

AU/ACSC/093/1999-04

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

LEADERSHIP IN FORCE XXI

IS THE ARMY'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP MODEL AND
LEADER DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE PROPERLY
ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY
THE TRANSITION TO FORCE XXI?

by

Carl M. Johnson, Major, US Army

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Thomas Meara, Major, US Army

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 1999

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No.
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-04-1999	2. REPORT TYPE Thesis	3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-1999 to xx-xx-1999
---	--------------------------	--

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Leadership in Force XXI Is the Army's Current Leadership Model and Leader Development Doctrine Properly Addressing the Challenges Brought About by the Transition to Force XXI? Unclassified	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) Johnson, Carl M. ;	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Air Command and Staff College Maxwell AFB, AL36112	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
--	--

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS .	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
A PUBLIC RELEASE

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
The infusion of technology into the Army's Force XXI organization creates new leadership challenges for non-commissioned and commissioned officers at all levels. The purpose of this research paper is to answer the question, "Is the Army's current leadership model and leader development doctrine properly addressing the challenges brought about by the transition to Force XXI?" This is not a project focused on command and control of Force XXI organizations -- it is an examination of the leadership challenges created, and how we need to address them. I have used a number of Army Field Manuals and Pamphlets on leadership and Force XXI, books, articles, and reviews of leadership models, previous research on leadership models, and a number of Army web pages to gather the most current information on the subject. Using the descriptions of technologies and organizations already fielded, or still on the drawing board, I have attempted to do some predictive analysis of what the demands of the Force XXI Army will be. Using the vision of what the Army will look like, I assess that the Army is taking some effective steps in employing transformational leadership to help guide organizational change. Melding of the Army's current leadership development models into this more academic model is taking place as part of the six imperatives of Force XXI.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:	17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT Unclassified	Public Release	55	Fenster, Lynn lfenster@dtic.mil
b. ABSTRACT Unclassified			
c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			

	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER
	International Area Code
	Area Code Telephone Number
	703767-9007
	DSN
	427-9007

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Preface

I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Reilly (LTC, US Army) and my Faculty Research Advisor, Major Tom Meara (MAJ, US Army) for helping me narrow my focus early-on to something manageable. Major Matt Stafford (Maj, USAF) also provided some great insight into RMAs and MTRs as I plodded down that path. He wasn't my Faculty Research Advisor, but in typical "Matt Stafford style" he spent the time to help me gather information that I could meld into the work.

Abstract

The infusion of technology into the Army's Force XXI organization creates new leadership challenges for non-commissioned and commissioned officers at all levels. The purpose of this research paper is to answer the question, "Is the Army's current leadership model and leader development doctrine properly addressing the challenges brought about by the transition to Force XXI?" This is *not* a project focused on command and control of Force XXI organizations -- it *is* an examination of the leadership challenges created, and how we need to address them. I have used a number of Army Field Manuals and Pamphlets on leadership and Force XXI, books, articles, and reviews of leadership models, previous research on leadership models, and a number of Army web pages to gather the most current information on the subject. Using the descriptions of technologies and organizations already fielded, or still on the drawing board, I have attempted to do some predictive analysis of what the demands of the Force XXI Army will be. Using the vision of what the Army will look like, I assess that the Army is taking some effective steps in employing transformational leadership to help guide organizational change. Melding of the Army's current leadership development models into this more academic model is taking place as part of the six imperatives of Force XXI.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Know the Enemy, Know Yourself, Know the Terrain.

—Sun Tzu (Paraphrased)

Is the Army's current leadership model and leader development doctrine properly addressing the challenges brought about by the transition to Force XXI? That is the focus of this research paper. The scope of this paper is limited to a review of the most popular leadership models in the field; an overview of Force XXI technologies and organizational changes; the Army's current approach to military leadership; the evolving Army leadership model; and an evaluation of this model with recommendations for potential modifications.

The paraphrased quote from Sun Tzu shown at the beginning of this chapter has secured a preeminent place in the lexicon of the Force XXI Army. The specific quote from Sun Tzu is, "Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total."¹ The US Army's approach to Force XXI focuses on the same truths that Sun Tzu stressed. Force XXI technologies are designed to answer three similar questions; "Where am I? Where is the enemy?" and "Where is my buddy"?. In other words know myself, know the enemy and know my adjacent, subordinate and higher forces in terms of relative positioning to each other, and the battlefield. The Army's infusion of technology and the

changes to organizations revolve around answering these three questions; through what the Army stresses is improved *situational awareness*. These changes, it is said, create the need to change our leadership doctrine.² I would term these “required changes” however, as something more akin to a tune up or azimuth correction – not wholesale change.

This research paper is designed to provide evidence that the Army’s military leadership doctrine is evolving to meet the new challenges of Force XXI, but is also grounded in a foundation that transcends what some are terming this Military Technological Revolution (MTR), or Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Why examine Leadership and Leadership Doctrine?

One might ask, what evidence is there that proves a need to reexamine military leadership in the Force XXI Army? In 1997 and 1998, Lieutenant General (Retired) Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. offered several observations about military leadership in speaking tours, papers and articles presented to professional military organizations. Excerpts from one of his articles are outlined below.

- “A 1997 survey of several thousand soldiers conducted as part of the investigation of abuse of authority at Aberdeen Proving-Ground and elsewhere reported that less than half the respondents replied positively to questions of confidence in their leaders.
- A survey sponsored by the Army Command and General Staff College in 1995 found some concerns about leadership and the command climate strikingly similar to those reported in the 1970 Army War College *Study on Military Professionalism*.
- Articles in military journals increasingly include comments to the effect that innovation is being crowded out by fear of failure (“Fear of Mistakes Throttles Initiative in the Ranks,” says one headline.) Thoughtful pieces in *Army* magazine argue that both personality and systemic factors undercut aspects of professionalism in the officer corps...

- Many senior service college students in recent classes seem to display more than typical student skepticism about the quality of senior leaders they have observed. Anecdotes about poor leadership, particularly at the field grade and General Officer levels, are too persistent to ignore.”³

To keep Lieutenant General Ulmer’s comments in context, I must stress that he was talking about a more holistic view of leadership in the Army than what is covered in the scope of this paper. The issues he identifies however are applicable to defining what the enduring leadership qualities of the Army should be; and also help form the foundation that one must consider when choosing, or developing, a leadership model to train leadership in the Army. The bottom line is that the Army’s move toward Force XXI in combination with other factors such as; recruiting and retention problems, the Aberdeen scandal, and the scandal surrounding Command Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney, to name a few; create the need to examine our leadership doctrine and determine if we are on the right path for the future. In my view, we must examine where we are and where we are moving to assess how well we are doing it.

