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AIR UNIVERSITY

EDUCATING COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

BY

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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Preface

In 1993, I volunteered to serve as a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) for 179 days in Western Sahara. During my service as an UNMO, I learned how ill prepared I was as an Air Force officer to understand and interact with the United Nations structure, civilian populations, and combatants. Pre-deployment training prepared me for the limited military tasks I would perform but nothing prepared me for the role military forces play in this highly politico-military environment. This “blended” environment captures what is becoming more and more a part of the US military mission, military operations other than war (MOOTW). This paper examines how well Air Force professional military education (PME) prepares company grade officers to understand the principles, objectives, characteristics and planning and execution considerations of MOOTW.

I would like to thank Dr. Mahoney-Norris, my faculty research advisor for her support and patience as we whittled a dissertation topic down to a research project. Her knowledge and understanding of the United Nations, MOOTW and field grade officer PME helped immensely. None of this would be possible without access to the curricula and demographic data for each PME school and course. Special thanks to: Major Anne Sumpter and Technical Sergeant Bruce Womack, Squadron Officers School; Dr Richard Lester, Company Grade Officer Professional Development Course; and Majors T.R. Morgan and “Flip” McCaw, Aerospace Basic Course.

Abstract

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) are becoming a more visible and frequently employed component of America's national security strategy. This project traces the evolution of MOOTW through the National Security Strategy statements of 1994, 1997, 1998 and the National Military Strategy statements of 1992, 1995 and 1997. Establishing a foundation in national security and military strategy, the project describes joint and Air Force doctrinal guidance on MOOTW.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, requires the services employ a two-prong approach to MOOTW education and training (figure 3) and suggests some instructional methods to accomplish this training. Additionally, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, also supports MOOTW education from officer accession through senior service school attendance. This project evaluates how well Air Force company grade officer professional military education complies with the JP 3-07 requirement to teach MOOTW principles, objectives, characteristics and planning and execution considerations. Resident and distance learning curricula are evaluated from the three associated PME courses conducted under the auspices of Air University, including the Aerospace Basic Course (ABC), Company Grade Officer Professional Development Course (CGOPDC) and Squadron Officer School (SOS).

Recommendations include: (1) updating curriculum to reflect current joint and service doctrine for MOOTW, (2) creating a distance learning program for the Aerospace Basic Course to ensure the widest exposure of Air Force officers, civilians and sister service officers to Air Force doctrine, (3) de-emphasizing MOOTW as special but rather as a normal part of the application of military power across the spectrum of peace or war, (4) creating a company grade officer web site to bring tailored education and training opportunities to officers, (5) eliminating the Company Grade Officer Professional Development Course (CGOPDC) and replacing it with a Base Familiarization program run by the Company Grade Officer Council/Association at each base, (6) applying MOOTW concepts during the Atlantis war-game at Squadron Officer School, and (7) making SOS completion by correspondence or in-residence as equivalent by eliminating training reports and record of completion method.

Chapter 1

Evolving National Security Strategy

“Most OOTW (Operations other than War) missions have also called for decentralized execution. This dispersion requires greater politico-military sophistication in younger officers, to include direct contact with the media, non-governmental organizations, and foreign governments as well as coping with the inherent ambiguities and complexities of such international operations.”

“Emergence of the Joint Officer”, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996¹

As this paper is being written, it is believed President Clinton will send US ground forces into Kosovo at the request of the international community to stop the killing of ethnic Albanians and establish conditions sufficient for peaceful negotiations. In the post-Cold War world, conflicts like Kosovo occur frequently despite the efforts of international diplomacy using both “carrot and stick” approaches. Threats of NATO airstrikes against the Serbs for their policies in Kosovo have loomed for months with little or no lasting effects on the crisis. It is likely that soon NATO and US forces will replace civilian observers in Kosovo and America’s involvement in the quagmire of Kosovo will deepen.

The challenge for US military leaders at all levels will be planning and executing these complex and difficult military operations other than war (MOOTW) scenarios such as Kosovo in support of national objectives. MOOTW are described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, as “encompassing a wide range of military

activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than large-scale combat operations usually associated with war.”² The term MOOTW is commonly used when describing peace operations, peacekeeping, nation building, and much more. Throughout this paper, MOOTW will describe the 16 types of operations identified in JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.³ Given the range of MOOTW activities involving both combat and non-combat activities, education serves to provide a foundation in MOOTW principles, objectives and planning and execution considerations necessary to apply military capabilities in any MOOTW activity.

In 1993, I served as a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) and was able to see first-hand the complexities of military operations closely intertwined with political processes. As a company grade officer, I was often frustrated by how seemingly simple tasks were made more complex by political sensitivities and posturing. My understanding of the United Nations was extremely limited, as was my appreciation for just how complex peacekeeping really can be. In retrospect, pre-deployment training made me appreciate the landmine threat and sharpened my map reading skills but did little to help me understand the important subtleties of peacekeeping compared to other military operations. I would learn these things, first-hand through trial and error.

This paper will first provide some background on the evolution of MOOTW through an analysis of the national security strategy and the national military strategy. Next, I will consider how MOOTW has been supported in joint and Air Force doctrine. Finally, I will examine how well USAF PME meets the requirement to educate company grade officers concerning MOOTW principles, objectives, and planning and execution

considerations as directed in JP 3-07. Bloom's educational taxonomy will be used to assess the learning outcomes sought by each PME program in MOOTW instruction.⁴

The Strategic Environment and Evolving US Policy

As the United States approaches the 10 year anniversary of the end of the Cold War, we are struggling to develop national security and military strategies as to how the national instruments of power (IOPs) can best be employed to support our own national interests in global peace and prosperity. Many in the world community expect the US to use its awesome political, economic and military power to promote world peace and stability. Global security challenges include nuclear weapons proliferation, terrorism, and rogue leaders, states or ethnic groups who threaten their neighbors or commit atrocities against their people. The diversity of these new challenges is evident when contrasting DESERT STORM and Somalia. During DESERT STORM, US-led air, ground and naval forces put on a dazzling show of precision combat power, systematically destroying Saddam Hussein's military forces and driving them from Kuwait. After the overwhelming success of the military in DESERT STORM, the humanitarian aid mission in Somalia appeared safe and relatively simple in comparison. Ultimately, America and its military forces left Somalia as a country still in anarchy, achieving arguably minimal impact on the long-term problems facing Somalia.

