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EVERY CITIZEN A SOLDIER: HISTORIC FOUNDATIONS
FOR GENDER INTEGRATED TRAINING (GIT) AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR AIR FORCE READINESS

by

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Preface

Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME), a member of the Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, captures the essence of our reactions to current efforts regarding gender integrated training issues. Senator Snowe's opening comments included the following:

“...the ongoing integration of women in the military is absolutely essential to meeting our force level requirements, and it's essential to our national security interests in a voluntary service system. Integrating women in our military, gender-integrated training, is not a political ideology. It is not a social experiment. It's a question of what's important to our national security interests. In fact, women have successfully been in the military since the beginning of this century, and so I was somewhat surprised when we held our first hearing on the issue of sexual harassment, that the question of gender-integrated training became an issue, because I didn't quite understand the correlation, or the connection. One is an issue of behavior and misconduct, and the other is an issue as to whether or not we're going to train our units in a cohesive fashion, consistent with a goal of training the way they fight, and fight the way they train. The whole issue of basic training is to create cohesion among the men and women who'll be called upon in a variety of circumstances, and so it seems only logical that that should start from the outset.”¹ Exactly.

Abstract

This paper examines several problem areas related to the current debate over gender-integrated training (GIT) and military readiness in the DOD: whether or not men and women should train together in the best interest of military readiness. The review is not limited to the Air Force. Included in the review is a brief history of the evolution of increased participation by women in American national defense, as well the parallel legislative measures that normally accompanied each notable movement. The sociological work done by pioneering military social scientists Dr. Charles Moskos and his protegee, Dr. (Lt Col) Karen Dunivin, are included for fuller discussion. The primary focus is the last 18 months where the Senate charged each service to investigate the propriety of GIT for their branch, and make recommendations and necessary changes. In providing a current and comprehensive look at the issue, the researchers hope this document addresses most of the facets of a highly complex and vital issue in one place, making it easier for sincerely motivated parties to recognize the facts objectively and decide our future wisely.

Notes

¹ Congress, Senate, Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, *Hearing on Gender Integrated Training*, 5 Jun 97, p.4 of 39.

Chapter 1

Historical Background and Cultural Context

It was never about women's equality to the exclusion of readiness considerations. It was about the privilege of serving one's country without artificial barriers based solely on gender. In short, women's struggle for a place in the armed forces has been about seeking the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

—Maj Gen (ret) Jeanne Holm

Historical Perspectives

In an attempt to answer the persistent question of whether gender-integrated training (GIT) enhances military readiness or not, this paper presents a compilation of histories, reports and data concerning women and men training and serving together in the defense of the nation. Most importantly, it examines the evolution of American women discovering their full rights and responsibilities as citizens, including military service. The somewhat disparaging term “social experiment”¹ has been used several times and in several places in our military history. Once before, it described the unlikeliness that African-Americans could ever successfully serve in integrated units. During WWII, the Tuskegee Airmen were trained at Moton Field in Tuskegee, Alabama, an hour away from the white Maxwell Field in Montgomery. But the then conventional wisdom said that was how it should be. The units wound up serving together overseas, with great success, during World War II (the 99th pursuit squadron never lost a bomber in over 200 escort

missions), and our previous beliefs about black and white incompatibility in combat are unthinkable fifty years later. In the same way, there are prevailing negative suppositions about women and men serving together successfully. Despite an amazing record of valor under duress, women's military success stories are not well known. But, advances toward recognition and equity are apparent as we mark significant milestones. Milestones are key in the form of progressive legislation. Contrary to the myth that the military is a place of social experiments, each time it was a policy or legislative change reflecting American cultural evolution that prompted actions. (In 1956, Dr. Eli Ginzberg told the DACOWITS panel that "the increasing participation of women in the labor force does not take place on an even, slow moving pace, but rather, through a series of breakthroughs."²) Social reality played 'catch up' after each legislated policy change. Social experiments did not lead the way, as some assume. In this chapter, we'll discuss the social-psychological dynamics and relate the legislation trail of 'breakthroughs' for women in the military, as it becomes apparent that GIT enhances military readiness for both women and men.

Recent Senate hearings suggest there are social concerns about men and women training together. We've moved past the day of a separate Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines for American women to fully integrated forces. According to Mr. De Leon, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, "In the early 1970's, on the eve of the establishment of the all-volunteer force, women comprised only two percent of the force. Today, they represent almost 14 percent of our active military force; 80 percent of all military specialties are open to women, including more than 99 percent of the specialties in the Air Force and 91 percent in the Navy. Women now pilot fighter aircraft

and attack helicopters, skipper ships and command missile batteries. As noted in the Kassebaum Baker report, ‘...the increasing number of women in expanded roles is an important reason why the United States is able to maintain an effective and efficient volunteer military force.’”³ In light of changes since the 1970s, in particular the expanding role women have assumed in defense of the nation, the issues surrounding gender-integrated training and service are vital to examine and resolve. The bedrock concern here is a social-cultural one. We will discuss each dynamic in turn, beginning with intergroup relations.