Leadership Defined

To properly address the whole topic of leadership in the Army it is crucial to come to a common understanding on a few definitions. This paper focuses on military leadership and therefore the meaning of that term requires some clarification. *Webster’s New World Dictionary* defines a leader as “a person or thing that leads; directing, commanding, or guiding head, as of a group or activity”⁴ The Army’s capstone doctrine on Leadership, *FM 22-100, Military Leadership*, devotes the opening chapter to define the concept of leadership. It defines leadership simply as “the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.”⁵ More

importantly however is FM 22-100's description of leadership in terms of battlefield challenge, "Inspire soldiers to do things against their natural will – to carry out missions for the greater good of the unit, the Army, and the country."⁶ Finally, evolving Army doctrine on command and leadership defines it as "the process, through direct or indirect means, of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing resources, purpose, direction and motivation and of creating the conditions for sustained...success. It involves the commander's ability to impart his vision of success."⁷ The Army is about winning the nations wars. As such, the military leadership definition referred to throughout the remainder of this paper will meld with that found in evolving doctrine and the battlefield portion of the definition provided by FM 22-100. *Military Leadership is, the process, through direct or indirect means, of influencing others to do things, sometimes against their natural will, to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction and motivation.*

Doctrine Defined

Webster's New World Dictionary defines doctrine as referring "to a theory based on carefully worked out principles and taught or advocated by its adherents."⁸ The role of doctrine and really the essence of the Army's definition of doctrine is contained in the opening chapter of the Army's capstone operations manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*. The following excerpt provides a definition of doctrine from an operational standpoint.

Doctrine is the statement of how America's Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war. It is the condensed expression of the Army's fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events in operations other than war, and deterring actions detrimental to national interests. As an authoritative statement, doctrine must be definitive enough to guide specific operations, yet remain adaptable enough to address diverse and varied situations worldwide. It [doctrine]

also incorporates the lessons of warfare and the wisdom of the Army's collective leadership in establishing a guide to action in war and operations other than war.⁹

Although the doctrinal definition used above is written to describe *operational* doctrine one can see that the fundamental elements of *Webster's* definition are included. For the purposes of this paper I will meld the definitions and create the following statement of what doctrine is. *Doctrine is an expression of the overarching principles under which an organization operates. It is authoritative in nature, flexible in application, and reflects the collective wisdom of the leaders of the organization.*

I spend the time to define doctrine because as I begin to examine the Army's current and evolving approach to leadership training the reader must understand that what the Army is about to embark on is a fundamental change in the way the organization thinks about leadership. Because leadership is the most critical element of combat power, the changes we make in the way we view it will have far-reaching effects on our ability to fight and win the nation's wars in an operational environment.¹⁰

Model Defined

Throughout the course of this paper I will refer to leadership models. Again to provide common understanding I will provide some thoughts on models. *Webster's* provides a definition of model as referring "to any person or thing to be followed or imitated because of his or its excellence, worth, etc.." ¹¹ A synonym for model, in the context in which we are using it, is framework. *Webster's* defines framework as, "a structure, usually rigid, serving to hold the parts of something together or to support something constructed or stretched over or around it; skeletal structure, the basic structure, arrangement or system." ¹² Again, for the purpose of this discussion, I will

meld the definitions. *A model is a structure that holds the parts of a position or argument together. It provides a framework of reference for a system and provides structure and arrangement for an argument or position.*

Summary

To this point I have discussed the need to address leadership in the Army and provided definitions of leadership, doctrine and models to ensure the reader has a common frame of reference. Lieutenant General Ulmer's findings provide proof that soldiers and leaders believe that something is missing from their leaders. The key definitions are highlighted below:

Military Leadership: The process, through direct or indirect means, of influencing others to do things, sometimes against their natural will, to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction and motivation.

Doctrine: An expression of the overarching principles under which an organization operates. It is authoritative in nature, flexible in application, and reflects the collective wisdom of the leaders of the organization.

Model: A structure that holds the parts of a position or argument together. It provides a framework of reference for a system and provides structure and arrangement for an argument or position.

Notes

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Translated with an Intro. By Samuel B. Griffith, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.pg. 129.

² Excerpts from Chief of Staff of the Army, Dennis J. Reimer's speech to the Armor Conference, May 21, 1998 as found at http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/whte_ppr.pdf

³ Ulmer, Walter F. Jr.,), "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another "Bridge Too Far?"" *Parameters*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp 5-6.

Notes

⁴ *Webster's New World Dictionary, 2d College Ed*, New York: The World Publishing Company, 1972, pg. 801.

⁵ US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Military Leadership*, (Washington, DC Headquarter, DA, 31 July 1990), pg. 1-2.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-102, *Command* (draft) (Washington, DC: Headquarters, DA, 28 Jun 1995), pg. 1-4.

⁸ *Webster's New World Dictionary*, pg. 414

⁹ FM 100-5, pp. 1-1 to 1-2.

¹⁰ FM 100-5, pg. 2-11.

¹¹ *Webster's*, pg. 913.

¹² *Ibid*, pg. 553

Chapter 2

The Basics of Leadership

Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth.

—James MacGregor Burns¹
Leadership, 1978

James MacGregor Burns' observation is shared by many. It is my intent to provide an overview of the foremost leadership models in order to allow a better understanding of the Army's current and evolving model(s).

Leadership is a subject that has been addressed since nearly the beginning of recorded history. Sun Tzu, who wrote nearly 2500 years ago, had a great deal to say about leadership. He addressed the leadership role of the ruler in both military and non-military terms and he addressed the role of commanders when he said "a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."² He went on to say that "the potential of troops skillfully [sic] commanded in battle may be compared to that of round boulders which roll down from mountain heights."³ A leader gets the most out of his people. Sun Tzu was not alone. Other preeminent military writers such as Carl von Clausewitz and Jomeini also wrote on the requirements of good leadership and its impact on military operations. There are common themes that flow from these classical writers, but there are an equal number of issues that seem to run counter to one another. In more recent history scholars have tried to put together

leadership models to help explain how leadership should be viewed and how it should be practiced. The common thread among all of the models is the relative position of the leader, the follower (or the led), and the situation.

The basic leadership model that transcends all of the others is one that expresses leaders, followers and the situation as overlapping rings.⁴ Other models will take their place within these rings by determining the degree of influence one ring has over the other. I would also add the Army's piece of the equation, *communication*, by displaying it as the link(s) between the rings.⁵ Although situations may not "communicate" in a linguistic sense, they will impact the leader and/or followers in such a way as to communicate the need for some action (see figure 1).




Figure 1. Leader, Follower, Situation, Communication Model⁶

Most models incorporate the premise that an effective leader must provide at least some control, motivation, and/or direction over the influence of the three factors described. An effective leader is one who can, for lack of a better term, *manipulate* the overlap of the rings to take the followers or the organization in the direction he intends.

The leader determines the direction he or she wants the organization to take and then develops and communicates his or her vision to subordinates. The Army's evolving leadership doctrine focuses on the situational element of "change". Before diving into the emerging leadership model in the Army it is worthwhile to look at the leading models to see where some of the Army's ideas may be rooted.

There are a myriad of leadership models/theories that one can look at. Lieutenant Colonel Jan M. Camplin, who also holds a Doctorate in Business Administration, reviewed thirteen theories in her paper entitled "Leadership Approaches and Theories with Special Reference to Military (Army) Fundamental Leadership."⁷ Many of the theories she describes overlap one another and for the purpose of this study, I will narrow them down to the following four: the Great Man Theory; Situational Leadership; Transactional Exchange; and Transformational Appeal.