These new security challenges are clearly understood and accepted in the three national security strategy (NSS) documents (1994, 1997 and 1998) issued during the Clinton Administration. Each new strategy document has shown a greater willingness to use military force and personnel to decisively shape the international environment through MOOTW. A RAND study describes a "Decade of CALCs" (Crises and Lesser

Conflicts) where the military responded to everything from a noncombatant emergency evacuation (NEO) in Grenada to airstrikes against Libya in retaliation for sponsoring terrorism against Americans to providing humanitarian relief in Zaire.⁵ This decade, starting in 1983, includes 30 distinct operations that could be classified as MOOTW involving both combat and non-combat operations. The level of international involvement has led some to characterize the US military as the nation's "911 force"; on call, ready to go at a moment's notice to answer the call anywhere in the world. Is America's military just a quick and convenient response to crisis or is there a national strategy involved?

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1994

The central goals of the 1994 *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* were "to credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight, bolster America's economic revitalization and promote democracy abroad."⁶ These central goals were to be accomplished through an overarching strategy of engagement and enlargement. Engagement from a military perspective has been occurring for many years through the foreign military sales programs and training exercises. The presence of military forces shows America's commitment to a regional partner and brings about respect for US capabilities and resolve to use the military to promote peace and deter aggression. The second goal, democratic enlargement, has involved "increasing our security by protecting, consolidating, and enlarging the community of free market democracies."⁷ Ultimately, engagement and enlargement have supported the fundamental belief that "democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote

sustainable development.”⁸ When armed conflict did occur, the NSS expected to field forces capable of fighting “two nearly simultaneously major regional conflicts (MRCs).”⁹ Two MRCs represented the worst-case military scenario but smaller scale, regional contingencies and humanitarian operations occur much more frequently. For contingencies, the NSS required that US forces also prepare for peace operations as an intervention that could “support democracy or conflict resolution that with others in the international community will seek to prevent and contain localized conflicts before they require a military response.”¹⁰ It went on to assert that “multilateral peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.”¹¹ Peace operations, however, are not a “silver bullet” and there are specific conditions under which the US will deploy forces. Incorporated in these conditions we see the “lessons learned” of past interventions. Operations must serve “US interests as well as assurances from an international community of interests for dealing with the threat on a multilateral basis, identification of clear objectives, availability of the necessary resources, and identification of an operation’s endpoint or criteria for completion.”¹² Finally, the NSS asked, “regardless of success or failure, do we have an exit strategy?”¹³

A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1997

The 1997 NSS core objectives were to “enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win; bolster America’s economic prosperity; and promote democracy abroad.”¹⁴ Differences between the 1994 and 1997 NSS objectives are noteworthy. First, our central objective in 1997 was to “enhance” rather than just “sustain” (1994) our security. Perhaps US policy reflected

new confidence in its ability to shape the international environment and reduce potential threats in the post cold-War world. Second, engagement was still a keystone concept but enlargement was emphasized less as NATO membership for former Soviet satellite nations was openly opposed by Russia. Third, conditions for US military involvement, for the first time, were characterized as supporting vital or important national interests or humanitarian interests.¹⁵ Fourth, the NSS described a need for the military to respond to “challenges short of war”-a concept akin to MOOTW.¹⁶ Fifth, the NSS now asserts that “every dollar we devote preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, and stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings a sure return into our own security and savings.”¹⁷ This statement presented humanitarian and “peace operations” as an investment in America’s security. This “investment” was clearly not without risk to the “blood and treasure” of America and its citizens. And finally, the 1997 document coined the new term “smaller scale contingencies” (SSCs) which were defined as operations encompassing “the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, no-fly zones, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes, and interventions.”¹⁸ It appears the administration still in power today believes in the ability of the military to shape the international environment and expects the military to be called upon more in the future.

A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1998

The three core objectives of the 1998 NSS are stated simply as to enhance our security, to bolster American economic prosperity, and to promote democracy abroad.¹⁹ National security is no longer the sole task of the military but a highly integrated task requiring varied degrees of involvement of each IOP. Threats may exist where economic

pressure backed by the deterrent power of military forces and capability are sufficient to change hostile will. Conversely, expertly managed diplomatic and economic pressure may be all that is required to deter a threat.

Examining the evolution of the last three national security strategy statements, it becomes obvious that the military role has grown well beyond fighting and winning the nation's wars to that of a finely tuned diplomatic instrument. The military is now an instrument capable of providing capability across the spectrum of intervention from humanitarian assistance to complete enemy destruction. The military had adapted so well to these roles that the current NSS states that "our priority is to shape the international environment so as to deter the onset of major theater wars."²⁰ Over the course of the last three NSS documents the employment of US forces in concert with other IOPs has evolved from deterring and defeating aggression to the expectation of preventing the onset of major theater wars. Additionally, the 1998 NSS maintains that a "fundamental transformation of our military forces" would be required to respond to the military challenges of the 21st Century.²¹ MOOTW scenarios continue to pose a significant challenge to US military forces that are primarily organized to win military engagements rather than to support finely tuned political objectives.

Notes

¹ *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, page 71.

² Page V-1, paragraph 1 a.

³ Page III-1, figure III-1.

⁴ Air Force Manual 36-2236, *Guidebook for Air Force Instructors*, 15 September 1994, page 15. Bloom's educational taxonomy identifies six levels of learning which describe a learner's transition from simple to more complex mastery of information learned.

⁵ *Organizing, Training and Equipping the Air Force for Crises and Lesser Conflicts*, page 6. The authors took this data from a *Joint Forces Quarterly* article using information taken from a study by Adam B. Siegel and Scott M. Fabbri, *Overview of*

Notes

Selected Joint Task Forces, 1960-1993 and excerpted in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1993-1994, pp. 36-37.

⁶ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, July 1994, page i.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, i.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 10

¹⁴ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997, page i.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, ii.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, page 12.

¹⁹ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, October 1998, page iii.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

Chapter 2

National Military Strategy and Doctrine

“It is important to recognize that there is nothing peaceful about peacekeeping. Soldiers are going to die and be wounded in the service of peace. Although unfortunate, these are the facts that must be accepted by any nation that supports these noble but often dangerous missions.”

