


**The Center for Naval
Warfare Studies**

The Fight for Legitimacy: Liberal Democracy versus Terrorism



by
Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D.
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

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**U.S. Naval War College
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The Fight for Legitimacy: Liberal Democracy versus Terrorism

by

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Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army**

This paper was completed as an independent research project in the Advanced Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College. It is submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the academic requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies. As an academic study completed under faculty guidance, the contents of this paper reflect the author's own personal views and conclusions, based on independent research and analysis. They do not necessarily reflect official current policy in any agency of the U.S. government.

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To Joel,

Ben, Alex, Olivia

and

Mom and Dad

Introduction

Terrorism poses unique challenges to the liberal democratic state. The transnational nature of terrorism necessitates cooperation between and among states to address this common threat. Comparative studies reveal that societies of liberal states must provide consensus for those anti and counter terrorist policies adopted by the state. If liberal democracies take police state-like action in response to terrorism, then arguably the terrorists have achieved their ends. If societies must condone such policies, then those societies of the cooperating states must reach a minimal level of consensus of how to view justice, human rights, rule of law, civil liberties, etc; the operating level of these traits in a society describes a society's political culture. In short, terrorists target state legitimacy, and political culture is at the crux of this study because it reflects a society's legitimacy for its leaders and policies. It is also the missing element of many electoral democracies.

An interdisciplinary approach is necessary to address the challenge of transnational threats to liberal democracies. The theoretical portion of this paper will use international relations, security studies, and comparative politics to address the transnational nature of the security environment; the basis of state legitimacy; terrorism as a transnational threat to liberal democracies; and the connection of political culture and political community to a liberal democratic state's legitimacy. The Basque case will demonstrate the relevance of the theoretical connections and examine how cooperation between Spain and France facilitated Spain's democratic consolidation and mitigation of the Basque terrorist threat, while also strengthening France's liberal democratic

principles. Through cooperation, both countries addressed the transnational terrorist problem, while securing the legitimacy of their liberal democratic orders. In fact, Europe as a region benefited from this case because it helped pave the way for increased regional cooperation on this issue and other transnational threats. Moreover, Spain's persistent adherence to liberal democratic principles, even in the midst of its democratic transition, bolstered its legitimacy vis a vis the ETA, the Basque terrorist group, among the Spanish and Basque population. In a strategic context, the spread of liberal democracy is not just a value-laden objective, it is a security imperative.

The Basque case serves as a base case for this paper's two on-going cases: the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and the Kurds in Turkey. These three cases provide for good comparative analysis because they are ideally suited to case study methodology. During the timeframe of each case, they share the following characteristics: they are all within the European region; they are in some phase of democratization; each state is faced with the challenge of gaining state legitimacy from a large ethnic community within the state; each state must face a terrorist organization that has roots in that ethnic community; and, all the states experience the forces of globalization and fragmentation. While there is a regional limitation, nonetheless, the insights gained will help foster a mid-level theory that, through more testing, may develop into general theory.¹ Furthermore, mid-level theory will be useful for the region and its periphery for the future. Alice Ackerman explains that "The upward spiral of internal conflict in this region is likely to continue. Gurr, for example, lists 24 states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with 59 minorities that are "at risk," the second highest number after

¹ For a discussion on building comparative theories, specifically middle-range and grand theories, see Howard J. Wiarda, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing, 1993), 171-172.

Sub-Saharan Africa, where 28 states have 66 active minorities." The disintegration of states and the attempts to form new multiethnic states where ethnic communities cross state borders has been the seeming cause of much violence during the post-Cold War era. In fact, the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia has been the most costly, in terms of civilians loss of life, wounded, and displaced and physical destruction.²

The purpose of this study is to learn from our European allies. According to Bruce Hoffman: "The changing face of terrorism will only diminish the divisions between the United States and Europe, as governments on both sides of the Atlantic strive to adapt to the challenges posed by transnational networks...."³ And "Given the prevailing patterns of globalization, the security, coordination, and policy challenges facing Europe today are likely to spread to other countries tomorrow....It is perhaps time for the United States to listen and learn rather than to hector and push."⁴ Moreover, with the newly formed EUROPOL, which is an integrated European police force with a charter to combat terrorism, there may be widespread convergence of political cultures across Europe in the future. As Europe's primary ally, the United States has many opportunities for cooperation, especially when dealing with transnational threats, such as terrorism. Cooperation will be essential to address these threats, but it ought not be at the expense of American regime legitimacy. A convergence of political cultures implies that the participants are all making adjustments at the foundation of their regimes, namely recalculating their legitimacy formula. This study will also shed light on the meaning and implication of the concepts of terrorism, liberal democracy, political culture, political

² Alice Ackerman, Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 14.

³ Bruce Hoffman, "Is Europe Soft on Terrorism," Foreign Policy, (Summer 1999), 7.

⁴ Ibid., 8.

community, and legitimacy. A better understanding of these terms may enhance policy discourse and choices.

Theory

The Security Environment

The challenge of terrorism to liberal democracies must be analyzed in a strategic context; it is not just an ancillary concern to security professionals. This is not an easy task, for as Ted Sorenson once remarked: "The touchstone of our nation's security concept – the containment of Soviet military and ideological power is gone. The primary threat cited over forty years in justification for most of our military budget, bases, and overseas assistance is gone. The principal prism through which we viewed most of our world-wide diplomatic activities and alliances has gone."⁵ There have been many proposed theories since the end of the cold war, such as clash of civilizations, democratic peace theory, nationalism, etc, which have tried to develop a consensual theoretical world view. I will focus on the observable forces of globalization and localization as a start point for this discussion. Many scholars argue that globalization is the dominating force, while others claim that localization or fragmentation dominates. The term, "globalization" is a frequently used term that is cast in a variety of contexts, and, consequently, it has come to mean many different things to many different people. It has taken on the best of all possible meanings for some, and for others it is the epitome of all evil and inequity. For our purpose here, it is important to view globalization as a dynamic process that has potential for both good and bad, democratic and non-democratic, and security enhancing and security detracting. In sum, it is a non-normative

⁵ Ted Sorenson as cited in a Department of Social Sciences briefing to alumni in June 1999 at USMA, West Point, New York.

process; it is not a value-laden term. James Rosenau makes this point when he differentiates between globalism as a world system that embraces universal values and globalization as a process that describes forces in every sphere of human and environmental activity that transcends borders. He further distinguishes between globalization and localization: "In short, globalization is boundary-broadening and localization is boundary-heightening." He describes the combination of these forces as "fragnegration." Moreover, he argues that eventually the forces of globalization will dominate.⁶

Jessica Mathews argues that there has been a monumental "power shift," if not only in terms of a shift from two superpowers to one, but a shift away from the nation-state as the sole actor. The basis of this shift is the "computer and telecommunications revolution...[which has] broken government's monopoly on the collection and management of large amounts of information.... In every sphere of activity, instantaneous access to information and the ability to put it to use multiplies the number of players who matter and reduces the number who command authority." According to Mathews, this revolution in information affects communal relations, thereby connecting people across borders, disconnecting societal-state relations, and causing other social divisions and groupings.⁷ She tends to emphasize more of the fragmentation portion of Rosenau's fragnegration. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century recognizes these two forces: "This Commission's Phase I report pointed to two

⁶ The discussion on globalism and globalization is found in James Rosenau, "The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization," in Understanding International Relations, eds. Daniel J. Kaufman, Jay Parker, and Kimberly C. Field (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 756-758 and the quote and the idea of the predominance of globalization is found on pp. 758-759.

⁷ The quote is found in Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," in Strategy and Force Planning, 3rd ed., eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000), 94 and the idea of changing communal relations is found on pp. 94-95.

contradictory trends ahead: a tide of economic, technological, and intellectual forces that is integrating a global community, amid powerful forces of social and political fragmentation."⁸

In my view, these forces are not necessarily contradictory. I don't believe that we are seeing the withering of the nation-state; rather, we are witnessing a sharing of powers both at the local and supranational level. The nation-state is still the most viable political entity, and nations without states are still struggling in their quest for statehood. However, with the end of bipolarity feelings of irredentism, nationalism, religion and ethnicity stress the international system. Bruce Hoffman claims that these sentiments, not ideology, are fueling terrorism and forecasts that these forces "...long held in check or kept dormant by the cold war may erupt to produce even greater levels of non-state violence...."⁹ While this paper's focus is the challenge of the transnational nature of terrorism that the end of the Cold War has escalated, it is not the only transnational threat we face. Our National Security Strategy describes transnational threats as:

...threats that do not respect national borders and which often arise from non-state actors, such as terrorists and criminal organizations...Examples include terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migration, and trafficking in human beings....We also face threats to critical infrastructures, which increasingly could take the form of a cyber-attack in addition to physical attack or sabotage....¹⁰

Moreover, with the increased number of weak states and transitioning states, internal conflicts, regardless of the cause, can quickly escalate regionally and

⁸ "Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom," The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, (April 15, 2000, 5.

⁹ Bruce Hoffman, "Low-intensity Conflict: Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare in the Coming Decades," in Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, ed. Lance Howard (New York: Praeger, 1992), 139.

¹⁰ "A National Security Strategy For A New Century," The White House, December 1999, 2.

possibly globally. Michael Brown contends that internal conflicts matter because they are widespread, cause much suffering, involve proximate states, and can indirectly or directly influence the interests of international organizations and "distant powers."¹¹ While the scope of this paper is limited to terrorism, its significance as a source for internal conflict and the escalating effects of such conflict, make critical study of terrorism even more a matter of national - and global - security.

The discussion above focuses on the threats and vulnerabilities associated with the forces of fragmentation. There are also opportunities in such an environment.¹² Common interests and the coinciding of national and global interests among states have fostered alliances, treaties, international organizations, and international regimes as means for attaining or securing these interests. For example, the European Community offered member countries great advantages. For Germany, it offered a means to gain sovereignty of the iron and steel resources; a path back into the international system, and hope for possible reunification. For France, the EC helped manage the "German problem," while allowing France to influence Europe. The EC gave more voice to the smaller states, such as the Benelux countries, vis a vis the larger European states; brought Spain and Portugal back into the European family of nations; assisted with Italy's economic development; and offered Britain a powerful forum, which it could not

¹¹ Michael Brown, Introduction," ed. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 3.

¹² For a comprehensive discussion of a security framework that includes a security environment consisting of opportunities, threats, vulnerabilities, and challenges, see Richmond Lloyd, "Strategy and Force Planning Framework," Strategy and Force Planning, Third Edition, ed. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport: Naval War College, 2000), 1-17.

afford to ignore. The integration of these member EC (now the European Union or EU) countries was supported by the idea that unification could prevent war.¹³

Other opportunities in the environment include non-state actors such as civil society, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. The global security environment, through the forces of "fragnegration," presents liberal democracies with not only challenges, but also tools to manage and meet these challenges, as well.

Terrorism

Before we begin a critical analysis of terrorism in the context described above, it is imperative to carefully consider the myriad of definitions, categories and perceptions of the term, terrorism. Alex Schmid cautions that, "The question of definition of a term like terrorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency."¹⁴ It is a subjective term, an important point to which we will return later in the paper. According to Donald Hanle, "Terrorism is called terrorism because it violates the normative values of the target entity regarding the employment of lethal force."¹⁵ Philip B. Heymann illustrates the subjectivity of this term by reviewing several countries' definitions: According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany's internal security agency, terrorism is the, "enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes [such as murder, kidnapping,

¹³ Robert Cooper, "Integration and Disintegration," *Journal of Democracy*, 10.1 (1999), 3-4.

¹⁴ Donald J. Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989), 104.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 105.

arson].” Britain’s “Prevention of Terrorism Act” of 1974 defines terrorism as “the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.” The U.S. State Department views terrorism as any violent act conducted for political purposes by substate actors or “secret state agents” against normally noncombatants with the goal of influencing an audience. U.S. laws (18 U.S.C. 3077) defines a terrorist act as criminal violence that “appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.” And according to a group of European Interior Ministers coordinating their efforts concerning the challenges of terrorism, they state: “Terrorism is...the use, or the threatened use, by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to affect political aims.”¹⁶

Heymann settles for a definition that seems to represent a common ground for most definitions. Consequently, he uses the following traits: politically motivated; conducted by groups, but not by individuals; acts are an integral part of a bigger strategy; directed at noncombatants; not a form of warfare; and , “to preserve moral fervor,” Heymann limits his use of terrorism “to political violence in or against true democracies.”¹⁷ His definition raises important issues. Is terrorism different from other criminal activities? In other words, does motivation or effects matter? Is it a type of warfare or is it a peacetime activity? Heymann concludes that “terrorism is an illegal form of clandestine warfare that is carried out by a sub-state group to change the policies, personnel, structure, or ideology of a government, or to influence the actions of another

¹⁶ Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 3.

¹⁷ Ibid., 6.

part of the population – one with enough self-identity to respond to selective violence.”¹⁸

Other issues that Heymann’s definition raises are: should terrorism include states that terrorize their own populations? Should terrorism be limited in scope concerning only democratic regimes?

Paul Wilkinson also views terrorism as a means to a political end:

...the systematic and premeditated use of violence to create a climate of fear for political purposes. Second, it is violence directed at a wider audience - a wider target - than the immediate victim of the violence. Third, as a consequence of this wider targeting, it inevitably involves random and symbolic targets that include civilians. Fourth, it involves extra-normal means in quite a literal sense, which is to say, a deliberate violation of the norms of society regarding conflicts and disputes and political behavior to create the impact of fear and the exploitation of that fear for the terrorists' ends.¹⁹

For Peter Chalk, terrorism's aim is to upset the societal status quo. Its destructive acts are designed to attain "...the long-term objective of gradually removing the structural supports which ultimately give society its strength."²⁰ Cindy Combs describes terrorism as a "synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence - that which is perpetrated on innocent victims - played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes."²¹ Bajhlit Singh sums up terrorism as a "threat or use of symbolic violent acts aimed at influencing political behavior."²² All these definitions suggest a political purpose for terrorist acts, and these acts are conducted outside normal political bounds, involving symbolic violence usually

¹⁸ For further discussion on the questions proposed, see Heymann, 7-9, and the quote is taken from Heymann, 9.

¹⁹ Paul Wilkinson, "Freedom and Terrorism," in Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, ed. Lance Howard (New York: Praeger, 1992), 156.

²⁰ Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 95.

²¹ Cindy Combs, Terrorism in the 21st Century (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997), 8.

²² Bajjit Singh, "An Overview," in Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, ed. Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), 7.

perpetrated against innocent victims in order to weaken the bonds between the legitimate government and society.

Consequently, these definitions compel academics and policymakers to view terrorism in a historical, social and political context.²³ For purposes of this study, it is necessary to examine the trends as discussed in the previous section to better understand the challenges terrorism poses to our nation. The significant trends are the accessibility of information, accessibility of weapons of mass destruction, and democratization. First, the accessibility of information has reduced the power of the nation-state, increased the availability of non-state sponsors of terrorism, introduced cyber-tools to terrorist tactics, and enhanced networking for terrorist strategies. Information accessibility disrupts hierarchies because it facilitates communication and coordination, functions that tend to flatten hierarchical structures.²⁴ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt describe such information networks and the challenge they pose to nation-states as netwar. Networks favor autonomy, flexibility, and adaptability, and they challenge traditional jurisdictional lines of responsibility. These scholars claim that netwar actors will tend to be sub-state and transnational in nature.²⁵ Not only will these actors take advantage of the information technologies available, they will develop new doctrines and strategies that will exploit these technologies.²⁶ Moreover, terrorists can quickly diminish users' perceptions of the integrity of the Internet. Attacks on the Internet may reduce states'

²³ For a comprehensive analysis of terrorism in context see Martha Crenshaw, ed. Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

²⁴ Mathews, 95.

²⁵ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "The Advent of Netwar: Analytical Background," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 3 (July-September 1999): 194-195. David Ronfeldt concludes from two articles in a special issue of the journal, that "networking is spreading among various terrorist and extremist groups - and that their leaders are doing a lot of thinking about how to gain advantages from the information revolution," in David Ronfeldt, "Netwar Across the Spectrum of Conflict: An Introductory Comment," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 3 (1999): 191.

²⁶ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 195.

ability to protect Internet commerce. While the terrorist use of the Internet for communication and propaganda is not revolutionary, its "global immediacy" is. Lorenzo Valeri and Michael Knights categorize the convergence of terrorism and the Internet as Offensive Information Warfare, which they define as a: "...set of activities carried out by individuals and/or groups with specific political and strategic objectives, aimed at the integrity, availability and confidentiality of the data collected, stored and transferred inside information systems connected to the Internet."²⁷ Clearly, states that rely heavily on information are extremely vulnerable to this terrorist method of attack. Moreover, the non-state, network organization, and transnational nature of these terrorists complicate their identification and subsequent apprehension. It is evident that states cannot combat terrorism alone; international cooperation is paramount.²⁸

Second, the availability of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists is another trend that states must consider. Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow argue that "The danger of weapons of mass destruction being used against America and its allies is greater now than at any time since the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962."²⁹ They propose a reorganization of U.S. domestic agencies to deal with "catastrophic terrorism," and, moreover, they propose to universally criminalize the development of prohibited WMD. The universal nature of this law would allow "...the power of national criminal law to be used against people, rather than the power of international law against

²⁷ The idea of global immediacy is found in Lorenzo Valeri and Michael Knights "Affecting Trust: Terrorism, Internet and Offensive Information Warfare," in Terrorism and Political Violence 12, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 16. The quotation is found on Ibid., 17.

²⁸ The idea of vulnerabilities and the importance of cooperation is taken from Gregory D. Grove, Seymour E. Goodman, and Stephen J. Lukasik, "Cyber-attacks and International Law," Survival 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 89-90.

²⁹ Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998): 81.

governments."³⁰ While their proposal sounds right, they fail to acknowledge that different political cultures make the universality of law problematic, which gets at the heart of my thesis. Jessica Stern agrees that terrorists may increasingly look to WMD as a tool for their purposes. Russian scientists are exploiting their NBC knowledge for a price to interested groups. Additionally, Russian safeguards on NBC material have diminished.³¹ Robert Bunker introduces the idea of weapons of mass disruption, which not only target things, but also societal and political bonds. He establishes two criteria of such weapons: a threshold of effect based on a weapon's expansive properties that enable it to effect a massive area and an ability to affect "bonds and relationships." For example, he discusses biological weapons as weapons of mass disruption because "...their employment would also degrade and alter the bonds-relationship within a society, as would nuclear weapons. Examples of such degradation include the loss of confidence in governmental competency and heightened perceptions of insecurity (literally terror) by citizens who would now view themselves in imminent danger."³² Accessibility of these weapons that have the potential for enormous destruction and disruption compels international coordination among states as a means to reduce accessibility to such weaponry.

Finally, security professionals must address the global trend of democratization and the unique challenge liberal democracies face with combating terrorism. States that are transitioning to democratic regimes are vulnerable to internal conflict that terrorists can exploit. Essentially, these transitioning states are replicating

³⁰ Ibid., 86.

³¹ Chris Dishman, "Review Article: Trends in Modern Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 4 (1999): 360-361.

³² Robert J. Bunker, "Weapons of Mass Disruption and Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 12, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 44.

the early stages of state-making. Different power centers are competing for supremacy, which can easily erupt into conflict. How do such states survive these internal conflicts without de-legitimizing themselves as liberal democracies? Perhaps this question underscores the reason for the existence of illiberal, electoral democracies. According to Larry Diamond, "...elections are only one dimension of democracy. The quality of democracy also depends on its levels of freedom, pluralism, justice and accountability."

He continues to explain liberal democracy as having the following conditions:

Freedom of belief, expression, organization, demonstration, and other civil liberties, including protection from political terror and unjustified imprisonment; a rule of law under which all citizens are treated equally and due process is secure; political independence and neutrality of the judiciary and other institutions of "horizontal accountability" that check the abuse of power, such as electoral administration, audits, and a central bank; an open and pluralistic civil society, including not only associational life but the mass media as well; and civilian control of the military.³³

Democratic political culture fosters these traits of civil liberties, rule of law, civil society, and civilian control of the military, all of which are necessary to a liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama claims that it is not the mere existence of democratic institutions that will secure the fate of transitioning democracies; rather, it will be in the critical realms of civil society and culture that will determine successful transitions.³⁴ In fact, a number of studies indicate that even with the rise of electoral democracies, freedoms world-wide have decreased. The connection between democracy and liberty is not linear, and culture seems to be a critical intervening variable.³⁵ Samuel Huntington calls for policies that emphasize the liberalization of electoral democracies. He

³³ Both quotes are from Larry Diamond describes the elements of liberal democracy as civil liberties, etc. in Larry Diamond, "The Global State of Democracy," *Current History*, 99, no.641 (December 2000: 414-415.

³⁴ Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 14.

³⁵ Russell Bova, "Democracy and Liberty: The Cultural Connection," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no 1 (1997): 112-113, 124.

recommends greater cooperation and the development of a community among liberal democracies, a community he suggests be called a Demintern (now that the Comintern is gone!).³⁶

Mature democracies face a similar challenge when dealing with terrorism, and political culture stands out again. While the definitions of terrorism may differ, there seems to be a consensus concerning the imperative of society's support in its state's counter and anti-terrorist policies. This consensus is important on several levels. First mature, liberal democracies cannot undermine their own values by imposing police-state like policies as a means of addressing terrorism. Grant Wardlaw warns that "The danger lies in the possibility of doing the terrorists' job for them by taking unnecessary steps in an attempt to counter the perceived threat and thereby fundamentally altering the nature of democracy."³⁷ And in a comparative study, the editor acknowledges that "political culture, more than any other factor, shaped - and continues to shape - democratic responses to the challenge of ...terrorism."³⁸

Political Culture, Political Community and Legitimacy

Political culture is at the crux of this study because it is the target of terrorists' actions, it reflects a society's legitimacy for its leaders and their policies (in this case counter/anti-terrorist policies), and it is the missing element of many so-called democracies. Inherent in the concept of political culture is the idea of a political

³⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (October 1997): 11-12.

