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EVOLUTION OF NATO IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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by

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Preface

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has radically changed the strategic environment in which the Western military forces must operate. Nowhere in the world is this more evident than in Europe, which formerly was the focal point of the bipolar superpower confrontation. In present-day Europe, the threat of massive Soviet aggression has given way to more subtle threats to the region's stability.

The effect of these historical developments on the Western military institutions has been tremendous and they are still the governing factors behind the Western nations' efforts in restructuring their militaries to match evolving national military objectives and ever shrinking military budgets. As these changes directly affect the way future military operations will be conducted in our area, we find it of fundamental value, as European military professionals, to examine the consequences of the new strategic environment.

It is the goal of this research paper to give an up-to-date analysis of how NATO, as the major military alliance in the European region, has been able to adapt to these changing circumstances until now, and to evaluate the viability of the alliance as a security and stability provider in the future.

We greatly appreciate the assistance of Squadron Leader Dave Bye in the research process. His insights and comments helped us to focus our efforts within this very extensive subject, and challenged us to create a product of value.

Abstract

NATO has successfully provided security and stability in Europe through the Cold War era. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has changed the strategic environment in Europe. The new situation is defined by these significant facts:

- A direct confrontation between two superpowers does not seem possible
- Present day Russia does not have the influence zone it used to have
- Some new nation states have appeared while others have disappeared
- Geopolitical changes generate unrest and could spawn violent conflicts (e.g., Former Yugoslavia)
- NATO has made fundamental political and organizational changes to reshape herself to match the emerging security challenges

This situation affects all European countries and the North Atlantic alliance's members. These changes do not affect all countries in the same way, because of their different geographical location, and their different internal political and economic circumstances.

Working within a framework of fundamental questions and issues common to all members, three individual country perspectives from Denmark, Germany, and Spain are presented. In a final compare and contrast analysis between these country perspectives, the paper identifies major similarities in key areas influencing NATO's future development. Based on these findings, this paper will establish that the North Atlantic alliance is still the best option for maintaining military stability and security in Europe, even though the circumstances have changed since 1989.

Chapter 1 provides a general introduction, establishes the thesis, and limits the scope of this paper. Chapter 2 describes global trends and how they affect the strategic environment in Europe. Chapter 3 examines NATO's adaptation, since 1989, to the emerging European security challenges. Chapter 4 is an intermediate summary, extracting key aspects of the common framework (Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4), and it raises questions and considerations for the present and future development of NATO, forming the basis for the individual country perspectives. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 then provide these individual country perspectives. Chapter 8 compares and contrasts these perspectives in key areas that influence the future development of the alliance. Finally, Chapter 9 provides a summary of our research findings and our concluding remarks.

Chapter 1

Introduction

For the United States and its allies, NATO has always been far more than a transitory response to a temporary threat. It has been a guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability. That is why its mission endures even though the Cold War has receded into the past.

—William J. Clinton

NATO's foundation on 4 April 1949 was a manifestation of the widening ideology-driven break between the former Second World War allies in the West and their Soviet controlled counterparts in the East. The break, characterized by Churchill as the Iron Curtain, had its origin in the Yalta Conference,¹ which divided Europe into Eastern and Western spheres of influence. In effect, this confrontational setting, later described as the Cold War, would become the governing strategic overlay for the European security situation for the next 40 years.

In this setting the NATO treaty was signed, to provide its members with collective security on the basis of the UN Charter's Article 51.² Central to the treaty was not only Article 5,³ stating a common agreement on the obligation of mutual support in case of a military attack on one of the member countries, but also an agreement to settle any internal differences within the alliance in a peaceful manner. It was the first time in history that an organization was set up with these characteristics, formally binding the destiny of its members together in a far-reaching way.

In the 40 years of the Cold War, NATO successfully provided military security and stability to its members by checking the massive Soviet threat against the Western European democracies. This was done in a deepening bipolar setting, fairly static in its nature, but where the stakes and the effort involved were tremendous. Security guaranteed by NATO, combined with parallel European cooperative efforts outside the military field, made possible a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity on the European continent.

With the relatively sudden disintegration of the Soviet Empire in the late 1980s, the bipolar strategic overlay lifted, and NATO was propelled into a state of identity crisis. The main overriding threat gone, NATO's very *raison d'être* was questioned by some, while others, not questioning the alliance itself, more cautiously recognized the need for change in strategic concept and tasks, if NATO was to remain a viable player in the new European strategic environment.

The somewhat disconcerted initial European and American approach to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 only emphasized that a common Western response to threats to the European security and stability was no longer a given. No current organization was in place at the time to deal effectively with these more complex threats that emerged because they were no longer suppressed by the usual strong strategic overlay. With the stakes decreasing in the region, Europe had lost its position as the focal area for US military planning, and the area was now just one of several major security issues for the United States. This led the US to assume a more reluctant leadership position, somewhat shifting the obligation of initiative in security matters more to the European countries.

Since these early years of post-Cold War uncertainty, NATO has indeed adapted to the new European strategic environment by changing its strategic concept and by expanding its efforts in the political field.⁴ Provisions for a strengthened European role in dealing with regional security matters have likewise been delineated albeit not yet fully implemented. This is an ongoing process under constant evaluation, as the Western policy makers try to get a long-term grip on the evolving strategic environment in Europe.

Thesis

Based on NATO adaptation so far, we will argue in this paper, that NATO, capitalizing on its history of success in the Cold War, is still the best option for maintaining military stability and security in the region, even though the circumstances have changed since 1989. NATO is the only organization that has the experience, command structure and the joint combined forces available to counter effectively the military dimension of emerging threats to stability in the region.

The more complex geopolitical situation in the region will tend to erode the cohesion within the alliance. While the major military threat has vanished, new less massive but multifaceted threats constitute the most pertinent present danger to the complex and vulnerable structures of the European industrial countries. These threats, which are increasingly less military in the classical sense, affect each member country in different ways, making it hard to find common solutions. In addition, their very nature requires the involved nations to look at security in broader terms. The present strategic concept of NATO, which is generally agreed upon by the member states, addresses these new threats, by making provisions for more flexibility in employment of forces,⁵ and less rigidity in the

definition of the alliance's operational area. This has confirmed NATO's role as a practical instrument of power, making the alliance viable also under the present circumstances.

With the strengthened political side of NATO and the growing European responsibility for regional security and stability, the alliance now plays a changed but still important role also outside the purely military field. NATO must work in conjunction with a multitude of other organizations mostly with less military focus. The future stability of the region will depend upon the creation of a concerted European address to regional security issues, balanced and integrated with efforts within the NATO alliance, so that they support and supplement each other towards a common goal.

Finally, even though American interest in Europe is waning, there is still a need to keep the US involved in the European security arena. Currently, only a US presence can off-set the Russian strategic potential, especially in the nuclear field, and US leadership in creating a common Western response is still important. Looking into the future, there is a mutual benefit for the nations on both sides of the Atlantic in meeting the emerging challenges of the 21st century, in unison, from a foundation of common shared values. NATO's role in keeping the link with the US strong, and the combined policy coordinated across the Atlantic cannot be overemphasized.

Scope

This paper will focus mainly on the evolving military security issues of present-day Europe and the consequences thereof, as they relate to NATO's continuing existence and role as security and stability provider. We recognize, however, that it is becoming

increasingly difficult to view military security in isolation, especially in light of the trends in the European threat picture, which must be countered by comprehensive efforts using all instruments of power. We will seek to validate NATO's continuing role within this setting. In short, the focus is at the national strategic level, and not the operational level.

In outlining this paper, we have sought to set up a common framework in which fundamental questions and issues of common importance to all members will be addressed. It is outside the scope of this paper to analyze the issues raised in the common part and suggest possible courses of action. The framework is merely set up to function as the foundation and point of reference for the individual accounts and analyses of our respective national perspectives. Issues discussed in the common framework include the short-term adaptation, the enlargement question, the alliance's relationship with Russia, and general discussions relating to geopolitical, global and regional trends and changes in the threat environment.

From the perspectives of three NATO members (Denmark, Germany, and Spain), and in relation to these countries' national interests and objectives, our project will in turn seek to answer if, and how, NATO can contribute to further the respective countries' national security objectives. The individual Danish, German, and Spanish parts will analyze the respective countries' position within NATO, and the countries' local circumstances with respect to threat and geopolitical and strategic position. By comparing and contrasting the national parts in key areas the group will illustrate to what degree NATO can accommodate the individual countries' needs, and further indicate possible sources of challenge to the cohesion of the alliance.

We are fully aware of the fact that three country perspectives out of 16 will not represent the full array of national positions and circumstances that exist within NATO, but the three countries in question do provide significant variety in such central dimensions as size, geography, and duration of membership in the alliance.⁶

Notes

¹ Yalta Conference: Allied conference, attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in February 1945. Among the chief decisions agreed upon by the “Big Three” were the Soviet Union’s agreement to enter the war against Japan after Germany’s defeat; receiving occupation areas in the East in return. The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia. 1995 ed. Columbia University Press. Microsoft Bookshelf © 1987 - 1995 Microsoft Corporation.

² UN Article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations....” *Charter of the United Nations*, San Francisco, 26 June 1945; on-line, Internet, 16 March 1997, available from <http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html>.

³ NATO Article 5: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949; on-line, Internet, 16 March 1997, available from <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

⁴ The Declaration of Rome is central in this respect. It will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3 of this paper. Further information on the Declaration of Rome is available in *NATO Handbook 1992*. Brussels. NATO Office of Information and Press. Not dated; on-line, Internet, 16 March 1997, available from: <http://www.saclantc.nato.int/nato/handbook/004.html>

⁵ The so-called Combined Joint Task Forces. The establishment of these forces were endorsed by the NATO leaders at the 1994 Brussels Summit. *NATO’s New Force Structures*. NATO Fact Sheet No.5, Brussels, 1996; on-line, Internet, 16 March 1997, available from: <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/facts/fs5.htm>

⁶ The dimensions are covered by our respective member states as follows:
Denmark: Northern, small, original member, 4 April 1949
Germany: Central, large, Second Accession, 23 October 1953
Spain. Southern, medium, Third Accession, 10 December 1981.

Chapter 2

Recent History and Emerging Trends

The realization that communism was not a competitive ideology initiated the fall of the “Soviet Empire.” The Cold War was definitively over when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1990. Soon after, the Warsaw Pact dismantled itself by decision on 1 July 1991.

Since the end of the Cold War, a remarkable historical event in the 20th century, new trends have emerged in the global and regional strategic environment. Along with reemergence of former or previously suppressed ones, they have given the network of relationships among traditional state-actors new dimensions, as well as giving non-state actors increasingly relevant roles in international affairs.

Europe, as the potential focal point of confrontation, has not remained unaffected. Particularly, the disappearance of the overriding ideological and military entrenchment has given way to multifaceted, multi-directional-oriented trends with cultural, economic, technological, and informational aspects of a predominantly destabilizing character. Although generally aligned with global tendencies, regional trends could generate individual, often fragmentational characteristics. Accordingly, the violent disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia can be seen as a master example of destabilizing trends, challenging security and stability on the European continent.

Global Trends

Since 1989, the main global trends can be identified and characterized as: increased cultural self-determination, expanded economic competition, accelerating technological progress, and comprehensive informational domination.

Culture

The end of the ideological competition has created outcomes which have affected countries of the former second and third world. The lack of political influence has caused ideology to be replaced by a strong national oriented identity deriving from ethnical, and religious roots.¹ Furthermore, the financial and political support, provided by the former first and second world countries to preserve their ideological interests, has faded, reinforcing the predominant trend of strong cultural expression or nationalism.

The inherent fragmentational force of nationalism could easily break up states where populations have different ethnic and religious heritage.² This can happen violently or peacefully, but always with the goal to create a nation-state or to become superior to another nation.³

Economy

Turning the focus to another global dimension, ideological rivalry has also been replaced by expanded economic competition. Declining military dominance and the subsequent dwindling of defense budgets have liberated funds for increasing investments and extensive trade. These factors, coupled with world markets, no longer hampered by the Iron Curtain, thus generate a global network of interdependencies and relationships.⁴ Developments are contradictory, however. While the Western World, still dependent on

access to resources, has gained significantly from global changes, the third world countries have remained stagnant. Stagnation also describes the present situation of the former Soviet Union and her satellite-states, although this has been caused by the socio-economic transition from a publicly owned, central planning market system to a free market system based upon private property, innovation, and investment.

Generally, the lack of economic solidity makes a state more vulnerable to any destabilizing forces. In particular, the widening prosperity gap has caused a continuous migration from developing countries to developed ones.⁵ Conversely, industrialized countries increasingly tend to intervene in second and third world countries when destabilizing trends jeopardize access to vital natural resources.⁶

Technology

Technological progress is accelerating, generated predominantly by the highly developed industrialized countries of the Western World. High output capacity, a cheap labor force, worldwide competition, and improved transportation support decreasing prices on the world market and increasing global availability of advanced and sophisticated technology for any purpose, even for less financially capable state and non-state actors.⁷

Technology with the most destabilizing character, in the form of large stockpiles of modern military weaponry accumulated during the Cold War, has flooded the world market, proliferating predominantly into crisis regions.⁸

Information

Starting as a subset of technology, information has recently become a dimension on its own with worldwide presence and effects. The advantage of processing data at high

speed in a global network has created instant availability of data at any point in the world, thus creating a kind of global community.⁹

Manipulative trends, particularly in the use of the media¹⁰ but also possible in financial transactions,¹¹ clearly demonstrate that, regarding information, there is a fine line between benefit and abuse. Information has therefore evolved into a powerful tool, since the present complex economic and state systems have become heavily dependent on it.

Changing Europe and Regional Trends

The end of the Cold War has radically transformed the political landscape in Europe. The strategic environment in particular provides an inconsistent picture. The continuing process of integration in Western Europe is opposed by fragmentational forces in the East and Southeast of the continent. Additionally, the diverse developments on the Mediterranean littoral have increasingly caught European attention.

Eastern Europe

Basically, the situation in Eastern Europe can be described as a vacuum of power, left behind by disappearing communism, that is being slowly filled by the consolidating and transitioning new democracies in the shadow of a weak, but in terms of resources still powerful, Russia. While the socio-economic and democratic transition of the Central and East European countries is characterized by the great effort to meet NATO's and the EU's requirements in order to rush under their protective umbrella, Russia remains unpredictable. Although her military has been weakened by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, her nuclear and conventional military potential, stored in huge arsenals, cannot be disregarded.¹² Furthermore, inherent diverse political and nationalistic trends,

and the inability to establish an economic foundation as an initial “stabilizer,” apparently make the step back to imperialism possible. The subsequent avalanche effect would undermine all progress in Central and Eastern European countries, and could finally cause in a new division of Europe.¹³

The Balkans

Since 1989, historical developments in the Balkans have been dominated by the fight between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia; a violent conflict, at times extreme, it was not expected ever to appear again in Europe after WW II.

After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, in 1996, the Balkan region is still unstable.¹⁴ While European nations are trying to resolve this conflict in a long term effort, extreme nationalistic fervor, which started the war, is still present. The combination of religious and ethnic aspects, with poor economic conditions, underscore the strong fragmentational character of this trend.

The migration of displaced persons and refugees, and the continuing nationalistic conflict between the factions using informational means could significantly affect other European countries on the continent.

The Mediterranean Littoral

In the global village, the Mediterranean Sea is no longer an insurmountable obstacle for emerging trends. Many countries, in particular on the North African rim, have increased the size of their military forces during the last decade and some of them are already equipped with modern weapons. Unrest in, and radicalization of, the Muslim world, as well as refugee flows into European countries, which obviously provide a better

and more prosperous future, could generate crises which Europe has never seen before and is not prepared to deal with.¹⁵ Undoubtedly, the clash of two major cultures, Christianity and Islam would affect the whole European theater.

Western Europe

While consolidating the integration process of the EU, Western Europe is increasingly becoming concerned about the continent's security and stability. The initial approach was to generate a common European response to emerging crises, because it was anticipated that they would be of a less massive character. However, this approach failed during the initial part of the war in the former Yugoslavia.