Sociocultural Context

According to sociologist, Richard T. Schaefer, there are four identifiable patterns that describe typical intergroup relations. Each defines the dominant group’s actions and the minority group’s responses. These are useful as the discussion of the validity of gender integrated training and service progresses.

Amalgamation describes the end result when a majority group and a minority group combine to form a new group. This is the American “melting pot” concept where nothing distinctive remains about any one group, but a new hybrid group is created.

Assimilation is the process by which a person forsakes his or her own cultural tradition to become part of a different culture. This is generally practiced by a minority group member who wants to conform to the standards of the dominant group. The minority disappears into the dominant group entirely.

Segregation refers to the physical separation of two groups of people in terms of residence, workplace and social functions. Generally, it is imposed by a dominant group

on a minority group. However, segregation is rarely complete; intergroup contact occurs even in the most segregated societies.

Pluralism is based on mutual respect between various groups in a society for one another's cultures. It allows a minority group to express its own culture and still participate without prejudice in the larger society. All the groups are able to coexist in the same society. (Switzerland is an example with neither a national language nor a dominant religious faith, and has political devices in place meant to safeguard ethnic group interests.)⁴

It becomes apparent that, with regard to the gender issue in military settings, the desired end state would not likely be total separation; it's just not practical. Nor is it necessary to lose everything feminine in order for women to disappear into a completely masculine world. Noted military experts suggest pluralism is the desired end state for successful gender integrated service, and this concept is addressed in Chapter Three. Noted among these leading military social scientists is recently retired Lieutenant Colonel Karen O. Dunivin.

Lieutenant Colonel Dunivin earned her PhD in Sociology from Northwestern University under Dr. Charles Moskos, the noted military sociologist and commentator. From her unique vantage point as a career maintenance officer-turned-educator, Dr. Dunivin suggests several ways to perceive our military culture and prescribes a possible overall solution for improved gender relations. Her observations are especially helpful for the purposes of providing the best framework from which to understand how new military members should be indoctrinated. In her article "Military Culture: Change and Continuity" as well as a book in progress, Dr. Dunivin discusses two, current U.S.

military culture models. The first is the **Traditional Model**, termed the **Combat Masculine Warrior** (CMW, discussed further, later), which reflects conservatism and moralism, with policies of exclusion and separatist attitudes complicated by hostility between minority members and the majority. The second model she titled the **Evolving Model** that reflects the same conservatism, moralism and CMW, but has policies of inclusion of minority members and egalitarianism with tolerance between the majority and minority members.⁵ Why do these models matter? She uses Levin's *Sociological Ideas* to define the term. "**Models** organize complex ideal types so we can simplify and understand social phenomena."⁶ By "ideal type," Dr. Dunivin is referring to **culture**, the complex set of learned rules and accepted behaviors that identify members of any given discernable group. How the intricate rules and norms are learned is our prime concern for the issue at hand, that of gender integrated initial training into the Air Force. "Specifically, culture is 1) learned from previous generations; 2) broadly shared by members; 3) adaptive to the conditions in which people live; and 4) symbolic in nature—agreed upon symbols help people create order and make sense of the world."⁷ Dr. Dunivin shows how 'the military way of life' matches the four qualities of 'culture.' "**Military culture** is learned (via socialization training such as boot camp); broadly shared by its members (e.g., saluting); adaptive to changing conditions (e.g., integration of blacks); and symbolic in nature (e.g., rank insignia and language jargon make sense only within a military context)."⁸ Perfecting membership in a foreign culture demands a great deal of the new member of that society, and we see how that burden can be lessened in Dr. Dunivin's recommended perspective on the traditional paradigm of the CMW: Combat Masculine Warrior. Charles Moskos, cited by Dunivin, describes what the

Combat Masculine Warrior paradigm actually means to the military: “Thus a deeply entrenched “cult of masculinity” (with accompanying masculine norms, values and lifestyles) pervades military culture.”⁹ Dr. Dunivin suggests, in light of the cultural shifts taking place in the military, i.e. combat roles open to women since 1991, “the military must adopt an ideology of inclusion and reduce its practice of exclusion...alter its CMW paradigm...adopt an identity that encompasses war fighting, peacekeeping and disaster relief roles...alter its view of warrior as a male-only vocation.”¹⁰

The issue isn’t one of feminizing war. If violence becomes necessary, it is objectively classified as a “masculine” endeavor (based on the traditional categories of masculine and feminine traits). However, military service has expanded to include peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. As suggested by Dunivin, each of these requires a more diplomatic, humane set of abilities and traits. Both men and women are capable of exhibiting both the traditionally-held masculine traits of violence, competitiveness, etc, and feminine traits of diplomacy and cooperation. As Maj Gen Holm said earlier, concerning the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the issue here is recognizing American women and men both deserve the opportunity to fully participate in whatever form of conflict management is needed for the best defense of national interests.