³⁷ Grant Wardlaw, "The Democratic Framework," in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries, ed. David A. Charters (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994), 6.

³⁸ David A. Charters, "Conclusion," in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: Its Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries, ed. David A. Charters (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994), 225.

community that describes a society's loyalties towards the political system. These concepts - political culture, legitimacy, and political community - are intricately interwoven, but because of their amorphous nature, they do not always receive the critical analysis necessary to understand political behavior. Consequently, I will address each of these foundational concepts and then fold them back together to better understand how liberal democracies can best ward off threats that target their inner souls. This inner soul is the state's legitimacy. According to Max Weber, "If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?"³⁹ This inner justification is a state's legitimacy. Ralf Dahrendorf explains legitimacy and effectiveness as two keys to a state's stability. He argues that for governments to work

...two things have to be present: effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness is a technical concept. It simply means that governments have to be able to do things which they claim they can do...they have to work. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is a moral concept. It means that what governments do has to be right....A government is legitimate if what it does is right both in the sense of complying with certain fundamental principles, and in that of being in line with prevailing cultural values.⁴⁰

Moreover, these two concepts are asymmetrically related. Governments, such as totalitarian regimes, may be effective without being legitimate.⁴¹ However, "Over time, ineffectiveness will probably erode legitimacy."⁴² Dahrendorf is most concerned about

³⁹Max Weber, "Politics As A Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. Note that the citations from Weber, Dahrendorf, Norton, Gurr and McClelland, Easton, and Hudson are found in Cindy R. Jebb, *Ethnicity, Legitimacy, and State Alignment in the International System: Bridging the Comparative and International Relations Fields* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1997), 72-76.

⁴⁰Ralf Dahrendorf, "On the Governability of Democracies," in *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, ed. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), 332.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 333.

⁴²*Ibid.*

the erosion of legitimacy because for democracies "...there is a great danger that the response to a crisis of legitimacy will be authoritarianism and illiberty."⁴³

Augustus Norton agrees that the most important element for state survival is legitimacy, meaning "that authority which rests on the shared cultural identity of ruler and ruled."⁴⁴ States base legitimacy on a "political formula" which justifies a leader's rule.

As Gaetano Mosca notes, political formulas are not 'mere quakeries aptly invented to trick the masses into obedience....The truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature; and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force, but on the basis of moral principle, has...a practical and a real importance.'⁴⁵

When legitimacy dissolves, the regime is vulnerable to change.⁴⁶ Timothy J. Lomperis argues that "...a state can rule without legitimacy, but not well."⁴⁷ Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland stress the importance of societal attitudes for legitimacy. They define legitimacy as "the extent that a polity is regarded by its members as worthy of support. This is not the same as citizens' compliance with laws and directives, but refers to a basic attitude that disposes them to comply in most circumstances..."⁴⁸

Along with this idea of an attitude towards the political system is the idea of a political community or identity.⁴⁹ David Easton refers to the political community as a

⁴³Ibid., 340.

⁴⁴Augustus Richard Norton, "The Security Legacy of the 1980s in the Third World," in Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 20.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 32.

⁴⁸Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland, "Political Performance: A Twelve Nation Study," in Comparative Politics Series, ed. Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, vol 2, no. 01-018 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), 30.

⁴⁹Pierre Manent observes that "Today's popular term 'identity' is a terribly impoverished substitute for the older term 'community,'" in Pierre Manent, "Democracy Without Nations?" Journal of Democracy 8, no. 2 (April 1997): 97.

"domain of support" for the political system.⁵⁰ Michael C. Hudson links the idea of community with legitimacy: "If the population within given political boundaries is so deeply divided within itself on ethnic or class lines...then it is extremely difficult to develop a legitimate order."⁵¹ Furthermore, this "legitimate order requires a distinct sense of corporate selfhood: the people within a territory must feel a sense of political community...."⁵²

These ideas of a political community and attitude towards the political system describe the concept of political culture. In fact Robert Dahl's work on political opposition groups helped reveal political culture based on a society's attitudinal orientations towards problem solving, the political system, cooperation and individuality, and people. Interestingly, even among democracies, political cultures differ. For example, citizens of Italy and France have been described as having alienated or apathetic attitudes towards their political systems; West German citizens exhibited detached attitudes; and citizens of the United States and Great Britain tended to have an allegiant orientation towards their political systems.⁵³ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, in their seminal work on civic culture, conclude:

In sum, the most striking characteristic of the civic culture ... is its mixed quality. It is the mixture in the first place of parochial, subject, and citizen orientations....The result is a set of political orientations that are managed or balanced. There is political activity, but not so much as to destroy governmental authority; there is involvement and commitment, but they are moderated; there is political cleavage, but it is held in check. Above all, the political orientations that make up the civic culture are closely related to general social and interpersonal

⁵⁰David Easton, "The Analysis of Political Systems," in Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, ed. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown (Fort Worth: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1996), 52.

⁵¹Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search For Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 389-390.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 4.


⁵³ Philip Norton, The British Polity, Second Edition (New York: Longman, 1991), 32-35.


relationships, of general trust and confidence in one's social environment, penetrate political attitudes and temper them.⁵⁴

A civic culture, that is a democratic political culture, describes a culture in which people feel that they make a difference politically; they tolerate others; they trust their fellow citizen and political elites; and they have allegiance towards the political system.⁵⁵ I will use Almond's definition of civic culture, Diamond's criteria for liberalism, and the idea of political community to assess the impact of terrorism on political culture for the case below. Consequently, I will examine institutions, attitudes, policies, and scholarly opinion that reflect shifts in the political culture. A liberal, democratic culture is the essence of democracy; it provides legitimacy for the democratic regime, making it the terrorist's bull's-eye.

⁵⁴ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 492-493.

⁵⁵ Almond and Verba make the point that the sense of trust is extended to the political elite on Almond and Verba, 490. See Almond and Verba, 473-505 for their concluding thoughts on civic culture.





The Basques in Spain: Case I

Introduction

I chose this case for several reasons. First, it reflects the trends discussed above. A democratizing state, Spain, and its eventual partner, France - a mature democracy, together faced the challenge of transnational terrorism. Moreover, the timeframe of this case, 1975-1992, includes Spain's transition and consolidation of democracy.⁵⁶ The Basques and the EU demonstrate the forces of "fragnegration." More importantly, the case reveals the impact of cooperation on Spain and France's political cultures as they worked together to manage their common terrorist threat. By examining this regional case, we may discover insights that will help the United States in its efforts to combat terrorism. Bruce Hoffman claims that "The changing face of terrorism will only diminish the divisions between the United States and Europe, as governments on both sides of the Atlantic strive to adapt to the challenges posed by transnational networks...."⁵⁷ And "It is perhaps time for the United States to listen and learn rather than to hector and push."⁵⁸

⁵⁶ I am using Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's definition of a transition occurs when the democratization process produces a legitimately recognized elected government. In Spain's case, the transition occurred between 1975 and 1977. The consolidation phase occurs when the democratization process is marked by behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional changes: behaviorally, there are no significant challenges to the regime; attitudinally there is consensus concerning the regime's legitimacy, and constitutionally, conflicts are resolved within the rule of law. Linz and Stepan believe that the consolidation phase ended after the 1982 elections. I extended the timeframe of the case to 1992 when Spain became a member in the EEC. The definitions are from Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3 and 6; the timeframes are found on 99 and 108.

⁵⁷ Bruce Hoffman, "Is Europe Soft on Terrorism," Foreign Policy, (Summer 1999), 7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

Background

Spain is an interesting case because it was the first country to democratize in Huntington's "third wave." It was a "regime-initiated transition"; the authoritarian regime did not suffer a defeat per say. Moreover, the problems and issues of a multi-lingual and multi-national state came to the fore during the regime's transition.⁵⁹ For the purpose of this paper, Spain is unique because as Howard Wiarda claims, "Perhaps in no other country in the world has the culture...the political culture, changed as dramatically in so short a time - during the 1960s and 1970s - as in Spain. In that period Spain went from being a fundamentally conservative, traditional, and exceedingly Catholic society to being liberal, radical, innovative, and secular...." ⁶⁰ In this context, Spain had to legitimize its transitional democracy in order to consolidate and stabilize its democratic, political regime. The story of the Basques, therefore must be told in this democratizing context.

Three themes emerge that have historically affected Spain's political development. First, Spain has had to deal with the tension between the central authority and regional areas. Geography reinforced regional and tribal isolation and the authority of the local caudillos vis a vis the state. Second, there has been conflict between the state and the robust corporate life, consisting of the military, religious fraternities, guilds, towns, etc. Third, there's been an ideological split between advocates of tradition and faith versus those of liberalism. This split manifested itself in the Spanish Civil War, from which Franco emerged and consolidated power at the state level.⁶¹ Additionally,

⁵⁹ Linz and Stepan, 87-88.

⁶⁰ Howard J. Wiarda, "Spain 2000: A Normal Country?" Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues 11, no 3 (Summer 2000): 39.

⁶¹ Ibid., 33-35.

change has been an on-going process for Spain. It experienced industrialization during the last decades of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century with a reactionary monarch in power. Spain even experienced some political participation during its First Republic in 1931-1936. Franco's emergence after the Spanish Civil War rolled back many of these advances; however, during the 1960s and 1970s, Franco did allow for some opening in the economic, political and social realms. This opening characterized the change of his regime from a "Dictadure" (hard dictatorship) to a "Dictablanda" (soft dictatorship).⁶²

While there was some openness, Franco's goal was to restore Spain's authenticity. He sought to instill values that reflected conservatism, tradition, Catholicism, anti-communism, and obedience. Public opinion polls in the 1960s reflected these values, suggesting that Franco was somewhat successful.⁶³ Additionally, he set out to modernize the country by increasing industrial production in the established, industrial Basque and Catalan regions. He diverted the gains made in these areas to the lesser industrialized areas of the south. This strategy had devastating effects on the Basques. First, with increased industrialization, many non-Basques fled to the area for jobs thus competing with the Basques. Second, needed resources to deal with the public effects of industrialization were nonexistent since the resources were diverted elsewhere.⁶⁴

The story of the Basques and the Spanish state has been a long, contentious one. The Basques were on the losing side of the civil war, and Franco was determined to create "a single personality, Spanish." Consequently, the Franco regime dealt with the

⁶² Ibid., 31-32. The characterization of the regime is from Kenneth Maxwell and Steven Spiegel, The New Spain: From Isolation to Influence (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), 5.

⁶³ Wiarda, 53-54.

⁶⁴ Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980 (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 18.

Basques in a repressive manner, forbidding any outward expression of Basque culture and political identity. In response, the Basques' formed a we-they identity between themselves and the Spanish, viewing the Spanish as an occupying foreign force.⁶⁵ The inability to express cultural or political aspirations through legitimate means created a growing sense of discontent and disenfranchisement among the younger Basque nationalists. From 1956 and 1975, Franco declared twelve states of exception in which five were directed against all of Spain and six were directed only against the Basque region. Approximately, 8,500 Basques were directly affected by either arrests, imprisonment, torture, or fleeing the state. The ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom) was founded in 1959 in response to Franco's repression, having the goals of Basque independence and maintaining Basque cultural integrity.⁶⁶ The unique regional dialect, Euskera, provided a source for identity of the ETA's nationalist aspirations. Many of the rural areas spoke the dialect by the end of the 19th century, but Basques embraced it as a means to preserve cultural identity. General Franco forbid the dialect because it detracted from centralism and unity, the basis of his Fascist Falange goal. Initially, the ETA did not call for terrorist strategy or insurgency, although it did not share the PNV's (Partido de Arana - the recognized nationalist party) goals at the time. With Franco's continued brutality on the Basque region and culture and the influence of the Third World's anti-colonial struggles, the ETA opened its terrorist

⁶⁵ Goldie Shabad and Francisco Jose Llera Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 419. The quote is found on Shabad and Ramo, 419 and they cite Robert P. Clark, "Language and Politics in Spain's Basque Provinces," Western European Politics 4 (January 1981), 93.

⁶⁶ Shabad and Ramo, 419-420 and 411.

campaign in 1968.⁶⁷ The ETA violence did not cause the transition, but it did put pressure on the Franco regime. Franco responded through severe repression, which tended to further de-legitimize Franco.⁶⁸

Democratic Transition and Consolidation

Spain had some facilitating conditions that helped it through its transition. First, its cultural, economic, and social institutions resembled those in Europe. Spain's economy was doing well, ranked 10th among capitalist countries, world-wide. Although its economy dipped during the transition, it did not adversely affect the people's support of the political regime. Civil society was in place, and Spain had established rule of law. The international environment played a role as well. Although Spain did not become a member of the EEC until 1986, the membership incentives enhanced Spain's democratic transition and subsequent consolidation. Suarez had submitted Spain's request for EEC membership in 1977, and he received full backing from the parliament. The EEC lent credibility to democracy, and its members were very supportive of Spain's democratization.⁶⁹

However, ETA's activities greatly challenged Spain's democratic transition. The main challenge the ETA posed was its ability to provoke perceived, harsh police state-like responses from Spain. Critics of Spain's regime point to its alleged torture of ETA members and the regime's support of right-wing counter-terrorist groups. These harsh responses were infrequent, and they did not represent main-stream policy of the

⁶⁷ Chalk, 55.

⁶⁸ Linz and Stepan, 107.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 112-113.

transitional regime.⁷⁰ Also, the state did not officially sanction any state-sponsorship for counter-terrorist activities. The purpose of the ETA in the post-Franco period remained the same: de-legitimize the regime, mobilize public support, and Basque independence. The ETA targeted six audiences: the Spanish public at-large with the aim of furthering polarization; the Basque public with the goal of eliciting nationalist sentiment; the Spanish military, which the ETA wanted to put at odds with the state; the Spanish state, which the ETA wanted to de-legitimize by eliciting repressive reactions; ETA members, with the aim of sustaining solidarity; and the Basque government, which the ETA viewed as traitorous, but ironically, wanted its support.⁷¹

During this transition, opinions about the institutional nature of the state wavered. With national focus on issues of regional autonomy versus independence, Spanish public opinion changed from 1977 with 45 percent supporting regional autonomy to 1979 with 56 percent in favor of autonomy. The Basque opinion in 1977 was 63 percent supporting autonomy and 16 percent supporting independence, and in 1979 (with the constitution ratified), 20 percent supported independence and 54 percent favoring autonomy. Interestingly, the Spanish population's supportive opinion of autonomy increased, while Basque opinion reflected more polarization. Overall, in 1979, the Basque population did not reach consensus on its future regional status, but more importantly, the Spanish population rejected any move towards state repression or conciliation. The Spanish people wanted rule of law, and they supported negotiation. Interestingly, the Basque

⁷⁰ The effectiveness of the regime to deal with the ETA in a restrained manner will be evident throughout the discussion of this case.

⁷¹ Shabad and Ramo, 446.

diverse opinions were reflected in the multiple parties (namely, Partido Nacionalista Vasco - PNV, Euskadiko Ezkerra - EE) that represented the Basque region.⁷²

Moreover, there were schisms within the leading party, the PNV, that reflected its desire to gain support among the diverse opinions among the Basques. Consequently, the PNV had an ambiguous platform that reflected its desire to strengthen its power within the state system but to also represent Basque nationalist sentiment. One PNV elite remarked that the party's goal was "to reunify the Basque provinces so that we can join our brothers in France."⁷³ One Basque Socialist leader, explained PNV's situation: The PNV "cannot dare to condemn the convent [ETA] because they are orthodox; it cannot renounce *posibilismo* because that is salvation. As a consequence, its ambiguity persists; ambiguity in its behavior, ambiguity in its words, and in its strategy...It wants at one and the same time to be with the constitution and with ETA."⁷⁴ The PNV Basque government did not publicly condemn ETA violence until 1985, which followed ETA violence against PNV officials.⁷⁵ Shabad and Ramo make an insightful observation, that is that moderate parties may manipulate extremist or violent terrorist groups to strengthen their own bargaining power with the state.⁷⁶ The Basque province itself was wracked with ambiguity and polarization. In 1983, one former Socialist leader remarked: "Something paradoxical has occurred in the Basque Country. In these moments, it is the corner of Spain that is most remote from democratic principles practiced in Europe...It is

⁷² Ibid., 448-451.

⁷³ Ibid., 453.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 460.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 461.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 466.

the corner in which intolerance, fanaticism, and violence are most entrenched. They are the ones who represent the old Spaniard...the intolerant Spaniard, fanatic."⁷⁷

Given this situation, Spain successfully transitioned. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan give a great deal of credit to the leadership of Adolfo Suarez as a critical factor in Spain's democratization. Suarez convinced the Cortes (legislature) to sanction new elections, which ultimately meant that its members would be voted out of office. Consequently, the Cortes passed the Law for Political Reform and the people, through a referendum, approved it on December 15, 1978. Suarez exploited this opportunity to make in-roads with opposition party members, and he began the process of creating an inclusive political regime. Political reform was the first step; economic reform would follow. According to Suarez, "As long as political unknowns [incognitas] hang over the country, there cannot be either economic reactivation or stability."⁷⁸

Robert Hislope condones Suarez's inclusive steps during the transition: "When minority elites are invited into the political process and regularly interact with elites from the dominant group, common norms and values can be discovered, friendships forged, and hostile stereotypes dispelled....Inclusion, voice, and routinized patterns of interaction give minority groups a sense of having a stake in the system."⁷⁹ The political leadership was determined to undo Franco's harsh cultural hegemonic policies. To reflect this goal, it invited moderate Basque and Catalan representatives to serve on the initial committee that guided the transition immediately following Franco's death. Moreover, the 1978 constitution recognized Spain as a multi-cultural entity and authorized the devolution of

⁷⁷ Ibid., 461.

⁷⁸ Linz and Stepan, 95. See Linz and Stepan, 91-96 for a fuller discussion on Suarez.

⁷⁹ Robert Hislope, "Ethnic Conflict and the 'Generosity Moment'" *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 1 (1998): 141-142.

power to regional governments. Suarez, however, excluded the Basque representatives from the constitutional negotiations, and the Basques nationalists called for "no" votes or abstentions during the ratification process. Suarez did not make the same mistake in 1979; he wanted consensus on the autonomy statute. He gained support from the head of the PNV through private meetings. By 1985, electoral imperatives caused a coalition between the PNV and the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Party). The PNV, as a result of this coalition, publicly strongly supported the constitution and denounced terrorism. The Basque Left (EE) also publicly supported the state and renounced terrorism. Only the Herri Batasuna (HB) remained steadfast in its commitment to Basque independence and support of terrorism. Consequently, the PNV and EE elites have been integrated into the political system, while HB and ETA have been increasingly isolated.⁸⁰

This transition period was very vulnerable to instability, and the ETA took advantage of this opportunity. Between 1960 and 1975, when Franco died, the ETA caused 43 deaths. During 1978, the year in which the constitution was approved, the ETA caused 65 deaths; in 1979, the total number rose to 78, and in 1980, the year of the first regional elections, the total reached 96. Also, the transition period saw the first killings of military officers as a result of Basque terrorist activities.⁸¹ Remarkably, the transitional regime was not blamed for these acts because of the legitimizing steps it took during the democratization process. First, state-wide parties campaigned in the Basque and Catalan regions and four of them captured 51.4 percent of the Basque vote. Second, the government devolved power to the regions of Catalan and Basque. Linz and Stepan argue that by establishing state-wide elections before regional level elections, Spain

⁸⁰ Hislope, 143-145.

⁸¹ Linz and Stepan, 99.

defused the Basque nationalist fervor. Regional politicians were able to work with legitimate state-wide politicians, which strengthened their relationships. Moreover, this fostered multiple, regional and state, identities that were supportive of democracy.⁸²

Unfortunately, the Spanish government had not been able to completely eradicate the ETA's terrorism, but due to Spain's political legitimacy, the ETA did not threaten the regime. The attitudes of the Basques towards the ETA have changed over time. In 1979, 5 percent viewed the members of ETA as criminals and 17.1 percent viewed them as patriots; in 1989, 16 percent considered them criminals, and 5 percent saw them as patriots. Other surveys indicate that 8 percent fully supported the ETA in 1981, but in 1989 that figure dropped to 3 percent. Finally, in 1981, 23 percent totally rejected the ETA and 48 percent responded with "don't know, no answer" and in 1989, 45 percent totally rejected the ETA, while 16 percent responded with "don't know, no answer." Even among the party respondents, surveys reflect a diminished support for the ETA. Responses concerning ETA members as patriots from voters of the main nationalist party, PNV, reflect a drop of 40 percent in 1981 to 16 percent in 1989. A similar drop occurs among voters of the Herra Batasuna party.⁸³ A 1986 survey asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: "That Violence is not Necessary to Achieve Political Goals...." Only the most radical Basque Party disagreed with only 12 percent. Spain's political parties, including the PNV and EE, overwhelmingly either very much agreed or somewhat agreed. Even the response, "somewhat disagree" occurred in

⁸² Ibid., 101-102.

⁸³ Ibid., 105-106.

the single digit percentages, except for HB, which had a 28 percent response.⁸⁴ ETA's violent activities did not have widespread support; it failed politically.

