experience in performing conventional military operations. If called, the army would fight hard and well to defend the country, but would be unable to cope with a well-prepared enemy armed with modern weapon systems. Most of its weapons systems are procured from China. Strategy is based on the preservation of unity, protection of sovereignty, and the defense of Burma against external threat.

While the Burma air force has acquired more modern systems, it still has a reputation for timidity in battle due to inexperienced pilots. The AF is roughly organized along British lines. The Burma Navy has significantly upgraded and its scope of operations has expanded to include its new Chinese patrol boats reportedly carry anti-ship missiles in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The Navy does have a riverine capability.

A paramilitary police force of some 50,000 and a militia of about 35,000 supplement the military. Doctrine has long been dominated by internal security

requirements – the need to quell civilian dissent in population centers and to conduct counter-insurgency operations against ideological, ethnic and economic insurgents in rural districts. However, in recent years, greater emphasis has been given to more conventional defense roles.

Burma Insurgents

The armed organizations struggling against the Burma government, and conducting cross border operations are:

- Mong Tai Army (MTA): consists of about 10,000 men based along the Thai border (between Lashio and the Chinese border). Insurgents in the Shan State have moved into the border areas north of Chiang Rai and west of Chiang Mai.
- Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA): 4,000 men on the Thai border in Karen State.
- Karenni Army (KA): 1,000 men strong, based along the Thai border in the Kayah State.
- Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA): 1,000 based on the Thai border in Mon State.

Laotian Forces

Laotian forces armed by China, and reportedly with People's Liberation Army (PLA) advisors, are believed to have moved into Thailand east and south of Chiang Rai.

Chinese Forces

There are no reports of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers in the Burma-Thailand border area. However, there are reports that Chinese pilots are flying Burma combat aircraft on operational reconnaissance and re-supply missions over Thailand.

Civilians on the Battlefield

There are numerous displaced persons (DP), and refugees in the AO, causing over one hundred outside relief organizations to deploy to the area. There are “thousands and thousands” of Thai and Burma refugees and displaced citizens on the roads and in make shift camps south of Chiang Rai, south of Mae Song Sori and along the roads north and south of Chiang Mai. There are internally displaced citizens in the Burma Kayah and Kayin States, which are fighting in Thailand west of Tak.

Representatives of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), and of more that 100 non-governmental organizations have been working in the area since January 2004.

Another significant threat is the presence of organized crime and drug trafficking syndicates. Thailand has a long history of involvement with the heroin and opium drug trade. Thailand functions as a major transshipment point for drugs originating in Burma and Laos.³⁷

Determine Threat Courses of Action (COAs)

Understanding threat courses of action requires a certain level of predictive analysis – using FM 3-0’s elements of operational design as a way to frame intelligence requirements is useful.

Burma Centers of Gravity (COG)

- Strategic: Alliance with China
- Operational: Military leadership (SPDC)
- Tactical: Army forces

Burma Decisive Points

- Establish a “semi-permanent” Burma military presence in northern Thailand in order to sue for negotiations
- Show Thai weakness (lack of government resolve to hold and defend its own country)
- Embarrass the Thai government by showing the failure to move against the drug infrastructure and anti-Burma insurgents in the “Golden triangle” (by using captured Thai general officers, implicated in the drug trade, in a psychological campaign)

Burma Critical Vulnerabilities

- Heavy reliance on foreign logistics and foreign suppliers
- Lack of transparency
- Pariah status
- No blueprint for future

Burma Critical Capabilities

- The large Burma army

Burma Aim

- The aim of the Burma actions is a change in the Thailand government

Burma COA

Burma forces will continue small-scale offensive operations near Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai while conducting counter-guerrilla operations in northern Thailand against Burmese rebels.

Thailand Center of Gravity

- Strategic: Alliance with the US
- Operational: Military leadership (3 service chiefs and CSA)
- Tactical: Air Force

Thailand Decisive Points

- Use of coalition intelligence assets to target Burmese-Laos forces
- Insistence on US involvement in combat operations

Thailand Critical Vulnerabilities

- Downsized military

Thailand Critical Capabilities

- The upgraded Air Force

Thailand Aim

Maintenance of domestic stability, developing and supporting its ever-expanding economy and vigilance and flexibility in the international political and economic environments

Thailand COA

- Recapture lost territory and secure its border.

CHAPTER FOUR:

ANALYSIS

Thus far, this study has examined the IBCT, RSTA, and complex environmental frameworks. This chapter synthesizes those frameworks within time, space, purpose, and resources parameters to calculate the capabilities and limitations of the supporting intelligence architecture in a SSC Burma-Thailand scenario.

The Setting

In an attempt to cause a change in Thai policy supporting Burmese insurgents, Burmese forces are conducting raids against Thai cities and military headquarters and “mopping up” Burmese insurgents in Thailand and along the Burma border. The Burmese are occupying major portions of the city of Chiang Rai, and are threatening Chiang Mai. Laotian forces armed by China, and reportedly with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) advisors, are believed to have moved into Thailand east and south of Chiang Rai. Thai units are holding (not in contact) in defensive positions 50 km south of Chiang Rai and are fighting in the southern outskirts of Chiang Mai. Thai and US special operations forces are conducting intelligence collection and “liaison” operations with several of the Burmese insurgent groups along the Thai-Burma border. In addition, the numerous NGOs are operating overtly and covertly throughout the area in an attempt to relieve the suffering caused by the displacement of thousands of Burmese and Thai refugees. While there has been no overt action by the drug

cartels in the area, they continue to assist both Burmese insurgents and government forces with logistics.