Noted social-psychologist, Dr. James Vander Zanden, in his book *The Core*, made several observations about violence and gender,

“Whereas adults encourage boys to display aggression, girls are pressured to inhibit it. From boyhood scuffles and sporting events onward, men learn to view aggression in much the same manner Carl Von Clausewitz saw war—as an instrument to gain respect, status and power. Whether the stakes be a handful of marbles or a nation’s grandeur, males use aggression because it works. In contrast, females learn from their parents, the media and “cooperative” girls’ games” that they must control their aggressive impulses and revile them as character flaws

(Campbell,1993)...Women, like men, can be expected to exhibit aggression where the norms support such displays, and inhibit in other domains (Hyde, 1984; Perry, Perry and Rasmussen, 1986). In sum, it seems that there is little that is psychologically male or female, although our cultural definitions often make it appear so.”¹¹

With so much of what we become as individuals being dependent on learning, the focus of this paper on gender-integrated training is that much more pertinent to military readiness. An historical overview of women’s participation in America’s national defense is helpful here.

Women In The Military: Past And Present

It is well known women served this country in times of peril throughout our history without full military status. From the legendary Molly Pitcher in the American Revolution, to Clara Barton during the Civil War, women served as nurses, spies, saboteurs and scouts, while many disguised themselves as men to serve on the front lines. World War I saw the first use of the newly established Nurse Corps as auxiliary units in a quasi-military status to the Army and Navy. During that same time, women were enlisted into the Navy and Marine Corps to serve as clerical personnel and for other essential duties to free up eligible men for the frontline. Although this enlistment of women was seen only as a temporary fix in a time of need, the advantages and success of this experience did not go unnoticed. However, following the war, all but the nurses were demobilized.¹²

With the United States’ entry into World War II, a serious manpower shortage was again on the horizon. In response, Congress passed bills establishing the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) as well as Women’s Reserves for the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. No longer women’s auxiliary groups, these bills gave women full military status,

but set them up under separate support structures within the services. During World War II, women contributed to the war effort, not merely as administrative assistants and nurses, but as ferry pilots, aircraft controllers, aircraft mechanics, and gunnery instructors, to name only a few of the positions they filled in defense of our national interests. In fact, women made up such a vast number of critical positions that at the end of the war many military leaders declared them indispensable and a “military necessity” that they remain at their posts while the services demobilized.¹³ This indispensable service served as an impetus to the growing necessity for women’s full integration into the armed services. In June 1948, Congress passed the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act that served to “establish the Women’s Army Corps in the Regular Army, to authorize the enlistment and appointment of women in the Regular Air Force, Regular Navy and Marine Corps, and in the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, and for other purposes.”¹⁴ Part of the reasoning was that the retention of women in the armed services in a reserve status was necessary and of great value to the nation by serving as a large reservoir from which to draw in case of national emergency.¹⁵ This Act ushered in an all new era for women in the military.

Women were now integrated into the military structure as permanent, full-fledged members, not just as auxiliaries or volunteer groups. Despite this progress, with the exception of the Air Force, the services continued to segregate women during and after training. The Air Force was the first to integrate their women by sending qualified enlisted women through the Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Lackland Air Force Base in January 1949. This was “the first major co-ed officer-commissioning program in any service.”¹⁶ The men and women at OCS received academic instruction together,

however, they were separated for physical training and field exercises.¹⁷ Although the officer training was now integrated, basic training continued to be segregated. The Basic Training Wing at Lackland AFB had separate men's and women's training squadrons that, although they were co-located, conducted similar yet separate training programs. The type of training that the recruits received was the typical basic soldiering indoctrination geared towards teaching the recruits about life in the military as well as about physical conditioning. Initially, the women recruits participated in this same training, although the emphasis on physical conditioning was somewhat different from their male counterparts. However, soon women's status and training began to follow the ebb and flow of the National Defense Strategy. From the lesser manpower requirements of Massive Retaliation to the increased numbers needed for Flexible Response, the armed services were able to meet most of their manpower demands through the drafting of young men, not the recruitment of women. As such, the services began to strive for "quality" not quantity in their selection of women. This more or less escalated into a beauty contest of sorts between the services as "physical appearance became the chief criterion in the selection process."¹⁸ According to Maj Gen Jeanne Holm, "this obsession with appearance carried over to all aspects of the women's programs... All basic training programs were heavily sprinkled with courses to enhance feminine appearance and bearing."¹⁹ Women no longer trained in most basic soldiering skills. Their training focused on their proper role in the military and how to wear their makeup correctly.

As the women's movements began to pick up steam during the Vietnam era, President Johnson signed Public Law 90-130 repealing the 2 percent ceiling on women in the armed services as well as removing the restrictions on rank. One major fallout of this

law was to cause the services to reevaluate women's career opportunities and their training programs. Other than OTS (formerly OCS), women's training programs were not integrated; however, in 1969 the Air Force began a test program and admitted women into their ROTC program at select college campuses. The success of this program prompted the Army and Navy to follow suit, and by 1972 they also began enrolling women into their ROTC programs.²⁰ Yet another breakthrough came in 1975 when President Ford signed Public Law 94-106, The Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1976. One of the provisions of this act was the direction to the services to begin admitting women into the service academies.²¹ The first women entered the academies in 1976 under the same requirements as the men, with the exception of some adjustments to physical training. That same year the Women in the Air Force (WAF) organization officially came to an end, further consolidating women into the mainstream Air Force. Also in 1976, the Air Force began integrated basic training at Lackland AFB and has remained that way through the present. At that time, the Air Force's version of integrated training consisted of same sex flights that came together at the squadron level to train. The Army followed suit the next year, however, they ended the program in 1982 because they perceived (insufficient actual data) men weren't sufficiently challenged and their performance was subsequently degraded.²²

