

Flightfax

ARMY AVIATION
RISK-MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION

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Aircrew Coordination

**being too polite can get
you killed**

Crew Coordination: Just Do it

Aircrew Coordination: we all talk about it; it's part of what we do every time we fly. It's as basic as a three way positive transfer of controls in the traffic pattern or as complicated as clearing the aircraft into a confined area, under goggles with zero moon illumination, or dealing with inadvertent IMC. We have all

been through academic and flight training to enhance crew coordination in the aircraft, but the investigators at the Safety Center continue to find cases where lapses in crew coordination directly contribute to serious accidents. Unfortunately, these lapses often occur during relatively routine situations.

NOT A TIME TO BE EXCESSIVELY POLITE

One of the shortcomings in crew coordination that often shows up in investigations is commonly referred to as "excessive professional courtesy." This can be simply defined as an aircrew member, in most cases an inexperienced one, not communicating when he/she perceives a hazard because the other pilot "must know what he's doing". This



reluctance to say anything to the more experienced aviator may be caused by a lack of personal confidence, overconfidence in the other aviator's ability, uncertainty that there truly is a hazard, or even fear that there may be reprisals from the more experienced aviator.

Two examples from recent accident investigations demonstrate this crew coordination breakdown. Fortunately in both cases, all the crewmembers were available for interview by the accident board. In the first

case, a UH-60 was conducting training under night vision goggles in an extremely dusty environment. The PI, who had been flying for most of the period, was a 600-hour aviator. The IP had over 8,000 hours of flight time and was highly respected for his abilities. On the takeoff that resulted in the accident, the IP was on the controls. As the aircraft took off into the dust cloud the PI and both crew chiefs sensed that the aircraft was in

a left turn. None of them said anything over the intercom. They all became concerned when they didn't break out of the dust and then the aircraft contacted the ground, rolled over, and was destroyed. The board found that the aircraft had indeed been in a left turn from immediately after takeoff. This left turn had changed a stiff right crosswind into a tailwind. Once the aircraft was in the tailwind condition, it couldn't clear the dust cloud because the power application was not sufficient to establish a climb.

In the second case a helicopter was hovering close to an obstacle on a nearly perfect day. The crew had conducted the maneuver numerous times before and was confident in their ability to do it again. The more experienced IP was on the controls and closest to the obstacles. The PI was seated in the aircraft away from the obstacle, but thought the aircraft was lower and closer to the obstacle than in previous iterations. He didn't say anything to the IP because he was sure the IP would maintain sufficient clearance. As the aircraft hovered and unloaded troops, the rotor system contacted the obstacle. The aircraft began to vibrate severely and was eventually destroyed in the accident.

In both of these cases, crewmembers knew that the operation was not going precisely as planned. They either sensed or saw that the pilot on the controls was doing something that was not

expected. In both cases the deviation from the plan was small and not expected to cause any problems. **AND IN BOTH CASES A QUICK COMMENT OVER THE INTERCOM COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ACCIDENT!!!!!!!**

So as a crewmember, what do you do? First and foremost, everyone in the crew must understand his or her responsibilities as far as crew coordination is concerned. Experienced aviators must ensure their fellow crewmembers understand the responsibility to speak up if they think that something's not quite right. The experienced members of the crew need to mentor less experienced members in the knowledge that while we all make individual mistakes on occasion, and only as an integrated, working crew can missions best be accomplished safely.

Lastly, for the "new guys", know your responsibilities. Every aircraft's aircrew training manual has standards for crew coordination. Know them and meet them. Talk to the Instructor Pilots, Unit Trainers, and Pilots in Command that you fly with. You will find that if you are familiar with the standards and demonstrate that you want to do things the right way, they will not only welcome it, but you may be able to mentor the old guys a little.

