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DUAL CONTAINMENT: US POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF
AND A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FUTURE

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Preface

American policy makers still fight how to deal with the new world order, or lack of any order, left in the wake of the end of the Cold War. What has developed is a strategy of engagement and enlargement, and the desire to expand democracies and market economies. In the optimistic light of engagement and enlargement, some nations still do not conform to accepted international standards of behavior. These backlash nations are handled in a familiar manner, a comfortable policy option for America - containment.

After fifty years of containing the Soviet Union, the United States is again in the business of containment. I find it intriguing that containment may be evolving as the policy of choice when America faces a hostile, aggressive, or backlash nation.

I pursue the topic of dual containment with the idea that it should be a temporary policy only. Engagement and enlargement is a viable strategy for America to follow and should be expanded to the fullest.

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Abstract

This paper is a critical analysis of the US foreign policy toward Iran and Iraq known as dual containment. The objective of dual containment is to isolate these regimes politically, economically, and militarily. This paper evaluates recent American policy directed toward the region in order to place the policy of dual containment in perspective. The paper contains a review of the policy of dual containment itself by examining the writings of the authors of the policy. The debate that has surrounded the policy of dual containment is summarized. In conclusion, the paper offers three possible policy options for the future, provides some predictions of the near term future for the region, and closes with a policy recommendation. The paper concludes that dual containment is a sustainable policy for the region. In the long term, however, it is argued that the interest of the United States would be better served if a policy of incremental engagement toward Iran and Iraq was initiated. This policy option should begin with economic engagement leading eventually to restoring diplomatic relations. For this to become a reality, the regimes in Iran and Iraq need to demonstrate the desire and ability to accept the standards of behavior as established by the community of nations.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Bad administration, to be sure, can destroy good policy; but good administration can never save bad policy.

—Adlai Stevenson

The United States has followed a policy of dual containment toward Iran and Iraq since May 1993. The object of dual containment is to isolate these regimes politically, economically, and militarily. The United States has been actively involved in the Middle East for the last 50 years and dual containment is a shift in policy direction. It is relevant at this time to examine the viability of dual containment within the context of the region and balanced against the current national security strategy of engagement and enlargement.

President Clinton began to set the foundations for America's current Persian Gulf policy almost immediately upon assuming office. During his first year in office, his administration issued numerous policy objectives. These aspirations culminated in the announcement of dual containment on May 18, 1993.¹ The policy is the creation of two senior White House aids - Martin Indyk, at the time the National Security Council's Middle East Officer, and Anthony Lake, then serving as Special Assistant to the President for National Security.² With this announcement, the United States formally altered its foreign policy toward the two most powerful and populous Persian Gulf states - Iran and

Iraq. Thus, the Clinton Administration began to isolate these states politically, economically, and militarily.

The rationale for dual containment is the direct result of three events. First, the end of the Cold War allowed the United States to pursue a more discriminate policy. Previously, these two nations were used by the superpowers as pawns, with the Iraqi regime leaning to the Soviets, and Iran developing ties to the United States (which were severed by the Iranian Revolution in 1979). No longer, however, is America forced to balance one state against the other to achieve strategic objectives. With the demise of the Soviet Union, America became the sole remaining superpower, and now has the luxury of selectivity with respect to foreign policy strategies. A second determining factor is the political outcome of Desert Storm. Although the war was a clear military victory for the coalition forces, its political aftermath is considered a failure by many observers because Saddam Hussein remains in power. The United States, ever leery of Saddam's preoccupation with military adventurism, is resigned to the fact that American foreign policy must incorporate strategies that will cripple this despot. Additionally, the issues that initially led to this war are still unresolved and other difficulties have manifested themselves - political uncertainty, regional hostility, fear of military actions, and the specter of weapons of mass destruction.³ The third factor is the Arab-Israeli peace process. Both Iran and Iraq have well-documented ties to subversive elements that are opposed to the peace process. In the case of Iraq, these relations are generally formed with the more radical Palestinian groups. Iran, in contrast, tends to form ties with Shiite Islamic fundamentalists - like Hezbollah. It is the belief and desire of the Clinton

Administration that the strategy of dual containment will severely cripple Iran and Iraq's ability to influence their surrogates in the Levant.

The policy of dual containment is significant in that it is focused on a region that is vital to the national security of the United States. Approximately 66 percent of the world's known oil reserves are found in the Persian Gulf and the surrounding states. Not only is oil very abundant, but it is accessible and of high quality. Iran and Iraq are considered the regional superpowers. These two nations have a combined population exceeding 85 million people. Although neither presents a serious challenge to a NATO type military, they do pose a very real threat to the surrounding Gulf states. The United States has for the past 50 years stated that uninterrupted access to oil from the Persian Gulf is of vital national interest. The defense of these vital interests equates to a willingness to go to war to ensure that they are not challenged.

Notes

¹ Lenczowski, George, "Iran: The Big Debate," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1994, p. 52.

² Lake, Anthony, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2, March/April 1994, p. 45, and Indyk, Martin, et al, "Symposium on Dual Containment: US Policy Toward Iran and Iraq," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 1.

³ Stav, Arie, "Mideast Arms Race: Reaching Critical Mass," *Global Affairs*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 60.

Chapter 2

United States Policy in the Persian Gulf

Power is not merely shouting aloud. Power is to act positively with all the components of power.

—Gamal Abdel Nasser

A sense of direction in the development of American policy leads to the current policy of dual containment. To its authors, the concept of containment is not new and the policy “incorporates a number of elements from previous American policies.”¹ The authors of the policy of dual containment find it to be, “the culmination of a trend toward an increasingly direct American strategic role in the gulf.”² Officials in the Clinton Administration, “have tried to justify ‘dual containment’ in historical terms,” as a logical progression of US policy in the region.³

American interest in the Middle East has grown over the past 200 years. In the late nineteenth century, US interest was primarily commercial. With World War II came a strategic interest in the area, especially in the Persian Gulf. Since the end of World War II, the interests of the United States have deepened and become “petrostrategic.”⁴

Early commercial endeavors in the Persian Gulf required no political commitments on the part of the United States. American policy makers from the 1850s to the 1930s rejected any political role for the United States in the region.