This chapter examines what the commander must do (purpose), what he has to do it with (resources), and if he has it all at the right place and time. By making some broad generalizations in terms of the space, time, resources, and purpose, this paper takes a snap-shot-in-time analysis to determine the commander's needs.

Purpose

In order to further develop the situation, assumptions on why the NCA sent US forces, and particularly the IBCT, to Thailand must be made. According to the National Security Strategy of 2000, one of our goals in the SEA region is to strengthen our security alliance with Thailand. Honoring a bilateral security agreement between Thailand and the US, and quickly showing resolve in this tenuous situation, helps strengthen that security relationship. Conversely, our policy toward the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is both principled and pragmatic – to expand our areas of cooperation while dealing forthrightly with our (US-China) differences. A quick but substantial deployment of forces sends a firm message to the PRC of US resolve in the region. What is not said by the NCA, but implied, are three other concerns. Thailand's military needs to be pushed to resolve its problems of corruption, politicization and professionalism, and training. Burma's poor human rights record needs to be highlighted on the world stage in order to perhaps prompt a favorable change. The NCA's intent is to send a message to China, encourage Thailand, and punish Burma.

Highlighting the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) for this situation requires first determining the purpose or mission for component commanders.

USPACOM Purpose: Establish Joint Task Forces to the region to “support Thai sovereignty and conduct humanitarian assistance operations.”

USPACOM PIR:

- What are Thailand's capabilities and limitations in regards to countering Burmese military incursions, intelligence operations, and humanitarian assistance operations?
- What is China's intent?

CJTF Stilwell Purpose: Stop the Burmese-Laotian offensive, restore the borders, and ameliorate human suffering (DPs)

CJTF PIRs

- What is the size, location, and intent of Burmese & Laotians forces?
- What is the food shelter, medical, and transport capacity to support DPs?
- What are the security risks to this operation?

31ST MEU Purpose: the 31st MEU has been ordered to Phitsanulok to assist Thai forces in the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the 25th IBCT and the two follow-on brigades of the 25th Division.

MEU PIRs

- What are the military staging, storage, and POL facilities in Phitsanulok?
- What is the number of NGOs/IOs in the area?

ARFOR Purpose: The 25th ID has been ordered to conduct an immediate deployment to central Thailand to show resolve and to prepare for potential combat operations

ARFOR PIRs

- What is the threat perception of US 'show resolve' actions?
- What is the number of violent acts against coalition forces or IO/NGOs from DPs?

IBCT Purpose: The 25th IBCT deploys to central Thailand in order to show resolve, and support the Thai effort in combat and relief operations. Be prepared

to conduct combat operations in order to stop the Burmese – Laos offensive. Be prepared to restore borders and assist in recapture of Thai urban areas.

IBCT PIRs

- What is the composition and disposition of Burmese-Laotian forces in Chiang Rai/Chiang Mia?
- What is the threat perception of US 'show resolve' actions?
- What are the capabilities of Thai combat intelligence operations?
- Who are the key leaders and community elders amongst the DPs?
- What is the security posture of the DPs (Infiltrators? Weapons?)
- What is the threat logistics infrastructure in Thailand?

Based on the purpose (mission), which intelligence disciplines are needed? HUMINT is the best collection source to determine how a target audience perceives friendly operations, identify threat infrastructure (logistic support), observe, elicit and exploit material and documents to gain information of drug traffickers. Counterintelligence (CI), a sub-discipline of HUMINT, helps assess our vulnerabilities, conduct joint liaison, as well as host nation intelligence and security liaison. IMINT can provide disposition and composition of target forces as well as the status of key terrain (bridges) and border areas. SIGINT helps gain insight into target nations immediate reactions to friendly activities.

Based on chapter two, RSTA O & O analysis, the IBCT commander has the organic capability of all of the intelligence disciplines at his disposal. However, quick analysis of this SSC shows he may not have sufficient HUMINT assets that the environment requires, nor the IMINT and SIGINT capabilities based on the weather and terrain in this scenario. The question is, does he have the right assets at the right time.

Space

For purposes of this study, the IBCT/RSTA space is confined to the Chiang Rai/Chiang Mai region.

Time

According to Joint Publication 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, there are eight phases of a campaign: mobilization, predeployment, deployment, entry, operations, conflict termination, redeployment and demobilization. For purposes of this study, analysis of the IBCT is confined to the operations phase.

The ultimate objective of deployment operations is the arrival of the right force at the right place and at the right time. The following timelines are used as planning factors for this scenario.

D + 10 = 25th IBCT closes at Lampang
D + 15 = CJTF Advanced HQ closes in Bangkok
D + 20 = ARFOR closes on Phitsanolk
D + 25 = combat
D + 30 = Negotiation
D + 60 = Redeploy³⁸

Understanding where units are on what day of a deployment, and their capabilities at that time can be difficult, particularly in a CJTF deployment. Focusing on only a few days and a few units helps visualize a time and space relationship of assets.

D-Day:

- The IBCT, located at Fort Lewis, begins deployment to Bangkok. (To close no later than D + 4).
- The Amphibious Read Group (ARG) Tarawa, with the 31st MEU, arrives in Bangkok.

