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HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SHAPE TRAINING
FOR THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE IN THE SUPPORT OF
THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE

By

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Preface

As the world begins the third millenium the emerging strategic landscape will place a growing significance on the continent of Africa. For several decades, the United States foreign policy towards Africa has been confined to a series of bilateral aid relationships. The U.S. involvement in Africa was influenced by strategic considerations inherent to the Cold War. However, the current U.S. policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa needs a comprehensive reassessment to reflect global and regional realities. The U.S. has many vital and important interests in Africa and is dependent on Sub-Sahara Africa for strategic minerals, raw materials and there is a growing number of American jobs in Africa. The impetus for the African Crisis Response Initiative (modified from the original plan of an African Crisis Response Force) arises from the U.S. desire to help promote peace and stability in Africa and to prevent the reoccurrence of recent destabilizing situations. In Somalia, U.S. troops went in to undertake a humanitarian mission and became casualties of the country's civil war. The genocide in Rwanda's civil war provoked an immediate outcry against the international community, particularly the U.S., for not acting more quickly to stop the slaughter, which claimed more than 150,000 lives. Unless the U.S. revises its approach, scenarios similar to these will drain U.S. resources and restrict access to vital minerals that are essential to the U.S. economy.

The costs to the world community for these two crises alone were in the billions of dollars. Enhancing the capabilities of African units to better perform peacekeeping and

humanitarian relief tasks would help alleviate instability on the continent, and may lead to fewer instances of U.S. troop deployment.

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) offers a unique solution to outside intervention into African problems. Training peacekeeping forces comprised of African militaries will allow Africa to accomplish something sought after for many years; Africans resolving African problems. This program holds great potential to create an all African peacekeeping force. This force would significantly reduce the requirement for outside intervention, particularly by the U.S. The key to the program is planning, organizing and executing it in a consistent, standardized, professional manner.

The administration, with congress' approval, allocated \$35 million for exercises to achieve this objective. Each exercise will cost approximately \$3 million, of which \$1 million covers the cost of military equipment provided to the participating country. This equipment includes small quantities of ammunition for training in force protection exercise, night vision goggles, generators, Motorola hand held radios, radio broadcast repeater systems, high frequency radios for upper level command and control, satellite communication systems, uniforms, canteens, and backpacks. This is a one-time expense with minimal maintenance cost for sustainment. Although this appears to be a substantial cost, the deployment of a single light infantry brigade cost in excess of \$50 million for each peacekeeping deployment.

By training African forces the U.S. will save money and American lives. This study will attempt to show why the ACRI program is in the interest of the United States and why we as a nation need to support this program. This paper will also address the future roles, requirements, and other issues related to the African Crisis Initiative.

Abstract

Historically Africa has been viewed as a continent with little strategic significance to the United States. As a result the United States has enacted ad hoc policies towards Africa. However, in the emerging 21st century strategic landscape Africa will become a national interest to the United States. Africa is a dynamic continent rich with raw materials and minerals used by countries all over the world. These minerals are essential to the industrial and technological growth of the United States. A peacekeeping force capable of prosecuting peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions provides security and stability for these interests. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in October 1996. The initiative was to work with international partners and African nations to enhance African peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capacity. Through the ACRI program, the United States offers training and equipment to African nations who seek to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities and are committed to democratic progress, principles, and civilian rule. This study attempts to determine the following questions. What lessons from previous peacekeeping operations can be applied to the ACRI? What is the training status of the identified participants? What are their training requirements for peacekeeping operations and human rights training? What should be the scope of United States involvement? What should the command and control structure look like? What are the keys to success

for the ACRI training program? The lessons learned from this analysis can be applied to many future peacekeeping operations.

Chapter 1

Importance of Africa to the United States

Africa possesses many vital and important interests for the United States. Economic, regional stability and humanitarian issues have come to the forefront and received media attention in the recent years. Media exploitation of Rwandan refugees and starving Somalis graphically showed United States citizens the humanitarian issues that developed from political instability. Public outcry related to these issues have guided United States policies towards Africa. Additionally, in 1994 statistics show that Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for \$4.4 billion dollars in United States purchases and provided more than eighty thousand American jobs.¹ Interests similar to these, have driven, and in some cases, changed U.S. African political strategies.

The United States strategy in Africa shifted significantly between 1995 and 1998. In 1995 National Military Strategy (NMS) document stated that there was “very little strategic significance in Africa.”² In 1998 the National Security Strategy (NSS) showed a dramatic shift and indicated concerns over attenuation of regional conflicts, economic development, enhancing democracy, human rights, counter-proliferation, control of weapons of mass destruction and transnational threats within the continent³. As a result, interest in Africa has grown within the U.S. political realm.

Through my analysis, I have determined that there are six areas of U.S. interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. My analysis parallels the 1998 NSS and amplifies why Africa should be a vital interest to the United States. These vital interests include regional stability, access, information and warning, safety of U.S. citizens, regional freedom of sponsors or safe havens for transnational threats, regional comity and cooperation, regional governance and economic development. Each one will be addressed below⁴.

Regional stability is a major concern to the United States. Instability has resulted from “failed states,” border disputes, interstate aggression, insurgencies, civil wars, large scale banditry, oppressive regimes and other situations that produced refugee flows into bordering countries⁵. These activities not only threatened African interests, but also those of the United States. As a result, the United States has used military force over twelve times in Africa since 1990 to stabilize or squelch situations similar to those listed above⁶.

