An Analysis of the United States Leadership's Effective Employment of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, July 1950-June 1951
Abstract
This narrative recounts the historical lead up to the Korean War and an operational account of some of the battles and named operations during the first twelve months of the war. Its primary focus is on U.S. employment of ROK Army units during these named operations and the conditions which the U.S. military leadership tried to set in order to assure the Republic of Korea Army would succeed in its assigned missions. Issues such as type of mission, assigned strength, equipment availability and status, terrain, and U.S. augmentation to ROK Army units are addressed in the context of each operation to determine if the U.S. military leadership effectively employed ROK Army units. This thesis concludes that the many failures experienced by the Republic of Korea Army during the first year of the Korean War were due primarily to the lack of competent Korean military leadership, training, and the inexperience the average Korean foot soldier had as he went into combat and were not a result of ineffective employment of ROKA units on the part of the Eighth Army and the various corps and division commanders.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2001
- Accession Number
- ADA394892
Entities
People
- Daniel R. Shea
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College