Lagging well behind the Army and the Navy, the Air Force opened up their Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) and Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT) to women in 1976. Because of the combat exclusion law, they would only be assigned to non-combat aircraft. The next year, both officer and enlisted women were trained as Titan II missile crew members, chipping away at exclusion-oriented roles. In 1993,

following the successful participation by women in such operations as JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM, the Secretary of Defense issued a policy memorandum directing the services to open combat aircraft and ships to women, and in 1994 only barred women from direct ground combat duties. During this time, the Army again returned to integrated basic training for their combat support and combat service support soldiers to better “train as they will fight.” And in July 1997, the Air Force integrated basic training at the flight level.

Incidents of sexual misconduct and harassment at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in November 1996 brought the issue of gender integrated training into the limelight at the Congressional level. In June 1997, Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, established the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues to assess the current training programs of the armed services. The committee’s report, more commonly known as the Kassebaum Baker Report, recommended all basic training at the platoon, flight and/or division level be same-gender organized. They also recommended the services return to separate barracks for men and women at both basic and advanced training. Again, the issue of integrating women into the core military unit is center stage.

Notes

¹ Jim Wooten, “Don’t Make the Military a Laboratory,” *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 11 April 1993, G-5.

² Holm. 21.

³ *Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender Integrated Training and Related Issues*, by The Honorable Nancy Kassebaum Baker, chairman (Washington, D.C., 16 Dec 1997), 12.

⁴ Richard T. Schaefer, *Sociology*, (McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1998), 298-300.

⁵ Karen O. Dunivin, “Military Culture: Change and Continuity,” *Armed Forces and Society* 20, no. 4 (1994): 535.

⁶ William C. Levin, *Sociological Ideas*, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth publishing Co, 1991), 25.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 117-119.

Notes

⁸ Dunivin, 533.

⁹ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man*, (New York: Sage, 1970).

¹⁰ Dunivin, 542.

¹¹ James W. Vander Zanden, *The Core*, (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996), .228.

¹² Holm, 16.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹⁴ United States Code: Congressional Service, vol.1, *Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Public Law 625* (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1948), 372.

¹⁵ United States Code: Congressional Service, vol.2, *Women's Armed Services Integration Act, House Report No. 1616* (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1948), 1802-1803.

¹⁶ Holm, 134.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 135.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 181.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 181.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 269.

²¹ United States Code: Congressional and Administrative News, vol. 1, *Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1976, Public Law 94-106* (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1975), 89STAT.537-538.

²² *Hearing on Gender Integrated Training*, p8 of 39.

Chapter 2

Basic Training: Cohesion and Teamwork

So what does being “part of a team” mean? It doesn’t always mean being the smartest or the fastest. It does mean recognizing the big picture goal and the contribution that each individual brings to the whole. It may not mean being the life of the party, but it does mean being able to get along with people and to tread a fine line...knowing when to compromise and when to stand firm.

—Dr. Bonnie J. Dunbar, Astronaut

Cohesion and Teamwork

In Chapter One, the focus of our discussion was on the background of the GIT issue. This chapter clarifies and more fully examines relevant terms, focuses on available data about training, and relates the effectiveness of gender-integrated basic training programs, in addressing readiness concerns. According to available data and military senior leadership, gender-integrated unit performance is superior to separate training for all services (there is no data available for the still separately-trained Marine Corps).

While data are carefully examined in this chapter, the hard numbers in basic training don’t tell the whole story. There is a key concept germane to unit effectiveness, even readiness: Team Cohesion. Organizational behaviorist, Dr. Robert Vecchio, offers: “Cohesiveness is the extent to which members are attracted to a group and desire to remain in it...sometimes described as the sum of all forces acting on individuals to remain in the group...pertains to how group members “stick together.”¹ But, how is

cohesion fostered? As Congressional testimony shows, this is the linchpin that GIT rests upon. Vecchio offers six factors: similarity of attitudes and goals, external threats (leads to interdependence), unit size (smaller is better to account for diversity challenges), reward system (group versus individual), work unit assignments (liking teammates is a factor), and isolation (fosters sense of common fate, defend against outsiders, etc).² Some of the positive effects of cohesion on teamwork include satisfaction with the group and themselves, highly effective communication among the team members, and high level of productivity in goal-oriented groups.³

These academic observations are borne out in basic training as told to the Senate Personnel Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee by Admiral Tracey, the Navy's senior training officer, "If people cannot train together, that (sic) we would have some doubts about whether they would be able to work together. It would affect, we think, unit cohesion that is best bolstered by this from day one kind of shared experience that we are able to create today in (sic) integrated environment."⁴ But, perhaps more important to concerns over readiness and actual performance in combat are the observations made by the senior Army training officer, General Hartzog. In the same congressional session, he said, "In my experience in field operations in the last five or six years, we have been in a gender integrated environment and the kinds of operations that we're doing today, there are no real true front lines and rear areas. There are people on the battlefield working together in teams. And I had the privilege of leading and working with both men and women in Panama and Haiti both, and found them to be strong soldiers willing to do whatever was necessary to accomplish their mission as part of a team."⁵