—LTC W.R. McInnis, Director of Operations, USASC, DSN 558-2461 (334) 255-2461, mcinnis@safetycenter.army.mil

ACT Revisited

The current Army Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) program does not adequately support the dramatic changes in Army aviation mission complexity, operations tempo, declining experience levels, and modernized systems.

This is the initial finding of the group tasked with enhancing the Army's Aircrew Coordination Training program. The purpose of this effort is to improve the crew and team coordination effectiveness of Army aircrews and aviation leaders. This program can provide a tool for leaders at all levels.

The enhanced ACT program will build on the original exportable training package, revitalizing it from a one-time training event and enhancing it to a dynamic, relevant program that is continuously updated and improved.

The plan provides a proactive, multi-phased course of continuous improvement to maximize Army aviation modernization investments and complement leadership training initiatives. The current ACT Enhancement program, with its focus on upgrading and sustaining ACT, constitutes Phase One.

PHASE ONE: UPGRADE AND SUSTAIN THE CURRENT ACT PROGRAM

Major actions in this phase include:

- Establish an interim

Aircrew Coordination Working Group (ACWG) to guide the ACTE applied research effort.

- Review current programs.

- Include information and discussion on ACT policy and program enhancement initiatives in aviation leader conferences.

- Recommend adding ACT as a permanent item of interest for Senior Readiness Oversight Council.

- Develop a behaviorally-anchored ACT performance evaluation system.

- Develop core-training modules.

- Pre-test courses of instruction.

- Demonstrate and validate courseware.

- Field test and refine courseware with both active and reserve units.

- Develop an evaluation-based feedback system to evaluate, manage, and maintain overall program effectiveness.

PHASE TWO: REFRESH AND MAINTAIN THE UPGRADED SUSTAINMENT PROGRAM

Phase Two completes the applied research effort and will further advance the upgraded program by establishing a permanent ACT working group consisting of Interim ACWG plus Major Command, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve representatives,

Eight elements of crew

1. Communicate positively—sender direct
2. Direct assistance
3. Offer assistance
4. Announce actions
5. Acknowledge actions—repeat critical
6. Be explicit
7. Provide aircraft control and obstacle
8. Coordinate action sequence and time receive clear acknowledgement and

designating an ACT program manager and instructional model manager, and developing a separate ACT policy or preparing an ACT specific supplement to TC 1-200. Additional Phase Two major actions will include:

- Tailor training scenarios for specific aircraft and missions.

- Integrate ACT into Readiness Level training, APART evaluations, and Flight School XXI.

- Provide an accident investigation tool and training materials for accident investigations and field use.

- Include ACT in distance learning developments.

- Develop a web site for ACT related data and anonymous reporting.

PHASE THREE: DEVELOP AND DEPLOY ADVANCED APPLICATIONS

Phase Three incorporates the prototype training products into normal flying operations and deploys advanced ACT applications. This final phase

ew coordination

cts and receiver acknowledges

l parts

advisory

ng – Request tail clear,
urn tail

will include the development of training packages for non-rated crewmembers and implementation of the accident investigation tool. Additional Phase Three tasks will include:

- Develop advanced ACT scenarios for AVCATT or reconfigurable simulator, e.g., multiple aircraft team

operations and UAV interactions.

- Develop a web-based repository for ACT training resources, applications examples, and lessons learned.

- Establish an ACT Operations and Maintenance recurring funding plan.

- Establish a formal team training and evaluation research and development program.

A FORUM FOR INPUT

The Army's ACT program effectiveness has greatly declined since 1995. It needs revitalizing.


We now have the opportunity to: 1) integrate ACT into all aspects of aviation operations, 2) reinforce ACT in the Flight School XXI initiatives to include aviation leadership training and junior officer professional

development, 3) incorporate ACT into all aspects of mission training, 4) recognize ACT as a key component in Army aviation's risk management and decision making process and controls, and 5) capitalize on advances in distance learning and web-based instructional technologies. The Army Research Institute and USAAVNC believe that the current revitalization plan will accomplish these goals, but they would like input from you to keep them on course. You can provide your feedback by visiting the ACT Enhancement website at <http://teams.drc.com> and clicking on Flightfax Feedback. Expect to see periodic progress reports and feedback articles in future issues of Flightfax.