Stability is the basic key interest in Africa.⁷ Conflict resolution is one of the primary United States goals in Africa.⁸ Dr. Karl Magyar, in an October 1998 lecture on Sub-Saharan Africa to Air Command and Staff College, stated that, “41% of the world’s crises between 1963 and 1979 occurred in Africa.” He further stated that, “95% of the conflict in Africa occurs in the poorest countries.” ACRI provides the vehicle and potential to resolve African conflict by the use of African militaries.

Access throughout Africa is critical and must be preserved. Access to key persons, institutions, facilities and economic opportunity is a prime U.S. interest. Lines of communication, ports of embarkation and debarkation, and sea-lanes provide economic interface for U.S. and African corporations. Maintenance of this access is critical.⁹

Access to strategic minerals used for the U.S. military industrial complex is a critical interest and an essential part of the U.S. economy. As much as “50% of the 17 strategic and critical minerals essential to either the U.S. defense sector or the economy must be imported.”¹⁰ Many of these minerals come from Africa. Africa supplies 79% of the chromium, 59% of the cobalt, 53% of the manganese and 89% of the platinum used by U.S. defense contractors. The U.S. must import strategic minerals for the production of high technology weapons systems. This demand has not diminished, nor have substitute supplies been identified.¹¹

Regional stability is crucial to mineral access. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa are prime sources for strategic minerals used in U.S. defense production.¹² The Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced political instability, which resulted in a reduction of cobalt production. Zambia, the second largest cobalt producer, has also experienced instability.¹³ South Africa holds the world’s largest resources of chromium, manganese and platinum. Instability has also been prominent in this country with whites and blacks competing for political power as well as post apartheid issues.¹⁴ If greater stability can occur in Africa, it will insure that the United States will have access to key minerals.

In some cases, these minerals travel along lines of communication spanning several African countries before reaching ports of debarkation. Continued access to these routes is vital to the African economy while at the same time critical to U.S. interests. Disruption of these lines of communication would result in limiting access to critical strategic minerals and possible shortages. Although stockpiles exist in the U.S.,

emergency surge requirements may exhaust supplies more rapidly than replenishment could take place.¹⁵

The adage “information is power” applies to the U.S. and her interests within the continent. Disruption of the information lines of communication could result in catastrophic outcomes for American business ventures, citizens and the African economy.

This results in information and warning being a critical U.S. interest. Open lines of communication for information must be established, maintained, and enhanced to provide for U.S. economic and political growth within the continent. Better flow of information to and from Africa can provide mutual benefits. Timely information will allow appropriate and adequate response to African crises by U.S. instruments of power.¹⁶

Safety of American citizens is another critical U.S. interest. Americans employment in Africa continues to grow and shows U.S. citizens working throughout Africa in the economic, industrial, political, and civilian sectors. Missionary efforts by the U.S. religious sects provide a good example. Citizen safety is paramount and is deemed critical by the Clinton Administration.¹⁷ Over eighty thousand Americans are employed in Africa.¹⁸ Instability in Africa represents a real threat to American citizen safety. This is exemplified in the recent killing of two American tourists in Uganda by Rwandan rebels in March 99. To place U.S. forces on the ground in Africa will take time due to deployment distances. ACRI forces, already positioned on the continent, hold high potential to assure both African and U.S. citizen security during periods of instability.

Another U.S. interest is a region free from transnational threats. The reduction and deterrence of transnational threats, such as drugs and terrorism, must be supported by the United States to assure that our interests are protected.¹⁹ Breakdowns in civil order have

encouraged terrorism, drug use and trafficking in Africa.²⁰ ACRI forces would be prime candidates for counter drug missions within the continent. These missions would promote and possibly restore stability to the affected region.

Economic prosperity is important to both Africa and the United States. Regional comity and cooperation must be maintained. U.S. input and cooperation in Africa's economic development will reinforce and enhance stability throughout the region. This critical interest can be fostered by support of African economic organizations and the African Trade Initiative.²¹ Continued economic development relies on regional stability for prosperity and security. Instability would severely disrupt economic growth until restoration could occur.

Self-government has always been sought by African nations throughout the years. Violent coup d' etat and bloodless takeovers have not always resulted in a government for the people that supports human rights. Support of African governments that are democratic and purport human rights will promote stability and enhance security of vital U.S interests. U.S. policy regarding African militaries has been to "downsize, demobilize and democratize."²² ACRI shows renewed interest in equipping and training African militaries to foster regional stability and support recognized governments from the threat of coups.

Finally, sustained economic development will also serve U.S. interests and benefit Africa. Creation and enhancement of "a stable economically dynamic Africa"²³ will bolster U.S. interests in the region. Development of African economies, which can exploit natural resources for commercial development, hold great potential for relieving

poverty and increasing citizen welfare. Governments must be held accountable to route profits back into population benefiting programs.

Notes

¹Office of International Security Affairs, U.S. Security for Sub-Saharan Africa, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C

²Henk, Dan, US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, Parameters, VOL XXVII, No 4, Winter 1997-98, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 95

³ibid,95

⁴ibid,96

⁵ibid,96

⁶ibid,95

⁷ibid,97

⁸Bureau of Africa, U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 October 1996, On-line, Available from [Http: www.state.gov/regions/africa/us_policy-subsahar](http://www.state.gov/regions/africa/us_policy-subsahar).