Such a positive experience with men and women serving as a team to get the job done is one of the objectives of gender-integrated training, to teach teamwork early in the careers of these soldiers. However, the whole issue of Gender-Integrated Training has again come under comprehensive review. After much publicized events of the last several years involving sexual misconduct and harassment, the military was forced to look at its training programs with a gender magnifying glass rather than with a realistic training/readiness magnifying glass. On June 5, 1997, the Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee received testimony from the commanders of each of the services' training commands. The focus of the hearing was gender-integrated training. During this testimony, each of the commanders firmly defended their service's basic training programs, of which all but the Marine Corps' are gender-integrated.

Gender-Integrated Training

While little hard data has been collected to support the effectiveness of gender-integrated units, each commander testified that training in this manner is the best method for developing teamwork and cohesiveness among the recruits. As General Newton, Commander of Air Education and Training Command, testified "The dichotomy of separate but equal simply does not work. Ultimately we must form a single Air Force team composed of both men and women. And we believe the best way to accomplish this is to start on day one."⁶ So with such strong support for GIT from training-integrated services, why is the topic under review again? Aberdeen.

As a result of drill-sergeant sexual misconduct incidents at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds and others, Secretary of Defense Cohen appointed the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Matters to look into the services'

current training programs and assess their effectiveness. More commonly known as the Kassebaum Baker Committee, this committee concluded that basic training should be segregated at the flight, division and platoon level, and that men and women should have separate barracks at both the basic and advanced levels. The reasons they cited were less discipline, less unit cohesion and more distraction from the training programs.⁷ The methods for gathering their information included site visits to all the services' training facilities, conducting discussion groups with over 1000 recruits, 500 instructors, 375 first-term service members, and interviews with over 275 supervisors at operational units.⁸ According to the report, integrated units that are split by separate housing requirements cannot achieve a cohesiveness and teamwork level as those of same sex units because of their inability to work together in the billeting units or sleeping bays. The committee felt that by organizing same gender training units, the services can "recapture the cohesion, discipline, and team-building of living and training together as an operational unit."⁹ There were a number of other recommendations made by the committee as steps to improve the quality of training as well as reevaluating recruiting policies.

On March 17, 1998, the Military Personnel Subcommittee, chaired by Congressman Steve Buyer, received testimony on the findings and recommendations of the Kassebaum Baker Committee. Included in this testimony was the response by each of the services on the changes they planned to make based on those recommendations. The services agreed with nearly all of the recommendations, however, most notable of those that the Air Force, Army and Navy did not agree with are separate housing and separate training units. All three defended their service's integrated training programs. General William Crouch, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, summed it up best: "Gender integration at

other than squad level denies soldiers the opportunity to train as they will fight, exacerbates perceptions of inequality in standards and rigor, and defers true integration until Advanced Training or in the unit where a lesser degree of supervision exists. Gender-integrated training, as well as gender-separated One Station Unit Training, provides operational units with soldiers who are prepared to succeed in the specific environment in which they will serve.”¹⁰

In anticipation of this testimony and to prepare for the upcoming Defense Authorization Bill, Secretary of Defense Cohen directed the services to take additional action in three key areas: training cadre leadership and recognition, rigor of training, and to provide secure gender-separate living areas. The first two of these was designed to motivate the trainers as well as the trainees, and provide for a more challenging training environment. The goal of the last directive, providing secure separate living areas, was to provide for “greater privacy and dignity and safe, secure living conditions.”¹¹ The goal was security and privacy of the individuals, not unit cohesion. However, Secretary Cohen did stop short of directing the services to implement the other controversial recommendation made by the Kassebaum Baker committee, that of same-gender training units. This stirred a series of debates within the two houses of Congress.

The House National Security Committee voted 30-23 in May 1998 to end integrated basic training in small units.¹² Though not carried by an overwhelming majority, it highlighted the fact that the recommendation from the Kassebaum Baker report was what Congress expected the military to follow. This direction from the House was subsequently attached to the 1999 Defense Authorization Bill. The debate shifted to the Senate, where the vote yielded the opposite result: support of integrated training until the

results of yet another commission are finalized in March 1999. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) established the Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues to look into the subject and issue a final report in March 1999. As a result of the differences between the two houses, the 1999 Defense Authorization Bill passed in the House with a compromise to allow integrated training to continue until such time as the new commission's report is made final.

The SASC commission is currently gathering data from all of the services' training facilities in the form of on-site surveys of over 12,000 recruits and 2300 drill instructors. They also mailed out over 25,000 military leader surveys to O-3s, O-5s, E-6s, E-7s and first sergeants to gain the views of military leaders. It appears that, unlike the 1982 decision by the Army to halt integrated training based solely on anecdotal evidence, Congress is striving to develop much needed hard evidence and data to support or refute Congressional concerns once and for all.