The beginning of World War II marks America's first political commitments in the Persian Gulf. Those commitments led to greater involvement and interdependence between the United States and the Persian Gulf states. America considers itself the "Guardian of the Gulf," a role that has been assumed through deliberate policy doctrines, covert actions, and diplomatic/military reaction to crises.⁵

The national interests of the United States in the Middle East remained relatively constant from 1946 through 1989. America pursued three broad security objectives in the region: containment of the Soviet Union, security for Israel, and access to oil. The end of the Cold War concluded confrontation with the Soviet Union. Containment in the region continues; however, the Soviets have been replaced by the backlash states of Iran and Iraq as the object of containment.

During the early 1990s, the world witnessed the downfall of many Communist regimes and the end of the Cold War. President Bush, who came to office in 1989, was forced to grapple with these dramatic changes. Concerning the Middle East, Bush had to tailor his policies to reflect this new world order. Containment of the Soviet Union was a moot point. Israel's sovereignty was almost guaranteed due to the loss of Soviet influence in the Arab world. Access to oil was the only US interest that could be challenged in the Middle East. American priorities in the region now focused on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and continued access to Persian Gulf oil.

To maintain access to oil, US policy in the Persian Gulf continued to balance Iraq against Iran. However, one major weakness of this policy was the, "lack of shared vision with the countries of the region."⁶ Early in his administration, "President Bush adopted a relatively more conciliatory policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran, [and] his

administration actively supported Saddam's Iraq.”⁷ The Bush Administration sought to expand trade with Iraq and deflect congressional investigations into Iraq's human rights violations.⁸

President Bush had been “pursuing a policy of bringing Iraq back into the family of nations, through diplomacy and economic aid.” The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a surprise.⁹ The new world order that was supposed to replace the Cold War did not account for acts of aggression that would strike so close to one of America's vital interests, access to oil. American policy had been aimed at building up Iraq to support and balance it against Iran. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait gravely threatened this delicate balancing act and the stability of the entire Gulf region.

Bush gained international support to oust Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait by using the United Nations as a means to legitimize and build a military coalition to oppose Iraq. After UN sanctions and diplomatic efforts failed to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, the United States launched Operation Desert Storm, liberating Kuwait through a massive military campaign. The American led coalition achieved the preservation of the nation of Kuwait, maintained access to oil reserves, defeated the Iraqi military, and crushed Iraq's infrastructure. Despite this huge victory for the coalition forces, Saddam Hussein remained in control of his regime and went on to stage brutal campaigns against the Shiites in southern Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds in the north.

President Bush left office with the United States no longer able to strike a balance of power between Iran and a war-weakened, belligerent Iraq. The Gulf had become an “American Lake,” and US access to oil was still unquestioned, yet, “no stable security arrangements for the Gulf emerged from America's victory of 1990-1991.”¹⁰ Saddam

Hussein remained in control of Iraq and continued to consolidate his power. America had turned to an arsenal of UN sanctions in an attempt to subdue Iraq.¹¹ The balance of power would now depend upon the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations.¹² President Bush said of America's agenda in the Middle East:

. . . we will maintain forces deployed in the region, expand our bilateral defense arrangements, preposition materiel and equipment, and conduct joint and combined exercises to defend the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of our partners in the region. We will continue to work to assure access to oil, deter recourse to war, terrorism and subversion, and enforce UN Security Council resolutions.¹³

President Clinton took office in a time when conducting diplomacy was increasingly complex. Clinton's first year in office was "a period of 'international deregulation,' one in which there are new players, new capabilities, and new alignments - but, as yet, no new rules."¹⁴ Many political analysts found that President Clinton's administration began with a "sense of confusion" in defining US interests and foreign policy.¹⁵

In spite of its confused start, the Clinton Administration defined US interests in the Middle East the same as previous administrations. In the President's national security strategy he states:

The United States has enduring interests in the Middle East, especially pursuing a comprehensive breakthrough to Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and our Arab friends, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. Our strategy is harnessed to the unique characteristics of the region and our vital interests there, as we work to extend the range of peace and stability.¹⁶

President Clinton has embarked upon a national strategy of engagement and enlargement. In this strategy, the President has stated that America is not the "world's policeman," although, as the remaining superpower, militarily and economically, the United States is obligated to create stable political relations and open trade.

By engaging nations through “preventive diplomacy” (support for democracy, economic assistance, military presence, military-to-military contacts, and multilateral negotiations) America can focus its resources “where it can make the most difference.”¹⁷

Enlargement is described by the Clinton Administration in the following terms:

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.¹⁸

The strategy of engagement and enlargement was tested in 1994 when Iraqi threats against Kuwait were answered by America’s rapid deployment of forces to the threatened border. In the words of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry “in short, the Gulf in 1991 was a prime example of America’s ability to fight a war, and the Gulf in 1994 was a prime example of our ability to prevent one.”¹⁹

A significant part of President Clinton’s strategy to safeguard US interests in the Persian Gulf is dual containment. In conjunction with dual containment, the United States “will maintain our long-standing presence which has been centered on naval vessels in and near the Persian Gulf and pre-positioned combat equipment.”²⁰ The Clinton Administration’s primary focus in the Gulf is to “reduce the chances” that any nation will threaten the sovereignty of any of the GCC states.²¹ In addition to American presence in the Gulf, the US strategy calls for helping the GCC nations maintain a collective defense.

American policy in the Gulf has gone from indirect involvement, using the region as a setting for Cold War confrontation, to very direct US intervention, war with Iraq. Over the course of American involvement, there have been numerous presidential doctrines

issued, covert operations conducted, and diplomatic/military reactions to crises that have flared up. In 1947, America drew a line along the Northern Tier of Middle Eastern states against the Soviets, and in 1990, drew a “line in the sand” against Iraqi aggression.

