

JOINT VISION 2010

A CATALYST FOR US MILITARY SERVICE VISIONS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY

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Contents

	<i>Page</i>
DISCLAIMER	ii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	v
LIST OF TABLES	vi
PREFACE.....	vii
ABSTRACT.....	viii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
THE IMPETUS BEHIND A JOINT VISION.....	5
A COMMON DIRECTION FOR THE FUTURE.....	10
SERVICE PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS	14
Army Vision 2010.....	15
Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force	17
Forward ...From The Sea	19
Operational Maneuver from the Sea	21
THREADS OF CONTINUITY	27
SOME CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING JOINT VISION 2010.....	32
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS.....	37
APPENDIX A: TITLE 10 U.S.C. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE US ARMED FORCES.....	41
APPENDIX B: JOINT AND SERVICE VISIONS—SUPPORTING INFORMATION.....	44
Joint Vision 2010’s “Critical Considerations”	44
US Army “Patterns of Operation”	45
US Air Force “Core Competencies”	47
Operational Maneuver from the Sea Focus Areas	47
GLOSSARY.....	50

BIBLIOGRAPHY	51
--------------------	----

Illustrations

Page

Figure 1. Common Themes in Joint Vision 2010 and Service Vision Statements.....	28
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Tables

	<i>Page</i>
Table 1. Joint Vision 2010’s Operational Concepts	12
Table 2. US Army “Patterns of Operation” and JV 2010’s Operational Concepts	46
Table 3. US Air Force “Core Competencies” and JV 2010’s Operational Concepts	47

Preface

The global strategic environment that existed during the Cold War is difficult to recognize today. As they prepare for the next century, the US Armed Forces face a new array of opportunities, challenges, and uncertainties. If their strategic vision statements are any indication, however, the Services appear to be headed in the right direction. *Joint Vision (JV) 2010* is a landmark achievement for the Department of Defense (DOD). By defining the total future warfighting requirement, it provides a guide post for turning operational concepts and revolutionary ideas into new military capabilities. In turn, *JV 2010* can also help coalesce Service and unified command efforts during increasingly difficult times for America's military. Today's and tomorrow's warfighters must engage in energetic debate to further define *JV 2010's* concepts, discover the implications for future joint and multinational operations, and translate its ideas into reality. *JV 2010* is the first step on the arduous, yet exciting, road that lies ahead.

I would like to acknowledge my research advisor, Commander Mitchell Alexander, US Navy, for his guidance and critical insight during this research effort. I would also like to thank my family for their infinite patience, love, and support, and for being a constant reminder of why I proudly serve in the world's greatest military.

Abstract

In July 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) unveiled a 21st-century vision statement as a call to arms for the Department of Defense (DOD) to “achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”¹ Titled *Joint Vision (JV) 2010*, its publication offers an opportunity for comparison between joint and Service warfighting² perspectives. *JV 2010* provides a catalyst for critical thought and debate on military operations, as well as Service roles in the future geostrategic environment. *JV 2010*’s release also coincides with Service efforts to refine their strategic visions, amidst the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The author examines *JV 2010* and Service vision documents to ascertain incongruities, reveal implementation challenges, and identify areas for further study. This paper shows that, while Service visions are generally in line with the joint vision, they are presented from Service-unique warfighting perspectives, and also contain distinct elements of interservice rivalry, both of which could hamper efforts to implement *JV 2010*.

Notes

¹Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, July 1996, 1.

²Throughout this paper the term “warfighting” refers to the entire continuum of military operation—from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to total war—including types of operations that do not exist today but may in the early 21st century. The term also covers activities related to the organization, development, and application of military forces to execute military operations.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The central purpose of the Department of Defense is to conduct effective military operations in pursuit of America's National Security Strategy...every DOD element must focus on supporting the operations of the unified commanders in chief. Everything else DOD does, from furnishing health care to developing new weapons, should support that effort.

—Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
Final Report to Congress, May 1995

In July 1996 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) published *Joint Vision (JV) 2010*, a 21st-century “conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of [its] people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”¹ An ambitious endeavor indeed, but one the Department of Defense (DOD) appears to be taking seriously.² *JV 2010* presents a timely opportunity for comparison of joint and Service visionary perspectives, which is especially relevant given diminishing defense budgets and increased operational demands for the US military, coupled with the dynamics and uncertainty forecast in the future geostrategic environment.

One of the principal goals of *JV 2010* is to provide a common framework for all DOD components as they prepare for the next century.³ This paper’s central thesis is that, given the reality of continued DOD downsizing, if the Services are to remain competitive—and

perhaps ultimately, if they are to survive—they must embrace a common, shared vision, incorporate it into their strategic plans, and strive to attain it.

The author therefore explores whether *JV 2010* can be both the unifying force and stimulus it professes to be, given current Service ideas about future warfighting. In late 1996, both the US Army and US Air Force released new vision statements intended to parallel the joint vision, while the US Naval Services⁴ were preparing to update their strategic vision at the time this paper was written. This paper compares and contrasts *JV 2010* with the most recent, published Service vision documents—the Army's *Army Vision 2010*; the Air Force's *Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*; the Navy's *Forward ...From The Sea*; and the Marine Corps' *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*. The goal is to discover discrepancies between joint and Service schools of thought that could endanger *JV 2010*'s successful implementation. Based on this comparative analysis, the author also examines some challenges to achieving the joint vision.

The intent of this paper is neither to critique *JV 2010* nor the Service vision statements as credible or viable strategic planning documents. The author recognizes that each document represents the legitimate, concerted effort by the Services and combatant commanders⁵ to chart a reachable course for the future. Rather, the author is interested in assessing congruency between these visions, to identify discontinuities and contentious areas. This paper strives to provoke those involved with implementing *JV 2010* and developing Service strategic plans.⁶ On a wider scale, this paper also serves to educate the reader on the major joint and Service visionary concepts and highlight some macro-level issues associated with implementing these visions.

This paper argues that, although Service visions share the same fundamental precepts as those espoused in *JV 2010*, they are tailored to each Service's operational medium—land, sea, air, and space—and are therefore bounded by distinct warfighting perspectives. This could present serious challenges to implementing *JV 2010*. Moreover, even if there was DOD-wide agreement on what *JV 2010* means, much remains to be done to translate its ambitious concepts into tangible, operational capabilities for warfighters.

The limited amount of public information available on *JV 2010* became this research effort's most significant limitation. Since *JV 2010* was published in July 1996, the public record contains few sources from which to assess its impact or debate its effectiveness. In addition, the most recent US Navy and US Marine Corps vision documents predate *JV 2010* by more than one year. The author therefore relied on statements made by senior Pentagon leaders and other US government officials to bridge the information gap. In addition, since the Services are just now assessing the joint vision and its possible impacts, it is too early to find tangible evidence of *JV 2010* being implemented. Obviously, the current QDR compounds this problem, as the Services tend to delay decisions pending the quadrennial review's outcome. Consequently, the author's challenge was to weed through official statements to find hard evidence that *JV 2010* is being institutionalized by the Services. Although the true test will occur many years from now, planning must begin now if *JV 2010* is to be realized in the next 10–15 years.

This paper is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research topic, its contemporary relevance, and the methodology used to examine the author's thesis. Chapter 2 presents some contextual elements that led to the creation of *JV 2010*, particularly the Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. *JV 2010*'s major

ideas are described in chapter 3, and chapter 4 introduces the four Service vision documents. Chapter 5 examines the similarities and differences between joint and Service visions. Chapter 6 considers *JV 2010* implementation issues and areas for further study, while chapter 7 presents the author's conclusions.

Notes

¹Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, July 1996, 1.

²Gen John M. Shalikashvili, "Posture Statement," made before the 105th Congress, Washington, D.C., 12 February 1997, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 18 February 1997, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/97postur.html>.

³Compounding the many challenges to implementing *JV 2010* is the current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a bottom-up examination expected to significantly reshape the DOD. The QDR—also called the quadrennial "budget review"—was mandated by Congress, in part due to the recommendations of the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. Among other things, its purpose is to ". . . consider recent and anticipated geopolitical and policy changes, technological developments, opportunities for shaping the security environment, the plausible range of DOD budget levels, and a robust set of force and capability options." The current QDR is expected to be complete by mid-1997. See "Executive Summary, 'Directions for Defense'," *Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces Report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 24 May 1995.

