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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PEACE DIVIDEND?

by

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Contents

	<i>Page</i>
DISCLAIMER	ii
ILLUSTRATIONS.....	iv
TABLES.....	v
PREFACE	vi
ABSTRACT	vii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.....	3
Early History	3
Post World War II.....	5
Israel-Egypt Peace Accords	8
Israel-Jordan Peace Agreement.....	9
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE.....	12
U.S. Assistance to Israel	13
U.S. Assistance to Egypt.....	14
U.S. Assistance to Jordan.....	16
Assistance Comparison	17
WHY NO “PEACE DIVIDEND”?	23
Israel and the Balance of Power.....	25
Jordan and the Camp David Accords.....	26
Jordan’s Choice in the 1991 Gulf War	27
CONCLUSION	30
Recommendations.....	31
APPENDIX A: U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE (1960-1999)	36
APPENDIX B: COMPARISON OF MILITARY STRENGTHS	37
BIBLIOGRAPHY	38

Illustrations

	<i>Page</i>
Figure 1. British Palestine Mandate (1922)	4
Figure 2. Jewish-Arab Partition Plan of the Palestine Mandate (1947)	5
Figure 3. Boundaries After the War (1967)	7
Figure 4. U.S. Military Aid to Israel (1960-1999)	13
Figure 5. U.S. Military Aid to Egypt (1960-1999)	15
Figure 6. U.S. Military Aid to Jordan (1960-1999)	17
Figure 7. U.S. Military Aid (1960-1999)	18
Figure 8. Total U.S. Military Aid (1960-1999)	19
Figure 9. Percentage of U.S. Military Aid (1960-1999)	19

Tables

	<i>Page</i>
Table 1. U.S. Military Aid Impact on Economies (1985-86).....	20
Table 2. U.S. Military Aid Impact on Economies (1993-95).....	21

Preface

I chose this research topic because of my recent assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan. During my assignment, I was very impressed with the Jordanian military, the Jordanian people, and the Jordanian government. After two years of working very closely with the upper echelon of the Jordanian military, I have come to appreciate their position in the middle east and respect the ways they have attempted to make peace and create stability in the region. As I watched them day after day trying to work within severe budgetary restraints, I soon realized that the U.S. could do more to help a true friend in the Middle East and further our own national interests at the same time. This research paper, I hope, shows just that.

I like to thank several people who made this project possible. My Faculty Advisor, Lt Colonel Rich Lombardi, who kept me on track throughout the project, and Peggy, my wife, and Mandy and Trey, my children, who often wondered what I was doing “holed” up in my room typing away. Without their continuous support, I couldn’t have finished this project.

Abstract

When Jordan signed the peace agreement with Israel in 1994, bringing years of hostilities to an end, expectations were they would also join in the "peace dividends" as Egypt and Israel had some years earlier. Egypt and Israel, however, have received billions each in U.S. assistance, while Jordan has received, comparatively, very little. What assistance it has received seems to have done little to modernize their military forces, enhance their national security, or publicly demonstrate the benefits of making peace. The Middle East region has a long history of tension and conflict and attempts by various countries to enable peace have been fraught with many stumbling blocks. The complex history of the region and its peoples further complicates peace initiatives.

This paper seeks to provide the reader a brief historical account of major events that have shaped the region and then, building on the knowledge gained from the brief review, examine the disproportionate amounts of military aid given to the three major players in the regional peace process. The United States has used foreign military and economic aid as an important tool of its foreign policy since the early 1940s. This paper explores why a pro-Western, moderate, and stable country like Jordan, one of the key players in an overall Middle East peace plan, comparatively has not received its share of U.S. military aid and hasn't reaped the benefits of the expected "peace dividend". Finally, several recommendations will be proposed with respect to the U.S. policy concerning Jordan and what the U.S. can do to assist our long time friend and ally.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Strategically positioned, both politically and geographically, Jordan's constitutional monarchy consistently has been a positive force in the Middle East peace process. U.S. military assistance enhances Jordan's important role in contributing to the peace and security of the region...

— U.S. State Department
FY 98 Congressional Presentation

When Jordan signed the peace agreement with Israel in 1994, bringing years of hostilities to an end, expectations were they would also join in the "peace dividends" as Egypt and Israel had some years earlier. Egypt and Israel, however, have received billions each in U.S. assistance, while Jordan has received, comparatively, very little. What assistance it has received seems to have done little to modernize their military forces, enhance their national security, or publicly demonstrate the benefits of making peace. Jordan's monarch, King Hussein I, has been a staunch supporter of the United States and its policies concerning the Middle East and has worked diligently to head off conflict and support peace in the region.

In November 1981, while addressing the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, California, King Hussein acknowledged the United States' role in the Middle East peace process and continued friendship between the two countries stating that, "...over these three decades there has been one central constant factor in our relations; that is, the unbroken confidence and friendship we feel for the United States."¹

This research project will delve into several explanations of why the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has received so little U.S. military assistance, compared to other friendly regional powers, in view of its role in the Middle East peace process. Before the reasons can be explored, a historical review of the Middle East conflict since World War II will be performed to set the stage for comparing Jordan's role in the peace process with Egypt's and Israel's. Once this historical frame of reference has been established, a comparison of the U.S. military assistance provided to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan will be accomplished. The comparison will attempt to reveal the enormous imbalance in U.S. military assistance provided to each country. I'll then present several possible explanations to account for the apparent disconnect in U.S. policy and major disparity in military assistance provided to the major players in the peace process and explore each in detail. Lastly, several recommendations will be given with respect to the U.S. policy concerning Jordan and what the U.S. can do to assist our long time friend and ally.

Jordan has been a stabilizing force in the region and has been a staunch friend and ally to the United States. It is important to understand the historical roots of the region's conflicts and to look at several key events that have shaped the U.S. policy towards Jordan. Correcting the huge imbalance in U.S. military aid to countries in the region is essential for a stable and peaceful future and understanding the past is an essential first step.

Notes

¹ King Hussein I, "*Views on Selected Subjects*," n.p., on-line, Internet, November 1998, available from <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo>.

Chapter 2

Historical Review of the Middle East Conflict

The overall goal of U.S. defense and foreign policy since World War II has been to foster a stable, peaceful world conducive to national security, economic prosperity, and individual freedom.

