STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE COST OF DEFENSE SANCTIONS: A CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA AND PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

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Sanctions have come under increasing scrutiny in the late 1990s. Punitive policies meant to compel change, sanctions are being labeled ineffective and, in many cases, harmful to the interests of the sanctioning state. Despite this, sanctions continue to be the policy of choice when dealing with recalcitrant states. Defense sanctions have seemed the appropriate policy prescription for countries whose militaries commit crimes or jeopardize democratic reform. The issue though is that severing defense ties with these regimes has, in some cases, cut contact with a weak state's most powerful institution, jeopardized fledgling reform movements within the state and not resulted in an improved or safer security environment. Recently, U.S. imposed sanctions have increasingly resulted in a rise in prominence of destabilizing influences in the target country and helped create, or, at least, not arrest the formation of a failed or near-failed state, thus jeopardizing the region's security. A look at Asian states that have been targets of U.S. defense sanctions reveals severing ties has not been an impetus for regime changes, military reform, or increased stability in the state or region. An analysis of Indonesia and Pakistan reveals that severing defense ties has not only been unsuccessful, but has resulted in exacerbating the conditions which served to initially justify enacting the sanctions.

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THE COST OF DEFENSE SANCTIONS: A CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA AND PAKISTAN

Sanctions have come under increasing scrutiny in the late 1990s. These punitive policies seek to compel change in the target country, however increasingly sanctions are labeled ineffective and indiscriminately harmful to the general population that in most cases is vulnerable and distant from the behavior that instigated the sanction. Scholars in the field of sanctions policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan from the Brookings Institution, note that, "Despite continued reliance on these punitive measures to address issues such as support for terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and violation of human rights, the record of these policies of punishment has been disappointing."[1] Despite this, sanctions continue to be the policy of choice when dealing with recalcitrant or rogue states.

Most of the research and writing in this field focuses on economic sanctions. This paper, however, analyzes defense sanctions. Defense sanctions are those policies enacted that affect (i.e., limit, deny, restrict, sever, or prohibit) military and defense oriented education, training and operational exercises, weapons and equipment procurement, and all other military-to-military contact with a target country.

In the case of a military coup, U.S. law imposes full defense sanctions and halts economic assistance. In other circumstances, the policy is not predetermined. When a state's military exceeds accepted international norms of armed defense force conduct, by securing state political power through force or turning combat power against its citizens to preserve power, the policy remedy is to enact defense sanctions. In some cases, the threat of sanctions may act as a deterrent to steer the country away from nuclear development. Consequently, US policy makers turn to defense sanctions hoping that cutting off communications, aid, equipment, training and recognition may compel the country, its military, and/or its leadership to change their aggressive behavior.

On the surface, sanctions seem the appropriate policy prescription for countries with militaries behaving in a manner counter to U.S. interests or inconsistent with U.S. mores, or policy mandate. Paradoxically, severing U.S. defense ties with recalcitrant regimes or countries has, in some cases, cut dialog with a weak state's most powerful institution, jeopardized fledgling civil-military reform movements, and failed to produce an improved or safer security environment. Over the past fifteen years, U.S. imposed sanctions inadvertently promoted the prominence of destabilizing influences in the target country (i.e., heightened Islamic fundamentalism, or closer contacts with China, Iraq, or North Korea) and helped create, or, at

least, not arrest the formation of a failed or near-failed state, thus jeopardizing the region's security.

A look at Asian states targeted by U.S. defense sanctions (i.e., Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, North Korea, Pakistan and Vietnam) reveals that one policy does not necessarily fit all. Severing ties did not promote regime changes, military reform, noticeable human rights improvements, or increased stability in the state or region. An analysis of those countries sanctioned reveals that the global policy remedy of severing defense ties has not only been unsuccessful on the surface, but has, in several cases resulted in exacerbating the conditions which served to initially justify enacting the sanctions.

SANCTIONS AS A POLICY OPTION

"Between 1914 and 1990 various countries imposed economic sanctions in 116 cases."[2] During the Cold War (1945-1989), according to a Heritage Foundation study, most sanctions were imposed to protect U.S. national security interests since these sanctions "intended to counter actual or potential military aggression, deny advanced, military sensitive technology to the Soviet Union or its allies and control weapons proliferation."[3] However, the Soviet Union's collapse and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact did not reduce the use of sanctions. In fact, quite the opposite occurred. The 1990's, coined "The Sanctions Decade" by two acknowledged sanctions scholars in a recent book of the same title (David Cortright and George A. Lopez; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), was a period of dramatic increase in sanctions.

A discussion of sanctions demands clear definitions. Sanctions fall under three major categories - defense, economic and political - and cover nearly every aspect of international interaction a country may have with others. Traditionally, arms embargoes were a tool used by the United Nations when countries took actions considered counter to the UN mandate, "To maintain international peace and security."[4] As discussed, defense sanctions include all forms of military-to-military contact, assistance, training and procurement. Economic sanctions range from specified commodity embargoes to international trade isolation across the broad spectrum of foreign trade and commerce and includes votes against the state in cases of international aid and assistance, i.e., International Monetary Fund and World Bank requests for assistance. Political sanctions include diplomatic isolation, severing of relations, and non-recognition of membership in international bodies.