Over the past fifty years, Iran has gone from ally to adversary. Presidents Kennedy and Carter pushed for democratization and human rights, which created friction for the Shah’s regime. The Nixon Doctrine placed Iran in the role of regional hegemon that sparked the Shah to build a massive and costly military. Nearly two decades of direct US involvement and support in Iran ended in the creation of the first Islamic republic, devoutly anti-American and now labeled as a backlash state.

Beginning with the Carter administration, US policy sought a balance of power between Iran and Iraq. American policy, while clearly focused on maintaining a regional balance of power, was indirect in its method, using such covert methods as “arms for hostages.” Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait brought the United States back to a direct role, this time engaging in armed confrontation with Iraq.

President Clinton’s policy of dual containment continues along the trend of more direct US involvement with Persian Gulf states. The United States is leading what it hopes to be worldwide isolation of Iran and Iraq.

Although American interests have remained constant in the Persian Gulf, the challenges to those interests have changed. Until 1989 the threat to US dominance in the region was the Soviet Union. The threat today, as defined by the Clinton Administration, is extremism. A spokesman for the administration stated, “It is extremism, whether religious or secular, that we oppose.”²² The US policy and response is continued direct involvement in the Persian Gulf. According to the National Security Strategy, “A key

objective of our policy in the Gulf is to reduce the chances that another aggressor will emerge who would threaten the independence of existing states.”²³

President Clinton is taking this direct role a step further with dual containment. America is not only directly involved in regional security, but two specific Middle East nations are the focus of US containment. The Clinton policy of dual containment can be seen as, “the culmination of a trend toward an increasingly direct American strategic role in the gulf.”²⁴

Notes

¹ Gause, Gregory F., “The Illogic of Dual Containment,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2, March/April 1994, p. 59.

² Ibid.

³ Goodarzi, Jubin H., “Dual Containment: Origins, Arms and Limits,” *Middle East International*, No. 507, 25 August 1995, p. 20.

⁴ Palmer, Michael A., *On Course to Desert Storm: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf*, Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington DC, 1992, p. 135.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 243-249.

⁶ Kuniholm, Bruce R., “Retrospect and Prospects: Forty Years of US Middle East Policy,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Winter 1987, pp. 17-18.

⁷ Bill, James A. and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, 4th ed., Harper Collins College Publishers, New York, 1994, p. 387.

⁸ Ibid., p. 388.

⁹ Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, MA, p. 5.

¹⁰ Gause, Gregory F., *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1994, p. 175.

¹¹ White House, *A National Security Strategy of the United States*, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, January 1993, p. 8.

¹² The GCC nations are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

¹³ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴ Haass, Richard N., “Paradigm Lost,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, p. 43.

¹⁵ Wolfowitz, Paul D., “Clinton's First Year,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1, January/February 1995, p. 30. Some contend the confusion went beyond Presidents Clinton's first months. “That American foreign policy stands in disarray and confusion is one of the few propositions on which a consensus exists in the country today,”

Notes

Hendrickson, David C., "The Recovery of Internationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 5, September/October 1994, p. 26.

¹⁶ White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1995, p. 30, this same language is used in the 1996 version of the national security strategy (White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1996, p. 42).

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁹ Perry, William J., "Working with Gulf Allies to Contain Iraq and Iran," prepared remarks to the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 18 May 1995 (LEXUS-NEXUS).

²⁰ White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 30.

²¹ Ibid., p. 31.

²² Lake, p. 52.

²³ White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 43.

²⁴ Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," p. 59.

Chapter 3

The Policy of Dual Containment

Never look down to test the ground before taking your next step; only he who keeps his eye fixed on the far horizon will find the right road.

—Dag Hammarskjöld

The official announcement of the policy of dual containment came from a speech delivered by Martin Indyk in May of 1993. Lake, Indyk's superior, expounded further on dual containment in an article in the March 1994 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Lake begins by defining the core values as: (1) pursuit of democratic institutions, (2) expansion of free markets, (3) peaceful settlement of conflict, and (4) promotion of collective security.¹

Standing in opposition to these core values are what Lake defines as “backlash states,” specifically Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. In his article, he further elaborates that these backlash states are aggressive and defiant, with growing ties between them.²

The backlash states share some common characteristics that run counter to American core values. Those characteristics are: control of power through coercion, suppression of human rights, promotion of radical ideologies, opposition to popular participation, inability to engage constructively with other nations (or to function well in alliances), and possession of a “siege mentality,” as evidenced by seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction.³

Lake states that as the sole superpower the United States has a responsibility to confront the backlash states and neutralize, contain, and reform them. Since each backlash state is unique, it is necessary for US policies to be tailored to each state, with the primary focus on containment. The containment of these nations will be done in three ways: first, through isolation from the international community, second, diplomatic and economic pressures using such methods as UN sanctions or international boycotts, and third, restrictions of their military and technical capabilities.⁴

With the above foundation established, Lake completes the article by looking at the containment of Iraq and Iran. The United States desires a balance of power in the Persian Gulf with the goal of protecting "the security interests of our friends and in the free flow of oil at stable prices."⁵

Lake reviews the recent policies that attempted to balance power in the region. The Nixon Doctrine's building up Iran, and the Reagan efforts to support Iraq against Iran relied upon one of these backlash states to balance the other. Today, both regimes are hostile to US interests and the only acceptable option, he believes, is containment of both nations. Dual containment cannot be accomplished by the United States alone; however, it requires the assistance of regional allies, especially the GCC nations.