The Western European nations are determined to have the ability to take responsive action to any emerging crisis on the European continent, thus they are restructuring NATO, the EU, and the WEU and reorganizing their relative configuration. Europe is capitalizing on the unique capabilities of NATO and the EU, with the WEU as the reinforcing European pillar of a new security network, in order to generate, instantaneously and with common agreement, any appropriate combination of instruments of power.¹⁶

Notes

¹ Papp, Daniel S. *Contemporary International Relations*. 4th ed. New York: Macmillan College Publishing Company 1994, 29

² Ibid., 29

³ Ibid., 32

⁴ McCrabb, Marris. "Anticipating the Twenty-First Century: Economic Sources of Conflicts." In *Global Security Concerns*. Edited by Dr. Karl P. Magyar et al. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, March 1996, 129

⁵ Davidson, Wayne D. and Bradley S. Davis. "Population Pressures, Migration and, Refugees." In *Global Security Concerns*. Edited by Dr. Karl P. Magyar et al. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, March 1996, 77

Notes

⁶ Hughes, Barry B. *Continuity in Change of World Politics: The Clash of Perspectives*. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1991, 372

⁷ Browne, Mark. "Conventional Armaments; Mapping Warfare in the Twenty-First Century." In *Global Security Concerns*. Edited by Dr. Paul Magyar et al. Maxwell AFB, Ala. Air University Press, March 1996, 241

⁸ Hughes, Barry B. *Continuity in Change of World Politics: The Clash of Perspectives*. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1991, 420

⁹ Ibid., 418

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. *War and Anti-War*. 1st ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993, 140

¹² Henricks, Robert H. "Nuclear Conflict and Nonproliferation Issues in the Twenty-First Century." In *Global Security Concerns*. Edited by Dr. Paul Magyar et al. Maxwell AFB, Ala. Air University Press, March 1996, 205

¹³ *White Paper 94*, Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 27

¹⁴ Larrabee, F. Stephen. "The Balkans" In *Strategic Appraisal 1996*. Edited by Zalmany Khalilzad. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1996, 97

¹⁵ Asmus, Ronald D. "Western Europe." In *Strategic Appraisal 1996*. Edited by Zalmany Khalilzad. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1996, 43

¹⁶ 'Other European institutions such as EC (now EU), WEU and CSCE (now OSCE) also have roles to play in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defense underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity', quoted from "Alliance's New Strategic Concept." In *White Paper94*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 51

Chapter 3

NATO Adaptation after 1989

The end of the East-West confrontation was the key cause for the major changes in the European geopolitical situation. Present and potential conflicts with various intensities, causes, and objectives have replaced the Cold War's bi-directional distinctive military threat. Therefore, security demands have changed in emphasis from a reactive, military, territorial protection to a projected response of combined military, economic, and political effort. This flexible "potential solution" should adapt to any conflict's unique root causes and outcomes. Cooperation on the political, economical, and military level and great international flexibility are required to provide an effective response to regional conflicts. Furthermore, these new types of conflict do not necessarily require the nuclear and strong conventional potential of the US, on which the European nations relied during the Cold War. The American perception is that the European NATO members are capable of dealing with any kind of future European conflict on their own, thus shifting the US's vital national interests from Central Europe to the Mediterranean.

NATO, as one of the unique major IGOs, has been able to respond to emerging conflicts and crisis in the changing European strategic environment. How did NATO try to overcome the almost simultaneous challenges to its survival, such as strategic reorientation, reinforcement of political capabilities, downsizing of member's military

forces, satisfaction of new security demands, and checking occurring conflicts? The following paragraphs will describe NATO's careful initial steps towards an uncertain future and illustrate how far the alliance has progressed.

Initial inertia?

The first significant step towards reorientation occurred in NATO's *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation* in 1991, which incorporates the alliance's new strategic concept. This concept laid out the foundation for a broader role of NATO as a combined political and military organization in order to manage future European security.

Key objectives are:

- the preservation and adaptation of sufficient military capabilities for self defense, deterrence and emerging crisis, which threaten European security
- the common political effort to establish and maintain dialog in order to find cooperative solutions for a European security, including arms control and disarmament¹

To achieve those objectives NATO formulated four basic security tasks:

1. NATO provides the undeniable foundation for a stable and secure European environment, based on the establishment and promotion of democratic structures and institutions, and the will to resolve any conflict peacefully
2. NATO provides *the* forum for its members' consultations about vital national interest and concerns
3. Deterrence of hostilities or attacks directed against member states
4. Preservation of the strategic balance in Europe²

This general approach included the policy of taking on more European responsibility (strengthening the European pillar) as well as stressing the transatlantic link as being still vital for the fulfillment of NATO's future missions.

Overall, this concept illustrates NATO's recognition of its future role in a new European era, although it took two years to find a common consensus to be declared in

Rome on 8 November 1991. The security challenges of the subsequent years have demonstrated well, that the process of change in the strategic environment has not finished yet. At least NATO's gradual adaptation to new situations validates the investment of two years' geopolitical trends assessment.

Changes in policy

The major change in NATO's policy is the establishment and reinforcement of its political capabilities. At least three of the four mentioned tasks include predominantly political actions. With dialog as the magic key, NATO invited the Central and Eastern European countries to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December of 1991. This Council provided a forum in order to generate mutual confidence on the basis of assistance in security issues and dialog about any national concern. Practically, it continued in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) project started in January 1994 with the goal to generate international responsibility and improvements to multinational forces' peacekeeping missions. So the consensus on NATO's enlargement to the East is a cornerstone of the successful integration process of Central and Eastern European countries, although it leads presently to political disagreement with Russia,³ an issue, NATO currently has no satisfying long term solution for. Russia's proposed idea, to give her full membership, would resolve this problem, but was rejected by NATO, because of the internal European imbalance that it would cause. Aware of the North African Maghreb Belt as a permanent region of crisis and inherent destabilizing forces, NATO recently extended dialog to countries along the Mediterranean littoral. Eventually,

political talks with the WEU, the EU and the OSCE concluded in a concept of mutual support and complementary contribution to preserve European security and stability.

According to military capabilities, and based on the new strategic concept, NATO started in 1992 to shape its forces for future missions. The formation of flexible, ready, integrated and multinational Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) was NATO's first step in developing the ability to generate an instant response to emerging crises. Additionally, this will enhance the integration of European nations, while overcoming the consequences of national military downsizing. Also, out of area missions, as long as they are carried out by UN mandate, have been added to the NATO force's repertoire. Improvement of forces' employment led to the decision on the formation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994⁴ as a continuation of RRF and the final adaptation to the new types of conflict and crisis. As a result of the changing missions, NATO's command structures altered and were simplified and streamlined in 1996.⁵ Less nuclear dependence due to a reduced nuclear threat also supports arms control and disarmament as instruments to control and prevent proliferation.⁶

In total, NATO established a variety of determined and effective instruments to adapt to new European security demands.

NATO's role in Yugoslavia

Parallel to NATO's reorientation phase, which apparently concluded with the decision about its final reform in 1996 in Berlin, the Yugoslavian conflict occurred. NATO's role in this conflict has been twofold. Firstly, the alliance provided forces under UN command as a contribution to UNPROFOR from 1 December 1994 to the 20 December 1995.

Secondly, under her own authority, NATO enforced, with IFOR troops, the following of the Dayton Peace Accord's conditions.

Due to the failure of a common European political effort to solve the Yugoslavian conflict, the first engagement under UN command was a careful step towards setting in practice its new strategy. Different national interests under the cover of UN, as well as complex and confused command structures hampered an effective impact of NATO troops in the Balkans. Those bad experiences led finally to the approval of the second mission under UN mandate but NATO command—IFOR (Implementation Forces). Experiences from this recently finished mission demonstrated that the presence of common European interests provides the opportunity of determined, and therefore effective, employment of forces. Eventually, IFOR was a successful test for NATO's new security role in Europe as it additionally integrated non-NATO forces (Russians as the most noteworthy ones) and its effort was coordinated with the EU and the OSCE.⁷ NATO was able to generate the necessary common pressure on the warring factions in order to force them to the negotiation table. This finally resulted in the Dayton Peace Accord, concluding the hostilities at the same time. Regarding nation building and assistance, it was the first time NATO was challenged and has been able to provide appropriate forces for this new type of missions.

Notes

¹ NATO's *New Strategic Concept* is part of the "Rome Declaration on peace and cooperation." On-line. Internet, 10 January 1997. Available from <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/facts/fs12.htm>

² Ibid.

³ Voigt, Karsten and Tomas Wachster. *The enlargement of the Alliance*. Draft Special Report of the Working Group on NATO Enlargement. May 1995.

Notes

⁴The Concept of Combined Joint Task Forces was endorsed at the Brussels summit 1994. *NATO's New Force Structures*. NATO Fact Sheet No.5, Brussels, 1996. On-line. Internet, 18 March 1997 Available from: <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/facts/fs5.htm>.

⁵ *Chairman's Summary Of The Meeting Of The North Atlantic Cooperation Council*. Berlin. 4 June 1996. On-line. Internet, 18 March 1997. Available from: <gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/00/natodata/PRESS/COMMUNIQUE/1996/nac64.96>

⁶ *NATO's New Forces Structure*. NATO Fact Sheet No.5, Brussels, 1996. On-line. Internet 12 February 1997. Available from: <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/facts/fs5.htm>

⁷"Final communiqué." In *Press communiqué M-NAC(DM)-2(96)89*. North Atlantic Council meeting 13th June 1996.

Chapter 4

Future of NATO based on History and Trends

The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America.

—The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation

The development to this date and the trends discussed earlier, will shape the circumstances under which NATO will have to exist in the future. The alliance's viability as a future security and stability provider for its member states, will be tested under these circumstances, and this will require active NATO involvement. In the following chapter we will outline some of the central issues remaining to be addressed, or only partially solved at this time.

Enlargement

There is a natural urge within most Central and Eastern European countries to seek security by joining established Western European organizations including NATO. The fact that many of the projected emerging threats and factors of instability are originating within these countries, makes it equally desirable for Western Europe that a suitable arrangement be made, in which stability can be projected eastward. This will have to be

done not only in a military sense through NATO, but maybe more importantly at the economic and political level through other organizations with the EU as the leading entity.

To spread the “security umbrella” to include the Eastern European countries without alienating or isolating Russia, will be the major task of the alliance well into the future. An enlargement without some sort of Russian consent, will only create a new dangerous divide in Europe albeit further to the east than the old Iron Curtain.

Conflict Responses

In general, it can be said that the recent geopolitical trends have made conflicts on a total war scale less likely. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the instability combined with large conventional and nuclear forces still present, leaves a latent risk for a major conflict. However, with the Russian forces in general disarray, the strategic warning time has grown considerably for the West in this respect, and the present security interests of Russia do not seem to warrant any full-scale military adventures.

With respect to the most likely conflict scenarios in the European region, the trend is that response to violation of NATO territory will give way to the need for NATO to engage outside its traditional area to counter sources of instability in a more pro-active manner. Provisions for this kind of operation under UN and/or OSCE tasking have been made,¹ as illustrated by the engagement in the former Yugoslavia. The new strategic concept of the alliance based on The Declaration of Rome,² lays out guidelines for these activities, but a further long-term refinement of policy and limitations will be needed.

Common Response to less Common Conflicts

The alliance can no longer be unidirectional in its planning, but must maintain a high degree of flexibility to respond to different types of conflicts originating from different geographical sources.³ How to plan for future potential conflicts, and where to put the alliance's main effort remains a central issue, and a potential challenge to the cohesion of the alliance.

The projected change in the nature of future conflicts will make them less militarily intensive, but politically harder to handle. The actors will be non-traditional either being non-state actors or international movements, not seeking direct military confrontation but rather acting as destabilizing factors. In some sense this will put more emphasis on instruments of power other than the military, and one can foresee a prolonged phase of political activity before a potential conflict escalates to the traditional military level. This shift in the nature of conflict will require the alliance to adapt to new roles, putting more emphasis on non-traditional military missions as peacekeeping and peacemaking, while still requiring the alliance to hold a viable military option behind the members common political strategy.

If future conflicts are to be resolved effectively before an actual outbreak of military hostilities, it will require an effective method of crisis management for the region. A timely show of strong solidarity within the alliance will be an important factor at the political level. Getting this common political response has been a notorious problem for the European nations, and any easy solution does not present itself, although this issue is being addressed within the European Union.⁴

Force Structure for the Future

One suggested way of securing a timely and optimized response to smaller future conflicts, is by using what has been termed as the “opt in / opt out policy,” where a coalition of some NATO members responds to a conflict with limited cooperation and support from the whole alliance. This should replace the need for total consensus before commencing military operations in the region. Some questions still remain to be addressed, most notably, the implications for the common force structure and the issue of what can be termed “passive consensus”; to allow the use of common command systems and infrastructure without common total commitment.

To set up a force structure working under the above mentioned conditions will require a high degree of flexibility as the nature of conflicts will vary, as may the involved nations. The ability for rapid power projection will be important, and the addition of out-of-area operations to the traditional NATO tasks will put further emphasis on mobility and lift over distances not usually negotiated by most NATO countries in the traditional setting.

One driving factor in the way the structure will evolve, is the general tendency of downsizing under the present budget constraints. By optimizing the contributions of the individual members to the common force structure some rationalization benefits can be gained. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), with characteristics as listed above and suitable for the expected threat, have been planned at this time.⁵ The practical implications of trying to optimize the CJTF structure based on each individual contributor’s unique capabilities versus retaining the individual nation’s right to opt in or out, have not been tested so far.

NATO and Other European Security Structures

The structures of cooperation in Europe remaining from the Cold War-era have different, but somewhat overlapping capabilities. The creation of an environment, where these organizations are able to supplement each other as opposed to muddle security issues or directly compete against each other, is very important. Problems in doing so, include the fact that the different organizations by and large relate to different IOPs, and that there is not total membership congruence between the various organizations. This can lead to a highly complex and slow political process and may have implications for the effectiveness of a future NATO military response and for the general cohesion of the alliance.

The total success of these organizations' combined efforts hinges on their ability to motivate countries to follow their recommendations, and their ability to project security and stability in a complementary manner.

Effects on the Transatlantic Link

Although the US will still be committed to maintaining European security,⁶ the region is now no longer the focal point for the US military planners, but merely one among many areas of US military interest. This will lead to less US engagement in European matters. A continued decline in the US leadership role in Europe will put more emphasis on the European pillar of the alliance, and the question is: whether common European policy can be formed effectively with less US engagement, and if so whether this will correspond to American wishes?

Some issues work in favor of keeping the transatlantic link strong. The common interest in keeping Russia engaged in some sort of mutual security arrangement may presently be the most obvious. Simply due to size, the Russian issue is not only European, but global in its nature. The common US and European interest in countering emerging global trends, such as international crime, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation, should also be noted. This does not, however, change the fact that the new strategic European environment most probably will lower the American stakes in the region, generally resulting in a trend of less US involvement in the European theater.

In the future, NATO will have an important role to play, as the organization binding Europe and North America together in a coordinated way, under these changed circumstances.

Notes

¹ At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo in June 1992 agreement was reached on providing conditional support for CSCE peace-keeping activities on a case-by-case basis, including making available Alliance resources and expertise. *NATO Handbook 1992*. Brussels. NATO Office of Information and Press. Not dated. Available from: <http://www.saclantc.nato.int/nato/handbook/000.html>

² *The Declaration of Rome, 1991*. Official Declaration agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Rome. 8 November 1991. Available from: <http://www.saclantc.nato.int/nato/handbook/098.html>

³ 'To ensure that [...] the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary.' Ibid..

⁴ The emphasis on a coordinated comprehensive response is also present in the Rome Declaration. Ibid., para 32-34.