⁴The phrase "naval Services" used throughout this paper is consistent with Title 10, United States Code, and refers to the US Navy and US Marine Corps. Within the context of joint warfighting, the US Coast Guard is also considered an element of the US naval Services, although it normally operates as an agency of the US Department of Transportation. The author's comparative analysis does not address the Coast Guard separately; rather, it is addressed as a warfighting component of the US naval Services.

⁵The terms "combatant commander," "unified commander," and "Commander-in-Chief (CINC)," are used interchangeably throughout this paper to denote "a commander in chief of one of the unified commands established by the President." (Joint Pub 1-02) A "unified" or "combatant" command is "a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments." (Joint Pub 1-02)

⁶This paper is also expected to be added to a *JV 2010* database maintained at the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), Fort Monroe, Virginia—the JCS-designated implementing agency for *JV 2010*.

Chapter 2

The Impetus Behind a Joint Vision

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service and Unified Command visions.

—General John M. Shalikashvili
Joint Vision 2010

Within three years after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, each US military Service had produced a new, post–Cold War strategic vision. However, despite increased Service efforts directed toward improving joint operations, a comprehensive, joint, DOD–wide vision was conspicuously absent until 1996. The prescriptions of the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization Act notwithstanding, DOD resistance to reform and lingering preoccupation with the Cold War impeded initial reorganization efforts. Spurred by the US Congress, and cognizant of changes forecast in the geostrategic environment, the CJCS concluded in 1993 that the DOD needed a strategic vision to focus its efforts, to meet 21st–century challenges and leverage emerging technologies to develop new warfighting capabilities.¹

Goldwater–Nichols did not come into being without a determined effort by its proponents. Concerned about losing authority and relinquishing operational missions to a

joint system, the US military Services resisted reorganization for five years before Congress was able to successfully pass legislation. The driving force behind the legislation was Congress' perception that the Services wielded power and influence that appeared to exceed their Title 10 authority,² and hence did not have the incentive to integrate their separate capabilities to improve joint operations.³ Service preoccupation with institutional roles hampered unified command efforts to develop joint operations plans, and combatant commanders were seldom able to influence Service force structure planning and procurement strategies.⁴

Congress became concerned that civilian control over the military—specifically by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Service secretaries—was being weakened by the JCS' reluctance to tackle Service parochialism and resolve disagreements over policies and programs before they went to the SecDef. By failing to reach common ground on a multitude of issues, the JCS in effect relegated the decisionmaking burden to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Over time this caused OSD to become isolated from the military, which in turn led to a lack of information for critical decisionmaking by the National Command Authorities (NCA).⁵

Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 divided the DOD into operational and administrative chains of command. Unified and specified⁶ commanders were given the responsibility for operational missions assigned by the NCA, while the military departments were to prepare forces for those missions. Goldwater–Nichols sought to address unintended shortcomings in these amendments by clarifying the authority and responsibilities of the SecDef, CJCS, Service chiefs, and unified commanders.⁷ The overarching goal was better equipped, better trained, and better prepared joint military

forces. Providing military capabilities that can effectively operate together to meet future challenges is in fact the common purpose of the Joint Staff, Services, defense agencies, and unified commands. Given Goldwater–Nichols’ lofty prescriptions, it would take time before the Pentagon would embrace the legislation, and even longer to institutionalize it.⁸

If post–Cold War experience is instructive, America’s Armed Forces face a future marked by rapid change, regional contingencies, smaller defense budgets, and the higher operational and personnel tempos that go along with increased military demands. The future environment will be characterized by: regional, sometimes unpredictable threats and instabilities; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; increased demand for US military forces; rapid technological advances, particularly in information technologies, stealth, and precision weapons; and other transnational problems such as counterterrorism, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation.

Although its national survival will not be threatened during the next 15–20 years, the US will face numerous threats to its global interests.⁹ The Armed Forces will continue to operate in an uncertain environment, where conflict, although often unpredictable, is probable. Moreover, US military forces are increasingly expected to perform alongside regional allies, coalition partners, and various domestic and international agencies in order to execute their assigned missions. Current US national strategy maintains that, for the foreseeable future, America will continue to be engaged worldwide, with the objectives of enhancing national security, promoting economic prosperity at home, and promoting democracy abroad.¹⁰ Maintaining a strong, responsive military is vital to this strategy, to protect and advance US interests when called upon.

It has been over ten years since Goldwater–Nichols was passed, and many of its objectives have been achieved. The Services are more knowledgeable of each other’s capabilities and limitations, and therefore work together more efficiently, and inter–Service relationships appear to be stronger. A myriad of joint doctrine publications has been published, and many more are currently in development. However, as will be discussed further in chapter 6, much work remains to achieve the Chairman’s joint warfighting vision. Nonetheless, *JV 2010* is a watershed for continued joint warfighting evolution and integration among Services, unified commands, and DOD agencies.

Notes

¹Gen John M. Shalikashvili, “A Word From The Chairman,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 12 (Summer 1996): 4–5.

²Title 10, United States Code, defines the fundamental roles of the US Armed Forces. See Appendix A for a summary of these responsibilities.

³James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater–Nichols,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 10.

⁴The Honorable John P. White, “Defense Organization Today,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 18–19.

⁵Senate, Committee on Armed Services, “Defense Organization: The Need for Change,” Senate report 99–86, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 620. Recalls former CJCS Gen Colin L. Powell: “Almost the only way the [Service] chiefs would agree on their advice was by scratching each other’s back. Consequently, the . . . Joint Staff spent thousands of man–hours pumping out ponderous, least–common–denominator documents that every [Service] chief would accept but few Secretaries of Defense or Presidents found useful . . .” See Colin L. Powell and Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 410–411.

⁶With the disestablishment of the US Army Forces Command on 1 October 1993, the notion of a “specified command” no longer appears in the Unified Command Plan, which defines geographic and functional responsibilities of the unified commanders. See Joint History Office, *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–1993*, Washington, D.C., February 1995.

⁷The major provisions of Goldwater–Nichols included: 1) making the CJCS the principal military advisor to the NCA; 2) clarifying the CJCS’ authority over strategic planning, readiness, and joint doctrine; 3) improving the powers of the unified commanders over Service components; and 4) strengthening unified command roles in the planning, programming, and budgeting processes. Serving as a spokesman for the CINCs while embracing a common DOD–wide perspective, the CJCS became the linchpin for

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instituting “jointness,” and the SecDef’s ally in defense matters. Service parochial interests became subordinate to CINC warfighting responsibilities.

⁸At first, the tremendous inertia of the DOD was not easy to shift along different axes. Arguably, it took the end of the Cold War in 1989—and the resulting changes in military missions and force structures—to ultimately produce measurable change. Following Goldwater–Nichols, each Service began to take steps to improve its warfighting focus—for example, by rewriting doctrine; revising professional military education programs; and increasing participation in joint training exercises. However, Service efforts weren’t directed toward a clear, common purpose. In 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces recognized this and recommended that “the [CJCS] propose a unified vision for joint operations to guide force and materiel development; integrate support to [unified commanders]—improve joint doctrine development; develop and monitor joint readiness standards; and increase emphasis on joint training.” This ultimately led to *JV 2010*. See “Executive Summary, ‘Directions for Defense’,” *Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces Report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 24 May 1995.

⁹Predictions for the early 21st-century threat environment are widely documented. The author refers to: Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), particularly Chapter 1.

¹⁰The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, i, 11–12.

Chapter 3

A Common Direction for the Future

We will move toward a common goal: a joint force—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.

—*Joint Vision 2010*

After almost two years of combined work by the Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, and defense agencies, the CJCS published *JV 2010* in July 1996.¹ Proponents of the vision will see it as the spark for future innovation and creativity in joint warfighting. Critics will likely dismiss it as more Pentagon rhetoric, regardless of how slickly packaged. Nevertheless, as a vision statement *JV 2010* engenders the DOD to develop new ideas about how it can take advantage of future technological opportunities by capitalizing on the ingenuity and vitality of its people. It provides a “sounding board” for critical evaluation and helps focus Service readiness and modernization activities. While often broad and far-reaching, and relatively silent on how to achieve its goals, *JV 2010* establishes a framework to focus critical thought and is the first step toward synergizing Service and unified command visions for the 21st century.