—Dr. Larry Katz, Research Psychologist, Army Research Institute Rotary Wing Aviation Research Unit, Fort Rucker, AL 36362, DSN 558-2385, katzl@rwaru.army.mil

Researching Mars and Venus Communicating in the Cockpit

Research in the social sciences has found that men and women communicate differently and for different reasons, a concept popularized by John Gray's "Men Are From Mars, Women Are From Venus." Much of the communication in aviation is procedural and well structured, but unclear or ineffective communication remains a frequent contributor to mishaps. Because females presently comprise about 7 percent of all Army aviators, we are investigating whether gender-related differences might impact crew coordination. Please consider completing a short survey that can be found at the following web address: <http://act.drc.com/Flightfax>. Information provided will be used by the U.S. Army Research Institute to assist in the current development of an enhanced aircrew coordination training program. Thank you for your assistance.



A simple failure to communicate

During an aerial gunnery exercise at a multipurpose range complex in Korea, the pilot was having trouble finding the targets. For three attempts his difficulties continued. On the fourth attempt, the pilot informed the instructor pilot that he had it, meaning that he had the targets in sight. On looking back on the incident with 20-20 hindsight, it is possible that those words may have had more than one interpretation.

All went well for the first couple of seconds. Then the aircraft started drifting to the right, nose pointing down. The pilot, who had many years of flying experience, became

aware of the possibility that the instructor pilot was no longer flying the aircraft. He must have assumed the pilot was flying. The pilot recovered the aircraft and continued flying downrange.

The above scenario actually happened. The outcome could have been disastrous, but for the experience of the pilot who was not intimidated by the instructor pilot. A positive hand-off of the controls is needed, whatever the level of the pilots' experience.

A less-experienced pilot, intimidated by the instructor pilot, may not have realized that the aircraft was not being flown. The instructor pilot, thinking that the pilot was on

the controls, may not have realized that there was no one actually on the controls until it was too late to make a successful recovery. The result could have been the loss of an aircraft, and possibly injury or death to the crew.

All through flight school, advanced training, and in units, positive hand off of the flight controls is stressed. Yet even when experienced pilots are flying together, it can be assumed that the "other one" has the controls. This is a good lesson on why positive hand off of the controls is stressed, and why it should always be followed.

—Michael T. Minson, 22 ASG Safety Office, Camp Daray, Italy. DSN 634-7045, michael.minson@setaf.army.mil

Coming Next Month in Flightfax

Next month's issue of *Flightfax* is a quantum leap forward in our history. Since 1972, we've been the official safety publication for Army aviation, bringing you stories and facts to help keep aviators out of harm's way.

Every month, we land in mailboxes and day rooms at Army installations around the globe. Over 15,000 copies are distributed and read by soldiers in the field (we've even heard tales that we are standard reading material in latrines). We hear from readers who access our publication on the safety center website at <http://safety.army.mil>, as well as those who read the traditional paper version.

We hope that you've found *Flightfax* to be a helpful and readable tool for the past 28-plus years. Now we come to the end of our black and white era. In August 2001, we'll be coming to you in vivid full-color. We hope this makes *Flightfax* livelier, more readable, and more interesting for you. But the bottom line, as always, is to send you the lessons learned about the principles of risk management, and to keep Army aviation's soldiers alive.



Safety Alert Notification

UH-60 Main Rotor Blade Expandable Pin

A Category One Quality Deficiency Report has identified a serious problem with UH-60 main rotor blade expandable pins manufactured by APEX with serial numbers 0001-3800. This problem led the leadership of the Army to issue Safety of Flight (SOF) Message UH-60-01-09 that requires removal of all pins produced by APEX Corporation with the aforementioned serial numbers and a one-time inspection of all other main rotor blade expandable pins.