⁵ The establishment of these forces were endorsed by the NATO leaders at the 1994 Brussels Summit. *NATO's New Force Structures*. NATO Fact Sheet No.5, Brussels, 1996. Available from: <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/facts/fs5.htm>

⁶ Europe is still considered a 'vital US interest' The White House. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. February 1996, page 35.

Chapter 5

The Danish Perspective—Small State Security

When the elephants fight, the grass suffers; when they make love, it also suffers.

—Håkan Wiberg, from old proverb

It is evident that European security policy is not formulated in Copenhagen. The size of the country and its relative power naturally tend to make Danish policy more reactive in nature, commenting on, and adding a Danish flavor to, trends in the common great power policy formulations. The impact of specific Danish ideas on the future development of NATO should be viewed in this light. The fundamental effects of the changing security environment on Denmark are, however, indicative of changes in the general situation of most small European states, and has, as such, applicability beyond our national borders.

The Danish security situation has changed radically since 1989. From being a front line state, only a few minutes away from potential hostile air bases, we are now in a situation, where a direct military threat is considered non-existing.¹ Disregarding a short period immediately after WWI, this situation is unprecedented in Danish history.² Focus and effort can now be shifted to threats of a more indirect nature without jeopardizing the nation's core military security objectives.

The absence of a direct military threat against our territory and the lifting of the Cold War strategic overlay has left Denmark and other small states³ more freedom of action in

policy formulation. This has had three major effects: Danish foreign policy as a whole has become much more profiled, especially in the local geographic region; secondly, the use of the military instrument of power now ironically plays a bigger role in foreign policy formulation than during the Cold War, and finally from being a net receiver of military reinforcements, Denmark is now actively contributing forces to regional out-of-area operations.

Focusing more directly on NATO and the Danish relationship with the organization, this leads to the following thesis: For Denmark there are no military security alternatives to active participation in the NATO alliance, and even in the context of a wider definition of security, the alliance's central position should not be radically altered. In the key areas of NATO future development: enlargement, out-of-area involvement and the continued US involvement in Europe, Danish policy is clear and it is supported by practical military solutions. The Danish reservations on the issue of further European integration and the nation's status as WEU observers, may have implications for Denmark's participation in the planned CJTFs, but the latest clarification of the relationship between NATO and the WEU on these matters would seem to lessen the effect of this particular Danish status.⁴

Traditional Danish Security Policy

To understand the decisions being made about present day Danish security policy and our position, which is sometimes at odds with the European mainstream, it is necessary to give a short background and paint a picture of Danish foreign policy prior to 1989.

Historical Background

Through history, the Danish security situation has mainly been dictated by the country's geographical position, being the cross-roads between Northern and Central Europe and controller of the access to the Baltic Sea. With the end of the Napoleonic wars, the nation's ability to act as a regional power in any way irreversibly vanished. The consolidation of power on the European continent in the 19th century into fewer and larger states totally changed the regional security environment, and from the late 19th century the nation's relative weakness was powerfully underscored by a united and ever-stronger Germany.⁵

Until the establishment of NATO, Denmark reacted to this environment by pursuing a policy of neutrality with a high degree of deference to German security interests, and a defense policy of pacifistic flavor, characterized by skepticism toward the effectiveness of military means.⁶ The policy proved to be only partly successful, in that it kept the nation out of WWI but did not hinder the WWII occupation. During the same period, international disputes involving Denmark were successfully resolved in a peaceful manner under the auspices of The League of Nations and The International Court.⁷ The formative effect of these experiences on the Danish foreign policy tradition can be traced forward to present day Danish involvement and emphasis on international organizations like the UN and OSCE.

Danish security policy after WWII has evolved around our NATO participation. The obligation to defend the Danish North Atlantic region (Greenland and the Faeroe Islands), constitute a unique problem and gives the nation a strengthened Atlantic focus. Generally, support for Danish membership of NATO has been without question, even though some

attempts have been made over time to facilitate a “softer” security policy than was generally evident within the alliance. The non-acceptance of the stationing of nuclear weapons and foreign troops in peacetime on Danish soil are examples of this. These measures, together with corresponding acts by the other Scandinavian countries within and outside NATO have been characterized by some as contributing factors in creating a Nordic area of relatively low tension.⁸

The low point of Danish NATO participation was reached in the early eighties, when the normally broad Danish defense support from most parties in Parliament collapsed under the influence of NATO’s INF policy.⁹ From a period known as the “foot-note era,” Denmark was just slowly working its way towards a more accepted position within the alliance, when the events of 1989 totally altered the situation.

The Five Traditional Tracks of Danish Foreign Policy

An alternative way of looking at Danish Foreign policy before 1989 and the effects of the new European order, is from a more theoretical, systemic view-point. This approach will somewhat simplified show that Danish foreign policy until recently was pursued along five distinct tracks, each representing a certain policy goal and each associated with an international organization:

1. The global track, where the UN served as a frame for efforts to create an international *legal order*.
2. The Atlantic track, where NATO took care of *security*.
3. The Western European track, where the EC contributed to *economic* welfare.
4. The All European track, where CSCE (later OSCE) sought to overcome the consequences of the *division of Europe*.
5. The Nordic track, which constituted the basis for a sense of *identity* (Nordic Council).¹⁰

On the grand scale, the division between the tracks was not total. Track 1, 3 and 5 all dealt with furthering traditional Danish values, albeit within different geographical settings. A more “watertight” partition existed between the security track and the economic track. Most Danish discussions on EC issues, including those of integration, have traditionally been focused on the economic dimension, somewhat naively neglecting most other political and security related questions. This serves well to illustrate part of the predicament that Denmark found itself in, when the above mentioned tracks became quite “slippery” as a result of the Soviet collapse and the accelerating European integration. Danish reservations toward the EU and especially the WEU will be discussed later in this chapter.

National Military Objectives prior to 1989

As a result of the country’s relative weakness compared to the Warsaw Pact forces in the close proximity, the Danish military objectives were realistically modest and focused almost entirely on the Danish territorial area. In general terms, the objective was to protect the Danish territory only for a limited period and in a way sufficient to secure the arrival of allied reinforcements, and then to cooperate as part of the NATO alliance. In practical terms this meant that the force structure was tailored for stationary anti-invasion defense, operating from fixed bases and relying in part on territorial home-guard units.

The strong Danish engagement in out-of-area operations, e.g., providing observers to UN peacekeeping operations, constitutes one of the exceptions to this arrangement, and can be viewed as our efforts along the UN foreign policy track. However, troops for UN duty were drawn from regular units and no real expeditionary support structure was set up. In summary, emphasis was almost solely on the defense of Danish territory.

Post-Cold War Danish Security

Compared to the Cold War era, Danish security policy has undergone tremendous change. The driving force in these changes has naturally been the changed strategic environment. The disappearance of the East-West confrontation has lifted the strategic overlay and has given especially small states more room to maneuver in the foreign policy field, but more importantly, the direct military threat to the Danish territory has practically vanished.

Local Threat Assessment

The official government notes on the present Danish Defense Act from late 1993 sum up the threats against Denmark as follows:

The Government is of the opinion that under the present circumstances there exists no direct military threat against fundamental Danish security-political values, interpreted as the existence, integrity and sovereignty of the nation.

A number of current and latent conflicts do, however, represent threats against extended Danish security-political goals and values, which are contained in the principles regarding peaceful adjustment of frontiers, the observance of human rights, the development of democratic systems, as well as viable social, economic, and ecological development. Such conflicts may have their origins within political, social, ethnic, religious conditions, or the availability of natural resources and often manifest themselves locally, but there is a risk that they may spread. A similar risk may emanate from the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, high technology conventional weapons, etc...

The Government is of the opinion that under the present circumstances, the direct military threat against the fundamental Danish security-political values has been replaced by a number of local conflicts and conflict potentials.¹¹

Looking at the origins of potential conflicts as stated above, it can be seen that the Danish threat assessment is very much in concert with the present US security concerns

and the global trends discussed earlier in this paper. From a local standpoint, the most pressing security concerns are directed towards the Baltic states and the Russian areas bordering the Baltic Sea. Conflicts spawned from ethnic minority problems and social unrest in this area, probably constitute Denmark's most direct security problem.¹²

Some concern has been raised over the fact that the removal of former Soviet weapons from the Central European theater as part of the CFE agreement has actually increased the military potential, including nuclear weapons, in the Nordic and Arctic flank area, thus increasing the area's relative strategic importance and increasing the risk of a nuclear ecological disaster.¹³ The overall trend in the Danish threat picture is, however, that the military threat has diminished dramatically, and that non-military threats now seem to be the most likely to be faced in the future. This fact has led the Danish policy makers to base the present defense policy on a broader security concept.

New Danish Security Policy

Danish security policy has clearly not been static since 1989, but in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union some general trends have crystallized, based on the new strategic situation. These trends reflect different dimensions of the new security situation and are not all unique to the Danish situation.

Perhaps most notable is the fact that security has become "divisible"¹⁴ now that the governing strategic overlay has gone. This has led to some *regionalization* of Danish security policy both at the European level as well as in the local area, introducing new organizations and shifting emphasis from existing ones. At the European level the main shift has been the increased involvement of the EU, a process which Denmark has had some reservations about on the military front, but has followed in other areas of policy. In

the local area the regionalization trend has led to a multitude of bi-, tri-, and multilateral efforts on security issues.

The *broadening of the security concept* has led to an increased use of non-military IOPs and institutions in formulating the security policy, and increased attention has been given to the so-called “soft security measures” like foreign development aid, supervision of former Soviet nuclear plants, accommodation of refugees, and cooperation against international crime. This trend is in many ways very well linked to traditional Danish policy goals,¹⁵ and consequently efforts in these areas have increased considerably. The total Danish expenditure on international non-defense related efforts is now higher than the defense budget.¹⁶ Along the same lines, making NATO more politically oriented with the introduction of the NACC and the PfP programs has been welcomed by Danish policy makers, and Denmark has played a very active role in the enlargement process, especially in the Baltic area.

At the same time and somewhat in contrast, it has now become *more feasible* for a small state like Denmark *to use its military IOP* in foreign policy formulation, partly because of the increase in number of international military tasks such as peacekeeping, which has traditionally been an area of strong Danish involvement. As an example, Denmark is engaged significantly with troops and equipment in the UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. The Danish forces are deployed with heavier equipment than most other nation's deployed forces, to include main battle tanks, and Denmark has had the highest per capita participation among the UN forces in the area.¹⁷

Over all, it can be stated, that Danish security policy has become much more *active and more international* than during the Cold War. The new reduced threat level has

enabled Denmark to actively follow extended security-political goals and values, without lowering the priority of the fundamental security-political goals.¹⁸ In other words, one can say that in the present situation, the nation's core security interests are best protected by active engagement in solving potential crises in the European area, before they can develop a military dimension or spread to our immediate neighborhood. This is a significant change of focus from prior to 1989 where the security focus was confined more directly to protecting Danish territory by military means, and the change conforms well to the presently stated NATO and EU policies on the subject.

Enlargement. Two areas of this more active policy have received particular attention in Denmark. Out-of-area operations, which will be discussed in more detail later, and secondly, the enlargement process. This process, which runs more or less concurrently along both NATO and EU tracks has been supported very actively by Denmark for various reasons. First of all, for a small state, stability is of paramount importance, and the enlargement process is addressing the very task of projecting stability into the former Warsaw Pact countries, whether through NATO or through the EU. Secondly, the process can also be seen as supporting the local efforts of definitively disengaging the Baltic states from sources of instability in the Russian area and further consolidating their status as independent nations. This is a process which in particular has been spearheaded by Denmark, with its outspoken support since the days when the three republics broke away from Russia.¹⁹

Like all NATO countries, Denmark is naturally very much concerned about not creating new dividing lines between the alliance and Russia through the enlargement process. The active policy towards the Baltic states has therefore been followed by

parallel attempts to engage the neighboring Russian area in the process of creating a stable East Baltic development, which also takes legitimate Russian wishes into consideration. After some initial success in the cooperative efforts between Denmark and Russia, the Russian handling of the situation in Chechnya has led Denmark to a temporary halt in implementing further cooperative measures.²⁰ This serves to show the delicate balance of keeping a good working relationship with a nation, which in many areas still pursues policies totally unacceptable to the Western democracies. However, even if the current expectations for the direct Danish-Russian cooperation thus are low, indicating in a small way, that a de facto division may be a future reality, the prospect for a former front line state of having an increased buffer by moving this dividing line further to the East, is not altogether unpleasant.

The last, but not the least important reason, is more indirect in its nature. Actively seeking NATO enlargement and combining this with a corresponding effort in the EU fits nicely with the Danish view on the European integration process. Because of the perceived danger of giving up excessive sovereignty, Denmark has concerns about a too rapid and too deep European integration, and by widening the number of member states, this process can be effectively slowed down. From a Danish viewpoint, focusing mostly on the economic aspects, the present level of integration is fairly ideal, and it is not necessarily desirable to ever reach the full set of goals for the integration. What is important, however, is the integration process itself,²¹ because that keeps the greater European powers in constant positive political contact.

New National Military Objectives

The Danish National Military Objectives are laid down by Parliament in the Defense Act,²² and supplemented by multi-partisan defense agreements usually covering a 4-5 year period, delineating expenditure levels and regulating force structures, etc.. The current Defense Act is from December 1993 and it clearly shows the transformation from local focus to the broader security perspective, and it also shows the importance of NATO in the Danish security structure. The following excerpt from the act is included to illustrate this:

Aims and Tasks of the Armed Forces

- (1) The Armed Forces shall contribute to furthering peace and security.
- (2) The Armed Forces constitute an important security political mean[s] whose aims are to:
 - 1) Prevent conflicts and wars.
 - 2) Uphold the sovereignty of Denmark and secure the continued existence and integrity of the country.
 - 3) Further a peaceful development in the world with due respect for human rights.
- (3) Under the mandate of either the United Nations or the OSCE, the Danish Armed Forces shall with military means, directly or through NATO, contribute to conflict prevention, peace-keeping, humanitarian and similar tasks.
- (4) As an integrated part of NATO, the Armed Forces shall be able to:
 - 1) Accomplish missions involving the prevention of conflicts, crises management as well as carry out effective resistance in case of attacks on Danish territory and complete defense of Denmark and neighboring areas in cooperation with allied forces, including the punctual reception, support and implementation of operations with allied forces deployed as reinforcements.

2) Participate in prevention of conflicts, crises management, and defense within the area of NATO, including demonstration of solidarity by the strategy of the Alliance.

(5) The Armed Forces shall be composed of forces from all three services whose size, combat power, endurance, mobility and flexibility make it possible to fulfill the tasks mentioned in subsections 3 and 4.²³

It is important to note, that the prime task of the Danish armed forces now is conflict prevention, and that the connection to NATO, UN and the OSCE is directly included in the law text. The official notes to the act further emphasize the weight Denmark puts on the NATO alliance. It is noted that the Danish Armed Forces by themselves cannot maintain sufficient war-preventive capacity to deal with a major European crisis, and that effective prevention of war in the area around Denmark, as hitherto, can only be obtained through continued and active Danish membership of NATO.²⁴ The government explicitly states that no alternative exists to the alliance in respect to protecting the fundamental Danish security-political goals and values.²⁵

The key position of NATO in the Danish security picture receives wide support from both the parliamentary parties and the public, a fact that was also the case prior to 1989. Recent polls on the subject show very high public support for Denmark's participation in NATO and the trend is even for increasing support of the alliance.²⁶

The more active Danish engagement in the larger regional context, and the new tasks specified above have led to Danish post-Cold War defense cuts well below the Western average.²⁷ Some have pointedly argued that this is because the Danish defense budget formerly was so small that there was no 'peace-dividend' to be collected.²⁸ The agreed level of defense expenditure for the next 5 year period continues this trend and maintains overall costs at roughly the same fixed price level.²⁹

Adaptation of Forces and Operative Concepts

Denmark has, from early on, adapted its forces to the changed security situation in response to the new national military tasks and the requirements of the international organizations pertinent to the Danish security situation. From having been a potential net receiver of allied reinforcements, Denmark is now contributing forces to NATO's reaction forces, both rapid and immediate, and to the UN. The contribution comprises forces from all services and is substantial. This is illustrated by the fact that 25% of the Danish combat aircraft are currently submitted to NATO's immediate reaction force.³⁰

Perhaps the most notable contribution to the military security organizations in the present European situation is The Danish International Brigade.³¹ This force structure was established by direct political direction in 1993 as a consequence of the changed security environment. This light armored brigade is specifically tailored to participate in preventive, peace-keeping, peace-making and humanitarian operations under the UN or OSCE, but at the same time, it is made available for NATO's rapid reaction forces and can be used in future out-of-area operations.³² The brigade consists of a pool of about 4500 troops with a contract to serve in the unit if needed, enabling about 1500 to be deployed at any one time. Currently elements of this brigade are serving as part of the Danish SFOR contribution.