Improved “jointness”—the synergistic application of individual Service capabilities to produce a more efficient and effective combined arms team—is *JV 2010*’s overarching goal. In the American psyche, this means accomplishing military missions as quickly as possible and at the lowest possible cost in terms of friendly lives and resources. To

achieve “full spectrum dominance” across the entire range of military operations, *JV 2010* describes a future warfighting construct centered around four new operational concepts: “dominant maneuver;” “precision engagement;” “full dimensional protection;” and “focused logistics.” These operational concepts, listed in Table 1, incorporate the core strengths of people, technology, and Service competencies to guide the development of future warfighting capabilities. In addition, several “considerations” are deemed critical to realizing the vision—people, leadership, doctrine, education and training, organizations, and materiel. These considerations, described in Appendix B, are *JV 2010*’s foundation for success. *JV 2010* seeks to stimulate changes in these areas, to institute a DOD-wide climate that fosters competition and creativity, encourages critical thinking, and eliminates cultural and structural barriers to innovation.²

A major premise of *JV 2010* is that rapid technological advances, particularly in information-related technologies, will revolutionize joint warfighting, if appropriately harnessed and skillfully leveraged by the DOD. As Gen John M. Shalikashvili noted: “*JV 2010* is not so much about technology as it is [about] developing new operational capabilities.”³ *JV 2010* in fact strives to create a “revolution in military affairs (RMA)” in joint warfighting, cognizant that merely exploiting technology falls short of an RMA if not applied in radically new constructs.⁴ Technological capabilities must be combined with process and organizational changes to create fundamental alterations in the conduct of joint operations. While few would refute the enormous opportunities afforded by technology, many assert sweeping change will only happen when the Services move beyond their interservice rivalries and aggrandize their ideas about joint operations in the “information age.” *JV 2010* requires the collective effort of the entire defense

establishment to make it work. The Services, in particular, must embrace its concepts and shape their visions around its core.

Table 1. Joint Vision 2010's Operational Concepts

<i>Dominant Maneuver</i>	The multidimensional application of information, engagement, and logistics capabilities to position and employ US forces to accomplish assigned operational tasks.
<i>Precision Engagement</i>	A system of systems that enables US forces to locate an objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess the level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision, when required.
<i>Full Dimensional Protection</i>	The ability to control the battlespace to ensure US forces can maintain initiative and freedom of action, while at the same time defending US forces, facilities, and information at all levels.
<i>Focused Logistics</i>	The fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, track and shift assets even while en route, and deliver tailored sustainment capabilities at all levels.
<i>Information Superiority</i>	The ability to collect, process, and disseminate information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.
<i>Full Spectrum Dominance</i>	The ability to dominate across the full range of military operations through the synergistic application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, July 1996, 16, 19–25.

Notes

¹The roots of *JV 2010* date back to at least 1993. At the time, the recently formed Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, began working on a study of how future joint doctrine should evolve given changes in: the strategic environment; technology; roles and missions of the Armed Forces; and other areas. This effort, in turn, induced the Joint Staff in 1994 to begin developing a joint, long-term vision, which eventually led to *JV 2010*. Lt Col Edward Felker, JWFC, interview with author during visit to Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 20 November 1996.

²Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, July 1996, 33.

³Gen John M. Shalikashvili, "A Word From The Chairman," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 12 (Summer 1996): 5.

⁴The notion of a "revolution in military affairs (RMA)" can be traced to Andrew J. Krepinevech, Jr., who first attempted to define a "military-technical revolution (MTR)," or that which "occurs when the application of new technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation to alter fundamentally the character and conduct of military operations." The terms RMA and

Notes

MTR are often used interchangeably. See Andrew J. Krepinevich, “The Military–Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment, Washington, D.C., July 1992.

Chapter 4

Service Perspectives on Future Military Operations

Joint warfare is team warfare... Joint warfare does not lessen Service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successful joint operations are impossible without the capabilities developed and embodied in each Service; Service “cultures,” heroes, and professional standards are indispensable.

—Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*

As the DOD endeavors to transform itself into a leaner, more capable instrument of US national power, the Services are at the same time charting their respective courses for the future. Current strategic thought within the military departments reflects Service—unique heritage, values, and experience, plus many of *JV 2010*’s underpinnings—global military demands, the corresponding need for unequaled military forces, and battlespace dominance enabled by technology. Not unexpectedly, the Services proudly champion their unique capabilities, without which, each Service claims, greatly diminishes the chance for success. More significantly, each Service puts forth a vision focused almost exclusively on its particular warfighting perspective and medium of operation, while references to joint operations are comparatively limited. Although the Services certainly espouse jointness, their vision statements reflect unique operational perspectives regarding the roles, utility, and relative importance of land, naval, air, and space forces. These different perspectives,

in turn, suggest underlying interservice rivalries centered around fundamental notions of how to conduct warfare.

Army Vision 2010

The Army of today is the product of 220 years of evolutionary change....The Army of tomorrow will be borne of that same process—grounded in the values, traditions, and heritage that are uniquely American. We are committed to forging that Army... to do what needs to be done as part of the joint warfighting team envisioned in Joint Vision 2010.

—Army Vision 2010

In November 1996, the US Army published its newest strategic vision, appropriately titled *Army Vision 2010*. Espousing the Army's global imperative, *Army Vision 2010* focuses on Army contributions to military operations within the overarching framework of *JV 2010*. As the Army's plan for managing institutional change and exploiting technology to produce an RMA, *Army Vision 2010* provides continuity between *Force XXI*—the Army's ongoing effort to transform itself into a digitized force—and "Army After Next"—its emerging long-term vision.¹

A loudly trumpeted theme in *Army Vision 2010* is the importance of land operations to preserving US national interests. The Army's purpose is to deter war, and if that fails, to achieve victory in war.² Land forces are heralded as the crucial element in fighting wars because, by controlling territory, people, and terrestrial resources, they "make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces."³ In fact, the Army daringly asserts—without providing the supporting evidence—that the post-Cold War reality has upheld the need for land forces and invalidated the theory that "power

projection and national military strategy could be primarily carried out...using technologically advanced air and naval forces.”⁴

An interesting subtlety emerges when one reads *Army Vision 2010*. Forces that operate on land—“land forces” as they are generically termed in *Army Vision 2010*—are presumed to be the NCA’s force of choice, for most types of military operations. The Army believes that many, if not most, operations will require “feet on the ground,” and contends that land forces “provide the most flexible and versatile capabilities for meeting CINC...requirements.”⁵ Unfortunately, “land forces” can be easily misinterpreted to mean “US Army forces,” even though air and naval forces also operate on land. More importantly, air and naval forces provide equally flexible warfighting capabilities.

While on the surface this may appear to be inconsequential, it exemplifies the different perspectives on each Service’s importance to the joint fight, as well as the underlying Service rivalries on the relative merits of land, naval, air, and space forces.⁶ Clearly, the Army is the only US military Service trained and equipped—and chartered by law—for sustained combat operations on land (see Appendix A). Land forces, however, depend on air and naval forces not only to get them to the fight, but to deploy their sustainment resources as well. This will be even more critical in the next century, as fewer ground forces will be permanently stationed overseas.

Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force

Global Engagement...is our continuing commitment to provide America the air and space capabilities required to deter, fight and win. This vision is grounded in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept of how we will fight in the early 21st Century—Joint Vision 2010. Moreover, it embodies our belief that in the 21st Century, the strategic instrument of choice will be air and space power.

—General Ronald R. Fogelman and The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall
Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force

In November 1996, after eighteen months of concerted effort, the US Air Force produced its latest strategic vision, *Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, the successor to its first post–Cold War vision, *Global Reach, Global Power*.⁷ Like *Army Vision 2010*, *Global Engagement* was published as a direct result of *JV 2010*. The Air Force contends its new vision is closely aligned with *JV 2010*, and “is based on a new understanding of what air and space power mean to the nation.”⁸ The Air Force also believes that, by 2025, technology will make it possible to find, track, and target anything that moves on the Earth’s surface, and that air and space power—that is, *the US Air Force*—will play a leading role in achieving this capability.⁹

In *Global Engagement*, air and space power are touted as essential to achieve *JV 2010*’s concept of “full spectrum dominance.”¹⁰ To that end, the Air Force has defined six “core competencies,” or operational areas deemed essential to fulfill Air Force roles, that are closely related to *JV 2010*’s operational concepts (see Appendix B).¹¹ Even though fiscal realities may preclude the Air Force from achieving its core competencies—most certainly in the near term—they are intended to provide a strategic focus to guide Air Force decision-making and manage institutional change. They also form the link between doctrine and, ultimately, joint warfighting capabilities.¹²

The Air Force is currently developing its implementation plan for *Global Engagement*.¹³ More than any other US military Service, the Air Force considers itself a world leader in space, and, unlike the other Services, is totally focused on the application of air and space power. In fact, the Air Force sees itself becoming more and more engaged in space as it evolves into the 21st century—a *space and air* force.¹⁴ Furthermore, the Air Force views information as a third realm of operations, analogous to air and space, in which dominance will be equally contested. Given this, the Air Force also envisions a strong role in future information operations.