Lake acknowledges that the Clinton administration has certain advantages that previous administrations did not. First, with the elimination of the Soviet Union, the strategic importance of Iraq and Iran is decreased. Second, the balance of power between Iraq and Iran is at a much lower level of military capability than in the previous two decades. Third, since the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq the GCC nations are less reluctant to join the United States in military alliances, more willing to allow deployment of US troops,

and pre-positioning of military stocks. Finally, American relations in the Middle East are strong with Egypt, Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.⁶

Based upon the changes in the region, the United States no longer needs to rely on Iraq or Iran to be a part of the balance of power equation. The Clinton Administration, referring to dual containment, is “confident that we can sustain this situation for some time.”⁷

Lake points out that dual containment is not duplicate containment. The Clinton Administration recognizes that the regimes in Iraq and Iran are very different, requiring tailored approaches. Iraq is Saddam Hussein’s regime: secular, aggressive, committing crimes against humanity, and, in general, an international renegade. Iran is an Islamic Republic; a theocratic, revolutionary regime with a feeling of cultural and political destiny, engaged in “outlaw behavior.”⁸

Lake notes that the United States is not opposed to an Islamic government; nor, does the United States want to overthrow the Iranian regime. He states that what America seeks is an “authoritative dialogue” in which to discuss Iranian behavior.

The tactics of the containment of Iraq center on the UN resolutions and reflect an international consensus. The United States wants a democratic Iraq and supports the exiled Iraqi National Congress. Frustrating the containment of Iraq is what Lake calls Saddam’s defiance, combined with a guise of compliance toward the UN sanctions. The Clinton Administration believes that once Iraq complies with the sanctions and oil flows again, Saddam will renew his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Lake argues, “Iran is both a lesser and a greater challenge.”⁹ This challenge is the dilemma facing American containment of Iran. More normal relations with Iran are

conceivable, but according to Lake, “political differences with Iran will not easily be resolved.” In spite of these formidable differences, this is not a “clash of civilizations.” What the United States is opposed to is extremism, either secular or religious. Iran challenges American interests in five areas:

1. seeking weapons of mass destruction,
2. sponsoring terrorism and assassinations,
3. opposing the Arab-Israeli peace process,
4. seeking to acquire offensive weapons, and
5. exploiting difficult situations with US allies.¹⁰

In containing Iran the Clinton Administration is not supported by UN resolutions, but instead must attempt to create an international consensus for support. Some challenges exist in confronting Iran’s procurement of conventional weapons. It is difficult to distinguish between military items for self-defense and those that have an offensive use that could destabilize the region.¹¹

Lake concludes by stating that dual containment is “a realistic and sustainable policy.”¹² Dual containment is not a crusade, but a “genuine and responsible effort” to protect American interests, stabilize international politics, and enlarge the community of nations committed to America’s core values.¹³

The proponents of dual containment admit some risks are involved in pursuing this policy. Since the regimes in Teheran and Baghdad are seen as weak, these risks are discounted as unlikely by Lake. The three major risks, acknowledged by Lake and other proponents of dual containment are: driving Iran and Iraq together in an alliance, opening Iraq to manipulation, and destabilizing Iraq’s sovereignty.

The first risk is that as a result of dual containment Iran and Iraq “may be driven together in their efforts to resist the West.”¹⁴ In a view from the Middle East, it has been

said that, “Baghdad and Teheran might form an axis and seek support from France and Russia.”¹⁵

Some evidence of limited cooperation between Iraq and Iran, specifically in recent prisoner of war negotiations, has been observed. In August of 1995, Iran released 100 Iraqi prisoners of war captured during the 1980-88 war. This may signal initial attempts at normalizing relations between the two nations. Or it may be, as one news agency said, “that the two countries are just playing cards in order to confront the US containment policy against them.”¹⁶

Many observers see the possibility of driving Iran and Iraq together as remote, since very basic cultural and political differences exist between the two nations. They fought a costly eight year war and have disputed the Shaat-al-Arab (Iraq’s only access to the Persian Gulf) for even longer. As Martin Indyk stated, “they distrust each other much more than they distrust the Great Satan, the United States.”¹⁷ This seething hostility between these two nations was highlighted by Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. He accused Iran of initiating the Gulf War, holding some 20,000 POWs, and supporting and sponsoring anti-Iraqi terrorist groups.¹⁸

The second risk involved with dual containment is that Iran will be provided opportunities to “meddle and prey on Iraqi weakness.”¹⁹ A fear exists that Iran will attempt to destabilize Iraq by manipulating the Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish populations. Up to this time, no concrete indications have surfaced that either group is interested in leaning toward Iran, or that Iran has made any significant overtures to fully support these groups.

The third risk that dual containment brings is the complete destabilization or disintegration of Iraq. It is possible that Saddam’s regime will collapse under the weight

of UN sanctions. A total collapse of the regime could create either a weak military junta or leave a political vacuum.²⁰

Pressures on a shattered Iraqi regime could come from an internal power struggle. More drastic consequences might be seen if the forces were external. Neighboring nations may seek to carve up Iraq.²¹ Or, Iran could attempt to put a friendly regime in Baghdad and begin to exert pressure on neighboring Gulf nations.²²

According to Lake and Indyk, the policy of dual containment depends upon three larger considerations. First, prior to the end of the Cold War, the United States was forced to support one regime against another in order to maintain a balance of power in the region against Soviet aggression. With our major adversary eliminated from the region, US policy toward the Persian Gulf is able to become less restrictive and more discriminate. With both Iran and Iraq displaying openly hostile policies toward America, the United States is at liberty to institute a policy that contains both regimes, without suffering a loss of strategic advantage. Secondly, the fundamental goal of dual containment is to politically and economically isolate these regimes, in part in order to increase the chances for a lasting peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel. Therefore, a policy that inhibits contact between these regimes and their surrogates can only expedite the peace process. Thirdly, the policy facilitates a forward deployment of US military to a region of the world that is capable of exploding at any time. Not only does American military presence decrease the chance of further war in the region, it also increases cooperation between our allies in the form of training exercises and joint operations.

The Clinton Administration contends that as long as the present regimes remain in power in Iran and Iraq, the United States does not need to depend on hostile states to maintain the balance of power or to protect American interests in the region. Dual containment is a realistic and sustainable policy that marries vital US national interests with the realities of the Persian Gulf. Dual containment continues to allow America to accomplish its three primary objectives in the region - isolation of Iran and Iraq, security of Israel, and access to oil.