- The ARFOR, a HQ element from the 25th ID that had been conducting a reconnaissance for the upcoming COBRA GOLD exercise, redeploys from Chanthaburi to Phitsanulok.
- CJTF Stilwell (I Corps), in Ft. Lewis, begins deployment of advanced elements and provides “reachback” support to the IBCT.
- IBCT Intelligence Picture: Until this point, the IBCT S2, MI company, and RSTA squadron relied on the JICPAC and I Corps for intelligence assessments of the AO. The JICPAC and I Corps will provide some resolution on PIR one – “What is the composition and disposition of Burmese-Laotian forces in Chiang Rai/Chiang Mai”. The RSTA squadron will continue to refine this PIR once it is in the AOR. In addition, based on the O & O concept, the package flow, as well as the movement to its forward operating base will require the RSTA to “fight for information” and therefore, it will precede the IBCT in movement.

D + 2

The ARG closes at Bangkok and immediately begins air mobile operations to take a Battalion minus of the 31st MEU to Phitsanulok to link up with the Thais and run the Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) operations for the IBCT and the 25th ID.

D+4

- The RSTA closes at Bangkok and prepares movement forward to Phitsanulok for RSOI.
- The ARFOR prepares two brigades from the 25th ID, located in Hawaii, for overseas movement.
- ARFOR deploys its DISE
- CJTF Stilwell deploys its JISE
- The Roosevelt Carrier Battle Group has arrived in the Andaman Sea.
- IBCT Intelligence Picture: The IBCT commander will want to immediately understand the current situation in the AOR, therefore it is very important for the Brigade to plug into the intelligence architecture on the ground. Reliance on host nation intelligence will be strong. This will require liaison with the US embassy, Thailand military intelligence, communications with the 25th HQ

element in Phitsanulok, and if possible the US SOF units in northern Thailand. In addition, connection with the MEU intelligence elements will be important for area knowledge in Phitsanulok.

D+6

- RSTA closed on Phitsanulok and conducts RSOI. This will require liaison with the MEU, and the Thai military.

D + 7

- IBCT closes on Phitsanulok
- CJTF begins deployment from Ft. Lewis to Bangkok.
- Intelligence Picture: RSTA and several Recce troops have pushed in advance to Phitsanulok. Integration with the MEU intelligence units and other coalition partners needs to occur. The DISE will not be on the ground, in turn, there is no intelligence communication with the ARFOR at this time. Heavy reliance on the host nation may require additional CI and linguists. At this point the resolution on the following PIR starts to develop: what are the capabilities of Thai combat intelligence operations?

D+9

- RSTA closes on Lampang
- IBCT Intelligence Picture: the move from Phitsanulok to Lampang is an important shift for the IBCT commander. At this point, he is leading the US effort in country and therefore a great demand will be placed on the IBCT to provide information and intelligence to the CJTF, ARFOR, and even national level consumers. Liaison with UNHCR and the NGOs/IOs for resolution on the following PIRs: Who are the key DP leaders, and what is the security posture of the DPs? Language specialists will be required at this point. Liaison and integration with the Thai military assets to integrate into their collection plan and fill their intelligence gaps is needed.

D+10

- IBCT closes on Lampang and sets up its headquarters.
- IBCT Intelligence Picture: liaison with local infrastructure, such as the Mayor provides insight on Thai public perception and sentiment towards US resolve.

D+12

- IBCT minus closes on its forward operating base at Phayao. Phayao's close proximity to both Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai enables the IBCT to provide supporting combat intelligence to the Thai effort, as well as be prepared for

possible combat operations. Liaison with US and Thai SOF teams will provide information on the Burmese insurgency.

D + 15

- CJTF HQ closes in Bangkok
- ARFOR 25th ID deploys

D+25

- Expectation of Thai-Burmese Combat
- IBCT Intelligence Picture. The RSTA squadron has had approximately 15 days to develop the intelligence picture for Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai. From Phitsanolk north, it has in large part had to rely on itself, the Thai intelligence architecture and the I Corps Sanctuary at Ft. Lewis for operational and strategic level intelligence. The ARFOR and CJTF have also been in various stages of deployment.

D + 35

- 25th closes at Phitsanolk

Conclusion

This chapter places a unit – one that is resourced and with a clear purpose, into a worst case scenario – one with competing humanitarian and possible combat operations, overshadowed by an uncertain threat. While the planning variables could be numerous in this situation, a general calculation of time and space were cognitively rehearsed for the RSTA Squadron. The snapshot-in-time analysis highlights the commander's possible intelligence needs, and planning considerations.

Resulting planning consideration

Employment of Additional HUMINT Assets – Recording how friendly operations are perceived by target audiences and eliciting information on targets such as drug traffickers, displaced persons, and insurgencies, requires intense HUMINT collection operations. In addition, vulnerability assessments of urban

areas in northern Thailand such as Phayao, and countering foreign intelligence services (particularly the Chinese) will require intense CI operations.

Employment of Dedicated Liaison Officers – The quick responsive nature of the IBCT means they will oft times deploy to an immature theater, where there is limited SU. The IBCT commander will want to gain immediate understanding on the day of arrival and requires intelligence LNOs and linguists. For example, based on this chapter's analysis there is an immediate need for a minimum of six intelligence LNOs (MEU, HQ ARFOR, US Embassy, Thai military intelligence, SOF, and NGOs and IOs) on the first day of arrival. The need for more LNOs increases as the number of intelligence entities increase in the AO (coalition, national level agencies such as the CIA, and local Thai security organizations, to name a few). The further into the interior of the country, and in particular in the north where Chinese, Laotian and local Thai dialects are spoken, the greater need for more linguists.