Summary of the Problem: A main rotor blade expandable pin was discovered with a crack in the cam handle that, if left uncorrected, could have resulted in a catastrophic failure and the loss of a main rotor blade. The material investigation indicated that the cracking was due to stress and corrosion. Pins currently in the inventory from APEX with serial numbers


0001-3800 are susceptible to this failure prior to normal wear out times because of a manufacturing defect. In order to control the risks these cracks present, the Army leadership has determined that the specified APEX pins are not safe for flight and must be removed. Additionally, all other main rotor blade expandable pins will undergo a one-time inspection with 10 power magnification for cracks and corrosion.

It is going to take a cooperative effort to ensure that we have safe aircraft to fly. Leaders must make sure that the SOF message is disseminated to all personnel and that all main rotor blade expandable pins produced by APEX are removed. This will

require a visual inspection of each aircraft to ensure all APEX pins are properly identified and removed. Additionally, leaders will have to ensure that appropriately trained and experienced personnel, technical inspectors, conduct the one time inspection of the remainder of the pins.

The Army leadership is developing a plan to provide replacement pins to the field at the earliest possible date. Until the replacement APEX pins become available, only pins manufactured by Avibank and Shur-lok Corporation are authorized for flight, and only after the appropriate one time inspection.

Gene M. LaCoste
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Army Safety



Laser FAQs: A Three part series begins

Part I, Lasers and aviation on the modern battlefield

The U.S. Army fields a number of laser systems. They primarily are used as range finders or designators. The first systems were fielded in the early 1970s. Yet, even today, lasers are a source of much misunderstanding. This article, the first of a three-part series which looks at lasers, laser protection and laser injuries as they apply to the aviator in the cockpit, attempts to address this confusion.

Q: How does laser light differ from "normal" light?

A: While "light" is "light," light produced by a laser has three unusual properties. The first is that laser light (energy) is emitted on a very narrow band of wavelengths. A second property is that laser energy can travel greater distances with very little spreading out (divergence). Laser beams have been bounced off the moon. The third property is called coherence, which means the light waves from a laser are in phase with one another.

Q: How are lasers named or classified?

A: A given laser can be classified in several ways. One way is by the region of the electromagnetic spectrum in which the laser energy

is emitted; e.g., visible, infrared (IR), or x-ray. This is defined by the laser's wavelength (measured in nanometers [nm]). Another way is by whether the laser produces a continuous beam or a series of pulses. Or, lasers can be named according to the optical medium used within the laser to produce the light; e.g., gas, solid-state, dye, etc. The most common military laser in aviation is the Nd:YAG laser (operating at 1064 nanometers in the infrared) used in rangefinders such as on the Apache.

Q: How far away from a laser do I have to be to be totally safe?

A: The distance from a laser beyond which the maximum permissible exposure (MPE) is not exceeded is known as the "Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance (NOHD)". For military lasers, this distance can be up to 10 kilometers for the unaided eye and up to 100 kilometers if viewed through unprotected optics.

Q: How do lasers vary in power?

A: Laser power is measured in units called "watts." Lasers, such as those used in science classrooms, are measured in thousandths of

a watt or "milliwatts."

Industrial lasers can range in the thousands of watts or "kilowatts." Pulsed lasers can deliver power in the "megawatts per pulse" range. Lasers can be classified by their power output (Class 1,2,3,or 4). The lowest power lasers, Class 1, are those that, under normal conditions, cannot cause damage even when viewed directly. Class 4 lasers are high power lasers capable of causing fires, damage to the skin, and damage to the eye, potentially even from reflections.

Q: What is a visible laser?

A: Any laser operating at a wavelength between 380-730 nm can be seen by the human eye. You can expect to encounter a variety of "colors" from common laser pointers ranging from blue (480 nm) to green (532 nm) to red (670 nm).

Q: Are there lasers I can't see?