The basis of most objections to dual containment seem to focus on the passiveness of the policy. America has chosen to “wait-out” the present regimes of Iran and Iraq. The United States waited almost 50 years before the powerful Soviet Union imploded, but at what cost? Thus, the same question is asked concerning dual containment in the Persian Gulf. What is the cost to the United States by pursuing this policy of isolating the two most powerful and populous countries in the region? And, how long is the United States willing to wait for these nations to change their ways or change regimes? Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s complaint is that this policy does not contribute to the overall US grand strategy. He calls containment a “doctrine of perpetual struggle.”²³

Graham Fuller contends that the United States has almost become obsessed with Iran.²⁴ The Clinton Administration, by declaring Iran as one of the most threatening regimes in the world, gives that government and its ceaseless call for Islamic revolution legitimacy. The United States has over estimated the power and influence of Iran. He maintains America should follow a policy of single containment of Iraq, while seeking out possible replacement governments for a post-Saddam Iraq, and advocates open and productive engagement with Iran.²⁵

Anthony Cordesman argues that America, when assessing Iran and Iraq's military strengths, focuses on order of battle numbers rather than actual capabilities.²⁶ In essence, the United States overestimates the military threat from these regimes. On the other hand, he believes these countries will eventually acquire weapons of mass destruction and that containment will not be able to stop this procurement. Containment, an extremely expensive policy for the US military, will only slow down the procurement of weapons of mass destruction. Cordesman does not argue with the overall strategy of dual containment, but questions how long the United States will be able to deploy its military forces to the region. If the United States insists on pursuing containment of Iran, its focus should be devoted to weapons of mass destruction only.²⁷

Phebe Marr echoes many of Cordesman's views toward dual containment; however, she is less optimistic of America's ability to project troops to the region, and questions America's ability to influence these regimes through sanctions. She is another proponent of productive dialogue with the government of Iran and the possible replacement of the government of Saddam Hussein.²⁸

F. Gregory Gause, one of the most outspoken critics of dual containment, believes the policy is unattainable. The United States, by isolating itself from Iran and Iraq, has effectively cut off any influence it may have had over these two states. He claims that the United States cannot contain Iran unilaterally, and that international pressure is growing to reevaluate the UN sanctions against Iraq. Gause notes that such a large American military presence in the region creates instability.²⁹ The legitimacy of the Gulf monarchies faces internal challenges. These factions contend the only reason the conservative monarchies hold power is with US military assistance. Gause concedes that the American military

presence lends credence to the argument that these regimes are illegitimate and acting as US puppet states. Gause proposes that the United States seek productive dialogue with Iran to ensure America's security needs are met. A similar dialogue must be opened with Iraq when it eventually transitions to a post-Saddam government. He also proposes that the United States seek out all other actors (Iraqi Shiites and Kurds) to ensure that Iraq does not break into ethnic states when Saddam's regime is gone.

French Ambassador Eric Rouleau says the United States must stop attaching morality to its foreign policy. He sees America preaching a policy of containment of Iran, but is one of Iran's leading trading partners. Rouleau highlights that sanctions are not hurting Saddam's regime, but are instead hurting those most vulnerable, the Iraqi citizens. Sanctions and embargoes will never fulfill their expected purpose because each of these backlash regimes have international trading partners. Iraq continues to trade with Jordan, and Iran is engaged in numerous business deals with international corporations. Rouleau believes the only way to improve the situation in the Persian Gulf is through productive dialogue with both regimes.³⁰

Professor George Lenczowski, also, is critical of the dual containment policy. His major disagreement with the policy is in regard to Iran. He contends that the United States trades with other nations not sharing our political or ideological views - namely China and Vietnam. Islamic fundamentalism is not a crime, and neither is Iranian opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process. Nor can the United States allow one personalized incident, the Rushdie affair, influence any part of our overall policy toward Iran.³¹

Most experts seem to support containment of Iraq, with varying degrees of severity. The Clinton Administration favors the most stringent rules governing containment - no trade or diplomatic contact. Conversely, the French advocate lessening of the sanctions and possible dialogue with the present Iraqi regime.

If the United States does continue with its present policy toward Iraq, it will be quite obvious when the opportunity would exist to open up relations with that country. Iraq and Saddam are synonymous. He is the government; therefore, when he is removed from the scene, the window of opportunity will be open.

Iran, on the other hand, is more complicated. America's policy of containing Iran is based on past US disappointment with opening productive dialogue, and that regime's unrelenting hostility toward America. The United States has chosen to remain silent and confrontational to the Iranians. American policy makers have chosen to distance the United States from any diplomatic contacts and have attempted, with limited success, to inhibit American companies from doing business with Iran.

Critics of dual containment generally agree that Iran is not the threat that the United States perceives it to be. Opponents of dual containment all recommend some form of diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic. If the United States would pursue such a policy, the question that arises is not, how to open the lines of communication, but with whom in the Iranian regime.³²

Dual containment has been in effect for over three years. This policy of political, economic, and military isolation of Iran and Iraq has achieved some of its objectives. The authors of dual containment stated that their goal was not duplicate containment, but

rather to tailor the policy specifically to each state. Implementing dual containment has been more successful with regard to Iraq than Iran.

America's attempt to control Iran politically, economically, and militarily has been almost without major success. It is practically impossible to isolate Iran geographically. The country is too large and its borders are porous. The first goal of attempting to change Iranian's political system has only succeeded in allowing numerous political elements to blame their problems on the United States. The second goal of attempting to damage Iran's economy was short-lived. Economic losses suffered by Iran due to US sponsored unilateral sanctions were quickly recovered. European and Asian nations were more than willing to fill the void left by the pullout of American companies. The most important goal of the Clinton Administration has been to hinder Iran's attempt to rearm itself. This objective has also been frustrated by the cash starved nations of the world, who have been more than willing to sell the Iranians military equipment - for a price. Finally, as in Iraq, these sanctions create unintended victims. In this instance, it has turned out to be American business.