Between 1992 and 1996 the United States imposed sanctions 61 times on a total of 35 countries in an effort to achieve various foreign policy objectives. The reasons for these sanctions range from state-sponsored human rights violations (China, Indonesia, Sudan) and

religious persecution (Cuba, China, Iran, Iraq, Laos, North Korea, Sudan and Vietnam), to proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons (India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Russia), to state sponsored terrorism (Afghanistan, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria).[5] Estimates indicate the United States has approximately 70 sanctions of various types currently in effect.[6]

The dramatic rise in sanctions does not mean the post-Cold War world is on the brink of a major conflict. There are four primary reasons for the increase in sanctions use. First, there is a growing sense of unaccountability among many states previously held in check, if only loosely, in the bi-polar Cold War era. Secondly, some sanctions were effective. President F.W. de Klerk's release of Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years of imprisonment and the abandonment of apartheid in South Africa in 1992 support this view. Thirdly, without the overarching Cold War strategy of maintaining Western solidarity at all costs, the necessity to overlook bad or reprehensible internal state behavior is moot. Finally, sanctions offer a way to take action against a regime without the extreme action of committing military forces.

U.S. REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

A measure of the cost of defense sanctions is determined from an appreciation of the value of contact and engagement in the context of U.S. defense strategy. The U.S. regional defense strategy defines its interests in the Department of Defense *U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.* "The United States aims to promote a stable, secure, prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific community in which the United States is an active player, partner and beneficiary,"[7] introduce the United States Government's Department of Defense (DOD) policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. The strategy is grounded on a policy of comprehensive engagement, encompassing political, economic and defense components. Comprehensive engagement includes basing (i.e., Republic of Korea, Japan, Singapore and Diego Garcia), senior officer visits, exercises, port calls and training through Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded-IMET (E-IMET).

This strategy is supports the DOD belief that "our military presence in Asia serves as an important deterrent to aggression, often lessening the need for a more substantial and costly U.S. response later. Only through active engagement can the United States contribute to constructive political, economic and military development within Asia's diverse environment."[8] These strong statements require U.S. military engagement to achieve the intended results.

Based on this strategic direction the Commanders-in-Chief for both the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) believe that engagement with foreign militaries is an integral task toward the accomplishment of their assigned mission "to shape the environment, respond to the full spectrum of crises, and prepare for the future in that region."[9]

Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief (CINC), USPACOM, stressed the importance of defense engagement during his Fiscal Year 2001 Posture Statement testimony to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee stating, "The character of U.S. military engagement will be a significant determinant in the future security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Regional engagement is a process to achieve national objectives, not an end in itself. Our program improves the ability of regional partners to defend themselves, strengthens security alliances and partnerships, increases regional readiness for combined operations, promotes access for American forces to facilities in the region, deters potential aggressors and promotes security arrangements better suited to the challenges of the 21st Century."[10]

Finally, as stated in the President's most recent National Security Strategy, "Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. [military] engagement and leadership abroad." This statement leaves little doubt concerning the seminal importance of engagement, though it is tempered by adding, "Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the threats and opportunities most relevant to our interests and applying our resources where we can make the greatest difference."[11]

Hence, an absence of U.S. military engagement with strategically important states in the Asia region comes with risk. For the U.S. not to engage leaves to chance the course a military, or a regime dominated by its armed force, might take and could conceivably result in conditions demanding greater and riskier U.S. interaction to restore order or reduce a threat in the future.

INDONESIA AND PAKISTAN

Indonesia and Pakistan have had long and comprehensive relationships with the United States. They've also been subject to several U.S. sanctions regimes. In Indonesia, partial sanctions were enacted after reports that the Indonesian military participated in violent clashes between East Timorese separatist groups and pro-Indonesia groups in 1991. Defense sanctions were again ordered after the Indonesian military was determined to have supported atrocities in East Timor after the August 1999 sovereignty referendum. In Pakistan, defense sanctions were imposed as a result of continued nuclear development (1990) and further increased after nuclear testing (1998).

There are important commonalties between Indonesia and Pakistan. Aside from the general geographic association with the community of Asian nations, from a twentieth century perspective both Pakistan and Indonesia are historically similar. Both are post-colonial states (Indonesia, a former colony of the Netherlands and Pakistan, a former colony of Great Britain) that remain in relatively early stages of nation development. Both the Indonesian and Pakistani militaries have played prominent and sometimes dominant social, economic and political roles in their countries and regions. Finally, the regions of Indonesia (Southeast Asia) and Pakistan (South Asia) are economically, politically and militarily pivotal to the United States.[12]

THE ROAD TO SANCTIONS

THE CASE OF INDONESIA

The history of U.S. involvement with the Republic of Indonesia dates to Indonesia's earliest days of independence after World War II. Through the lens "containment", the United States supported Indonesia's fledgling armed forces to undermine the communist movement, cropping up in the vulnerably weak countryside throughout the young nation. The Indonesian armed forces developed in an ebb and flow manner throughout the 1950s. Highlighted by revolts and political splinter groups, most notably on the islands Sumatra, Java and Irian Jaya, Indonesia's nation building process was tumultuous. Indonesian nationalists "...saw themselves in the final stage of a fight for survival."[13] As a consequence, the young military quickly grew in stature and importance as the guardian of the nation and the bedrock for the nation-building process.

In this setting, the relationship between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries was borne on the back of independence and nation-building on one hand and anti-communism on the other. According to Dean Acheson, former U.S. Secretary of State (1949 -1953) in his classic autobiography, Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department, "Of course we opposed the spread of communism; it was the subtle, powerful instrument of Russian imperialism, designed and used to defeat the very interests we shared with the Asian peoples."[14] Consequently, the fight against communism remained the foundation of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia for much of the three decades following World War II.

After President Truman was accused of failed policy in China with Chiang Kai-shek's defeat by the communists and a disappointing stalemate on the Korean peninsula, U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region was seen by some in Washington as weak and vulnerable. To make matters worse, the French were losing badly in Vietnam and creating the danger of another opportunity for communism to make inroads in Asia.