Lt Col Robert B. Adolph Jr., USA, Army *Times* commentary¹

This quote strikes at the heart of the issue concerning military operations other than war. Military operations other than war involve missions and tasks that range from the application of lethal combat power against an adversary to providing humanitarian assistance in permissive environments to situations where forces are under the constant threat of attack or resumption of hostilities. From a training and execution perspective, traditional wars are arguably more “black and white” with a clearly defined enemy and objectives to be achieved to secure victory. What is “won” in MOOTW? MOOTW is more complex because it demands the very judicious application of military force unlike that found in hitting a target with a precision guided weapon. The precision demanded in MOOTW centers on the use of military capability supporting political objectives to avert increasing conflict, anarchy or suffering. MOOTW does not allow the military to focus on battles and engagements but rather on limiting and controlling the level of conflict while diplomacy works. Our National Military Strategy (NMS) continues to adapt to the very dynamic and difficult missions required in MOOTW.

National Military Strategy of the United States, 1992

In the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, the NMS of 1992 was built on four foundations: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution.² While these foundations are consistent with the Cold War world, this NMS recognized several new roles for military forces. The new security environment would require our forces to execute “less traditional operations. These include newly defined roles for the military in the war on drugs and in providing humanitarian assistance.”³ The NMS even acknowledged that “in some cases (US forces) must be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need.”⁴ This was a particularly powerful statement that foreshadowed future conflicts like Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. As America has transitioned toward a strategy of engagement and enlargement, the military strategy has prepared to execute this national strategy.

National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement

The bedrock of the 1995 NMS was found in three key elements of strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict resolution, and fighting and winning our nation’s wars.⁵ In the 1992 NMS, military to military contacts served as a mechanism to prepare a response with allies against potential regional threats. The focus changed in 1995 as military programs overseas were also identified as “a platform for imparting influence and democratic values into militaries reforming or newly democratic nations.”⁶ Additionally, peacekeeping was mentioned in the NMS for the first time although US forces were already supporting peacekeeping operations. For instance, in 1994, I

completed a tour as a UN Military Observer performing peacekeeping duties as part of a 24-member, US military contingent supporting the UN mission in Western Sahara.

In 1995 the NMS stated that traditional peacekeeping was to be supported on a “case by case basis” and might include the “participation of US combat units.”⁷ Participation of US combat units marks a significant transition from what was traditionally seen as a “benign” peacekeeping environment to the more dangerous mission of peace enforcement. Peace enforcement represents a major step because these operations do not require the consent of the combatants but rather a UN mandate for military forces to act in a peace enforcement role. According to the NMS, peace operations would not be undertaken lightly or unilaterally,

“we prefer sharing the burden of peacekeeping with allies and friends. When the United States does participate, we will follow the guidelines of Presidential Decision Directive 25, to include seeking a clear delineation of the objectives of each operation, insuring an unbroken chain of command to the President, and ensuring rules of engagement to protect our forces and permit the proper execution of assigned tasks.”⁸

Peace operations also were recognized as unique enough that the services had to prepare and train to undertake these missions. “We recognize that peace operations are often different from traditional military operations in the tasks and capabilities they require of our armed forces. We are continuing to develop appropriate doctrine and training for these operations.”⁹ This continued development of doctrine and training was viewed as especially important as the “Reserve component elements will take on increased responsibility for participating in and supporting peacekeeping missions.”¹⁰

This NMS was the first to openly discuss military participation in post-hostilities as an important activity that should be planned for:

“in the wake of any major theater conflict, our forces will likely encounter numerous demands to attend to the needs of the indigenous population.

This may well include activities such as providing humanitarian relief and nation assistance that are included in the peacetime engagement components of our military strategy. Planning for post conflict operations will began prior to and continue throughout any conflict.”¹¹

While the direction to plan for post-hostilities seems a foregone conclusion it is very easy to fall into the trap of believing the military fights wars and politicians can sort out the aftermath. War termination does not equate to conflict resolution and the victor must help bring a country back “into the fold” or risk conflict in the future. Post conflict operations do not necessarily mean an indefinite military presence and the NMS stressed “close coordination and cooperation between military and other governmental and non-governmental agencies [which] will be particularly critical during the transition period following war as some functions are transferred to non-military organizations and while our forces are being redeployed and reconstituted.”¹² This statement emphasized the importance of the transition of the military back to its primary mission of preparing for the next crisis requiring US military force. Clearly the 1995 NMS demanded the engagement of military forces in both peace and war and appeared to prepare the military to help achieve greater success in winning the ultimate peace.

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997: Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era

The most recent NMS from 1997 was built on the premise that

“the United States will remain globally engaged to shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests and global security. It emphasizes that our armed forces must respond to the full spectrum of crisis in order to protect our national interests. As we pursue shaping and responding activities, we must also take steps to prepare now for an uncertain future.”¹³

Stated US national military objectives include “Promote peace and stability, and when necessary, to defeat adversaries. U.S. armed forces helped shape the international environment through deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership and alliances. Deterrence rests on a potential adversary’s perceptions of our capabilities and commitment.”¹⁴ Winning our nation’s wars was identified as primary but the military was directed to “also be prepared to conduct several smaller scale contingency operations at the same time, as situations may dictate the employment of U.S. military capabilities when rapid action is required to stabilize a situation.”¹⁵ Not only must our forces engage militarily but also “it is imperative that our joint forces also enhance their ability to operate in consonance with other U.S. government agencies, and with non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private voluntary organizations in a variety of settings.”¹⁶

The interrelationship of military and non-military entities reflects the complexities faced when executing our national strategy of engagement. As the *Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations* points out, there is indeed “no standard peace operation mission.”¹⁷ Unlike major theater wars (MTW), these crises appear to come from nowhere and involve actors and states sometimes wholly unfamiliar to the American public or military. The NMS addresses how the military should adapt its skills to this MOOTW environment: “The leadership, discipline, organization, and training inherent in maintaining our core war-fighting competencies are the foundation of our ability to adapt readily and efficiently to the challenges peculiar to a wide variety of smaller scale contingencies.”¹⁸ Doctrine is understandably the next logical step in

preparing forces to work together in the complex, joint environment required in many MOOTW operations.

MOOTW in Joint Doctrine

Joint Publication 3-07 describes MOOTW as supporting the US goals of deterring war and resolving conflict or promoting peace and support for US civil authorities.¹⁹ These goals involve operations characterized as combat and non-combat with the possibility of rapid transitions between both levels of military force. This transition, combined with the primacy of political over military objectives, makes MOOTW difficult to train for and execute. MOOTW education can be the great equalizer—while the uniqueness of every situation prevents specific training, the principles and objectives of MOOTW apply consistently and can be taught. Planners can build concepts and functional plans to execute military tasks but forces must be ready to respond with an understanding of the MOOTW environment to most effectively apply their military skills. Joint doctrine provides an essential framework to understand MOOTW principles, objectives and planning and execution considerations.