—Richard F. Grimmett
U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process

The Middle East region has a long history of tension and conflict. The attempts by various countries to enable peace in the region have been fraught with many stumbling blocks. The complex history of the region and its peoples further complicates peace initiatives. While this author can not give a complete detailed historical account of the region, a brief overview of the major events is necessary to the overall understanding of the reader.

Early History

In 722 B.C., Israel was conquered by the Assyrian King Shalmaneser and the Israelites were deported and were not allowed to return to land they originally called home until 536 B.C. Between 536 B.C. and the early 1500s, the region was in constant conflict with different rulers and religions competing for control. During the early part of the 16th century, the entire region was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. In the early 1800s, “a Jewish revival that called for the return of the Jews...to their historic

homeland” was finding support in Europe and the Jews began migrating from Europe to this homeland, Palestine.¹ At the end of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles outlined provisions for the region called Palestine, which included the area now known as Jordan, Israel, and the West Bank, to come under British authority, transferring its rule from Turkish to British. Sir Arthur James Balfour, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs issued a declaration in 1917 establishing a “national home for the Jewish people”² in the British mandate of Palestine and five years later Britain designated all lands west of the Jordan River as Palestine and those east of the river as Transjordan (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. British Palestine Mandate (1922)

Palestine remained under British control while Transjordan was to be ruled by the Hashemite family, with the British continuing to handle all administrative and military matters. It is important to note however, that many felt “Jordan was an artificial entity because inhabitants of northern Jordan [were] traditionally associated with Syria, those of southern Jordan [were] associated with the Arabian Peninsula, and those of western Jordan [were] identified with Palestinians...”³ Since then, the religious and cultural

differences among the inhabitants of the region encompassing Palestine and Transjordan have created a powder keg that has been quick to light and slow to diffuse. Throughout the British mandate period, from 1917 to 1948, the area was besieged with conflict as Jewish settlers and Palestinian Arabs both felt they had historical rights to the region.⁴ In 1946, the British relinquished administrative control over Transjordan (the area “across the Jordan” River to the east).

Post World War II

After World War II, the United Nations passed U.N. Resolution 181 partitioning the British mandate of Palestine into two, one a Jewish state and the other an Arab state (see Figure 2). Resolution 181 also called for the elimination of British rule and a gradual withdrawal of all British forces.



Figure 2. Jewish-Arab Partition Plan of the Palestine Mandate (1947)

While the Jewish inhabitants favored the resolution, the Arabs did not as they felt their homeland was being taken from them. When the U.N. voted on the resolution, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen voted

against passage, but the resolution passed 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions.⁵ Shortly after, the U.N. passed resolution 194, establishing the holy city of Jerusalem under United Nations control.⁶

In 1948, Israel proclaimed itself a state and immediately the region was again thrown into heated conflict. The surrounding Arab states (Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq) declared war against Israel. After 15 months of fighting, the war drew to a close with Israel the victor. Under the U.N brokered armistice, Egypt gained control of Gaza, a small strip of land on the western coast of Israel, while Jordan gained control of the West Bank, a small area of land on the western bank of the Jordan River occupied by the Palestinians. Shortly after, the king of Transjordan, merged the areas on the east and west bank of the Jordan River into one state and renamed it Jordan. During the early 1950s, Jordan and Israel exchanged fire, both physically and diplomatically, over claims of Israeli overuse of the waters of the Jordan River. The border incidents between Jordan and Israel continued to worsen, as did their political relationship. When Jordan joined the United Nations in 1955, harsh diplomatic exchanges continued as both sides charged the other with raids across their state boundaries.⁷

The following year, amid growing discord between Egypt and Israel, Israeli Defense Forces invaded and captured the Sinai Peninsula, subsequently handing over the gain to a United Nations Emergency Force for administration. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a dissident group representing the Palestinian people, from bases in Syria and Jordan, increased their strikes against Israel during the early 1960s. Although the PLO was responsible for the attacks, since they originated in Jordan, Israel attacked areas in Jordan and by 1967, the situation had reached the brink of war. Israel continued

reprisals against PLO bases, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli vessels, and Israel prepared for war. Egypt began mobilizing troops because of Syrian claims that Israel was preparing to invade, and Jordan aligned with Egypt and Syria.⁸ During the Six-Day War, Israeli Defense Forces “overran the whole Sinai Peninsula, up to the Suez Canal; took the entire West Bank of the River Jordan; and in the last days, without the benefit of surprise, captured a great part of the Golan Heights.”⁹

After the war, the Middle East maps were drastically altered (see Figure 3). In November 1967, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242 calling for peace in exchange for Israeli pullback from the occupied territories gained in the 1967 war.¹⁰




Figure 3. Boundaries After the War (1967)

King Hussein, in an address to his nation, called the resolution “the basic cornerstone [for peace], enjoying international unanimity, for achieving a just and peaceful settlement. Jordan not only participated in securing this resolution but has supported it since its adoption.”¹¹ Realizing the resolution represented the only way to a

comprehensive peace in the region, Jordan embraced the resolution and worked diligently to see it to fruition.

Israel-Egypt Peace Accords

Although, Egypt's history of internal and external conflict can be traced back well before the Ottoman Empire, Egypt's involvement in the current Arab-Israeli conflict began in 1948 when Israel declared itself a State. Egypt, along with the armies of other Arab nations joined forces to conquer Israel and save Palestine. As mentioned previously, the Arabs were handily defeated, but the tension remained. Egypt, responding to an Israeli attack in Gaza in 1955, began building its military forces again. After being rejected by the U.S. and pro-west European powers for military assistance, Egypt turned to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Shortly after, Egypt militarily took over the Suez Canal from an international company that operated it. In response to this action, Israeli forces, in collusion with Britain and France, attacked Egypt. Although Egypt sustained heavy losses, Britain, France, and Israel were forced to withdraw and a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was placed on the Egypt-Israel border and in the Sinai. When Egypt signed a mutual defense pact with Syria in 1966, tensions again began to rise. Israel threatened to invade Syria because of increasing guerilla raids from Palestinian groups based in Syria. In 1967, based on a tip from the Soviet Union of Israel's pending invasion of Syria, Egypt massed its forces on the Israeli border, ordered the UNEF troops to leave, and threatened to close the Straits of Tiran. Israel interpreted Egypt's actions as a declaration of war and an all-out attack on Egypt, Jordan, and Syria ensued. As mentioned earlier, the June 1967 War, or Six-Day War, was a massive defeat for the Arab nations.