The Danish SFOR contribution serves to illustrate a practical aspect of the changed operational concepts developed as a consequence of the changed security situation. As noted earlier, during the enlargement discussion, the Danish focus has been predominantly towards the Baltic states, and one of the practical consequences has been the Danish attempt to draw these Baltic states and Poland into closer operational military cooperation

in the peace-keeping field. This has been done as part of the PfP program and involves combined training of troops and combined deployment. The present Danish battalion in Bosnia has platoon elements from all three Baltic states, and the battalion is itself, in turn, part of the Nordic Brigade, which also contains a Polish battalion.³³

Denmark and the European Security Structures

Denmark is not altogether in the mainstream on its position regarding some of the emerging trends in the European security structure. Most notable is the fact that Denmark has elected to remain outside the WEU, having only observer status in this institution. The reasons behind this can be linked back to the division of Danish foreign policy along the 5 tracks, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, where Denmark has always preferred to limit Western European cooperation to civilian, economic and general security policy issues, keeping NATO as the sole organization to deal with specific security and defense policies.

At the political level, the need for adaptation of Danish policy in this respect has actually been recognized from soon after the fall of the Soviet Union. In the discussions leading to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 the Danish political leadership went along with the EC integration plans, extending the fields of cooperation to include foreign and security policy. The very narrow Danish popular rejection of this Treaty in a referendum in June 1992³⁴ led to renegotiations of the terms for Denmark's further participation in the EU-integration process. Broad Danish political consensus was gained on a proposal excluding Danish participation from some areas of the EU integration process, and this

proposal was accepted by the other EU states, and by the Danish people, in a second referendum held in early 1993.

In the security field, this arrangement has had two major effects for Denmark. The first, of course, being the direct result that Denmark does not participate directly in the WEU organization. Secondly, and perhaps of more long term importance, is the fact that the second referendum and the national political negotiations leading up to it, have tied the question of Danish WEU participation to the rest of the issues dealt with by the Maastricht Treaty, some of which are very contentious for the Danish public. Thus, even though WEU participation is presently becoming less of a contended issue in the Danish debate, because of the delineated sharing of responsibilities between this organization and NATO, this effectively means that the issue of membership cannot be dealt with in isolation and without another referendum.

The actual short term effect of Denmark being outside the WEU has not been very dramatic. After some initial 'scary' years in the beginning phases of the development of the European Defense Identity, the now established cooperation between NATO and the WEU leaves Denmark with the ability to participate actively in the European security arena.

The US acceptance and encouragement of the development of a more distinct European defense capability *within* NATO, and the CJTF concept decided upon by the NATO-summit in 1994, with its emphasis on establishing flexible ad hoc 'coalitions-of-the-willing' task forces, both have room for the unique Danish position. Probable force structures dealing with European regional security problems and conflict prevention efforts presently seem to range from pure WEU structures at the low end, through

NATO+/- structures for mid level conflict prevention, to pure traditional NATO forces in the case of a major conflict in the region. The most likely scenario in the present European environment will probably have to be found in the center of this continuum,³⁵ not decreasing the possibility of Danish participation in any significant way.

A Danish View of the Transatlantic Link

A strong link to the US in security matters is very important to Denmark for historical, political and cultural reasons. Apart from Danish-American cooperation in the North Atlantic, especially in Greenland, within the framework of NATO, the importance of a continued strong transatlantic link can be seen from three perspectives: Western European power balance, meeting global trends with common shared values, and finally as part of the remaining All-European nuclear power balance.

The following passage from a speech made by the current Danish Minister of Defense, Hans Hækkerup, illustrates the Danish view on some of these matters:

North America and Europe share a common heritage, common values and many common interests. Together we have an interest in meeting the challenges which lie ahead of us. Europe needs the United States and the United States needs Europe. Especially seen from the perspective of a smaller European nation, the United States has an important balancing role in Europe. It acts as a counterweight to the greater West European powers.³⁶

At the global level, the effectiveness of the cooperation between Europe and the US will be a deciding factor in determining to what extent the emerging global trends can be met effectively, so that solutions will be based on common shared Western values.

Denmark sees NATO as a vital link between Europe and the US, effectively tying the US to the European security situation. It is seen as fundamentally important for the

security of Europe that the US keeps forces stationed in Europe and remains engaged, partly as a latent defense in the event that a nuclear power should again be felt as a threat, and partly as a balance between the classical European great powers.³⁷

With regard to balancing the Western European great powers, this is perhaps of special importance to the small European states, as this provides Denmark and other similar countries with more freedom of action in foreign policy formulation than would otherwise be the case.³⁸ Additionally, the US special military relationship with Germany and the stationing of troops in that country is of importance, in that it provides Germany with a certain amount of security and thus serves to keep the German military machine at a level that does not raise any concern in the rest of Europe.

Finally, effective US leadership must not be forgotten. The improved situation in the former Yugoslavia can very much be attributed to the more concerted and direct effort by the NATO countries within the UN framework - a change only made possible by more active US engagement at the military and diplomatic level.

Conclusion

From a Danish perspective, the NATO alliance is still a cornerstone in the European security architecture, providing viable and wide-ranging security guarantees, and effectively tying the US to the European theater. Denmark recognizes the fact that due to its limited size, the country's armed forces cannot alone provide sufficient war preventive capability, and Denmark has therefore been very active in pursuing its extended security goals through the alliance and the UN.

The changed security environment in Europe, and the continuing European integration has impacted the traditional division of Danish foreign policy along 5 separate tracks in a serious way. Danish non-participation in the WEU is an indicator that Danish foreign policy is still having some problems adapting to the changed situation. The present security configuration, with the WEU working as the European pillar within the NATO alliance, and the flexible CJTF concept, leave room for Denmark to participate in military conflict preventive operations in the European region.

On the practical military level, Denmark has embraced the changed environment and has adapted actively to the new situation. Extensive participation in the ongoing peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, the Baltic cooperation within the PfP framework, and the adaptation of the Danish force structure, all support a new, more active, Danish foreign policy.

The tie to the US through NATO is very important for a small state like Denmark. This provides a source of backing forces in case of a major conflict in the region, it keeps the US as a balancing European power, and it provides US leadership to make ongoing operations more effective. Common shared values on a majority of political and cultural issues make the US a natural partner in facing the global challenges of the 21st century.

The Danish perspectives on current issues as indicated above, should make it very clear that Denmark, while also focusing on the global UN cooperation, will actively seek to keep the NATO alliance as a viable security organization well into the future - even under changing circumstances.

Notes

¹ *Act on the Aims, Tasks, and Organization etc. of the Armed Forces*. Law no. 909, 8 December, 1993, Danish Ministry of Defence, Copenhagen 13 December 1993.

² Nikolaj Petersen. "Danish Security policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation." In *Small states and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. Edited by Bauwens et al.. *Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No.8*. London, Brassey's, 1996, page 171.

³ The concept 'small state' has been introduced into the study of international relations. The concept functions as the basis for a fully separate branch of political science, trying to explain the continued existence of less powerful states. A working definition of a small state could be as follows: "A small power is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primary by the use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the small power's must believe in its inability to rely on its own means and must also be recognized by other states involved in international politics." Rothstein, L. Robert. *Alliances and Small States*. Columbia University Press, 1968.

⁴ At the Brussels summit in 1994, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces was endorsed by the alliance leaders. They directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities and in coordination with the WEU, to develop this concept, with a view to providing *separable but not separate* military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU as a means of facilitating contingency operations, including operations with nations outside the Alliance. and to establish the necessary capabilities. This initiative will assist in the development of a viable European Security and Defence Identity *compatible* with the Alliance. *NATO's New Force Structures*. NATO Fact Sheet No.5, Brussels, 1996. On-line. Internet, 18 March 1997 Available from: <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/facts/fs5.htm>.

⁵ The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament. *Danish Security Policy*. Copenhagen: Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1993, page 8.

⁶ Nikolaj Petersen. "Danish Security policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation." In *Small states and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. Edited by Bauwens et al.. *Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No.8*. London, Brassey's, 1996, page 180.

⁷ Part of the Danish territories, lost in the 1864 war against Prussia and Austria-Hungary, were returned to Danish rule as a result of an internationally supported referendum held in the concerned areas with respect to national identity. Undisputed Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland was established, after a Norwegian claim to part of the island was refuted in The International Court in The Hague.

⁸ In contrast, this has by some great powers been characterized as mere 'freewheeling', contributing less than is generally accepted or agreed upon. Allen Sens. "Small-State Security in Europe: Threats, Anxieties and Strategies After the Cold War" In *Small states and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. Edited by Bauwens et al.. *Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No.8*. London, Brassey's, 1996, page 74.

⁹ The planned stationing of theater nuclear missiles in Europe could not be supported by the Social Democratic Party, and other center/left parties, all in opposition at the time.

Notes

These parties together constituted what has been termed “the alternative security policy majority” exercising control over Danish security policy through parliamentary resolutions, against the ruling government of the period.

¹⁰ Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg. *Dansk og Europæisk Sikkerhed*. Copenhagen, Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1995, pages 27-36

¹¹ Official Notes on the *Act on the Aims, Tasks, and Organization etc. of the Armed Forces*. Law no. 909, 8 December, 1993, Danish Ministry of Defence, Copenhagen 13 December 1993, page 182.

¹² Nikolaj Petersen. “Danish Security policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation.” In *Small states and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. Edited by Bauwens et al.. *Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No.8*. London, Brassey’s, 1996, page 176.

¹³ This has, not without humor, been termed the ‘sausage-link effect’ - Squeeze it in the middle, and it will bulge at the ends. Danish Defence Minister Hans Hækkerup. *Det nordiske forsvarspolitiske samarbejde og europæisk sikkerhedspolitik*. Danish Ministry of Defence, 1995, not published, page 3.

¹⁴ With the governing strategic overlay gone, sub-regional problems do not automatically escalate to the regional or global level. This leads to the emergence of disconnected zones of varying levels of stability, requiring a more varied foreign policy. Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg. *Dansk og Europæisk Sikkerhed*. Copenhagen, Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1995, page 306.

¹⁵ Denmark and Norway are presently the only countries allocating more than the UN-prescribed 1% of GNP to 3rd world development aid. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *This is Denmark*. Copenhagen. JJ Film, 1996. Videocassette.

¹⁶ The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament. *Danish Security Policy*. Copenhagen: Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1993, page 39.

¹⁷ Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg. *Dansk og Europæisk Sikkerhed*. Copenhagen, Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1995, page 41.

¹⁸ Official Notes on the *Act on the Aims, Tasks, and Organization etc. of the Armed Forces*. Law no. 909, 8 December, 1993, Danish Ministry of Defence, Copenhagen 13 December 1993, page 183.

¹⁹ In August 1991, Denmark was the first Western country to recognize the newly won independence of the three Baltic republics and to establish full diplomatic missions in all three capitals. Nikolaj Petersen. “Danish Security policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation.” In *Small states and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. Edited by Bauwens et al.. *Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No.8*. London, Brassey’s, 1996, page 183.

²⁰ Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup. *Cooperation Around the Baltic Sea: Danish Perspectives and Initiatives*. Brussels. NATO REVIEW, Web edition No.3, May 1995. On-line, Internet 12 Nov. 1996. Available from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9503-3.htm>.

²¹ Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg. *Dansk og Europæisk Sikkerhed*. Copenhagen, Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1995, page 57.

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²² The official name of the defense act is “Act on the Aims, Tasks, and Organization etc. of the Armed Forces.”

²³ . *Act on the Aims, Tasks, and Organization etc. of the Armed Forces*. Law no. 909, 8 December, 1993, Danish Ministry of Defence, Copenhagen 13 December 1993

²⁴ Official Notes on the *Act on the Aims, Tasks, and Organization etc. of the Armed Forces*. Law no. 909, 8 December, 1993, Danish Ministry of Defence, Copenhagen 13 December 1993, page 183.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Gallup Polls show Danish NATO support as follows: 1992, 73% for NATO, 15% against, and 12% undecided. 1995, 78% for NATO, 10% against, and 12% undecided. Two sources: The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament. *Danish Security Policy*. Copenhagen: Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1993, page 23, and Headquarters Chief of Defence Denmark. *Facts about Denmark, The Armed Forces*. Vedbæk, Information Branch, Headquarters Chief of Defence Denmark, May 1996.

²⁷ In fixed 1996 prices, the level of Danish defense expenditure has developed as follows: 18.2 billion Danish Kroner in 1989, 17.6 billion Danish Kroner in 1996. Headquarters Chief of Defence Denmark. *Facts about Denmark, The Armed Forces*. Vedbæk, Information Branch, Headquarters Chief of Defence Denmark, May 1996.

²⁸ Nikolaj Petersen. “Danish Security policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation.” In *Small states and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. Edited by Bauwens et al.. *Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No.8*. London, Brassey’s, 1996, page 175

²⁹ Danish Ministry of Defence. *Årlig Redegørelse 1995*. Copenhagen, Danish Ministry of Defence, April 1996, page 50.

³⁰ Ibid., page 59

³¹ In the NATO context this brigade is known as The Danish Reaction Brigade. Ibid..

³² Official notes on the *Parliamentary Resolution on the establishment of a Danish International Brigade*. 25 November 1993. Copenhagen, Ministry of Defence, December 1993, page 194.

³³ Headquarters Chief of Defence Denmark. Briefing of Lt.Gen. Manfred Gerber 4 June 1996, page 14. Headquarters Chief of Defence Denmark. Not published.

³⁴ Less than 20,000 votes decided the outcome of the referendum. In percentage: 50.7% against the treaty, and 40.3% for the treaty. Nikolaj Petersen. “Danish Security policy After the Cold War: Adaptation and Innovation.” In *Small states and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*. Edited by Bauwens et al.. *Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No.8*. London, Brassey’s, 1996, page 189

³⁵ Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup. Address. Wash Conference of the WEU, 25 June 1996. Danish Ministry of Defence. Not published.

³⁶ Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup. Address. The Oluf Palme Center, Stockholm, 21 April 1995. Danish Ministry of Defence. Not published.

³⁷ The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament. *Danish Security Policy*. Copenhagen: Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1993, page 27

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³⁸ Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg. *Dansk og Europæisk Sikkerhed*. Copenhagen, Det Sikkerheds- og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg, 1995, page 316.

Chapter 6

The German Perspective

Introduction

‘The European Revolution has granted Germany her unification and Europe freedom.’¹ This statement expresses two significant aspects determining Germany’s views on European security and stability and on the role of NATO.

Firstly, freedom in Europe does not necessarily equal security and peace. From the disappearance of the ideological confrontation’s stabilizing effect, a wide spectrum of limited, regional oriented, but destabilizing threats has emerged. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia gives, as the worst of all potential developments, a clear warning, that military conflicts should be taken into account on the European continent again.

Secondly, the fall of the Iron Curtain has altered Germany’s position in Europe. The united Germany has evolved from her geopolitical niche of the Cold War towards a regional power² in the center of the European mainland. Despite the unification of the German nation, granted with sovereignty and strong economic power, Germany cannot relax. She now has to consider and establish her security policy in European terms rather than solely in her national context.