The four theories, or models, named above all rely on the elements described in the Leader-Follower-Situation-Communication shown in figure 1, but to varying degrees. I will discuss these theories in the order listed.

The Great Man Theory, as the name implies, relies most heavily on the Leader portion of the model. The theory postulates that followers look up to and respect the leader to such a degree that they are willing to transcend themselves and the situation to follow in the direction he prescribes. The weakness of this theory is that it rests almost exclusively on the leader and does little to account for conditions (situations) that allow for the rise of leaders or for the followers themselves. The weakness may be illustrated using Adolph Hitler as an example. It is my position that Hitler could not have risen to power if German society (the followers), the economy, and the national honor (situational

conditions) had not existed to allow his rise. Using Hitler as an example we can look at the Situational Leadership Theory in a little greater detail.

Researchers use historical examples to support their position of the preeminence of the Situational Leadership Theory. The researchers highlight the fact that most great leaders emerge in response to economic crisis or political and social upheaval. One can see the point – it is hard to think of a great leader who came to the forefront during a time of tranquility. People who espouse this theory also tend to believe that leaders are born, not made. The situation allows someone with natural leadership talents to rise to the top as cream rises to the top of fresh milk. The weakness of this theory is that little credit or blame is laid on the followers who participate in the interactive process of leadership.⁸ Followers expect to be part of the equation. When their well-being is not considered, or when they are treated like robots, they will balk. In the words of General Maxwell D. Taylor,

“American troops, in particular, resent any suggestion that they are without individuality, that they are ciphers and not people. They want to be known for themselves and will resist any attempt to mold them into an anonymous pattern.”⁹

The Transactional Exchange Theory is based on the premise that there is an exchange between leader and follower. The theory says that followers accept the leadership of the leader because they get something from him or her in exchange for following. The easiest example to use is from the business world. An employee follows under the “leadership” of his or her supervisor because the supervisor has the power and authority to impact later promotions or pay raises. The leader, on the other hand, gains something from the follower as well. In our business scenario the leader gets work done which impresses his boss, which may in turn result in promotions or raises for him.

There is a transaction for mutual benefit. The failing in this theory is that there is little said about how the situation effects leader or follower.

The last theory I want to discuss is Bass's (1985) Transformational Leadership Theory.¹⁰ I will spend the greatest amount of time on this theory because it is the one that appears to be most espoused in the business world; has its roots in military leadership of the past; and the groundwork of the Army's evolving leadership model appears to emanate from this theory.

Formal Transformational Theory came of age in 1985 with B.M. Bass's work on the subject. Essentially Bass believed that transformational leaders have the ability to create a vision and then motivate followers towards that vision with charisma. He also believed that transformational leaders formed a bond between themselves and their followers that transcends the simple requirements of give and take highlighted in the transactional form of leadership. If we recall the definition of military leadership that we used earlier one can see that this theory aligns most closely with that definition. Comparing it to the Leader-Follower-Situation-Communication model from figure 1, we can see that transformational leadership lies at the center of the diagram where all of the circles cross. It is pushed to the center and balanced by effective communications between the leader and the followers with apt consideration of the situation at hand.

Two books on the subject of transformational leadership also provide a healthy insight into the theory: Noel M Tichy and Mary Anne Devanna's, *The Transformational Leader* and Andrew S. Grove's, *Only the Paranoid Survive*. Both books provide advice to industrial leaders on how to lead their organizations through change. The authors stress that the first question that must be answered in order to properly employ

transformational leadership is “what causes a need for change?” An examination of this point is critical to understanding why the Army feels the need to change its leadership model as it pursues Force XXI and the follow-on “Army After Next.”

Andrew Grove, who is also the President and CEO of Intel Corporation, calls the point where an organization needs to change the “Inflection Point.”¹¹ The Inflection Point is that moment in time where a change is required to take the organization to the next higher level. If the leadership of the organization misses the Inflection Point he or she can recover, but there is a cost in terms of efficiency, dollars, organizational health or any number of other factors. The talent of the leader lies in knowing where that inflection point is and then developing a vision to move the organization in the right direction. I believe the Army’s senior leadership views Force XXI as the inflection point for the Army and is attempting to develop a vision that will lead the Army towards change. I will discuss more on this later in this paper.

Another critical note brought out in Transformational Leadership theory is that mid-level leaders and followers in the organization are often resistant to change. Most mid-level leaders have achieved some degree of success under the old system and resist movement away from established patterns that have worked for them. Tichy and Devanna point out that some successful companies tend to be extremely resistant to change even though they can see something is happening in their industry.¹² The business community does not have a monopoly on resistance to change. To paraphrase Sir Basil Liddell Hart when speaking about the military, “The hard part is not getting a new idea into their heads, it’s getting the old one out.” Leaders at all levels will normally recognize the need for change even though that realization may not be instantaneous.

The difficulty lies in using a leadership model or technique that will help subordinates (leaders or followers) see the need for change and commit to working within the leader's vision to see it come about. Bringing about the transformation of an organization is the second part of the transformational leadership model equation.

To paraphrase Tichy and Devanna, they break the process of leading the organization through change into the following six parts:

1. Identifying and diagnosing the problem.
2. Creating a motivating vision.
3. Mobilizing Commitment: Getting people committed to the mission
4. Creative Destruction: Tearing down the elements of the organization that work against change
5. Retooling the bureaucracy to promote change while preventing it from losing sight of people in the process.
6. Leader motivation of people toward the new vision and goals.¹³

Grove on the other hand, offers less of a “by-the-numbers” approach to leading change in an organization, he focuses instead on identifying the need for change. Following this identification, Grove advocates allowing experimentation and searching as the organization moves towards the vision, but senior leaders must be willing to quickly “rein in the chaos” to get the organization moving consistently along the lines of the strategic vision.¹⁴

While Grove's thesis centers on the strategic level of the corporate world there are applicable lessons for the Army. The Army has spent a great deal of time in experimentation to identify what the Army will look like at some point after the year 2005. General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army, outlined how the Army was continuing to develop its vision for the twenty-first century this way:

Force XXI starts with the Army After Next [AAN] wargames. What we do in the wargames is project ourselves on to a mountain top in 2020 and

look at the world at that point in time and determine the role for landpower and the role for the Army. After the wargame we move on to what I call constellation games, in which we look at the impact of the Army After Next vision and how it will affect each of the Army's six imperatives - training, force mix, modernizing equipment, developing quality people, leadership and doctrine. We do one of these cycles of wargames each year, and each year they have gotten better. They are giving us a clear and confident vision for what kinds of capabilities we will need in the next century.¹⁵

Summary

In my view it is clear that the Army is diligently working on the first few steps of transforming the Army towards Force XXI. The key to success will be how well the Army progresses from its leadership models of the past to those being developed for the future. Equally important however, is identifying what elements of the Army's past leadership model(s) must be retained.