Great (multi-echelon) Demand Placed on the IBCT for Intelligence – During predeployment and deployment, the IBCT is reliant on receiving intelligence from higher HQ. However, there will come a time when a shift will occur, and higher HQ will be reliant on the IBCT for intelligence. Based on this scenario, that shift will most likely occur at D + 9 when the IBCT is north of Lampang and is the lead US force on the ground.

“Black-Out” Intelligence Coverage – Degradation of intelligence coverage occurs when intelligence assets are ‘on-the-move’, or weather coverage is poor. However, when numerous intelligence levels are on the move at the same time,

(in a weather and terrain restrictive environment) it may degrade collection efforts. For example, on D + 7, the RSTA and IBCT are moving out of Phitsanulok, the CJTF is deploying from Fort Lewis, and the ARFOR DISE is in mid deployment and not yet on the ground.

CHAPTER FIVE:

CONCLUSION

The objective of this study is to identify factors that operational level planners should consider in the intelligence architecture support to the IBCT in a complex Smaller-Scale Contingency scenario. The previous chapters reviewed influences on the development of the IBCT and RSTA Squadron and examined their specific character. The character of the IBCT and its supporting units as a rapid and strategically responsive force, able to deploy anywhere in the world. The RSTA Squadron's operational character also requires it to provide the preponderance of SU for the force.

A unique PACOM environment riddled with strategic and tactical challenges was also examined. The operational-level planner key considerations for the employment of the RSTA in a SSC are:

- *Employment of additional HUMINT assets*
- *Employment of dedicated liaison officers*
- *Great (political) demand placed on the IBCT for intelligence*
- *"Black-Out" Intelligence Coverage*

The considerations listed above provide a starting point for intelligence planning considerations of a specific crisis. Many of the considerations mentioned above are not unique to an operational level planner. The difference between these issues and those associated with other organizations is generally one of degree.

This ground force enables US political leadership to provide effective forward ground presence in politically important scenarios. However, the concept for ground component intelligence assets in this scenario requires 1) more HUMINT capability in order to provide increased SU 2) more liaison capability in order to connect effectively with allied, interagency, and sister service intelligence organizations to provide the commander with the benefit of synthesized intelligence, and 3) more language capability as the vehicle to increased SU.

It will take years for the defense community to develop a solid understanding of all planning considerations and options for the IBCT and RSTA. Until then, this study recommends additional research on time and resource dimensions of the operational framework of the RSTA in SSC.

Much of this monograph has been to one degree or another speculative. Some matters can be resolved on the basis of logic, experience or more formal analysis, but there is a pressing need for a stronger empirical base on which to make judgments about the operational concepts and forces that were discussed. Vigorous efforts to establish a more reliable empirical base should include more stressful intelligence field experiments to characterize inserting, extracting, and supporting the IBCT in SSC operations. For example, two distinct operations (humanitarian and combat) may cause us to re-look augmentation, which could fundamentally reshape the rapid strategic responsive operational character of the IBCT. In addition, the augmentation of linguists, many of whom belong to reserve and national guard units, will require research on whether they can meet reserve call-up timelines in order to compete with the IBCT schedule.

The IBCT and RSTA remain units in evolution. Identifying issues early in their development affords the opportunity for adjustment and ultimately the opportunity to provide soldiers and Americans in general, the best.

APPENDIX A:

THAILAND-BURMA (MYANMAR) BORDER CLASH OF 2004³⁹

Asian Situation (Northeast Asia):

Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States have deteriorated significantly over the last four years. The sale of advanced military equipment to Taiwan in 2001, the continued US focus on human rights and opposition to China's bid for the 2008 Olympics, and the US refusal to find a diplomatic solution to the National Missile Defense issue have all contributed to this current state of affairs. The upcoming Taiwan presidential elections and the growing movement on Taiwan for independence are worrying China. The PRC has stated that a "vote for independence is a vote for war." A significant majority of the American Congress is calling for a full military alliance with Taiwan. The military alliance between Japan and the US, has moved from "cornerstone" and "linchpin" of American security in the Pacific to a new level of cooperation after the draw down of US ground forces from Korea. America's refusal to support South Korea's bid to improve relations with the North and growing popular resentment of the US military presence caused the Kim government to act. The ROK officially moved ahead with a unilateral plan and demanded the reduction of US military forces over a five-year period, 2003-2008. In reaction, Japan has voted to increase its defense budget, force structure, and joint exercise program. In a reversal of previous trends, the newly elected, and popular, conservative Japanese government has offered greater basing access to the United States with the upgrading of facilities in Okinawa and the building of new bases and training areas on the northern island of Hokkaido.

Asian Situation (Southeast Asia)

Relations between Indonesia and the United States have also deteriorated significantly after the military coup in Jakarta in 2002. Indonesia's move to "retake the homeland" in 2003 resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Indonesian minority populations and innocent civilians. The refusal of the UN (China's veto) to intervene has split Asia. Traditional American allies, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines sided with the US position that a humanitarian intervention was necessary. Indonesia, buoyed by Chinese support in the UN, has turned its military loose to stabilize the country—and the US and its regional friends and allies stood by and watched. Indonesia promised to "commit its full military power" against any Asian state that interferes in its internal affairs. UN, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and Australian forces have been ordered out of East Timor. Papua New Guinea has been warned about support to insurgents in Irian Jaya. Malaysia has been ordered to stop supporting and harboring rebels in northern Borneo. Singapore has been criticized and singled out for its support to ethnic Chinese in the country. Christian faith-based Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the Moluccas have been arrested and deported.