For example, even though the Army halted integrated training in 1982 based upon little evidence, they reinstituted gender integrated training as a result of the studies conducted by the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. As related by General Hartzog during his testimony, "...across the board, men in all integrated settings, both the 50-50, the 75-25 settings did better than either male alone...and... the integrated force at large did better than the female force alone in terms of physical fitness scores and in marksmanship and in individual skills proficiencies. And that's quantitative data that's purely straightfoward."¹³ (Tables 4 and 5)

Some data are already available for closer examination. The Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) as well as the Defense Equal

Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) presented the data concisely. Not an overnight endeavor by these organizations to create support for gender integration, these studies required several units at Army and Navy basic military training to be observed, analyzed and compared to pre-existing standards. All totaled, there were approximately 5584 recruits taking part in the studies that ranged from January 1992 until September 1995. These studies focused on the core basic military training unit and involved 46 companies, of which 11 were all male, 6 all female and 29 gender integrated (down to the squad level in the Army). Both of these independent studies came to the same conclusion: there were no significant differences in quantitative performance data between men and women trained in either same-gender or gender-integrated environments.

The DEOMI study focused on one six-month period of time at the Navy's only training facility for female recruits in 1992. The data they collected focused on surveys regarding teamwork, fraternization, and impact on training, as well as results of both academic and physical training tests from 9 all-male, 4 all-female, and 9 integrated companies. "Based on this data, it appears that integration has had neither a clear positive nor negative behavioral impact on training at RTC Orlando. It has neither interfered with nor degraded the quality of training of the recruits; however, the perceptions of the recruits indicate a positive attitudinal impact on training. *This aspect of the integration could have a favorable impact on mission accomplishment in the Fleet* (emphasis added)."¹⁴ This is exactly what the service chiefs testified about during the Congressional hearings: if you train the way you fight and fight the way you train, there will be a "favorable impact on the mission accomplishment."

The ARI study referred to here is actually a compilation of three separate studies conducted from 1993 until 1995. As a result, the Army study was more exhaustive than the DEOMI study and, therefore, offers some comparison data from which conclusions may be drawn.

One of the arguments behind segregated training is physical ability of men versus women. Proponents of same-gender training cite this as a splintering factor between the men and the women in the same unit. They believe that the weaker performance by the women has an impact on the men, complaining that the women slow or drag the men down to a lower performance level. As the ARI study points out, however, this is not an accurate assessment. Table 1 shows the basic recruit's entry-level physical fitness test results. This test is administered prior to the recruit being assigned to their training company. This table clearly indicates *both* male and female recruits enter basic training in poor physical condition, creating a burden on their counterparts as well as drill sergeants to increase fitness levels. However, as Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 show, by the end of the Basic Combat Training, almost all soldiers were able to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). This occurred without the Army changing or adjusting its fitness standards.¹⁵ The data are broken out by year group of the individual studies, as well as in 1993 by the single-gender versus integrated companies. According to the report, "soldiers trained in gender-integrated companies have performed as well, if not better than soldiers trained in all male or all female companies."¹⁶ Of particular note is the fact that integrated companies in the 1994 and 1995 studies show an upward trend in results over the single-gender companies of the 1993 study (with the exception of men's push-ups). This positive trend could be due to a number of factors far beyond the scope of this review.

But, one aspect of training discovered by the Senate committees was the importance of an increase in the acceptance of integrated training by the leadership and the drill sergeants. This could be a major reason for increased performance levels. One of the problem areas the ARI study discovered was the impact drill sergeants had on soldiers. As the study pointed out, “Battalions whose Drill Sergeants were most negative about gender-integrated training had lower levels of soldierization...”¹⁷ and demoralized the soldiers by making negative comments about integrated training or training females.¹⁸ As gender-integrated training continued to become more common place and accepted by the leadership, it is quite possible the recruits’ training environment became more positive and motivated performance improvements.

An additional argument from opponents of gender-integrated training is that separate housing arrangements cause a subsequent decline in cohesion, teamwork and morale. Again, both the ARI and the DEOMI studies negate blanket statements as simply as not substantiated. Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 show the results of the ARI surveys regarding the recruits’ levels of morale, teamwork and cohesion. Although the platoon morale level was lower for the ’93 integrated males (the first year of integration), the individual morale for all groups remained about the same. The levels of teamwork and cohesion showed in favor of the all-male groups in the ’93 study, however, the ’94 and ’95 year groups showed the levels for the integrated males to be approximately as high as the ’93 all-male groups. In all cases, the levels of morale, teamwork and cohesion remained about the same or increased for the female groups. Again, these data show that, at the recruit level, there were little to no differences between soldiers trained in either a gender-integrated or same-gender basic training unit.

There is another overarching dynamic worth examining. As Judith Hicks Stiehm observed in Arms and the Enlisted Woman,

“Such oscillations in policy have two negative effects. First they make women feel unappreciated and unsure about their future. This hurts morale. Second, policies lose their legitimacy when they appear to be more responsive to officials’ opinions than to evidence, logic, or agreed-upon assumptions. Institutions cannot thrive if some things are not settled.”¹⁹

Table 1. Initial Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)

Percent scoring 50 or more points on their first (diagnostic) APFT			
	Push-ups	Sit-ups	Run
Men	41%	56%	77%
Women	30%	37%	61%

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 19.

