TRADOC Bulletin 6: Countersurveillance and Camouflage
Abstract
To be seen is to be hit! To be hit is to be killed! These are truths of modern warfare borne out by an evaluation of weapons capabilities exhibited in the Yom Kippur War. Historical examples of the importance of camouflage abound. A classic case is the concentration of Russian troops into striking positions around Stalingrad. The large distances involved and the many routes over which the Russians could move were points in their favor. But they expanded those advantages through tight mail censorship, artful camouflage of poSitionS and equipment, and stringent radio discipline. To the north of Stalingrad, forests were used to help conceal movement. In the south the Russian commander, by moving only at night and hiding vehicles under piles of branches or grass thatch covers during the day, was able to move his units across the open steppes undetected. The operation was so successful that after the war the German Chief of Operations stated, "We had absolutely no idea of the strength of the Russian forces in this area. Prior to this there had been nothing in the area, and suddenly a thrust of enormous force, of decisive significance....The Russians have not forgotten this lesson. They habitually employ camouflage with a high level of discipline to the present day. A more recent occurrence shows how camouflage may be combined with deception on a large scale for effective results. In the 1973 Mid-East War, the Arab forces made extensive use of camouflage nets. Israeli pilots were able to report hitting nets, but it was not clear what was destroyed: a SAM--or an empty net. In both examples hostilities had already been in progress, but it is even more critical that we be strongly camouflage-conscious before war breaks out to insure that we win the first battle!
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 30, 1976
- Accession Number
- ADA392781
Entities
Organizations
- United States Army Training and Doctrine Command