Asian Situation (South Asia)

Relations between India and Pakistan remain tense due to the continuing problem in Kashmir. The US has attempted to play a positive role in reducing regional tensions. However, Pakistan claims that there is a growing relationship between India and the United States and has turned to Iran and China for military aid and economic assistance. The relationship between India and the US is improving, but remains cool and cautious. However, China's moves into Burma and Laos are of great concern to both India and the United States.

Thai-Burma-Bangladesh Situation

In January 2004, the repressive, and newly named, State Law and Order Entente (SLOE) brutally suppressed a student-led democratic movement that sought to end the dictatorship in Burma. In February, China supported the SLOE as it dealt with a coup attempt by a group of younger officers who tried to install the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ang Sang Suu Kyi as the legitimate head of state. India and the United States are currently assisting Bangladesh with the influx of Burmese refugees into the areas of Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar.

Burmese troops, loyal to the old order are currently taking revenge against insurgent groups along the Thai border that supported the coup and the anti-SLOE movement. There are internally displaced citizens in Kayah and Kayin States and fighting in Thailand west of Tak. Burma claims that Thailand has provided arms and equipment to the insurgents and has ordered battalion-sized elements to conduct operations into Thailand to response to "Thai aggression." Burmese insurgents in the Shan State have moved into the border areas north of Chiang Rai and west of Chiang Mai. The Thai government requested a UN force to intervene to assist in the growing humanitarian tragedy and to blunt the Burmese invasion of North Thailand. This debate ended with a Chinese veto in the Security Council of a proposed mandate for an observer mission and stepped up humanitarian assistance. Burmese forces are occupying major portions of the city of Chiang Rai and are threatening Chiang Mai. Laotian forces armed by China, and reportedly with People's Liberation Army (PLA) advisors, are believed to have moved into Thailand east and south of Chiang Rai. China categorically denies that any of its forces are in Thailand, but does admit that its military-to-military ties with Laos are "improving." Thai forces and Burmese insurgents report that SLOE forces are being equipped and supplied with new Chinese weapons, helicopters, and ground transport vehicles. Additionally, China has recently provided combat aircraft and transports to Burma. There are reports that these planes are being flown on operational reconnaissance and re-supply missions by Chinese pilots. There are no reports of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers in the Burma-Thailand border area.

The United States Intervention.

After the failed vote in the United Nations, the Thai government requested the immediate deployment of US military forces. The Thai asked for military assistance to stop the Burmese-Lao offensive, restore the borders, and ameliorate the human suffering of both Burmese and Thai citizens that have been and are being displaced by the conflict. The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has been authorized by the National Command Authorities (NCA) to establish Joint Task Forces to the region to “support Thai sovereignty and conduct humanitarian assistance operations.”

CJTF-Bengal has been designated a Combined Joint Task Force with India and Bangladesh to conduct humanitarian operations in southeastern Bangladesh. The 2nd Division IBCT is currently in Bangladesh under the tactical control of the Bangladesh Army Commander, and under the operation control of the US Naval Task Group Roosevelt.

CJTF-Stilwell has been designated a Combined Joint Task Force with Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore with Commander, US I Corps as the CJTF Commander. The Commander, 25th ID (L) has been designated the ARFOR Commander, and the 25th Interim Brigade Combat Team (25th IBCT), previously 3rd Bde, 25th ID, has been ordered to conduct an immediate deployment to central Thailand to show resolve and to prepare for potential combat operations.

Additionally, the Roosevelt Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), currently in the Arabian Sea, has been ordered to the Andaman Sea.

The Amphibious Ready Group Tawawa with the embarked 31th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) has been ordered to the Gulf of Thailand. In consultation with the Thai government, the 31th MEU has been ordered to Phitsanulok to assist Thai forces in the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the 25th IBCT and the two follow-on brigades of the 25th Division.

In addition, an Air Force Expeditionary Wing has been ordered to Thailand. Exact locations of aircraft basing in Thailand is currently being discussed. B-52 bombers are being forward deployed to Anderson AFB in Guam. Because of the escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait no additional US forces are currently planned for deployment into the T2BI (Thai-Burma-Bangladesh-India) Theater of Operations.

The Current Situation (1 June 2004)

Advanced elements of US I Corps are in the vicinity of Bangkok establishing a CJTF headquarters with their Thai Armed Forces (TAF) counterparts. A headquarters element from the 25th ID (L) that had been conducting a reconnaissance for the upcoming COBRA GOLD exercise has redeployed from Chanthaburi to Phitsanulok and has taken command of the 31th MEU and the newly arrived 25th IBCT that are currently located in the vicinity of Lampang. The other two brigades of the 25th ID (L) are moving north by road from Bangkok. Thai units are holding (not in contact) in defensive positions 50 km south of Chiang Rai and are fighting in the southern outskirts of Chiang Mai. Several key

leaders of Thai Army units normally stationed in Chiang Rai are reported missing in action. Thai reinforcements from Bangkok area units have stiffened resistance, but continue to fall back as refugees continue to complicate military operations and logistics movement along key Military Supply Routes (MSRs). Burmese light infantry forces operating in platoon, company and battalion strength infiltrated both cities (Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai) and are conducting raids and “mopping up” operations against Burmese insurgent formations inside Thailand and along the Burma border. Thai and US special operations forces are conducting intelligence collection and “liaison” operations with several of the Burmese insurgent groups along the Thai-Burma Border.