The new strategic environment has also changed the challenges faced by NATO. The alliance was successful during the Cold War and it still has the unique ability to generate a strong military response to any potential threat. NATO thus continues to be an appropriate organization to provide future European security and stability, though the military capabilities required will be less massive than hitherto. However, European security and stability have become continental considerations rather than being limited to NATO members' territory. The membership community is challenged to steer NATO in the right direction. Strategic issues, e.g., the potential threats in the Mediterranean littoral, the development in Central East Europe, the transatlantic relationship, the roles of the EU and the WEU, and reemerging national concerns, have to be constantly considered and evaluated in establishing NATO's new role.

'The Bundeswehr is the military instrument through which Germany takes precautions with regard to its external security.'³ In addition, German security is indivisibly linked to European security. It is Europe's current security requirements as well as Germany's increased responsibility within the strategic environment which have forced the united Germany to reconsider the mission and role of her armed forces. The new concept for the Bundeswehr reflects the changed geopolitical configuration, and the German Armed Forces have made their first successful steps towards their future role. However, historical concerns and traditions initially hampered the utilization of the new concept.

Regarding European security and stability, Germany's position clearly favors NATO; the German Minister of Defense has pointed out that 'The North Atlantic Alliance remains the foundation for Germany's security.'⁴ Since 1990 German political effort has turned to the development of a modified security policy which takes into account Germany's

increased European responsibilities. Moreover, this policy promotes NATO as the common means for maintaining European security and stability. The Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has made clear that ‘Germany’s history forbids her to stand on the sidelines where peace and freedom are at stake in Europe and other parts of the world. We must, and want to, play our part shoulder to shoulder with our partners.’⁵ Thus, the security policy of the united Germany politically and, increasingly, militarily supports NATO in taking on the new challenges.

Post Cold War Era—A New Set of Conditions

Reviewing the Cold War era, three elements of German security policy were of overriding importance: to protect the territories of Germany and her allies against the communist threat; to achieve and maintain the integration into the community of Western democracies and their socio-economic system; and finally to overcome the German division by peaceful means in order to provide peace and sovereignty for a united Germany.⁶

The ‘European revolution’ has made this security policy obsolete, since Germany has gained most from the political changes in Europe. She achieved her unity with the approval of both the Four Powers⁷ and the international community, and now enjoys full sovereignty. Although surrounded by friends and partners, Germany has remained a member of NATO and relies on the alliance for her national defense. Recently, Germany has perceived the obligation to promote good relationships with the young democracies in her close neighborhood on the foundations provided by NATO and the accelerating integration process within the EU.

Indeed, Germany is expected to assume new responsibilities and is prepared to extend her contribution to European and world politics. Focusing on the European continent, her economic and political strength has given her the ability to significantly influence on the development of a new security structure. In addition, her leading role within the EU offers the opportunity to extend the process of European integration eastwards, while concurrently enhancing its intensity. Finally, Germany's political weight and her good international reputation could also improve the transatlantic partnership and the strength of NATO.

The new conditions set the stage for a strong and formative German influence in order to combine the EU's unique political capabilities with NATO's military power in a future European security structure. However, there is a risk that Germany may overstretch herself in taking on all opportunities offered to her at once, while being challenged by the enormous internal burden created by her unification.⁸

German Unification—Benefit and Burden at the Same Time

The Four plus Two Treaty, signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990, formally and finally concluded the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers regarding both German states⁹ at that time, thus ending 40 years of separation. Closing the historic chapter of the Cold War, the treaty contributed to the foundations for Germany's new role in Europe and the modification of her security policy. However, the “new länder's”¹⁰ complete socio-economic restructuring has become a major challenge for Germany's financial and economic capabilities.

According to the Four plus Two Treaty, the ‘united Germany would be free to choose which alliance she wished to belong to’.¹¹ This statement already contains the

Western powers' vision, that the degrading influence of the Soviet Union would change the strategic environment in Europe and Germany could become a crucial part of a new configuration of states.¹² For Germany, the freedom of choice offered an opportunity to dissipate the emerging mistrust and fear regarding a militarily and economically dominating Germany in the center of Europe.¹³ By remaining a member of NATO, Germany was able to demonstrate that she, after the achievement of her unification, would continue her policy of cooperation and integration in the promotion of stability in Europe.

It should be noted that Germany had to accept Russians demands on the total peacetime strength of all German forces in order to gain unification and to maintain German membership in NATO. According to the Four plus Two Treaty, the Bundeswehr was to be limited to 370,000 troops¹⁴ and this forced Germany to downsize about 40% of her forces by the end of 1994.¹⁵ During this process the trends of the new strategic environment became much clearer, which influenced the determination of the military forces' future role in general. Moreover, NATO arrived at initial decisions on her new strategic concept and outlined the new role of her military forces in it¹⁶ Thus, a framework was provided for a fundamental reorganization of the German Armed Forces and their preparation for future requirements.

Germany's agreement to the significant reduction and the limitation of her military strength not only assured the German membership in NATO; it also endorsed Germany's renunciation of a dominating role in Europe. NATO, for Germany, has been and will be the key to European security and stability.

Nevertheless, the German broad approach of cooperation and integration as key concepts for European security and stability must still be realistic and affordable to

Germany's national budget. Indeed, finances have become a major limiting factor for German policy as the rapid rebuilding of East Germany has led to tremendous cost.¹⁷ At the same time, the efforts to meet the standards of the EMU¹⁸ are also generating enormous constraints on the Federal Budget and, subsequently, are effecting the defense budget.¹⁹ However, it should be noted that Germany is still Europe's biggest investor in, and strongest supporter of, the economical development of the Central East European countries and Russia.²⁰ It is Germany's view that their consolidation is paramount for the achievement and maintenance of stability in a wider Europe, and that Germany has a special responsibility to assist the nations of Eastern Europe in their transformation process.

Sovereignty—New International Responsibilities

A nation's security policy is a sovereign expression of its will to take care of its vital interests.²¹ Sovereignty is the significant difference between self-determination and heteronomy. There is no doubt that the divided Germany lived, until the Four plus Two Treaty in 1990, with a certain degree of heteronomy,²² though West Germany's security policy was a commonly agreed policy to a large extent. It matched the German national interests, but it assigned Germany a specific role rather closely related to her national fate than a European or global one.

Since 1990, the united Germany has defined her own values and perceptions regarding her security in the changed European strategic environment. In some cases, these values and perceptions have become unique or odd in the community of European nations. Indeed, they consider experiences of the Cold War era, when the US and allied powers initiated "the import of stability" to Central Europe during the 1950s. Hence, the

new and broader German approach to security capitalizes on the successful and valid principles of previous policy and should thus be understood as the “export of stability.”²³ From the German perspective, the export of stability aims to enlarge the zone of relative security in Europe through an international effort utilizing either the EU or NATO. International politics have always been conducted on the principles of mutual benefits and responsibilities. For almost forty-five years, this became tangible in the joint protection of Germany by the Western community against a common threat. During that time Europe and Germany were able to utilize the stability provided by mutual defense for the development of prosperous economies.

Now the international community is facing new challenges in Europe. By trying to maintain the solidarity within her allies and friends, Germany wishes to add new momentum to common policy and courses of action in order to meet the strategic environment’s new challenges towards European security. After a period of irritation, Germany has started to accept the consequences of her antagonistic role and, as the most significant example, has abandoned much of her traditional restraint regarding the employment of the German Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations.

Security Concerns

A military conflict in Europe which could threaten Germany’s existence has become unlikely. However, the previous massive confrontation has been replaced by less solid, multi-faced and multi-oriented threats, aiming at the foundations of states or state systems in order to destabilize them.

For Germany, the unstable situation in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Russia, is a major concern as any crisis there would directly impact on Germany herself.

Even though the democratic development in Eastern Europe has made good progress, it is, for Germany's closest neighbors, not irreversible.²⁴ The apparent internal political trends in Russia could still lead to a new confrontation on the European continent. In addition, her remaining arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons cannot be disregarded. Furthermore, the former Warsaw Pact states are developing in diverse ways, reawakening historic tensions and creating new ones. The integration of Russia and the other Eastern European nations into a European strategic network of traditional and new treaties is thus important for the political and economic development of Eastern Europe.²⁵ Moreover, this is the only way to realize the vision of a common political, legal and economical "System Europe."²⁶ Failure to integrate the Eastern European nations would most likely generate a new division of Europe on Germany's eastern border.

In addition, the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia has illustrated that civil wars and brutal regional conflicts have become likely again on the European continent. Apart from their unacceptable impact on the affected people, their lack of unpredictability, and their potential to rapidly escalate into a major crisis, such conflicts could significantly affect existing political and economical structures in Europe.²⁷ The protection of these structures is as vital for Germany as it is for any other European nation.

Further threats could emerge from the increasing military potential on the European littoral. Trends and conditions on the cultural and economical borders between Europe, Africa and Asia are fluctuating; structures involving states or regions are constantly changing, often under violent circumstances in which ethnic and religious aspects are predominant. In this environment, the proliferation of weapons of high technology or

mass destruction could rapidly turn any regional crisis or conflict into a supra-regional issue.²⁸

Side effects, generated by such crises, are capable of evolving threats to the European continent even if they are originated from outside. Generally, any form of international destabilization decelerates socioeconomic progress, destroys potential of development and wastes valuable resources. It also initiates migration, favors radicalism and promotes a propensity to violence.²⁹ Their influence generates less likelihood of a military escalation but impacts destructively on the financial and economic capabilities, which are crucial for both the individual state and the entire region. They could also be easily carried into highly developed countries of the world not directly affected by the crisis.

As a highly developed industrialized country, Germany is embedded in a global system of political and economic relationships which are vital and, because of their complexity, vulnerable to any instability. Densely populated Germany, bordered by more countries than any other European country, is particularly susceptible to migration, especially now while struggling with her decreasing industrial competitiveness, unemployment and financial deficits. Hence, Germany wishes to avoid any turbulence in the global political and economic system, but is, as is any other European country, not capable of protecting herself entirely against these threats.

The Principles of National Security and Defense Policy

Since the end of the Cold War, German security and defense policy have been adapted to the challenges of the new strategic environment in general, and her national security concerns in specific. Today, she pursues a strategy based on foresighted, integrated and multilateral security measures.³⁰ As alluded to in the previous chapters,

present and future security policy applies a broad combined approach, utilizing political, economic and military means. This requires multinational rather than a national effort, since no European nation individually is capable of handling the dimensions and complexities of modern crisis management. Therefore, German security policy aims to encourage cooperation and tries to deepen or extend European integration with friends and new partners. Any emerging instability is dealt with by preventive and cause oriented concepts, applying appropriate instruments and levels of power in order to neutralize the impact of the crisis.

In conclusion, 'German security policy is determined by the holistic combination of two basic functions: protection against risks and threats and the active shaping of stability and peace.'³¹ Consequently, 'Germany's defense policy is based on a capability to conduct national defense, and to defend its allies as a form of extended national defense. It is supplemented by the ability to participate in cooperative multinational conflict prevention and crisis management.'³²

Germany and the European Security Structure

It is Germany's view that peace and freedom in Europe can only be preserved by a joint effort capitalizing on common interests and contributions from all European countries. Therefore, existing international organizations in Europe must merge into an enhanced security structure which embraces all of the continent's countries. This structure would provide the whole spectrum of options in order to ensure a strong and credible European reaction to any emerging threat with the appropriate means.

The Significance of NATO

NATO has adapted herself to the requirements of the new strategic environment and is still the politically most coherent, and militarily the most capable, organization for European security and stability. Her new strategic concept³³ provides for ‘...military capabilities sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defense; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security,...’³⁴ From the German perspective, this concept contains the potential for major benefits which have already partially become reality with the NACC, the PfP-program³⁵ and the development of a strategic partnership with Russia.³⁶

The extension of NATO’s responsibility for security in Europe to the east is not an aggressive act against Russia; it will offer those experiences of the alliance to the Central East European countries which have successfully shaped the solidarity of her members.³⁷ This could promote stability in the entire region and should also be in Russia’s interest. The enlargement of NATO and the extension of her integration capabilities to Eastern Europe is of strategic relevance to Germany,³⁸ it refers to one of Germany’s major security concerns.

Furthermore, NATO continues to provide military power in Europe and is capable of projecting this power outside traditional NATO territory. Having assessed the variety of potential threats in and around Europe, the alliance has restructured her armed forces and is creating deployable, effective crisis management tools, like the reaction forces and the CJTF. This military dimension of the new strategic concept has been successfully

demonstrated in The Balkans with IFOR and SFOR. From Germany's perspective, the combined operations of NATO forces integrating units from Russia and other Eastern European countries demonstrates convincingly the defensive character of NATO's strategy: cooperation rather than domination.³⁹

Germany is convinced that the realization of the concept of combined and joint operations will definitely enhance internal solidarity of the allies which remains a prerequisite for mutual defense support in case of a military attack on one of the member countries.⁴⁰ It is also Germany's view that NATO's broad approach to security and stability offer opportunities to combine her unique capabilities with the strong political and economic ones of the EU, providing a comprehensive and strong spectrum of instruments of power.⁴¹ At the same time, NATO preserves the transatlantic partnership as a vital link for Europe and Germany.

The Transatlantic Link

The altering strategic environment in Europe and NATO's new strategic concept have shifted expectations and responsibilities from the US towards the European nations. As a matter of fact, NATO's European members ought to act more independently in crisis management in order to preserve their security, but the transatlantic link remains indispensable for security and stability in Europe. Indeed, it continues to provide mutual benefits for the partners on both side of the Atlantic, although this has to be seen in broader terms.

After 1989, Central Europe has lost its focus in US strategic planning. Nevertheless, a strong American interest in the issue of European security and stability has remained and the US conventional and nuclear capability are significant in maintaining a strategic

balance with Russia's remaining military potential. Therefore, US military power is a crucial factor in the efforts by NATO and the EU to stabilize the transition of the Central Eastern European countries. To address this issue, from the German perspective, the transatlantic link is vital for the enablement of a comprehensive European support for Eastern Europe.

Sharing common values and European potential capabilities has enhanced Europe's role as a reliable and predictable partner for the US in political, economic, and security matters.⁴² In fact, the increasing pressure of military cost effectiveness has emphasized the consideration of burden sharing in crisis and conflict management, even for the US.⁴³ This aspect, specifically validated in European support for the US during the liberation of Kuwait,⁴⁴ has encouraged the development of the CJTF and the establishment of multinational military formations. Nevertheless, the European failure to generate an instant, appropriate and common response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia illustrated that the European nations still need US guidance in taking action for their own stability and security.⁴⁵ Germany is well aware of the lack of consensus within the European nations; therefore, she seeks to advance common views regarding security policy and promotes European military cooperation.

European Union and Western European Union

Although there is no doubt about the importance of the transatlantic link to Europe, the creation of a European security and defense identity, since the end of the Cold War, has become a significant issue. In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, the WEU was tasked with the provision of military capabilities for the EU to be employed in Peace Support Operations. Therefore, NATO was asked to provide equipment and resources

for the WEU.⁴⁶ Later the EU members agreed in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 to develop a common foreign and security policy⁴⁷ using the WEU as its corresponding military instrument. Both issues have caused concern on either side of the Atlantic about the existence of two, apparently competing, security organizations in Europe.

For Germany the WEU is not a competitor to NATO. Instead, the WEU plays a bridging role, linking the EU's and NATO's unique capabilities in order to develop a strong and comprehensive security structure in Europe. The deep integration of France and her military capabilities would be one of the major improvements gained through this structure. The structure which Germany has in mind would be capable of providing the whole spectrum of instruments of power in international crisis management. Moreover, Germany is convinced that the integration of a large proportion of the European nations into this structure would increasingly generate a common European interest instead of favoring national policy. The European attempts to manage the crisis in the former Yugoslavia failed not least because the involved European nations acted too individually.⁴⁸ Finally, only a closely integrated Europe could balance Russia's overwhelming strategic weight on the European continent.