Three years after the defeat, Egypt had a change in their political leadership that emphasized economic reform. Part of their plan was to increase foreign, especially Western, investment. To accomplish their goal, the Egyptian leadership felt they must have peace with Israel, and to do that they ended their relationship with the Soviet Union and began a relationship with the United States. However, in 1973, due to increasing internal political pressures arising from growing economic problems, Egypt and Syria again attacked Israel. Again, although initially caught off guard, Israel beat back the attacking forces. Two years later, Egypt, Syria, and Israel signed a cease-fire agreement brokered by the United States and, in 1977, amid growing internal economic problems, the government of Egypt approached Israel and began final peace negotiations. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter invited the leaders of Israel and Egypt to the presidential retreat, Camp David, for further discussions. Finally, on 26 March 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed¹². Egypt became the first Arab nation to sign a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel. The peace agreements called for the end of hostilities between the two and the complete pullback of Israeli forces from Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula.¹³

Israel-Jordan Peace Agreement

Jordan's peace with Israel in 1994 also followed a complicated road. Since originally ceded the land now known as the West Bank in 1950 as a result of the UN brokered peace agreement after the 1948 war with Israel, Jordan's relationship with Israel and the Palestinians has been politically complex. After the Six-Day war, Jordan embraced UN Resolution 242, while the Palestinians rejected it "on the grounds that the Palestinian people [were] only mentioned...as refugees and not as a people deserving a national homeland."¹⁴ After much Palestinian violence in the Hashemite Kingdom, the

rift between Jordan and the Palestinians widened to the point where Jordan's King Hussein, in 1970, "ordered his army to attack"¹⁵. The Palestinian dissident groups were defeated by the Jordanian forces and in 1974 at the Rabat Arab League Summit Conference, "the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"¹⁶.

King Hussein, severed all legal ties with the West Bank in 1988 citing that a growing sentiment that Jordan and Palestine were one in the same was not true. This also reconfirmed to Israel and the rest of the Arab world that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people and that only the PLO could deal with Israel on the subject of the occupied West Bank.¹⁷

Jordan and Israel began negotiating a bilateral peace agreement in 1993 and in July 1994, King Hussein met with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin at the White House and jointly issued the Washington Declaration, which ended 46 years of war. Later that year in October, Jordan and Israel signed a formal comprehensive peace treaty, bringing an end to all hostilities.¹⁸

As one can tell from this brief history of the region, the peace between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan was one difficult to achieve. The Palestinian issue further complicated the problems. The United States played an important role in achieving both peace agreements using its substantial diplomatic and economic instruments of power. The Egyptian and Israeli armed forces have benefited considerably from the U.S.-provided "peace dividend". Jordan, on the other hand, comparatively has not as will be shown in the next chapter.

Notes

¹ Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Jordan: A Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1991), 6-22.

² Sir Arthur James Balfour, “*Balfour Declaration-1917*,” n.p.; online, Internet, November 1998, available from <http://www.nationalcenter.org>.

³ Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, xxi.

⁴ The United Nations Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, n.p.; online, Internet, November 1998, available from <http://israeliculture.miningco.com>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, n.p., online, Internet, November 1998, available from <http://israeliculture.miningco.com/library/weekly/blnov29.htm>.

⁷ Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 31-32.

⁸ Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 37-38.

⁹ Lorch, Netanel, *The Arab-Israeli Wars.*, n.p.; online, Internet, November 1998, available from <http://israeliculture.miningco.com>.

¹⁰ Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 39.

¹¹ King Hussein I, *Views on Selected Subjects*, n.p., on-line, Internet, November 1998, available from <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo>.

¹² Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Egypt: A Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1991), 83.

¹³ “The Peace Process: The Camp David Accords and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty”, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 12 February 1999, available from www.jajz-ed.org.il/100/concepts/d4.html.

¹⁴ Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 50.

¹⁵ Trevor N. Dupuy, Colonel, USA (Ret), ed., *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, Vol 3*, (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1993), 1390.

¹⁶ Jordan Media Group, *The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: What Is It?* (Amman, Jordan: Jordan Media Group, 1994), 2.

¹⁷ Ibid, 3.

¹⁸ Ibid, 3-4.

Chapter 3

Comparative Study of U.S. Military Assistance

Jordan's constitutional monarchy consistently has been a positive force in the Middle East peace process. Jordan's bold and courageous decision for peace with Israel in 1994 was an important step toward a comprehensive peace in the region. U.S. assistance to Jordan supports a stable and moderate government committed to democratization and an active participant in the search for a peaceful solution to the region's problems.

—U.S. State Department
FY 98 Congressional Presentation

The United States has used foreign military and economic aid as an important tool of its foreign policy since the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 was passed granting “the president extraordinary powers to sell, lend, lease, exchange, or otherwise transfer virtually any item to any country whose defense he deemed vital to the security of the United States.”¹ The U.S. uses its large purse to sometimes reward friendly countries and, at other times, punish countries that do not share U.S. views on a particular subject. Furthermore, military aid as a function of policy, can be used to attempt to balance a militarily imbalanced region in hopes of providing a more stable environment in the end.

Since World War II, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been one of trying to ensure stability in the region to guarantee U.S. access to the large quantities of crude oil harvested in the Persian Gulf area. In addition, as a result of domestic political pressure, the U.S. government has also provided much aid in hopes of solving the Arab-Israeli

conflict or, in the least, assisting Israel with its defense, if peace failed. Lastly, the U.S. has used its offers of aid to “win over” countries that were recipients of Soviet-backed aid during the Cold War. Once the aid is accepted, the country is converted and the U.S. becomes its sole supplier and the communist-backed supply of arms vanishes.

Over the years, many countries in the Middle East have been recipients of U.S. military aid. Our focus, however, will be limited to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan as the three major players in the Middle East peace process.

U.S. Assistance to Israel

U.S. support to Israel began in 1948 when Israel declared itself a state and fought successfully to maintain its sovereignty. U.S. military aid began, in earnest, in 1973 during Israel’s war with Egypt “with a massive American airlift of vital military materiel to Israel”².