There are “thousands and thousands” of Thai and Burmese refugees and displaced citizens on the roads and in make shift camps south of Chiang Rai, south of Mae Song Sori and along the roads north and south of Chiang Mai. Representatives of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right (UNHCHR), and of more that 100 non-governmental organizations that have been working in the area since January. There are reports of atrocities both inside Burma and in Thailand. Several NGOs are reporting that several Thai and Western workers have been captured and executed by Burmese forces. The UNHCR has been given UN lead for this crisis and has set up a temporary office in Lampang. China has called an emergency session of the UN Security Council to discuss the situation in the region.

Burmese forces will continue small-scale offensive operations near Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai while conducting counter-guerrilla operations in northern Thailand against Burmese rebels. Burma, with Chinese logistics support, wants to establish a “semi-permanent” Burmese military presence in northern Thailand as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. Burma will attempt to show Thai military weakness and lack of government resolve to hold and defend its own territory. This is an attempt to cause a change in government in Bangkok and a resultant change in Thai policy supporting Burmese insurgents. Burma will also attempt to embarrass the Thai government and its failure to move against the drug infrastructure and anti-Burmese insurgents in the Golden Triangle. It is believed several captured Thai generals, who are rumored to be supportive of the drug trade or Burmese rebels will be used in this information operation campaign.

The Chinese government was initially surprised by the swift and decisive action of the United States and its regional partners and has called for its immediate withdrawal of US and coalition forces. China has also demanded the establishment of a regional commission to study the border problems in northern Thailand. PLA forces have moved into northern Laos and from Simao, China to Keng Tung in Burma. However, these forces are reportedly made up predominately of logistics troops. There are reports of PLA Air Defense units being deployed to the region. The Beijing government has stated that any air or missile attacks against targets inside Burmese territory or a ground incursion by Thai or coalition forces would be seen as a “threat to the peace and security of the region and of grave concern.” These are the exact words used by the US

government in the Taiwan Relations Act. China has stated that it wants to “teach the US a lesson” about issues of sovereignty and hegemony in Asia.

Future US role.

US forces have been ordered to assist the Thai military in recapturing lost territory and in securing its border. China, embarrassed by the news reporting out of the region of Burmese atrocities and Chinese complicity in the offensive action, abstained on a vote by the UN Security Council that called for expanded humanitarian assistance operations in both Bangladesh and in Thailand. US forces will be augmented with medical, engineer, and civil affairs personnel and units to assist International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs in relief operations. Thai-US-Coalition military forces will engage Burmese forces conducting offensive and counter-insurgency operations in Thailand until Thai borders are secure. Cross border ground operations into Burma or Laos are not currently authorized. All air and missile targets and strikes, unless in direct support of ground operations and within Thai territory, must be cleared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Targets inside Burma or Laos must be “clearly and unequivocally” involved in supporting Burmese units engaged in combat in and over Thai territory.

APPENDIX B:


EQUIPMENT

1. REMBASS is a ground-based, all-weather, day-and-night, battlefield surveillance, target development, and early warning system capable of remote operation under field conditions. The basic purpose of REMBASS is to detect, locate, classify, and report personnel and vehicular (wheeled and tracked) activities in real-time within the area of deployment. With a meteorological sensor attached, it will also sense and collect weather information. It uses remotely monitored sensors emplaced along likely enemy avenues of approach. These sensors respond to seismic-acoustic energy, infrared energy, and magnetic field changes to detect enemy activities. The sensors process the data and provide detection of classification information which is incorporated into digital messages and transmitted through short burst transmission to the system sensor monitor programmer set. The messages are demodulated, decoded, displayed, and recorded to provide a time-phased record of enemy activity.

The Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) and Improved REMBASS (I-REMBASS) contain passive sensors that, once emplaced, can be unattended for up to 30 days. The sensors are normally in an idle mode with very low power dissipation. When a target comes into detection range, the sensors note a change in the ambient energy level (seismic/acoustic, thermal, and/or magnetic), and are activated. The sensors identify the target (as a person or a tracked or wheeled vehicle), format this information into short digital messages, and transmit the messages to a monitoring device (either the SMS, the PMS or M/P). Information received at the monitoring device is decoded and displayed, showing target classification and direction of travel. The sensors send a test message on initial power-up to verify operational status. The repeaters send periodic test messages. Operator calculations, based upon the sensor data, can be used to determine target location, speed, direction of travel, and number of targets.