Four primary joint publications concerning MOOTW form the foundation of operations planning, execution and training. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, devotes a chapter to MOOTW principles, planning considerations, and types of operations other than war (OOTW).²⁰ JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, follows JP 3-0 themes of MOOTW principles, types of operations and planning considerations while setting the stage for more tactical level advice through JTTP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*. JTTP 3-07.3 provides greater detail on specific service functions that may be employed

during peacekeeping (PK), the UN system and mandate processes, command and control, planning considerations, employment, training, and supporting functions. Though very specific to PK, JTTP 3-07 provides some very valuable information on UN operations in general.

Another resource is the *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, probably the most complete document covering the full range of MOOTW activities and issues. It is the author's belief (an airman's perspective) that current doctrinal publications provide a very solid foundation concerning MOOTW. The greatest value for airmen can be found in the understanding of activities on the ground and how these operations can be affected by air operations. MOOTW looks very different when enforcing a no-fly zone compared to conducting ground patrols to ensuring safe separation of rival factions. Joint doctrine for MOOTW requires guidance that is broad and sufficiently flexible to provide valuable input to both the planner and individual on the ground.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, *Military Operations Other than War*, reinforces MOOTW principles, combat, non-combat, and overlapping MOOTW command and control issues, rules of engagement, and planning and support considerations from an airman's perspective. In the author's opinion the most significant contribution of AFDD 2-3 is the recognition that active, guard and reserve security police, public affairs, civil affairs, logistics, weather, medical, and civil engineering functions and their personnel play a key role in executing and supporting MOOTW. The Air Force openly asserts that it is the service where its officers are the principal war-fighters. In many MOOTW scenarios combat aircraft are in a supporting role to ground operations. Finally, AFDD

2-3 considers education as the first step in preparing military and civilian personnel to conduct MOOTW. The intent is “to ensure Air Force personnel understand the principles, concepts and characteristics of MOOTW.”²¹

Notes

- ¹ Commentary, *Army Times*, 10 Jan 94.
- ² *National Military Strategy of the United States*, January 1992, pages 6-7.
- ³ *Ibid.*, 14.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ⁵ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1995, page ii.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 8
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 9
- ⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 16.
- ¹² *Ibid.*
- ¹³ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1997, page 1.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.
- ¹⁷ *Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations*, 16 June 1997, page I-1.
- ¹⁸ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1997, page 21.
- ¹⁹ Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995, page I-2.
- ²⁰ Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1 Feb 1995, pages V-1 – V-13.
- ²¹ AFDD 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, page 37.

Chapter 3

Research Design

*Readying forces to successfully conduct MOOTW requires a two-pronged approach [figure 3]. The first prong is the professional military education of all officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Their formal MOOTW education begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the senior service or academy level. **The focus of MOOTW education is to ensure leaders at all levels understand the objectives, principles and characteristics of MOOTW, and can plan and conduct these operations.** As leaders progress, they will learn about MOOTW at a level applicable to their current and next grade. Leader education will include discussions, lessons learned, and situational exercises, and should culminate with senior leaders performing in a command or staff position during a MOOTW exercise.*

—JP 3-07, page IV-13, 3 a. (Emphasis added by author.)

This study analyzes the resident and non-resident (distance learning) curricula of three Air Force professional military education (PME) schools or programs to see if Air Force company grade officer¹ PME meets the intent of JP 3-07 concerning MOOTW education. The three PME programs include the Aerospace Basic Course (ABC), Company Grade Officer Professional Development Program (CGOPDC) and Squadron Officer School (SOS). Based on the JP 3-07 and AFDD 2-3 requirements to teach MOOTW, each school curriculum was examined to determine (1) are MOOTW principles, objectives, characteristics and planning and execution considerations being taught? (2) What cognitive levels of learning are sought in instruction (table 4)? (3) What instructional methods are being used? In order to understand the complexity of this

research problem we will identify some assumptions, key terminology and concepts, and PME program descriptions.

Key Assumptions

There are several necessary assumptions in this project: (1) Education involves instilling knowledge and shaping attitudes that guide or influence future behavior. In contrast, training includes aspects of education but focuses on providing demonstrable skills rather than knowledge alone. (2) ABC, CGOPDC, and SOS are considered basic leadership training based on the JP 3-07 guidance. An argument could be made that commissioning programs like the Air Force Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps and Officer Training School are better described as basic leadership training. However, the cadets and trainees in these programs are not yet officers and while they need MOOTW education it does not reflect the stated intent of JP 3-07 which is the focus of this research. (3) ABC, CGOPDC and SOS are considered primary level education in the (USAF) Continuum of Professional Military Education and for our purposes would be considered “basic leadership training.”² (4) ABC, CGOPDC, and SOS curricula are under revision and the course content and duration described here do not reflect future initiatives or changes contemplated. Changes to ABC and SOS are being driven in large part to directed reductions in course length--ABC from seven to four weeks and SOS from seven to five weeks. (5) At the basic leadership training level it is expected company grade officers will understand planning and execution considerations but will not possess the experience to plan and conduct these operations during attendance at PME. This assumption reflects the belief that “as leaders progress they will learn MOOTW at a level applicable to their current or next grade.”³ It is assumed that CGOs

will participate in MOOTW at the tactical level and that subsequent PME and training will prepare them for future roles as planners and leaders at the operational level.

Key Terminology and Concepts

Before we can analyze whether or not MOOTW principles, objectives or characteristics and planning and execution considerations are being taught, these broad terms must be defined. Next, we will examine Bloom's educational taxonomy for the cognitive domain of learning (table 4).⁴ Also, we will describe instructional methods equivalent to discussions, lessons learned and situational exercises for teaching MOOTW topics. Finally, we will examine what is meant by non-resident curriculum and the instructional method of distance learning.

The principles of MOOTW include objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy (figure 1).⁵ The "objectives" of MOOTW do not exist in list form but JP 3-07 identifies three MOOTW contributions to the attainment of national security objectives including deterrence, forward presence and crisis response (figure 2).⁶ Objectives might also be expressed in terms of the 16 types of missions undertaken in MOOTW (figure 5).⁷ MOOTW characteristics are primarily defined here in terms of how MOOTW differs from operations in war including its focus on deterring war and promoting peace rather than waging war; increased sensitivity to political considerations and an environment where the military may not be the primary player; and more restrictive rules of engagement and a hierarchy of national objectives are followed.⁸ Finally, planning and conducting operations will not be examined specifically since the PME programs involved are not teaching senior officers, as defined above. While understanding planning and execution considerations are important, developing or

practicing specific planning skills are beyond the intent of basic leadership training for company grade officers.