Regarding the combination and coordination of EU, WEU and NATO, the progress has not yet reached a mature and practicable stage. Significant different national interests and the initial inertia of these three organizations still hamper Europe's capability to generate an instant *and* common European reaction.

German Armed Forces—Towards New Missions

The conflicts which have emerged since 1989 have illustrated not least to Germany that ‘the use of military power...has become pressing.’⁴⁹ The Bundeswehr is the military instrument to facilitate German security policy and the mission of Germany’s armed forces has been rewritten significantly since the end of the Cold War. However its core task remained unchanged.

‘The Bundeswehr:

- protects Germany and its citizens against political blackmail and danger from without
- advances military stability and European integration
- defends Germany and its allies
- serves world peace and international security in accordance with the Charter of the UN
- provides disaster relief, saves life and supports humanitarian activities’⁵⁰

This mission statement demonstrates the consistency of Germany’s new security policy in the military arena, although the realization has neither been very easy nor has It been concluded.

The new forces’ role and the abandonment of German restraints on the use of her military caused significant internal tensions. On the one hand, the missions beyond territorial defense were strongly questioned referring to the Basic Law. On the other hand, the policy of fostering European integration in terms of security would not be credible, if Germany put restraints to her military commitment.⁵¹ The ground-breaking decision of the German Constitutional Court on 12 July 1994 removed these tensions. It confirmed the legality of the Bundeswehr’s Peace Support Operations missions “out of area,” within the framework of collective security organizations⁵² and on the explicit

approval of the German Bundestag. Traditional NATO operations in the context of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty can still be approved by the federal government.

Officially, the road was paved for German military contributions to global crisis management. However, no German troops would be deployed without major public support. Basically, during the Cold War, the Bundeswehr enjoyed public acceptance only in her role to protect Germany's territory and integrity. Moreover, although the German forces were deeply integrated into the democratic structures of the Federal Republic of Germany, any form of military had become highly unpopular with the German public. Even the defense of her allies, as a consequence of Germany's NATO membership, was not an apparent role for the Bundeswehr in the eyes of many Germans at that time.

Now military conflict, which could threaten Germany's existence, has become unlikely and the new security policy tasks the Bundeswehr to defend European interests, rather than national ones beyond German, even NATO territory's borders. However, the outcomes of the changing strategic environment, and the insight that military preparedness and commitment are still an investment in the nation's security, even in European terms, was convincing enough to generate the public's conceptual leap to the Bundeswehr's new role supporting European security.⁵³ By clarifying the legitimization of, and gaining public support for, the employment of the Bundeswehr in Peace Support Operation missions, Germany is now able to provide the full spectrum of support in order to be a reliable and accepted partner regarding European, even global security concerns.

Adaptation to New Challenges

Now, as Germany is no longer hampered by internal dispute to employ her armed forces "out of area," she has clearly expressed the will to contribute to collective security.

Therefore, the Bundeswehr has to be prepared for, and adaptable to, all kinds of challenges in the strategic environment, namely: crisis management, conflict prevention, and territorial defense both national and within NATO.

Territorial defense requires forces with similar capabilities to those of the Cold War era. More reaction time permits a nation to reduce its force presence and provides enough time for augmentation by mobilization. Conversely, for the remaining standing forces it is most likely that they would be employed in provision of an instant military reaction in order to manage crises and prevent or deter violent conflicts. These operations will be limited in scope and time and will be conducted by multinational task forces with comprehensive capabilities, where each national component may not necessarily be fully self-sufficient or self-sustainable. Therefore, reaction forces must consist of readily available, rapidly deployable and operationally effective contingents.⁵⁴ It is Germany's view that emphasizing the international role and the mutual cooperation in performing the forces' tasks would contribute to cost effectiveness *and* promote European integration.

Germany is well aware that mobility, flexibility, multinationality, and the capability to project military power to any point of the European continent, characterize the requirement for NATO forces, and subsequently, must be reflected by the German Armed Forces' structure. Consequently, the Bundeswehr gives priority to training and equipment of the reaction forces in order to prepare and adapt them to the entire spectrum of possible missions; from modern guerrilla warfare to operations against forces using sophisticated and advanced technology, within a framework of a multinational coalition. Despite significant national financial problems impacting the defense budget, the concept of reaction forces has priority in its realization. They are planned to be fully operational by

2000⁵⁵ and will have available to them appropriate equipment, weaponry, and interoperable command and control systems.

First Experiences

Exclusively, all German participation in military operations “out of area” was conducted under the mandate of the UN. Missions undertaken, predominantly supported humanitarian and disaster relief by providing logistics, transportation, and medical capabilities. Nevertheless, these missions provided insight into the nature of likely crisis’ scenarios and necessary rules of conduct in an environment of different culture. Moreover, they practiced the cooperation with and within multinational organizations and task forces. Since 1990, the overt⁵⁶ participation of German forces in all missions outside national and NATO territory has accustomed incrementally the German public and armed forces’ personnel to the new role of the Bundeswehr.

IFOR was and SFOR has become the first organization, where the Bundeswehr’s missions have a particular peacemaking and peacekeeping character. Experiences from IFOR have not been examined in detail yet and the impact on the ongoing process of developing and equipping the standing reaction forces can only be alluded to. Basically, they confirmed the requirement to be able to integrate any Bundeswehr contingent into a large scale, multinational command and control structure outside NATO territory. It also illustrated the necessity of basic equipment standardization to enhance mutual support and cooperation.⁵⁷ Regarding the political and public impact, IFOR was successful, because it gained full support during the whole mission. This improved understanding of the national European responsibility has generated the official approval and continuing public support

for SFOR. This application of Germany's new role has increased her reliability and credibility as a partner in the North Atlantic alliance.

German Armed Forces in NATO

'The Bundeswehr is an alliance army'⁵⁸ and has always been deeply integrated into NATO since Germany joined the alliance in 1955. Since then, Germany's significance in Europe has assumed a new dimension. Germany continues to provide one of the strongest conventional contingents to NATO's military force structure; standing forces of 340,000 in peacetime with an augmented wartime strength of 700,000. These forces have an interoperable command and control structure available to them and equipment that is standardized with many NATO partners.⁵⁹ However, Germany confirmed with the ratification of the Four plus Two Treaty that she will continue not to have a national nuclear deterrent, but will contribute aircraft, aircrew, and ground personnel to NATO's nuclear forces in cooperation with the US.⁶⁰

Furthermore, Germany's support of the alliance's new strategic concept, and the subsequent decisions to implement military options are illustrated in the new structure of the Bundeswehr. Germany's standing reaction forces, operational by 2000, will consist of 50,000 troops,⁶¹ and will be designed to reinforce NATO's CJTF concept. Germany highly prioritizes this contribution in order to support the development of this NATO component as the most urgently required asset to deal with emerging crises and conflicts in Europe.

Conclusion

Since 1955, NATO has been of significant importance to Germany. Changes since 1989 have given security and stability in Europe a new dimension and Germany a new role. From the German perspective, the examination of the strategic environment in closer (national) and wider (European) perspectives has validated the continuing existence of NATO, albeit with some internal reorganization.

The management of many current issues and their inherent potential threats, more than hitherto, requires a broader spectrum of instruments of power; political determination, economic vigor and credible military forces. Germany, in her vision on a future European security structure, is convinced that only the complementarity of NATO, the EU and the WEU can maintain and improve stability and security in Europe. In the medium time-frame though, NATO is the most potent one of these organizations. The WEU, in this configuration, will maintain her important bridging role between NATO and the EU. In this context, Germany has realized that she must abandon her traditional self-restriction to a geopolitical niche. Otherwise she would not be accepted as a reliable partner by either organization if she failed to create clear evidence of her continuous support for a European security structure. Therefore, Germany not only maintains her unrestrained contribution to NATO's common defense as defined in Article 5 of the Washington treaty. She has also overcome many of her self-imposed limitations regarding peace support operations under international auspices.

Germany has adapted her armed forces to the challenges ahead and has been a major force provider to NATO's operations in the former Yugoslavia. Although Germany has not yet tested her capabilities in the whole range of military missions, she is confident that

this will not affect her contribution to NATO in general and is determined not to stand apart. Indeed, the new concept of the Bundeswehr has been developed and realized predominantly along the lines of NATO's new strategic concept and force structure. This presents a convincing conclusion to the German perspective of NATO as the valid organization for European security and stability.

Notes

¹ Rühle, Volker, German Minister of Defense. Address. Vortragsreihe "Politik und Moral" Hamburg, 5 February 1996

² Asmus, Ronald D. "Western Europe." In *Strategic Appraisal 1996*. Edited by Zalmany Khalilzad. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1996, 49

³ *White Paper 1994*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 83

⁴ *Ibid.*, 48

⁵ Kohl, Helmut, German Federal Chancellor. Address. 33rd Conference of Security, Munich, 3 February 1996

⁶ *White Paper 1994*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 40

⁷ The Four plus Two Treaty is the formal agreement of the United States of America, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France on Germany's unification

⁸ Rühle, Volker, German Minister of Defense. Address. Vortragsreihe "Politik und Moral," Hamburg, 5 February 1996

⁹ *White Paper 1994*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 13

¹⁰ The Federal States in Eastern Germany, established after the unification

¹¹ Part of the final agreements of the Four plus Two Treaty, quoted from *White Paper 1994*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 13

¹² Initially, this was the US position and became later part of the remaining Powers position; Hacke, Christian. *Weltmacht wider Willen*. Berlin, Germany: Ullstein, 1993, 452

¹³ Hacke, Christian. *Weltmacht wider Willen*. Berlin, Germany: Ullstein, 1993, 452

¹⁴ Four plus Two Treaty, quoted from *White Paper 1994*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 13

¹⁵ With the date of unification, the National Peoples Army was integrated into the Bundeswehr. The initial strength of the combined German forces were about 610.000 troops

¹⁶ NATO's New Strategic Concept is part of the *Rome Declaration on peace and cooperation*, agreed on in November 1991

Concept of Combined Joint Task Forces was endorsed at the Brussels summit 1994

¹⁷ Public funds (1990-95): over DM 600 bn; total investment volume (private investors 1990-95): over DM 240 bn; the public debt rose from DM 929 bn in 1989 up to DM 1800 bn in 1995; data from *Facts about Germany*. Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag, 1995

Notes

¹⁸ European Monetary Union

¹⁹ The defense budget 1997 is DM 46.5 bn, 2 bn less than originally planned. Additionally, the annual cuts of the already preplanned defense budgets up to 2000 will accumulate another DM 7 bn.; Data from “Entscheidung fuer Etat 97-wie geht es weiter?” *IAP Dienst Sicherheitspolitik*, No. 8 (August 1996). Bielefeld, Germany: IAP Publizistische Gesellschaft fuer Politik und Zeitgeschehen mbH, 1

²⁰ From 1989 to 1994 Germany supported the reform in the former Soviet Union totaled DM 100 bn. On-line. Internet, 10 January 1997. Available from <http://www.germany-info.org/close-up/reform.htm>

²¹ Papp, Daniel S. *Contemporary International Relations*. 4th ed. New York: Macmillan College Publishing Company, 1994, 498

²² Hacke, Christian. *Weltmacht wider Willen*. Berlin, Germany: Ullstein, 1993, 466

²³ Spero, Joshua, and Frank Umbach. *NATO's Security Challenge to the East and the American-German Geo-Strategic Partnership in Europe*. Köln, Germany: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche Studien 94, 3

²⁴ *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 1992

²⁵ NATO, NACC, PfP, EU, multilateral treaties

²⁶ *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 26 November 1992

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ *White Paper 1994*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 43

³¹ Ibid., 41

³² Ibid., 41

³³ NATO's “New Strategic Concept.” In the *Rome Declaration on peace and cooperation*. On-line. Internet, 10 January 1997. Available from <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/facts/fs12.htm>

³⁴ Quoted from “Excerpts of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept,” *White Paper 1994*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 49

³⁵ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, **Partnership for Peace**

³⁶ Rühle, Volker, German Minister of Defense. Address. Würzburg, 18 November 1996

³⁷ Rühle, Volker, German Minister of Defense. Address. Vortragsreihe “Politik und Moral.” Hamburg, 5 February 1996,

³⁸ Asmus, Ronald D. “Western Europe.” In *Strategic Appraisal 1996*. Edited by Zalmany Khalilzad. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1996, 48

³⁹ *White Paper 94*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 44

⁴⁰ Article 5, *North Atlantic Treaty*. On-line. Internet 10 January 1997. Available from <http://www.vm.ee/natodocu/basictext/treaty.htm>

Notes

⁴¹ ‘Other European institutions such as EC (now EU), WEU and CSCE (now OSCE) also have roles to play in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defense underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity’, quoted from “Alliance’s New Strategic Concept.” *White Paper 94*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 51.

⁴² *White Paper 94*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 44

⁴³ Hacke, Christian. *Weltmacht wider Willen*. Berlin, Germany: Ullstein, 1993, 562

⁴⁴ The coalition in operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM included British, French and Italian, other European nations provided financial and material support

⁴⁵ Spero, Joshua, and Frank Umbach. *NATO’s Security Challenge to the East and the American-German Geo-Strategic Partnership in Europe*. Köln, Germany: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche Studien 94, 27

⁴⁶ *White Paper 94*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 60

⁴⁷ The Maastricht Treaty was signed on 1 November 1993

⁴⁸ Hacke, Christian. *Weltmacht wider Willen*. Berlin, Germany: Ullstein, 1993, 572

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 585

⁵⁰ *White Paper 1994*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 85

⁵¹ Hacke, Christian. *Weltmacht wider Willen*. Berlin, Germany: Ullstein, 1993, 588

⁵² NATO, WEU and UN

⁵³ Asmus, Ronald D. “Deutschland und internationale Rahmenbedingungen,” *Reader Sicherheitspolitik*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense 1996

⁵⁴ In specific:

- Land forces must be capable of employing light airmobile and air-mechanized forces and a certain number of mechanized forces for multinational conflict prevention and crisis management

- Air forces must be capable of projecting regional multinational air power, including the capability to establish regional air superiority, and of providing air transportation

- Naval forces must be capable of projecting maritime military power, primarily in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, and of conducting mine counter measures

- Armed forces as a whole must be capable of supporting own forces enable them to react to crises throughout the alliance; *White Paper 94*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 91

⁵⁵ Rühle, Volker, German Minister of Defense. Address. United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, 8 January 1997

⁵⁶ This was definitely avoided before 1990

⁵⁷ Michael, Rüdiger. “Die Anspannung bleibt.” *Information für die Truppe*, no.12 (December 1996). Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 14

⁵⁸ *White Paper 94*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 84

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 117

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 13

⁶¹ *White Paper 94*. Bonn, Germany: German Ministry of Defense, 97

Chapter 7

The Spanish Perspective

Introduction

As we near the end of the twentieth century, many states are preparing for the challenges that the new century will bring. If we were to do a very short summary of the history of the last one hundred years in Europe, we would have to say: two world wars, one cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are many equally important events likely in the future.

The history of Spain has always been tied to the history of Europe. However, in the last century this history has been a little bit different. If we were to sum up very briefly the last century in Spain, we would have to say: the Second Republic, a civil war, a dictatorial political system, and finally a constitutional democratic monarchy.

With the monarchy and the democracy, Spain has rejoined the history of Europe and, more importantly, the future of Europe. There is a close relationship between Spain and the other European countries and between Spain and the most important European organizations.

One of the most important objectives of Spanish foreign policy in recent years was to find Spain's role in its natural environment: Europe and the West. Today Spain is a full

member of the European Union, Western European Union and NATO. So, clearly Spain wants to have the same destiny as Europe.