The Army's current leadership model focuses on the interaction of leader-follower-situation-communications with emphasis on the leader's control of the situation. The move towards Force XXI however, is creating an evolution in Army leadership doctrine that moves it more towards a transformational model. The Army's senior leadership has recognized that the move towards Force XXI creates a requirement for change. With the requirement for change comes a requirement to transform the organization (the Army) from where it currently is, to some point not yet fully defined. The following chapter will discuss the Army's current doctrine as a means of establishing the point of departure from which evolving doctrine must begin.

Notes

¹ James MacGregor Burns as taken from *Leadership: Quotations from the World's Greatest Motivators*, compiled by Robert A. Fitton, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pg. 158.

² Sun Tzu, pg. 93

³ Ibid., pg. 95

⁴ Richard L. Hughes, Robert C Ginnett, Gordon J. Curphy, *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience* (Burr Ridge, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1993), pg. 114

⁵ FM 22-100, pg. 2-2

⁶ Adapted from ideas taken from Hughes, et al and FM 22-100.

⁷ Jan M. Camplin, (LTC, US Army) "Leadership Approaches and Theories with Special Reference to Military (Army) Fundamental Leadership," prepared for US Army War College, April 1996.

⁸ Hughes, et al. pg. 312.

⁹ Maxwell D. Taylor as taken from *Leadership: Quotations from the World's Greatest Motivators*, pg. 272

¹⁰ Hughes, et al., pg. 443

¹¹ Andrew S.Grove, *Only the Paranoid Survive*, (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1996), pg. 32

¹² Noel M. Tichy and Mary Anne Devanna, *The Transformational Leader*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1990, pg. 44-63.

¹³ Tichy and Devanna, pp. 89-245.

¹⁴ Grove, pp. 123-157.

¹⁵ http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/whte_ppr.pdf

Chapter 3

The Army's Current Leadership Doctrine

The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. Leaders inspire soldiers with the will to win. They provide purpose direction and motivation in combat.

—FM 100-5, *Operations*
June, 1993

An Outline of Current Army Doctrine

In the previous Chapter I discussed the premise that Army Leadership doctrine helped form the basis for many of the leadership theories that have emerged in the corporate and collegiate world. The US Army's Field Manual 22-100, *Military Leadership*, provides the best overview of the Army's approach to military leadership. It provides a description of the principles of leadership and how they fall into the categories of Be, Know and Do as a watchword phrase for military leaders.¹

The Army takes an approach to leadership training that includes three pillars of leader development: institutional training and education; operational assignments; and self-development.² Important to understanding the Army's stress on leader development is to understand the Army's position that leaders are made and not born. Nearly every ROTC Cadet and new noncommissioned officer gets this thought ingrained from the start of his or her institutional learning process. Finally, the Army stresses all elements of the

L-F-S-C model. The chart below (figure 2) is taken from FM 22-100 and outlines how the Army definition of leadership; “the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation”; links with the principles of leadership.³

While looking at figure 2 the reader should keep in mind the over-arching guidance given under the headings of Be, Know and Do. As a doctrinal manual, FM 22-100 gives authoritative guidance on what Army leaders are expected to do in these three areas.

Be: As a leader, you are responsible for understanding and directly transmitting the Army’s values to your soldiers. These values are the foundation for service to the nation. Since the Army’s purpose is to protect the nation and its values, the Army’s ethic must be consistent with national will and values.⁴

Know: A leader must learn before he leads. You need to KNOW (understand) standards, yourself, human nature, your job, and your unit to be an effective leader.⁵

Do: Leaders can lose battles, but only soldiers can win them. Having the right values, beliefs, character, ethics, and knowledge is necessary but does not ensure success on the battlefield. Soldiers must be properly trained, equipped and employed (led) by their leaders to enhance their probability of winning. Leaders must also provide purpose, direction and motivation to meet the demands of combat.⁶

The traits of Be, Know and Do can be categorized into the two elements of Character and Competence (a phrase that seems to be growing in popularity as the Chief of Staff of the Army uses it in speeches while visiting units around the world). How the categories are grouped is not as critical as how the Army views the principles that fall under them. The important point is to see how values, skills and abilities in junior leaders; coupled with the motivation, direction and purpose provided by more seasoned leaders can create synergistic effects for an organization.

Leadership in Action		
As a Leader You Must:	Examples	
BE		
Be a person of strong and honorable character.	Determination Compassion Self-discipline Role Modeling	Initiative Flexibility Consistency
Be committed to the professional Army ethic	Loyalty to the nation, the Army and the unit. Selfless Service.	Integrity Duty
Be an example of individual values	Courage Candor	Competence Commitment
Be able to resolve complex ethical dilemmas.	Interpret the situation. Analyze all the factors and forces that apply.	Choose a course of action that seems best for the nation.
KNOW		
Know the four factors of leadership and how they affect each other.	The Leader The situation Sources of Army standards.	The led Communications How standards relate to wargighting.
Know standards.	Personality and performance. Strengths and weaknesses.	Knowledge, skills and attitudes.
Know yourself	Potential for good and bad behavior.	How depression and sadness contribute to fear and panic and how fear affects performance.
Know human nature	Plan and communicate effectively. Supervise, teach, coach, and counsel. Display technical and tactical competence.	Develop subordinates. Make good decisions that your soldiers accept. Use available systems.
Know your job.	Unit capabilities and limitations.	
Know your unit.		
DO		
Provide purpose.	Explain the "why" of missions Plan Maintain standards.	Communicate your intent. Supervise, evaluate, teach, coach and counsel.
Provide direction.	Set goals. Make decisions and solve problems.	Train soldiers and soldier teams.
Provide motivation.	Take care of soldiers. Serve as the ethical standard bearer. Develop cohesive soldier teams. Make soldiering meaningful	Reward performance that exceeds standards. Correct performance not meeting standards. Punish soldiers who intentionally fail to meet standards of follow orders.

Figure 2 – Army Principles of Leadership from FM 22-100⁷.

Great Man, Transactional, Situational, Transformational, or What?

With the information provided about leadership theories earlier, the reader may now be trying to pigeonhole the Army's approach to leadership development into one of the theories/models described. To save the reader some effort, I will describe why I believe the Army's approach is really a combination of all of these models, but is not really any one model in itself. This will begin to answer the specific part of my thesis that says the Army is well postured to face the challenges of Force XXI leadership. The basic elements for a leadership model designed to lead the Army through the change to Force XXI are present, the model however, continues to evolve.

The Army's position that leaders are made and not born, and the quote above that says soldiers can't lose battles, but leaders can, immediately weeds out a strict transactional model as a viable one for the Army's leader development practices. Although the Army points to great men in their history to learn leadership lessons, one would be hard pressed to get the Army to say that they espoused the Great Man theory of leadership. Situational impacts on the leader are critically important to the Army. For example, Chapter 3 of FM 22-100 consists primarily of anecdotal stories of leadership in battle. The stories are meant to show situations that leaders found themselves in and then stress the leader attributes used to overcome adversity. The Army stresses all elements of the L-F-S-C model with no special favor to the situation. The leading theory left is the transformational model as it works within the overarching exchange between leader, follower and situation.