⁹Henk, Dan, US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, Parameters, VOL XXVII, No 4, Winter 1997-98, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 97

¹⁰Butts, Kent Hughes, Strategic Minerals In the New World Order, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 30 November 1993,1

¹¹ibid,4, 11, 26

¹²ibid,13

¹³ibid,17

¹⁴ibid,17

¹⁵ibid,vii and 2

¹⁶Henk, Dan, US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, Parameters, VOL XXVII, No 4, Winter 1997-98, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 98

¹⁷ibid, 98

¹⁸Bureau of Africa, U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 October 1996, On-line, Available from [Http: www.state.gov/regions/africa/us_policy-subsahar](http://www.state.gov/regions/africa/us_policy-subsahar).

¹⁹Henk, Dan, US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, Parameters, VOL XXVII, No 4, Winter 1997-98, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 99.

²⁰Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 October 1996, 5.

²¹Henk, Dan, *US National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Parameters, VOL XXVII, No 4, Winter 1997-98, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 100

²²ibid, 102

²³ibid, 102

Chapter 2

Background Information on the ACRI Program

“...The {ACRI} will address a critical long term need on the African continent and improve the international community’s near term ability to respond to a potential massive humanitarian crisis...”

—George E. Moose, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

The United States asserts its power on the world scene in many different ways. Often its interventions are destructive, but other times the U.S. uses diplomatic machinery to resolve conflicts and promote peace. The Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia—with its notable ambiguities and imperfections—is an example of the type of peacemaking at which governments can sometimes succeed¹. Beyond traditional diplomacy, however, the U.S. government has recently gotten involved in two initiatives on the continent of Africa.

African Conflict Resolution Act (ACRA)

In 1994, churches and advocacy organizations called for U.S. foreign aid programs to provide financial assistance to African institutions for conflict resolution activities. This proposal was enacted into law in October 1994 as the African Conflict Resolution Act (ACRA). Assistance was to be given to the Organization of African Unity and African non-governmental organizations for improving and expanding conflict resolution skills and capabilities. This act also called for U.S. aid for demobilizing armies and

deminning operations. Since 1995 the relatively meager amount of aid channeled to ACRA activities has declined. Neither Congress nor the current Presidential Administration appears committed to giving this program much chance to succeed².

Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)

When the Clinton Administration's proposal for an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) was made public by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher in October 1996, it provoked a critical, and even hostile, response from a number of African and European governments. It also met with opposition from American legislators who were concerned by the potential costs of implementing the proposal and by the prospect that it would lead to direct American intervention in African crises³. As a result, the Clinton Administration revised the proposal considerably transforming it into a far more limited program and has renamed it the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).

In contrast to the ACRF proposal, the ACRI program is not intended to create a permanent, freestanding African force. Instead, it will enhance the capability of military units from a number of African countries, which will remain under the operational command of their respective governments. Furthermore, according to administration officials, the ACRI program is aimed solely at increasing the capability of these forces to engage in peacekeeping operations and is not intended to help them conduct peace enforcement operations, as was envisaged in the ACRF proposal.

The United States has already completed initial training with battalions from Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, and Mali. In early 1999, the United States will begin training two Ethiopian battalions and a brigade staff for this effort.⁴ The normal training cycle requires 60 days and approximately 70 U.S. trainers. Non-governmental and

private organizations are invited to participate in the training, affording trainers and trainees alike valuable opportunities for increased interaction and understanding of the role of civilian agencies in peacekeeping and complex humanitarian operations.⁵

After the initial training, U.S. military training teams return every six months for short duration to assist in developing self-sustaining training capability. Currently, three countries have completed sustainment training; Malawi, Senegal, and Uganda. The U.S. ACRI program also complements training efforts by several other countries such as Britain, France and the Nordic countries. The U.S. also consults closely on ACRI activity with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its Crisis Management Center, and African sub-regional organizations already pursuing capacity enhancement. ACRI is a five-year program with \$15 million allocated for the first two year, \$20 million for the last three years.⁶

Notes

¹ Office of International Security Affairs, U.S. Security for Sub-Saharan Africa, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

² Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Policy of a new Era in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 October 1996

³ African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): A Peacekeeping Alliance in Africa, <http://ACRI.html>, 1

⁴ McCallie, Ambassador Marshall F and McCracken, Colonel David E, *On-the-Record Briefing African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)*, Jul 28, 1997, 3

⁵ *ibid*, 5

⁶ *ibid*, 8

Chapter 3

Training Lessons Learned from Previous Peacekeeping Operations

“The era of intervention by non African forces in conflicts in Africa has passed.”

—Ghanian Lt. General Emmanuel Erskine, former commander for the UN
Interim forces in Lebanon

Sub-Saharan African military personnel have participated as observers and staff officers during United Nations peace operations throughout the world. Additionally, African countries have been willing participants in peace operations in Africa and elsewhere, all of which, whether successful or not, have provided a wealth of experience in both troop deployments and the conduct of peace support and humanitarian relief operations.

Africans have, of course, encountered a variety of problems in conducting peace operations. Many of these have been identified; some were cited by participants in a South African Institute of International Affairs conference held in July 1995.¹ One could reasonably argue, therefore, that Africans should preferably be deployed in peace operations only on their own continent, where they will be closer to home and will find themselves in a more familiar environment. However, serving on their own continent is not without its own array of problems. Listed below are some of these problems.