A: Yes, military laser rangefinders/ designators operate at longer wavelengths and are not visible. Such lasers emit at wavelengths greater than 780 nm and are referred to as infrared lasers. Even though you can't see infrared

lasers, the eye can still focus this energy on the retina creating the potential for injury.

Q: Can a laser change its wavelength?

A: Currently, all lasers you might encounter are single or "fixed wavelength" lasers. However, "tunable or agile" lasers exist in the laboratory. These lasers have the ability to change the wavelength at which they produce energy.

Q: What type of laser is used on the AH-64 and OH-58D?

A: The rangefinder/designator on the AH-64 and OH-58D is a Neodymium:YAG pulsed laser. It is a solid-state laser using an yttrium-aluminum-garnet (YAG) crystal as the lasing medium. It produces non-visible laser energy pulses in the infrared at approximately 1064 nm. Pulsed lasers put out energy in a single pulse or in a train of pulses. The important characteristics of pulsed lasers are their pulse frequency rates (PFR) and their energy or power per pulse. The most common pulsed laser is called a Q-switched laser. Its pulses are typically 20 billionth of a second long but can deliver a million watts or more of power per pulse.

Q: Are lasers a threat to me?

A: Yes, although lasers have been around for a long time, today they are cheaper, smaller, more easily obtained, and produce more energy than in the past. The number of reported laser incidents to date is small, but the potential for such incidents is growing

significantly. Of greatest concern to the aviator is the impact of laser exposure to the eye, the results of which could include dazzle, flash blindness, and retinal damage. And, yes, they are a threat not only from direct viewing such as might occur during force on force training, but also from reflections during firing range exercises. Rangefinders are also a hazard to maintenance personnel.

Q: Does my aircraft windshield stop laser energy?

A: In general, no. The typical aircraft windshield is highly transmissive to both visible and near-infrared lasers. It will stop ultraviolet and far-infrared lasers, but these are the least likely to be encountered.

Q: Is there such a thing as an "eye safe" laser?

A: The claim of being "eye safe" means that you supposedly are able to view the laser directly without incurring damage to the eye. This phrase is often misused. A wise philosophy is never to intentionally look directly into any laser device.

Q: Should I worry about the laser pointers being sold in department stores?

A: Yes and no. Laser pointers are inexpensive (\$5 to \$500) and readily available. They produce laser energy in a variety of colors (wavelengths), mostly green and red. These devices are very low power and unlikely to be a source of damage to

the aviator. However, they are capable of producing dazzle (a temporary loss of vision that will return immediately when the light source is removed) or flash-blindness (again, a temporary loss of vision, but this loss can persist for several minutes even after the laser source is no longer present). These effects are similar to being "blinded" by a bright light or flashbulb. It is obvious that even the temporary loss of vision in the aviation environment could have catastrophic results. USACHPPM has developed an excellent web-based presentation on laser pointers available from their site at <http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/laser/laser.html>. Safety officers can request it in various computer media formats.

Q: Where can I get more information on lasers?

A: Questions about lasers can be answered by contacting USACHPPM, Laser/Optical Radiation Program, DSN 584-3932 or COM (410) 671-3932.

Q: What is the Army doing about laser protection issues?

A: Due to the continuing change in the laser threat, providing protection has been a game of trying to catch up. Next month, Part II of this laser series will look at the issues of laser protection and what is available.

—Clarence E. Rash, research physicist, USAARL, DSN 558-6814, (334) 255-6814, Clarence.rash@se.amedd.army.mil; Jim Hauser, product engineer, PM-AES, DSN 897-4267, (256) 313-4267, jim.hauser@peoavn.redstone.army.mil

NGO Corner

NEW AVIATION TOOL SYSTEM (NATS)


POSITIVE SAFETY RESULTS SHOW THE VALUE OF ARMY'S NEW AVIATION TOOL SYSTEM (NATS)

It took a bit of time and "doing" to gain program approval and then to accomplish design, testing, and reconfiguration and, finally, fielding of NATS. But now the Army is beginning to reap the positive results envisioned several years ago for the new tool system.