Against this backdrop, early military-to-military engagement with Indonesia was robust and effective. One study determined that approximately 2,800 Indonesian military officers were trained in the United States in the period 1953 - 1965. By 1965 fifty-three officers had attended the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College and "between 17 to 20 percent of Indonesia's general officers [had] received training in the United States."[15] Former Political Officer to the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia during the Sukarno to Suharto transition, Paul Gardner concludes, "Personal bonds created by the U.S. assistance programs for the Indonesian military and police played what may well have been a decisive role in defining the future bilateral relationship."[16]

Strategic interest in Indonesia peaked in the lead-up to the near coup in 1965. President Sukarno was on a collision course with the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) and the only credible counter balance available to Sukarno was the Indonesian military. According to Gardner, in mid-1964 most U.S. observers feared that PKI's premise that this was "the socialist stage of the revolution" meant the actions by Indonesia's communist party were more than merely disruptive, and, in fact intended to transform the young nation into a communist state. He followed, "Americans had long viewed the Indonesian Army and its civilian allies as the principal obstruction to communism."[17]

What followed in the violent summer and fall of 1965 defined Indonesia and its armed forces. After the 'near-coup' crisis ended, Parliament banned President Sukarno and appointed Major General Suharto as "Acting President," thus defeating communism.

The U.S. reacted to this with support for the fragile government and engagement with the military. A successful repulsion of communism was worthy of engagement even if this meant overlooking other displays of less-than-perfect democracy. This was a country in critical formative stages and an active bilateral relationship with the United States guarded against a resurgent communist threat.

As the Vietnam War came to a close the United States became the primary aid provider to the Indonesian armed forces. Acclaimed scholar on the Indonesian military, Harold Crouch notes, "the United States was effectively the sole supplier of military equipment, and its aid increased suddenly from $5.8 million in 1969 to $18 million in 1970. By 1976 American military aid had risen to more than $40 million annually."[18]

Starting in 1977, after the departure from Vietnam, the United States worked hard to strengthen the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an institution in order to help the member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) resist threats from China and Russia. Ambassador Robert Oakley, then Deputy to Assistant

Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, noted, "In 1977, this included resuming close bilateral military ties in Southeast Asia."[19]

During this period, Southeast Asia continued to attract concern from U.S. policy officials. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978-79 served as a reminder that the threat of communist expansion was real. Meanwhile, Malaysia and the Philippines could not wipeout their respective, lingering communist insurgencies. In many ways, these incidents served to unify ASEAN member states through the strength of a unified front against communism. The Reagan administration's policy direction was to initiate closer defense relations with all ASEAN members, including increased training, arms sales, education and exercises with Indonesia.

The United States maintained as close a defense relationship with Indonesia from 1950 to 1990 as with any Southeast Asian nation, even when measured against the long-standing partnership and defense alliance with the Philippines. A review of the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) security assistance allocations reveals that in the categories of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) Indonesia maintained general parity with the Philippines, a treaty ally and home base to significant U.S. force presence, throughout the period.[20]

With the end of the Cold War, Indonesia increased its role and prominence across the wide diplomatic front. In the areas of peaceful settlement of disputes in the region, arms control and free trade, Indonesia's accepted position of leadership within ASEAN and pro-U.S. leaning established Indonesia as a "...positive force for promoting regional and global goals that are in the U.S. interest."[21] In 1991 Indonesia served as the co-chairman (with France) in negotiations which set up the UN-sponsored Cambodian peace process that led to the establishment of an elected government in that country. In 1993 Indonesia played a key role in forming the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a 21-member organization (including the United States) created to reduce security threats through cooperation among countries within and interested in the region. Under Indonesia's chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 1992-1995, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord notes, "[NAM] departed from its long history of taking positions contrary to U.S. interests."[22] In 1995, Indonesia supported a consensus decision that extended indefinitely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in 1996, Indonesia supported U.S. efforts to complete negotiation of a contentious Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. Also, in 1995 and 1996, Indonesia donated heavy fuel oil to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), thus helping to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea. Additionally, in 1996, Indonesia brokered a peace agreement between the Government of the Philippines and

the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that ended a decades-long conflict in the southern Philippines. It was, therefore, not an understatement for then Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord to describe Indonesia as a "critically important nation" that is a "positive force for promoting regional and global goals that are in the U.S. interest."[23]

The IMET program for Indonesia was started in 1978 and was, at its inception, the largest IMET program the United States had with any other country in the world.[24] The importance of training and exposing Indonesian officers to the United States military and society through an IMET course of study was gaining recognition. Aside from the decidedly pro-democratic course Indonesia would make in the 1990s, a team of Indonesian senior officers, led by IMET alumnus, Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, formed a group in late 1999 to chart the course toward absolving the military of its political role. Additionally, IMET graduate, Lieutenant General (Retired) Mohamad Yunus has been credited with lifting all censorship on the Indonesian Press while serving as the Minister for Information. According to Professor Salim Said, University of Indonesia, it was the experiences Mohamad Yunus had while in the United States attending the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that led to freeing the Indonesian press.[25]

Deep fissures in the U.S. - Indonesia relationship, however, began to show with the 'Dili Incident'. On November 12, 1991, reportedly fifty demonstrators were killed, ninety determined missing and ninety-one wounded as a result of clashes between East Timorese separatist groups and pro-Indonesia East Timorese groups, aided, in part, by Indonesia's 'counter insurgency' forces.[26] Defense sanctions were imposed the following year, restricting FMS and halting IMET and Foreign Military Financing.

The outcry was loud from a growing network of Human Rights groups and it resonated well in Washington without distractions of other visible threats to U.S. interests. Americans, in large part, were being introduced to Indonesia through press coverage of Indonesia's failing policy in East Timor and Suharto's corruption practices. Without a counter balance to the broad brush negative reporting on Indonesia, U.S. policy interest in Indonesia suffered and the U.S. - Indonesia defense relationship deteriorated.