FEATURES:

- · Multiple Sensors:
 - o Magnetic
 - o Seismic/acoustic
 - o Infrared
 - o Meteorological
- · Flexible:
 - o Field Programmable
 - o Durable
- · Reliable:
 - o Low false alarm rate/high nuisance rejection
 - o Tamper-proof
 - o Sensor status rpts
- · Built in EP:
 - o Jam resistant
 - o LPI
 - o Long life
- · Simple to emplace





PHYSICAL PARAMETERS:

- · Sensors:
 - o 11"L x 2"H x 5.7"W
 - o 3.5-4 lbs
- · Monitor:
 - o 12"H x 4"W x 3"D
 - o 5 lbs
- · Repeater:
 - o 11"L x 3"H x 4.4"W
 - o 6 lbs

PERFORMANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS:

- · Detection range:
 - o Personnel - 3-50m
 - o Wheeled - 15-250m
 - o Tracked - 25-350m



2. PROPHET

The Prophet consists of Prophet Air, Control, and Ground and is a suite of division- level EW/SIGINT systems that operate at the collateral level or below (The Prophet Control element will have the capability to co-locate and interface with SCI elements such as the ACE or Special Purpose-Built Systems (SPBS)). Prophet's primary mission will be to electronically map radio frequency (RF) emitters on the battlefield from 20 MHz (High Frequency/HF) to 2000 MHz (Super High Frequency/SHF).

Prophet's Missions.


- Signals Mapping (Electronic Mapping) **(Primary Mission)**
- Electronic Attack (EA)
- Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR)
- More precise locationing techniques to assist in the targeting process
- Selected signals internals exploitation (either directly from the Ground or remotely from Air)

3. TUAV

The Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) is the ground maneuver commander's primary day/night, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) system. The TUAV provides the commander with a number of benefits to include: enhanced enemy situational awareness, a target acquisition capability, battle damage assessment (BDA), and enhanced battle management capabilities (friendly situation and battlefield visualization). The combination of these benefits contributes to the commander's dominant situational awareness allowing him to maneuver to points of positional advantage with speed and precision in order to conduct decisive operations. As a command and control enabler for tactical decision making, it's the commander's "dominant eye," it allows him to shape the Army XXI battlefield to ensure mission success.

Brigade Commanders' TUAV System Description


AAIs Shadow 200



Present Tactical IEW Equipment


NOMENCLATURE	FUNCTION	PRIME MOVER	REPORTING TIMELINES	UNIT AND QUANTITY
AN/FP-10A(V-1) Radar set 	Moving target indicator range: 1.5- km- Personnel; 3- km- Vehicles	Men Packed or Vehicle	Q2: 1-3 minutes Processing and communication time from target recognition to the ASPS	LT DIV: 12 systems AASLT DIV: 8 systems ARN DIV: 9 systems
SSQ 107 REMBASS Remotely monitored battlefield sensor system 	Electronic/Acoustic, Magnetic, & Passive Infrared monitoring and detection	Men Packed or Vehicle	BDE/ Near Real Time	EAC: system at selected MI brigades LT DIV: 5 systems AASLT DIV: 5 systems ARN DIV: 5 systems

Present Tactical IEW Equipment

NOMENCLATURE	FUNCTION	PRIME MOVER	REPORTING TIMELINES	UNIT AND QUANTITY
ANFSQ-144(V) TROJAN Mon for control group 	SIGINT readiness system, COMINT collection system, with embedded high capacity satellite communication system	N/A	Near Real Time	EAC: 1 system at selected MI brigade garrison locations Corps: 1 system minimum Division: 1 system not deployable, see SPIRIT for deployable communications portion of this asset
Special purpose integrated remote intelligence terminal SPIRIT plus generator trailer 	Secure voice, data, message radio, FAX, SATCOM link, and secondary emergency dissemination Extends TROJAN system with a mobile, deployable SATCOM terminal	HQ/MCMV	Q2/ Near Real Time	EAC - 3 Corps - 3 Division - 3

APPENDIX C:

URBAN MAPS



ENDNOTES

¹ The country's name was changed from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 by the military government. A long tradition of hostility and mutual distrust characterizes the relationship between Thailand and Burma, dating back to before the Burmese destruction of the old Thai capital at Ayutthaya in 1767. Border disputes, ethnic conflict and differing ideologies have dominated their cool, but workable relationship.

² For purposes of this paper, full-scale intelligence operations refer to the intelligence disciplines: human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and technical intelligence (TECHINT).

³ Time, space, purpose and resources are specifically under the rubric of "concept of operations", which is one essential element of operational design. According to Draft FM 3-0 (Operations), concept of operations is defined as a method by which all elements of the force will cooperate to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects.

⁴ The Army interim force will convert six to eight medium-weight, full spectrum combat brigades to Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT). The first IBCT to transform to the new design, the 3rd brigade, 2nd infantry division, is scheduled to achieve its initial operating capability (IOC) by December 2001, the second IBCT, the 1st brigade 25th Infantry division, is scheduled to achieve its IOC by December 2002. As of this writing, the first two IBCT's are being fielded at Ft. Lewis Washington, and are referred to as "initial" brigade combat teams.

⁵ For the purposes of this paper, spectrum of operations refers to the range of operations from stability and support to offense and defensive operations. Per Draft FM 3-0, Multidimensional environment refers to the five dimensions of the operational environment: threat, political, unified action, land combat operations, information, and technology environment.

⁶ In addition, it will meet seven desired force characteristics: agile, survivable, sustainable, lethal, deployable, versatile, and responsive per General Shinseki's 1999 vision statement.

⁷ Per Operational and Organizational (O & O) Concept, hereafter referred to as O & O, Page 7.

⁸ Per FM 17-96, RSTA Squadron, Situational Understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgments to the unit's situation awareness to determine the relationships among the factors of METT-TC. Situational Understanding facilitates decision making by identifying opportunities for mission accomplishment, threats to the force or mission accomplishment.