Additionally, this study examines the teaching methods described in JP 3-07 as “discussions, lessons learned and situational exercises” (figure 4).⁹ These activities are easily matched with a broad range of instructional activities or methods used in PME. I do not believe JP 3-07 suggested these instructional methods because they are educationally better than others are but because they logically build on each other. These methods seem to help learners discuss not only MOOTW principles and operational concepts but also their attitudes and beliefs about the military’s role in MOOTW. As a student at ACSC, I have found that every discussion of MOOTW begins with a discussion of whether or not MOOTW should be a legitimate mission for the military. Many see MOOTW as taking away from our charter to fight and win our nation’s wars. If majors are struggling to “buy-in” to this mission, certainly we have to expect that more junior officers might also struggle with this idea. Lessons learned help learners appreciate and understand what factors have caused military operations to be succeed or fail during MOOTW. Ultimately, situational exercises provide an opportunity to apply principles and concepts in a real-world environment.

This building block approach fits very nicely with Bloom’s Cognitive Taxonomy, which describes the levels of learning in the cognitive domain.¹⁰ Very simply, Bloom’s taxonomy shows the progression and mastery of information developed by a learner. These levels of learning include knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. This study deals with PME curriculum that targets the knowledge, comprehension and application levels of learning. These levels of learning

can be easily identified through the behavioral verbs used in the criterion objectives used in instructional lesson plans (table 5).¹¹

Distance learning (DL) describes an instructional setting and method where the learner can access educational materials via paper course material, CD ROM, or web-based computer managed or assisted instruction. This instructional method and media has powerful advantages including: easier access for students unable to be physically present where training is held; new technology which allows students to view videotape segments, complete interactive tutorials, participation in war-gaming, simulations or exercises; costs are appreciably less compared to producing, copying and shipping paper course products; ease in making curriculum updates or introducing corrections or new curriculum; ease in tracking and managing student progress; and finally the opportunity for continued interaction with the learner by easily and conveniently offering additional training or reading materials on related subjects.

The distance learning program at Air Command and Staff College is a good example of the student population that can be reached through this instructional method and media. At ACSC, 10 staff members administer a DL program serving 7393 students annually.¹² The DL staff at ACSC does not include Extension Course Institute (ECI) personnel at Gunter AFB who support enrollment, shipping materials, test scanning and data management.¹³ ECI supports DL programs across the Air Force including career development courses for airman, enlisted and officer PME. Additionally, each ACSC teaching department (DEA, DEB, DEC) has a DL representative who “coordinates answers to bulletin board questions (electronic bulletin board), coordinates curriculum updates and test review boards. Typically, the deputy course directors for each of the 10

courses supports the (DL) reps with the updates and test review board rewrites.”¹⁴ ACSC has 90 faculty members and support staff to support 594 student attending in-residence each year.¹⁵ Obviously, in-residence attendance is preferred, but in today’s budget environment it can be a luxury compared to other mission activities requiring funding. The answer is to create distance learning components, which go beyond non-resident curriculum. Many times non-resident curriculum is created by simply taking in-resident lesson plans and materials and placing them on a CD-Rom or in printed coursebooks. In contrast, distance learning can be more interactive by employing media like satellite broadcasts of lectures with opportunities for students to ask questions. DL curricula could also be tailored to support the learners’ need for prerequisite instruction before moving on to more advanced material.

PME Program Descriptions

Each of the three basic leadership programs is structured differently to achieve their specific mission. To better understand each program we will first examine their mission, course content, and unique features.

The Aerospace Basic Course (ABC) is a seven week course chartered in 1997 by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff to remedy five deficiencies observed in the USAF officer corps: (1) a lack of understanding of the Air Force core values, (2) a lack of appreciation for Air Force core competencies, (3) the inability to responsibly advocate how 21st century aerospace power can contribute to success in joint operations, (4) the existence of stovepiping and careerism between officers from different commissioning sources and Air Force specialty codes (AFSCs), and (5) misunderstanding the importance of the teamwork concept in the American military.¹⁶

The course is foundational in that all newly commissioned officers (second lieutenants) will complete it prior to attending subsequent Air Force specialty training. ABC is a new course, and to date (1998) has only been taught to one class of 312 participants.¹⁷ Course content centers on Air Force and joint doctrine, missions, history and teamwork. Currently, the course is offered only in-residence at Maxwell AFB.

The Company Grade Officer Professional Development Course (CGOPDC) is designed to serve as a bridge between ABC attendance and SOS. CGOPDC is a 5 day, 40-hour course administered at the base level with curriculum developed by the Ira A. Eaker College for Professional Development (CPD) at Maxwell Air Force Base. CPD writes, validates and evaluates the curriculum plus provides instructor training on request. CGOPDC expects to reach about 6,700 officers each year.¹⁸ The premise of CGOPDC centers on providing new officers the training they will need in their first assignments and a better understanding of how they and their unit “fit” into the wing mission. Additionally, the course provides a broad overview of topics relevant to specific challenges they will face as new leaders and members of a unit. Once an officer arrives at their first duty station they will be eligible to enroll in CGOPDC. The curriculum is taught by officers assigned at bases across the Air Force and relies heavily on the support and emphasis of senior leadership at each base to make the course locally available. Currently, CGOPDC offers in-residence training at bases when senior leadership directs or supports offering the course. During CY 1997, 169 lieutenants completed the course during scheduled course validation at a variety of CONUS bases.¹⁹

Squadron Officer School (SOS) is a 7-week program designed to improve the professional competence of company grade officers and inspire their dedication to the

profession of arms.²⁰ This course requires that attendees are captains with four to seven years of commissioned service or a DoD civilian, grade GS-7 or above. Air Force Reserve and Guard officers and DoD civilians make up a small percentage of each class.²¹ SOS can be completed either via correspondence or in-residence attendance. Correspondence materials include a paper-based version of the course (course 24) and a CD-ROM version (course 25). The Air Force goal is 100 percent in-residence attendance for all active duty officers. Completion of SOS marks a significant pause in an officer's formal professional military education until they are selected for promotion to major at the 11-year mark and either attend ACSC or equivalent service school or complete this course via seminar or correspondence methods.