Considering the positive impact Indonesia was making on important diplomatic initiatives, however, sanctions were partially lifted in January 1996 when the U.S. Congress voted to allow limited military-to-military training and E-IMET, meaning that training would be non-combat related and focused on civil-military relations, human rights and disaster relief.

This policy stood until U.S. military-to-military engagement with Indonesia was halted following the devastating riots surrounding the stepping down of President Suharto on 22 May

1998. Fueled by a crippling recession, Indonesia seemed to explode with riots and demonstrations throughout the archipelago. Casualties are estimated to number in the thousands. Investigations revealed that 14 members of the Indonesian military, including the commander of the very powerful Army Strategic Command, KOSTRAD, and IMET alumnus, Lieutenant General Prabowo, were involved in killings, abductions and other human rights violations.

While there were instances and allegations of IMET alumni participating in or having knowledge of devastating human rights violations, it is generally accepted that the institutional shift that the Indonesian military was making toward supporting democracy and reform was significant and remarkable. "The Indonesian armed forces suffered a severe loss of reputation as a result of their identification with the Suharto regime," a recent RAND study notes.[27] However, the Indonesian military responded by mounting an active campaign of reform. The RAND study continues, "The changes have amounted to a revolution in civil-military relations."[28] To date, the institutional changes undertaken upon and by the Indonesia military consist of[29]:

- Removing the National Police from the military chain of command;
- Abolishing staff positions in socio-political affairs at TNI Headquarters and subordinate regional commands;
- Abolishing the post of Assistant for Security and Order at TNI Headquarters (dealing primarily with internal security and usually a National Police officer);
- Requiring that all military personnel in civil government posts either retire from the armed forces or return to normal military duties;
- Reducing dedicated military seats in Parliament from 100 to 75 in 1990 and to 38 in 1998, and totally eliminating them by 2004;
- Prohibiting any role by the military in day-to-day political activity;
- Prohibiting political party bias;
- Maintaining neutrality in the 1999 general election and all future elections; and
- Revising doctrinal publications and instructions to reflect the changing role of the military in society.

The nature of the U.S. - Indonesia relationship on all fronts was to be deeply changed in a very uncertain post-Suharto era. It was apparent that the dearth of functioning institutions and a very weak government bureaucracy (endemic to the 32-year Suharto regime) in Indonesia meant that if reform were to succeed, the military would have to continue to play an important role. The strategic interests for the United States hinged not so much on controlling out-of-

control civil-military conditions within Indonesia, but on containing a failing state that had potentially huge economic, refugee and bleed-over security implications for the region.

The U.S. military played an important, though diminished role in the overall United States' policy with Indonesia in the very uncertain period following Suharto. In spite of the policy of no formal military-to-military engagement, senior U.S. military officers were relied upon to access previously established relationships with Indonesian military leadership to advise, counsel and, at times transmit USG démarches when other avenues of communications either did not exist, or were ineffective.

The period leading up to the June 1999 Parliamentary elections in Indonesia was, in many ways, a turning point in U.S. - Indonesia relations.[30] Aside from significant reforms within the military, Suharto's successor, President B.J. Habibie made the remarkable commitment to resolve the contentious East Timor issue by conducting a sovereignty referendum in the troubled territory. While accountability for human rights violations by members of the Indonesian military remained an issue with many USG officials, the amount of reforms within Indonesia's military and government and a possible resolution to the East Timor issue were promising.

The June parliamentary elections would be Indonesia's first democratic experience in 45 years and the behavior of the military would largely determine how successful the event would be. To make the situation more uncertain, the Government of Indonesia took the potentially destabilizing step of moving the National Police out from under the organization of the Armed Forces of Indonesia on April 1, 1999. Most observers interpreted this reform with mixed feelings. While it was positive that the military was organizationally being distanced from internal security matters, the police were woefully under-financed, undermanned, had no inventory of contemporary police equipment and were poorly respected among the Indonesians because of instances of corruption, incompetence and inactivity.

The U.S. Government's interagency, as well as many in the international community, worked extensively with counterparts in Indonesia during the lead-up to the vote. The election was closely monitored by international bodies and considered by the vast majority of observers to have been a tremendous success - free, fair and largely without incident.

The major event remaining was the conduct of the East Timor referendum, scheduled to occur in August 1999. Though hailed by many foreign observers as a remarkable step, many in Indonesia grew increasingly fearful of the precedent being established for other rebellious, independent-minded provinces in the fracturing country.

The referendum was held on 30 August. Seventy-eight percent of voters chose to sever ties with Indonesia. After the referendum, violence broke out in Dili, East Timor led by pro-Indonesia militiamen. Intense looting, pillaging and rioting spread and ravaged the small territory. Hundreds were missing and assumed dead. Investigations revealed brutal killings involving members of the Indonesian military. Within weeks there were 30,000 refugees reported on the move and as many as 80,000 pro-Indonesia citizens that were estimated to be trying to leave the area. The United Nations mission conducting the referendum in East Timor was evacuated; a multinational force, led by Australia, was deployed to restore order, and the international community rallied to castigate Indonesia over the role of members of the military during the violence.

On September 9, following the general shock over the violence in East Timor, President Clinton articulated the difficult prospects ahead for Indonesia. "[Indonesia] has been undergoing an important democratic transformation. It has the capacity to lift an entire region if it succeeds and to swamp its neighbors in a sea of disorder if it fails."[31] Nonetheless, in light of the violence and the role of the military in fomenting, aiding and perpetuating the destruction in East Timor, the President followed, "Today, I have ordered the suspension of all programs of military cooperation with Indonesia effective immediately."[32]

THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been a state in transition since its independence from the British in 1947. Established under secular pretenses, as the Islamic alternative to India's predominantly Hindu population, Pakistan's post-independence history has been a remarkable saga, rife with security and internal political tumult. Since 1947, Pakistan has undergone three wars with India, six constitutional arrangements and close, but separate political-military associations with China and the United States.