Africans engaged in peace operations have often concluded that partners treated them from other contingents as second-rate soldiers. From their perspective, international organizations have tended to deny Africans substantial leadership roles in multinational peace operations. Additionally, whether provided by other organizations or by their own countries, Africans have deemed logistic support provided to them as inferior.²

Lines of communication within the continent of Africa have always been a problem. The longer the lines, the more costly the operation becomes, especially when sizable forces are deployed. The social aspects such as feedback to one's own country, mail, and remuneration are always affected adversely. As is true of leaders everywhere, African leaders are concerned with explaining to their own people casualties, mission creep (where this leads to protracted deployments), and ambiguous mandates.³

The biggest challenge that Africans face is the perception that multinational organizations may abandon them when a situation appears to be taking a turn for the worse.⁴ Africans recognize the risk entailed in relying on other organizations for financial and logistics support, and they fear the possibility that they could be left to their own devices in a dangerous situation.

Lack of interoperability and poor serviceability of equipment, lack of uniform peace-operations doctrine, and varying standards of expertise and performance among African armed forces have hindered peace operations in the past. If this is corrected African peacekeeping will be successful in the future.

Effective military operations on the African continent require military contingents that are skilled in specialties such as tracking, anti-mine warfare, low-intensity conflict,

and law enforcement activities. This makes African militaries ideal for conducting operations in this environment, since many African military establishments have retained these skills from recent liberation struggles.⁵

Intrinsic to the success of ACRI is the assessment of Mission Essential Tasks. The “Limpera” training program in Honduras shows the criticality of establishing a unit training Mission Essential Task List (METL). Special Forces (SF) detachment would deploy to a battalion and provide basic training to the new recruits. Another SF detachment would deploy to the same battalion a year to eighteen months later and train the same personnel in basic training skills. No unit METL was established or trained by the host nation. As a result, no training benchmark was established.⁶ The ACRI program has the same inherent deficiency.

In addition, the United States should only train militaries in peacekeeping operations that have a professional Officer and NCO Corps. This was not done in El Salvador in the 1980s when the United States sent advisors to train their Army. In El Salvador units were formed around conscripts with a two year enlistment requirement.⁷ Once their enlistment contract expired, these soldiers returned to their homes without any further obligations. Between mid 1981 and January 1983 over 7,000 Salvadorian soldiers were trained at Fort Benning, Georgia. By June 1983 only half of these soldiers were still on active duty and of the ones trained in 1981, only 15% remained.⁸ The failure to harness this manpower was further accentuated by the cost of their training. The cost of training El Salvador’s Bellosso battalion alone was \$8 million.⁹

These lessons learned and many others require incorporation into the ACRI training model. If not, time and training resources will get under utilized and the ACRI program will fail just as the ARCA did four years ago.

Notes

¹ Henk, Dan, The Concept of peace-keeping Operations in Africa, Parameters, Vol XXVII, No 4, Winter 1997-98, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle PA, 30

² ibid, 31

³ ibid, 32

⁴ ibid, 34

⁵ ibid, 46

⁶ United Nations, *UN Expenditures for Peacekeeping 1990-1997*, On-line, Internet, available from <http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/pkexpend.html>

⁷ A.J. Bacevich, et al., *American Military policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador*, New York, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, p. 27

⁸ Stephen Oriofsky ed., "Operation Well Being Begins", Facts on File, Vol. 43, 17 June 1983, p. 448.

⁹ John P. Caves Jr., "Foreign Assistance Resources Problems and Requirements for Low Intensity Conflict", paper submitted to SAWS, May 1986, p. 26.

Chapter 4

African Crisis Response Initiative Concept of Training

“Our objective is to assist in developing rapidly-deployable, interoperable battalions and companies from stable democratic countries that can work together to maintain peace on a continent which has too often been torn by civil strife”

—U.S. Ambassador Marshall F., McCallie

When a crisis occurs, restoring stability as quickly as possible is crucial. A strong multi-national peacekeeping force of African nations tasked to resolve African crises is a positive concept. ACRI has the potential to achieve this important goal. The concept calls for enhancing the participating African military capability to effectively prosecute humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions. It further aims to “improve basic soldier skills, strengthen combat support and combat service support units, and develop African headquarters capabilities. Success for ACRI revolves around the structure and organization of an ACRI training program. My analysis of the ACRI training program will include its mission, execution, constraints, support requirement, training concept, regional exercises, and who should be the trainers from the United States Military.

Mission

The ACRI mission is to train and equip peacekeeping troops from African nations, stationed in their nations of origin, for rapid deployment to areas of crises in Africa.¹

ACRI trained forces could conduct limited Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HUMRO) to provide a more secure environment for either refugees or internally displaced people and to facilitate the wholesale delivery of humanitarian aid, in order to minimize human suffering and deter violence or participate in limited (Chapter VI) Peace Keeping Operations (PKO).² Notional ACRI mission statements for each type of operation could look like this:

1. HUMRO. When offered, ACRI trained forces conduct operations to provide a more secure environment for either refugees or internally displaced people and facilitate the wholesale delivery of humanitarian aid, in order to minimize human suffering and deter violence.³

2. PKO. When offered, ACRI trained forces conduct operations designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of a negotiated peace agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.⁴

The U.S. vision for the ACRI program is, “to enhance the African capacity to perform peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in a timely, professionally competent manner.”⁵ The ACRI program aims to provide equipment and training to 10,000-12,000 African soldiers in well-prepared companies and battalions, commanded by trained African officers and capable of deployed operations with consistent doctrine and procedures, using interoperable communications.⁶ If this training occurs, at the end of a five-year period of time it will lead to a self-sustaining African peacekeeping contingent.⁷

Execution

USEUCOM is currently the executive agent for development of the military aspects involved in establishing the ACRI concept⁸. USCENTCOM, SOCOM, ACOM, and TRANSCOM are designated as supporting Combatant Commanders. Coordination and corporation must continue to occur in the future. If these agencies fail to cooperate the ACRI program will lose its support and ultimately end up like the ACRA program.