The Army has been forced to change to meet technological advances before. The invention of the repeating rifle, the invention of airplanes, the development of the tank,

satellite-based Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and other technological innovations continue to push the Army towards change. *My position is that of the models presented, the Army has used a transformational sense of leadership from at least World War II to the present.* The problem has most often been achieving the first step of transformation that Hughes, Tichy, Devanna and Grove all spoke about –identifying the need for change in the organization. The Army encourages leaders to motivate their subordinates towards organizational goals and objectives within a value system common to all. These elements taken together support the position that the Army has employed transformational leadership for many years.

The following chapter will describe a few of the organizational and technological aspects of Force XXI as a means of showing some of the changes that the Army must address in its next move towards change. Following a discussion of the technological and organizational changes the Army is facing, I will make an assessment of the evolving leadership model the Army appears to be moving towards.

Notes

¹ FM 22-100, pg. 2-4,

² Otis E. Cooksey's (LTC, US Army), "Developing Senior Leaders in the 21st Century", prepared for US Army War College, pg. 10.

³ FM 22-100, pg. 1-2.

⁴ FM 22-100, pg. 4-1.

⁵ FM 22-100, pg. 5-1.

⁶ FM 22-100, pg. 6-1, 6-2.

⁷ FM 22-100, pg 7-2, 7-3.

Chapter 4

Force XXI

We must also recognize that success on past battlefields has resulted not so much from technological advances but from innovative ways of considering and combining available and sometimes new technologies as they apply to warfighting.

—TRADOC Pam 525-5, Force XXI Operations

What is Force XXI?

A brief look at the emerging technologies and organizational change that accompany the Army's move into the twenty-first century is necessary to help build a foundation for explaining the Army's evolving leadership model. The reader will find that some, but not all aspects of this emerging model are built to address emerging technologies -- equally important, (according to leading Army publications) is a focus on the strategic environment.¹ Before we discuss the specific technologies and organizational changes of Force XXI, it is important to look at what Force XXI is and isn't.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, refers to Force XXI as the "Army's Change Process". Force XXI is more than just the technological and organizational changes being made -- is a look into the future using the "Army After Next Wargames" as a means of trying to develop a vision of where we (the Army) need to be twenty or more years into the twenty-first century.²

The Army is moving from an organizational structure titled “Army of Excellence (AOE)”, towards Force XXI. Appendix A includes a chart that highlights the changes from AOE to Force XXI. In fact, due in large part to the target date of the changes (1986), the precursor to the term Army of Excellence was Division ‘86. Using a holistic view of the term “Force XXI” as one including all aspects of the Army’s move towards the twenty-first century one can see the parallel.

A few key points on the Army’s move to Force XXI as outlined in the Force XXI action office’s presentation slides found on their web site reveal a great deal about the larger scope of Force XXI. The first critical highlights are the six imperatives of Force XXI as defined by the Chief of Staff of the Army:

1. Quality People
2. Training
3. Force Mix
4. Doctrine
5. Modern Equipment
6. Leader Development³

There are no startling revolutions in these imperatives, but keep them in mind as we briefly explore the concept of a Military Technological Revolution below. The next critical elements of Force XXI encompass the design principles that highlight the direction of the force in the next century.

1. Organize around information
2. Dominate battlespace: speed, space and time
3. Control battlefield tempo with overwhelming lethality and superior survivability
4. Mount, execute and recover from operations simultaneously
5. Capable of quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties
6. Rapidly deployable and operationally agile
7. Enhance tailorability through modularity
8. Divert tasks that inhibit primary mission: to fight and win⁴

I believe that the only element of the list above that requires clarification is item 7, “enhance tailorability through modularity.” The following excerpt from *Force XXI, Operations*, best provides the crux of this explanation for this phrase.

Tailorability and Modularity. Aided by information technology, organizations will tend to grow flatter and less rigidly hierarchical. Strategic lift limitations, other service capabilities, time limits, and other factors may compel the Army to use only those forces absolutely necessary [tailorability]. Limits also exist on the number and types of units in the Army. These factors will demand forces that are as modular as logic allows to facilitate tailoring to meet each contingency.⁵

The reader can see that it is possible to speak of Force XXI without constantly dwelling in the realm of technology, but when discussing Force XXI the discussion inevitably gets back to technological innovation.

Technologies’ Place in Force XXI

What is technology’s place in Force XXI? Is it the central point from where all other things must grow? Is it an enabler to help the Army move towards the next century? There is a great deal of debate throughout the Army on this subject. The Army takes the position that we are in the midst of a Revolution in Military Affairs that is technology based (also referred to as a Military Technological Revolution (MTR)).^{6,7} The central technology is the technology dealing with informational exchange. It includes all of the technologies that allow information to move from soldier to soldier or across the world in the blink of an eye and from increasingly smaller pieces of communications equipment, it includes the hardware and the software that makes this information exchange possible.

The current authoritative source on Force XXI, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI Operations*, focuses on the operational and strategic level of conflict to describe how Force XXI operations will take place. Although it discusses technology a great deal, the

focus of the pamphlet is not technology itself. In fact, more time is spent discussing the changing strategic environment and command information structures than technology. Changes in technology, are of course, great contributors to the command information structures, but the focus of Force XXI operational doctrine is not technology, but rather the effects of technology. Technological effects are most profoundly felt in the command information structures of the Army. *If* there is a revolution in military affairs, it is in this area of information exchange.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5's discussion of technology is broad based and focused on informational systems and what has come to be known as Information Age technology. The thrust of the discussion on technology is that it will make the Army's hierarchical systems "flatter," meaning information will pass along multiple networks up, down and laterally. Internetted systems will allow some information to automatically pass along the network little or no restrictions (e.g. logistics statuses) while other information (e.g. maneuver orders) will continue to pass in a hierarchical fashion. Figure 3 provides a graphic depiction of the hierarchical versus nonhierarchical structures discussed –it is one of the center points of Force XXI capabilities that is impacting organizational change.⁸




Figure 3 – Command Information Structures⁹

Conclusions

The Army's focus on the effect of informational technologies and their impact on improved situational awareness is not a mistake. The important point here however is not the specific technology, but the effect of technology. The Army's focus, as illustrated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, is that there is a need for change in the way leaders approach solutions to tactical problems. (Tactical is not used in the sense of strategic versus operational versus tactical levels of war, but rather in the sense of warfighting). Those who focus on the technological aspects of Force XXI at the expense of understanding the effects of this technology and the requirement to change the approach to leadership do so at their own peril.

The effect of technology on the command informational structure of the Army is the crux of Force XXI and is the reason the Army's leadership model is evolving. The Army's senior leadership understands that improvements in information technologies and the *potential* for improving situational awareness across all levels of the organizational structure requires a modification in the way leaders approach their subordinates, the situation, and the way the organization communicates.

Transformational leadership allows leaders to help move the organization towards the changes created by Force XXI, but the basic principles of sound leadership already exist in the Army. The following chapter will describe how the transformational model used in conjunction with existing (current) Army leadership principles will allow a smooth transition to Force XXI

Author's Note

A scenario is included at Appendix B to help the reader understand some of the practical applications of Force XXI technologies. It is designed to provide the reader who is unfamiliar with Force XXI technologies a brief glimpse into the future and a desire for increased self-study to learn more. It is a fictitious scenario that may help illustrate how some of the technologies the Army is integrating into its structure will impact soldiers and leaders throughout all levels of the Army.