Throughout this history, the United States has recognized the importance of a friendly, or at least non-adversarial, Pakistan. Characterized as "partners" by President Clinton during his recent visit, the U.S. - Pakistan relationship has been very useful to U.S. policy in South Asia, the Middle East, toward China and, particularly during the Cold War in containing the spread of communism.[33]

However, when the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, the dominant U.S. policy interest in South Asia became the management of the nuclear problem. Initially a policy of "preventing New Delhi and Islamabad from going nuclear," U.S. policy eventually transitioned to nonproliferation and pressing both states to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[34]

The United States signed an agreement with Pakistan in 1953 providing for military and economic assistance by the USG in return for Pakistan's membership into alliances opposed to communism. The 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries was followed by Pakistan's entry into SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) and the Baghdad Pact (later becoming the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO), allying Iran, Turkey and Pakistan; two alliances expressly established to "...prevent Soviet encroachment or domination."[35] The relationship was further cemented with Pakistan leasing military bases to the United States to support military operations in the region. By the late 1950s, the U.S. - Pakistan defense relationship was growing close, as evidenced by the more than US$700 million in military grant aid Pakistan received between 1955 - 1965.[36]

The Pakistanis, though, experienced anything but consistency from their Cold War ally. The relationship has fluctuated between alliance partner and sanctioned state since 1954, continually modulated by U.S. policy makers' attempts to balance Washington's favor between India and Pakistan, fearing an unbalanced level of interest or activity would be destabilizing to the region. As an example, in the 1950s Pakistan built a modern and legitimate military force from the fruits of their alliance with the USG.[37] This reliance on U.S. assistance, though, proved fatal when Washington imposed an arms embargo during the 1965 India-Pakistan War, leaving Pakistan unable to supply, repair or sustain its military without U.S. shipments. At war's end, Pakistan was unable to acquire and hold territory in the hotly contested Kashmir region, leaving the claim subject to UN arbitration and Pakistanis feeling dangerously vulnerable to India. Following this experience, Pakistan assumed a more self-reliant policy, largely influenced by the Chinese.

U.S. assistance remained minimal until the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Shortly after the invasion, President Carter described Pakistan as a "frontline state" to U.S. interests in the Middle East, paving the way for demonstrably improving the relationship. In 1981, the Reagan Administration followed by negotiating a US$3.2 billion military and economic assistance agreement. Pakistan became the primary base of resistance to Soviet presence in the region, funneling arms and equipment for the Afghan resistance. Continued Soviet occupation resulted in another aid package in 1986 totaling US$4 billion in further economic assistance and military equipment.

Nuclear development in South Asia has been an issue since India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974. It was clear to most Pakistan observers that achieving nuclear parity with India would be considered a strategic necessity, regardless of international response.[38] Sensing that nuclear development was underway, or not far off, the United States Congress

passed the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in 1985. The amendment was written as a deterrent, holding sanction as the penalty for Pakistan, should they possess a nuclear weapon. The law required that "No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, unless the President certifies [to Congress] that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device."[39] Although, it was generally accepted that Pakistan was engaged in nuclear technology, it was determined that the threshold of "possessing a nuclear explosive device" had not been crossed. Under the notion that the deterrent was working, certification was provided under the Reagan and early Bush administrations.

The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989 signaled the end of the Cold War. It also coincided with another change in U.S. policy toward Pakistan. U.S. national and strategic interests in South Asia turned from containment of communism and protection of access to the Middle East, to nuclear arms nonproliferation.

According to then-Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, in 1990, "Pakistan's nuclear program continued to develop." A campaign of repeated appeals to the country's leadership to stop the development was met without action.[40] As a result, President Bush declined to make such certification and arms deliveries were suspended, formally ending a nearly ten-year period of close cooperation during the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.

One of the most serious impacts of this sanction was the suspension of Pakistan's 1989 order of 71 F-16 aircraft and other arms. According to Ambassador Oakley, the "F-16s were to form the core of Pakistan's conventional defense versus India for decades to come."[41] Pakistan had paid US$600 million for the aircraft prior to shipment. After the 'de-certification', delivery was halted and the payment was not returned to Pakistan, pending a 'third country' purchase of the aircraft. The aircraft remained unsold and the money was not returned to Pakistan until late in the 1990s, frustrating the Pakistani government into threatening to take the case to the World Court for retribution. Prohibitions upon the sale or transfer of weapons, spare parts, or with any other country where U.S. licensed components were involved were further tightened after Pakistan's nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998 following nuclear tests by India on 11 and 13 May.[42]

However, as important as arms sales had been, from the beginning of the U.S. - Pakistan defense relations in 1954, there had been a robust program of unit and individual training in both Pakistan and the United States. The training varied from U.S. officers attending the Pakistan Army Staff College in Quetta as a part of U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer training, to Pakistani officers attending U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force War Colleges.

The Pakistani officers attending training or IMET schools developed personal and professional relationships; however, the effects of experiencing democracy and freedom in the United States were proven to be lasting. In one notable instance, recounted by then retired Lieutenant General William E. Odom in 1993 Congressional testimony, it was apparent that engagement and particularly IMET, benefited the United States:

> "Another kind of desirable influence through IMET is demonstrated by US-Pakistani relations immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. General Zia, the President of Pakistan, was being urged by his foreign minister to scorn US offers of assistance in favor of coming to terms with Moscow. Because Zia had attended two US Army schools and because he had made extremely close friends with ordinary American citizens during those two years, he was subjectively inclined toward the US offer. As a party to the meeting with him in Pakistan when he made the decision to accept the US offer, tying his policy to US strategy for Afghanistan, I gained the impression that his IMET experience was a critical factor in his decision."[43]

Two other notable cases involve former Chiefs of Army Staff, the accepted seat of power within the Pakistani Armed Forces, Generals Abdul Waheed Kakar and Jehangir Karamat. Both officers attended schools and training in the United States under the auspices of the IMET program. When faced with political crises and demands for changes in government, both generals avoided the opportunity to exert exceptional influence, opting rather to support elections. In 1995, holding firm to the principles of democracy, Kakar brokered a settlement between the Prime Minister and the President and supported the caretaker government until elections could be held later in the year. When faced with a similar choice of assuming power during the Constitutional crisis of November-December 1997, General Karamat insisted that the army stay out of the political tussle. In the end, General Karamat resigned rather than enact martial law.