Iraq's geography makes it easier to isolate. All of Iraq's neighboring countries have agreed to uphold UN sponsored sanctions, with the exception of some limited trade with Jordan and Turkey. Iraq is, in essence, geographically isolated from the rest of the world. Also, the structure of its economy has contributed significantly to the success of containment. Iraq's main exports and imports, before sanctions were levied against it, were petroleum products and foodstuffs, respectively. The community of nations has very effectively severed both of these economic lifelines. The goal of the Clinton

Administration is to cripple this country politically, economically, and militarily. This has been achieved, at the price of considerable suffering to the population.

Dual containment was designed to force political change in Iraq. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein remains in power, and from all indicators will continue to be Iraq's leader well into the future. Dual containment was intended to undermine the Iraqi economy and to encourage the populace to rise up and challenge the regime. The opposite has occurred. The rich are still in control and have not suffered. Meanwhile, the victims have been the Iraqi middle class and poor, who are now more concerned about finding their next meal than undertaking revolutions. Finally, and most important, the greatest consequence of dual containment and its instrument of choice, UN sanctions, has had a devastating effect on Iraqi public health.

Notes

¹ Lake, p. 45.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 46.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 46-47.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 47-48.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 48-49.

⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

⁸ Ibid., p. 50.

⁹ Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁰ Indyk, p. 5.

¹¹ Lake, p. 53.

¹² Ibid., p. 55.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁵ ———, "Saddam's 5-year Old Thirst for Revenge," *Mideast Mirror*, Vol. 09, No. 146, 1 August 1995 (LEXUS-NEXUS).

¹⁶ ———, "Iran Issues Decree Releasing 100 Iraqi POWs," The Xinhua News Agency, 15 August 1995 (LEXUS-NEXUS).

¹⁷ Indyk, p. 6.

Notes

¹⁸ Lorieux, Claude, "Tariq Aziz: Iraq is not Opposed to Arab-Israeli Peace Process," *Paris LE FIGARO*, 30 September 1995, p. 2, translated from French, FIBIS-NES-95-191, article ID "drnes 191_k_95003.

¹⁹ Lake, p. 54.

²⁰ Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," p. 63.

²¹ Gold, Dore, "Middle East Chess Players Abandon Old Strategies," *The Jerusalem Post*, 15 September 1995, p. 11.

²² Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," p. 63.

²³ Kissinger, Henry, "Reflections on Containment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 122.

²⁴ Dr. Graham Fuller is a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation. He has written and spoken extensively on American policies in the Middle East.

²⁵ Indyk, p. 7.

²⁶ Dr. Anthony Cordesman is a Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown University and a Woodrow Wilson Fellow.

²⁷ Indyk, p. 12.

²⁸ Dr. Phebe Marr is a Senior Fellow at the National Defense Institute.

²⁹ Indyk, p. 62, an increased American presence could become a "lightening rod for discontent."

³⁰ Rouleau, Eric, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, p. 68. An article by Jack Patterson details the dilemma of UN sanctions against Iraq, see, Patterson, Jack, "The Sanctions Dilemma," *Middle East Report*, Vol. 24, No. 2-3, May-June 1994.

³¹ Lenczowski, p. 61.

³² Ghoreishi, Ahmad, "Prospects for a Regime Change in Iran," unpublished article, 1995, p. 20.

Chapter 4

Conclusions and Recommendations

It is much easier to be critical than to be correct.

—Benjamin Disraeli

There seems to exist three broad policy options for America in shaping a policy for the Persian Gulf. First, America certainly has the option of continuing its policy of dual containment. Second, various alternatives of engagement are available. This choice could include engaging either Iran or Iraq, or both. Third, the United States can actively and aggressively seek regime changes in Iran and Iraq through overt or covert military activities.

What follows is a brief description of each of these policy options. Each alternative is presented along with its major advantages and disadvantages.

The continuation of a containment policy is the first and obvious option. The United States has the choice of maintaining dual containment in its current form. The Clinton Administration can continue with unilateral sanctions against Tehran. Iraq has not demonstrated full willingness to comply with the UN resolutions. Although some nations have wavered in their commitment to support UN-imposed sanctions, the United States has the diplomatic and military clout needed to insure the resolutions and current sanctions are broadly respected.

The advantages of containment are many. The policy of dual containment enjoys domestic support. Americans are unhappy with both Iran and Iraq and believe it is in our national interest to limit their influence. As a result, Congress, the voice of the people, is inclined to support dual containment. Additionally, for those seeking greater isolation for America, dual containment is an acceptable policy approach. After almost five decades of pursuing a policy of containing the Soviet Union, Americans are comfortable with containment as a foreign policy strategy.

Continuing the policy of dual containment would demonstrate commitment and dedication to international affairs by President Clinton. He was plagued by criticism early in his first term for having no clear foreign policy agenda.¹ Dual containment was an early foreign policy statement by his administration. President Clinton has been able to deflect some of his critics charges with his continuing support of this policy.

Dual containment is a low cost policy politically. The vast majority of Iraqis and Iranians in this country have been extremely supportive of dual containment, since it was the brutality of these regimes which forced them to take refuge in America.

Dual containment ensures that America's vital interest in the region remains unchallenged. American military units are always on station, ready to counter these regimes on a moment's notice.

The disadvantages of containment have been expressed by many critics and are summarized in the following. Because the United States has failed in its attempt to gain international support for sanctions against Iran, this American policy has to some extent set it at odds with important allies in Europe and Asia. American firms are losing out on opportunities to do business with both Iran and Iraq. European and Asian companies are

presently trading with Iran, and are drawing up plans to do business with Iraq as soon as the sanctions are lifted.

Criticism is building within the United Nations that the containment of Iraq is punishing its citizens, rather than Saddam Hussein. One of the goals of UN sanctions, and dual containment, is to relieve human rights violations within Iraq - not to heighten them.