Table 2. APFT During Basic Combat Training

Pass Level				
	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG
Men	99%	98%	99%	99%
Women	98%	99%	99%	99%

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 21.

SG = gender segregated IG = gender integrated

Table 3. APFT During Basic Combat Training - Push-Ups

Pass Level				
	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG
Men	65%	65%	60%	55%
Women	63%	62%	68%	72%

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 21.

Table 4. APFT During Basic Combat Training - Sit-Ups

Pass Level				
	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG
Men	70%	68%	75%	85%
Women	68%	68%	73%	87%

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 22.

Table 5. APFT During Basic Combat Training - Run

Pass Level				
	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG
Men	74%	75%	82%	91%
Women	68%	70%	82%	89%

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 22.

Table 6. Platoon Morale

Rating of Current Level of Morale (in Percent)								
Males					Females			
Rating	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG
High/Very High	67	50	63	58	36	51	51	55
Moderate	25	37	28	32	48	39	43	36
Low/Very Low	8	13	8	9	16	10	6	10

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 28.

Table 7. Individual Morale

Rating of Current Level of Morale (in Percent)								
	Males				Females			
Rating	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG
High/Very High	76	72	75	74	71	67	66	69
Moderate	20	22	19	20	24	28	30	28
Low/Very Low	4	6	6	5	5	5	5	4

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 28.

Table 8. Soldier's Teamwork

Agree/Strongly Agree (in Percent)								
	Males				Females			
Item	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG
Work Well Together	50	39	47	47	31	48	43	42
Help Each Other Get the Job Done	54	41	59	55	54	61	55	57
Encourage Each Other to Succeed During Trng	80	72	71	70	75	76	82	77
Pull Together and Share the Load	52	40	53	47	38	52	53	55

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 29.

Table 9. Soldier's Cohesion

Agree/Strongly Agree (in Percent)								
	Males				Females			
Item	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG	'93 SG	'93 IG	'94 IG	'95 IG
Care About What Happens to Each Other	38	31	40	44	33	42	45	47
Can Trust One Another	37	28	32	34	13	23	32	30
Respect One Another	26	18	29	25	9	19	28	27

Source: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), 30.

Notes

¹ Vecchio, Robert P., *Organizational Behavior*, The Dryden Press, New York, 1988, p.364

² Ibid.. 364-5

³ Ibid.. 365-6.

⁴ *Hearing on Gender Integrated Training*, p24 of 39.

⁵ Ibid.. 23-24.

⁶ Ibid., 10.

⁷ *Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender Integrated Training and Related Issues*, by The Honorable Nancy Kassebaum Baker, chairman (Washington, D.C., 16 Dec 1997), 12.

⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁹ Ibid., 13.

¹⁰ Congress, House of Representatives, Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services. *Hearing on the Kassebaum Baker Report*, 17 March 1998.

¹¹ William S. Cohen, press conference, 15 Mar 98, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

¹² *Washington Times* (Washington, D.C), 7 May 1998.

¹³ *Hearing on Gender Integrated Training*, p23 of 39.

¹⁴ Jerry C. Scarpate and Mary Anne O'Neill, *Evaluation of Gender Integration at Recruit Training Command, Orlando Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida* (Patrick Air Force Base, FL: Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, July 1992), 5.

¹⁵ Mottern, Jacqueline A., David A. Foster, Elizabeth J. Brady, and Joanne Marshall-Mies. *The 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study*. (Alexandria, Va: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 1997), pviii.

¹⁶ Ibid., 52.

¹⁷ Ibid., viii.

¹⁸ Ibid., 54.

¹⁹ Judith Hicks Stiehm, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 67.

Chapter 3

Conclusions and Recommendations

Giving American women the right to prove themselves as warfighters established them on new footing as fully participatory, first-class citizens. It serves to dismantle the divided, hegemonic culture of two classes—the protector and the protected—and leads the way to what theorist Judith Hicks Stiehm calls “a society of defenders.” The old gender norms are not trashed, but enlarged.

—Jean Zimmerman, *Tail Spin: Women at War in the Wake of Tailhook*

We’ve examined the socially mandated legislation that drove policy changes within the Department of Defense, and focused on a recent example of our legislators, who represent the American people, requesting clarification as we move forward to implement those policies. And the process yields predictable results: modern practices in our military training system relevant to the American citizen who chooses to serve, answering bottom line readiness concerns.

