Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti

Abstract

Because of lack of planning, the top UNOSOM II military commanders had no understanding of the transition; the number, capability, or concept of employment of their forces; or the rules of engagement (ROE). Their staff consisted only of that assembled hastily for them by UNITAF from its component units which would stay for UNOSOM II and they received only weak support from the inexperienced, undermanned, and overworked UN Secretariat staff. (At this time the Secretary General's military advisor had a staff of only two officers. Two years later, by the time planning began for UNMIH, this office had expanded to over one hundred experienced officers). Given this background, it is not surprising that UNOSOM II encountered the difficulties it did.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 1995
Accession Number
ADA394683

Entities

People

  • David Bentley
  • Robert Oakley

Organizations

  • National Defense University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil Affairs
  • Civil War
  • Combat Forces
  • Doctrine
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • Military Advisors
  • Military Commanders
  • Military Doctrine
  • National Security
  • Rules Of Engagement
  • Security
  • Special Forces
  • Training
  • Transitions
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.