Figure 4. U.S. Military Aid to Israel (1960-1999)³

Since 1948, the U.S. has provided over \$42 billion in military aid alone, the majority of which was non-repayable grant aid. In 1989, the U.S. administration reported that

over half of Israel's defense budget was provided by the U.S. but their military expenditures still were a significant hardship on their economy, and thus, the justification for more aid being to help Israel become more secure and strong by promoting economic stability.⁴ In addition to military grant aid, the U.S. has signed many agreements with Israel to include prepositioning U.S. military material in country, joint military exercise agreements, military research and development, and U.S. defense contract bidding. Using the sizeable funds provided by its U.S. friends, Israel has built its military into a robust and formidable force. U.S. funds have allowed Israel to purchase state of the art, high technology U.S. weaponry that very few countries have, to include airborne early warning platforms such as the E-2C Hawkeye, precision missiles including the AGM-65 Maverick and AGM-45 Shrike, and superior fighter aircraft to include the new F-15I Eagle.⁵ As the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world, both in annual aid and cumulatively, Israel has benefited tremendously from its partnership with the U.S. As will be shown in the next section, Egypt has also benefited immensely, as well.

U.S. Assistance to Egypt

Egypt was one of the countries referred to earlier as originally being a communist-supplied country. In the 1950s, because Egypt had not aligned itself with either East or West, the U.S. and Britain rejected Egypt requests for military aid. France also turned down Egyptian requests because Egypt would not stop aiding Algerians who wanted independence from French rule. Egypt, out of necessity, turned to Czechoslovakia in 1955 and soon became dependent on Soviet military equipment. When Sadat became President in 1970, he realized that to solve Egypt's economic ills, western financial investment was the key. That investment, however, "would not be forthcoming until

there was peace between Egypt and Israel, Soviet influence was eliminated, and the climate became more favorable to Western capitalism”.⁶ To that end, Egypt expelled all of its Soviet military advisors in 1972. After Egypt’s failed 1973 war with Israel, the U.S. began brokering the peace agreement between the two. After the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979, the U.S. began providing military aid to it’s new peace partner. Beginning in 1984, all U.S. military aid to Egypt was non-repayable grants. In 1994, the U.S. State Department, in support of Egyptian military aid, stated that “since the Camp David Accords in 1979, Egypt has played an essential role as a partner in fostering the peace process between Israel and her Arab neighbors.”⁷




Figure 5. U.S. Military Aid to Egypt (1960-1999)⁸

As one can see from the graph in Figure 5., the turning point for Egypt was its signing of the peace agreement with Israel in 1979. Since then, military aid to Egypt has averaged \$1.3 billion annually, making Egypt the second largest recipient of U.S. military assistance (with Israel being the largest). In the 1991 Department of State’s Congressional Presentation, aid to Egypt was summarized as supporting “Egyptian efforts to replace aging Soviet equipment with the latest U.S. weapon systems” and to

reorient Egypt “from an offensive-minded and Soviet-equipped military into a leaner, but more efficient deterrent force”.⁹

Over the years since 1979, the U.S. has funded the purchase of many high-tech weapon systems for Egypt to modernize their military including: F-4 and F-16 fighter aircraft, C-130 transports, E-2C Hawkeye electronic surveillance aircraft, M60A3 tanks, M-113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), Improved-Hawk antiaircraft missile batteries, and improved TOW antitank missiles.¹⁰

Egypt, like Israel, has benefited a great deal from the U.S., for accepting a lasting peace in the region as the norm and joining the U.S. in achieving that peace. As we’ll see next, Jordan has not benefited in a similar fashion.

U.S. Assistance to Jordan

U.S. assistance Jordan has its roots some 50 years ago beginning in 1948. Total military aid between 1960 and 1998 has amounted to just over \$1.8 billion. Interestingly, this figure matches the amount Israel receives each year. Much of the assistance provided to Jordan has been susceptible to Israeli influence through powerful Jewish congressional lobbies, as in the case of an air defense system sale proposal in the early 1970s and others.¹¹ When the sales agreement for the HAWK air defense system was finally reached, Israeli influence pressured the U.S. to require that the sites be fixed instead of mobile as designed. So although Jordan finally got the system they needed, it didn’t meet their needs.¹²

Using the comparatively small amount of U.S. aid and aid provided by Saudi Arabia prior to the Gulf War, Jordan has purchased several defensive weapon systems. Systems purchased include the F-104 Starfighter and F-5 Tiger combat aircraft, C-130 Hercules

and UH-1 Huey transport aircraft, and just recently in 1996, refurbished F-16A/B fighter aircraft. Army equipment purchased includes HAWK surface to air missile batteries (although the bulk of this system purchase was financed by the Saudis), M60A1/A3 tanks, M113A1/A2 armored personnel carriers, and various artillery pieces.




Figure 6. U.S. Military Aid to Jordan (1960-1999)¹³

U.S. military aid to Jordan has a long history of highs and lows but when compared to Egypt and Israel, the amount is relatively insignificant.

Assistance Comparison

This author chose to look at the three major regional actors in the Middle East peace process for two reasons. First, to limit the scope of this research paper, and more importantly, to compare the U.S assistance provided to each of the countries that have accepted peace, signed formal agreements, and contributed to a major U.S. policy goal.

If one were to compare just raw numbers, it is easy to see the differences in aid granted. Israel has long been supported by the U.S. for military aid. The amount given

each year has allowed the country to expand its military and its offensive capabilities to counter the anti-Israeli threat in the region.

During the 48 years of military assistance from the U.S., Israel's per capita gross domestic product has increased 127 percent as Israel has shifted more of its domestically sourced revenue back into their economy.¹⁴




Figure 7. U.S. Military Aid (1960-1999)¹⁵

Egypt is second in the world only to Israel in the amount of aid received from the U.S. Since signing the peace treaty with Israel, becoming the first Arab country to do so, the U.S. has supported their military establishment in replacing old, outdated Soviet equipment with new high-tech U.S.-built arms. Egypt, like Israel, using U.S. funding for arms purchases, has seen a 142 percent increase in gross domestic product per capita over the years of U.S. assistance.¹⁶

Jordan, on the other hand, as you can see from Figure 8, has received very little aid from the U.S. when compared to Israel and Egypt. Jordan has long been identified as critical to U.S. foreign policy in the region because of its central geographical location

and pro-Western government and a stabilizing and moderate force in a region beset with conflict. The relatively small amount of aid they have received, coupled with their




Figure 8. Total U.S. Military Aid (1960-1999)¹⁷

struggling non-oil based economy, has kept them lagging behind the other countries in the region in acquiring updated current military technology that is logistically supportable. From 1965 to 1995, the aid received from the U.S. has done little to help an economy that has actually decreased 28 percent in gross domestic product per capita.¹⁸




Figure 9. Percentage of U.S. Military Aid (1960-1999)¹⁹

Whether comparing totals or percentages, the differences are tremendous. Figure 9 shows the percentage of aid given to each of the three countries from 1960 to 1999. It is readily apparent there is a disconnect in the amounts granted to each country. In Egypt's case, the signing of the peace agreement, brought with it a huge "peace dividend" of \$1.3 billion per year. When Jordan signed in 1994, the "peace dividend" it expected did not materialize.