The pressure of dual containment may cause Iraq to break apart if Saddam is removed from power. The world has come to realize that in the post-Cold War era, new nations formed on ethnic and religious grounds are extremely volatile. This breakup could further complicate political stability in the region.

Maintaining a US Naval presence and reserve military stocks in the region is costly. A large and visible US military presence in the Gulf may carry the political cost of being a destabilizing force for GCC nations (a lightning rod for discontent).

Dual containment is too passive to force a change in behavior from either regime. Containment is a policy of inaction, which gives both regimes an inflated sense of their own power.

The second general option for the United States is to pursue a policy option of greater engagement. The following three options are variations of the engagement alternative. The advantages and disadvantages of all three policy options overlap; therefore, they will be considered together. All three options of engagement would begin slowly in engaging the target nation or nations and would be directed at expanding economic links first and political ties next.

The first engagement option would be to engage Iran and contain Iraq. This option requires that the United States abandon its attempt to isolate Iran. America must reverse

its present foreign policy agendas and explore ways to engage Iran. Also, this option still requires the containment of Iraq until this state completely complies with all UN resolutions.

The second engagement option would be for America to contain Iran and engage Iraq. Efforts to isolate Iran would continue under this directive. Subsequently, the United States would increase its efforts to encourage international support for the containment of Iran. America would attempt to engage Iraq commercially and diplomatically. This option, however, requires approval from the United Nations that Iraq has met all provisions of the UN resolutions.

The third option would be for the United States to engage both Iran and Iraq. This option brings together the criteria for engagement as stated in options 1 and 2. Each nation would present different challenges for engagement and would require separate approaches by the United States.

Some of the advantages of an engagement strategy follow. Opening economic and/or political dialogue with either Iran or Iraq (or both) would exemplify the Clinton Administration's overall national strategy of engagement and enlargement. One of the tenants of the national strategy is to seek the peaceful integration of the international community, and engaging these two states, if successful, would be a great step in that direction.

Engagement would expand business opportunities for American companies, opening up markets and access to resources.

Engaging one or both of these nations would enhance the likelihood of modifying the behavior of these regimes. Change is more likely to occur as a result of engagement than from containment.

Opening relations with either Iran or Iraq would be an economic benefit to other nations in the region by expanding markets and eliminating trade barriers.

Any of the three options of engagement would provide greater security for the GCC nations. Increased stability in the Persian Gulf would also lessen the military requirements for the United States.

There are a variety of disadvantages to the engagement strategies. Attempting to engage either Iran or Iraq would present a huge political risk for the President of the United States, Saddam Hussein, and the ruling elements in Iran. After years of portraying the other as the source of great evil, the slightest suggestion of engagement could easily be interpreted as a sign of political weakness.

Domestic pressure in the United States to support the Arab-Israeli peace process and the security of Israel would stand in opposition to any of the options for engagement. Engagement with Iran or Iraq could be interpreted as a threat to Israel or America's resolve to support Israel's security.

Engagement with Iran and/or Iraq would reduce current oil prices. This action would be extremely unsettling for the GCC nations and also for the oil producing American states.

After several years of pursuing dual containment, shifting to a more open policy may not be well received by all of America's allies within the region.

A significant difficulty in any attempt to engage Iran would be in deciding whom to approach in the Iranian regime.

Engaging Iran or Iraq could be interpreted as a symbolic victory for them against the United States and the West.

The third general option of dealing with Iran and Iraq can be to become more aggressive in engaging these nations. This option involves the United States actively seeking or supporting a change in the regimes of Iran and Iraq. Efforts under this option could involve both covert and open support of opposition groups seeking to change the regimes in Iran and Iraq.²

The advantages of this option are few. This option would bring an active and quicker change in the regimes as opposed to the passive and long-range approach of dual containment.

Opposition groups exist in both Iran and Iraq that would welcome an active US role in their cause. In Iraq, a very clear target exists - Saddam Hussein.

There are several major disadvantages of this option. Aggressive American action directed at either Iran or Iraq would be difficult to achieve militarily or covertly.

The potential political cost for actively supporting opposition groups or covert operations, which may become public, would be extremely risky. Exposure of such activities in either Iran or Iraq could further galvanize anti-American attitudes in those nations.

Selecting this option might carry the risk of terrorist retaliation by either Iran or Iraq. Attacks could target the United States or US allies in the region, jeopardizing America's two national interests - access to oil and the security of Israel.

A regime change may not yield the desired results. A new regime in Iran or Iraq could be even worse than those presently in control.³

Before voicing a policy recommendation, it is necessary to hypothesize some near term Iranian and Iraqi aspirations. The behavior of these two nations and the surrounding states will be a determining factor in future policies of the United States. The following predictions are based upon the policy trends already reviewed.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been in existence since 1979 and shows no sign of weakening. The Iranian regime will likely proceed along a path of softening its revolutionary rhetoric and backing away from some of its extreme points of view. As Iran becomes more economically interdependent with Europe and Asia, certain ideological compromises will be required by Iran to maintain these ties. Iran has already shown a more moderate approach by not pursuing the “death warrant” against the author Salman Rushdie.

Iraq will comply with UN resolutions before this decade is over. The desire to attempt to reenter the family of nations is growing in Iraq, but the desire to end the sanctions will be the driving force for compliance. As cruel as the sanctions may be, they are having an effect on Iraqi willingness to open up with the world, to engage in international trade, and to reestablish diplomatic relations with a wider range of nations. However, America’s desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power is not likely to be fulfilled soon, and not as a result of UN sanctions. The United States needs to prepare for the possibility of dealing with Saddam as a legitimate leader of Iraq. Saddam and his regime will be around for some time to come.

The political climate in the United States does not currently allow for engagement of Iran and Iraq, but may change. President Clinton's reelection may allow him to feel less compelled to bow to domestic pressures. The President, now in a second term, has a new opportunity to reevaluate the policy of dual containment and to make a decision to stay the course or change policy direction.