Just as the Army champions the versatility of land forces in *Army Vision 2010*, the Air Force has established a vision that it believes will make it the force of choice well into the next century. According to Gen Ronald R. Fogleman: “Air [and space] power gives the NCA an option to take swift action in an unanticipated crisis where other means of force, whether land- or sea-based, are too far out of position to affect unfolding events in a timely fashion.”¹⁵ The Air Force contends that surface forces depend on air and space forces to maneuver with impunity. The Air Force also alleges that, because of the inherent speed, range, and flexibility of air and space power, it will get to any crisis first, anywhere and at any time. A bold assertion indeed, but one that it is also somewhat misleading. The ability to get there first does not always equate to successfully accomplishing the mission, nor does it always make the Air Force the force of choice.

At the heart of *Global Engagement* is the Air Force belief that air and space power can dominate the battlespace. Although the Air Force recognizes the importance of its ground support role, it also views an air and space campaign that, at times, can be distinct from surface operations. There are strong undertones in *Global Engagement* that suggest

future air and space operations will focus on a strategic perspective not necessarily shared by the other Services—one that, at times, suggests an independent air and space effort.

Forward ...From The Sea

The Cold War may be over, but the need for American leadership and commensurate military capability endures. Many of our most vital interests remain overseas where the Navy and the Marine Corps are prepared for new challenges—forward deployed, ready for combat, and engaged to preserve the peace.

—*Forward ...From The Sea*

The US Navy's strategic vision is officially documented in 1994's *Forward ...From The Sea*. Like its predecessor, the 1992 white paper *...From The Sea*, *Forward ...From The Sea*'s centerpiece is the Navy's doctrinal shift from "blue water" operations to that of operations in the world's "littoral" regions.¹⁶ Navy Cold War doctrine was focused primarily against a global maritime threat, in particular the former Soviet Union. Today, naval forces are integral to the joint team, focusing on those areas adjacent to the sea that sea-based forces can control and against which they can project their power.

Forward ...From The Sea updates and expands the ideas presented in *...From The Sea* by addressing new global and regional dangers and increased naval participation in military operations other than war. One of its central themes is that, for the foreseeable future, the US will remain a maritime nation with many national interests overseas, where naval forces are poised for quick, decisive operations. The Navy is fully committed to operating as part of joint and multinational teams, and their involvement in joint and combined operations has steadily increased since 1989.¹⁷ The Navy expects this trend to continue

into the 21st century as regional contingencies and global commitments increase the demand for forward presence naval forces.¹⁸

The principal thesis underlying *Forward...From The Sea* is that naval forces, operating from forward locations throughout the world, provide unrivaled capabilities that can be tailored as required to meet national needs. While deterrence is their primary role, the fundamental purpose of US naval forces is to “fight and win [the nation’s] wars.”¹⁹ In more and more locations throughout the world, US forces are withdrawing and overseas bases are closing. The Navy believes that naval forces are different from air and land forces in that they, as a whole, are constantly engaged worldwide.

As such, there are elements in *Forward ...From The Sea* that resonate the same Service-unique bravado found in the Army and Air Force vision statements. The Navy asserts that naval forces have freedom of action in international waters, and, unlike land and air forces, are unencumbered by political constraints “that may inhibit and otherwise limit the scope of land-based operations.”²⁰ Stated another way, the naval Services believe themselves to be uniquely qualified to implement US policy when so directed by the NCA. This is hardly a new assertion, for the naval Services have always touted their substantial overseas presence, particularly compared to that of the other Services.

The Navy also contends that as the US continues to withdraw from overseas bases, naval forces will assume an even greater forward presence role to counter the reduction in permanent US presence.²¹ While this is generally accepted as true, *Forward ...From The Sea* overlooks the fact the US naval forces are not designed for independent, comprehensive, long-term operations, particularly in the air and on the ground. Rather, the Navy views itself as an enabling force to support follow-on, long term operations by

the entire joint team. Even though the Navy acknowledges this fact, *Forward ...From The Sea* devotes comparatively little dialogue to joint operations. Instead, naval forces are extolled as inherently “joint.”²²

While the Navy embraces the idea that technology will transform the naval forces of the 21st century, it is somewhat more cautious than its Army and Air Force brethren regarding an impending RMA.²³ Historically, large capital investments in ships, submarines, and other materiel do not adapt easily to rapid technological changes. Additionally, significant naval force structure adjustments typically require very long lead times. Accordingly, one of the more pressing reforms the Navy is pursuing as part of its long-term vision is a leaner, more flexible and responsive procurement system.²⁴

Operational Maneuver from the Sea

Just as a littoral is formed by the meeting of land and sea, Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare... these elements...provide the United States with a naval expeditionary force that, while deployed unobtrusively in international waters, is instantly ready to help any friend, defeat any foe, and convince potential enemies of the wisdom of keeping the peace.

—Operational Maneuver from the Sea

In 1995, the US Marine Corps released *Operational Maneuver from the Sea* (OMFTS), to further develop the concepts described in *Forward ...From The Sea*, as they pertain to the Marine Corps. OMFTS is not a revolutionary take on amphibious warfare; rather, it represents the continued evolution of amphibious operations, driven in part by technology and changes in the geostrategic environment. According to Hon. John H. Dalton, OMFTS has another purpose: to project the Marine Corps into the 2025 time frame to help guide long-range decisionmaking, planning, modernization, and training.²⁵

As with *JV 2010*, the Marine Corps hopes that *OMFTS* will incite debate and create a framework for turning concepts into future capabilities.²⁶ As an extension of the ideas presented in *Forward ...From The Sea*, *OMFTS* offers the same basic operational philosophies regarding naval forces.²⁷ To attain the naval Services' overarching vision, *OMFTS* also highlights the need for "significant changes" in Marine Corps organization, capabilities, and operational philosophy (see Appendix B).²⁸

OMFTS represents the application of new technology and maneuver warfare to naval operations.²⁹ The Marine Corps' maneuver concept focuses on using the sea to gain a decisive advantage over the enemy, just as friendly land and air forces seek to dominate their respective mediums of operation.³⁰ Naval forces are the implementing instruments, and Marines are the driving force. As Gen Charles C. Krulak recently declared: "...the most important *OMFTS* enhancement will be in the training and education of the individual Marine...we will equip our Marines, not man our equipment."³¹

As with other Service visions, *OMFTS* does not abandon the time-tested principles of war or lessons learned from thousands of years of warfighting. The Marine Corps' vision is firmly grounded in the tradition, values, and common heritage of "The Corps." *OMFTS* combines these truths with the integration of maneuver and amphibious warfare, enabled by emerging technology, to spur new directions in naval force evolution. To that end, the Marine Corps has embarked upon various initiatives—for example, a new warfighting laboratory, the "Sea Dragon" testbed, and a special purpose, experimental Marine Air-Ground Task Force—to push innovation to its limits and develop new concepts and capabilities.

Where *OMFTS* does falter slightly is in its somewhat narrow perspective on joint warfighting, particularly the Marine Corps' role in future joint operations and its interactions with the other Services. Though joint is implied throughout *OMFTS*, the Marine Corps vision statement is focused almost exclusively on naval-specific operations. This may be symptomatic of the Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy—accepted by the other Services—which views preserving the Marine air-ground team at all costs in order to successfully implement amphibious operations.³² Unfortunately, the casual reader of *OMFTS* is left wondering whether the Marine Corps considers itself to be an independent, vice joint, force in the vast majority of situations.

