Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait
Abstract
For more than fifty years, Taiwan's unresolved international status has been the cause of repeated crises in East Asia. While the parties involved would be willing to live with the status quo, the domestic political transformation of Taiwan has called the status quo into question. China, Taiwan, the United States, and Japan have national interests in how the conflict is resolved, and these interests will be difficult to reconcile. By conventional measures, China cannot gain Taiwan by force before the end of this decade. Chinese leaders believe by using asymmetrical means they will be able to overcome the military advantage of the U.S. and Taiwan. While the U.S. will be able to delay Chinese action against Taiwan, it is unlikely to be successful at long-term deterrence. Deterrence as used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War will not be effective with China without significant modification. The cultural divide affects not only deterrence theory, but also how China and the U.S. understand and communicate with each other. Crisis deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely to succeed due to conflicting national interests and several crucial mutual misperceptions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 28, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA391835
Entities
People
- Douglas Mccreedy
Organizations
- United States Army War College