ACRI is currently compatible with both the EUCOM and National Military Strategy⁹ (see figure 1). This is important so that adequate funding and resources will get committed to the training program. I will now outline how ACRI tasks at the tactical level are congruent with the national level objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa:¹⁰

1. NMS Promote Peace and Stability: Enhancing PKO/HUMRO capabilities within Africa directly supports the NMS objective of promoting peace and stability.
2. EUCOM Promote Stability, Democratization, and Military Professionalism in Africa: The training conducted leads to an apolitical, professional military that respects human rights.
3. EUCOM Provide Prompt Response to Humanitarian Crisis: Enhance African capability to conduct PKO/HUMRO missions provides additional options for U.S. response. The country knowledge gained, and relationships developed, will be invaluable if the geopolitical involvement requires us to respond to a humanitarian crisis in Africa or elsewhere.

ACRI STRATEGY CROSSWALK (U.S TASKS)




Figure 1. ACRI Strategy Crosswalk

Constraints

Only countries with professional military units which meet the following standards: acceptance of democratic civilian authority; respect for human rights; participation in prior peacekeeping operations or a demonstrated interest in engaging in peacekeeping activities; and a relatively high level of basic military proficiency, are able to receive ACRI training. The Congressional Record of 12 November 1997 stated that ACRI “should be utilized to foster the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights in Africa.” It further stated that ACRI “should not be directed to undemocratic governments with a history of human rights abuses by their militaries” and to countries that “have military establishments that accept the supremacy of democratic civilian government.” As a result, Nigeria, which has a military government, cannot be trained under the ACRI.¹¹

International Support for the ACRI Program

The United States deployed pol-mil teams to Europe seeking support for the ACRI. The teams traveled to the Netherlands, UK, Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.¹² While there is a general consensus on the concept's viability, there are numerous questions concerning the establishment, training, equipping, and employment of the force. Several Allied nations recommended that the U.S. concept be closely coordinated with French efforts (EUCOM regularly coordinates ACRI concepts with the French). The French have developed their own version of the ACRI, called "The Reenhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity."¹³ The key is that the French, British, and American programs are complementary and coordinated.

The U.S. also deployed pol-mil teams to Africa and engaged African representatives to the UN. To date, Ethiopia has offered two infantry battalions; Uganda Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Malawi offered one battalion each.¹⁴ USEUCOM pilot (assessment) teams traveled to Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, Mali, and Ghana and reported that, at the battalion level, these forces are capable of participating in operations with minimal training and equipment.¹⁵ The pilot teams recommended training designed to improve basic peacekeeping soldier and junior leader skills and development of battalion and brigade staffs capable of conducting multi-echelon, multinational (regional) operations.¹⁶ Momentum for the program continues to build as numerous other African nations search for their role in the ACRI or other PKO training concepts.

Equipment and Maintenance Support

The United States is providing limited equipment, approximately \$1.2M per African participant for equipment purchase.¹⁷ This money will buy and ship command and control equipment (Motorola hand-held radios, spare batteries, repeaters, battery chargers, and generators), training ammunition, individual soldier equipment (uniform, boots, load bearing equipment), and peacekeeping support equipment (water purification equipment, night vision equipment, and flood lights). Maintenance training is integrated throughout both initial and sustainment training. The service support tasks listed in the ACRI Program of Instruction (POI) covers most logistics subjects. Maintenance training is provided for both ACRI issued equipment and organic unit equipment. The 3rd Special Forces Group (SFG) responsible for training Sub-Saharan Africa units, normally augments their training team with logistic subject matter experts from USAEUR to assist them in training African maintenance skills. The focus is on teaching operator level maintenance and the maintenance management skills necessary to develop and run a good maintenance program. Although operator and some direct support maintenance is taught; only limited general support or detailed troubleshooting is included in either initial or sustainment training. Contractor support is available for ACRI issued equipment that is still under warranty.

ACRI Training Concept

The training concept encompasses a 60-day period. During this training cycle, a battalion size unit will be trained and evaluated. The “crawl, walk, run” method of training is incorporated with progression from individual through collective level tasks included. A train-the-trainer program is also part of the program. Once units are trained

at the collective level, a situational training exercise (STX) and a command post exercise (CPX) will be conducted to evaluate company level capability. A battalion field training exercise (FTX) follows to culminate the training cycle and to evaluate battalion level capability to function as an ACRI task force. The desired end state is a battalion task force capable of conducting an effective, collective response to peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance crises on the African continent (see figure 2).




Figure 2. ACRI Initial Training Plan

Only U.N. approved doctrine for peacekeeping operations will be used. This doctrine includes selected sources from the U.N., Nordic, U.S., and NATO.¹⁸ All of the training tasks from platoon to battalion have been approved by the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPDO), and are in accordance with UN peacekeeping doctrine and meet the stipulations outlined in UN Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter¹⁹ (see Appendix A Collective Tasks).