It is also interesting to look at what portion of each country's economy the U.S. military assistance represents. Table 1 shows the budget figures for the three principal players for the year's 1985/86. As one can see, the aid given to Israel and Egypt has had a large impact on their budgets, representing 10 percent each. Even more telling, is the impact on defense expenditures, with 38 percent of Israel's defense expenditures paid for by U.S. grant aid, and a staggering 67 percent for Egypt. In Jordan's case the impact has been minimal, representing only 3 percent of total revenues and 13 percent of their defense expenditures.

Table 1. U.S. Military Aid Impact on Economies (1985-86)²⁰

\$ US (Billions)	(TR) Total Revenues	(DE) Defense Expenditures	U.S. Military Aid	% of TR	% of DE
Israel (86)	18.1	4.6	1.7	10%	38%
Egypt (85)	12.0	1.8	1.2	10%	67%
Jordan (86)	2.8	0.635	0.083	3%	13%

Table 2 also shows the impact of U.S. military aid on the three countries but uses data from 1993/94/95.

Table 2. U.S. Military Aid Impact on Economies (1993-95)²¹

\$ US (Billions)	Total Revenues	Defense Expenditures	U.S. Military Aid	% of TR	% of DE
Israel (94)	42.3	6.5	1.8	4%	28%
Egypt (93)	18.0	3.5	1.3	7%	37%
Jordan (95)	2.0	0.564	0.008	<1%	1%

In 1993/94, the U.S. paid for almost one third of Israel and Egypt's defense expenditures. On the other hand, the U.S. only contributed less than one percent to the total revenues of the Jordanian government and represented only one percent of its defense expenditures.

After looking at the tremendous differences in the amount of U.S. aid given, both before and after peace agreements were signed, one can easily see why Jordan could feel neglected, if not ignored, by the U.S. His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan, then next in succession to Jordan's King Hussein, said in a speech in September 1998, "there is no tangible result to show for all our patience" referring to the "peace dividends" that have not manifested after four years of peace.²² The other major players in the peace process, Egypt and Israel, have benefited tremendously from U.S. military and economic aid and their economies are growing and healthy. Jordan, on the other hand, has a declining growth economy, unemployment that is estimated between 25 and 30 percent, and a military whose equipment is deteriorating because of lack of spares and support.

While the reasons are complex, it is important to understand what has driven U.S. foreign policy and military aid funding for Jordan. In the following chapter, we will look at several reasons to explain the lack of a "peace dividend" and explore each in detail.

Notes

¹ Chester J. Pach, Jr., *Arming The Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950*, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 9-10.

² Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Israel: A Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1990), 234.

³ Data from U.S. Agency for International Development, memorandum to Author, 15 December 1998.

⁴ Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1989* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 132.

⁵ *Jane's World Air Forces: Order of Battle and Inventories*, Lindsay Peacock, Compiler, 1997.

⁶ Metz, *Egypt: A Country Study*, 76.

⁷ Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1994* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 173.

⁸ Data from U.S. Agency for International Development, memorandum to Author, 15 December 1998.

⁹ Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1991* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 129.

¹⁰ Metz, *Egypt: A Country Study*, 363-368.

¹¹ House, *United States-Jordanian Relations and Arms Supply Issues*: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Congress, 2d session, July 29 and August 27, 1980, 23. Israel expressed their concern over the possible sale of tanks to Jordan and the deal was subsequently disapproved.

¹² Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 262.

¹³ Data from U.S. Agency for International Development, memorandum to Author, 15 December 1998.

¹⁴ Brian T. Johnson et al., *1998 Index of Economic Freedom* (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 1998), 18.

¹⁵ Data from U.S. Agency for International Development, memorandum to Author, 15 December 1998.

¹⁶ Johnson, 18.

¹⁷ Data from U.S. Agency for International Development, memorandum to Author, 15 December 1998.

¹⁸ Johnson, 18.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ This table was compiled using budget data from the Library of Congress, *A Country Study* series for the country depicted. The other figures were calculated.

²¹ This table was compiled using budget data from the Library of Congress, *A Country Study* series for the country depicted. The other figures were calculated.

²² Ghadeer Taher, "A Frustrating Peace: Jordan-Israel Ties Five Years On," *Jordan Times Online*, on-line, 23 November 1998.

Chapter 4

Why No “Peace Dividend”?

We had 550,000 young Americans at risk, in harm's way, in the Middle East, and King Hussein was on television giving aid and comfort to the enemy...

—U.S. Representative Dan Burton
Congressional Quarterly

If one were to visit Jordan, one would see first hand the effects of a sluggish economy, high unemployment, and a lack of highly-profitable natural resources from which to improve the overall situation. Additionally, virtually every inch of the country is bordered by past, present, or potential national security threats. To the east, Iraq; to the north, Syria; to the west, Israel; and to the south Saudi Arabia. And, although illegal drug trafficking is not prevalent in Jordan, smuggling from the bordering countries through Jordan is rampant. In many cases, the smugglers are better equipped than the Jordanian armed forces and Public Security Department assigned the mission to stop the smuggling. Jordan's pro-Western constitutional monarchy is seen as too Western in orientation, which sometimes leads to unrest among the religious and political fundamentalists of the region. So, in short, the primary role of the Jordanian armed forces is to protect the internal security of the Kingdom of Jordan and provide for its defense.