Moreover, ten years after Franco's death, people responded positively to the democratic regime. Seventy-six percent of the population expressed pride in the regime, and only 9 percent responded negatively. Additionally, public opinion felt strongly about the regime through the 1980s. Eighty-one percent agreed to the statement: "Democracy is the Best Political System for a Country Like Ours."⁸⁵ In a 1986 survey, eight out of ten Basques rejected violence and had positive sentiment for Spain's democratic system.⁸⁶ Howard Wiarda concludes that Spain has become more "Europeanized." He claims that attitudes reflecting less affiliation with the Catholic Church, strong support for democracy, more emphasis on merit than family or personal ties as a means of social mobility, consumerism and materialism, changing gender roles, and finally political moderation and apathy describe a shift towards a civic culture. He hastens to add that Spain has not fully Europeanized, but it has made great strides.⁸⁷

Cooperation: France and Spain

While Spain was able to politically marginalize the ETA, it still needed to provide protection to Spanish society. Spain needed France's help, but French cooperation did not come easily. Since 1927, French law protected asylum seekers. While this law favored human rights, it was vulnerable to exploitation by extremist groups who based

⁸⁴ Francisco J. Llera, "Conflicto en Euskadi Revisited," in Politics, Society, and Democracy: The Case of Spain, ed. Richard Gunther (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 191.

⁸⁵ Linz and Stepan, 108-109.

⁸⁶ Llera, 191.

⁸⁷ Howard J. Wiarda, Iberia and Latin America: New Democracies, New Policies, and New Models (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 57-60.

their activities in France, but caused violence elsewhere. It was a law that was abused by the French government, which used the law for political effect, that is as a means to express opposition to a particular government or to make political statements. Refusal of extradition requests were based on and abused for the same reasons. The history of French politics has influenced the way the French view terrorism. The French Revolution was born from it, and through the years French leaders, citizens, and institutions have engaged in terrorism. There is an ambivalence in French counter-terrorist policies that reflect the French experience. President Giscard D'Estaing's statement in 1980 reflects this ambivalence: "France must and will remain a land of the asylum," and "France will not allow its soil to become a base for foreigners seeking to organize violent actions here."⁸⁸

The most serious case of French leniency on such groups was its relationship with the ETA. France opposed the Franco regime, and consequently, allowed the ETA freedom of movement within France.⁸⁹ The ETA was a transnational terrorist organization; Basques lived on both sides of the French-Spanish border, which was a hard border to control. France helped legitimize the ETA's activities by offering sanctuary.⁹⁰ Additionally, the ETA coordinated such activities as training and arms supplies with other terrorist organizations in Europe and the Third World, and it adopted foreign frameworks to assist with legitimizing its activities and developing strategies. Specifically, ETA members have received training in Yemen, Libya, and Algeria, with the Middle East supplying arms and Libya providing funds. Other European terrorist

⁸⁸ Michael M. Harrison, "France International Terrorism: Problem and Response," in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism: It Effect on Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries, ed. David A. Charters (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994), 103 and 113.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 123.

⁹⁰ Shabad and Ramo, 443.

groups have coordinated the purchase of weapons from Communist Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union, and close continuous ties were established with the IRA. Finally, the ETA adopted anti-colonial ideological views and insurgent strategies from many terrorist groups from the Third World.⁹¹

Two events in 1973 influenced French policy. First, the emergence of ETA's French counterpart, Iparretarak, and second, ETA's assassination of the Spanish prime minister. The French counterpart of ETA was Iparretarak, which formed in 1973. Its goal was also Basque independence. Violence erupted when Iparretarak conflicted with ETA, and ETA struck a deal with the French police in 1981. In return for French toleration, ETA promised not to commit violence on French soil. As a result, Iparretarak lost legitimacy in its struggle for Basque independence, and by 1988, Iparretarak was defunct.⁹² In the latter case, the perpetrators fled to France and held a press conference claiming responsibility. France arrested the assassins in 1974, renounced ETA as an organization and banned separatist groups. However, it was not until Franco's death in 1975, that France made more deliberate efforts against ETA activity on its soil.⁹³

In 1976, France placed harsher restrictions on attaining work and residential status and work permits. France conducted searches without warrants, surveillance, and harassment of ETA members, and in 1977, France began a policy of preventive detention. In January of that year, France sent seven Spanish Basques to Spain. Still France refused extradition of any ETA members. By the end of the decade, however, France was

⁹¹ Ibid., 444-445.

⁹² Michel Wieviorka, "French Politics and Strategy on Terrorism," in The Politics of Counter-Terrorism: The Ordeal of Democratic States, ed. Barry Rubin (Washington D.C.: Johns Hopkins University, 1990), 63-64. The discussion on the two events is from Harrison, 123. Michael Harrison claims that Iparretarak was active as late as 1992 in Harrison, 104.

⁹³ The discussion of the assassination is from Harrison, 123. The banishment of separatist groups is from Shabad and Ramo, 444.

experiencing its own Basque separatist problem with unofficial Spanish anti-Basque activities causing much violence in France. France learned that providing sanctuary to terrorists was dangerous.⁹⁴

However, France still clung to the view that terrorists were freedom fighters. In 1981, a French court ruled in favor of Tomas Linaza's extradition. Linaza was wanted in Spain for murdering six civil guards, however the political authorities overruled the court's ruling. Gaston Defferre, the interior minister, ruled against extradition of any ETA members and compared their activities to the French resistance.⁹⁵ However, public opinion, during the 1980s, concerning France's toleration of extremism declined. The election of a Socialist President for the first time in the Fifth Republic in 1981 and again, in 1988, with a socialist majority in parliament from 1981-1986 reflected a change of allegiances that moved from the extreme to the center. However, the government of 1981 still took a firm position concerning extradition towards the ETA. Spain continued to insist that France change its asylum and extradition policies.⁹⁶

In 1982, the French government reviewed its extradition and asylum policies, and by 1984, there was a change. France realized that it would be blamed if Spain's transitional democracy failed. Also, Spain had a policy of reconciliation, not retribution towards ETA members living in France. France and Spain signed an anti-terrorist cooperation agreement, with Gaston Defferre claiming that "A terrorist is not a political refugee."⁹⁷ This agreement, which began France's cooperation for extradition requests and asylum denials with respect to the Basque situation, had far-reaching consequences

⁹⁴ Harrison, 123-124 and Shabad and Ramo, 444.

⁹⁵ Harrison, 124.

⁹⁶ Wieviorka, 72-73.

⁹⁷ Harrison, 124-125. The quotation is found in Harrison, 125.

on other groups. France was no longer the guarantor of sanctuary. It agreed to ratify the European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, and it broadened its cooperative efforts with other European countries. In May 1987, France hosted an EC/Summit Seven conference of interior and justice ministers, which France's Interior Minister claimed "a willingness to take all the measures necessary" to better international cooperation against terrorism.⁹⁸

Analysis

An analysis of the Basque case highlights the challenge terrorism poses to transitioning democracies. The ETA increased its activities during the transition, with the goal of taking advantage of a vulnerable regime. It was a legitimate organization during the Franco years of repression. However, institutional steps taken during the transition bolstered the regime's legitimacy vis a vis the ETA. As the previous section demonstrated, however, the transition was not a smooth process. Violence increased and there was significant Basque nationalist sentiment. Suarez's inclusive regime-building strategy and the multi-party structure allowed for divergent views to be heard within the political system. Basque leaders, parties and people began to have a stake in the democratic system. The autonomy statute sent a strong signal that cultural diversity was sanctioned by the state. Regional governments derived legitimacy not only from the regional, political community, but also from the state through the autonomy statute. Moreover, Linz and Stepan argue, the transition sequence, namely having state-wide elections prior to regional elections, de-legitimized the ETA and fostered the Basques

⁹⁸ Ibid., 124-125.

acceptance of multiple identities - Basque and Spanish.⁹⁹ The regime, through institutions, was able to elicit loyalties at the state and regional levels, thus fostering a state and regional, political community.

It was not just the institutions that played a role, but the attitudes of the Spanish and Basque populations were instrumental as well. The Spanish population did not support repressive measures against the Basque, even during the tense transitional period. Regime restraint bolstered its legitimacy. As the transition continued through the consolidation phase, there was a noticeable decline of support by both Basques and Spaniards in general for the ETA and its violent tactics. These sentiments reflect more tolerance, trust, and consensus among the population. The parties reflected diverse views that were integrated into the political system. Additionally, there was a state-wide referendum on the constitution. The people, in my view, felt that politically they made a difference. There were still cleavages, but Almond, Verba, and Diamond claim that civic cultures have some polarization.

What does this case reveal about terrorism? It is a dangerous phenomenon during a regime's transition period. However, Spain, through its democratizing efforts, was able to contain the effects of ETA's violent activities. In short, Spain won the fight over legitimacy because the population developed allegiance to the regime, not to the ETA. This case shows that terrorism must be viewed in a political context. The ETA presented no threat to the regime, even while violence acts increased, because it never established legitimacy among the people. Should terrorism be considered in only a democratic context? In other words, was the ETA a freedom-fighting or a terrorist organization during the Franco regime? The ETA had more legitimacy during the Franco years, and

⁹⁹ Linz and Stepan, 105-106.


the regime offered no alternatives for political expression. Perhaps, over time, the ETA might have won the legitimacy fight over Franco. I am hesitant, however, to define terrorism in only a democratic context as Philip Heymann does. First, not all democracies are liberal, that is they do not have a developed civic culture. Second, it is not clear that we should consider all non-democratic regimes illegitimate. If not, then we should be able to address terrorism in that context. Finally, should terrorism be considered a crime or an act of war? Spain was able to contain the ETA so that its political effect remained insignificant. In this context, I believe, terrorism should be regarded as a crime. However, if a terrorist group evokes sufficient support among the population to de-legitimize the regime, then, for that regime, terrorism crosses over from an act of crime to an act of war. This case also revealed the subjectivity of the term, "terrorism" when France and Spain learned how to cooperate.


Larry Diamond claimed that liberal democracies must be able to protect its societies from political terror. France realized that it could no longer isolate itself from international terrorism; terror had come to its borders. Both Spain and France required each other's cooperation. The French elite's and people's view towards justice as it relates to terrorism changed and were reflected in the new asylum and extradition laws that Spain requested. In fact, France has always had to wrestle with its competing views of terrorism, but it had to converge with Spain's view in order to cooperate effectively. France felt pressured to work with a democratizing Spain. Shabad and Ramo claim that the establishment of the Spanish constitution in 1978, the statutory recognition of the Basque autonomous region, and Spain's entry into the EC, contributed to France's stricter

policies against the ETA.¹⁰⁰ France certainly did not want responsibility for Spanish democratic failure because of its refusal to extradite ETA members, while offering them sanctuary. When Spain took a conciliatory policy concerning reconciliation towards ETA members, France could not justify its non-extradition and lenient asylum laws. Moreover, the government was responsive to the people's changed attitudes as reflected in the elections. Consequently, France made some institutional changes through its asylum and extradition laws, and it has continued to cooperate in different forums.

While Spain's political culture made much greater shifts towards the establishment of a civic culture, France, as a mature democracy also experienced shifts in attitudes. However, French political culture, though, is difficult to assess. It does not have consensus on many issues, as reflected by its several regime changes. Consequently, its counter-terrorist policies seem ambivalent. However, increased cooperation with Spain and other countries, especially with fellow EU members who now share an integrated European police force (EUROPOL), may serve to temper France's political culture. A changed political culture will ensure continued state legitimacy, while cooperation will ensure state effectiveness towards future terrorist threats.

¹⁰⁰ Shabad and Ramo, 443-444.





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|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | Macédoniens | | Valaques | | Base militaire de l'OTAN |
| | Torbes, Goran (Macédoniens islamisés) | | Grecs | | Base arrière de l'Armée de libération du Kosovo |
| | Serbes | | Turcs | | Zone d'entraînement des Forces armées de la République du Kosovo |
| | Albanais | | Roms (Tsiganes) | | |
| | Limite entre Gréques (au nord) et Tosks (au sud) | | Les Roms sont aussi dispersés dans l'ensemble du pays. | | |

The Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia: Case II

Introduction

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is another interesting case of "fragnegration." At a National Endowment for Democracy forum, in Berlin Summer 2000, Madeleine Albright discussed the importance of Southeastern Europe, which faces the forces of globalization, fragmentation, and democratization:

First, democracy may be the most stable form of government in the long run, but in the short run it is among the most fragile. The leaders of new democracies are often required to implement dramatic economic and political reform in countries with little democratic tradition and a host of inherited problems. In such situations, democratic processes must be relentlessly nurtured, for their success cannot be assumed. Second, as democracy has spread, truly global cooperation on its behalf has become possible. However, [globalization] has also made democracy more vulnerable in more places. Southeastern Europe is a prime example. So our new Community of Democracies will begin life with much work to do.¹

And Dr. Gjorge Ivanaov highlights the importance of liberal democracy, namely the significance of substantial democracy over procedural democracy:

The problem to organize a normal dialogue is within each ethnic group. That is why political leaders should be diplomats rather than pragmatic politicians. They should know how to negotiate and to respect the counter partner because democracy is not a matter of procedure but it is a substantial as it depends on the participants themselves [note his earlier emphasis on the citizenry]. Procedure is also essential but not as much as it is with homogeneous societies.²

This case is somewhat messier than the Basque case because it is an on-going case. However, its relevance and significance off-sets its messiness. One must be careful, though, not to haphazardly apply lessons from one case to another, recognizing

¹ John Brademas, "Promoting Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe," Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues 12, No. 1 (Winter 2001): 51-52.

² Dr. Gjorge Ivanov, "The Albanian Question in Macedonia: The Macedonian Perspective," Lecture given October 2000 at Ohrid, Macedonia.

that key differences are just as important as discovering important similarities. A key challenge in this case is understanding and analyzing the nature of the NLA. The NLA is a recent phenomenon that seems to have evolved from the KLA. While history and a plethora of information facilitated analysis of the ETA, currency and a lack of information makes analysis of the NLA difficult. Based on the information available, however, this case treats the NLA as a transnational, terrorist organization born from the grievances of the Albanian community in FYROM and possibly from the Albanian experience in Kosovo. Another key difference between the cases stems from Spain's relative peaceful neighbors and FYROM's warring neighbors. FYROM's leaders have witnessed an ethnic war at their doorstep, and it appears that their war aversion has played a key role in their search for a political solution.

Nevertheless, there are possibilities of learning lessons through case analysis. The Basque experience in Spain demonstrates how a state can foster the values of a liberal democracy as championed by Diamond, Almond, and Verba, such as tolerance, diversity, competence, trust, basic freedoms, rule of law, protection from political terror, and civilian authority over the military. Consequently, Spain created a legitimate political community at the national and regional levels that enhanced state legitimacy. The Basque case revealed that fostering an inclusive political regime through power sharing, ethnic parties, leadership, reconciliation and dialogue bolstered the state's legitimacy in the eyes of all the people. Moreover, the transnational nature of the ETA required interstate cooperation, a cooperation that tended to have reflective properties. In other words, the foreign policies of the cooperating states had internal effects, which served to interlock the participating countries' domestic policies as well. To meet the

challenge of a common transnational threat of terrorism, the involved states moved closer towards a common political culture that fostered the principles of liberal democracy. Consequently, the states successfully won the fight for legitimacy and through cooperation were able to more effectively manage the terrorists' violent tactics. As this case explores the challenges of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, will its leaders take those steps that seemed to work in Spain?

Background

Macedonia and its surrounding area is so rich in history that it is criminal to attempt to sum it up in a few pages; Kenneth Hill, a former Ambassador to Bulgaria remarked that "the Balkans has more history than it can consume."³ Consequently, this section will focus on the relevant aspects of Ottoman influence, the Albanian and Macedonian peoples, and the significant events that led to Macedonian independence.

The Ottoman Empire reached its peak during the middle of the sixteenth century. It covered the Balkan Peninsula, Romania, a significant part of Hungary, all of the Aegean Islands, Cyprus, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, Georgia, and Crimea.⁴ Interestingly, the Ottomans practiced religious tolerance. With the exception of the recruitment for the Janissaries and early Islamization, for the most part, the Turks conducted very little proselytizing, although many Albanians, Rom, and Slavic speaking people did convert to Islam.⁵ The Turks

³ The portion in quotation marks indicates how Richard Harteis paraphrased Kenneth Hill in Peter Liotta, "The Future Republic of Macedonia," European Security 9, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 93.

⁴ Stoyan Pribichevich, Macedonia: Its People and History, (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1982), 95.

⁵ The point concerning Islamic conversion is from Ackerman, Alice, Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 54 and the discussion

believed that religion corresponded to nationality, which was the basis of their millet system. Non-Moslems throughout the Ottoman Empire enjoyed autonomy and religious freedom as long as they accepted the Sultan's sovereignty. The Slavs in Macedonia were ruled by their fellow Slavs, who in turn were subject to Turkish governors. Political rights, however, were reserved for the Turks, but "religious toleration made possible the self perpetuation of national consciousness."⁶ Alice Ackerman describes Ottoman rule similarly: "However repressive and exploitive, Turkish rule was also a time of peaceful coexistence. Turks, Slavs, Albanians, Greeks, Vlachs, Jews, and Rom often lived together in multiethnic communities."⁷

As the Ottoman Empire declined during the late 19th century, Macedonia became a pawn in the European balance of power politics. After the Turk-Russian War of 1878, Macedonia became part of Bulgaria as a means to counter Austria-Hungary. Four months later at the Congress of Berlin, Macedonia was sent back to the Ottomans. To counter Turkish rule, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization emerged in 1893.⁸ Dimitrija Chupovski, in a 1913 article, describes the 35 years between the Congress of Berlin and the Balkan Wars as "one bloody page of continuous struggle of the Macedonian people for their liberation." Between 1898 and 1903, there were 400 Macedonian versus Turkish confrontations. European press reports confirm the terror and violence conducted by the Turks on Macedonians during the 19th century.⁹

concerning religious toleration and lack of proselytizing is from Pribichevich, 99. Note that the Janissaries were recruited from the Ottoman non-Muslim population. See Pribichevich, 96-97 for details.

⁶ Pribichevich, 99-100. The quote is found on p. 100.

⁷ Ackerman, 54.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ John Shea, Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, 1997), 166.

The celebrated August 1903 Macedonian uprising lasted two months and ended in defeat. However, its significance that is recounted in the FYROM's constitution, stems from the fact that 30,000 rebels held off a formidable 300,000 Turkish force and established a democratic commune called the Krushevo Republic. Dr. Nikola Karev was even elected as the Republic's first President.¹⁰ Although this republic only existed for a short time, its government demonstrated tolerance for its Vlach, Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Albanian population. Its Manifesto is unwritten, and therefore, it is not a widely known event.¹¹ The First Balkan War (1912-1913) resulted in Macedonia and Albania's liberation; however the Second Balkan War in 1913 ended in Macedonia's division: one-tenth to Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia), one-half to Greece (Aegean Macedonia), and two-fifths to Serbia (Vardar Macedonia). World War I resulted in another Macedonian division, but by the end of World War II, Macedonia was a recognized republic with a distinct identity and language within the Yugoslav federation.¹²

Albanians' sense of nationalism was the last to develop among the Balkan peoples. In 1878, the Prizin League was established to protect Albanian lands, and it would later challenge Ottoman rule. Albanian guerrilla units emerged in 1906, and in 1908, Albanian leaders adopted the Latin alphabet for the Albanian language. In 1910, the Albanians revolted against the Ottomans in Pristina, which spread throughout Kosovo, and in 1912, Albanians took over Skopje. The Treaty of Bucharest in 1913

¹⁰ Shea, 169 and 171.

¹¹ Keith Brown, Interview at the Watson Institute, Brown University, 4 April 2001.

¹² Ackerman, 55.

established the Albanian state; however, almost half the Albanian population lived outside its borders.¹³

After World War I, Vardar Macedonia and Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but Albanians were never recognized as a separate nation. Macedonia was known as South Serbia and Kosovo as Old Serbia. The Serbs suppressed the Albanians, which fostered Albanian armed resistance in the 1920s and raised Albanian national awareness among Albanians. When Tito split from Stalin in 1948, relations between the Albanian state and Yugoslavia worsened, which made life for Yugoslav Albanians unbearable. Yugoslavia closed down Albanian schools and discriminated against them politically, economically, and socially. Albanians began identifying themselves as Turks just to escape this discrimination.¹⁴

Tito wanted a strong Macedonian identity in the Macedonian republic as a way to contain Albanians within Serbia and Macedonia, and he forfeited an earlier promise of creating a friendly Albanian state that united the entire Albanian population. The ethnic Macedonian population increased within the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as Greek Macedonian refugees fled from the Greek Civil War (1946-1949). Macedonia's state apparatus gained more authority when the Yugoslav 1974 constitution decentralized the Party and state administrations' activities for all the republics. Furthermore, the constitution reinforced Tito's contrived borders, which enhanced his own divide and conquer tactics, and the Yugoslav National Army served as the protector of the

¹³ Aydin Babuna, "The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding Religion," Nationalities Papers 28, no. 1 (March 2000): 68.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 68-69.