The logical progression for ACRI training is to move from enhancing battalion capabilities, to developing brigade staff capabilities, to command and control the

battalions and separate companies trained under ACRI. The building block approach of developing battalion C2 capabilities and then brigade C2 capabilities allows for future development of CJTF capabilities and structures. Figure three shows the importance of developing a detailed training plan that incorporates maintenance, professional development and sustainment training. ACRI initial and sustainment training develops the basic command and control staff skills required to work at a higher level. EUCOM, in conjunction with the ACRI TF must now start the logical C2 training progression from battalion to brigade staff.²⁰ Development of Brigade HQ staff capabilities will allow for easier transition to CJTF staff capability.




Figure 3. Regional Training Model

I believe Africans themselves, in cooperation with other organizations, will want to develop standby command structures, which will enable them to field peacekeeping units rapidly and effectively. Key to this command and control capability is leadership and staff training. Some African countries have Command and Staff Colleges capable of addressing these issues. Britain, Ireland, Canada, and the Nordic countries are also committed to staff training in an international context. ACRI initial and sustainment training develops the basic command and control staff skills required to work at a higher

level. It is imperative that command and control is part of the sustainment training that occurs every six months. This will allow for the staff to grow and mature and be an effective headquarters. The long-term strategy for the ACRI program is to train 10-12 interoperable African battalions and 4-6 specialized companies.²¹ This will require a brigade staff that is proficient in civilian police, peacekeeping, medical and logistic operations. It is my recommendation that command and control training follow a model similar to figure 4. Using this model will ensure that all the required staff skills are developed for command and control of a brigade size task force.




Figure 4. ACRI C2 Training Model

Regional Exercises

A regional exercise needs to take place each year. The exercise needs to consist of a seminar, CPX and then a multi-national PKO or humanitarian assistance exercise.²² If a PKO exercise is going to be conducted then the following collective tasks should be trained and evaluated on:

1. Establish and operate a lodgment
2. Conduct route security
3. Conduct convoy escort operations

4. Secure an area of operations
5. Maintain a zone of separation
6. Secure a border
7. Secure an urban area

If a Humanitarian Assistance exercise is going to be conducted, then the following collective tasks should be trained and evaluated:

1. Provide humanitarian assistance
2. Conduct humanitarian civic
3. Assistance activities
4. Provide medical care to non-combatants
5. Deliver supplies or humanitarian aid

All these collective tasks can be crossed walked directly back to the battalion, company and platoon collective tasks that were listed above. This will insure interoperability from the brigade staff all the way down to the platoon.

Trainers of the ACRI Program within the United States Military

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.²³ The primary organization within the United States military for this type of mission is U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and they have given this mission to the U.S Special Forces Command. USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID mission.²⁴ Additionally, “Special Forces has been legislated by Congress as the primary FID player in DOD.”²⁵

The Special Forces role in FID is “to organize, train, advise and improve the tactical and technical proficiency of these forces (host nation forces), so they can defeat the insurgency.”²⁶ This role encompasses the training requirement of ACRI. Although not

necessarily countering an insurgency, ACRI units will be used in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Special Forces collateral missions include peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, which are commonly trained to foreign militaries during FID operations. Stabilizing the crisis situation will be the inherent mission of the ACRI task force.

Two Special Forces Groups currently hold responsibility for the ACRI mission. The 3rd and 5th Special Forces Groups are tasked with ACRI. The 3rd Group will train the Sub-Saharan African units, with the 5th Group concentrating upon training units from the “Horn of Africa” region. If units from Northern Africa, e.g., Tunisia, decide to participate in ACRI, the 10th Special Forces Group will serve as their primary trainers.

Notes

¹ Headquarters, European Command, *African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Concept and Training Update*, 22 August 1997, 2.

² *ibid*, 1

³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-20-3 *Foreign Internal Defense*, United States Army, Washington, DC 20 September 1994, 15

⁴ Headquarters, European Command, *African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Concept and Training Update*, 22 August 1997, 6

⁵ *ibid*, 4

⁶ *ibid*, 2

⁷ *ibid*, 3

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-07, 4

⁹ Headquarters, European Command, *African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Concept and Training Update*, 22 August 1997, 2

¹⁰ *ibid*, 2-3

¹¹ *ibid*, 9

¹² *ibid*, 8

¹³ *ibid*, 9

¹⁴ *ibid*, 10

¹⁵ *ibid*, 10

¹⁶ *ibid*, 11

¹⁷ McCallie, Ambassador Marshall F and McCracken, Colonel David E, *On-the-Record Briefing African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)*, Jul 28, 1997, On-line, Internet, available from <http://www.state.gov/www/refions/africa/acri>

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¹⁸ Headquarters, European Command, *African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Concept and Training Update*, 22 August 1997, 4

¹⁹ McCallie, Ambassador Marshall F and McCracken, Colonel David E, On-the-Record Briefing, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), 28 July 1998, On-line, Available from [http:// www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/acri_briefing_970728.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/acri_briefing_970728.html), 3

²⁰ Headquarters, European Command, *African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Concept and Training Update*, 22 August 1997, 8

²¹ *ibid*, 20

²² *ibid*, 11

²³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-20-3 *Foreign Internal Defense*, United States Army, Washington, DC 20 September 1994, 1-17

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-07.1, IV-3

²⁵ *ibid*, 1-17

²⁶ , Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-20-3 *Foreign Internal Defense*, United States Army, Washington, DC 20 September 1994, 1-17

Chapter 5

Keys to success in the ACRI Training Program

During this research, many facets of the ACRI program were reviewed. Issues of interoperability, standardized training requirements, sustainment, command and control options, funding provided insight from which conclusions were drawn. The following paragraphs amplify these findings.