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¹Under the *Force XXI* concept, the Army has embarked on transforming itself into a leaner, more efficient and flexible entity, one adept at exploiting information, electronically connected at all levels, and fully integrated into the joint warfighting team. A pathfinder force is currently being formed and trained at Fort Hood, Texas. *Army Vision 2010* strives to: 1) provide guidance and common direction to organize, train, and equip the force; and 2) spur the development of Army doctrine. The “Army After Next” process is working on conceptualizing the Army thirty or more years into the future, and is focused more on organization and operational philosophy. For more information, see TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5, *Force XXI Operations*, 1 August 1994, particularly Chapter 3; as well as Col Robert B. Killebrew, “The Army After Next: TRADOC’s Crystal Ball Eyes The Service’s Shape Beyond Force XXI,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1996, 36–45. The US Army’s *Force XXI* Internet home page is another very useful source of information; it is available from <http://204.7.227.75:443>.

²Field Manual (FM) 100–5, *Operations*, June 1993, iv–v. While winning wars is the Army’s ultimate goal, land forces make significant contributions across the range of military operations, from war to military operations other than war. The Army further states in *Army Vision 2010* that it contributes a powerful deterrent capability, first by threatening to employ, then actually deploying, land forces on foreign soil. See US Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, 13 November 1996, 3–4.

³US Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, 13 November 1996, 2.

⁴*Ibid.*, 5.

⁵*Ibid.*, 6.

⁶As an example of the Army’s perspective on land forces’ contribution to future joint warfare, current Army doctrine and *Army Vision 2010* still suggest Cold War era force—

Notes

on–force engagements between ground elements, as opposed to the effects–based type of operations envisioned in *JV 2010*.

⁷According to the Air Force, the vision espoused in *Global Reach, Global Power* met USAF needs during the post–Cold War transition period, but extraordinary developments in the global environment necessitated changes to that vision. The USAF wanted a vision it could act upon; one that would highlight the importance of air and space power to joint operations; one that would focus on all aspects of the force and not just on air operations; and one that was in–line with *JV 2010*. See US Department of the Air Force, *Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, November 1996, i; and The Honorable Sheila E. Widnall, “Adapting To An Altered Strategic Environment,” address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 25 November 1996, n.p.; on–line, Internet, 13 December 1996, available from http://www.dtic.mil/airforcelink/pa/speech/current/Adapting_To_An_Altered_Stra.html.

⁸US Department of the Air Force, *Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, November 1996, 1.

⁹Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, “Global Engagement,” address to the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 21 November 1996, n.p.; on–line, Internet, 13 December 1996, available from http://www.dtic.mil/airforcelink/pa/speech/current/Global_Engagemen.html.

¹⁰*Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, 7.

¹¹Though not exclusive to the Air Force, core competencies “represent the combination of professional knowledge, airpower expertise, and technological know–how that, when applied, produces superior military capabilities.” See *Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, 9.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³As part of its implementation plan, the Air Force is in the process of establishing six battle laboratories to conduct a “vigorous program of experimenting, testing, exercising and evaluating new operational concepts and systems for air and space power.” Patterned after the US Army’s battle laboratories, the Air Force laboratories are geared toward achieving Air Force core competencies, in particular focusing on the following areas: space; air expeditionary forces; battle management; force protection; information warfare; and unmanned aerial vehicles. See *Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, 1, 9, 25. Furthermore, like the other Services, the Air Force underscores the importance of people to realizing its vision. In an effort to reorient its cadre toward warfighting, the Air Force has embarked on a grass roots campaign to instill in each member what air and space power is all about and what it means to be an “airman.” See, for example, Widnall, “Adapting To An Altered Strategic Environment.”

¹⁴*Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, 7.

¹⁵Quoted in John A. Tirpak, “First Force,” *Air Force Magazine*, September 1996, 37.

¹⁶Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1 defines “littoral” as follows: “The term ***littoral***, as it applies to naval operations . . . , is not restricted to the limited oceanographic definition encompassing the world’s coastal regions. Rather, it includes that portion of the

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world's land masses adjacent to the oceans within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces." See NDP 1, *Naval Warfare*, 28 March 1994, 6.

¹⁷The Honorable John H. Dalton, "Steady As She Goes," address to the US Navy Current Strategy Forum, Newport, R.I., 11 June 1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 3 February 1997, available from <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/speeches/curstra.txt>.

¹⁸US Department of the Navy, *Forward ...From The Sea*, undated, 3–7.

¹⁹*Forward ...From The Sea*, 1. The Navy's vision also reiterates the enduring roles of naval forces: forward presence—which includes power projection ashore, sea control, and maritime supremacy—as well as strategic deterrence; crisis response; and strategic sealift. See *Forward ...From The Sea*, 8; and NDP 1, 15–29. The forward presence aspect is also emphasized in *JV 2010*: "...power projection, enabled by overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental strategic concept of our future force." See *Joint Vision 2010*, 4–5.

²⁰*Forward ...From The Sea*, 5.

²¹Dalton, "Steady As She Goes."

²²*Forward ...From The Sea*, 7. In fact, naval expeditionary forces, built around carrier battle groups and Marine Air–Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), are touted as benchmarks for joint, combined-arms operations. According to *...From The Sea* and NDP 1, naval expeditionary forces are able to: 1) quickly respond, on short notice, to crises anywhere in the world; 2) build power from the sea; 3) sustain long-term operations; 4) function unrestricted by the need for transit or overflight approval from foreign governments; and 5) respond to crises unilaterally or provide the initial enabling capability for joint and multinational operations. See US Department of the Navy, *...From The Sea*, September 1992, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6 November 1996, available from <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt>; and NDP 1, *Naval Warfare*, 28 March 1994, 8, 60.

²³The Honorable John H. Dalton, "The Role of Forward Presence," address to the World Affairs Council, Pittsburgh, Pa., 11 October 1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 3 February 1997, available from <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/speeches/pitts-wc.txt>.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵Dalton, "Steady As She Goes."

²⁶Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, undated, 1.

²⁷Like *Forward ...From The Sea*, *OMFTS* reiterates the future challenges for the naval Services, including: global as well as regional dangers and responsibilities; the corresponding increased demand for forward naval presence and naval forces; and the enhanced role of naval forces in military operations other than war.

²⁸*Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, 11.

²⁹As stated in Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1: "Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope." The *OMFTS* concept is directed against adversary

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centers of gravity, not with the goal of physical annihilation, but of rendering an adversary incapable of continuing the fight. See FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, 6 March 1989, 59; and *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, 5.

³⁰According to *OMFTS*, the central tenets of the Marine Corps' maneuver concept include: 1) focusing on an operational objective; 2) using the sea as maneuver space; 3) generating overwhelming tempo and momentum; 4) pitting friendly strengths against adversary weaknesses; 5) emphasizing intelligence, deceptions, and flexibility; and 6) integrating organic, joint, and combined assets, to accomplish operational objectives. See *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, 6.

³¹Gen Charles C. Krulak, "Innovation, the Warfighting Laboratory, Sea Dragon, and the Fleet Marine," *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 1996, 13–14.

³²According to FMFM 1–2, a Marine Air–Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a "task organization of Marine forces . . . under a single command and structured to accomplish a specific mission . . . [MAGTF] components will normally include command, aviation combat, ground combat, and combat service support elements (including Navy Support Elements). The three types of [MAGTFs] . . . are the Marine expeditionary unit, Marine expeditionary brigade, and Marine expeditionary force." See FMFM 1–2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*, 21 June 1991, C–7.

Chapter 5

Threads of Continuity

The Services remain the bedrock of military capabilities. Their unique competencies enable joint warfighting. Different perspectives—framed by expertise in certain technologies and ways of warfare—are essential to operational success.

—The Honorable John P. White
“Defense Organization Today”
Joint Force Quarterly

Given prognostications of DOD challenges in the early 21st century, the benefits of having a common, joint perspective for the future are clear. America’s Armed Forces will be called upon to execute more missions with fewer resources, and will continue to face difficult choices regarding current force readiness and future modernization. Threats will be diverse yet harder to predict, and regional instabilities will place greater demands on limited US military capabilities. A unifying vision resolutely supported throughout the chain of command can help focus DOD efforts in increasingly uncertain times.

As the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces observed in 1995, the Services historically have had to rely almost exclusively on their perceptions of the future to guide force structure decisions.¹ Today, the DOD has instituted an array of initiatives to facilitate decision-making, including joint doctrine, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) processes,² and joint education and training programs. By defining the total joint warfighting requirement,

JV 2010 is the first step toward Service and unified command convergence on future warfighting capabilities.