Yugoslavia's unity. Tito's death unraveled all his efforts, and Yugoslavia became subject to eight political parties and eight fiefdoms.¹⁵

Recent events in the FYROM have turned the state's, region's, and world's attention to the actions of the National Liberation Army (NLA), a self-appointed protector of Macedonia's ethnic Albanians. The NLA is, indeed, a transnational organization, with many of its commanders KLA veterans from Kosovo. Some believe that during the Kosovo crisis, members of the KLA included ethnic Albanians from Macedonia to include Ali Ahmeti, the current leader of the NLA. He was raised in the city of Kiceva, FYROM and became politically active while studying at the University of Pristina. His participation in a 1981 street demonstration landed him in a Idrizo prison for a year. In 1993, he and Emrush Xhemajli gained the approval of the Nationalist Movement of Kosova to create the KLA. By 1997, Ahmeti was living in Tirana, organizing groups to infiltrate and attack police in Kosovo. At this time, he was assisted by his uncle, Fazli Veliu, and by 1999, they established the NLA. Just as there were reports of arms smuggling from FYROM to Kosovo, now there are reports of arms smuggling from Kosovo to FYROM.¹⁶ And there are reports of other transnational efforts that helped coordinate a clandestine logistics network within FYROM in support of the KLA¹⁷

Western analysts believe that the NLA has 1500 members. The NLA recognizes that any forceful overreaction by Macedonia will play to the NLA's advantage. Some

¹⁵ Erich Frankland, "Struggling With Collective Security and Recognition in Europe: the Case of Macedonia," European Security 4, no 2 (Summer 1995): 366.

¹⁶ Jeffrey Smith, Birth of New Rebel Army: Macedonian Guerilla Group Forming in Kosovo Poses Threat of Expanded Conflict in Balkans," The Washington Post, March 30, 2001, A1. Downloaded 1 May 2001, <http://infoweb5.newsbank.com>.

¹⁷ "War in the Balkans Again?" The Economist, 24 March-30 March 2001, 57-58.

observers believe that the NLA actions are a result of frustration by the ethnic Albanian extremists in Kosovo based on the recent elections in Kosovo that produced a moderate local government under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. So far, the confrontations between the state and the NLA have taken place in Tetovo and other border towns that have mostly ethnic Albanian populations. And so far, NATO has had a difficult time securing the border, and, thus the NLA-Kosovar connection continues.¹⁸

While this study focuses on ethnic Albanian-ethnic Macedonian relations, it is important to recognize that other inter and intra-ethnic tensions existed. Upon FYROM's independence, Greece withheld recognition of the new state's designation as the Republic of Macedonia. Greece based its non-recognition policy on three points: first, the kindred community of Macedonians and historical Macedonian regions that extended into Greece could foster future expansionist desires of the new state. Second, the name, Macedonia, belongs to Greece; and, third, Greece objected to the new state's flag that depicted the Star of Vergina, a symbol that Alexander the Great used and to the new state's currency that depicted the White Tower, a symbol of the Greek city of Thessaloniki. Greece not only tried to influence EU members to follow suit, but it also imposed an oil and commodity embargo, not including food and medicine, on the new state.¹⁹

On April 1993, the UN recognized the republic named "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"; EU members and the United States followed, and China, Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia recognized the new state with its chosen

¹⁸ Ibid. Note that Tetovo has a population of 70,000 with 90% Albanian as reported in Steven Erlanger, "Wide Offensive by Macedonia Presses Rebels," The New York Times, March 26, 2001, A10.

¹⁹ Stephane Lefebvre, "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," European Security 3, No. 4 (Winter 1994): 713-714.

name, Republic of Macedonia.²⁰ However, Greece's embargo and the lethargic international recognition hurt the FYROM's economy; lack of recognition prevented receipt of foreign loans and capital. Once the compromise name, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was approved by the UN, the country was finally able to join the IMF and attain observer status in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Not only did the FYROM suffer from Greece's embargo, but it also suffered from the UN blockade imposed on Serbia, its main trading partner. Six weeks into the Greek blockade cost the FYROM 80 million dollars per month, an estimated 85 percent of its total export income. BY 1994, the anti-Yugoslav blockade cost FYROM three billion dollars.²¹ From the beginning, Macedonia faced daunting internal and external challenges.

Democratization

On September 8, 1991, Macedonia held a referendum concerning the establishment of an independent Macedonian state. The vote overwhelmingly was in favor of independence. Interestingly, the vote was extended to Macedonians who lived outside the Macedonian state. This extension of votes uncovers the issue currently debated, which is the tension between a citizen of the Macedonian state and a member of the Macedonian nation, and the obligation of a citizen of a state versus a member of a nation. The Constitution reflects this tension as well. It refers to constitutional nationalism, which confers a special status for the dominant nation within the state versus

²⁰ Shea, 156.

²¹ Ibid., 217-219.

the democratic principle that confers sovereignty on all citizens of the state.²² The

Constitution states:

Taking as starting points the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom...and particularly the traditions of statehood and legality of the Krushevo Republic...as well as the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia, and intent on the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent state, as well as a civil and democratic one...."²³

Dr. Ivanov, an ethnic Macedonian, states that the preamble allows for other nationalities, thus making it a "civil and democratic state..."²⁴ and that

The Slav population in the Republic of Macedonia and its Macedonian national identity has always been both [an] ethnical and political or civil one. There are no contradictions for the Macedonians in this regard. As for the Macedonian Albanians, demanding their loyalty to the State is a problem in terms of the necessity to over bridge the gap between their ethnic origin and political reality in Macedonia.²⁵

On the other hand, an ethnic Albanian party leader, Nevzat Halili provides a different perspective: "What we need are radical changes in the Macedonian Constitution.

Albanians in Macedonia should be recognized as a constitutive people. There are three categories of citizens in Macedonia. Macedonians are first-class citizens, Albanians are second class, and Serbs, and others are third class."²⁶

The FYROM's area is about 25,000 square kilometers, and it has a population of just over two million people, with 66.6% ethnic Macedonians, 22.7% ethnic Albanian,

²² Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 142-143.

²³ "Macedonia-Constitution." Downloaded 18 April 2001 at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mk00000_.html.

²⁴ Ivanov, 1.

²⁵ Ibid., 3. Note that the terms, "ethnic Macedonians," "Slavs," and "Macedonians," are used interchangeably in the literature as well as throughout this case.

²⁶ Shea, 242.

4% Turkish, 2.2% Roma, 2.1% Serb, and 2.4% of other minorities. These percentages are from a highly disputed 1994 census, with Albanians insisting that they comprise 40-50% of the population.²⁷ The FYROM is a coalition-led parliamentary democracy. The 1999 U.S. Department of State gave the FYROM generally high marks concerning its human rights practices. Of note, FYROM maintains an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and "generally [respects] the human rights of its citizens." All these traits seem to support Diamond's criteria of a liberal democracy. Additionally, while the report documented problems, especially concerning irregularities based on ethnicity, it praised the government for its handling of over 335,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo during the Kosovo crisis. This situation, however, strained political relations, as ethnic Macedonians feared that the refugees would permanently remain in Macedonia, thereby significantly changing the ethnic balance within the country.²⁸

Strained relations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians marked the birth of FYROM. The Albanians boycotted the referendum on Macedonia's independence and the 1991 census, claiming that the census would not portray their true percentage of the population. However, by 1993, the Albanian party, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) announced that Albanian autonomy was not on its agenda. Instead the PDP wanted state and constitutional recognition of the Albanian nation. The on-going university dispute concerning the Albanian university in Tetovo and the flying of Albanian flags on administrative buildings in Tetovo and Gostivar resulted in police

²⁷ "Macedonia, The Former Yugoslavia Republic of," CIA World Fact Book 2000. Downloaded on 2 April 2001 at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html>. The ethnic Albanian estimate is found at Babuna, 81.

²⁸ "1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," U.S. Department of State, 1-16. Downloaded on 2 April 2001, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/macedonia.html.

intervention and three Albanian deaths in July 1997.²⁹ These unfortunate deaths were the beginnings of greater unrest.

The PDP's desire for partner nation status is based on the Albanian claim that their ancestors pre-date the Slavs as Macedonian inhabitants, that Albanians have peacefully coexisted with many minorities, and that they constitute the largest minority in Macedonia. Practically, the partner-nation status would establish joint decision-making mechanisms at the state and local levels; proportional representation on the police force, the military, the judiciary, and other such institutions; and, rights such as the state-sanctioning of Albanian language, education, and flag. Many Macedonians feel that Albanians are treated equally as evidenced by the political participation of Albanian parties and leaders. Furthermore, partner-status may lead to a Bosnia-like situation with spill-over effects from Kosovo.³⁰

Given the historical context of ethnic relations in Macedonia, one must differentiate between Kosovar Albanians and Macedonian Albanians. From its start, the FYROM, unlike Serbia, copied Spain's political recipe for building an inclusive regime. In Macedonia, Albanians have been included in the state's politics; in Kosovo, the Albanians set up parallel state institutions. Albanian political parties in FYROM have been instrumental government coalition partners. Between 1992 and 1998, the PDP served under the leadership of Branko Crvenkovski, head of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDU). After 1998, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) joined the government coalition of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-

²⁹ Babuna, 80-81.

³⁰ Ibid., 83.

Democratic Party of Macedonian Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and the Democratic Alternative (DA).³¹

Moreover, like Spain's Basques, the Albanians in the FYROM are not monolithic. The splits within the PDP manifested this diversity of opinion within the Albanian community; after several splits producing the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDPA) under the leadership of Arben Xhaferi and the National Democratic Party (NDP), Xhaferi emerged as the prominent political leader of the DPA today. Interestingly, it was the increasingly nationalistic tones of regional neighbors, Albanian President Sali Berisha and Kosovar Albanian leader Rugova, which fostered the splits within the PDP in the FYROM.³²

As the Basque case demonstrated, an effective governing coalition required leaders that were willing to compromise and foster dialogue to tackle the challenges of a newly democratizing state, especially if that state wanted to gain legitimacy from all the people. The FYROM has been fortunate to have such leaders. In 1998, when Ljupco Georgievski, leader of the VMRO, included Arben Xhaferi and his party as a coalition partner, Xhaferi expressed moderation of his previous stance: "We can find common ground for ethnic integration through mutual understanding."³³ In fact, both Georgievski and Xhaferi's moderate stands are much different from past rhetoric.³⁴ Vasil Tupurkovski, leader of the Democratic Alternative (DA) observed, "They [VMRO and

³¹ Ibid., 81-82.

³² Ibid., 82.

³³ Liotta, 80.

³⁴ Ibid., 80.

DPA] realized perfectly well they could never have won with the radical positions they used to hold, and they really wanted to win, and to hold power."³⁵

The 1998 coalition was not the first expression of moderation. Four years earlier the government responded to the voters' desires, marking an important aspect of Almond and Verba's political culture, that being competence. Voters witnessed that they made a difference in the political system. In 1994, the voters rejected VMRO's nationalist agenda. Instead, voters elected a coalition of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM), the Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM), the Liberal Party (LP), and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP). Under the leadership of President Gligorov, the coalition maintained a pragmatic approach to its foreign and domestic policies. It skillfully managed relations with Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria, and it maintained an accommodative approach towards Macedonia's ethnic Albanian population.³⁶

This 1994 election result came after the Macedonia's first multi-party elections in 1990 that produced a nationalist coalition under the leadership of the VMRO. A twenty-four year old poet, Ljupco Georgeivski, led the VMRO, and he articulated four aims: first, Macedonian independence; second, withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army and the establishment of the Macedonian Defense Forces; third, an independent currency; and, fourth, world recognition as a sovereign state. The Party's message was that Macedonia was for Macedonians, which was not widely received by Macedonia's ethnic minorities.³⁷ Fortunately, other points of view were represented. For example, the

³⁵ Ibid., 81.

³⁶ Ackerman, 59.

³⁷ Ibid., 57.

SDSM pushed for a compromise solution with Yugoslavia such that Macedonia would have autonomous status as a Yugoslav republic.

Moreover, because the 1990 elections did not produce a majority, the government created a panel of experts, who had little party affiliation; this panel was designed to facilitate good governance that reflected compromise. Three ethnic Albanians were included on this panel, an early indication of the government's accommodation through power sharing, a technique witnessed in the Basque case. Also, even with the nationalist coalition's slight majority, Kiro Gligorov, a former Communist, was appointed as President, while Georgievski was appointed as Vice President. An economics Professor, Nikola Kljusev became the Prime Minister. This form of power sharing reflected the polls of the day. An April 1991 poll indicated that sixty percent of the people favored a restructured Yugoslavia as opposed to Macedonian independence. Also, people were concerned that a purely nationalist government may lead to a Slovenian and Croatian political outcome.³⁸ It appears that the values of toleration and diversity were important elements to the people and leaders of FYROM.

So far, Macedonia's political accommodation has been able to avert the ethnic conflicts and disasters experienced by its regional neighbors. The ethnic parties helped to influence the governing coalition agenda. In June 1993, a constitutionally directed institution, the Council of Interethnic Relations, was stood up. The thirteen-member council, which has representatives from six ethnic groups, is charged with studying interethnic issues and making recommendations to Parliament. While its influence is questionable, it is a forum for dialogue.³⁹

³⁸ Ackerman, 57-58.

³⁹ Shea, 236.

Moreover, Macedonia's political leadership has been a significant factor for Macedonia's relative ethnic harmony, as mentioned earlier. In 1995, President Gligorov talked about the citizens of Macedonia: "We are all Macedonians. We are all citizens of this country and Albanians have a long-term interest to integrate themselves in this country. This does not mean that they should lose their national, cultural and linguistic characteristics." Furthermore, he stated that:

In the ethnically-mixed Balkans, it is impossible to create compact national states in which only members of one nation can live. This is an absurdity which can hardly be realized in Europe....Perhaps one nation can win a victory here and there, but then this would only lead to revanchism on the part of the others, and thus, there would never be an end [to warfare].⁴⁰

According to Alice Ackerman, one way to defuse the problem of conflicting nationalities is to create a new nationality or identity. The idea of creating a European identity in Macedonia has influenced Macedonia's desire for membership in European institutions.⁴¹ According to Keith Brown, the idea of a federalized Europe resonates with citizens of the FYROM. They are used to a federalized system under the former Yugoslavia, and they view their inclusion in the European family as a way to bolster their status and way of life.⁴² Just like Spain's overlapping state and local political communities, the FYROM seems comfortable with overlapping identities and political communities. Some ethnic Albanians do feel Macedonian. Nusret Jakupi, a military officer in the Macedonian army said: "I, as an Albanian, feel I am in my country. I haven't come from another country. I am living in the same place where my grandfather,

⁴⁰ Ackerman, 66.

⁴¹ Ibid., 66-67.

⁴² Keith Brown, Interview at the Watson Institute, Brown University, 3 April 2001.

my great grandfather, and generations before have lived."⁴³ According to an ethnic

Albanian leader, Sami Ibrahim

I think we have been lucky to establish this country without any conflict at all. And the contributions of [the ethnic] Albanians were a huge part because we know that we can talk to each other. The dialogue is going on in Macedonia. That is our priority. We respect each other, but the promises that are given are not realized. It was always said that things would be realized step by step but unfortunately there's still not a real democracy here. But we have continued to preserve the peace. If we have not learned the lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina then we are illiterate.⁴⁴

And President Gligorov explains the balance that must be achieved to win legitimacy

from not only ethnic Albanians, but also from the majority, Slavic Macedonians:

It's not possible to implement overnight a maximization program because there are other political entities in the country that have to accept those solutions. Two-thirds of the population in Macedonia are [Slavic] Macedonians, and one-third consists of all the [other] ethnic groups together. Therefore, if you want to improve some of the ethnic rights, then you have to convince the [Slavic] Macedonian population that that is good, and that it is to the benefit of the country and of the [Slavic] Macedonians of the nation. All this requires time, preparation, argumentation, patience.⁴⁵

It seems that by first acknowledging overlapping identities and political communities, the state can better know how to foster legitimacy from the diverse population.

Recent polls conducted from March to May of 2000 support Gligorov's concern of attaining legitimacy among all ethnic groups. Ironically, it is the ethnic Albanians who seem to have more confidence in the government. Based on polls conducted in April 2000, political preferences have changed since the 1998 elections. The governing coalition (VMRO-DPMNE and DPA) has lost public support, but that loss is mainly among the ethnic Macedonians. Ethnic Albanians, however, have increased their support for the coalition, and particularly show increased support for DPA over PDP. The main

⁴³ Ackerman, 67.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 94.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 93.

opposition party, SDSM, has since doubled its public support since the 1998 elections. This support is mainly from the ethnic Macedonian and other-than Albanian ethnic communities. Also, SDSM supporters tend to have more urban, educated, and higher economic status than supporters of VMRO-DPMNE. Specifically, ethnic Macedonians have increased their support of SDSM from 15% to 27%, while their support of the VMRO-DPMNE coalition has declined from 16% to 13%. Ethnic Albanian support has remarkably grown for DPA from 31% to 50%, yet decreased for PDP from 32% to 13%. President Trajkovski received positive support from ethnic Albanians (62%) and mixed support from ethnic Macedonians (46%). Prime Minister Ljupco Georgievski, also from the VMRO-DPMNE, received more favorable support from ethnic Albanians (54%) than from ethnic Macedonians (37%). The overall declining confidence in the ruling coalition may be attributed to events in Kosovo, a presidential election scandal, and poor economic performance.⁴⁶ The leaders of the SDSM party, Tito Petkovski and Branko Crvenkovski, are gaining ethnic Macedonian support while losing ethnic Albanian support. Former President Gligorov, whose views are in line with VMRO-DPMNE, continues to have great support among ethnic Macedonians (72%) and limited support among ethnic Albanians (15%). Arben Xhaferi enjoys widespread support among ethnic Albanians (83%) and minimal support from ethnic Macedonians (21%).⁴⁷

What do these polls mean? First, President Gligorov seems to enjoy support based on his leadership. Even though his views reflect the views of the ruling coalition,

⁴⁶ According to the international observers of FYROM's elections, the elections were "marginally more transparent than previous ones" because a repeat vote occurred as a way to address inconsistencies. Still, more ethnic Macedonians (33%-65%) believe that the elections were fair than ethnic Albanians (59%-32%) who believe they were fair. See "Opposition SDSM Pulls Ahead in FYROM," Opinion Analysis, Office of Research, Department of State, April 21, 2000.

⁴⁷ "Opposition SDSM Pulls Ahead in FYROM," Opinion Analysis, Office of Research, Department of State, April 21, 2000.

the declining support for that coalition has not affected him. It appears that he enjoyed great power vis a vis his prime ministers during his time as President. Under President Trajkovski, the powers of the prime minister vis a vis the president seem more balanced. President Gligorov's personality and leadership seems to be the basis of this differentiation, as indicated by the polling data. Second, the ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians are not homogeneous in their opinions. Ethnic Macedonians tend to be split between the VMRO and SDSM, while there are several Albanian parties. Although, the DPA is gaining more Albanian support, it is a party that reflects political accommodation and moderation. The DA party received the same support from the ethnic Albanians and Macedonians, and ethnic Albanians gave ethnic Macedonian President Trajkovski great support. Perhaps we are seeing the beginning of cross-cutting cleavages such that political parties reflect issues that override previous ethnic agendas.

Other indicators show that there has been a decline in support of the police and army in both ethnic communities. However, ethnic Albanians have increased their support for the judicial system from 7% to 20% favorable and for both the national, rising from 24% to 50%, and local governments, now at 51% from last year's 38%. Ethnic Macedonians, however have less support for the national government, declining from 46% to 27%, and the local government, dropping from 38% to 29%. Moreover, each community's views towards each other have changed. Ethnic Albanians' view of ethnic Macedonians have improved from 17% as very favorable to 44% very favorable. In fact, a total of 76% responded as either very or somewhat favorable. Only 30% of ethnic Macedonians viewed ethnic Albanians as either very favorable or somewhat favorable. However, only 9% of ethnic Albanians and 20% of ethnic Macedonians felt that ethnic

relations were very bad that could result in a grave crisis. Indeed, both groups strongly back a united FYROM (ethnic Albanians at 82% and ethnic Macedonians at 99%). Finally, 30% of Albanians only identify with their ethnic group and 50% view themselves as an ethnic Albanian and then as a Macedonian citizen. Ethnic Macedonians view their residency in FYROM as the most important factor of their identity (55%), followed by town (12%), occupation (13%), nationality (13%), and religion (5%).⁴⁸

These polls also reflect increasing legitimacy for the government among the ethnic Albanians, and even increasing tolerance towards others, important criteria for a liberal democracy. The polls, again demonstrate the importance of the government's ability to elicit legitimacy from all communities, even among the ethnic Macedonians who are showing declining support for the government. These polls suggest that there may be cross-cutting societal cleavages based on how people perceive themselves and others. State loyalties seem to be present and may help form the basis of a widespread civic identity; these loyalties and identity may help form the basis of a cohesive political community at the state level. Clearly, there are still polarized sentiments, but as Almond and Verba tells us, all societies will have some polarization.

Another set of polls indicate that ethnic Albanians appear to be more optimistic about the economy than ethnic Macedonians, with 65% of ethnic Albanians optimistic concerning the arrival of Western economic aid than the ethnic Macedonians (34%). However, both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians tend to favor the market economy with some restrictions. Overall, 77% of the public is in favor of private versus state ownership of small businesses, and 58% in favor of foreign investment. Supporters

⁴⁸ "Macedonian Albanians' Political Influence Gives Them Reason for Optimism: But May Feed Suspicion among Ethnic Macedonians," Opinion Analysis, Office of Research, Department of State, May 9, 2000.

of VMRO-DPMNE and DPA tend to support the free market more than supporters of SDSM. Ethnic Macedonians view trade (26%), foreign investment (26%), and fighting corruption (16%) as the top economic policy priorities, and ethnic Albanians relatively agree, with foreign investment (31%), privatization (23%), trade (14%), and fighting corruption (12%).⁴⁹ Additionally both communities put unemployment as their top election issue.⁵⁰ The importance of the economy will come to the fore again in the cooperation section of this study.