Notes

¹ TRADOC Pamphlet (PAM), 525-5, *Force XXI, Operations*, 1 August 1994, Chapter 1.

² http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/whte_ppr.pdf

³ <http://www-tradoc.army.mil/pao/newdiv/oneteam/tsld009.htm>.

⁴ <http://www-tradoc.army.mil/pao/newdiv/oneteam/tsld011.htm>.

⁵ TRADOC PAM, 525-5, Para 3-1.

⁶ TRADOC PAM, 525-5, Para 2-3.

⁷ Author's Note: The six imperatives and the design principles listed above seem to support the fact that the Army identifies this period as an MTR and is formulating a strategy to capitalize on it. Whether or not we will effectively create a MTR is still unknown, but it is my belief that the Army is taking the right steps to harness technology. The key ingredients of doctrinal development, technological application, leader development, and organizational changes, and focused training are all present. The test will be how effectively we develop doctrine, organizations, equipment, leader development and training.

⁸ TRADOC PAM, 525-5, Chapters 2 and 3.

⁹ TRADOC PAM, 525-5, Figure 2-6.

Chapter 5

Systems Thinking – The New Direction?

“Systems thinking and learning organization models are helping shape how Army leaders view the world and the relationship of our Army in the ever-changing world security environment.”

Major Jack Gumbert
“Leadership in the Digitized Force”

Introduction

I have had two opportunities to listen to General Dennis Reimer speak about the Army. The central point of both speeches was the new direction that the Army was taking as it moved towards the twenty-first century. Earlier, I highlighted an excerpt from the speech he gave at the 1998 Armor Conference that described Force XXI as one of the stepping stones, or building blocks, designed to help build the Army of the future. I believe the Chief of Staff is attempting to get leaders and followers in the Army (if you're not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, you are probably both a follower and leader) to catch the spirit of his vision and work in a transformational way towards the future. Despite the evidence that General Reimer appears to be following a transformational model of leadership to help guide the move to the future, there is a growing school of thought that is termed “systems thinking.” I have heard General Reimer use the term himself in past addresses to military audiences.

Systems Thinking

Systems thinking is a school of thought centered on leaders. It concentrates on how leaders should train both themselves and their subordinate to think and lead in a way that is in theory, different from what they do now. It is a theory/model that would have us depart from the Army's current leadership model and move towards another that is purportedly a better complement to a more technological Army. The best work I have found on the subject was an article written by Major Jack Gumbert (MAJ, US Army). He says,

“Together, systems thinking and learning organization models are helping shape how Army leaders view the world and the relationship of our Army in the ever-changing world security environment. Significantly, these concepts are creating new leadership ideas and developing new relationships between leaders and subordinates. Systems thinking represents a true revolution in how individuals view cause and effect relationships. Further, it represents a unique method of understanding and analyzing the environment. The overarching importance of becoming a systems thinker is critical to becoming a successful leader in the future. Systems thinking focuses on the relationships between the arrangements of the various systems and subsystems that operate in a given environment.”¹

The significance of Major Gumbert's observations and their impact as a growing leadership model are clear when analyzed using the leader, follower, situation, communications model discussed earlier. His discussion hits on every facet of this model. Substitute the word situation for the word environment in the quote above while understanding that communications must be present in any interaction between leaders and followers, and the equation is nearly complete. The second part of his thesis and a position held in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Force XXI, Operations*² and FM 22-102, *Command* (draft); is that the Army is a “learning organization.”

The basic leadership precept in a learning organization is that leaders design groupings to take advantage of the baseline capabilities of the multiple parts of the organization. They recognize that synergy is achieved by maximizing the sub-systems of the organization as they operate within a common vision.³ We have seen a similar description of this type of focused leadership in other publications. My position is that this precept is a typically military one.

The systems approach to leadership has merit. It stresses the need for leaders to gain a thorough understanding of their organization -- its capabilities and limitations, the technology that drives it, the systems within systems, and the communicative tools (natural and man-made) used to maintain links between leaders, followers and situation. The question in my mind is whether or not a move towards a "new" leadership model is warranted or whether modified emphasis within the "old" model is sufficient. The following chapter will address that question.

Notes

¹ Jack Gumbert, (Major, US Army), "Leadership in the Digitized Force." *Military Review*, January-February 1998, pg. 13.

² TRADOC PAM, 525-5, pg 4-1

³ Gumbert, pg. 14.

Chapter 6

The Right Mix -- Conclusions

Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace it.

—General Omar Bradley

Introduction

The infusion of technology into the Army creates unique challenges. The environment (read situation) is changing. The strategic environment has changed and technology itself is changing the way leaders will communicate with their subordinates in training and combat. Leaders also have a responsibility to become technically proficient with new informational technologies centered on computer literacy. Leaders of combat arms units can no longer pride themselves on being “computer illiterate.” It is common knowledge that the soldiers entering the Army come from a generation much more familiar, and comfortable, with computer-age technologies, but this is not enough either. They too must be trained in the specific application of knowledge to the hardware and software systems that are entering service even now.

Army leadership doctrine needs to better prepare leaders to address the technological modernization of the force and the changes being made to nearly all of the units that make up the fighting back-bone of the organization. Changes to the leadership approach

do not however, necessitate an overhaul of the entire leadership model the Army currently works under.

Summation, Conclusions and Recommendations

Summation

In the first Chapter I examined why the Army needs to look at leadership doctrine and leadership models when developing a holistic approach to Force XXI doctrine. Using Lieutenant General (Retired) Ulmer's study I showed that there is a need to address leadership doctrine in the context of Force XXI. I also defined military leadership as *the process, through direct or indirect means, of influencing others to do things, sometimes against their natural will, to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction and motivation.* This laid the groundwork for the subsequent discussion of the foremost leadership theories.

Chapter 2 focused on the basics of leadership. An examination of the foremost leadership theories showed that all address the elements of leader, follower, situation and communication, but to varying degrees. I also established that the Army's senior leaders are taking a transformational leadership approach to lead the organization towards change. The transformational approach however is rooted in the existing Army leadership model.

The Army's use of leader, situation, follower and communication; is wrapped into its model of Be, Know and Do. Chapter 3 described the way in which the Army incorporated the fundamental elements of the military leadership definition into its model

and depends on a balance of institutional instruction, operational assignments and self-study to improve leader skills.

An examination of Force XXI in Chapter 4 showed that it is more than just the equipment and technology being fielded in Army organizations. Force XXI includes all of the changes (equipment, technology, leadership and organization) the Army is making to address the new strategic environment while maximizing the *effects* and application of technology. Improved situational awareness and non-hierarchical information and command structures create a need to address how the Army trains leaders.

Chapter 5 discussed one of the leading models under consideration to frame the Army's approach to leadership training – systems thinking. Given an examination of the foremost leadership models, the Army's current doctrine and a discussion of the evolving systems thinking approach to leadership we can draw some conclusions from this information.