Dunivin’s research offers important observations and possible solutions zeroing in on pluralism (based on mutual respect between various groups in a society for one another’s cultures) within an evolving model. She noted, “Proponents of inclusionary laws and policy cite social equality and military effectiveness as reasons for change.” Edwin Dorn, then Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in testimony before Congress, observed, “There appears to be a consensus in the United States that the Armed Forces should be a reflection of the society.” In other words, the military should

mirror society's social demographic makeup...To them, excluding whole groups of "others" (e.g., women) from combat diminishes the pool of talent available for our nation's defense...the transformation to a pluralistic culture is painful at times."¹

Pluralism and inclusionary practices within Dunivin's evolutionary model are helpful concepts for describing the current state of our national evolution. Until a phenomenon can be labeled or described, it's unmanageable, even threatening. Once that 'new thing' is put in terms we can all manage, it's not the threat it was before. The idea of women and men serving side by side in identical power roles is new to most people. As an example, due to the exceptional ability of some extraordinary pioneers, the space shuttle was piloted twice, and then commanded in December 1998, by USAF Col Eileen Collins, wife and mother of a three-year-old daughter. In the authors' opinion, it's not a concern over where we're going; it's an issue of accepting where we already are.

As Dr. Schaefer described pluralism earlier: "mutual respect between various groups in a society for one another's cultures allowing all the groups to coexist in the society" just makes sense. In the military, this begins with basic training. Allowing men and women to train together and gain that mutual respect will teach them to not only coexist within the military society, but to build an effective team starting from day one. Morale, teamwork and cohesion are basic fundamentals needed to build an effective military unit. As the comparison data from the 1993 and 1995 ARI studies showed, gender-integrated training units' physical performance exceeded that of the same-gender units, while maintaining a similar level of morale, teamwork and cohesion. The ability to build an effective team did not rely on the gender issue, rather it relied on the soldier issue. The

men and women learned to work together as soldiers, sailors, or airmen to accomplish a mission. (Table 9)

It's interesting that, as the United States finds itself leading the world in fully integrating all its citizens in national defense, we also find ourselves completely redefining and reorganizing the way we look at our national defense priorities. The CMW paradigm fits only a fraction of the operations it used to. With the advent of our primary efforts abroad focused on MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War) and, specifically, HA (Humanitarian Assistance) and Peace Operations, there is a call for a more complex and versatile defense force. Traditionally "masculine" strengths need to be balanced against the needs of MOOTW as defined in Joint Pub 3-07 and HA defined in the multi-service procedures handbook (FM 110-23-1). Among these elements in MOOTW are the focuses on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crisis. (Ch. 1, I-1) HA includes disaster relief, refugee assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance and civil support. (Ch.1, 1-2,3) These are not the traditional priorities of war (large-scale, sustained combat operations JP 3-07, Ch 1, I-1).

Given this new defense environment, novel and broader approaches to the business of doing our jobs as military personnel are required. It would be helpful for military sociologists and war theorists to combine efforts and describe the future defense force makeup and preparation for success in this new world of defense challenges. If such research is undertaken today, MOOTW and other conflict management efforts emerging in the new millenium may enjoy far greater degrees of success.

Notes

¹ Dunivin, 538.

Glossary

APFT	Army Physical Fitness Test
ARI	Army Research Institute for Behavioral & Social Sciences
DACOWITS	Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DEOMI	Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
DOD	Department of Defense
GIT	Gender-Integrated Training
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NDS	National Defense Strategy
OCS/OTS	Officer Candidate School/ Officer Training School
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Commission
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
UPT/UNT	Undergraduate Pilot/Navigator Training
USAF	United States Air Force
WAC	Women's Army Corps
WAF	Women's Air Force

advanced training. Refers to training after basic training that more fully prepares a member in their duty specialty. May take place in settings other than academic.

amalgamation. American “melting pot” where once distinguishable groups are melded.

assimilation. When minorities “disappear” into a majority culture completely.

basic training. “Boot Camp” for air force enlisted members at Lackland AFB, TX, 6-week program teaching discipline, core competencies/values and physical fitness.

cohesion. Sum of all forces acting on individuals to remain in a group...how group members “stick together.” (Dr. Robert Vecchio)

combat masculine warrior. Traditional military fighting man model reflecting conservatism with policies of exclusion and separatist attitudes.

culture. Complex set of learned rules, accepted behaviors that identify group members.

drill sergeant. Or “T.I.”(training instructor) in the air force. The enlisted professionals responsible for all phases of basic trainees’ initial exposure/indoctrination into the services. Became Senate Committees focus for improvements after investigation.

evolving model. Concept reflecting conservatism but promotes inclusion of minorities.

first sergeant. In larger air force units, is the senior enlisted person responsible for good order, morale and discipline. Works directly with/for the commander.

intergroup relations. Study of dynamics between sets of people classified as distinguishable groups.

operational unit. As distinguished from basic training, members are trained and performing duties at a location with a national defense mission..

organizational behaviorist. Academicians who specialize in observation and analysis of organizational dynamics; may prescribe courses of action when acting as consultants.

pluralism. Mutual respect, support between groups; all groups coexist in same society.

readiness. Instills the confidence needed to succeed in a wide variety of challenging situations. Provides flexibility to shape global environment, deter potential foes, rapidly respond to broad spectrum of threats including theatre war. (NMS)

segregation. Physical separation of two groups, generally imposed by majority group.

social experiment. Concept describing a semi-controlled test environment involving people as subjects, implies a temporary situation or one-time event.

sociology. Study of society; people in groups.

traditional model. See Combat Masculine Warrior above.

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