Notes

¹ Company grade officers includes grades 0-1 through 0-3, 2nd and 1st lieutenants and captains. Senior officers grades include majors (0-4) and above.

² *Continuum of Officer Professional Military Education Strategic Guidance*, Air University, 1998, page 3.

³ JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, page IV-13.

⁴ Air Force Manual 36-2236, *Guidebook for Air Force Instructors*, page 6.

⁵ JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, page II-2, figure II-1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I-3, figure I-2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I-2, figure I-1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I-1.

⁹ *Ibid.*, IV-13.

¹⁰ Air Force Manual 36-2236, *Guidebook for Air Force Instructors*, page 11.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹² ACSC Distance Learning Enrollment Report, AY 98-2, February 1999.

¹³ 10 Feb 99 E-mail from Lt Col Drake, ACSC Distance Learning office, Maxwell AFB.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Data provide by Captain Colmenares, Deputy Director for Mission Support at Air Command and Staff College, 27 Feb 99.

¹⁶ *Origination, Implementation, and Evaluation of the Aerospace Basic Course (ABC)*, September 1998, Chapter 1, Executive Summary, page 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Notes

¹⁸ Interview with Dr. Richard Lester, Education Advisor, Eaker College of Professional Development, Maxwell AFB, AL, 19 Jan 99.

¹⁹ January 22, 1999 E-mail from Dr Lester.

²⁰ *Squadron Officer School Student Handbook*, CY 1999, page 5.

²¹ Data provided via E-mail, January 25, 1999 by Squadron Officer School, Captain Pete Guisti, Director of Student Affairs. Based on FY 97 and 98.

Chapter 4

Analysis and Evaluation

“In war or in any crises, you are responsible for junior officers and enlisted members in your command or vicinity. You must organize these people and if necessary lead them under fire. Regardless of your specialty code, you can’t hesitate or refuse to lead in a crisis; it is your sworn duty. Use SOS [Squadron Officer School] and further professional study to prepare your mind, body and spirit so you’ll be ready to act appropriately.”

Squadron Officer School Correspondence Course Introduction, January 1997.

Each PME program analyzed in this study approaches MOOTW education in a variety of ways. Described below are the findings for each program based on compliance with JP 3-07 guidance, level of learning sought and instructional methods employed. Distance learning will only be addressed for SOS, as it is not available for ABC or CGOPDC.

Aerospace Basic Course

The Aerospace Basic Course most fully meets the intent of JP 3-07 concerning training for MOOTW. Using AFDD 2-3 and related joint doctrine, ABC keys in on MOOTW principles, objectives and characteristics. Additionally, the course combines readings, a situational exercise (a war-gaming exercise) and lecture to convey course content. MOOTW in the ABC curriculum includes knowledge, comprehension and application level activities (table 6). Lesson 3200, Military Operations Other Than War,

clarifies how MOOTW is different than war, how MOOTW contributes to national objectives, and how the Air Force supports MOOTW. Next, Lesson 3220, a MOOTW exercise, allows students to apply MOOTW principles with airpower missions in support of MOOTW activities in a Bosnia-type scenario. Finally, Lesson 3225, Transition to Peace: A War-fighter's Perspective, explains why we need to plan for post-hostilities and how this planning affects ultimate conflict resolution. These three lessons reflect a building-block progression of learning outcomes from knowledge to comprehension to application levels.

Company Grade Officer Professional Development Course

The CGOPDC does the least amount of MOOTW education based on its purpose and time available for the program. To its credit, CGOPDC does discuss some topics related to MOOTW at the comprehension level of learning (table 7). Lesson 2, Area 3, Air Force Basic Doctrine, asks students to compare and contrast the contributions of aerospace power in MOOTW. However, despite having a comprehension level lesson objective for MOOTW, very little of the actual lesson content centers on MOOTW. Additionally, the program includes an optional lesson on Public Affairs, where the importance of public affairs in MOOTW is briefly discussed. The primary method of instruction is a lecture supplemented by reading.

Squadron Officer School

Squadron Officer School meets JP 3-07 requirements in limited areas in both distance learning and in-residence programs (table 10). First, in the distance learning program there are two lessons that describe MOOTW related topics at the knowledge

level of learning (table 8). Lesson 405, Nature of Counter-insurgency, asks that the learner be able to define peacekeeping and peacetime contingency operations. It also identifies the five types of peace operations and eight principles of peacekeeping. Lesson 450, Special Operations Forces (SOF), describes how SOF capabilities are used in countering terrorism, drug trafficking, subversion and insurgency. Distance learning relies entirely on readings to convey course content. Though MOOTW principles are taught, they are outdated and do not reflect current Air Force or joint doctrine.

In the resident program, four lessons deal with issues related to MOOTW at the knowledge and comprehension levels of learning (table 9). Lesson 1120, Deployment Stress, is a lecture and reading focusing on strategies for dealing with some conditions found when personnel are deployed to conduct peacekeeping operations. Lesson 4100, Nature of Warfare, covers peacekeeping functions, the use of the military in peace and war, and the benefits of MOOTW. Additionally, Lesson 4260, Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Forces (AFRES), describes their roles in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Finally, Lesson 4305, Special Operations, covers the missions performed by special operations forces (SOF) including military to military contacts, noncombatant emergency evacuation, humanitarian assistance, security assistance and peacekeeping. SOS uses a combination of lecture, readings, and seminar to convey course content. The resident program speaks to some MOOTW topics but needs to be updated to reflect current Air Force and joint doctrine.

Chapter 5

Conclusions and Recommendations

“This is the [Air] Force of the future,” Ryan said. “We are building a very, very, rapidly deployable force that has the capacity to pick up and move quickly, tailored to the needs of the situation—from humanitarian to a shooting conflict anywhere on the globe—with a capacity to project power when and where it is needed.”

General Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff, USAF¹

Does the education provided in the three basic leadership courses examined here allow us to meet General Ryan’s vision of the Air Force of the future? The primary conclusions of this study are grouped in three categories: general, distance learning, and program specific conclusions. Tables outlining each PME program are provided in Appendix B.