The political process still holds promise as a viable alternative to ethnic violence. The DPA is increasingly asserting itself in government, attaining better job and bank loan access for Albanians. Additionally, the ethnic Albanian politicians in Kosovo are not supporting the ethnic Albanian extremists; they do, however, warn of western support for their Slavic rivals. Macedonia's neighbors have declared support. Albania reaffirmed its commitment to respect Macedonia's borders and reject any call for a Greater Albania. Greece and Bulgaria have offered military support to assist with border security between Macedonia and Kosovo.⁵¹

Furthermore, PM Ljupco Georgievski's coalition has continued to facilitate good relations between the Albanian and Slavic Macedonian communities, and this year Tetovo University will conduct education in the Albanian language with state-approval. The Deputy Prime Minister Ibrahim and other ethnic Albanians hold high posts in the government. The Economist reported that: "Despite this week's violence, the party [DPA] seemed keen to stay in government and uphold the tradition whereby patronage

⁴⁹ "Public Says Ailing FYROM Economy Needs Trade and Investment for Growth," Opinion Analysis, Office of Research, Department of State, May 4, 2000.

⁵⁰ "Opposition SDSM Pulls Ahead in FYROM," Opinion Analysis, Office of Research, Department of State, April 21, 2000.

⁵¹ "Europe: Oh No, Not War in Macedonia As Well," The Economist, 10 March-16 March 2001, 46-47.

and political responsibility are shared out amicably." DPA has rejected the extremist goal of a 'greater Albania,' and even Mr. Ibrahim claimed that Albanians can live in several countries, just as German-speakers live in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.⁵²

The NLA, however, has challenged Xhaferi's political efforts, and in response, Xhaferi is pressing for more rapid improvement concerning ethnic Albanian rights using the political process. Most Albanians just want stability and opportunity, and they have no desires for a Greater Albania. Generally, Albanians want their language officially sanctioned, more decentralization, constitutional amendments guaranteeing equality, a change in the preamble of the constitution, an internationally monitored census, and an Albanian language university. The EU's security chief, Javier Solana has tried to discourage use of force from all sides, and he has encouraged President Trajkovski to step up negotiations. However, Solana noted that Macedonia's democracy is strong enough that it does not need direct international mediation for its political dialogue. Solana observed: "Xhaferi is part of the government."⁵³

Xhaferi warns: "People must not generalize and criminalize everyone and create some Satanic idea about the Albanians." Moreover, "They must talk about concrete positions of real people, and not make false presumptions. And you cannot buy loyalty to the state with the repression of its citizens."⁵⁴ Xhaferi rejects the NLA's violence and has had no contact with its leader, Ali Ahmet. However, Xhaferi attributes his warning to the NLA that increased violence would damage any gains on the political front led to the NLA's recent restraint. Xhaferi acknowledges the delicate balance he must attain: "The

⁵² "Macedonia: Passing Clouds?" The Economist, 3 March-9 March 2001, 49.

⁵³ Steven Erlanger, "Use Words, Not Guns, Balkan Leader Tells Rebels," The New York Times, March 28, 2001, A4. The demand for the census and change in the preamble is from Steven Erlanger, "Wide Offensive by Macedonia Presses Rebels," The New York Times, March 26, 2001, A10.

⁵⁴ Erlanger, "Use Words," A4.

boys in the hills have a collectivist ideology. But if I don't succeed in opening the process of real change, I will have failed, and I will be responsible for the change in people's heads. I want to civilize the conflict, not militarize it. But I must succeed."⁵⁵

The West wants Xhaferi to succeed as well and has pressured President Trajkovski to use restraint against the 1000-member NLA forces, intensify negotiations and address Albanian grievances. According to Nikola Dimitrov, Macedonia's national security advisor, "This is a fight against terrorists, not against any single ethnic community." An ethnic Albanian villager called the government attacks against the NLA "a tragedy and a crime." But he also added that the Albanians want "only justice" and not a separate state.⁵⁶

According to Branko Geroski, the editor of Dnevnik, Macedonia's largest newspaper, the state sanctioned language status for the Albanian language and a change in the constitutions' preamble that clearly articulates equal citizenry status for all people were imminent. The state, with the OSCE's help, has accredited a new university, albeit not the Tetovo University, with Albanian as the primary language.⁵⁷ While movement has been occurring on a political front, action had to be taken against the NLA.

According to a senior Macedonian official, "we needed to do it to keep ordinary Macedonians from losing faith in the government and turning to private vendettas." He noted that even with the killing of a Macedonian policeman, "not one single Albanian shop window has been smashed." And a senior Western diplomat remarked that the government "had to do something to stop the Macedonians from melting down in this

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Steven Erlanger, "Wide Offensive by Macedonia Presses Rebels," The New York Times, March 26, 2001, A1 and A10. The quotations are found on A10.

⁵⁷ Ibid., A10.

crisis, because they're all frightened and critical of inaction."⁵⁸ Was the government just fulfilling its obligation of protecting its population from political terror, a tenet of liberal democracy as discussed by Diamond?

Cooperation

The FYROM's cooperation with International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and other states have helped counter the NLA actions. This case differs from the Basque case because of the plethora and increased robustness of IGOs in the FYROM case. Such cooperation, nevertheless, is required to defuse the transnational NLA, especially on the regional level. According to Carl Bildt, "There will not be stable peace in the region until a political arrangement for this area is accepted by the peoples of Kosovo, all the countries of the region, including Serbia, and the U.N. Security Council."⁵⁹ Moreover the FYROM leadership realizes that the redrawing of borders to accommodate ethnic populations is dangerous. According to President Trajkovski: "We cannot redraw borders and boundaries, making smaller units of even purer ethnic states. We cannot survive as a region if ethnicity becomes the sole defining justification of statehood."⁶⁰ The alternative is to turn towards a transnational and integrative Europe. The desire to join Europe is a regional unifying factor. Interestingly, Bildt describes the road to EU membership as to "likely be a long one for most of these countries."⁶¹ However, on April 9, 2001, the FYROM became the first Southeast European country to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement Pact. This Pact confers the status of potential

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Carl Bildt, "A Second Chance in the Balkans," Foreign Affairs 80, no 1 (January/February 2001): 154.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 155.

⁶¹ Ibid.

EU candidacy to the FYROM, with a transition period of ten years towards full EU membership. For the FYROM, the SAA is concrete EU recognition of the FYROM's political and economic progress, especially in the areas of regional cooperation and respect of fundamental rights.⁶²

According to the Stability Pact Coordinator Bodo Hambach, the regional neighbors' support for the FYROM will quell the current conflict. His view is that the "terrorists" are politically isolated "as never before, from the government of Albania, from the official Kosovo Albanians and from the political parties of the Albanians in Macedonia." In fact when asked in an interview "Who is supposed to keep in check these UCK (NLA) fighters from Kosovo?" Hambach replied:

Whoever holds power in Kosovo. And that is Kfor. It has the obligation under international law to ensure that no threat to a neighboring country comes from this territory. Kfor has to draw a line in the sand." Furthermore, he stated, "Not all violence shown on TV means war. We are dealing with armed confrontations, but these are not crossing the threshold of war. I consider it a controllable conflict. This includes clear opposition terrorism....These terrorists now notice how isolated they are. They now want to present themselves as freedom fighters and portray the terrorist actions as a popular uprising in Macedonia."

Mr. Hambach made clear the importance of the Stability Pact as a means towards regional cooperation: "we have made demonstrable progress, precisely in the area of regional cooperation. Since Milosevic's departure there has been no head of state in the region who considers military aggression to be a means of policy."⁶³

⁶² "The EU and Southeastern Europe: On the Road to Europe: First Stabilisation and Association Agreement to be Signed on 9 April 2001 with Former Republic of Yugoslavia," Europa. Downloaded on 25 April 2001 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/sec/news/memo01_127.htm. Note that Slovenia and Hungary are applicant EU countries and are sometimes considered Balkan countries. For a review of the applicant process, see "A Survey of EU Enlargement: Europe's Magnetic Attraction," *The Economist*, 19 May- 25 May 2001, 3-4.

⁶³ "Macedonia: Stability Pact Coordinator on Prospects for Peace," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, March 19, 2001. Downloaded on 1 May 2001, <http://infoweb5.newsbank.com>

Interestingly, recent polls indicate that ethnic Albanians support NATO and feel more secure with NATO troops in the FYROM. However, ethnic Macedonians do not favor a NATO presence in the FYROM and half have an unfavorable view towards the United States. VMRO-DPMNE supports NATO presence in the FYROM, but SDSM does not. However, ethnic Macedonians respond favorably to joining NATO, with perhaps the hope of that NATO membership could help secure economic benefits. Confidence in the EU, UN, and OSCE has also gone down from 1999 to 2000 among ethnic Macedonians (41% to 33%, 44% to 34%, and 42% to 30%, respectively). Ethnic Albanians have consistently held these organizations in high regard (82%, 79%, and 85%).⁶⁴ According to Keith Brown, however, there is great support within the FYROM for being included among the European family of states. In fact, the idea of the European welfare state is much more attractive than the model of the United States.⁶⁵ It would be fascinating to see what future polls will reveal now that the FYROM is a SAA signatory.

Furthermore, the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten has repeatedly called for Albanian Kosovar leaders to reject NLA actions, which they have.⁶⁶ He warned the Kosovar leaders that an absence of such rejections would harm the continuance of the substantial EU aid to Kosovo. The EU doubled its aid to Kosovo, providing 900,000 euros, during a recent visit by Serbian Deputy PM Covic to Brussels. The EU has also discussed plans for additional aid for the Presevo Valley area. Currently, the Commission has provided 470 million euros to the FYROM in the form of

⁶⁴ "Macedonians Disillusioned by NATO Action in Kosovo: Albanians Still Support NATO and Feel Safer with Troops in FYROM," *Opinion Analysis*, Office of Research, Department of State, April 25, 2000.

⁶⁵ Keith Brown, Interview at Watson Institute, Brown University, 3 April 2001.

⁶⁶ See concerning Rugova's rejection of violence. See footnote below reference Chris Patten.

government assistance with inter-ethnic issues via education, road construction, refugee shelters, and establishing border-crossing points.⁶⁷

Inter-state cooperation has recently occurred between Serbia and Macedonia. Both countries agree that the best way to manage the ethnic Albanian extremists is with restraint. As the Basque case demonstrated, state restraint vis a vis terrorists seemed to help elicit state legitimacy from the population. Presidents Trajkovski and Kostunica have signed treaties that delineate the border between their countries.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Kostunica rejects the idea of a "Greater Serbia" and believes that political accommodation will produce a future stable and decentralized Yugoslav state.⁶⁹ Unfortunately for Kostunica, the task of producing such a state is formidable. Bernard Kouchner, the high representative of the UN secretary general in Kosovo during its first 18 months as an international protectorate, concluded at the end of his term in late 2000: "Kosovo remains a violent society in which guns are used to resolve arguments and exact revenge." He added: "The Kosovo Albanians have already damaged their reputation in the eyes of the world and undercut international sympathy by the culture of impunity and tolerance for reverse ethnic cleansing."⁷⁰ So far, Albanian insurgents have posed a security problem for Kostunica with their killings and kidnappings of local Serbs. President Kostunica has asked for increased UN patrols to combat Albanian "terrorism," which has spilled into the buffer zone that borders on Macedonia.⁷¹

⁶⁷ "Commissioner Patten to Visit Skopje," External Relations: The EU and South Eastern Europe, 2 April 2001. Downloaded on 1 May 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations. The discussion on aid to Serbia and Kosovo is from Chris Patten, "Debate on Conflict Prevention/Crisis Management," External Relations: The EU and South Eastern Europe, 14 March 2001. Downloaded on 1 May 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations

⁶⁸ "Macedonia: Passing Clouds?" 48.

⁶⁹ Leonard J. Cohen, "Post-Milosevic Serbia," Current History 100, no. 644 (March 2001): 100.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

On the process of democratization, Kostunica realizes that it is a process that takes time. In 1996 and 1997 at civic protests, he said, "For people who have not experienced democracy it is important that democracy grow in this country. If it was somehow imported, it would not give people the right idea." He also talked about his attraction to U.S. democracy.⁷² Just like the FYROM, Kostunica's FRY has had to face many challenges as it forges its path to democracy. Kostunica faces a corrupted and mismanaged economic system that lasted thirteen years under Milosevic; U.S. sanctions were only lifted on Jan 2001; and, his state has suffered from delayed foreign investment and aid. But democratic progress has occurred. There has been a noticeable change in political culture: more pluralism, freedom of expression, and an unhindered media. The police have shed their heavy handed ominous presence, the state has reestablished its international contacts, the value of the currency has remained steady, and wages are increasing. And as Leonard Cohen observes, "...the more virulent xenophobic and authoritarian aspects of Serbian political culture have waned considerably."⁷³ So far, it appears that Kostunica has directed Serbia (FRY) on the path towards greater tolerance and acceptance of diversity. The recent election of a moderate Kosovo government, which has also renounced violence, seems to validate Kostunica's efforts. As the Basque case highlighted, however, such transitional efforts by a democratizing state may be met with increased violence from terrorist groups. Kostunica must stay the course to effectively and politically marginalize the KLA (Albanian extremists). A marginalized

⁷² Ibid., 100.

⁷³ The points about the police, contacts, currency and wages are from Eric D. Gory, "Building a 'Normal, Boring' Country: Kostunica's Yugoslavia," Current History 100, no. 644 (March 2000): 113. The rest is from Cohen, 106 and 108.

KLA will not only cause less problems for the FRY, but it will be less of an asset for the NLA as well.

The FRY seems to be taking other steps that support the rule of law and greater tolerance. Over 100 Kosovar Albanians were freed from Serbian jails. They were arrested in 1999 on suspicion of terrorism and were serving sentences that ranged from 7 to 13 years.⁷⁴ Condemning an attack on several FYROM soldiers by extremists, the head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Hans Haekkerup remarked that political, religious and community leaders in Kosovo, support FYROM's government and citizens because "People...want to live in peace for a better future."⁷⁵ President Kostunica has been working with UNMIK to help foster the work of Kosovo's committee to design a legal framework for a provisional self-government, and specifically, he has encouraged Kosovo Serb representation.⁷⁶

Other countries, as mentioned earlier have also manifested signs of democratization and a willingness to cooperate. Specifically, Albania has rejected the idea of a Greater Albania and has championed its own democratization. Albania's Prime Minister Ilir Meta seems to be committed to Albania's democratization. He's been able to cut crime, improve the customs service, and regulate taxes. Nevertheless, poverty is still pervasive and extreme (GDP per capita is \$1,000). Elections take place in June 2001, and PM Meta says that his goal is to expand the Albanian economy into the Balkan

⁷⁴ "UN Official Welcomes Kosovar Albanians Freed From Serbian Jails," UN: Bringing Peace to Kosovo News Reports, 25 April 2001. Downloaded on 1 May 2001, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2htm>.

⁷⁵ "Security Council members condemn ambush in FRY of Macedonia," UN: Bringing Peace to Kosovo News Reports, 25 April 2001. Downloaded on 1 May 2001, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2htm>.

⁷⁶ "Kosovo: Serb Representative Rejoins Panel Drafting Legal Framework for Self Government," UN: Bringing Peace to Kosovo News Reports, 25 April 2001, downloaded on 1 May 2001, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2htm>.

market and foster ties with the EU. Albania's restraint during the Kosovo conflict won great approval from the EU.⁷⁷ Greater regional inter-ethnic tolerance has helped to foster a domestic intra-ethnic tolerance as well. The promise of a future EU inclusion seems to entice states to pursue a liberal democratic path.

At issue is the smuggling between the Macedonian and Kosovo border. Unemployment is high at 32 percent, and many unemployed Slavic Macedonians are not enamored with ethnic Albanians who are attaining wealth through illegal activities, namely smuggling. The good news is that Macedonia has been able to curb inflation, obtain 250 million dollars of Greek investment, attain a budget surplus, and foster job-creating investments. The continued path towards economic prosperity may help defuse potential ethnic tensions.⁷⁸ And as mentioned earlier, Greece and Bulgaria even volunteered to patrol the border, which would help thwart the smuggling activities.

Concerned about the transnational nature of the NLA, President Trajkovsky has urged Kfor and UNMIK to help with border control. The President called the recent violence in his country a "direct export from Kosovo." He claimed that the armed extremists are trying to destroy FYROM's multicultural democracy, charging that they are guided "racist ideology" and "trafficking in drugs and women."⁷⁹

Peter Liotta discusses two key lessons from Kosovo that may shed light on Macedonia's situation. First, he insists that American avoidance of the Kosovo situation at the Dayton Peace Talks in the hopes of making a compromise on Bosnia more appealing to the ruthless Milosevic led to the legitimization of the KLA. Second, the

⁷⁷ "Albania: Getting Better," The Economist, 24 February - 2 March 2001, 53.

⁷⁸ "Macedonia: Passing Clouds?" 49.

⁷⁹ "FYR of Macedonia: President Calls for Greater Control of Border Crossing with Kosovo," UN: Bringing Peace to Kosovo News Reports, 10 April 2001. Downloaded on 1 May 2001, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm>.

West's lack of support to legitimate democratic opposition in Kosovo and Serbia led to increased violence. The message received by many Kosovars was that nonviolence did not produce international support. Instead, violence hardened ethnic identity and increased legitimacy within those ethnic groups for perpetrators of violence.⁸⁰

Arben Xhaferi may be a key player in Macedonia's ability to avert ethnic conflict. As leader of the DPA, he exerts some power among the ethnic Albanians and within the VMRO coalition-led government. Will his political strategy and the actions of the FYROM government successfully secure Albanian rights, or will the violent tactics of the recent National Liberation Army over-power their efforts?⁸¹ Will the regional and global players continue to cooperate and, thereby bolstering the FYROM's chances for success? Will the FRY continue on its path to democracy, thereby marginalizing ethnic Albanian extremist activities?

Analysis

The FYROM case reveals some of the same patterns discovered in the Basque case. Specifically, FYROM has been able to survive and continue its democratization because of the state's adherence to liberal democratic principles and the more recent regional cooperation from its neighbors and international organizations. With the advent of regional cooperation, the participating states, namely FYR and FYROM also saw shifts in their political cultures towards the Larry Diamond and Gabriel Almond/Sidney Verba criteria. The NLA, just like the ETA in Spain, has been increasing their activities just as FYROM is approaching a consolidated democratic state.

⁸⁰ Peter Liotta, *Dismembering the State* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 324-325

⁸¹ "Arben Xhaferi, Macedonia's Pivotal Albanian," *The Economist*, 31 March -6 April 2001, 50.

It appears that FYROM has been able to marginalize the NLA and attain legitimacy by following a similarly elite-driven political development path as Spain. Both countries used an inclusive approach to democratization; allowed ethnically-based political parties; established a parliamentary system, that implements a proportional representative electoral system with a cap; used power sharing techniques, and had the fortune of good political leadership. For both countries, the ethnically-based political parties served a representative function, not a governing function; however, in both cases the ethnically-based parties influenced the governing coalition and were able to get ethnic issues on the political agenda. Because each country required parties to attain a certain percentage of the vote in order to get a seat, both countries avoided the problem of over-representation at the expense of effective governance. In other words, they were able to limit the number of political parties in their multiparty system, and therefore, produced representative governments that could, indeed govern. While it can be argued that Spain had a more developed civic culture than the FYROM, the people of the FYROM had an ethnic war at its doorstep. War aversion seemed to have kept points of disagreement and despair in the political process.

Legitimacy for the government of FYROM has been at an acceptable level. The state provides for freedom of expression, organization, demonstration, institutional accountability, citizens' votes matter, and a flourishing media, and rule of law. There are still controversies concerning language rights and the constitutional definition of a citizen. The polls seem to indicate that ethnic Albanians are satisfied, and the DPA leader has insisted on rejecting violence. Perhaps the pace of democratization has been slowed down by the ethnic Macedonians who have been less tolerant of the ethnic

Albanian community as indicated by declining rates of satisfaction with the government. However, it appears that through the leadership of Gligorov, Trajkovski, and Xhaferi, political accommodation has been the path of choice and accepted by most citizens of Macedonia. And perhaps, with the political development of the party system, ethnicity will become a lesser priority the agendas of political parties. However, the West must resist the temptation to make FYROM like itself. As Kostunica had remarked, imported democratic models will not work. For example, the countries of Southeastern Europe must ascertain a satisfactory definition of a citizen vis a vis a nationality. They must find their own way of attaining those liberal democratic values that will secure them the legitimacy of their population that will overcome terrorist challenges.

Liberal democratic states must also, according to Diamond, protect their population from political terror. FRY required cooperation, especially at the regional level in order to effectively protect its population from the transnational NLA. Also, its neighbors helped defuse ethnic tension by adopting liberal democratic values themselves, especially those of tolerance and diversity. Examples include Albania's renouncement of a Greater Albania; Kostunica's rejection of a Greater Serbia; Bulgaria and Greece's contribution to border patrols between FYROM and Kosovo; and, Greece's open acceptance of FYROM and subsequent trade. The recently elected leaders in Kosovo have denounced violence and are working towards a legal framework for self-government. Both the FRY and FYROM need each other to prevent cross-border activities that enhance terrorist acts by Albanian extremists in either country. By halting arms smuggling and denying safe havens, both countries have a better opportunity to mute the NLA's and former KLA's activities. In fact, Trajkovski's and Kostunica's


policies of restraint have served them well, to the disappointment of the NLA and former KLA members.