From the Spanish perspective, NATO, with other institutions, is a fundamental organization for stability in Europe. In the words of Juan Carlos I, the King of Spain, “Spain supports the idea that the Alliance must continue to act in a coordinated way with all other organizations responsible for security matters. Through an appropriate network of relationships between the Alliance, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Council of Europe, it will possible to set up a new and strong system of cooperative security in Europe.”¹

Due to its geographical position, Spain has always been concerned with Mediterranean issues. Moreover, Spain has several interests in the western Mediterranean. Firstly, Spain has interests in its non peninsular territories: the Balearic islands, and Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. Secondly, Spain has strategic interests in the Canary axis, Straits of Gibraltar and Balearic Islands. Finally, Spain has economic interests in the Mediterranean area due to its trade relations with other states, particularly in North Africa.²

On the other hand, there is little doubt about the importance of the Mediterranean area in Europe. Many European countries have interests in the Mediterranean Sea, including access to the oil producing countries. This is important not only for Europe, but also for the world. For this reason, from the Spanish perspective, stability and security in the Mediterranean area are not only vital for the interests of Spain, but also they are very important for the stability and security of Europe.

According to the King of Spain in his speech on 26 April 1996 in the NATO HQ, “Spain is firmly convinced that Europe’s peace, security and stability are closely linked to the stability of the Mediterranean region as a whole and to the establishment of strong and deep relations of dialogue and cooperation among all riparian States.”

I will develop this chapter from the Spanish perspective. Firstly, I will give a very short review of Spanish history from 60’s to the beginning of the 80’s. To understand the Spanish perspective, it is important to consider these historical factors. Secondly, I will consider the geopolitical changes in Europe since the fall of the Soviet Union and how these changes and their consequences affect Spain. I will focus on the Mediterranean zone and I will give the Spanish Armed Forces’ perspective. Finally, I will describe Spain’s role, particularly within NATO, and the new Spanish model with associated responsibilities and competencies.

Historical Review

Spain did not participate directly in World War II. Spain had just emerged from its civil war and it had to rebuild the country. However, the indirect support of Germany by the Spanish government is well known. When W.W.II finished with the allied victory, Spain was isolated from the rest of the Western countries because it had no democratic political system. So Spain had to rebuild and develop its economy alone. In fact, Spain did not participate in the Marshall Plan.

On the other hand, the most important Western European countries began to organize collective economic organizations (the European Economic Community) and a collective defense system (Atlantic Alliance). Obviously, Spain was excluded from all these

systems.³ However, this situation began to change slowly in the 50's, and more so in the 60's.

The 60's and the Beginning of the 70's

In an international environment with the Cold War and the Korean conflict, the US had strategic reasons for establishing relations with Spain. At the same time, Spain saw the opportunity of ending its isolation and to a certain degree, obtaining a support for the survival of its political regime. So, the combination of an international situation with military interests on one side and political interests on the other side was to lead to cooperation agreements between Spain and the United States in 1953, 1970 and 1976.⁴

Basically and Briefly, US forces deployed to Moron, Torrejon and Zaragoza air bases and later to Rota air naval base. In this way, Spanish territory was placed at the disposal of the US and, in addition, of the Atlantic Alliance. From this strategic position, the US and the Atlantic Alliance obtained two benefits. First, a deterrent contribution to the southern flank of the Alliance. Second, complete control of the Strait of Gibraltar and hence access to the Mediterranean and an outlet to the Atlantic. At the same time, Spain received economic assistance and aid for the Spanish Armed Forces. This situation remained stable until 1975 when everything began to change quickly.

Spain as a Parliamentary Monarchy

With General Franco's death in 1975, Spain began an important political, economical, and social change. Once the Monarchy had been reestablished, Spain began the slow process of democratizing its institutions. First of all, a new Constitution was approved, and after a democratic general election, the Democratic Center Party formed government.

This period of time was named “transition” and “consensus.” It was a period of transition between the old institutions and the new and democratic institutions, and to a certain degree, from an old way of thinking way to a new one. It was also a period of consensus, because all social forces and all political parties agreed with the necessary internal changes.

On the other hand, not all political parties had complete agreement on foreign policy and what Spain’s international situation had to be. One of the examples of this was Spain’s request to become a member of European democratic institutions such as the Council of Europe and later the European Community. Nevertheless, in security and defense concerns consensus was not as clear as in other subjects.⁵

Defense and Security Concerns

In a broad sense, Spanish political parties did not agree on security and defense subjects. Mainly the left-wing parties (Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party and Spanish Communist Party) opposed Spain’s membership in any military alliance. This thinking was also common in a large sector of the population. However, the decision to join NATO was approved by the Spanish Parliament in October 1981. Months later, in May 1982, Spain was formally given membership of NATO.⁶

In October of that year, the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party won the general elections and in its electoral program had said that it would hold a consultative referendum on Spanish membership of the Atlantic Alliance. For that reason the joining process was stopped.

The Socialist Government focused on the important aspects of security and defense issues. Firstly, to give a new structure to the Department of Defense and, at the same

time, to reorganize the Armed Forces. Secondly, to work out the structure of Spain's defense in relation to Western security.

To meet the first objective, several measures were taken during the legislative period. In summary, the government accomplished four important tasks. Firstly, the Armed Forces were organized under the political management of the government. Secondly, a strong review of personnel was made to reduce the number of troops, encourage professionalism and improve operability. Thirdly, the Joint Strategic Plan was approved and a planning cycle was established. Finally, the relations between civilian industry and the Department of Defense were improved⁷

The second main objective of the Spanish Government was to solve the problem created by Spanish integration in NATO and the electoral promise of referendum. In other words, the second task was to establish a program on security policy. In October 1984, the Spanish President of Government presented to the Congress of Deputies the "decatalogue" on peace and security policy. This document had two main proposals. First of all, the document had to be the basis for a consensus of all parliamentary forces regarding national security and defense policy. Secondly, and no less importantly, the document had to present to the Spanish public an outline of Spanish security policy.

Since then, Spanish National Policy for Peace and Security has been based on three pillars: the Atlantic Alliance (NATO), The Western European Union (WEU), and the bilateral defense relationship with the United States of America. On the other hand, the most important aspects of the "Decatalogue" on peace and security were the following: Firstly, the maintenance of the existing situation with respect to the Atlantic Alliance, i.e. membership without incorporation into the integrated military structure. Secondly, the

maintenance of the bilateral defense relationship with the United States, but with a progressive decrease of American military presence on Spanish territory. Thirdly, the denuclearization of Spanish territory, with the possibility of signing the Treaty of Nuclear Non-proliferation. Fourth, the desire to integrate Spain into the Western European Union. Fifth, the government would seek a Spanish presence in international disarmament forums. Sixth, to claim the return of Gibraltar to Spain. Finally, to improve and strengthen bilateral relations with other Western countries on defense issues.⁸

With these security and defense guidelines and the subsequent referendum about the continued membership of Spain in NATO, we have what was called the “Spanish model in NATO.”

The Spanish Model in NATO

After the government’s intensive propaganda campaign in favor of the Alliance, on 12 of March of 1986 Spain called a referendum about the continued membership of Spain in NATO under the terms that the Spanish Government had set (Decalogue of Peace and Security Policy). The outcome of the referendum was: 52.5 per cent supported the government’s position (to continue in NATO under the conditions mentioned earlier), and 39.8 per cent voted against the government position (for the complete Spanish withdrawal from Alliance). However, the question was whether Spain would adopt a defense posture similar to France (the “French model”) or move to a closer integration within the Alliance.

From the beginning, Spain had enjoyed a closer participation in the Alliance than France. After the referendum, Spain began to take part actively in all NATO’s committees including the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Defense Planning Committee

(DPC). At the same time, Spain appointed a Spanish permanent military representative (MILREP).⁹

During the following two years, Spain worked with NATO to define the basic guidelines of Spanish participation within the Alliance. Finally, these guidelines were approved by Military Committee and DPC, and noted by the North Atlantic Council in December 1988. These guidelines were called the “Spanish model” and they are the six basic tasks that Spain has to be ready to undertake within NATO but outside the integrated military structure. They are:

1. The defense of Spanish territory.
2. Air control and air defense in the Spanish area of responsibility including cooperation with adjacent areas.
3. The establishment of a new NATO naval force under Spanish command to patrol sea lanes around the Straits of Gibraltar.
4. Naval and Air operations in the Eastern Atlantic.
5. Naval and Air operations in the Western Mediterranean.
6. The use of Spanish territory as a transit, support and rear logistic area.¹⁰

Each of these six main tasks has been developed (not without difficulties) in coordination agreements, however, problems associated with these tasks arose because of the lack of participation in the military structure. On the other hand, Spain takes part in all committees of the civilian structure of the Alliance as well as in the Defense Planning Committee.

In summary, this was the framework of the Spanish relationship with NATO until 1996. Just last year, an important and qualitative step occurred which, I think, will design the future relationship between Spain and the Alliance. I will cover this later.

Geopolitical Change in Europe

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic environment changed in the European theater. As we saw earlier in chapter 2, several geopolitical trends emerged after 1989. We saw some global trends such as the increasing importance of culture, technology, economy and information. On the other hand and more specific to the European area, we saw integration and fragmentation along with more destabilizing forces. However, all these trends and forces did not affect all European countries the same way. In Spain's case, in this sub-chapter we will look at first, the internal and external situation; secondly, new challenges and new threats; thirdly, Mediterranean stability; and finally the Spanish Armed Forces' perspective.

External and Internal Situation

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Spain continued with its own process of internal modernization and closer participation in European forums. Internally, the first political problem was the consolidation of democratic institutions and related to this was the autonomy issue. According to the Spanish Constitution, Spain is divided into seventeen Autonomous Communities. Every one of them has its own government and parliament, with its own competencies. In this way, there are autonomous competencies (for example, some taxes and legislation), central competencies (for example, all things referring to vital or national interest), and finally mixed competencies (for example, education and medical assistance). Over recent years, the Spanish government has been working on this issue and trying to gain maximum political support on this delicate subject. Closely tied to the Autonomous Communities issue is Spanish Nationalism.

Spain has always had distinct nationalities. In fact, there are four historical communities within Spain: Basque Country, Catalanian, Galicia and Navarra. However, there are two factors that have increased the nationalist feeling in these territories. First of all, the Spanish Democratic Constitution and its freedom gives nationalists legality. Second, nationalism is a rising force in Europe as result as the Soviet Union's collapse. Due to historic reasons, both nationalist movements are completely different, but Spanish nationalism shares support with the other European nationalist organizations.

Another important problem which is related to nationalism is terrorism. For years, the Basque terrorist group ETA has attacked Spanish democratic institutions. Although it has minority support, as all terrorist groups do, it has caused enormous damage to Spanish society. For years, the Spanish government has been fighting against this terrorist group with internal and external measures. Internally, with a political consensus among all political parties and with police measures. Externally, Spain has coordinated the antiterrorist fight with other countries (for example France) and has tried to cut down the connection with international terrorism.

Externally, Spain has continued the process of integration in all European institutions. In other words, modern Spain has more European identity than before. In this sense, Spain has worked very hard to meet the economic conditions for monetary union within the European Union. To achieve that objective, it has required not only a great economic effort but also in many cases a change in the economic structure of the country. What is clear is that Spain believes in its European identity.

One other example of Spanish integration in Europe is the Spanish participation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict. Spain participated with the Western European Union and

with United Nations and NATO. In fact, Spain today has a brigade deployed in Bosnia within the IFOR (NATO Implementation Force).

Within this framework, we will now look at new challenges and new threats from a Spanish perspective.

New Challenges and New Threats

In the last quarter of the Twentieth Century, Spain has established a solid base for the future. This does not mean that all objectives were achieved or that the new century does not have challenges or threats. Now more than ever, Spain is involved with the future structure of Europe in terms of political, economic and security issues. However, there are some areas in which Spain must improve and in many cases find solutions to continuing problems.

In line with the first part of the chapter, Spain has the following challenges: First of all, politically, the consolidation of the Autonomies Communities with their own competencies is an objective that must be achieved. At the same time, the different Communities must not forget the overarching community that is Spain. While the strength and richness of Spain are based on its diversity and different cultures and communities, they must contribute to cooperation and union instead of separation.

In the same way, another important aspect is the terrorism issue. Spain must find a solution to the problem. This is an important challenge that must overcome, because while the terrorism problem remains, it is very difficult to have the necessary political, economic and social conditions for continued development.

Economically, Spain has the same challenges as other European countries. In 1998 Spain will have to fulfill the Maastricht conditions for the next integration step in the

European Union. In this area, Spain has made a great economic effort in the last two years and the expectation is that Spain will be able to pass the “exam.”

On international issues, and maybe for its geographical position, Spain has always considered itself on the margins of the debate on Soviet issues and its zone of influence. I do not mean that the problems in Central and Eastern Europe do not affect Spain, I mean that Spain has always looked more to the South and Western Mediterranean rather than to Central and Eastern Europe. Normally, in Spain it is said that the threat comes from the South. For that reason from the Spanish perspective, the stability of the Mediterranean is a central theme.¹¹

Mediterranean Stability

Spain has important and direct interests in the stability of the Mediterranean and principally in its western region. Firstly, Spain has one third of its littoral on the Mediterranean Sea. This supports an important fishing industry and an important tourist industry. Secondly, Spain has sovereignty over some Mediterranean islands (the Balearic archipelago). Obviously, from the military perspective, Spain has a strategic interest in the control of this Mediterranean area.

On the other hand, the possession of two towns in North Africa (Ceuta and Melilla) has always been a source of concern with possible emerging threats from the South.

At the same time, Spain has important economic interests in North Africa and mainly with Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia). In fact, foreign trade with these countries is of great benefit to Spain. In particular, Spain has made important trade agreements with Algeria. Spanish building companies have invested heavily in that country. On the other hand, Spain imports natural gas from Algeria. In the

year 2000, Spain estimates that 40% of natural gas consumed will be from Algeria. Recently, Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in Algeria is causing social and political instability that can damage these economic relations.¹²

Finally, the growing gap between welfare states in Europe and the poorer North African countries is having important consequences: a large migration flow from North Africa to European countries. This issue can become not only a social and economic problem but also, in many cases, a racism and xenophobia issue. It can be very dangerous to the stability of European countries.

For all these reasons, Spain has always tried to maintain bilateral relations with North African countries and closer cooperation with European western Mediterranean countries, mainly France and Italy.

Spanish Armed Forces: Changes and Challenges

Within this new environment, the Department of Defense has made an important effort to adapt the Spanish Armed Forces to the new threats. The Armed Forces are ready for all challenges that the new century will bring them. The central theme is that they must be effective and efficient. To achieve these characteristics, the Department of Defense has adapted and changed based on a new “strategic concept.”

The new “strategic concept” is based on three compatible ideas. Firstly, the defense of the territory is the most important single strategic concept. Secondly, the Armed Forces will be used for the protection of national interests wherever they are. Finally, the Spanish Armed Forces will be offered to international organizations, such as the United Nations, for peacekeeping operations.

According to this strategic concept, the Spanish Military Instrument of Power must be agile and flexible. As a result, several reforms have been necessary. The Army has reformed its structure and organization to adapt to out of country operations (“North Plan”). At the same time, it has modified its deployment capability and reduced the personnel. The Navy has concentrated its force on two main issues: the Fleet and the Forces in the Zones (Cantabrian, Mediterranean and Atlantic). The Air Force has concentrated its force in an Air Defense Integrated System based on the role of Spanish air and space protection and the possibility of projecting air power abroad. All these changes and reforms have been completed with the creation and development of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs Staff and the Operative Commands (Army, Navy, Air).¹³

In summary, the most important challenge for the Spanish Armed Forces is to be ready to respond to a crisis or conflict, within the new geopolitical situation and a changing environment. At the same, time they must be ready to participate in a deployed multinational force operation.

Spain and External Security Structures

From the Spanish perspective, the security of Europe must be based on two important pillars: Western European Union and NATO. Both security organizations must be compatible and must not duplicate competencies and/or capabilities. Moreover, in the case of NATO, there is a fundamental cohesive link: “the transatlantic link.” This “transatlantic link” has, at least, two effects: first, a balance of power in Europe, and secondly a cohesive link among all members. On the other hand, the “new Alliance” must

be opened to all countries that fulfill political requirements if they want to participate in this project.