The previous chapter touched upon some similarities and differences between *JV 2010* and the Services' vision statements. Figure 1 highlights some common themes in these documents. Despite different Service perspectives, the author did not find any significant incongruities between Service visions and *JV 2010*, ones that would suggest the Services have embarked upon radically divergent paths, or ones that would be contrary to *JV 2010*'s objectives from the outset. At the macroscopic level, all four Services envision the same basic future as that described in *JV 2010*, and each includes many of the same intellectual underpinnings.

Common themes in *JV 2010* and US military Service vision documents include:

- the value of joint operations, especially given anticipated political and economic realities;
- the need for each Service to function more efficiently and effectively, both independently and as part of joint and combined teams;
- the complex realities of the future geostrategic environment;
- the future opportunities afforded by technology and innovation;
- the vision's applicability across the entire range of military operations;
- the unique capabilities of each Service and their contributions to the joint fight;
- the importance of leadership and high quality, dedicated, and well-cared for people to successful military operations;
- the need to focus Service efforts to organize, train, and equip their forces;
- the value of doctrine as a link between concepts and capabilities;
- the need for continued joint and combined education and training; and
- the desire to reinforce the heritage, values, and fundamental beliefs in all members of each respective Service.

Figure 1. Common Themes in Joint Vision 2010 and Service Vision Statements

When one reads the Service vision documents, they are clearly directed at individual Service members. Perhaps to provide reassurance during an increasingly complex and uncertain environment—particularly the continuing post-Cold War drawdown—and more

conspicuously, to build loyalty and camaraderie within each Service, these vision statements are rallying cries within each military department. In addition, each Service vision articulates a commitment to jointness and fiscal responsibility, pledges that help build confidence within America's civilian leadership. Peculiarly, each vision suggests a sense of urgency, as if the QDR or geopolitical environment will threaten each Service's survival. Clearly this is not the case, but if their vision documents are any indication, the Services do not appear to be willing to sacrifice their essence, individuality, or unique competencies solely for the sake of jointness.

With respect to differences, each Service, not unexpectedly, focuses on Service—specific roles, missions, and challenges. Interestingly, the most significant differences between Service visions can be traced to just how visionary each Service purports to be, or conversely, how constrained Service thinking is by current responsibilities and mediums of operation. With some exceptions—notably the application of air power—the Services generally concede to their sister Services in areas outside their traditional realms of expertise. Obviously there are contentious areas, yet it is almost as if each Service has carved itself a niche in *JV 2010*'s overall framework, and that is where it plans to focus its efforts. The author, therefore, is not surprised that mild undercurrents of Service parochialism and interservice rivalry exist within each Service's vision document. Unfortunately, *JV 2010* attempts to reach beyond Service specialization, concentrating more on general warfighting capabilities than particular operational mediums or missions.

On the positive side, each Service speaks as though guided by the need to be an integral member of the joint team, and each boasts global response capabilities and joint warfighting perspectives. *Army Vision 2010* highlights the enduring value of land forces

and concentrates on transforming the Army into an information-intensive, technologically-enhanced fighting force. In *Global Engagement*, the Air Force advocates the ever-increasing importance of air and space power within a framework of core competencies to help guide Air Force decisionmaking. *Forward ...From The Sea* and *OMFTS* champion the significance of naval forces and are accordingly more focused on forward presence and rapid crisis response.³

Of course, there is ample latitude for interpreting joint and Service visions, a characteristic inherent in visionary proclamations. Further, as stated in Chapter 1, it is still too early to ascertain just how in line each Service is with *JV 2010*. In addition, the author discovered that the Service vision documents by themselves are inadequate to determine discontinuities between Service long range plans and the Chairman's joint vision. As will be discussed in the next chapter, numerous implementation challenges exist for *JV 2010*.

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¹The Honorable John P. White, "Defense Organization Today," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 20.

²The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) provides a forum to tie the requirements generation and acquisition processes to warfighter needs. Using mechanisms such as Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams and the JROC Review Board (JRB), the JCS can assess joint military capability areas, challenge and validate key warfighting requirements, and identify opportunities to improve warfighting effectiveness and Service cross-pollination. Given its cross-Service perspective and unified commander focus, the JCS expects the JROC process to play a pivotal role in the implementation of *JV 2010*. See Gen John M. Shalikashvili, "A Word from the Chairman," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 5-6.

³Although *Forward ...From The Sea* is comparatively silent on technologies, enabling concepts, and other factors associated with attaining the vision, this information has been provided in other amplifying documents. The US Navy Office of Information, Washington, D.C., periodically releases "Updates" that expand upon the ideas articulated in *...From The Sea* and *Forward ...From The Sea*. These documents can be found at the

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Navy Public Affairs Library Internet web site; the address is <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea>.

Chapter 6

Some Challenges to Implementing Joint Vision 2010

To achieve Joint Vision 2010...we must be able to conduct coherent joint operations. [Joint force commanders] must be able to integrate Service capabilities to achieve common tactical and operational objectives.

—General John R. Sheehan
Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command

In theory, a common, shared vision helps focus defense department efforts on joint operations, fosters cooperation among DOD components, provides direction and motivation for innovation, and may even take “jointness” to a higher level. In practice, however, fiscal realities and increased demands for US military forces worldwide provide significant friction against these visionary aims. As the Services are directed to support more missions with fewer resources, the tendency may be to refrain from “pushing the envelope.” This will be particularly true during highly uncertain times, for instance, the dawn of the information revolution. To produce the types of change needed to make *JV 2010* a reality, however, calculated risk-taking and “out of the box” thinking are vital.

One challenge to implementing *JV 2010* is to overcome the “self-preservation” or survival instinct—whether at the individual, organizational, or DOD level—in favor of a greater joint or Service purpose. Individual energies must be channeled toward a collective purpose if *JV 2010* is to get off the ground. This does not mean sacrificing Service uniqueness in the name of “jointness,” for on the contrary, it is the synergistic

application of Service capabilities that is the essence of jointness. It does mean, however, that Service parochialism must give way to joint considerations whenever it is in America's best interests.

Another challenge to implementing *JV 2010* concerns the ability to achieve information superiority throughout the spectrum of joint operations. *JV 2010* presumes that proper technologies will be available *and* can be cost-effectively applied by the DOD in a manner that is useful and timely for warfighting commanders. Unfortunately, this may turn out to be *JV 2010*'s single-point failure. At present, information technologies, like many other technologies, are largely driven by the commercial market place, and this trend is expected to grow. While *JV 2010*'s authors recognize this, some of the enabling technologies for *JV 2010* may never materialize unless the DOD invests in their development. Furthermore, the defense department's planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition systems must be revamped, incorporating new processes to enable warfighters to quickly exploit technology. *JV 2010* is not intended to be solely about technology, yet clearly its success or failure rests with being able to leverage technology. Technology is a great enabler, yet can also be an Achilles' heel; that is, joint and Service visions succeed or fail depending on the ability to exploit emerging technology. In the end, failure to achieve information superiority puts future warfighting concepts at risk.

Information technologies will, among other things, revolutionize command and control functions, particularly with respect to the quantity, accuracy, timeliness, and availability of information throughout all echelons of command. Each Service intends to dominate the 21st-century battlespace by leveraging information technology, yet the operational concepts and infrastructures needed to do so do not yet exist. Moreover, they

require enormous amounts of time, effort, and resources to develop, and consequently may not be attainable by the year 2010. Given these challenges, as well as the historically conservative tendencies within the DOD, fiscal constraints may force the Services to choose current force readiness over future modernization.

One paradox of *JV 2010* is that strategic and budget realities do not coincide. The defense department's budget is not expected to increase for at least the next six years (the Future Years Defense Program)—in fact, it will probably decline. Even though *JV 2010* is intended to guide acquisition decisions, many programs required to implement *JV 2010* simply will not be affordable. Furthermore, current DOD organizational structures and processes are not oriented toward rapid infusion of new technologies. The Services will therefore face mounting pressure to balance current force readiness against future modernization, and will find themselves increasingly trading off capability with affordability. These factors will combine to exacerbate existing interservice rivalries as the Services find themselves fighting over more and more cost-prohibitive programs.

Service perspectives also vary on the relative importance of land, naval, air, and space forces to joint operations. For example, major Service disagreements exist on topics such as: theater missile defense; fire support coordination; command and control; and information operations.¹ These different perspectives must be addressed before *JV 2010* can succeed. Global operations will be the subject of intense competition among the military departments, not only because the Services will have the ability to infringe upon one another's traditional battlespace, but also because such many overlapping capabilities will be seen as indispensable to future warfighting success. Neither joint doctrine, *JV 2010*, nor Service visions offer sufficient guidance to resolve long-standing issues.