Interoperability

Success in ACRI rests on the foundation of having interoperability among the trained units. This can be achieved by ensuring standardized communication equipment is purchased. To provide the right communication equipment, advice should be sought out by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The communication equipment being provided by the United States needs to be similar in all of the countries which participate in the initiative to ensure interoperable command and control in any multinational peacekeeping operation or humanitarian mission. It is my recommendation that they continue to buy off the shelf communication packages with frequency adjustment capability. This will enable international battalions to communicate with one another and up the chain of command with their respective headquarters and with the United Nations, if that is the convening authority.

Standardized Training Requirements

ACRI requires fully trained battalions capable of conducting peacekeeping operations throughout Africa in response to crises. These battalions would form the nucleus of a brigade task force that would be placed under the operational control of the United Nations. In order for these units to be fully capable, training must be standardized and concentrate on light infantry tasks. The program must include collective training at the platoon and company levels to achieve the desired end state of a fully trained battalion. Light infantry training coupled with the peacekeeping training tasks outlined on the U.N. approved ACRI points of instruction will certainly provide the rudimentary training required for future missions.

Of critical importance is establishing the unit training status at the completion of each training iteration, and prior to the conduct of future training iterations. Unit mission essential task lists (METL) must be established, with continual enhancement training conducted throughout host nation training cycles. METL assessment will serve as the primary training benchmarks and will serve as the training focus for host nation units. These critical benchmarks form the cornerstones necessary to base future training requirements upon.

Sustainment

Sustainment and enhancement training is critical at all levels, (e.g., platoon, company and battalion), to assure unit readiness levels necessary to execute ACRI missions. This training can be conducted by the unit during normal training cycles and monitored by either the UN or the established command and control structure. Large-scale exercises, similar to the U.S. Army Readiness Training Enhancement Program

(ARTEP) can be used to validate collective unit training. Exercises must be graded events and proctored by the established command and control structure to assure validation of unit capability.

Each participating ACRI battalion must receive a graded unit evaluation on a yearly basis. This evaluation should incorporate all peacekeeping tasks taught in the initial ACRI training and collective skills at battalion level. The evaluation should be conducted by UN personnel and consist of ACRI participants as well as other United Nations members. Evaluators should include UN and ACRI trained personnel.

Following the initial training, smaller teams (20-30 trainers) should return to the host nation every six months or so for sustainment training and command post exercises, emphasizing logistic, battalion and brigade leadership, train the trainer skills and the development of civil and military operations in humanitarian emergencies.

Command and Control Options

All participating units must have command and control capability and be fully trained in the command and control structure for ACRI. Command and control training is imperative for ACRI, and must be incorporated at battalion and brigade levels at a minimum, and preferably at all levels from platoon through brigade. Conducting training in this fashion will breed familiarity and knowledge of the command structure. Chain of command would be established as well as subordinate to superior command relationships, and could be incorporated into all regional training exercises.

If the ACRI force falls under the command and control structure made up of African participants, a higher potential for harmony and success exists. Africans would command African military units and resolve African crises. If non-African participants command

the ACRI force (e.g., Canadians, British or French) the potential for success will diminish. This arrangement may be viewed as colonialist and create problems with the ACRI force. With success relying upon the command and control structure, UN involvement may be the most viable option at the present time.

Perhaps a combination of regional and UN command and control offers the best option. This structure would represent both the UN and the regional organizations, and would potentially support the agendas of both. Recommend the command and control structure for ACRI task forces be placed under United Nations control and be made up of African military officers.

Funding

Future funding of ACRI program will benefit the United States in many ways. By investing in this program it will reduce the United States involvement in African Peacekeeping operations. The anticipated 25 to 40 million-dollar contributions to the project are significantly less than the price of prosecuting a protracted peacekeeping operation similar to Rwanda. A trained African peacekeeping force diminishes the expense and the requirement for deployment and sustainment of U.S. forces. Additionally, no U.S. casualties will be experienced if African forces stabilize the situation.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

“Many forces will go untrained. Only African governments, which believe in, and practice, the fundamentals of democracy will benefit from ACRI. U.S law forbids military assistance to countries run by military governments that have displaced citizen governments.”

—CNN Correspondent Bill Delaney

Africa is a dynamic continent rich with raw minerals used by countries all over the world. With these dynamics comes the drive for power and control of the resources by other countries and other African nations.

Africa has been a continent continually fighting instability. Coups, insurrections and cross boarder incursions have occurred leaving many countries in a constant state of flux. When war has broken out in Africa in the past it has required outside intervention to achieve conflict resolution. Many times interventions were perceived as colonists interfering in African matters.

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a positive step in promoting regional stability and security throughout the African continent. This initiative will provide training and equipment to African peacekeepers to prosecute conflict resolution of crises. This significant program will create peacekeeping battalions to be used in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions on the continent of Africa.