In October 1999 the Chief of Army Staff, COAS, General Pervais Musharraf arrested Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, declared martial law and set up a caretaker government. All this was at the cost of tremendous outrage and sanction by the desperately needed international community. The USG swiftly imposed further sanctions, particularly adding restrictions of military-to-military contact to the nuclear-based defense sanctions still in effect.

POST-SANCTION PERIOD

The period since Indonesia and Pakistan were sanctioned has been neither secure, nor stable. Both countries suffered intense internal political upheavals, violent social chaos

resulting in countless deaths and failed to recover collapsing economies. There exist real threats to regional order in both Southeast Asia and South Asia because of the internal social and political breakdowns in Indonesia and Pakistan. A "balkanization" of Indonesia is no longer considered a remote possibility and the rise in militant Islamic activism is evident in both countries.

At the core of both countries' unraveling are their defense establishments. In Indonesia, the rise in separatist, ethnic and sectarian violence is staggering and neither the police nor the military are able, or, in some cases, inclined to restore order. In some instances, members of the police and military contributed to the violence, or failed to take rudimentary steps to stem the breakdown in order. The military is fractured. The result of the breakdown in the military and the rise in violence is that democratic reform is effectively paralyzed.

In Pakistan, political, social and economic conditions are dangerously similar to those in Indonesia. The strategic effects of sanctions are beginning to exact its toll on reform. Political and economic recovery appears paralyzed and negative social consequences are beginning to mount. Long-time Pakistan scholar, Stephen P. Cohen of Brookings Institution notes, in Pakistan, "...extremist and sectarian groups operate freely and openly."[44] The dangerous rise in terrorist group activity and militant Islamic group violence is affecting reform within Pakistan and basic security in its volatile surrounding regions. The bleed-over of this breakdown in stability exacerbates the long-standing India-Pakistan dispute in Kashmir. In spite of Musharraf's harsh words early in his tenure aimed at militant Islamic groups, the occurrence and scale of Muslim extremist violence increases. Pakistan's uncomfortably close relationship with the Taliban government in Afghanistan has drawn criticism from Russia and the United States. Commenting on the troubling effects of the increase in Islamic militancy in Pakistan, a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) paper notes that the violence and the government's inability to effectively deal with it "...have made Pakistan a source of instability that radiates outward to its neighbors."[45]

However, in Pakistan the armed forces remain an intact and functioning institution amid crumbling economic, political and social institutions. Incompetence and corruption cripple every civilian administration since sanctions were imposed. Thus, defense sanctions in Pakistan have a much broader and debilitating effect than merely contributing to a breakdown in security.

In addition to stalled reform and increasingly unstable conditions in both countries, Indonesia and Pakistan are forging closer relationships with potential U.S. adversaries, largely because of the deleterious effects not having access to U.S. education, arms and assistance has had to military readiness. Indonesia is considering buying armaments from Poland and

Russia while "[Pakistan's] military remains dependent upon China for military aid and technology."[46] Pakistan has also established a missile-related technology transfer relationship with North Korea, one that Pakistan will "...continue to rely on ... unless the United States can successfully intervene to staunch the flow."[47]

The prominent role of defense and security in both the Indonesia and Pakistan cases makes defense sanctions even more important. Richard Haass noted in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, "It is not simply that sanctions failed to do what they were designed to do, namely, deter Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing. Rather, it is also that the United States has too many interests at stake to allow sanctions to dominate both bilateral relationships. Pakistan, in particular, is a country whose stability cannot be taken for granted; sanctions can work against our many interests there."[48] The net result is that United States' interests become singularly defined by terms of the sanctions. Thus, other political, national security and economic interests become subordinate to defense sanctions' conditions.

The long term effects of sanctions in Indonesia and Pakistan potentially threaten U.S. and regional security interests. In Indonesia, not only democracy, but also its territorial integrity is at stake. The security crisis and the inability of the security forces to restore order have contributed to President Wahid's failed administration. Wahid's departure is considered by most observers to be imminent. Forces posturing to fill the anticipated political vacuum include the Axis Group, a Muslim-based political coalition, calling for Shariah law. Boldly stated in one analysis, "If that happens, Indonesia will certainly break up. Provinces where Christianity is strong - East Nusatenggara, Maluccas and North Sulawesi - have hinted that they would declare independence if Shariah law is adopted."[49]

In Pakistan, defense sanctions have contributed to altering the course Pakistan has taken building their defense strategy and will continue to do so. Ambassador Oakley argues, the sanctions have "... clearly led to an acceleration of [Pakistan's] nuclear efforts, as well a shift from strategic reliance upon sophisticated U.S. aircraft to acquisition of Chinese and North Korean ballistic missiles capable of carrying the nuclear warheads. [Additionally,] cancellation of IMET and most other military education and training for Pakistan has aggravated anti-U.S., Islamic and nationalistic attitudes amongst its officer corps and reduced incentives for restraint in military-supported, anti-Indian activities in Kashmir and elsewhere." [50]

The U.S. - Pakistan relationship was built upon a foundation with two policy planks; containment and non-proliferation. In 1988, Pakistan's strategic value changed when their role as a "frontline state" lost relevancy with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Non-

proliferation became the foundation of the relationship. The issue is, though, as Richard Haass alludes to in his testimony before Congress, "... the United States has too many interests at stake" in South Asia to allow a relationship to be dominated by any one issue.[51]

Similarly, conditions in Indonesia resulted in hinging the U.S. bilateral relationship on one issue. Though founded on the broad, yet singular issue of containment, the U.S. - Indonesia relationship transferred 'containment' with 'human rights' in the Post-Cold War era. Fueled by knowledge of atrocities committed by the Indonesian military, U.S. interest in Indonesia became defined by outrage over conduct by the military. As a result, political, economic, and national security interests became secondary. Efforts to change the corrupt behavior of the military through the penalties of defense sanctions have been unsuccessful.