Compounding this problem is the fact that significant latitude exists in joint doctrine to permit various interpretations of the joint vision.

Some critics of *JV 2010* believe that many of its concepts are oriented toward “high-end” operations—that is, high intensity conflict—whereas the majority of future military operations will fall well short of war. However, *JV 2010* clearly applies across the entire spectrum of military operations.² In addition, Service planning efforts focus on long-range issues whereas unified commanders are faced with more short-term concerns. Hence, a significant challenge is to balance short and long term needs while at the same time trying to revolutionize joint operations throughout the entire continuum.

The Constitutional role of the Armed Forces to defend the US land mass is largely overlooked in *JV 2010*. The Services must balance their programs for traditional warfighting responsibilities, particularly overseas, with domestic responsibilities such as defense against weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, and illegal immigration. As certain technologies become more affordable and globally accessible, the US will likely face increased threats to its internal security. As a result, the Services may find themselves increasingly called upon to address domestic concerns.

While there are numerous other implications associated with *JV 2010*, the intent is not to discuss them all here—that is reserved for further study.³ The examples cited in this chapter give the reader an idea of the magnitude of the task currently facing the DOD. Underlying these challenges is the fact that the Services must integrate their efforts into unified command warfighting plans and make resource decisions that reflect not only their institutional orientations, but also the needs of the unified commanders. Due in part to the National Security Act Amendment of 1958, the Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization

Act of 1986, and Unified Command Plan requirements, the Services can ill afford to conduct planning, programming, acquisition, and force development independent of the warfighting CINCs.⁴

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¹See, for example, Gen Dennis J. Reimer and Gen Ronald R. Fogelman, “Joint Warfare and the Army–Air Force Team,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 11 (Spring 1996): 9–15.

²The relevance of *JV 2010* to the entire spectrum of military operations is described in great detail. See *Joint Vision 2010*, 4, 8–11, 17–18, 25–27.

³The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, has been designated to be the implementing agency for *JV 2010*, under the auspices of the JCS/J7 directorate. As part of that responsibility, the JWFC is developing a “living” document that will amplify the key ideas in *JV 2010*, titled *Concept for Future Joint Operations*. A significant portion of this document is devoted to the implications behind *JV 2010*. The author recommends the reader also refer to this document for further study. Interested parties should contact Lt Col Edward Felker, JWFC, DSN 680–6551, for a copy.

⁴An interesting subtlety also came to light during the CORM’s investigation. Despite Goldwater–Nichols’ attempts to promote unity of effort among the CINCs and Services, unified command visions continued to focus on near-term regional and functional interests while Service visions emphasized long-term conceptualization in their respective mediums—land, sea, air, and space. *JV 2010* attempts to synergize Service planning and procurement efforts with CINC warfighting requirements. See Maj Gen Charles D. Link, “21st Century Armed Forces—*Joint Vision 2010*,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 70.

Chapter 7

Concluding Thoughts

Even during a time of unparalleled technological advances we will always rely on the courage, determination, and strength of America's men and women to ensure we are persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.

—*Joint Vision 2010*

Joint Vision 2010 represents a watershed for the DOD. It charts a course for the future, and “provides a conceptual underpinning for assembling Service core competencies to conduct fully joint military operations.”¹ Among other things, it will help guide the QDR process and subsequent deliberations on Service roles, missions, and capabilities. More importantly, it provides a benchmark from which to assess the vast array of DOD programs, and to coalesce future efforts toward improved joint operations.

Joint operations in the 21st century, like all others that precede them, will be based on a foundation of time-tested warfighting principles, experience, and lessons learned. No matter what quadrennial reviews, commissions, or Congressional committees conclude, no US military Service will cease to exist as a result. The Services know this, yet the age-old debate continues over who should support whom in various military operations, as well as which capabilities are most vital to carrying out the national security strategy. While it is unlikely that, in the foreseeable future, the Services will speak with one voice on all issues,

their energies can be collectively channeled into healthy debate and critical analysis of *JV 2010*'s joint paradigm.

By comparing and contrasting *JV 2010* with each military department's 21st-century strategic vision, the author discovered that Service visions are generally congruent with *JV 2010*. Each Service, enthused and challenged by the road that lies ahead, is equally committed to transforming itself into a more proficient member of the joint team. The Army and Air Force have already released new vision documents closely aligned with *JV 2010*, and the naval services are presently developing "Navy Vision 2020," a new strategic vision that will incorporate *JV 2010*'s concepts and update the ideas articulated in *Forward ...From The Sea* and *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*. Even though neither *JV 2010* nor Service vision documents present radically new warfighting philosophies, their value lies in the ability to focus often divergent Service and unified command efforts toward greater, common objectives.

As suggested above, Service strategic thought remains constrained by unique warfighting perspectives and operational medium-focused thinking, that is, land, sea, air, and space. *JV 2010* attempts to transcend these physical boundaries, to incite Service members to explore beyond their traditional realms of operations. Whether it can do this remains to be seen, for conservatism, combined with a history of inter-Service rivalry, makes each Service reluctant to intrude into one another's operational realm. Each Service is certainly responsible for maximizing its contributions to the total, joint warfighting requirement, but *JV 2010*'s definition of jointness is not limited to the sum total of each Service's part. Rather, the synergistic combination of Service capabilities must yield geometric increases in US military power. Service and unified command near-

sightedness, coupled with different warfighting perspectives, could diminish prospects for attaining the joint vision.

To overcome their conservative tendencies, the Services must continue to work together, building upon and expanding the positive gains yielded by joint doctrine, joint education and training, and numerous joint warfighting systems. Selecting the best and brightest for joint duty assignments is also a good start, but the program could be expanded to provide more opportunities for cross-pollination of personnel between Services. In a similar vein, Service battle laboratories should work together to maximize joint warfighting efficiencies and to develop more cost-effective, interoperable military systems. Relegating such responsibilities to senior oversight committees like the Defense Acquisition Board and Joint Requirements Oversight Council does little to resolve disagreements at the Service level; the perception is still one of “winners” and “losers.”

History has shown that individual Service identity is vital to successful joint warfare. Inter-Service competition often produces innovative systems, new technologies, and novel joint warfighting concepts. Service pride, tradition, and culture encourage Service members to “push the envelope” in their various specialties, and to seek new ways to fulfill Service roles. As the renowned Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz once wrote: “War is an instrument of policy....The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.”² The Services are uniquely qualified to perform their roles, but cannot afford to compete with one another at the expense of accomplishing the mission or protecting America’s citizens and interests.

Notes

¹Maj Gen Charles D. Link, “21st Century Armed Forces—*Joint Vision 2010*,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 70.

²Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 610.

Appendix A

Title 10 U.S.C. Responsibilities of the US Armed Forces¹

The US military Services are organized, trained, and equipped to perform specific combatant functions—sometimes termed roles and missions—which the US Congress has elected to define in law under Title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C.). These combatant functions provide the organizational division of responsibility within the DOD for developing military capabilities, and are fundamental both to force development and employment. Under 10 U.S.C., each of the military departments and Services has the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to fulfill their assigned combatant functions, and for administering and supporting such forces.

Army (10 U.S.C. § 3062).

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of:

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;

(2) supporting the national policies;

(3) implementing the national objectives; and

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, except as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

Navy (10 U.S.C § 5062).

(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

(b) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefore.

(c) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements. Matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.

Marine Corps (10 U.S.C § 5063).

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

Air Force (10 U.S.C. § 8062).

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Air Force that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of:

(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;

(2) supporting the national policies;

(3) implementing the national objectives; and

(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.

(b) There is a United States Air Force within the Department of the Air Force.

(c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

Notes

¹United States Code, Title 10—*Armed Forces*, as amended through 31 December 1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6 March 1997, available from <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10>.

Appendix B

Joint and Service Visions—Supporting Information

Joint Vision 2010’s “Critical Considerations”¹

According to *JV 2010*, turning 21st-century operational concepts into tangible military capabilities requires stimulating changes in six key areas. These “critical considerations,” described below, are offered as forums for critical thought, the competition of ideas, and the removal of barriers to innovation within the DOD.

High Quality People

- The human element is the key to achieve full spectrum dominance.
- High quality soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will remain the key to success in future joint operations.
- Recruiting and retaining dedicated, high quality personnel is the highest priority.
- Individual initiative, judgment, and creativity are essential to implementing *JV 2010*’s concepts.