One may ask that, since Jordan has a pro-Western, moderate, semi-democratic form of government and the monarch is held in high esteem by many American, Arab, and

Israeli leaders as one of the key players in an overall, comprehensive middle east peace plan, why then is the U.S. not helping out this important ally with more military [and economic] assistance. With Jordan's economy posting negative growth rates, unemployment in the upper 20 percent range, and a military that is in severe need of modernization, why do we give Jordan just over 1 percent of what we give to Israel and Egypt individually each year.

The U.S. recognizes Jordan's key role in the region. In the 1992 Security Assistance Program presentation to Congress, the U.S. State Department wrote, "Maintenance of a stable Jordan after resolution of the Gulf crisis remains a key facet of U.S. interests in the region. Jordan's traditional moderation on the Arab-Israeli dispute and its key geographical location accentuate the value of Jordanian stability."¹ So, to complete the circle, the U.S. recognizes Jordan's importance, economically the country is showing negative growth, and the military, whose primary role is defense, is in severe need of modernization. Why then, is the U.S. not helping more?

This author believes there are several events and/or reasons that have had a cumulative negative effect on Jordan's standing with the U.S. Congress. First and foremost is the U.S. policy with regard to Israel and ensuring a balance of power in the Middle East. Second, Jordan's refusal to sign the Camp David Accords in 1979 with Egypt and Israel, and lastly, but most fresh in the minds of U.S. congressman and the American public, Jordan's unwillingness to join the U.S.-led Coalition during the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq. We'll explore each reason in more detail below.

Israel and the Balance of Power

U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote, “From the founding of Israel in 1948 we had supported the territorial integrity of all the states in that region. Our commitment was not inscribed in any treaty, but it was strong nonetheless. It was rooted in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in which the United States, Great Britain, and France promised to oppose any effort to alter by force the national borders in the Middle East. Four presidents—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and myself—had publicly reaffirmed this pledge.”² Since 1950, the United States has followed a policy of protective assistance in regards to Israel with each U.S. President reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the young state. When asked to describe the U.S. commitment to Israel, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush said, “We were very important in helping to establish the State of Israel. We have been a very important bulwark in defending Israel through the years by the supply of arms and by other aid. We have a very deep interest, of course, in the people of Israel who have suffered very, very grievously in prior years.”³ In regards to the balance of power in the region, the communist influence, and the influence on U.S. national security, Mr Rush further stated, “...the Soviet Union has been supplying very massive equipment and armaments to other countries in the area, so it is necessary for us, in turn, to supply help to Israel in order that we can maintain a balance of strength in the area... If the Soviet Union were able by supplying equipment to the Arab countries opposing Israel to change the balance of power, that would have a very strong conflict with our national security interest, which is so vital to us with regard to many things, including energy...”⁴

Although the U.S. has never had a formal treaty or mutual security agreement with Israel, it has always been clear that the U.S. would respond if Israel were gravely threatened.⁵ During the 1990-91 Gulf War, the U.S. sought to protect Israel from Iraqi scud missile attacks by deploying Patriot Air Defense batteries inside Israel's borders. This action was to both protect Israel, and to protect the coalition's primarily Arab-makeup by preventing Israel's involvement. In an effort to balance the power in the Middle East, the U.S. has helped build up Israel's military arsenal through massive grants and by releasing sophisticated U.S. equipment for transfer. The Israeli inventories of military armament equals or exceeds the U.S. in many respects. The F-15s, currently flown by the Israeli Air Force, for example, are more sophisticated than the jets currently flown by U.S. pilots. It is interesting to note that our initial arms policy with regards to Israel was to ensure a balance of military power in the region and that, as of 1993, Israel had by far the largest and most sophisticated Air Force of any in the region.⁶ The efforts by the U.S. have helped create a regional military force that is second to none and without U.S. intervention and assistance, Israel's overwhelming victories in 1948, 1967, and 1973 could not have been possible.

Jordan and the Camp David Accords

As previously mentioned, when President Sadat of Egypt contacted the Israelis to begin peace negotiations in 1977, many countries in the Arab world were upset over the unilateral action and, by negotiating with Israel, Egypt's implied recognition of Israel as a state. King Hussein "was reluctant to join the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. He feared that by joining the negotiations he would isolate Jordan in the Arab world, incur Syria's wrath, and potentially destabilize Palestinians on the East Bank...".⁷ The Camp David

Accords signed by U.S. President Jimmy Carter, President Sadat of Egypt, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, not only called for peace between Israel and Egypt, but also included statements about the future of the West Bank. King Hussein “expressed anger that Jordan was included in the Camp David framework without his prior knowledge or approval” and decided not to join the agreement for this and other reasons.⁸ The King’s decision not to join the peace process under the Camp David accords was seen by many in the U.S. Congress as not supporting the peace process in general. In a 1980 hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives on the sale of M-60A3 tanks to Jordan, several Congressmen either were outright opposed to the sale or implied opposition to the sale through questioning based on Jordan’s “refusal to join or encourage the Camp David process.”⁹ Representative William M. Brodhead, although not a member of the hearing panel, felt so strongly that Jordan should not receive the advanced tanks, wrote a statement of opposition to the sale, citing that by rejecting the Camp David accords, “Jordan has raised grave questions about its motives and intentions”.¹⁰ This proposed sale and others were denied due to Jordan’s assumed lack of commitment to the peace process.

Jordan’s Choice in the 1991 Gulf War

While Jordan was still in the shadow of its decision not to join in the Camp David Accords, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait in August 1990. Jordan, again, was placed in a very precarious position and faced with a decision that would determine its immediate future. Would Jordan support the coalition forces in their attempt to remove the Iraqi invaders or support Iraq? As is common knowledge now, Jordan did not join the coalition, and by not doing so further eroded its standing in the

U.S. Shortly after the end of the Gulf War, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the foreign aid bill for FY 1993 that included “an amendment punishing the government of Jordan for its support of Iraq during the gulf war.”¹¹

The decision by the government of Jordan to not support the coalition in evicting Iraq from Kuwait was a terrible blow to its international standing although support to the coalition could have been detrimental to the government itself. Had Jordan supported the coalition, the internal security problems would have immense as a large part of the Jordanian population is of Iraqi descent, family ties are strong, and much of Jordan’s economy was tied to Iraq. Many of King Hussein’s public speeches after the Gulf War sought to explain that Jordan’s concern was always the welfare of Iraqi people and attempted to distance itself from the despotic ruler, Saddam Hussein. In an interview with the Reuters News Agency in April 1993, King Hussein stressed his concern for the Iraqi people and called for the Iraqi President to step down.¹² The stigma from the Gulf War remained however as the U.S. Administration wrote in its 1993 report to Congress on Foreign Aid, “While we allocated \$20 million in FY 91 FMF [foreign military financing] for Jordan, those funds...are still being held for policy reasons, because of Jordan’s position on the Gulf Crisis.”¹³ Jordan’s latest stand reduced their U.S. military aid back to pre-1970 funding levels.