General Observations

As each PME program was evaluated it became clear that they were not “cut from the same cloth.” Nor were they built with necessarily complementary curriculum--each program was developed independently, for a different purpose and with very different objectives. The Air University Continuum of Education (COE) architecture advocates a “common base of PME required for all airmen” and that this common base “should be enumerated in terms of core curriculum areas of knowledge, skills and abilities.”² COE goes on to identify five “core areas: Profession of Arms, Leadership and Management

Studies, Military Studies, Communication Skills, and International Security Studies.”³ This continuity is an effort to develop increasingly higher levels of learning in each of the core curriculum areas. But this is not necessarily occurring. For instance, as we have seen in the SOS curriculum, many lessons are taught at the knowledge level of learning when previous education at ABC was accomplished at the comprehension level on the same material.

MOOTW Is Not “Special”

Serious efforts to emphasize the need to train for MOOTW could easily follow the way of the Quality Air Force (QAF) movement. This movement started as a new way of doing business, revolutionary and touted as sure to solve many of the problems we encountered in doing business. We ultimately learned that the best way to infuse quality, however, was to make it a normal part of our business. MOOTW should be similar. Lessons entitled “Military Operations other than War” seem to suggest that MOOTW is appreciably different than war. However, operations like RESTORE HOPE in Somalia demonstrate how military forces can perform nation building by day and be ambushed by rebel soldiers at night. MOOTW should be a way of thinking about the activities of a military force across the spectrum of conflict, even occurring in the absence of conflict as in peacetime engagement. Given the unique nature of these missions, success will be most likely when highly disciplined and trained personnel apply military skills and training with an understanding and appreciation for the principles, objectives and characteristics of MOOTW.

ABC Recommendations

The Aerospace Basic Course (ABC) is an outstanding course of instruction in terms of teaching Air Force doctrine. It is this emphasis on doctrinal instruction that suggests the course be offered also through distance learning (DL). Currently, the course is taught in-residence because of the requirement to develop teamwork and service identity. Based on these goals, in-residence attendance would always be preferred, but should it be the only way to receive the education and training ABC can provide?

A distance learning program could help ABC influence a much broader population of active and reserve component, line and non-line officers, DoD civilians and even sister service or allied officers. ABC is the most thorough PME program for CGOs in terms of its treatment of Air Force and joint doctrine. This foundation in doctrine should be available to line and non-line officers alike. As a former Squadron Officer School instructor, it was very apparent to me how little exposure non-line officers and DoD civilians had to Air Force doctrine. To limit the potential impact of ABC to in-residence curriculum misses a great opportunity to educate many other people vital to our mission.

In the next three fiscal years, the differences between the number of training seats available versus the number of students requiring training are very wide, especially during FY 99, 00 and 01 (see table 1). The Air Force should not lose a valuable training opportunity while attendance ramps up to 100 percent attendance by lieutenants. This delta can be eased through developing a distance learning option and many DoD civilians and sister service officers might benefit from this course. At ACSC, DoD civilians comprise about seven percent of the total enrollment and sister service officers comprise anywhere from 16-20 percent.⁴ It is very likely DoD civilians would enroll in ABC, but

the extent of sister-service officer participation is unknown. Finally, this distance learning component of ABC may be adapted for incorporation into the Senior Non-commissioned Officer Academy (SNCOA) or NCO academy curricula.

For those concerned about the distance learning version of ABC, the course could be accomplished in a format similar to the ACSC seminar program. The ACSC seminar program requires students to meet weekly to present prescribed lessons supported by readings, tutorials, briefings, video clips and lesson materials on a CD-ROM for each student to use. Students take turns acting as the lesson instructor or facilitator where they cover lesson objectives and lead discussions on class material. Having personally completed ACSC by seminar, I saw how much easier material was to master when you could draw from the experience and thoughts of your classmates. ACSC periodically provided faculty lectures via satellite to seminars around the world simultaneously. With all Air Force PME collocated at Maxwell AFB, the speakers, technology and resources are readily available to make this same technique work for ABC as it does for ACSC. ACSC has a great deal of experience and lessons learned in distance learning and should be the benchmark for any future programs.

CGOPDC Recommendations

CGOPDC provides an important and unique function at the base level. It has some drawbacks in terms of contributing to an officer's knowledge of MOOTW, but provides important, practical information for the new officer. The difficulty for CGOPDC is that after completing ABC many students go on to undergraduate pilot or navigator training or some other Air Force specialty training. After all of this training, these new lieutenants are expected to enter unit-level training to further sharpen their skills to

perform their unit's mission. On top of all this, the lieutenant continues to adapt to the demands of his or her new role as an Air Force officer. For this reason, CGOPDC is seen by some leaders as adding one more requirement for schooling on top of an officer who has already experienced a great deal of education and training in their already brief career. Additionally, instructors and resources must come from the base itself. My recommendation is that the current CGOPDC be eliminated and replaced by a base familiarization program administered by the base Company Grade Officers Council or Association (CGOC/CGOA).⁵ This program could provide opportunities to interact with base leadership, learn about the missions of units on base, and tour base facilities. Ultimately, unit training should address MOOTW topics as they relate to their specific mission rather than attempting to do this during CGOPDC.

Much of the content of the current CGOPDC could be provided via CGO web site. At this web site, officers could read about current issues and selected topics based on their own interest and needs at the time. This site would provide quick access to helpful links and articles on subjects important to CGOs. Rather than taking a "one-size-fits-all approach," instructional materials would be provided over a wide range of topics allowing the student to pick and choose relevant information at that particular time. Since ABC and SOS faculty are probably the most knowledgeable people concerning CGO issues they would be the best choice to create and maintain the information on this web site. Done properly, a web site like this could become an important source of information for CGOs and a conduit for conveying timely information to this group of people. Ultimately, a site like this could offer distance learning opportunities for ABC, SOS or other courses deemed appropriate for CGOs.

SOS Recommendations

SOS is probably the single most important place to teach MOOTW principles, objectives and characteristics because of the large number of active, guard and reserve officers requiring training. In FY 98 SOS educated almost 3000 officers, DoD civilians and international officers (table 2) through the in-residence program and another 5296 through distance learning (table 3). On the other hand, ABC will educate 4653 students in FY 04 (table 1). SOS is a program geared toward helping develop the leadership skills of young captains. This is a daunting task in a seven-week course, but will become even more difficult as SOS moves to a five-week program. With a shorter course it will be important that the SOS curriculum be more efficient in meeting its mission statement. In order to improve in its ability to teach MOOTW topics SOS must: (1) update its curriculum to reflect current MOOTW principles, objectives, and characteristics, (2) use MOOTW scenarios to reinforce leadership topics and key MOOTW subjects, (3) bring in speakers experienced in the MOOTW environment to discuss leading people in complex contingency operations, (4) integrate AFDD 2-3 into the curriculum so students are aware this guidance exists, and (5) add a MOOTW component to the Atlantis war-gaming exercise or create a separate scenario-based activity where students can apply MOOTW principles, objectives, or characteristics.