What is the NLA? Is it a terrorist group, a rebel group, freedom fighters, or just a criminal organization? It appears, so far that the FYROM, with the help of the regional and world community, has marginalized the NLA. The Kosovar leaders have renounced the NLA as have all the other regional and world players. The NLA still makes headlines with its violent activities, but it has not been a politically legitimate entity. Xhaferi continues to use the political process, and the government has been praised for its restraint. However, the government must still protect its people, so it has taken action. One point that deserves further investigation is the possible organized criminal goals of the NLA. Based on the goals of Ahmeti, the NLA's leader, the NLA only wants more political rights for ethnic Albanians. Yet, some reports indicate increased smuggling, drug trafficking and other illegal cross-border operations. Is the NLA linked to these activities? Have these activities become an end, not just a means to support NLA activities?

Another key difference between the Basque Case and this one is that the EU is much more robust today. FYROM seems to have many international organizations that may help its democratization process. And this last point may be a good sign for FYROM. With all the gloomy predictions for the FYROM's demise, it remains a pillar for Southeastern Europe, signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement and a Interim Agreement with the EU on 9 April 2001. It is also interesting that this agreement was signed in the wake of NLA's recent attacks. It perhaps was a reward for FYROM's restraint and continued political efforts concerning the rights of its ethnic Albanians.

Furthermore, the economic benefits of increased EU integration may have also help to appease the ethnic Macedonian population, which according to recent polls, are most worried about their economic plight. If the FYROM makes economic progress, then perhaps the ruling coalition will regain support among the ethnic Macedonians.

Through cooperation and an increasingly developed civic culture, the FYROM has been able to stay the course given its rough beginnings and ring-side view of the last decade's terrible ethnic wars. Its neighbors have also experienced political culture shifts as everyone saw the connection between domestic intra-ethnic and regional inter-ethnic relations. Another point for further study will be the reflective culture shifts within Europe as the family of European states expands. The next case will highlight this point.





The Kurds in Turkey: Case III

Introduction

This is another “messy” case because it is, like Case II, an on-going case. This chapter will concentrate on the 1984 to the present timeframe since August 1984 marks the beginnings of Turkey's struggle with the increased violence from the terrorist group, the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers Party) led by Abdullah Ocalan.⁸² The analysis of Turkey, a country on the periphery of Europe, holds promise for additional insights on the democratization process, legitimacy, religion, and terrorism. It is the only secular state within the Islamic world, and just like the previous cases, it has a relationship with the EU, albeit a tenuous one.⁸³ Turkey's global role is not yet clear, but it has become significant with the end of the Cold War. It is at the crossroads of three continents, geographically and some would argue culturally. While Turkey may be able to influence regional and global events, conversely it has had to endure regional and global attention concerning its domestic situation.

In this case more than the previous cases, globalization plays a key role concerning the Kurdish issue in Turkey because of the muted domestic dialogue. In fact, Dogu Ergil, a renowned scholar on Turkey noted that “it appears that, for the time being at least, solutions to the Kurdish problem are more likely to come from outside the system than from within.”⁸⁴ Turkey's Kurds are only 50% of the Middle East Kurdish

⁸² Michel M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 1.

⁸³ Ergun Ozbudun claims that Turkey is not just the the only secular state in the Islamic world, but also the only democratic one in Ergun Ozbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 1.

⁸⁴ Dogu Ergil, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey,” *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 3 (2000): 130.
Downloaded on 12 December 2000 at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy.

population. Specifically, they constitute a sizable proportion of the populations in Iran and in Iraq, and to a lesser proportion in Syria. Aspirations of Kurds in one country directly affect the aspirations of those in another country as well as influencing the state policies and actions within the region. Moreover, Europe has a sizeable Kurdish community (over a half million), especially within Germany that has witnessed confrontations between its Turkish and Kurdish communities.⁸⁵

Once again, the forces of "fragnegration" play a starring role in this story as it did with the other cases. Svante Cornell emphasizes the link between the Kurdish issue and possible regional and global consequences, specifically for Europe: "The Kurdish question is arguably the most serious internal problem in the Turkish republic's seventy-seven-year history and certainly the main obstacle to its aspirations to full integration with European institutions."⁸⁶ As the last case poses the question of political culture shifts within Europe due to the expansion of the European family of states, the possibility of Turkey's inclusion raises the issues of European identity and culture to another level. The significance of this case is undeniable as Turkey sits at the crossroads of the Middle East, Europe, and the Caucasus. Its future has the potential for far-reaching consequences on a regional and global scale.

The key difference between this case and the previous two cases is that the Turkish government has been reluctant to acknowledge the Kurdish issue. Turkey has not taken the inclusive political steps that seemed to have helped Spain and the FYROM manage their respective terrorist challenges because Turkey seems to prize security at all

⁸⁵ Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 2.

⁸⁶ Svante E. Cornell, "The Land of Many Crossroads: The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics," Orbis 45, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 31.

cost, namely liberal democratic values. The conception of the nation-state and Turkey's legitimacy formula excludes Almond and Verba's criteria of tolerance and diversity. Moreover, the military's dominance in government violates Diamond's criteria of civilian control of the military and basic freedoms. Turkey's desire to build a Turkish political community in support of the state has been at the expense of civil liberties. Is Turkey forging a different democratic path than the first two cases? Or is Turkey doomed to a hollow democratic framework empty of liberal democratic values that will ultimately lose the struggle for legitimacy?

Background

The plight of the Kurds in Turkey can be traced to the Ottoman Empire. Within the Empire, the Kurds were one of many ethnic groups within the Sunni community. However, the Ottomans only recognized religious minorities, such as Jews and Christians. The Ottoman rulers viewed minority groups based on religion, not ethnicity, and they, subsequently, did not recognize the idea of Islamic ethnic groups. As a result these groups never attained minority status under Ottoman rule.⁸⁷ The Ottoman focus on religion was most likely a result of the basis of Ottoman rule. The empire was an authoritarian, monarchy, and the sultan based his legitimacy on his claim as the caliph or the spiritual leader of the world's Muslims.⁸⁸ However, the Empire received many people from all faiths as immigrants. The Empire's multicultural nature and the international political climate led to the Empire's granting of asylum to many non-Muslim ethnic groups. Consequently, many Jews and Christians became subjects of the

⁸⁷ Barkey and Fuller, 6.

⁸⁸ Cornell, 32.

Empire.⁸⁹ However, the Ottoman view of religion and ethnicity, as they relate to Muslims, carries on today. In fact, modern Turkey's first Islamic prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, made the following remark in 1996 concerning the Kurds: "We have bonds of brotherhood. There is nothing more absurd than ethnic differentiation among Muslim brothers."⁹⁰ In fact, some of the Empire's multiculturalism declined with the birth of Turkey's statehood. During World War I, most Armenians were deported, and in accordance with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Greeks of Anatolia were exchanged for the Muslims of Greece.⁹¹

In 1925, the Kurds rebelled against the Turkish government during Turkey's struggle with Britain over the oil-rich areas of present-day northern Iraq. Turkey claims that the British encouraged the rebellion; however, the rebellion was also a response to the Turkish government's intrusion of Kurdish autonomy that thrived under Ottoman rule. Kurdish unrest continued throughout the 1930s, resulting in increased governmental repression. In the name of security, the government withheld foundational freedoms that Diamond claims is essential for liberal democracy: rule of law, social justice, pluralism, and accountability. However, for the Kurds, such new policies did not effectively assimilate and modernize them because of Kurdish regional isolation, tribalism, and economic dependency on "landed elites."⁹²

Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk used France as an example for statehood and designated six principles or arrows as the basis for Turkey: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, popularism, etatism, and reformism. Ataturk did not establish a

⁸⁹ Kemal Kirisci, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices," Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 3 (July 2000): 3.

⁹⁰ Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 4.

⁹¹ Ergil, 124.

⁹² Ibid., 124 -125.

democracy, but he did break from the traditional precepts of monarchical rule. Most significantly to the Kurds, however, were his principles of secularism and nationalism. His focus on secularism de-legitimized and offended Kurdish rulers who derived their legitimacy from Islam, while his concept of nationalism was narrowly and exclusively defined by Turkish nationalism. All groups within the former, multiethnic Ottoman Empire had to assume the Turkish identity at the expense of their ethnic identity.⁹³

Ataturk's civic conception of the Turkish state was expressed by his maxim, "Happy is whoever says, 'I am a Turk.'" A Turkish citizen refers to someone who lives within the boundaries of the Turkish state; citizenship corresponds to a national community that includes all ethnic communities; however, all members of ethnic communities were expected to shed their primordial roots and assume the Turkish identity. Ataturk and his circle of elites named their new state, the "Republic of Turkey," referring to its geographical area that contained its multiethnic peoples, and they did not name it after a dominant ethnic group. Interestingly, Ataturk's use of the term, "Turk," reversed the previously Ottoman derogatory connotation of the term, which had referred to the peasants of Anatolia. The imposition of the Latin alphabet and the Turkish language served to reinforce the new nature and construct of the nation.⁹⁴ Thus, the basis of Turkey began as an inherently non-tolerant, anti-pluralist society in the name of assimilation. Ataturk's creation of a Turkish political community was devoid of liberal democratic values. Dogu Ergil remarks that "The Turkish mentality invariably confuses

⁹³ Cornell, 33.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 34. The point about the term, "Republic of Turkey," is taken from Ergil, 124.

unity with uniformity."⁹⁵ If there is unity only with uniformity, then the ideas of tolerance, diversity, freedom of expression, and other basic freedoms do not exist.

After Ataturk's death in November 1938, his cult of personality grew. In fact the statutes of his party, the Republican People's Party (RPP) declared him the party's "eternal party chairman."⁹⁶ His legacy continued, notably his paradoxical authoritarianism that included his vision of a modern, secular, and democratic Turkey. A positive sign of democracy occurred when his successor, Ismet Inonu stepped aside after Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes and their party, the Democratic Party (DP) won the elections in 1950. Unfortunately, the DP took many undemocratic measures, which led to unrest and a military coup in 1960.⁹⁷

Kurdish policy has been the result of Kemalism and its conception of political community. The government does not even conduct census counts of minorities because such a count would indicate recognition of their existence (although current estimates reveal that there are 12-13 million Kurds, which is 20% of the population). In 1980, the state banned the Kurdish language, although the ban was lifted in 1991. After the 1980 coup, the state changed the names of Kurdish towns and Kurdish children were forced to take Turkish names. The press hardly reported on any of these repressive measures; however the oral accounts of these measures cost the regime its legitimacy in the eyes of many of its Kurdish citizens. The Kurds who do succeed are those who have not politicized ethnicity.⁹⁸ Assimilation or political activity outside the Turkish political system seemed to be the only alternatives for the Kurds.

⁹⁵ Ergil, 123.

⁹⁶ Gunter, 7.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 7-8.

⁹⁸ Ergil, 125-127.

The Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) was established in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan.⁹⁹ However, as a result of the 1980 military coup, it fled to Syria and Lebanon and continued its training in these safe havens. By 1984, the PKK returned to Turkey and began its violent attacks in the southeast region of Turkey, which since then has cost 30,000 lives. Its goal was to polarize the Kurdish and Turkish populations by targeting military and economic centers and civilians. The PKK wanted to weaken the state by denying the state's ability to provide protection of its citizens and provide public services. Consequently, the PKK focused its efforts on disrupting infrastructure and tourism. According to the U.S. State Department, in 1993 the PKK kidnapped 13 tourists and bombed hotels, restaurants, and tourist sites. The PKK's military targets have included ambushing patrols and targeting gendarmerie stations, thereby demonstrating that in southeastern Turkey, the PKK, not the state was in control. Additionally, the PKK attacked civilians to gain "submission of villagers." From 1987 to 1990, PKK strategy included burning villages, but Ocalan halted these extremist and unpopular practices; however, violence increased from May 1993-Oct 1994 resulting in 1,600 deaths.¹⁰⁰

The PKK also targeted schools because it felt that the state was using education as a means to assimilate the Kurdish population. Between 1984 and 1994, an IHV (Turkish Human Rights Foundation) report claimed that 128 teachers were killed, mostly at the hands of the PKK. Families of teachers were also targeted. According to the Turkish Minister of the Interior, 5,210 schools closed (the PKK burned 192 of these schools) in east and southeastern Turkey between 1992 and 1994 due to security problems. After

⁹⁹ Hugh Poulton, "The Turkish State and Democracy," *The International Spectator* XXXIV, no. 1 (January-March 1999): 4. Downloaded on 15 May 2001, <https://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao>.

¹⁰⁰ Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 127 and the point on lives lost is from Cornell, 31.

1994 and killing ten teachers, the PKK announced that only those teachers sanctioned by the PKK could teach.¹⁰¹

The state gave the Turkish military a free-hand to deal with the PKK's terrorism, and by the spring of 1994, PKK was effectively weakened.¹⁰² But in Nov 1998, Turkey's Kurdish issue came to the fore and gained international attention with the seizure in Italy of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK. Ocalan was forced to leave Syria, a haven for the last 19 years, because Turkey threatened war with Syria if Syria continued its offer of haven; Ocalan tried to find asylum in Russia, Belgium, Netherlands, but all refused his request. He went to Italy, and he was forced to leave; finally he was apprehended in Feb 16, 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya.¹⁰³

Democratization

Alain Touraine warns: "Democracy concerns political society, but it is defined by both the latter's autonomy and its own role as a mediator between the state and civil society. A direct an unmediated confrontation between the state and civil society might lead to victory of one over the other but never to the victory of democracy."¹⁰⁴ This comment on democracy is fitting as one analyzes the Turkish Constitution, especially regarding the role of the military. The very first sentence states that: "Following the operation carried out on 12 September 1980 by the Turkish Armed Forces in response to call from the Turkish Nation, of which they form an inseparable part...."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 128.

¹⁰² Ibid., 127.

¹⁰³ Cornell, 31.

¹⁰⁴ Dogu Ergil, "Identity Crises and Political Instability in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no 1 (Fall 2000): 45.

¹⁰⁵ "The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey." Downloaded on 18 April 2001, http://www.turkey.org/politics/p_consti.htm.

Unfortunately, the story of Turkey's political development involves the seemingly lack of political autonomy and mediation due to the military's omnipresence. To understand Turkish politics, then is to understand the pervasiveness of the military in politics and society, a violation of Diamond's criteria of liberal democracy.

Turkey has had its democratic process interrupted three times by military coups: 1960, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983. The 1960 and 1980 coups produced new constitutions and new institutions. In both cases, the military greatly influenced the new constitutions, but the intention was not to create a military regime; rather, the military wanted to restore democracy. The military's reward for its role each time was the guarantee of exit rewards. In other words, the military benefited each time it withdrew from its governance role after the coup. ¹⁰⁶

During the 1971-1973 intervention, the military ruled behind the scenes. The breakdown of order and ineffectiveness of the government led to the coup. The military did not dissolve the parliament; the 12 March coup by memorandum explains that:

The Parliament and the Government, through their sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest. They have caused the public to lose all hope of rising to the level of contemporary civilization, which was set for us by Atatürk. ¹⁰⁷

As a result, the government led by Suleyman Demirel resigned, and Nihat Erim formed an above-the-party government after he resigned from the RPP. From 1971-1973, the military revised the constitution that allowed for more executive authority and less civil liberties. ¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Ozbudin, 24.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 33.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 34.

The 1980 coup was a result of ineffective governance and anarchy, once again. Left and right extremist groups were conducting large-scale political violence, and the major political parties were accusing each other of not equitably applying rule of law to these groups. The 1980 coup produced the National Security Council (NSC), which was the ruling council between 1980 and 1983, composed of the five highest, ranking generals in the military. It was determined to restructure the institutions, which reflected the NSC's distrust of the "national will" in the form of elected assemblies, political parties, and other civil society institutions. In fact, cooperation between political parties and trade unions was not permissible. The institution of the presidency was strengthened, and the coup leader General Kenan Evren became president for the next seven years.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, the National Security Council remained as the most significant institution. Robert Kaplan recounts a discussion with a foreign diplomat who revealed that the Turkish General Staff developed foreign policy, not the Foreign Ministry.¹¹⁰ The NSC meets monthly; the president serves as chair, and the Council members include military commanders, namely the chief of staff and commanders of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Gendarmerie; the prime minister; the ministers of foreign affairs, interior, and defense; the director of National Intelligence; and, the secretary general of the Council, who is a military general. The power of the NSC has grown, and no issue is outside its jurisdiction; it effectively ousted the Erbakan government on 28 February 1997. In fact, the NSC's newly formed Western Study Group has investigative powers and is accountable to no one. It is charged with investigating enemies of the state and conducting campaigns that discredit anyone who acts or says anything that offends the

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 57-59.

¹¹⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary, (NY: Random House, 2000), 107.

military. In 1998, when Mesut Yilmaz and his center-right Motherland Party came to power after Erbakan, he tried to disband the Group, but his efforts were muted.¹¹¹

The 1997 "coup," however, is instructive of the military's role as "guardian of the state." The Refah (Welfare) party's gains at the 1995 ballot box forced the center-right Motherland and the True Path Parties' invitation to Refah to join their coalition in 1996. This invitation led to Erbakan's eventual prime ministerial role. Erbakan embarked on policies marked by Muslim values, but he did not encourage nor create fundamentalist policies. Refah seemed to reflect the changing dynamics within Turkish society.

Globalization, urbanization (within a decade Istanbul's population increased from 5 million to 12 million), and the prior government's inability to effectively address labor and social issues broadened Refah's appeal. The military was quick to associate Erbakan and his Refah Party with the PKK, and this association was never questioned. Through the Working Group, propaganda, and the courts, Refah was closed and Erbakan resigned.¹¹² Many Muslim officers were forced to retire, and one recounted:

According to Article 125 of the Constitution, the YAS [Supreme National Council] decisions are not subject to judicial review. So there is no way we can seek restitution of our rights from any judicial or administrative authority. Two years prior to the year 2000 in Turkey, a country which claims to be upholding the rule of law, even a staff member of a faculty is being denied the "freedom of being judged freely at free and independent courts" envisaged for all by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms Convention adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950.¹¹³

Even with many "liberalizing" amendments to the 1982 constitution, the tradition of the strong, centralized state is prevalent. This point is significant in terms of Kurdish

¹¹¹ Candar, "Redefining Turkey's Political Center," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 4 (1999): 130-131. Downloaded on 15 December 2000,

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v010/10.4candar.html.

¹¹² Jeremy Salt, "Turkey's Military 'Democracy,'" *Current History* 98, no. 625 (February 1999): 72-75.

¹¹³ Salt, 75.

policymaking, which is produced by a Turkish elite that is committed to a unitary state with a single national identity. This elite does not recognize alternative identities or the presence of diversity. The interventionist military and the limited media have muted intellectuals, civil society and political parties and have, thus, fostered the "Kemalist consensus."¹¹⁴

In fact, this consensus has been perpetuated throughout the Turkish public. Even within mainstream Turkish public opinion, the Kurdish issue is not clear. For many years, the state denied the idea of a distinct Kurdish identity; Kurds were referred to as "mountain Turks" and their language as a Turkish dialect. In fact, the state ridicules Kurdish demands for linguistic rights because it considers the Kurdish language as an inferior vehicle for communication. Even those Kurds who peacefully seek language rights or state recognition of their identity are labeled as traitors, separatists, or terrorists. It is problematic when all Kurdish political activity is identified with the PKK, terrorism, and separatism because dialogue then ceases. Barkey and Fuller claim that "...the state has created for itself one of the single biggest obstacles to future dialogue: the formation of public opinion that finds the concept of 'Kurdish identity' absurd, unnecessary, and subversive, and that all who talk about Kurdish rights are terrorists and enemies of the nation." The Kurdish issue is not even discussed within academia.¹¹⁵ This point is significant and different from the other cases. If all political activity is labeled as terrorism, then political dialogue becomes nonexistent and real grievances are never addressed. How a state categorizes terrorism matters. This point differentiates this case from the Spanish and Macedonian cases. In Spain and the FYROM, the governments did

¹¹⁴ Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 133. The point concerning the constitutional amendments is from Ozbudin, 5-6.

¹¹⁵ Barkey and Fuller, 117-118. The quote is found on p. 118.

not associate terrorist activities with the whole ethnic population. Instead, they addressed real ethnic grievances within the political system. The terrorists were politically marginalized, especially in the Spanish case. In fact, in both cases, the governments deliberately differentiated between the terrorist organization and the ethnic community.

A key factor that has also muted the Kurdish issue has been the ban on ethnically based parties. Since the 1950 multiparty elections, all parties espousing a Kurdish agenda have been closed, usually with their leaders facing prosecution. By not offering a political process to the Kurds, the state offered no other option than assimilation or extra-political activities. As recently as 1998, the Constitutional Court banned the Democratic Mass Party by a margin of 6 to 5. This party, which represented the Kurdish cause rejected violence and sought a peaceful and democratic process to address the Kurdish problem. According to Ergun Ozbudun,

federal and regional schemes should be ruled out because they would run counter to the unitary nature of the Turkish state, although recognition of certain cultural rights on an individual basis is not out of the question. Most Turkish political leaders, however, feel the timing is not right and that the PKK would perceive such a move as a sign of weakness and indecision. If and when terrorist activities subside, Turkish political leaders can be expected to be more forthcoming.¹¹⁶

While the author is critical of the ban on ethnically based parties, I disagree that a regional and federal system is out of the question. PM Ciller had even, albeit fleetingly, considered the possibility of adopting a Basque-like approach to the Kurdish issue.¹¹⁷

It is difficult to comprehend the PKK's goals. Interestingly, the PKK began in 1978 with a Marxist ideology. By the 1990s, the PKK advocated nationalism, rather than

¹¹⁶ Ozbudun, 143. The point about the 1998 ban is from p. 143.