The one-dimensional nature of U.S. relationships with Indonesia and Pakistan has proven to be strategically weak. Since the end of the Cold War, viewing the relationship through human rights or nonproliferation lenses established 'single points of failure' for both relationships. Thus, when issues arose, sanctions were enacted, there is no other point of connection and the relationship is severed. In the "pivotal" states of Indonesia and Pakistan the results of the sanctions have been damaging for the states, the region and U.S. interests.

Conditions in Indonesia and Pakistan have not improved with the implementation of sanctions. In fact, the state of security has dramatically worsened. Governance in both states is becoming, or has become, ineffective. Economic recovery is stalled and conditions indicate further recession is under way. The spillover effects of these failing states continue to be felt in Asian markets, reduced productivity of natural resources and, in Indonesia's case, more unstable transit routes through important straits. Meanwhile, the militaries are not actively contributing to reform and recovery.

CONCLUSIONS

Managing bilateral defense policies for Indonesia and Pakistan in the Post-Cold War period challenged U.S. policy officials. The policy dilemma has been to balance punishment with support for continued reform. Remarkably, reforms in both states are not completely off track. Indonesia has elected their parliament and president and vice president in remarkably free and fair democratic elections. While in Pakistan, marginal economic reforms continue, however, the unfortunate status quo of military prominence in politics remains.

Looking at defense relationships through the lens of maintaining and nurturing strategic interests set the course for this paper. Defined in the most current U.S. National Security Strategy, "Our strategy for enhancing U.S. security has three components: shaping the

international security environment, responding to threats and crises, and preparing for an uncertain future."[52] In states where militaries play an important, if not primary, role access and influence with the military is more important to meeting U.S. strategic interests than with states whose militaries are less dominant.

The cost of defense sanctions in some cases is high for the United States. In Indonesia and Pakistan, defense sanctions have uniquely hurt reform. Continued isolation of the militaries in both states by the Unites States neither empowered other state institutions, nor was a catalyst for fundamental change in the militaries. The net result of defense sanctions was to weaken the institutions of the armed forces and diminish the states of security to such an extent that progress in political, economic, or other civil-military reform essentially halted. The RAND Corporation study notes that continued collapse, or "...in the worst case, balkanization of Indonesia would generate widespread disorder and violence, provoke destabilizing refugee flows, depress investor confidence and sharpen Chinese hegemonic aspirations."[53] In Pakistan, the forecasts are equally dire. Stephen Cohen notes, "In the long term, Pakistan's fundamental social indicators are mostly pointing in the wrong direction. There is a race between the further decay of the socio-economy and the reforms that are slowly being implemented. Although the past year has seen a few successes, notably failures remain."[54]

Finally, sanctions resulted in a general diminishment of U.S. influence in Indonesia and Pakistan. The reliability that either regime will support U.S. requests for participation in responses to regional crises (i.e., the UN-led coalition against Iraq in 1991 and East Timor) is becoming increasingly less assured. The impact of influence is hard to measure, however, an excellent example is the influence then-CINC, USCENTCOM, General Anthony Zinni had with senior government and military leaders in Pakistan in light of destabilizing Pakistani troop movements in the Kashmir in June 1999. General Zinni's unique access to Pakistan's leadership[55] and his timely diplomacy led to Pakistan's military disengaging from the Line of Control (LOC) and the resulting de-escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan in the very volatile Kashmir region.

One policy does not necessarily fit all. In developing states whose militaries are prominent, severing ties has not been an impetus for regime changes, military reform, noticeable human rights improvements, or increased stability in the state or region. In fact, considering the conditions in Indonesia and Pakistan, the policy remedy of severing defense ties has not only been unsuccessful on the surface, but has, resulted in exacerbating the conditions which served to initially justify enacting the sanctions.

ENDNOTES

[1] Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, "Engaging Problem Countries," in Policy Brief No. 61, Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 2000), p. 1.

[2] Robert P. O'Quinn, "A User's Guide to Economic Sanctions", Backgrounder No. 1126, (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 25 June 1997), p.1.

[3] Ibid., p. 5.

[4] Charter of the United Nations, signed 26 Jun 1945 in San Francisco, California at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization and came into force on 24 October 1945.

[5] O'Quinn, "A User's Guide to Economic Sanctions", p. 5

[6] Discussions with Meghan O'Sullivan, Brookings Institution on 23 February 2001.

[7] William S. Cohen, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 1998), p. 8.

[8] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[9] William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 2000), Chapter Three.

[10] Dennis Blair, Fiscal Year 2001 Posture Statement, testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 March 2000).

[11] William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), p.3.

[12] Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds. The Pivotal States; A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), pp. 6-8. In this recent book the discussion of what determines a "pivotal state" is well articulated. Not detracting from the accepted value of "great powers," the authors have correctly specified that certain smaller powers also require U.S. attention. They close the discussion with, "Given the size, population, geostrategic position, economic potential, capacity to affect global and regional issues and the related criteria, they [listed as Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey] demand focused American attention."