As one can see, several key events have contributed to determining the U.S. view of Jordan over the last 40 years. Beginning with the attempt by the U.S. to do everything it could to support the creation of the state of Israel and help to defend her from attack by building up its arms inventories while not contributing to the inventories of its Arab neighbors. Jordan’s decision not to join the first breakthrough in the peace process in

1979 and its subsequent decision not to join the U.S.-led coalition in 1990 were not only detrimental to expanding aid packages but also tainted the landmark peace agreement that it made with Israel in 1994. Although the peace agreement should have brought with it a substantial peace dividend, it did not. The following chapter will present several recommendations to correct the aid imbalances and create an environment for a stable region in the future.

Notes

¹ Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, FY 1992* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 191.

² Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 287-288.

³ Senate, *Emergency Military Assistance: Cambodia, Israel—Emergency Disaster Assistance: Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sahelian Africa, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 1973*, 18.

⁴ Ibid, 18.

⁵ Bernard Reich, *Quest For Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1977), 383.

⁶ Aharon Yariv, ed., *The Middle East Military Balance: 1992-1993* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 432-433.

⁷ Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, p.52

⁸ Ibid, 53.

⁹ House, *United States-Jordanian Relations and Arms Supply Issues: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Congress, 2d session, July 29 and August 27, 1980*, 17.

¹⁰ Ibid, 71.

¹¹ Carroll J. Doherty, "Amendments Reflect Hostilities Toward Jordan, Communism," *Congressional Quarterly*, June 22, 1991, 1683.

¹² King Hussein I, "Views on Selected Subjects: Interview with Reuters News Agency, 30 April 1993" n.p., on-line, Internet, November 1998, available from <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo>.

¹³ Department of State, *Congressional Presentation on Foreign Assistance, FY1993* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 211.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

King Hussein and the people of Jordan have proven themselves as vital partners with Israel in the Middle East peace process. The transfer of the F-16 aircraft to Jordan will contribute to Jordanian security, as well as to the security of the entire region, and further the commitment made by the United States to support Jordan's efforts to further the Middle East peace process.

—U.S. President Bill Clinton

Letter to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives

Jordan's role in the Middle East peace process has been one of constant struggle--a struggle to accommodate peace in a region where peace is not well known. Geographically centered between ideological and religious enemies of long histories, Jordan has been influenced by economical ties, historical family bonds, and Arab nationalism -- many times to its own detriment. Decisions made in the past have severely curtailed military support packages.

If one were to look at Jordan realistically, one would see a small country, torn by an internal need to stand up for its Palestinian neighbors to the west, attempting to provide a defense from its Syrian neighbors to the north, and trying to prevent an immense smuggling problem from the east and south. It is a country that has no oil resources in a region where oil is power and is forced to obtain the oil to power its economy from Iraq. Adding to the stranglehold, close to one third of the population is unemployed. The military is greatly outnumbered by its neighbors (see Appendix B for comparison) and

has no credible offensive capability. Jordan's military capability is centered on defense and security, both internal and external.

If one accepts the U.S. position with Israel as an unchangeable fact, then it is important to recognize that, in the Arab world of the Middle East, only two Arab countries have made formal peace with Israel--Jordan and Egypt. Having a strong Jordan located on Israel's eastern border benefits Israel in two ways. First, Jordan would, by default, provide an early warning of impending attack from Syrian or Iraqi forces attempting to pass through Jordan to reach Israel, and secondly, Jordan would provide a slowing, if not halting defense to an attacker. Jordan's embracing of peace, their commitment to the peace process, and constant productive dialog with the Israeli government makes Jordan a strong neighbor to the east. In his first interview since becoming King, His Majesty King Abdullah restated a long-standing Jordanian position when he said, "We do not allow Jordanian territory to be used as a springboard for interference in the domestic affairs of another country."¹ Jordan's repeated stance that Jordanian soil will not be used to launch an attack against Arab or Israeli reinforces their continuing commitment to peace. It is therefore in the interest of Israel and the United States to have a strong, defensively capable Jordan. Today, after years of reduced U.S. aid, Jordan's military is suffering from parts shortages and equipment deterioration.

Recommendations

It is inherent that the U.S. reaffirms its commitment to Jordan and peace in the Middle East. The U.S., in order to ensure our credibility abroad and with states in this volatile region, can not be lopsided in our assistance. The expected "peace dividend" must show its face for peace to be embraced by struggling countries in the region. As

mentioned previously, Jordan's military is facing severe shortages. Almost all of the current FMF that Jordan receives is used to pay for the sixteen newly acquired F-16 aircraft and associated support equipment. If the U.S. hopes to maintain Jordan as an ally and stable pro-Western government, there must be action taken now to fix the problem in the near term and allow strategic planning for the long term. To accomplish this and meet the US's stated objectives of maintaining stability in the kingdom, promoting long-term economic growth, and "a comprehensive peace in the region"², the U.S. will need to: increase FMF funding levels, eliminate drawdown authority³ as a means of support, and increase economic assistance.

The amount of FMF offered to Jordan must be increased. Since the Jordan-Israel peace agreement was signed in 1994, Jordan has received less than \$300 million in military assistance, most of which has been used to cover the cost of a single program.⁴ Budgetary constraints in the U.S. have been cited as a reason for the small amount of FMF for Jordan however the additional funding could easily be transferred from the huge coffers of the Egyptian and Israeli FMF accounts. The White House's just released FY 2000 budget proposal shows that "of the \$3.43 billion in FMF grants, 94 percent will go to Egypt and Israel."⁵ Jordan's part of the FY 2000 aid package represents just over two percent of the total. The additional FMF would allow the Jordanian Armed Forces to purchase badly needed spares from U.S. companies before they close down production lines or go out of business and upgrade their current inventory to more supportable configurations. The additional FMF would also visibly show the Jordanian people the tangible benefits of peace as many of them believe "...that the reward for burying 45 years of violent enmity with the Jewish state has been negligible."⁶ The U.S. Secretary of

State just announced that the U.S administration would be seeking an additional \$200 million for Jordan that would be spread over five years “to help bolster Jordan’s ability to cope with regional turmoil”.⁷ While this is a move in the right direction, only \$141 million will be targeted as military assistance⁸ and it will not be enough unless it is part of a long-term comprehensive strategy to modernize the Jordanian military. This strategy should encompass the potentially destabilizing areas that concern the Jordanian government such as combating terrorism, curtailing drug/weapons smuggling activities from Iraq and Syria, and demining the fertile Jordan Valley to expand economic opportunities.