NATS is a tool system designed to bring about a new level of tool control and accountability. It supports AR 385-95, *Army Accident Prevention*, which requires commanders to establish foreign object damage (FOD) prevention programs that, in turn, require unit personnel to "ensure all tools, hardware and other equipment are properly accounted for at the end of each maintenance operation." NATS and this regulation, working together, will substantially reduce FOD and increase safety in Army aviation.

Since Army aviation began,

there has been a not-so-well-appreciated discipline required of aviation maintenance personnel. That discipline is tool control. Because of the potential negative impact of improper tool control upon the safety of the aviator and his/her equipment, as well as the responsible aviation mechanic, there has been significant interest in finding "a better way." Ultimately, this concern led to outright insistence upon what has evolved into NATS. Approval of NATS for Army aviation provided an opportunity to satisfy an



additional long-standing request from mechanics—higher quality tools.

Recently, the Aviation Ground Support Equipment (AGSE) office at Huntsville, Alabama received an e-mail from an OH-58 maintenance test pilot who had been about to test fly an aircraft after the crew chief had made an adjustment to the pitch change links which connect the flight controls to the rotor head. He

inspected the adjustments and then looked around the area for tools and other debris. He did not notice anything out of the ordinary.

As he walked by the mechanic's toolbox, he observed that an open-end wrench was missing from its slot. He humorously inquired if the mechanic had "Lost his tools already." The mechanic replied that he had them all before he started the repair. Fortunately, the test pilot got back on the aircraft and found the missing wrench stuck in the aircraft rotor system

swashplate. How unfortunate it might have been if the pre-NATS toolboxes (the ones without the NATS instant inventory feature) had still been in service. Possibly the test pilot would have started the aircraft and done severe damage to both the aircraft

and, he says, "my ego."

Even though the tool control features that are designed into the NATS tools have proven effective, the mechanic must follow a disciplined tool control process. He must ensure that all toolboxes have been returned to the toolbox at the end of each aircraft maintenance task. Field Manual 1-500, *Army Aviation Maintenance*, requires this process.

—AMCOM AGSE office
John Lewis (256)430-1610 X 118

Accident briefs

Information based on preliminary reports of aircraft accidents

AH6



Class C

C series

■ During aircraft familiarization training, right skid became hooked under a perforated steel plate expansion joint. Part of the skid was torn off. Damage to the right skid, front right landing gear and surrounding sheet metal where the strut enters the lower fuselage.

AH64



Class E


A series

■ During take-off from airfield, aircraft's stabilator auto mode failed with audio, and would not reset to auto mode, and IP manually controlled stabilator. After aircraft turned downwind, manual control could not be maintained. During approach, IP reset stabilator and auto mode was restored. Aircraft was landed and shut down without further incident. Maintenance replaced stabilator transducer.

D series

■ During confined area operations utilizing the night vision system, aircraft's aft deck fire audio, caution warning and up-front display (Deck Fire) illuminated. Aircraft was landed and shut down without further incident. No visible signs of fire were present to crew. Replaced aft deck fire overheat detector.

OH58



Class C

C series

■ Damage to aircraft was discovered during a 10 percent QDA inspection. Damage consisted of several small holes and a large gouge to aircraft's underbelly between forward and aft landing gear cross tubes near the fuel drain.

D-R series

■ During nap-of-the-earth, night vision goggle flight, wire strike protection system contacted the ground.

CH47



Class D

D series

■ Aircraft was run up and take off initiated for training mission with AFCS deactivated. Upon touchdown, aircraft landed on a fire extinguisher, damaging the aircraft's ramp, operating cylinder and strut.