⁹ Draft FM 3-0 pg. 1-7 paragraph 1-25.

¹⁰ Chapter 2, O & O.

¹¹ At the time of this writing, Andrew Marshall is heading President Bush's 2001 "top-down" review.

¹² A small but influential Washington think-tank.

¹³ General Zinni is the former CINC, CENTCOM. California (where Asian Americans are increasingly influential in State elections) is enormously important in U.S. domestic politics, which can make or break presidential candidates.

¹⁴ The Washington Quarterly – Winter 2001 "Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements" pg. 9.

¹⁵ Ibid. Pg.16.

¹⁶ Per the O & O.

¹⁷ The Corps HQ could be designated as the ARFOR, the JFLCC, and/or a JTF HQ within a joint or combined command. According to the O & O, the IBCT's higher HQ, when appropriate, is responsible for providing joint battlespace and situational awareness and support to the IBCT.

¹⁸ Situational Understanding is the fundamental force enabler across all IBCT BOSs and the foundation for risk mitigation with respect to its vulnerabilities – requires robust HUMINT – requires increased recon, counter recon, deception and surveillance.

¹⁹ In section IV of chapter one, FM 17-96 describes the mission as follows: "The squadron is optimized to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the full multidimensional range of threats operating on an area basis. This means that the squadron's orientation is on the AO and the wide variety of threats that will face the brigade commander versus the more traditional cavalry operations, where the reconnaissance formation orients on the friendly force main body

and develops the situation when threat contact is made. This “reactionary” approach to reconnaissance operations often results in the early commitment of friendly forces to fight at a time and place of the threat’s choosing. By leveraging information technology and air-ground scout capabilities in complex and urban terrain, the RSTA squadron can develop the situation by focusing early on designated AOs and multidimensional threats. Thus empowering the brigade commander to achieve battlefield mobility and agility while choosing the time and place to confront the threat at his method of engagement.

²⁰ Page 5-53, Draft FM 17-96.

²¹ Definitions from Draft FM-19-96 Situational Awareness: the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of relevant information and the tactical situation. Situational Understanding: the product of applying analysis and judgment to the unit’s situational awareness to determine the relationships among the factors of METT-TC. Situational Dominance: a significant information advantage gained by collecting, processing, and disseminating an uninterrupted flow of relevant information in support of military operations while exploiting or denying an enemy or adversary the ability to do the same.

²² Time is multifaceted, affecting both the threat and the U.S. on many levels. Long U.S. deployment periods afford the threat the opportunity to oppose lightly equipped U.S. early entry units to prevent development of the theater to a “mature” status. Failing this, the threat will attempt to prolong the conflict to “outlast” the US’s will to continue.

²³ Across the spectrum of military operations, national, operational and tactical intelligence communication missions and support structures become ill defined. It is difficult to determine which system or element supports specific Warfighter information requirements. What is clear is that some division of effort will exist across a wide variety of intelligence-producing organizations supporting the operational commander at the forefront of enforcing the policies of our national command authority. National support can manifest itself in many forms and it is important to understand the multiple systems and architectures available to the national community in support of unit operations. Often a tactical unit will not be given access to the direct source of information. What is most important, however, is to ascertain the means by which the necessary information can be received.

²⁴ “ Secretary of Defense memorandum, 15 March 1991, “Strengthening Defense Intelligence,” established the JIC as the primary intelligence organization providing support to joint warfighting at all levels.

²⁵ Bangkok ranks among the most congested and polluted cities in the world.

²⁶ The country’s location requires overland travelers visiting Singapore and the Malaysia peninsula, to go through Thailand. Economically, Thailand is playing an active role in the economic development of the three Indochina countries and Burma.

²⁷ It is located 60-km southwest of Chiang Mai.

²⁸ Chiang Mai is Thailand’s the third largest city, with a population of 150,000.

²⁹ Burma is the only country in Southeast Asia to be steadily increasing the size of its armed forces. Dominated by the army, a strong and increasingly well armed force. The military is now double the size of what it was in 1988.

³⁰ Burma gained full independence from the UK on 04 January 1948. It followed socialist ideology until the collapse of the Burma socialist program party (BSPP) in 1988, and then a military *junta*, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) seized power. In 1997 the SLORC was dissolved and replaced by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), and has remained in control of the country ever since.

³¹ Conflict continues, together with ethnic cleansing and wholesale abuse of human rights).

³² Since its arrival in power, it has imposed martial law based upon the 1974 constitution. The civil service, police and judiciary are under martial law and all private organizations, including political parties and religious bodies, are tightly controlled.

³³ More than half the world’s supply is grown in the ‘Golden Triangle’, which comprises adjacent sections of Burma, Laos and Thailand.

³⁴ Some intelligence assets have the unique ability to dismount – or be take off a vehicle chassis and become man portable.

³⁵ The term is diffraction.

³⁶ Specifically, its armor, artillery, and intelligence capabilities have enlarged.

³⁷ This region is known as the Golden Triangle region.

³⁸ The following are deployment times (unconstrained)

- IBCT – four to eight days
- CJTF – eight days
- ARFOR – twenty days
- MEU – four days
- CVBG – seven days

³⁹ This Scenario was written by Mr. Geoff Babb, Instructor for the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Department of Joint, Multinational Operations (DJMO), Military Operations Other than War Division – for which the author of this monograph is eternally grateful.

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