Innovative Leadership

- The dynamic nature of the 21st-century battlespace will require exemplary leadership—those who are disciplined, knowledgeable, and agile.
- Leaders must demonstrate great versatility and skill to successfully execute future joint operations.
- Leaders must be able to act decisively in the increasingly complex, information—saturated environment of the future battlespace.

Joint Doctrine

- Joint doctrine must be the foundation that fundamentally shapes the way US forces plan, think, and train for joint operations.
- Joint doctrine is the key to enhanced jointness, transforming ideas and concepts into joint capabilities.

- Joint doctrine is essential to institutionalize *JV 2010*'s concepts and to provide focus for force modernization efforts.

Joint Education and Training

- Education and training programs must prepare military personnel to meet 21st-century challenges.
- Future warfighters must be schooled in a variety of disciplines throughout their careers.
- Education and training programs must instill a practical knowledge of each Service's contributions to future joint operations.

Agile Organizations

- Organizations must develop the flexibility and adaptability to respond to the full range of future military operations.
- Agile organizations and processes are essential to exploit emerging technologies.
- Traditional command and control relationships and organizational designs will be radically altered by 21st-century battlespace needs.

Enhanced Materiel

- The US must skillfully leverage leading edge technology to improve its military capabilities.
- Future joint operations will require increased commonality and interoperability among Service and multinational partners.
- More responsive research, development, and acquisition processes are essential to efficiently incorporate emerging technologies.

US Army “Patterns of Operation”

Current Army doctrine describes a deliberate set of simultaneous “operational patterns” through which land forces execute their responsibilities. These patterns serve to focus the multitude of tasks performed by the Army in military operations. First defined as part of the *Force XXI* concept, they are refined in *Army Vision 2010*, and are described below. As the table shows, these patterns are directly related to *JV 2010*.

Table 2. US Army “Patterns of Operation” and JV 2010’s Operational Concepts

Patterns of Operation	Links to JV 2010
<i>Project the Force</i> • Dominate an adversary physically and morally • Provide forward presence and prepositioned assets • Create a tailored, rapidly deployable CONUS–based force to function as part of joint and combined teams	• <i>Dominant Maneuver</i>
<i>Protect the Force</i> • Protect friendly forces across the full range of operations • Protect the US land mass from attack	• <i>Full Dimensional Protection</i>
<i>Shape the Battlespace</i> • Dominate the multidimensional battlespace • Maintain friendly freedom of action while destroying an adversary’s centers of gravity and freedom of action • Integrate all combat activities with maneuver to achieve simultaneity and overwhelm an adversary	• <i>Dominant Maneuver</i> • <i>Precision Engagement</i>
<i>Conduct Decisive Operations</i> • Mass effects, not forces • Conduct simultaneous, brief, violent attacks in multiple directions, then disengage, reorganize, and reattack	• <i>Dominant Maneuver</i> • <i>Precision Engagement</i>
<i>Sustain the Force</i> • Deliver tailored logistics packages directly to each level of operations • Fuse logistics and information technologies, agile combat service support, and new doctrinal concepts	• <i>Focused Logistics</i>
<i>Gain Information Dominance</i> • Deny an adversary the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information, while protecting friendly information • Conduct offensive and defensive information operations	• <i>Information Superiority</i>

Source: US Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, 13 November 1996, 11–17.

US Air Force “Core Competencies”

In order to determine what air and space power capabilities the US will need in the early 21st century, the Air Force has defined six “core competencies.” They are described below, including their relationships to *JV 2010*’s operational concepts. These core competencies represent what the Air Force intends to contribute to future joint operations, areas where the Air Force will focus its future efforts, including, among other things, doctrine, procurement, and education and training.²

Table 3. US Air Force “Core Competencies” and JV 2010’s Operational Concepts

Core Competency	Links to JV 2010
<i>Air and Space Superiority</i> • The ability to prevent adversaries from interfering with the operations of friendly air, space, and surface forces. • The ability to assure friendly freedom of action and movement.	• <i>Dominant Maneuver</i> • <i>Full Dimensional Protection</i>
<i>Global Attack</i> • The ability to attack rapidly anywhere on the globe at any time.	• <i>Dominant Maneuver</i> • <i>Precision Engagement</i> • <i>Full Dimensional Protection</i>
<i>Rapid Global Mobility</i> • The ability to rapidly move to any spot on the globe, including deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.	• <i>Dominant Maneuver</i> • <i>Precision Engagement</i>
<i>Precision Engagement</i> • The ability to tailor the application of military forces, to apply selective force against specific targets, and to achieve discrete and discriminant effects. • The ability to deliver what is needed for the desired effect, with minimal risk and collateral damage.	• <i>Precision Engagement</i>
<i>Information Superiority</i> • The ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information while denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.	• <i>Information Superiority</i>
<i>Agile Combat Support</i> • The ability to tailor logistics and support operations to ensure the proper support can be provided to the right place, at the right time.	• <i>Focused Logistics</i>

Source: US Department of the Air Force, *Global Engagement: A Strategic Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, November 1996, 9–17.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea Focus Areas³

In *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, the Marine Corps defines three general areas where it must focus its efforts to yield the greatest return on its investment. Characterized

below, the Marine Corps believes that, to attain its strategic vision, it must improve its operations, modernize its capabilities, and strengthen its intellectual underpinnings.

“Operational Directions”

- *Organization*—The cooperation of land, sea, and air units is essential. The Marine Corps must develop an *esprit de corps* that transcends Service identity or occupational specialty. Naval expeditionary forces must be organized and trained into highly cohesive teams.
- *Movement Between Land and Sea*—OMFTS requires rapid movement back and forth from the sea to inland objectives. Ship-to-shore movements will no longer be separated from operations on land.
- *The Spectrum of Conflict*—OMFTS applies to the entire spectrum of conflict. A variety of techniques are therefore required to respond to all possible contingencies.

“Capability Improvements”

- *Mobility*—OMFTS requires seamless transition from maneuvering at sea to maneuvering ashore, and vice versa. Limitations imposed by distance, terrain, and weather must be minimized.
- *Intelligence*—Rapid collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence is crucial to the high operational tempo of OMFTS.
- *Command and Control (C²)*—The ability of fire support units to see the battlespace will lead to C² techniques which exploit technology and the availability of information. Marines must develop new skills and ideas in order to take advantage of technology.
- *Fires*—Fires will be used to exploit maneuver. Sea-based fires will increasingly be used to support units ashore. The naval Services must improve mobility of shore-based fire support systems and streamline fire support coordination procedures. Increased range, accuracy, and lethality of fire support systems is essential.
- *Aviation*—Aircraft must be capable of operating from a variety of platforms and perform a variety of missions. Marine aviation units must be fully integrated with naval expeditionary forces.
- *Mine Countermeasures*—The naval Services must develop and enhance counter-mine capabilities, including detection, marking, clearing, and breaching.
- *Combat Service Support (CSS)*—CSS units must be able to sustain fast-moving, combined arms forces. Speed, mobility, efficiency, timeliness, flexibility, and security are essential.

“Intellectual Foundations”

- *Doctrine*—Tactics, techniques, and procedures must be revised to be more in accord with OMFTS, particularly in the areas of fire support, logistics, C², and ship-to-objective maneuver.
- *Training and Education*—OMFTS requires Marines who can excel under dynamic, uncertain, and stressful conditions. Leaders must be able to quickly assess the battlespace, make informed judgments, and act decisively. Intuitive-based decision-making will be enhanced by increased investment in: education; wargaming and simulation activities; and battlefield visualization techniques.

Notes

¹Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, July 1996, 27–32.

²Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, “Global Engagement,” address to the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 21 November 1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 13 December 1996, available from http://www.dtic.mil/airforcelink/pa/speech/current/Global_Engagemen.html.

³Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, undated, 11–13.

Glossary

ACSC	Air Command and Staff College
AFB	Air Force Base
AU	Air University
CINC	Commander in Chief [of a combatant command]
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CORM	Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
DOD	Department of Defense
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JV	Joint Vision [2010]
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
MAGTF	Marine Air–Ground Task Force
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MTR	Military–Technical Revolution
NEF	Naval Expeditionary Force
OMFTS	Operational Maneuver from the Sea
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
US	United States
U.S.C.	United States Code

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