If the U.S. sincerely wants to help Jordan, an increase in FMF alone will not be enough. The last two years, the U.S. has provided Jordan with over \$100 million in drawdown authority. The drawdown authority directs the Department of Defense (DoD) to transfer assets to Jordan from their stocks. Of course, much of the transferred materiel is old, outdated, or not mission capable. The drawdown not only masks the support to Jordan but also hurts the DoD as well. This practice of transferring old equipment must stop and should be replaced with a structured long-term planning approach that replaces outdated equipment with supportable and more advanced military hardware.

The U.S. policy goal to secure a comprehensive peace in the Middle East is contingent on several factors. The U.S., as the remaining superpower, must show countries not at peace that there are benefits to be gained with peace. Secondly, the U.S. should encourage democratic rule and free market economies and hold tight to those countries that do embrace those ideals. Lastly, the U.S. must be very careful not to

further imbalance an already militarily imbalanced region and add to the instability already present.

It was not the intent of this paper to take sides or to show that Jordan is a country misunderstood by the U.S or that Jordan's past decisions were justified. The purpose was to give the reader a brief look at the complex history of the region and show that obtaining peace is not a simple task. It was also to show that U.S. military aid to the countries that have accepted peace is not equal, but in fact extremely lopsided and that Jordan, by virtue of past events and decisions, has not benefited from the "peace dividend" as expected. If the U.S. hopes to maintain its long, positive history with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, we must jointly develop a strategy that will enhance stability and finally provide the, thus far, elusive "peace dividend".

Notes

¹ "Jordan will not be springboard for interference abroad—King," *Jordan Times*, on-line, 25 February 1999.

² Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY1998* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 574.

³ Drawdown Authority is a special power of the President to direct the Department of Defense to drawdown defense articles, services, or training not to exceed \$100 million in any fiscal year. This equipment is coming mainly from individual units, prepositioned equipment, and logistics stocks. To not impact operational readiness, the equipment chosen can be in very poor condition and require significant rework. From Louis J. Samuelson, Ed., *The Management of Security Assistance*, 17th ed. (Wright-Patterson AFB: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 1997), 74–75.

⁴ The PEACE FALCON F-16 program implemented in 1996 at a total cost of \$212 million has used the majority of FMF provided to Jordan. The Jordanian Army, Navy, and other Air Force programs have been hurt substantially by the F-16 program.

⁵ "Israel, Egypt Retain Huge Piece of FMF Pie," *Defense News: U.S. Defense Budget*, 15 February 1999, 12.

Notes

⁶ “Key Peace Player Jordan Feels Slighted by US,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 20 October 1997, 8.

⁷ “Albright Pledges To Seek More Aid for Jordan,” *Defense News: This Week*, 11 January 1999, 2.

⁸ “Jordan To Seek Missile, Fighter, Tank Upgrades From U.S.,” *Defense News*, 1 February 1999, 18.

Appendix A: U.S. Military Assistance (1960-1999)

Source: (Data from U.S. Agency for International Development, memorandum to Author, 15 December 1998.)

\$ U.S. (Millions)	Egypt	Israel	Jordan
1960	0.0	0.5	5.4
1961	0.0	0.0	4.0
1962	0.0	13.2	3.2
1963	0.0	13.3	4.6
1964	0.0	0.0	5.3
1965	0.0	12.9	9.1
1966	0.0	90.0	22.4
1967	0.0	7.0	14.4
1968	0.0	25.0	0.4
1969	0.0	85.0	14.2
1970	0.0	30.0	0.2
1971	0.0	545.0	59.5
1972	0.0	300.0	54.9
1973	0.0	307.5	54.9
1974	0.0	2482.7	45.7
1975	0.0	300.0	104.5
1976	0.0	1700.0	137.7
1977	0.0	1000.0	130.9
1978	0.2	1000.0	127.4
1979	1500.4	4000.0	109.7
1980	0.8	1400.0	79.3
1981	550.8	1400.0	44.4
1982	902.4	1400.0	56.9
1983	1326.9	1700.0	52.8
1984	1366.7	1700.0	116.7
1985	1176.7	1400.0	91.9
1986	1245.8	1722.0	83.1
1987	1301.8	1800.0	41.9
1988	1301.5	1800.0	28.3
1989	1301.5	1800.0	11.8
1990	1295.9	1792.3	59.8
1991	1301.9	1800.0	21.2
1992	1301.8	1800.0	20.6
1993	1301.8	1800.0	9.8
1994	1300.8	1800.0	9.8
1995	1301.0	1800.0	8.3
1996	1301.0	1800.0	101.2
1997	1301.0	1800.0	81.7
1998	1301.0	1800.0	51.6
1999 (Note)	1300.0	1860.0	46.6
Total	24981.7	46086.4	1926.1

Note: Figures for 1999 are estimates based on U.S. budget projections.

Appendix B: Comparison of Military Strengths

Army (91-92)	Personnel	Tanks	Guns/Mortars	SSM
Jordan	145,000	1067	600	0
Israel	499,000	3850	1300	12
Syria	406,000	4800	2400	60

Source: The Middle East Military Balance: 1992-1993, Editor: Aharon Yariv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 428-429

Air Force (91-92)	Personnel	Combat A/C	Helicopters	SAM Batteries
Jordan	9700	103	54-59	14
Israel	87,000	694	224	+
Syria	120,000	530	285	108

Source: The Middle East Military Balance: 1992-1993, Editor: Aharon Yariv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 432-433

+ indicates precise number unknown

Author's Note: Data is presented for Israel and Syria because they represent the two countries bordering Jordan that present either a past or current threat. Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia meet neither condition.

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