It is worth repeating the four paragraphs of the King of Spain's speech in NATO HQ that confirm these fundamental ideas: "Europe's security continues to be closely linked to that of the countries of North America but, above all, because the European and North American democracies share the same heritage and civilization, something which makes the Alliance a true community of values."

"The Alliance's support for the development of a European Security and Defense Identity represents, in Spain's view, the recognition of the fact that Europeans can and should take on a greater responsibility for their common security and defense. It also means the logical acknowledgment of the fact that the process of European integration will remain incomplete as long as it does not include the defense aspects."

"However, as Spain has underlined, the development of European Security and Defense Identity must be conducted in such a way that this greater European participation in collective defense leads also to the strengthening of the transatlantic link. At the same time, and in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of resources, my country has stressed the importance of finalizing the Alliance's provisions that are necessary to implement the concept of "separable but not separate forces."

"Nevertheless, the transformation of the Alliance must not be limited to its internal aspects. We must be ready to contribute to Europe's security and stability as a whole by unreservedly backing the process of democratization of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, Spain supports the process of enlargement of the Alliance

that will lead to the consolidation in these countries of the supreme values of democracy, individual liberty and the law upheld by the Alliance.”

With these fundamental ideas I will develop the discussion of the role of Spain within the EU, WEU and NATO.

WEU: Spanish Participation

Spain has actively participated in the development of the WEU in recent years. In the second half of 1995, Spain had the presidency of the EU and hence the WEU. In that period of time (six months), in security and defense issues, the document entitled “The European Security: a common concept of twenty seven Nations of the WEU” was finished and published. This document is the basis of the security and defense policy of Europe.

One important issue is the initiative taken by France, Italy and Spain to organize a Land Force (EUROFORCE) and a Maritime Force (EUROMARFORCE). These forces are opened to the WEU members and can also be employed in the framework of NATO. These multinational forces will be employed in the missions defined in the Petersberg declaration (WEU meeting 1992), mainly in peacekeeping missions.¹⁴

EUROFOR is described as a flexible Land Force with a maximum entity of a light division and the capability for quick and easy deployment. This unit has a permanent Headquarters in Florence (Italy), and it has forces “on call” (at a high state of readiness).

On 11 November 1996, the Spanish two-star General Juan Ortuño was named the first Commander in Chief of EUROFOR. In his speech he said that the reason for the existence of EUROFOR is to “reinforce the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance and consolidate the European capability of force projection.”¹⁵

Finally, the EUROMARFOR is a flexible maritime force with air-naval and amphibious capability. This unit is structured but it does not have permanent forces. According to the circumstances, its forces could vary from a group of warships to an air-naval task force.

NATO: Spanish Participation

The Spanish model of participation in NATO is basically unchanged since it was defined in 1988. Moreover, Spanish participation in NATO has been at all levels, and under the same conditions as other members. Importantly, in 1994 the North Atlantic Council approved the conditions for Spanish participation in the “NATO Security Investment Program.” In the same year, the Brussels summit approved the concept of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) as a means to adapt the operation of NATO’s units to encourage the participation of other non-NATO countries.

Spain has always been very interested in “Mediterranean issues within the Alliance.” For that reason, and as a consequence of a Spanish initiative, the North Atlantic Council decided to establish dialogue with North African and Middle Eastern Countries. The Spanish aim is to contribute to the security and stability of the Mediterranean area through better relationships between NATO and all these countries. On the other hand, Spain supports the process of enlargement of the Alliance, although this possible enlargement should include the same cooperation efforts with the Mediterranean South iberian countries.¹⁶

With its participation in all important issues, Spain has tried to take part in the new and renewed NATO. In this sense, Spain has taken an important qualitative step. In December 1996, the Spanish government proposed (to the Congress of Deputies) full

Spanish integration in the NATO military structure. It was approved with 91% of the votes. In the final resolution, the Congress considers that Spanish participation in the renewed NATO is important for Spanish national policy and security. Moreover, the Congress recommends to the government that in the integration process it must focus on five points. Firstly, to support a military structure reduced in size and flexible. Second, the military structure must focus on European security and defense identity. Third, Spain must have command and operational responsibilities according to its political role and military contribution. Fourth, to respect the right of Central and Eastern European Countries to join NATO under the same conditions as other members. Finally, to support negotiations with Russia to obtain a stable framework of Euro-Atlantic security.¹⁷

This is the Spanish point of view within NATO, and I think that it is similar to most other European countries, at least in the main points. I will finish with these words from the Spanish Monarch: “I am convinced that all Allies wish to advance in this process in such way that the proposed objectives are achieved without creating new divisions in Europe. Through the effort and dedication on the part of us, we shall be able to attain this ambitious goal.”

Conclusion

In the last thirty years, Spain has transitioned from complete isolation to integration in the most important European structures. Since achieving a democratic political system, Spain has tried to recover its standing and its political influence in Europe. Today, Spain is a full member of European Union, Western European Union and NATO. So, from this

perspective, Spain wants to work closely with the other European countries in the construction of a 21st century Europe.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has changed the strategic environment within Europe. As a result, and in a different way, all European countries have been affected by new trends and destabilizing forces. However, the most important European countries and organizations are now discussing and formulating a “new Europe.”

One important aspect of this “new Europe” is the security issue. The security and stability of Europe are important not only for European countries, but also for the “Western world.” For this reason, from the Spanish perspective, NATO and the Western European Union are fundamental organizations for European security and stability. However, it is important that an appropriate network of relationships between these organizations and with other organizations such as UN, OSCE, CE...and so on, can exist. In this way, a close relationship between all will set up a new and stronger system of cooperative security in Europe.

The Western European Union and NATO must be compatible and must not duplicate competencies and capabilities. In both cases, they must reaffirm European security and identity, because the Europeans have to take a greater responsibility for their common security. Moreover, in the NATO case, the “transatlantic link” is still important, because the security of Europe continues to be a vital interest to the countries of North America. Within the security and stability of Europe, Spain is convinced that it is closely linked to the stability of the Mediterranean area. For this reason, Spain has always focused its efforts on this issue, by encouraging initiatives, maintaining bilateral relations with North

African countries and encouraging closer cooperation with European and western Mediterranean countries.

Finally, Spain supports the process of enlargement of the Alliance. This enlargement will help to consolidate the democratic political systems in those countries wishing to join NATO. However it must not be at expense of a good relationship with Russia, which is essential for a stable framework of Euro-Atlantic security.

Notes

¹ Speech by his Majesty the King of Spain. NATO HQ. Brussels, 26 April 1996. Internet address: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/>

² Jane's NATO Handbook 1991-1992. Countries study: Spain, by Rafael L. Bardaji, Director of Strategic Studies Group, Madrid.

³ "Spain, NATO and Western Security." Sr. D. Narcis Serra, Spanish Minister of Defense. Page 4.

⁴ "Spain, NATO and Western Security." Sr. D. Narcis Serra, Spanish Minister of Defense. Page 5.

⁵ "Spain, NATO and Western Security." Sr. D. Narcis Serra. Spanish Minister of Defense. Page 6.

⁶ "España en la OTAN: contribución en su doble dimensión de seguridad y defensa." Comandante E.A. Francisco Almerich. Boletín de información CESEDEN año 1995 num.241. Page 76.

⁷ "Spain, NATO and Western Security." Sr. D. Narcis Serra, Spanish Minister of Defense. Page 7.

⁸ "Peace and Security Policies defined by Spain over the past few years." "SI, SPAIN." Embassy of Spain in Canada.

⁹ "España en la OTAN: contribución a su doble dimensión de seguridad y defensa." Comandante E.A. Francisco Almerich. Boletín de información CESEDEN año 1995, num. 241. Page 78.

¹⁰ Jane's Military. "Spain." Mark Stenhouse and Bruce George. Page 44.

¹¹ Jane's NATO Handbook, 1991-1992. Countries study: Spain, by Rafael L. Bardaji, Director of the Strategic Studies Group, Madrid.

¹² El país digital-internacional. "El negocio con España se dispara." S. Hernández, 25 Nov. 1996. Internet address: <http://www.elpais.es>

¹³ Ministerio de Defensa. Memoria de la V Legislatura (1993-1996). "Organización de la defensa," página 69. Ministerio de Defensa. Secretaría General Técnica.

¹⁴ Ministerio de Defensa. Memoria de la V Legislatura (1993-1996). "Política de seguridad y defensa," página 41. Ministerio de Defensa. Secretaría General Técnica.

¹⁵ Revista Española de Defensa. "La Eurofor inicia su actividad." Javier de Mazarrasa. Diciembre 1996, página 40.

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¹⁶ Ministerio de Defensa. Memoria de la V legislatura (1993-1996). “Política de seguridad y defensa,” página 37. Ministerio de Defensa. Secretaría General Técnica.

¹⁷ Revista Española de Defensa. “El Congreso respalda la plena participación en la OTAN.” Santiago F. de Valdo. Diciembre 1996, página 7.

Chapter 8

Comparing & Contrasting Key Areas

Having established the common framework, we are now able to set up a comparison of the different national perspectives as they relate to the main NATO issues, while focusing on factors of cohesion and factors that challenge NATO solidarity. We acknowledge the fact that three country perspectives out of 16 will not cover all the aspects and main issues within NATO in detail, but at the same time, the three countries' different circumstances with regard to size, history and military tradition do serve to illustrate some of the factors governing NATO's future.

From the individual perspectives we can extract common areas indicating NATO's significance for the European security and stability. The areas include:

1. The relationship between local and European regional threats. Impact of potential differences.
2. European security architecture. Interlocking institutions and their relations and relative importance.
3. National adaptation in major areas to new force structure. Trends within the alliance.
4. Transatlantic link.

Threats and Stability

There is a difference in local threats based on level and direction. Based on the very significant changes that have occurred in surrounding countries, Denmark and Germany presently perceive no direct military threats. However in the wider perspective, general

threats to the security and stability of Europe are perceived. Spain is relatively more threatened by North African areas of instability and military potential. Due to its geographical position and economic interest in this area, Spain has always tried to establish a strong and deep relationship, dialogue, and cooperation among all Riparian states.

The extended security policies of Denmark and Germany both share the common goal of promoting stability and security in the whole European region. In addition, with the two countries' active contribution to international out-of-area operations, the difference in perceived threat does not seem to challenge NATO solidarity in any serious way.

We recognize that German and Danish focus is predominantly towards the East, which is only natural, as these countries have most to gain directly by the continuing enlargement process and the associated increase in stability. Spain has stated, its interest lies in contributing to Europe's security and stability as a whole, and unreservedly backing the enlargement process. This will likewise not corrode the solidarity.

In conclusion, the differences in local threats can be accommodated within the alliance under the currently developed NATO strategy. The common goal of furthering the stability of the region as a whole, exemplified by the latest NATO lead involvement in the Balkans, is binding the alliance together.

Security Architecture

Considering the main security issues in Europe, all three countries realize that these issues are too powerful and complex to be resolved by one sole nation or by any one of the existing security organizations, in isolation. An effective address to these issues will

require the comprehensive use of appropriate instruments of power available through a coordinated effort by all European institutions, relevant to the issue at hand.

All three nations emphasize the importance of NATO in the new European security structure especially in the military dimension. Differences do exist between the countries on the issue of European defense identity, with Spain most actively promoting a sole European approach using the EU and the WEU, while Denmark, not being a full member of the latter, represents the opposite end of the spectrum, only hesitantly going along with the development of a separate European defense and security capability. The German position on the subject realizes the need for Europe to take greater responsibility on security issues and emphasizes the need for further European integration, while at the same time acknowledging the need to maintain the US involved in the European security environment.

In the short term the differences can be overcome by practical workarounds, although the present coordination of the use of different IOPs through the various European institutions, is less than optimal. The European integration process will be the key factor, determining the relative importance of the institutions in the future European security architecture. This also holds true for NATO's future value and applicability as security and stability provider in Europe.

Adaptation of Force Structure

The analysis of the three nations' adaptation of forces in recent years, illustrates that there is a remarkable similarity present in the way that each country has tried to tailor its forces to the new strategic environment. This similarity exists also in the individual

countries' national military objectives, and is an indication of a common view on the importance of countering the emerging less intensive but more complex threats in the European region as a whole. Conflict prevention and crisis management are now listed side by side with territorial defense in tasks set up for all three countries' military forces.

The adaptation in the force structures is made in accordance with NATO's new strategic concept in all countries, with emphasis on flexibility, rapid mobility, and operation in a multinational environment. Small differences do exist in the tempo with which these adapted forces are, or will become, operational, but the general adaptation process is the same.

Transatlantic Link

All three countries recognize the mutual benefit to both the European countries and the US in meeting the emerging challenges of the 21st century (global trends) in unison from a foundation of common shared values. This is also the stated official US policy.¹

All three countries agree strongly on the US role as a balancing actor in Europe. The US military capabilities are, presently, a very important element in off-setting the remaining Russian conventional and nuclear potential. Furthermore, US guidance in generating appropriate and coordinated responses to emerging crisis in Europe, is necessary from a short term perspective, but may be replaced in the future by a more developed European security and defense identity. NATO's future viability will be tied closely to this development.

The perceived importance of tying the US to the European security environment for these various reasons will act as a factor in strengthening NATO cohesion in the future.

Realistically, from the US perspective, this cohesive factor will be qualified by the fact that the US interest in Europe is waning, with the main security focus shifting to areas of more immediate pertinence to US national security.

Notes

¹ The White House. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office. February 1996.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Empire in the late 1980s lifted the bipolar strategic overlay which had governed the European security situation for the previous 40 years. NATO was propelled into a state of identity crisis, and with the main enemy gone, the alliance's very *raison d'être* was challenged. The new strategic environment introduced new and more complex threats to European security. The war in the former Yugoslavia was a clear example of trends in the evolution of threats to the security of the region.

The combined effort of the presently deployed NATO lead force in the Balkan area, based on the alliance's new strategic concept, is in stark contrast to the initial disconcerted European and American approach to the crisis. This clearly shows that NATO has indeed adapted its policy effectively so far, and that the alliance still presently has a very large role to play in the European security arena.

The alliance's mostly successful adaptation until now, does not change the fact that NATO's viability in the future will be tested in a continually changing environment, where the complexity of the emerging threats will put more emphasis on the use of IOPs other than the military. This will fundamentally change the balance between the institutions in the European security architecture. With NATO being the only transatlantic institution in

this architecture, this will consequently also change the relationship between Europe and the American NATO partners.

The three country perspectives and the comparative analysis, give an understanding of significant areas influencing the future viability of NATO as an important European security and stability provider. Although not representative of the whole alliance, the three country perspectives do provide significant insights into different aspects of NATO's role in the new strategic situation, covering regional perspectives from Northern to Southern Europe.

The comparative analysis shows major similarities in all key areas affecting NATO's future. All countries recognize that national security is best provided by addressing security concerns at the European level in a proactive way, seeking to increase the stability in the region as a whole. Additionally, each country advocates dealing with the emerging threats to European stability using a supra-national approach.

NATO's new strategic concept reflects this approach in dealing with future European security concerns, giving the alliance the practical means of generating a common response to emerging threats. The national force adaptation in each of the three member states clearly demonstrates strong support of this strategic concept, and shows the countries' conviction that NATO is the only valid security organization, responsible predominantly for creating military responses. NATO's existence is thus not seriously challenged in the short term.

The different perspectives provide the common perception that maintaining the transatlantic link is vital for the future development of NATO and is in the interest of the European nations. Presently, and in the short term, the US engagement is necessary as a

balancing factor in Europe, and it generates appropriate and coordinated responses to emerging regional crises.

In the long term, the transatlantic relationship will change with the growing European security and defense identity, and as responses to the regional conflicts become more comprehensive involving other European institutions. Combined with the waning US interest in Europe this will, in turn, change the relative importance of NATO as an institution, and perhaps challenge the alliance's current position. However, the transatlantic link will remain important as there is an obvious mutual benefit for the countries on both sides of the Atlantic in meeting the global emerging challenges of 21st century in unison, and NATO will still have a crucial role to play in coordinating these efforts.

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