The number of nations supporting the US policy of dual containment will continue to decrease, while diplomatic ties between Iran and the rest of the world will grow. Political pressure will increase from members of the United Nations to end the sanctions against Iraq. In the Middle East, completion of the Arab-Israeli peace process will eliminate one more point of contention between the backlash states and America.

US efforts to isolate Iran have hurt the Iranian economy. Nevertheless, Iran has made efforts to open trade with other nations. Iran's economy is expanding and has made sufficient attempts to service its foreign debt. Iran will continue to expand its European and Asian trade as worldwide support for dual containment shrinks.

Not until UN sanctions are lifted will Iraq be able to begin rebuilding its economy. Sanctions have ruined Iraq's economy, but many European and Asian firms are ready to begin rebuilding it following the removal of sanctions.

Both Iran and Iraq possess oil resources that are of interest around the world. Of equal importance are the possibilities of using either or both of these nations as transit routes for oil and gas supplies from the Caspian Sea. Iran could become a key player in the full realization of the value of the oil fields in Turkmenistan if pipeline routes are placed through Iran to the Persian Gulf.

Dual containment has had far less economic impact on the United States than on Iran and Iraq. However, in the future as Iran and Iraq open up to the world, dual containment will be judged to have held US companies out of these new markets. Dual containment will have given nearly all other businesses in the world a head start in Iran and Iraq at the expense of American corporations.

Dual containment has been unable to deter either Iran or Iraq from expanding their military strength. As economic conditions improve in each of these countries, their revenues will grow, which will allow them greater ability to finance their rearmament programs.

General economic relations will grow between the GCC nations, Iran, and (eventually) Iraq. With this expanded interdependence, comes a decrease in the perception of these nations as threats to the GCC. It is possible that the GCC will slow arms purchases from the United States as a result.

Diminished Iranian and Iraqi threats to Persian Gulf security will lessen the need for a large US presence in the region. The GCC nations will use this outcome as an opportunity to ease the US military out of their countries, a presence that for most Gulf monarchies is a political liability. The bottom line for the United States is the potential loss of its foothold in the region.

Based upon the debate reviewed in this paper and the possible options that exist at this time, the following recommendation is made. The United States should pursue a more active policy of engagement and enlargement. President Clinton needs to take the opportunity of winning his second term to the White House to begin an incremental process of engagement with Iran. Containment of Iraq should continue until full

compliance with all UN resolutions is reached. However, even before full Iraqi compliance is attained, American strategic planners should begin to formulate plans for open engagement with Iraq.

The first method of engagement should be commercial. It may take years before any manner of formal diplomatic relations can be established with Iran or Iraq. Business relations could pave the way for diplomatic ties, reintroducing America slowly to Iran, and later to Iraq. As President Clinton stated, “nations with growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom.”⁴

By engaging both Iran and Iraq, it will be simpler to monitor compliance with efforts to limit weapons of mass destruction. Guarantees for human rights would be better observed from within these nations rather than attempting to influence them through isolation.

Iran is simply too large to ignore. Because of its size and location, Iran will always be a significant player in the Persian Gulf region. The United States is much more likely to have an impact on the Iranian regime from inside than outside.

America must find some common ground with Iran. As previously suggested, that may initially be through economic contact. Iran was willing to make an oil concessions deal with CONOCO, which suggests that a desire exists in Iran to accept US businesses within their borders. If America doesn't engage Iran soon, opportunities will be lost for any meaningful entry into the Iranian economy by US businesses. Other nations have already filled the void created by lost American business.

The United States has been able to conduct business and diplomacy with other nations that we do not see eye to eye with. China has struggled with charges of human rights

violations, yet retains a most favored nation trading status with America. After a protracted conflict with Vietnam, the United States has recognized Vietnam and is beginning to open commercial relations.

Opening up with Iran could also place added pressure on Iraq to comply with the UN resolutions. It is possible that US engagement with Iran could in some way serve as a positive example for Iraq.

Until Iraq complies with all the UN resolutions, the United States should continue a policy of containment. The resolutions should run their course. Too much time and effort have gone into the containment of Iraq to end just short of the goal.

Saddam Hussein has proven that he wants to buy and build long-range, offensive weapons. The Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program is not fully uncovered and thus remains a potential threat to all of Iraq's neighbors. Progress has been made by UN inspectors in uncovering details of Iraqi weapons programs and this progress should not be lost by stopping short of full compliance.

Though the UN resolve in the enforcement of sanctions has weakened the resolutions are still in effect. The United States must demonstrate resolve in completing the efforts begun in 1990.

In time Iraq will buckle under the pressure of the sanctions and comply with the UN resolutions. Preparations need to begin on how America plans to deal with a recovering Iraq. The question must be asked now: After containment, what?

The Persian Gulf has grown into an area of vital interest to the United States. Iran and Iraq are physically and politically significant in the region. Whether the United States

chooses to contain or to engage these two nations, it will require a high level of political energy.

The United States should seek to engage and influence the Persian Gulf region. The Clinton Administration has stated:

Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the greater our nation likely to prosper.⁵

A US policy, which recognizes that Iran and Iraq are less of a threat if they are engaged, will be the greatest contributor in achieving our strategic interest in the region.

Notes

¹ Graham-Brown, Sarah, "Security Council Conflicts Over Sanctions," *Middle East Report*, No. 2, March/April 1995, p. 5.

² Rathmell, Andrew, "Iraq-The End Game?," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 7, No. 5, May 1995, p. 225. Rathmell states that "senior figures have argued that US policy of dual containment takes too long term a view and that more decisive intervention is necessary to change the regime in Baghdad."

³ Levins, John M., "As Iraq Awaits Saddam's Downfall King Hussein Revives Hashemite Claim," *Washington Report on the Middle East*, Vol. XIV, No. 5, January 1996, p. 25. Levins states, "The great dilemma with Saddam for the Iraqi people, the Arab world and the West as well, is that the devil you know is better than the one you don't. When Saddam goes, someone worse might follow."

⁴ White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. I.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

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