ACRI is a key tool in shaping the African environment by promoting professional apolitical militaries, respect for human rights, and the role of a military in a democracy. It prepares both African and U.S. soldiers, for possible operations in Africa and it provides knowledge and relationships that will enable the U.S. to respond to crisis and humanitarian situations in Africa.

As we approach the turn of the century, the world as a whole faces daunting challenges; regional instability, upheaval in financial markets, the resurgence of terrorism and of misplaced nuclear ambitions. Nowhere can the U.S. afford to be an idle bystander. Africa is no exception. An old Asian proverb states, “When fate throws a dagger at you, there are only two ways to catch it, either by the blade or the handle.”

We cannot watch passively, waiting for Africa to achieve perfection before we engage actively in helping to shape its future. If we temper our engagement or hold back until the whole of Africa is on even footing, we will concede important opportunities to our competitors and worse still, leave doors open to our adversaries. We must invest U.S. commitment, talent, resources, and energy in Africa in order to promote lasting peace, security, and prosperity here at home.

Appendix A

Collective Tasks

Platoon Collective Tasks

Listed below are the collective tasks that need to be taught to all platoons that are participating in the ACRI program:

1. Conduct Patrols
2. Establish and operate observations posts
3. Establish and operate a checkpoint
4. Plan for media/react to press interviews
5. Conduct Liaison /negotiate
6. Escort Convoy
7. React to Ambush
8. React to indirect fire
9. Establish lodgment
10. Secure a route
11. Mine clearing
12. Provide Command and Control
13. Protect the force

Company Collective Tasks

Listed below are the collective tasks that need to be taught to companies participating in ACRI program:

1. Conduct Patrols
2. Establish and operate observation posts
3. Establish and operate checkpoint
4. Plan for media/react to media rep requests for unit support
5. Conduct liaison/negotiate
6. Escort convoy
7. React to ambush

8. React to indirect fire
9. Establish a lodgment
10. Secure a route
11. Mine clearing
12. Provide command and control
13. Protect the force

Battalion Collective Task

Listed below are the collective tasks that need to be taught to battalions participating in ACRI program:

1. Execute R&S plan
2. Establish and operate a series of OP's
3. Employ a quick reaction force
4. Establish and operate checkpoint
5. Plan for media/react to press interview
6. Conduct liaison with local authorities
7. Negotiate with belligerents
8. Conduct convoy escort operations
9. Establish a lodgment
10. Provide command and control
11. Protect the force

To ensure interoperability, it is imperative that all collective tasks can be cross-walked to the next higher headquarters. If this is done correctly, it will ensure that standardized training will occur throughout all units participating in the ACRI program. At the present time all of the above tasks can be cross-walked to their higher headquarters.

Glossary

- African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).** A concept to form a joint-combined African military force to execute combat operations, humanitarian assistance and military operations other than war to alleviate crisis on the African continent.
- Combatant Command.** A unified or specific command with broad continuing mission under a single command established and so designed by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.
- Foreign Internal Defense (FID).** Participation by U.S. civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs taken by the host government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
- Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HUMRO).** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or prevention that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great danger to or loss of property.
- Logistical Exercise (LOG EX).** Combat Service Support rehearsals are normally performed within the framework of a logistical exercise. The purpose of the LOG EX is to ensure that all Combat Service Support Units have been planned for and are synchronized with the maneuver plan.
- National Security Strategy (NSS).** The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and information) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.
- National Military Strategy (NMS).** The art and science of disturbing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war.
- Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO).** Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
- Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.
- Peace Operations (PO).** The umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary, or nonmilitary action in support of a diplomatic peacekeeping process.
- Special Forces (SF).** U.S. Army Forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special Forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, counter terrorism.

Special forces Group (SFG). A combat arms organization (ARMY) capable of planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war.

United States Army Europe (USAUER). U.S. Army Europe maintains a combat ready, forward deployed force capable of providing immediate response in support of NATO, U.S. bilateral, U.S. multilateral, and U.S. unilateral objectives; supports U.S. Army forces in EUCOM area; receives and assists in the receptions, staging, onward movement and integration of U.S. reinforcing forces; established, operates, and expands operational lines of communications within EUCOM; and supports U.S. combatant commanders and the joint and combined commanders with forces, and joint tasks force headquarters, as required

United States Atlantic Command (ACOM) is responsible for maximizing U.S. military capability through joint training, force integration, and deployment of forces located in the continental United States to support other geographic CINCs. The Atlantic theater, and domestic requirements.

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is assigned an AOR that includes 20 nations, covering an area larger than the continental United States. The Central Region is one of the most diverse regions in the world. It is the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity and Islam; has a population of more than 427 million people; and is divided into 167 different ethnic groups, 420 tribal groups, six major languages, and hundreds of dialects.

United States European Command (USEUCOM). Support and advance U.S. interest and policies throughout the assigned area of responsibility; provide combat ready land, maritime, and air forces to Allied Command Europe or U.S. unified command ; and conduct operations unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners.

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) includes all activity and reserve special operations, US Army psychological operations and civil affairs forces stationed in the United States. USSOCOM is responsible for providing trained and combat ready special operations forces to the combatant commanders, and, when directed by the president or Secretary of Defense, for exercising command of selected special operations missions.

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). United States Transportation Command provides a defense transportation system ready and capable of meeting the nation's needs. It ensures timely, customer-focused global mobility in peace and war with efficient, effective and integrated transportation from origin to destination.

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