¹¹⁷ PM Ciller considered the Basque model but quickly faced strong opposition as discussed in Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, 139.

communism.¹¹⁸ However, this emphasis on nationalism may not have been at the expense of its Marxist roots. According to several documents that emerged from the January 1995, Fifth Party Congress, the Party describes itself as the "vanguard of the global socialism movement, even though the Party hasn't yet come to power."¹¹⁹ Additionally, the documents indicate that the Party has always tried to engage supporters from other countries. In fact, the PKK rationalized the Soviet Union's demise and bankrupt ideology: "Soviet socialism was a kind of deviation," and its ideology was "rough," "wild," and "primitive." However, "the PKK's approach to socialism is scientific and creative."¹²⁰

To better understand the PKK, however, it is important to understand its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He directs every PKK proclamation, decision, and action. Radu likens Ocalan to Stalin with his megalomania and corresponding personality cult. Ocalan's roots, however, seem to make him an unlikely candidate for the leadership of the PKK. His mother was not Kurdish, and she ran the family in lieu of his "helpless" father. He recounts his family's strong feudal values, but it was his education in Ankara that introduced him to Marxism and political violence. Just like Stalin, Ocalan eliminated his competitors to his leadership. Selahattin Celik, the founder and first commander of the People's Liberation of Kurdistan (the military wing of the PKK), recounted that "There were between 50 and 60 executions just after the 1986 Congress. In the end there was no more room to bury them."¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Cornell, 38.

¹¹⁹ Michael Radu, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 45, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 48-49.

¹²⁰ Radu cites from the "Party Program of the Kurdistan Workers Party," in Radu, 49.

¹²¹ Ibid., 49-50. The quote is found in Ibid., 50.

Radu claims that Ocalan adopted a Maoist strategy, and the idea of a Kurdistan was a means to an end, that being a base from which to promote socialism regionally and globally. This agenda did not truly represent the majority of the Kurdish people. In fact, the PKK's beginnings included non-Kurds. Even as early as 1980, the PKK had difficulty recruiting Kurds. Ocalan, himself did not even speak in the Kurdish languages of Kurmanji or Zaza; he spoke Turkish!¹²² When nationalism helped the cause, then Ocalan used it. In 1977, Ocalan talked about "other patriotic revolutionary movements in Kurdistan," and he used Masoud Barzani's KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party, one of two main Kurdish parties in Iraq)¹²³ for support. This alliance crumbled when the PKK adopted its violent tactics in 1984. In 1989, the PKK used Islam and started to include Islamic phrases in the PKK literature.¹²⁴

For many reasons, Ocalan never seemed to truly represent the interests of a majority of Turkish Kurds. According to Jalal Talabani, leader of the Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) said: "Ocalan is possessed by a folie de grandeur...he is a madman, like a dog looking for a piece of meat." Iraqi Kurdish leader, Masoud Barzani of the KDP compared Ocalan to Idi Amin. PKK leftist ideology lost its popularity after fall of Soviet Union and communist regimes. Moreover, the Kurds have become increasingly more geographically dispersed, which disrupted the PKK's ability to concentrate its efforts. The PKK discovered that to control areas, it had to coopt tribal leaders, which caused the PKK to have a stake in tribal society. Most of all, however,

¹²² Radu, 52-53.

¹²³ Gunter, 19.

¹²⁴ Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, (New York University Press, Washington Square, New York, 1997), 234-235. The quote is found on Poulton, 234.

many Kurds did not want their own state.¹²⁵ Ocalan himself recanted the PKK's program: [the PKK] "should have taken into account the development the country had undergone both when it was founded and in the 1990s." He even admitted that "a separate part of a state, something which...would have been very difficult to realize - and, if realized, could not be maintained and was not necessary either."¹²⁶

The lack of Turkish Kurdish support for the PKK seems well substantiated. A leading Kurd in exile, Kerim Yildiz of the Kurdish Human Rights Project stated that no one knows what the Kurds in Turkey want because they are not allowed to freely express themselves. While he acknowledged that he can't speak for all Kurds, he made the following points: Kurds do not want to separate from Turkey as they have historical links to the state; if Turkey asked them to form their own state, Kurds would decline because of migrations to the cities and Turkey's economic development; Yidiz advocates some form of federation or autonomy.¹²⁷ A recent New York Times article confirmed that. "most Kurds say they want nothing more than the right to observe their Kurdish heritage within Turkey." Nevertheless, four provinces within southeastern Turkey remain under emergency rule even after PKK laid down its arms.¹²⁸

Furthermore, in a poll conducted in 1993 in Istanbul, among those people who self-identified as Kurds, almost half felt that the PKK was a "terrorist organization" and 17% said that it was possible that the PKK was a "terrorist organization." Of the 13.3 % who identified themselves as having Kurdish roots, 3.7% considered themselves as Turks and only 3.9 % considered themselves as Kurds. Seventy-eight percent did not want a

¹²⁵ Cornell, 40.

¹²⁶ Radu, 59.

¹²⁷ Poulton, Top Hat Grey, 243.

¹²⁸ Douglas Frantz, "Where Misery Abounds, the Kurds Make Merry," New York Times, March 23, 2001, A4.

separate state; instead, they wanted to live with Turks. Interestingly, those Kurds who self-identified as Turks were more well-off than those who considered themselves as Kurds. Could economic benefits mitigate the Kurdish issue? With urbanization and Kurdish migration from the southeast region to the cities, perhaps the Kurdish issue will become less pronounced.¹²⁹

While the PKK may not elicit internal support, it has appealed to the international community. The PKK has depended on the Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe as well as on the cooperation of other states in the region. Ocalan gained world-wide sympathy. In fact, it appears that the PKK derives most of its legitimacy from the international arena. According to Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow, "The PKK leadership was correct to remark that violence made "the world accept the existence of a Kurdish question."¹³⁰ President Mitterand's wife even addressed him as "Dear President Ocalan" in a 1998 letter. She ended it with: "Rest assured, Abdullah, that I am committed to be beside you in the bid for peace. Sincerely your, Danielle Mitterand." Ocalan was still able to gain support from his Marxist allies in Western Europe as well. Germany's and Italy's Marxist terrorists even joined the PKK. Ocalan used a satellite television channel that operated in London and then in Brussels as a propaganda tool under the guise of promoting Kurdish culture. In fact, it was finally shut down because of its blatant propaganda. However, the PKK derived much legitimacy from the international community as well as funding. European estimates indicate that the PKK received 200 and 500 million dollars annually from the Kurds living in Western European and from crime conducted in Germany, Switzerland, France, Scandinavia, and the Benelux

¹²⁹ Poulton, Top Hat, 248-250.

¹³⁰ Kirisci and Winrow, 131.

countries. This leftist and global support highlights the PKK's weakness. It never really represented the Kurds in Turkey.¹³¹

While the Turkish government took drastic means to wipe out the PKK, it never addressed the Kurdish issue because it erroneously linked the PKK with the plight of the Kurds. These two points are in clear contrast to the previous two cases, in which the governments used restraint and differentiated the ethnic community from the terrorist organization. In 1987, Turkey deployed its forces in southeastern Turkey, declaring a state of emergency. By March 1996, the state had renewed its state of emergency 26 times because, by law, parliament must renew state of emergency every four months. The state of emergency allows civilian governors to exercise "certain quasi-martial law powers, including restrictions on the press and removal from the area of persons whose activities are believed inimical to public order." These states of emergency has suspended the application of the ECHR in those regions of Turkey and "curbed the application of Turkey's emerging political liberalization process in the region."¹³²

The Anti-Terror Law of April 1991 targeted domestic security problems, specifically against the PKK and terrorist acts that involved "actions involving repression, violence and force, or the threat to use force, by one or several persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Turkish Republic including its political, legal, social, secular and economic system." This definition combined with the state's ban on dissemination of ideas fostered an environment marked by human rights abuses. According to the IHV, by the end of 1994,

¹³¹ Radu, 54-56.

¹³² Kirisci and Winrow, 128. The first quote is cited in Kirisci and Winrow, 128 from U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991 (Washington D.C.: 1992), 1247, and the second quote Kirisci and Winrow cite from P. Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," International Affairs 69, no. 4 (October 1993): 664.

violations of the Anti-Terror Law resulted in detention for 95 intellectuals, politicians and academics.¹³³

However, the forcefulness of the government raised allegations of state "mystery killings." In 1990, there were 11 unsolved murders; in 1991, 31 cases; in 1992, 362 cases; in 1993, 467; in 1994, 400; and in 1995, 92 cases. The state has accused the PKK and Hizbullah of these "mystery killings." The Turkish Parliament's Unsolved Political Killings Commission claimed that the military supported Hizbullah activities as a means to kill rival PKK. However, Turkey had its own forces deployed within its own borders to do the job. Counting police, special forces and village guards (who were employed by the state), Turkey deployed 300,000 security forces in its eastern and southeastern regions.¹³⁴ In 1994, The Economist noted that Turkey "may be winning the battles against the guerillas but it is losing the war for the support for ordinary Kurds." One village leader remarked that the Kurds were "the slaves of the military during the daytime and slaves of the PKK at night."¹³⁵ This situation is, unfortunately, reminiscent of the U.S. experience in Viet Nam. No one seems to be gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the ordinary Kurds.

There have been some attempts to address the Kurdish issue in the political arena. In 1991, President Turgut Ozal rescinded a law that prohibited the use of the Kurdish language. In 1992, Turkey passed a law, known as CMUK, that attempted to bring "Turkish law into conformity with international standards in the vital areas of detention periods, arrest procedures and interrogation practices." According to a U.S. State Department Human Rights Report in 1996, "the human rights situation improved in a

¹³³ Kirisci and Winrow, 128-129.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 129-130.

¹³⁵ Both quotes are from Ibid., 131.

number of areas, but very serious problems remain." A different study concluded though CMUK was a good start, it did "not apply equally to the State Security Courts, to so-called 'terrorist' crimes, or to the state of emergency area of the Southeast."¹³⁶

Ozal, who claimed to have some Kurdish roots, took the first steps to acknowledge and address the Kurdish issue. Unfortunately, he died in 1993, and his successor, Demirel reversed Ozal's reforms. Demirel viewed the Kurdish issue as a terrorist problem. When PM Erbakan tried to establish an indirect dialogue with the PKK in 1996 in an attempt to convince it to end its violence, Demirel blocked him. When PM Ciller attempted to initiate dialogue and civilian oversight of the military, Demirel blocked her as well. Ciller soon embraced the hard-liner policies, and she, too equated the Kurdish issue with terrorism. Kurdish policy was reduced to PKK elimination, body counts and cross-border raids. She made enough cosmetic reforms, however, to appease the E.U. and the U.S. to ensure Turkey's accession to the European Customs Union. By 1995, the party apparatus was defunct, and Ciller replaced many party members with her loyalists. Because these loyalists lacked constituencies, they were beholden to her. It is no wonder that many politicians perceive that the state is more powerful than the elected government.¹³⁷

In essence, Turkey has been de-politicizing itself. From Ciller to the 1997 military intervention, there's been more movement towards consensus concerning issues of statism and nationalism. Decisions are made outside the political system and the role

¹³⁶ Gunter, 19. Note that the State Security Courts handle cases of freedom of expression. Their duties are contained in Article 143 of the Constitution; they must "deal with offenses against the indivisible integrity of the State and its territory and nation, offenses against the Republic, which are contrary to the democratic order enunciated in the Constitution, and offenses which undermine the internal or external security of the State." This point is found in Hugh Poulton, "The Turkish State and Democracy," 9.

¹³⁷ Barkey and Fuller, 136-139.

of politicians is marginalized. Unfortunately, elections are won based on populist appeals.¹³⁸ Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, twenty political parties have been outlawed. Recently, seven of these parties brought their grievances before the ECHR, and three came away victorious: the United Communist Party of Turkey, Socialist Party, and the Freedom and Democracy Party. Two parties' fates are before the Constitutional Court: Virtue Party (FP) and People's Democracy Party (HADEP).¹³⁹

Ciller's True Path Party's (DYP) coalition with the Islamic Refah or Welfare Party in 1996 that resulted in Erbakan's becoming the prime minister, would haunt her in the 1999 elections. The public realized that DYP, which continued its association as an electoral partner with one of the Islamist parties in 1999, would not be allowed to form a government. The secular elite still viewed her with disdain. The April 1999 election produced a coalition of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and Bulent Ecevit emerged as the prime minister. The Virtue Party (successor of the Welfare or Refah Party), the Motherland Party (center-right) and the True Path Party (DYP) all lost votes. Even the centrist party of Ataturk lost votes. Moreover, the Kurdish party (HADEP), which is on the cusp of being a banned party, did well in the southeast, but it failed to meet the ten percent threshold nation-wide.¹⁴⁰

Is this shift from the center significant? It is difficult to know. Perhaps voters were exhausted from the ineffectiveness of the centrist parties of the past? But Ecevit's party, DSP, did well only because of Ecevit's popularity. The party itself did not have an articulated platform or program. In Istanbul, the DSP won in the national elections, but the Virtue Party won locally. The 1999 election produced a Motherland, DSP, and MHP

¹³⁸ Candar, 138.

¹³⁹ Gunduz, Aslan, "Human Rights and Turkey's Future in Europe," *Orbis* 45, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 23.

¹⁴⁰ Candar, 132-135.

coalition, and the two parties left out were the ones removed from power in 1997.¹⁴¹ Dogu Ergil provided Robert Kaplan with his insight on Turkey's political party system. He explained that Turkish political parties not like Western political parties. In Turkey, parties are "chieftaincies" led by one or two men.¹⁴² Additionally, 1990 and 1999 surveys found that citizens of Turkey felt that political parties were not performing a representative function of the people, rather they were self-serving institutions.¹⁴³ In the West, parties serve as the key link between the state and society. They articulate and aggregate interests and represent citizens.¹⁴⁴ Turkish parties have not performed these functions, so the linking mechanism between state and society is broken.

If the voters used the 1999 elections to register their dissatisfaction with the status quo, then Ecevit needs to be concerned. Charges of governmental corruption, inflation rates that hit 70% at the beginning of 2000, and an IMF bailout of 7.5 billion dollars that PM Ecevit wants increased by 25 billion dollars have challenged Ecevit's credibility.¹⁴⁵ According to a poll this year, six in ten Turks blame Ecevit (21%) or the government (42%) for Turkey's current economic woes. Eight in ten believe that the government has done a poor job informing the public of the current economic crisis, and 73% have little or no confidence in the government's ability to address the problems. Even more sobering, 87% are dissatisfied with how the coalition is running the government and 87% are dissatisfied with Ecevit. The polls indicate that 53% oppose any military intervention even if the politicians cannot effectively solve Turkey's economic problems. Even with

¹⁴¹ Candar, 135.

¹⁴² Kaplan, 113.

¹⁴³ Dogu Ergil, "Identity Crisis," 57.

¹⁴⁴ See Roy C. Macridis and Steven L. Burg, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Regimes and Change, (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 58-73 for a full discussion of political parties and party systems.

¹⁴⁵ "Turkey Nervous," The Economist, 3-9 March 2001, 49.

the public's dissatisfaction with the domestic political situation, most oppose (49% oppose; 29% favor; 22% unsure) international help via the IMF and World Bank. Interestingly, 79% are satisfied with President Sezer. Sezer became President in May 2000 after serving as the head of Turkey's constitutional court. He is considered a liberal, which has raised concern among the military elite. So far, he has called for more civil liberties and the revision of the 1982 constitution so that it reflects the European Convention on Human Rights.¹⁴⁶ Is Sezer the leader that Turkey needs? Will he be able to successfully stand firm when the military challenges him? So far, it seems that Turkey, unlike Spain and FYROM, has not been able to nurture committed democratic leaders who are both courageous and politically skillful.

While there is some difference in opinion between Kurds and ethnic Turks on the effectiveness of rule of law, sizeable portions of ethnic Turks are not satisfied. According to polls conducted in Turkey concerning Ocalan, 58 percent of ethnic Turks were confident that Ocalan deserved a fair trial, and 61 percent believed that he would actually receive a fair trial. A significant portion of ethnic Turks did not, however, feel he deserved (39%) a fair trial, and many did not believe (34%) he would receive one. More generally, 56% of ethnic Turks had confidence in the Turkish justice system and 42% did not. Most Kurds did not have any confidence in the justice system. Finally, many ethnic Turks (69%) believe that Kurds' human rights are protected by the state, and two-thirds of ethnic Turks have positive feelings about Kurds living in Turkey. However, these same feelings do not translate to Kurds living in Iraq. Only 16% of

¹⁴⁶ "Turks Blame Government for Economic Crisis," U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, May 2, 2001. The description of Sezer is from Martin Walker and David Fromkin, "The Turkish Miracle," The Wilson Quarterly (Autumn 2000): 3. Downloaded on 15 December 2000, <http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb>.

Kurds believe that their human rights have state protection.¹⁴⁷ It is not just the Kurds who lack confidence in Turkey's rule of law; even the ethnic Turks question the fairness of the justice system. The fact that Turkey has delayed the death sentence in the Ocalan case shows some EU influence on Turkey's human rights implementation. The Ocalan case has shed light on Turkey's justice system, and it does not seem to elicit much confidence throughout its population.

Unfortunately, not only have the people of Turkey become distrustful of the political institutions, they have also become distrustful of each other. According to Almond and Verba, distrust of fellow citizens is extremely detrimental to a liberal democratic society. Opinion polls conducted in 1990 and 1999 reveal that only ten percent of those surveyed believed that their fellow citizens could be trusted.¹⁴⁸ In another 1999 poll concerning democracy, only 22% felt Turkey was a democracy, 41% felt it was becoming a democracy, and 29% felt it could never be a democracy.¹⁴⁹

Cooperation

It is difficult to assess the effects of cooperation on political culture shifts. The effect of the December 1999 EU decision that approved Turkey's candidacy for EU membership seems to have had some effect on Turkey's human rights record. Even with the problems Ecevit is facing, the U.S. State Department noted that torture and other such acts have declined.¹⁵⁰ As mentioned earlier, PM Ciller took some liberalizing measures to assure Turkey's entry into the European Customs Union. Indeed, with the arrest and

¹⁴⁷ "Ocalan Deserves Death Penalty, Many Turks Say," U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction, June 10, 1999.

¹⁴⁸ Dogu Ergil, "Identity Crisis," 57.

¹⁴⁹ "Economy Tops List of Concerns in Turkey," U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, November 24, 1999.

¹⁵⁰ "Turkey Nervous," 49.

conviction of Ocalan in 1999, Turkey has delayed his death sentence based on the European Court of Human Rights' stance on capital punishment. Turkey's future EU membership rests on Turkey's overall record of human rights, and the Ocalan case serves as a key measuring stick for that record.¹⁵¹

But Turkey's death penalty hinders cooperation among states as some European states refuse to extradite criminals to Turkey.¹⁵² As the Spanish case revealed, common extradition and asylum policies among states are key to combating transnational terrorist activity. The price for cooperation seems to be a consensus on basic values and a common perspective on what constitutes terrorism. The EU's "post-Westphalian" nature is the price for membership. In other words, the EU greatly influences and, at times, directs domestic policies of its members. As Buzan and Dietz explains, "Part of the price to be paid even for partial association with an international organization such as the EU is tolerance of a high level of mutual interference in domestic affairs, aimed at harmonizing a wide range of legal, moral, and institutional practices."¹⁵³

This harmonization of practices and values will be difficult. When Foreign Minister Ismail Cem of the Democratic Left Party, just after the EU announced Turkey's candidacy for the EU, that "each Turkish citizen should be able to speak his or her mother tongue on television," he was roundly criticized. Enis Oksuz of the Nationalist Movement Party shot back that "One nation can have only one official language." President Demirel said that changing Turkey's language policy would be detrimental to "national unity." Furthermore, he said, "Turkey must, as part of the European judiciary

¹⁵¹ Ergil, "The Kurdish Question," 122.

¹⁵² Aslan Gunduz, "Human Rights and Turkey's Future," *Orbis* 45, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 28.

¹⁵³ Barry Buzan and Thomas Dietz, "The European Union and Turkey," *Survival* 41, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 50. The idea of a post-Westphalian EU is from Buzan and Dietz, 50.

system, respect all differences in the domain of individual rights." However, this would not mean the granting of collective rights, which would "encourage tribalism and open the way for separatist violence and terrorism."¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, Turkey's attempt for EU membership has been appealing for the Turkish Kurds, Islamists, democrats, and human rights activists with the hope that membership will lead to increased democratization, and economic prosperity.¹⁵⁵

As mentioned earlier, the most tangible event that signals a political culture shift in Turkey has been its compliance with the ECHR's ban on capital punishment concerning Ocalan. Interestingly, the Ocalan incident has had an effect on Greece as well. In fact, since the Ocalan arrest, relations between Turkey and Greece have improved. Greece's initial non-cooperation with Turkey's pursuit of Ocalan and actual complicity with Ocalan's escape resulted in the resignation of some of Greece's hard-line ministers. More liberal politicians replaced them, including Foreign Minister George Papandreou, who played a pivotal role in reversing Greece's objection to Turkey's future membership in the European Union. The year 2000 marked the first time in forty years that the Foreign ministers of both countries visited each other's country.¹⁵⁶

Papandreou has linked Greece's long-term interests with Turkey's democracy and prosperity via the EU. Greece's new position reversed many other states' leaders' positions concerning Turkey's EU membership. Two years earlier many European states were adamant about blocking Turkey's membership. Premier Jean-Claude Junker, the

¹⁵⁴ Llana Navaro, "Breaking Turkish Taboos," The Jerusalem Report, 8 May 2000, 2-3. Downloaded on 4 April 2001, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc>.

¹⁵⁵ Cornell, 40. The appeal for EU to include Islamists, Kurds, democrats and human rights activists is from Fotios Moustakis, "An Expanded EU and Aegean Security," Contemporary Review (Nov 2000). Downloaded on 15 December 2000, <http://proquest.umi.com/pdqweb>.