Conclusions

All of the research I have done on this subject leads me to a simple conclusion: *the Army's current leadership model and leader development doctrine provides an effective framework to address the challenges brought about by the transition to Force XXI.* This statement is the answer to question I put forth at the beginning of this work. The operative word in the statement however, is *framework*. Army leadership doctrine must remain flexible enough to integrate the best ideas from other models to become a more effective and authoritative source for a leadership training approach. The Army is a learning organization that will transform to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The key elements of transforming an organization were discussed earlier. Again borrowing from Tichy and Devanna, the key elements of transformational leadership are the following:

1. Identifying and diagnosing the problem.
2. Creating a motivating vision.
3. Mobilizing Commitment: Getting people committed to the mission
4. Creative Destruction: Tearing down the elements of the organization that work against change
5. Retooling the bureaucracy to promote change while preventing it from losing sight of people in the process.
6. Leader motivation of people toward the new vision and goals.¹

The speeches made by the Chief of Staff of the Army, the publication of such pamphlets as TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 and the renewed focus on the Army's organizational values all contribute to establishing a motivating vision, mobilizing commitment and focusing leaders on the future. The Army After Next wargames that the Chief of Staff described serve to identify and diagnose the problems of a new environment while providing insight into creating the vision of the world's most capable land force in the twenty-first century. Creative destruction sounds rather draconian, but is a necessary requirement to lead the force towards change. One can look back at the near panic created in some circles when mechanics were consolidated in the headquarters company in mechanized infantry and tank battalions when the Army of Excellence was created in 1986 – this as an example of creative destruction. The benefits of changing the system have proven themselves in a more effective maintenance system with improved operational readiness rates. Tearing down bureaucratic barriers does not mean tearing down the organization itself. Initiatives in streamlining acquisition; making it more joint; and capitalizing on off-the-shelf technologies is a form of tearing down bureaucratic

barriers. Training and encouraging leaders who can lead the organization through change will prove to be the most important systems oriented change we make.

The Army's senior leaders are establishing the correct climate for necessary modifications to the Army's leadership doctrine and models by correctly applying a transformational style of leadership to direct the Army towards the still uncertain future called "The Army After Next." One of the initial steps in that journey is Force XXI.

As established earlier, Force XXI includes a holistic approach to the organizational, technological and leadership changes the Army must make in its move towards the Army After Next. Within this context, I will offer a few recommendations on what the Army should do within its current leadership model to better position its leaders for the twenty-first century.

Recommendations

The leader, follower, situation, and communication model still works to address the learning organization the Army is trying desperately to become. The training pillars of institutional learning, operational assignments and self-study should be the targets of modification.

I do not believe that the principles espoused by the systems thinking leadership model are the end-all for addressing modifications to the leadership approach, but they do provide a good outline for some of the critical skills that we must teach leaders to become more effective. The merit of the systems thinking approach to leadership is that it stresses the importance of educating leaders about the systems that they control and the systems that impact them, their subordinates and the situation. In my view this is not a leadership model in itself, but rather a roadmap of sorts to help focus leader training. We

should use the points made in the systems thinking approach to identify the skills leaders need to be more effective.

The Army must take a close look at the leadership skills being taught in its institutional schools. A review of the curriculum at the Army Command and General Staff College and the battalion/brigade pre-command course reveal little, if any instruction in technology.² Students at ACSC still write out the answers to their exams on blue books. Simple things like forcing the field-grade leaders to gain some computer literacy by issuing laptops and then requiring them to submit their exams using them is a step in the right direction. The Air Force's Air Command and Staff College (the USAF equivalent of CGSC) does it and it works – part of the organizational culture of the Air Force is described as technological competence.³ Improvements in the institutional learning structure are not enough however. Another example of our need for improvement in this area is the fact that the US Army's Infantry Officer's Advanced Course did not even begin executing solutions to tactical exercises in computer simulation until FY 95.⁴ We are making improvements, but the pace of these improvements must be improved if we are going to match the tempo of the changes we face.

The second area to concentrate is operational assignments. I believe the Army is taking the correct actions in this area. Changes made by instituting the Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) will help us along this path. It provides greater opportunity for promotion outside of command channels and rewards success in whatever job the officer is assigned. A full evaluation of this system will not be possible for years to come, but the Army is taking a big step to address the issue of officer

assignments and development. The greatest benefit to officers in terms of operational assignments however will come from working in the organizations modified by Force XXI. The place to put leadership theory into practice is in the field. The Army must listen to the lessons learned from these officers and noncommissioned officers as they work through the problems and experience the leadership challenges first-hand.

The last element of the Army's approach to leadership develop that I need to address is self-study. In a survey conducted by the faculty at the Army War College in 1995, 432 general officers and promotable colonels were asked what traits senior leaders should have to be successful. The competencies listed included: managing and responding to change, knowing how to lead in learning organizations, ability to manage huge amounts of data, psychological and physical stamina, hands on skill at the computer, and knowledge of Force XXI implementation.⁵ All of these skills can be self-taught or at least improved upon by leaders who take it upon themselves to learn. Self-study is another critical area that leaders must improve if they expect to successfully lead in the "learning organization" called the Army.

The area of leadership training where I feel the Army faces the most significant challenge is self-study. The following quote taken from the Airpower Journal provides interesting food for thought.

In a world that is constantly changing, there is no one subject or set of subjects that will serve you well for the foreseeable future, let alone for the rest of you life. The most important skill to acquire now is learning how to learn.⁶

It has been my experience that too many officers avoid self study and reflection on new thoughts, technologies and organizations entering the Army, opting instead to "learn it when they get there." The Army must break down this barrier to self-study. Unit

Commanders can help in this process by demanding that officers under their command enter into a program of professional reading focused on understanding the vision for the future, the changes that the Army is going through and the leadership skills required to lead their subordinates towards the new vision. I put the topic of commander led or commander directed study programs under the self-study portion of this discussion because that type of program will likely be the catalyst behind motivating more junior leaders to a continual process of self study. The training institutions can also help in this regard by improving the publication and advertisement of web sites for leaders to learn about the evolving technologies and organizations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, my overall assessment is that the Army is taking most of the right transformational steps to lead the organization through change. A great deal of effort has been made to develop and communicate the vision of Force XXI to the Army at large. Work continues in refining the organization itself and the leadership development tasks necessary to ensure a strong cadre of leaders for the Army of the next century.

Leadership development is an emotional issue and one that is sure to evoke a response out of even timid officers and noncommissioned officers. We must continue to work hard at improving our institutional structure of leader development, reward those leaders who stress leader development and promote smooth change in their organizations, and encourage self-study in the strongest terms to keep the Army on the right path. We can accomplish all of these tasks, but only if we stay grounded in the basic values we pride ourselves in and maintain a focus on the soldier. The Army is soldiers – they deserve the best leadership we can give them.

Notes

¹ Tichy and Devanna, pp. 89-245.

² <http://www-cgsc.army.mil>

³ James M. Smith, "Service Cultures, Joint Cultures, and the US Military," as published in Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL: AU Press *Leadership and Command Coursebook*, AY 1999.