RC7




Class E

B series

■ During normal taxi after normal landing, pilot flying felt abnormal brake action. Pilot not flying verified HYD #1 reservoir quantity read zero. Crew terminated flight and returned to parking with no further incident. Hydraulic line nut was found to be loose.

■ Number 4 Engine oil segment light and master caution light illuminated during flight. Oil pressure was confirmed below 75 PSI. Engine was shut down with precautionary engine shut-down check-list. Flight continued to home station on three engines with no further incident. Maintenance replaced oil seal.

UH1



Class E

H series

■ While in flight, crew smelled a faint odor of burning wire. PI shot an approach into an approved LZ and came to a stationary 3-5 ft hover. Crew chief opened cargo door and noticed smoke coming from engine compartment. Aircraft was set down and starter-generator was found smoking. No open flame was observed. Flight was terminated. Maintenance replaced the starter generator.

TH67



Class C

■ After engine start, during throttle roll-up, aircraft engine N2 overspeed to 114 percent occurred.

UH60



Class C

A series

■ Post-evaluation flight inspection revealed damage to the intermediate gearbox cover, two main rotor tip caps, and tail rotor drive shaft. Damage is suspected to have occurred during a high-speed landing demonstration.

■ A parked aircraft, chocked and tied down with mooring chains, sustained damage to the lower right forward section of its tailboom from the rotor wash of another aircraft hovering in close vicinity. Aircraft reportedly rotated about the left landing gear.

L series

■ During live rescue hoist training, the soldier in the basket began to spin at a high rate as the basket got closer to the aircraft. Upon reaching the door the soldier in the basket stuck out his foot to arrest the spin and contacted the crew chief in the upper thigh. The contact resulted in a severe bruise to the crew chief. The crew chief was placed on 10 days bed rest with resultant loss of work days.

Class E

L series

■ The stabilator auto mode failed after takeoff. After pilot attempted slewing the stabilator to flat pitch, auto control did not reset and sequentially failed to reset a second time. The pilot terminated the flight at a satellite airfield. The flight ended without further incident. Maintenance replaced the stabilator actuator.

UC35



Class C

A series

■ Aircraft encountered weather with hail in flight. Postflight inspection revealed hail damage to radome and rubber de-icer boots.

For more information on selected accident briefs, call DSN 558-9855 (334-255-9855). Note: Information published in this section is based on preliminary mishap reports submitted by units and is subject to change.

2001 Aviation Life Support Equipment User's Conference

The 2001 ALSE (Aviation Life Support Equipment) user's conference will be held at the Rocket Auditorium, Redstone Arsenal, AL on 17-18-19 July. Commanders, ALSE officers and technicians, unit Safety officers and other interested personnel are invited to attend. There will be no conference fee charged this year. A block of one

hundred rooms is reserved at the Huntsville Hilton (256-533-1500 or 800-445-8667). Mention you are attending the conference in order to get the per diem rate.

If you are interested in making a presentation or would like a particular topic covered during the conference, notify the Program Manager Aircrew Integrated System (PM ACIS) point of contact before 15 Jun 01. A copy of the

briefings/presentations should also be forwarded to the PM ACIS point of contact. Those planning to attend should notify PM ACIS by 15 Jun 01.

The dress for the conference attendees is BDU/ABDU or class B uniform. The last day of the conference civilian attire is acceptable.

The PM ACIS points of contact are: Melanie Barksdale, (256)313-4269, melanie.barksdale@pcoavn.redstone.army.mil; or John Jolly, (256)313-4262, john.jolly@pcoavn.redstone.army.mil

Correction for July issue

In the April 2001 issue of Flightfax, in the "Speaking of harnesses" story, we incorrectly identified the Advisory Message. The correct numbers are AIS 97-09, which relates to the leg straps of the Safety Vest with proper adjusters, spring loaded lockbar installed.

Thanks to SSG Gary L. House of Fort Rucker for pointing out the correct information.

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POV Fatalities



through 31 May

FY01
60

FY00
75



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Brigadier General, USA
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