[13] Paul F. Gardner, Shared Hopes, Separate Fears; Fifty Years of U.S. - Indonesian Relations; (Bolder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1997), p. 24.

[14] Dean Acheson; Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), p. 356.

[15] See Brian Evans, III, "The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army," (Cornell University, Master's Thesis, 1988).

[16] Gardner, op. cit., p. 197.

[17] Gardner, op.cit., p. 202.

[18] Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 338.

[19] Interview with Robert B. Oakley, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, The National Defense University, 11 March 2001.

[20] See Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts" (Washington, D.C.: Deputy for Financial Management Comptroller, DSCA, September 30, 1999). In FMS, Indonesia received 10% of Southeast Asia's allocation while the Philippines received 11% and in FMF expenditures, Indonesia received 16%, compared to the Philippines 15%. Indonesia received 8% of the region's IMET expenditures compared with the Philippines 9%.

[21] Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State, "U.S. Relations with Indonesia," Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 18, 1996.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] U.S. - Indonesia Society (USINDO) Conference Report, "Indonesia's Military: Backbone of the Nation or Achilles' Heel?," 28 March 2000, (unpublished), p. 19.

[25] Ibid. p. 20.

[26] See Gardner, op. cit., pp. 285-289. Indonesia's East Timor policy had long been a cause for concern and contention between the United States and Indonesia largely on grounds of human rights abuses. However, this was not always the case. The eastern half of the island of Timor had been a Portuguese colony for four centuries until a leftist coup assumed power in Lisbon and withdrew abruptly from its colony in August 1975. A Marxist party seized power in the desperately poor former colony, declared independence and Indonesia was faced with communism at its back door. In Vietnam, Saigon had just fallen to North Vietnam and the thought of potential communist expansion beyond Indochina precipitated a chance meeting between President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger and President Suharto in late 1975. It is widely reported that, upon hearing of Indonesia's plan to wage a fight against the communist uprising in East Timor, Kissinger responded that he understood that "the Indonesians had to do what they had to do." Indonesia launched an attack against East Timor's armed Marxist group, *FRETILIN* (*Frente Revolucionária De Timor-Leste Independente* or Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) in December of that year taking high casualties and committing Indonesia to a costly counterinsurgency war. The numbers of casualties are staggering; Indonesia lost over 130,000 and there is estimated that over 10,000 East Timorese died during the 24-year campaign. The 1991 'Dili Incident' became a watershed event, marking the failure of Indonesia's counterinsurgency policy and drawing international attention and sympathy for the East Timorese and against Indonesia.

[27] Angel Rabasa, "Preserving Stability and Democracy in Indonesia," in Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter, Zalmay Khalilzad, eds. *Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security*, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, November 2000), p. 93.

[28] Ibid.

[29] John B. Haseman, "To Change a Military - The Indonesian Experience," Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 2000), p. 26.

[30] See Congressional Record, S4721, "Upcoming Elections in Indonesia and the Future of East Timor," Senate, May 4, 1999.

[31] William Clinton, " Statement By The President On East Timor," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1999.

[32] Ibid.

[33] William Jefferson Clinton's address to the people of Pakistan, 25 March 2000 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 25 March 2000)

[34] Stephen P. Cohen, "A New Beginning in South Asia," Policy Brief , Number 55, The Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, January 2000)

[35] Stephen P. Cohen, "Partners or Friends? U.S. - Pakistan Security Relations Revisited," in Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose, eds. Pakistan- U.S. Relations: Social Political and Economic Factors, (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), p. 21.

[36] Barbara Leitch LePoer, "Pakistan - U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service Report, No. 94141, Updated January 24, 2001 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 1.

[37] Ibid., p. 23.

[38] Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan - U.S. Security Relations: Pakistani Perceptions of Key Issues," in Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose, eds. Pakistan- U.S. Relations: Social Political and Economic Factors, (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), pp. 14 - 15.

[39] Amendment proposed to Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in the Fiscal Year 1985 Appropriations Act by Senator Larry Pressler, referred to as 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

[40] Interview with Robert B. Oakley, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, The National Defense University, 11 March 2001.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Leitch LePoer, op. cit., p. 7.

[43] William C. Odom, Lieutenant General (Retired), "U.S. Military Assistance After the Cold War," Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment, June 16, 1993.

[44] Stephen P. Cohen, "Pakistan's Fear of Failure," The Asian Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2000.

[45] Melissa Iqbal and Teresita C. Schaffer, " Pakistan, The Middle East, And Central Asia," *South Asia Monitor*, Number 30, February 1, 2001, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies).

[46] Stephen Cohen, "Pakistan's Fear of Failure," op. cit.

[47] Ashley J. Tellis, "South Asia: U.S. Policy Choices," in Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter, Zalmay Khalilzad, eds. *Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security*, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, November 2000), p. 85.

[48] Richard N. Haass, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, March 3, 1999.

[49] Kanis Dursin, "Wahid's Enemies Plot an Islamic State," Asia Times, March 10, 2001.

[50] Robert B. Oakley; "Defense Diplomacy," paper for the 41st Annual International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference, September 1999

[51] Richard Haass, Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, March 3, 1999, op. cit.

[52] William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, op. cit., p.5.

[53] Angel Rabasa, "Preserving Stability and Democracy in Indonesia," in Frank Carlucci, Robert Hunter, Zalmay Khalilzad, eds. *Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security*, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, November 2000), p. 92.

[54] Stephen Cohen, "Pakistan's Fear of Failure," op. cit.

[55] Dana Priest; "An Engagement in 10 Time Zones; Zinni Crosses Central Asia, Holding Hands, Building Trust," Washington Post, 29 September 2000, Sect. A, p. 1. Priest comments "the 20 American ambassadors interviewed along the trip confirmed, no other U.S. official in the region spent more time trying to build relationships with nations where virtually none existed.

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