¹⁵⁶ Resat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdogan, "Turkey at a Crossroad," Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 10.

host at the 1997 EU summit in Luxembourg said that he would not "sit at the same table with a bunch of torturers." Helmut Kohl declared the EU "a Christian club."¹⁵⁷ But Cengiz Candar and Graham Fuller believe that "Turkey's Islamic identity will not, in the long run, hinder Turkey's entry into the EU, for it will be the very presence of Turkey that will demonstrate that Europe truly embraces universal values above narrow Christian or European ones."¹⁵⁸ How will Turkey challenge the idea and practicality of a European identity? Barry Buzan and Thomas Dietz ask the question: "If Turkey meets the criteria, then why not North Africa, Russia, or Central Asia? Morocco's 1986 application was turned down unambiguously because it was considered to be a non-European state."¹⁵⁹

Several European leaders do see a future for Turkey as a member of the European family. Tony Blair viewed the December 1999 decision as "important for Europe, for Turkey, and the stability and security for our part of the world." The new German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder stated that "Turkey cannot be left out of the process of European unification." President Clinton claimed that Turkey's membership would benefit both Turkey and the EU. Turkey's Foreign Minister Cem observed that "Turkey is entering the EU making its synthesis between West and East, Christianity and Islam." PM Ecevit in December 1999 claimed that "Turkey is not only European, she is also Asian, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern." However, Ecevit was quick to add that "there is no constitutional change on the agenda of the government about organizing the National Security Council (NSC)...the main danger will come out by the removal of the NSC." FM Cem remarked that "the situation of the NSC was exaggerated in Turkey by the

¹⁵⁷ Walker and Fromkin, 4.

¹⁵⁸ Cengiz Candar and Graham E. Fuller, "Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey," Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues 12, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 37.

¹⁵⁹ Buzan and Dietz, 49.

West...soldiers put forward such a liberal approach toward some issues that I sometimes felt like a conservative person."¹⁶⁰

While there may be movement in terms of political culture shifts for Turkey, it is at best incremental and hardly institutionalized while the NSC remains. Likewise, EU members are starting to view Turkey in a European context, but without real Turkish reform, these views may be fleeting. Are Western leaders blinded by the possibility of geopolitical and economic benefits with Turkey's EU membership at the cost of real Turkish democratization? The eventual cooperation of Greece on behalf of Turkey's pursuit of Ocalan did cause shifts in the Greek government, which led to reconciliation with Turkey. This renewed relationship born from the Ocalan affair has led to more positive views of Turkey within Europe.

Moreover, the United States has been a big supporter of Turkey's future EU membership. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the lifting of Cold war restraints, Turkey has engaged in an activist foreign policy. The U.S. has recognized Turkey's new role and has emphasized its "front-line state" character that makes Turkey important on every Eurasian issue that is important to the United States. Turkey represents a pro-Western state in an unstable area; it is an example of democracy (perhaps), albeit flawed, in a primarily Muslim state; it is an Israeli supporter that sets the example for other states with Muslim populations; Turkey provides an Operation Northern Watch base that is key to U.S. strategy vis a vis Iraq; and, it serves as an ideological balancer to Iran and a buffer

¹⁶⁰ Moustakis, 1-2

to any future Russian adversarial actions. Finally, Turkey looms as a critical player for future Caspian energy sources.¹⁶¹

Has the U.S. push for Turkey's EU membership been wise? Martin Walker and David Fromkin warn that Americans view the EU as "a club of wealthy Western European allies, an economic giant and political dwarf, content to leave the great dramas of defense and grand strategy to the United States." However, the EU has changed; its center of gravity has shifted away from the Atlantic alliance. It now has great geographical reach to areas in which European and American strategies differ, most notably in the Middle East. Has the U.S. brought upon itself a strategic situation that is undesirable? Walker and Fromkin contend that U.S. insistence on Turkish EU membership has led Europe "into commitments and neighborhoods that it [U.S.] has been at pains to keep to itself."¹⁶² Are geopolitical criteria the right criteria for Turkey's membership? In a world of transnational threats, such criteria will produce disastrous results if it is at the cost of liberal democratic values. Turkey's lack of restraint in pursuing the PKK into Iraq and other forceful measures may lead the EU down a path it does not wish to go. The transnational nature of threats blurs the line between domestic and foreign policies, and without a liberal democratic compass, that blurred line can cause havoc with EU member states' own policies.

Interestingly, this case also demonstrates the problems of non-cooperation when dealing with a transnational threat. Clearly, Syria became a problem as it offered safe havens for the PKK. The defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War created a safe-haven for the PKK in Northern Iraq, and since 1991, Turkey has engaged in cross-border operations. It used

¹⁶¹ Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," *SAIS Review*, 19, no. 1 (1999): 9-10. Downloaded on 15 December 2000, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v019/19.1makovsky.html.

¹⁶² Walker and Fromkin, 7-8.

35,000 troops in a cross-border episode in 1995.¹⁶³ But it was roundly criticized for its actions by the West because of the ambiguity between Turkey's legitimate right to self-defense and allegations of Turkey's human rights abuses against Kurdish civilians. Ironically, many of the Iraqi Kurds supported the Turkish intervention because of the PKK's challenge to the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq. In fact in 1992, Iraqi Kurds joined the Turkish forces to fight against the PKK in northern Iraq. In contrast, Syria and the PKK had a "strategic alliance" against Turkey as Turkey and Syria engaged in a "dialogue of the deaf."¹⁶⁴ Clearly, this non-cooperation between Syria and Turkey enhanced the PKK's efforts. Because the PKK has transnational benefactors, Turkey has had to rely on other countries to block these transnational efforts. Turkey cannot do it alone; its last big military effort was too costly in troops and dollars, and the Turkish economy cannot support such large-scale efforts on a regular basis. The problem remains that even though Turkey's Herculean efforts have seemingly stamped out the PKK, it has yet to address the Kurdish issue.

Analysis

While some scholars and policymakers may refer to Turkey as a democracy, this study demonstrates that it does not meet the criteria as discussed by Almond, Verba, and Diamond. One must be careful studying Turkey because information is not readily available, which is an indicator itself of Turkey's regime. One must view polling data with suspicion because people may not feel free to express their real opinions and NGOs and PVOs (Private Volunteer Organizations) may bias polls as well to further their own

¹⁶³ Kirisci and Winrow, 130.

¹⁶⁴ Gunter, 19 and 94.

agendas. This study combined polling data from several sources, elite attitudes, and scholarly opinions to reach some general conclusions.

Turkey's political development does not reflect the inclusive political measures taken by Spain and FYROM. The rationale for Turkey's political intransigence in this regard stems from its Kemalist notion of a Turkish citizen. Interestingly, Cornell raises a possibility of Turkish identity evolving from a civic to ethnic nature: "Turkish identity has become more homogenous; as such it carries the risk of growing less civic and more ethnic in nature."¹⁶⁵ Perhaps the state's deliberate assimilation policies that squelch diversity in the name of a civic political community is inadvertently creating an ethnically pure and non-tolerant society. If so, it runs the risk of experiencing the same fate of many of its Balkan neighbors.

Whereas Spain and FYROM's policies acknowledge to some degree overlapping political communities on a regional, state, and European level, Turkey views this situation as threatening. Spain and FYROM institutionalized this recognition by sanctioning ethnically-based political parties that have the ability to influence the governing coalition. Political parties in these countries aggregate and articulate interests of the people they represent. As a result, people feel like their political participation makes a difference, thus meeting Almond and Verba's criterion of competence. Unfortunately for the Kurds, Turkey has banned ethnically based political parties and has banned public discourse concerning Kurdish issues. Consequently, Kurds do not feel they can politically influence the regime, and, therefore, Turkey also does not meet the criterion of competence in a liberal democracy. They are forbidden to nurture a regional political community, with no hope of gaining any type of federal or autonomy-like

¹⁶⁵ Cornell, 35.

arrangement. Moreover, the Kurds lack the wherewithal to feel included in the larger Turkish political community unless they forfeit their ethnic identity.

This point of competence however is lacking throughout the Turkish state's population. The party system does not serve as a representative institution; many people have lost faith in the government and its leaders. The military provides a self-styled oversight of the regime, and it remains accountable to no one. The state is currently suffering from its economic frailties, so it is failing in its ability to govern and represent the people. It suffers from a lack of legitimacy and effectiveness. Generally, Turkey's security concerns have overwhelmed its sense of liberal democratic values. When a country has 300,000 troops and police deployed within its own borders, then it would seem that the state no longer has legitimacy of its own people.

Interestingly, the PKK never seemed to attain legitimacy from the Turkish Kurds either. This point makes the "struggle for legitimacy" in Turkey a rather peripheral activity. It appears that the violent tactics by the PKK and the state cost them both internal legitimacy. Moreover, over 10 years of fighting with casualties on both sides caused distrust among the populations. The ethnic Turks, who lost sons in the army, have less tolerance for the Kurds, especially since the state links the Kurds to PKK activities.¹⁶⁶ The lack of restraint by the state, especially via its army, however, gave the PKK legitimacy from the international arena. In turn, it brought the plight of the Kurds to the attention of the world. The Kurdish issue in Turkey is a main point of contention in Turkey's bid for EU membership and highlights the global influence on a state's domestic politics. Ironically, if Turkey used restraint and reconciliation as did Spain and FYROM, then the PKK would most likely not have grabbed the international headlines.

¹⁶⁶ The point of less tolerance due to lost sons comes from Barkey and Fuller, 116.

Moreover, the state could have actually elicited legitimacy among the Kurds because the PKK never truly represented the Kurds and its violent tactics seemed to alienate them as well.

It is hard to categorize the PKK because its political agenda has had a chameleonic nature. Under Ocalan's leadership, it is hard to discern its political goals. If we assume that a Kurdistan was a goal, even if it was a means to a wider Marxist agenda, then the PKK did not and, perhaps, still does not represent the Kurdish people in Turkey; most Kurds want to remain in Turkey with basic freedoms. The PKK members are not freedom fighters to the Kurds in Turkey because they are not the legitimate representatives of the Kurdish population. However, the PKK has been able to wear the freedom fighter title to the international audience from whom the PKK has been able to attain some legitimacy. Ironically, the government of Turkey did more to legitimize the PKK by not allowing the Kurds to express their grievances via the political process and by resorting to tremendous force in the southeastern Turkey. In this respect, the PKK does qualify as a terrorist organization.

With the disappearance of the Cold War era framework, which included alliances that acted as constraints to prevent superpower confrontations, it appears that international organizations are imposing new constraints. These constraints are a security imperative, and they are designed to foster inter-state cooperation vis a vis transnational threats. Fragmentation has ushered in a new legitimacy formula for states. Not only must states gain legitimacy from its population, but it must also gain legitimacy from the international community. The PKK gained cooperation and legitimacy from the international arena, which fueled its agenda in Turkey. Turkey discovered that it is too

costly and ultimately not effective to fight transnational terrorism alone. It needed the international community to arrest Ocalan, for example, but now it must abide by the EU's rejection of Turkey's death penalty. The case showed some movement in Turkey's political culture by abiding by the EU's rule of law concerning Ocalan. President Sezer has called for changes in Turkey's constitution that will adhere to the EU's criteria. As Turkey convinces the world for economic aid and loans, will there be true democratization that institutionalizes liberalism or will we just see cosmetic changes?

Also, this case showed how Greece's lack of cooperation in the Ocalan case caused a backlash within its own country that resulted in a new set of more liberal leaders. Greece's tolerance towards Turkey led to other European leaders' willingness to consider Turkey as a viable candidate for EU membership. However, both Europe and the United States must be cautious. An illiberal Turkey that brings the Middle East and Central Asia to Europe's doorstep may lead Europe on a path it would rather not take. If Turkey does not take the necessary steps towards true democratization and continues to disregard Kurdish issues and other legitimacy issues, then its domestic policies will become entangled with EU's member states' and perhaps even the United States' policies. A state that shows no restraint towards its own population has the potential for cross-border and inter-state conflict in an environment of fragmentation.

With the convergence of international organizations, namely the EU, and a new generation of political leaders in Turkey, perhaps Turkey can embrace and institutionalize liberal democratic values. Spain, and so far the FYROM, have shown that inclusive political measures under the guidance of enlightened leadership is the state's best strategy in its struggle to win legitimacy vis a vis transnational terrorists. Not only do states win

the struggle for legitimacy at home, but it provides them with the best strategy to win the struggle for legitimacy outside their borders. Only then can states effectively cooperate and together defeat transnational threats.

Conclusion

The significance of these cases underscores the importance of analyzing terrorism in a strategic and political context. Moreover, the ethnic context of these cases is just a sampling of real and potential irredentist and secessionist claims based on peoples divided across boundaries, including the following: Baluch, Punjabis, Uzbechs, Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hungarians, Mayas, Mongols, and many African peoples.¹⁶⁷ The insights gained from the three previous cases of this study may be applicable to other regions as well; however, as mentioned in the introduction, scholars and policymakers must conduct more middle range theory analysis before extending theory on a grander scale. I offer this study as just a beginning step to a grander theory. But this study offers analysis that has applicability to other European countries to include newly democratizing countries and mature democracies, and to the United States. This section will briefly recount some of the insights across the three cases and offer policy implications for the United States towards Europe and itself.

Spain and the FYROM were able to address the concerns of their respective ethnic communities politically through their inclusive democratization efforts. Additionally, the regimes built the foundations for a civic culture as described by Diamond, Almond, and Verba. Spain legitimized the Basque political community, and has so far created compatible, yet overlapping political communities at the state and regional levels. The FYROM is in the midst of finding its way towards compatible, yet overlapping political communities. The state has recognized and acknowledged the ethnic Albanian desire for a regional political community, but the state has yet to design

¹⁶⁷ Barkey and Fuller, 2.

its constitution and laws that satisfy both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. So far, though, the FYROM seems committed to finding a legitimate, political solution. Turkey has yet to fully recognize the Kurdish people and their aspirations, so it is at best just staring its democratizing journey.

Spain, as a result of its legitimacy, was able to contain ETA and treat it like a criminal organization. And with France's cooperation, Spain effectively protected its society. France, also, bolstered its liberal democracy by more effectively protecting its society through cooperation. It also changed its views on justice, concerning terrorism. We do not yet know what the effects of EUROPOL will be on Europe, but the Basque case reveals a convergence of political cultures. So far, the FYROM has been able to treat the NLA as a criminal organization. Moreover, with the FRY's recent steps towards democratization, cooperation between the FYROM and FRY have helped mitigate the extremist ethnic Albanians' activities on both sides of the border. Even the extremist Albanians in Kosovo have been marginalized and rejected by the moderate Kosovar politicians. Consequently, the extremist ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have had less support in their efforts to aid the NLA in the FYROM. While the polls in the FYROM show an increased support of the state by ethnic Albanians, there have not been recent polls that explore the ethnic Albanians' view towards the NLA. However, the Albanian political parties have renounced the recent violence by the NLA and have formed a national unity coalition with the Macedonian political parties. With courage and continued international cooperation, FYROM can marginalize and overcome the NLA's activities.

Turkey, on the other hand, has always linked terrorism to the Kurdish population. Consequently, it has not even defined the Kurdish problem. Interestingly, the PKK has failed to represent most Turkish Kurds' aspirations as well. The struggle for legitimacy in Turkey seems to have been largely conducted outside Turkey's borders, where the PKK has gained most of its support. Ironically, it has been Turkey's lack of restraint that has bolstered the PKK's international legitimacy. Consequently, while Turkey defines the PKK as terrorists who are criminals, the international community views the PKK as freedom fighters or at least as an organization that champions Kurdish rights. There is evidence of the role of international legitimacy in the other two cases, but not to the same degree. The Turkish case suggests that there may be a new legitimacy formula for states given the context of fragmentation. That formula includes opinions, agendas, and activities of common ethnic groups living across borders, international and non-governmental organizations, and other states.

This study also sheds light on how policymakers and academics ought to define and/or categorize terrorism. Again, qualifying the term requires analysts and policymakers to view it in a political and strategic context. At the heart of this context are the concepts of political community, political culture, and legitimacy. It is the fight for legitimacy that characterizes terrorism. As long as states can politically marginalize terrorism, then terrorism is a criminal activity. When terrorism becomes a legitimate activity because the political system refuses to acknowledge real grievances and the people view the terrorists as legitimate, then terrorism becomes a political activity. This study suggests that when terrorism gains legitimacy vis a vis the state, then it is an act of war. As long as the state remains legitimate, terrorism remains a criminal activity. States

that adhere to liberal democratic principles as outlined by Almond, Verba, and Diamond attain that legitimacy and effectively win the struggle vis a vis terrorism. Policies of restraint and reconciliation towards terrorism seem to be more effective for the state's struggle for legitimacy. Spain and the FYROM's restraint gained them domestic and international support; Turkey's unrestrained response has worked against it in both the international and domestic arenas.

A key aspect of legitimacy, however, is the state's ability to protect its citizens from political terror - one of Diamond's criteria for a liberal democracy. In the context of globalization, such protection can only be attained through inter-state and IGO cooperation because terrorism crosses boundaries. For example, in the Basque case, France and Spain cooperated to marginalize the ETA, and consequently Spain successfully transitioned and France, a mature democracy, reassessed its values and policies. The FRY's recent democratizing steps have helped the FYROM's struggle with the NLA, and Greece's actions on the Ocalan case forced it to reassess its values and policies, while highlighting Turkey's justice system. The case of Turkey and the FYROM also highlighted the role of the IGO, namely the EU. The EU may bolster a state's ability to effectively govern, for example, through economic benefits, but it also may demand policy and value shifts of member countries. While twenty-five years ago, people may have scoffed at the idea of a Europeanized Spain, twenty-five years from now, a Europeanized Turkey may be taken for granted. Interestingly, member states also influence the nature of the IGO, which stretches the imagination concerning the bounds and nature of a European or Western culture.

If the US is to maintain its liberal democratic regime and way of life, it is imperative that it understand how cooperation with other states influence the very soul of its democracy and society. Moreover, as we learn more about the transnational nature of terrorism, it is evident that only inter-state cooperation will successfully face this challenge. Peter Grier recently called Osama bin Laden's terrorist network a "virtual country - the Republic of Jihadistan." He also cited a CIA report that describes the latest trend in modern terrorism: "the trend towards more diverse, free-wheeling transnational terrorist networks [will lead] to the formation of an international terrorist coalition with diverse anti-Western objectives and access to Weapons of Mass Destruction."¹⁶⁸ Cooperation is necessary to protect against such transnational threats, but it cannot be at the expense of liberal democratic values.

The changing legitimacy formula ought to concern U.S. policymakers, especially in light of the UN's rejection of the U.S.'s participation on the Human Rights Commission. The U.S. must stay engaged in IGOs concerning the promotion of liberal democratic values. Engagement means influence. The EU has influenced member states' domestic policies. However, given the transnational nature of threats, the line between domestic and foreign policies is blurred. These cases demonstrate that inter-state cooperation is essential to combat transnational threats. No country can go it alone. Moreover, effective inter-state cooperation requires convergence of political cultures because of the entanglement of cooperating states' domestic and foreign policies.

What does this mean for the United States? First, the U.S. must relook its push for Turkey's EU membership. The case of Turkey reveals the critical difference

¹⁶⁸ Peter Grier, "A Terrorist Version of NATO?" Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 2001, 1-2. Downloaded on 16 Feb 2001, <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2001/e20010216terrorist.htm>.

between engagement and appeasement. The United States must view its security interests in the context of fragmentation. By drawing a distinct line between internal and external threats, the United States ignores its own vulnerabilities. U.S. policy towards Turkey must consider Turkey's ability to gain legitimacy from all its peoples; otherwise, internal security problems may expand across borders. Restraint and decency must mark Turkey's policies. While it is important for the US and the EU to remain engaged with Turkey, this engagement should not become a policy of appeasement for Turkey's undemocratic ways. An undemocratic Turkey in the EU will be a security disaster. However, the EU and the US ought to continue engagement with Turkey so as to help inculcate liberal democratic values.

These cases also suggest that identities and political communities can undergo change. In this regard, the United States cannot take for granted the American identity. The civic conception of American citizenship is a blessing as long as diversity is celebrated. The Spanish case demonstrates that overlapping identities and political communities are attainable, just as the U.S. experience reveals. The federal nature of the United States supports overlapping political communities. In the future, however, there may be the possibility of an additional international identity or political community for the American citizen. Such an additional identity may be essential for an emerging new legitimacy formula in a world of fragmentation. In fact, the United States ought to embrace the international community when it can so as to better influence future international norms and institutions that are becoming integral parts of the political legitimacy formula for states.

As the U.S. Commission on National Security proposes changes in U.S. national security structures, including a call for a homeland defense, it is paramount to learn from our European allies and that we not lose sight of what the terrorist targets - our legitimacy.¹⁶⁹ The United States must resist any temptation to weaken its liberal democratic values in the name of security. As a superpower, it must encourage other states to adhere to liberal democratic values as well. Calls for other state policies of restraint and reconciliation towards terrorists, while providing states the wherewithal through diplomacy, economic benefits, and/or peacekeeping activities when appropriate will best help states with their struggle for legitimacy, especially during their vulnerable democratization process. By cooperating against transnational threats and adhering to liberal democratic values, the United States will assure itself a leading role in the international community and better embark on a policy of engagement, not appeasement. Liberal democracy is not just a normative concern, it is a security imperative in today's transnational security environment.

¹⁶⁹ Steven Mufson, "Overhaul of National Security Apparatus Urged," Washington Post, February 1, 2001, 2.

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