⁴ Authors personal experience with modifications to IOAC Program of Instruction (POI) as a Tactics Instructor and Team Chief during this time period.


⁵ Otis E. Cooksey (LTC, US Army) quoting an article entitled, "Strategic Leadership" from the *Leadership and Ethics Reader* provided as part of the AWC curriculum

⁶ John Naisbett, "Professional Military Education in 2020." *Airpower Journal*, Summer, 1995 as quoted by Otis E. Cooksey. (LTC US Army)

Appendix A – Comparison of AOE to Division XXI

AOE to Division XXI Comparison: Net Assessment

- An overview by Battlefield Operating System highlights many of the major changes between AOE and Army XXI
- Command and Control
 - Increased Battlespace
 - Rear and Main Command Posts collocated
 - Mobile C2 in C2Vs
 - Signal planning done in Div G6
 - Added Information Operations Cell
- Intelligence
 - Added additional ACT for Avn or DIVARTY use
 - Increased S2 strength in Avn and Cav Squadron
 - Increased connectivity with EAD
- Combat Service Support
 - Centralized CSS for Maneuver & Engineer
 - Distribution based supply system
 - Reduced Stocks
 - Self-sustaining for limited period
 - Passbacks to Corps of some functions; other functions to organic RC
 - Implemented enablers (multi-function mechanics, FRS-H, TIGER, etc.)
- Air Defense Artillery
 - Implemented SHORAD system of systems
 - Removed MANPADS




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Figure 4 –AOE to Division XXI Comparison (Slide 1)¹

AOE to Division XXI Comparison: Net Assessment

- Fire Support
 - Eliminated FS below Co level
 - Created Striker, placed in Brigade Recon Troop
 - Created MLRS / Target Acquisition BN
 - Down sized Paladin crew from 9 to 8
 - Optimized for improved weapons / munitions
- Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability
 - Removed EN Bde C2, put planning cell in division staff
 - Streamlined EN HHC
 - Redesignated EN Co
 - Assumed GRADLY savings early
 - NBC Recon in Div Cav Sqdn
 - Centralized CSS
- Maneuver
 - 45 platforms per battalion
 - 4 vehicles / platoon, 3 companies / battalion
 - Added Brigade Recon Troop to maneuver BDE
 - Standardized mortar organization, 4 / BN
 - Reduced and standardized EN scouts
 - Centralized CSS



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Figure 5 -- AOE to Division XXI Comparison (Slide 2)²

Notes

¹<http://www-tradoc.army.mil/pao/newdiv/oneteam/tsld012.htm>.

²Ibid.

Appendix B – A Scenario

Elements of the 82d Airborne Division were the first US Army units on the ground as part of the Flexible Deterrent Options that the National Command Authority (NCA) had employed as they continued to apply the diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of power to bring the situation under control. Two Carrier Battle Groups, an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) Wing and other Air Force assets were also in theater. Three weeks into the crisis, heavy forces from the 1st Cavalry Division arrived in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) drawing equipment from the Army Preposition Stocks (APS) in theater and afloat. The 3rd Mechanized Division was enroute using Fast Sealift Ships and other strategic mobility assets. The government of Parumphistan refused to acknowledge that the time for brinksmanship had ended – the United States and its NATO partners were serious.¹

First Lieutenant (1LT) Franks, a Scout Platoon Leader in the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry's Reconnaissance Unit, was positioned overwatching the main enemy avenue of approach into the host nation of Cortina. He had been on this screen line for two days now and had not seen a single “enemy” vehicle or soldier. The young officer was beginning to believe that this was just another one of those scenarios where he was forced to deploy, sit in a God forsaken country for six months, and then redeploy back to Fort Hood. He was confident though that his platoon would do well no matter what the situation.

MAJ Smith, 1st Brigade's Operations Officer, was in the Brigade Tactical Command Post (TACP) looking over the synchronization matrix on his Army Tactical

Command and Control System (ATCCS) again to make sure he had done everything possible to ensure the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was ready if Parumphistan forces attacked. Just then, his screen told him that a spot report was coming in through the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) of which his terminal, and the terminals on the other fighting vehicles forward, were a part. He told a member of the Situational Awareness (SA) staff section to wake the Brigade Commander from his rest period because a video feed was coming with the spot report. He was sure the commander would want to see “first hand” what was going on out on the screen line.²

Private First Class (PFC) Krause from 1LT Franks’ Scout platoon was on a dismounted Observation Post forward of the vehicle screen down in an area of low ground. PFC Krause had activated his second-generation forward-looking infrared radar at the first sound of a vehicle moving towards him from the border. His video camera captured the image of the three Parumphistan Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles moving across the border towards him and instantly transmitted them to his Platoon Leader.

Lieutenant Franks couldn’t see the video image, but the pre-formatted spot report that PFC Krause had sent using the lowest-end equipment from the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB²) system told him where Krause was, where the enemy vehicles were and what they were doing. LT Franks used his FBCB² system to instantly send the spot report to his Company Commander, adjacent Platoon Leaders, subordinate leaders and the Brigade TACP as the protocol on his wide-area network (WAN) called for.

By the time the Brigade Commander, COL Phillips had entered the TACP, MAJ Smith had the video feed up and running, ready for his review. With the entire digital

system fully integrated with the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites in semi-synchronous orbit some 10,000 nautical miles above the earth, COL Phillips watched as the feed showed that PFC Krause was within one meter of the grid coordinate shown as AB3476542366. He was tracking a group of eight vehicles two kilometers away moving towards him. The first group of three vehicles had passed him and been detected up by a Scout vehicle on the screen line behind PFC Krause; they too were well across the border continuing to move slowly towards the BCT's Assembly Area and hasty defensive positions. COL Phillips told MAJ Smith to forward the spot reports higher with his recommendation that the single JSTARS system in theater be scrambled to get a look at what was going on. His integrated Command and Control Systems were showing that he would not have good satellite imagery coverage for two hours and that might be too late. His follow-up report also included a request for close air support to engage, synchronized with his supporting artillery units. The call for fire had already gone to the guns using the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). They were waiting for his command to fire at a priority target. COL Phillips had made the decision that he would pass the authority for firing to LT Franks.

LT Franks received the voice transmission directly from COL Phillips via his frequency-hopping radio. He was a little surprised to be talking directly to the Brigade Commander, but he understood that his Company Commander wasn't in the best spot to physically see what was happening so he surmised that a direct call from the Brigade Commander might not be totally out of the ordinary. Franks was glad that the Brigade Commander had shown the confidence in him to let him begin what could be the first military engagement in a conflict. He was glad too that the Brigade Commander had sent

the Brigade Operations Officer, MAJ Smith, forward to look at his screen positions the day before. It was MAJ Smith who had recommended that Franks put a dismounted Observation Post (OP) forward in the low ground because you couldn't get a good look from up high. No matter how good the satellite imagery maps were that they transmitted directly to all the vehicles in his platoon, nothing replaced on the ground reconnaissance.

Notes

¹ The fictional country of "Parumphistan" is borrowed from the US Army's Opposing Forces at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California.

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