The SOS distance learning program can be a true force multiplier only when it is accepted as equivalent to completing in-residence rather than as a prerequisite for competing for in-residence attendance later. The Air Force acknowledges that it is almost impossible to meet their 100 percent opportunity target while officers who missed their original eligibility window gain waivers to attend later.⁶ This is like “robbing Peter

to pay Paul.” With an updated distance learning curriculum the Air Force should accept correspondence course completion credit as equivalent to in-residence. The best way to institutionalize this change is by masking the PME completion method on the officer personnel or selection briefs and by eliminating training reports for resident attendance.

When considering operations tempo, attending SOS in-residence looks like another seven-week deployment away from family. Distance learning provides the same basic knowledge minus the interaction with peers and SOS faculty found in the resident program. This interaction is important and valuable but is it worth the costs involved?

So far we have only examined the line officer issue, but what about non-line and guard or reserve component officers? In both FY 97 and 98, ANG and AFRES made up less than one percent of the students completing SOS (table 2). As ANG and AFRES personnel take part in more and more missions involving military operations other than war, it is critical that they receive training and education to make them capable to perform these types of missions.

It is obvious there will not be enough resources to educate everyone in-residence, but the current distance learning program does not reflect current MOOTW doctrine or terminology. This program should be updated immediately. The web site mentioned earlier under CGOPDC recommendations would be the perfect vehicle to communicate courseware updates to distance-learning students that reflect current information on the subject. Finally, distance learning needs to rely on more than reading alone. With current technology, distance learning students should be able to gain access to on-line tutorials, war-games, lectures, etc. to enrich the quality of their learning experience.

Military operations other than war are an integral part of our national security strategy and these operations will not end soon. The range of MOOTW activities provides our nation with a “toolkit” from which it can choose a military option or response appropriate in a developing crisis. If we become a military that only fights and wins our nation’s wars we will be prepared to fight that war while missing countless opportunities to prevent its onset. Clearly, our security and prosperity is inextricably tied to that of the rest of the world so we must invest our military power to promote peace. Indeed, MOOTW is an investment because it is not without risk in American blood and treasure but like the sentiment of an old FRAM oil filter commercial of the 1970s it warns, “you can pay me now or pay me later.”

Notes

¹ Air Force News article released 19 May 1998. *Air Force Adapts to Expeditionary Mission*. www.af.mil

² Continuum of Officer Professional Military Education Strategic Guidance, Air University, 1998.

³ Ibid.

⁴ ACSC Distance Learning Enrollment Report, AY 98-2, February 1999.

⁵ CGOC/CGOA is a base level organization for company grade officers which serves to help in the professional development of officers through community service and social interaction of its members. Of course, these organizations will vary in their activity and quality from base to base depending on the membership and senior leadership support.

⁶ “100% Opportunity to Attend SOS.” 4 November 1998. Available from: <http://afas.afpc.randolph.af.mil/pme/sos100.htm>. The author explains how 100 percent opportunity does not equate to 100 percent attendance because of the backlog of officers attending outside their normal 3-year eligibility window.

Appendix A

Glossary of Terms

- Bloom's taxonomy.** This taxonomy is simply a means of rank ordering learning within the cognitive domain. A learner must pass through each of the rank orders or levels (knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation) as they move to the more complex behaviors; a learner must have "knowledge" of a subject before they can "comprehend" or "apply" concepts or principles in the same subject area. (AFM 26-2236)
- cognitive domain.** A major area of learning which deals with acquiring knowledge (as opposed to attitudinal or manual skill knowledge (AFM 26-2236)
- crises and lesser conflicts (CALC).** International situations involving non-routine military operations short of war or preparations for war. (Builder and Karasik, reference RAND study)
- doctrine.** Presents fundamental principles that guide force employment. Doctrine is authoritative. It provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience in warfare. Doctrine facilitates clear thinking and assists the commander in determining the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision. (Joint Pub 1)
- levels of learning.** The degree to which a student is expected to internalize (master) a mental subject (cognitive domain), values (affective domain), or ability to perform psychomotor skills (psychomotor domain). (Continuum of Officer Professional Military Education Strategic Guidance, 1998)
- military operations other than war (MOOTW).** Encompasses a wide range of military activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. (Joint Pub 3-0)
- national military strategy (NMS).** The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. (Joint Pub 1-02)
- national security strategy (NSS).** The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy. (Joint Pub 1-02)
- peace operations (PO).** The umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary, or nonmilitary action taken in support of a diplomatic peacekeeping process. (Joint Pub 1-02)

professional military education (PME). The systematic instruction of professionals in subjects which enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war. (Continuum of Officer Professional Military Education Strategic Guidance, 1998)

smaller-scale contingencies (SSC). These operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, no-fly zones, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes and interventions. (1997 National Security Strategy)

Appendix B

Tables and Figures

Table 1 Aerospace Basic Course, FY 99-04 Projected Annual Student Load

Number of Students	
99	1014
00	780
01	1612
02	4446
03	4160
04	4653

Table 2 Squadron Officer School Annual Resident Course Completion

	FY97	FY98
Active Duty	3391	2735
ANG	135	47
AFRES	126	43
International Officers	76	64
Civilian	117	75
Total	3845	2964

Table 3 Squadron Officer School Distance Learning Program Completion

	FY97		FY98	
	Course 24	Course 25	Course 24	Course 25
ACTIVE	865	118	711	326
ANG	710	86	580	315
CIVILIAN	313	38	262	74
OTHER	138	4	150	63
RESERVE	2357	325	1935	880
TOTAL	4383	571	3638	1658

Note: Course 24, Paper-based course materials Course 25, CD ROM course materials

Table 4 Bloom's Cognitive Taxonomy, AF MAN 36-2236

Level of Learning	Definition
Knowledge	Recall previously learned material (facts, theories, etc.) in essentially the same form as taught
Comprehension	See relationships, concepts, and abstractions beyond simple remembering of material. Typically involves translating, interpreting, and estimating future trends.
Application	Used learned intellectual material in new and realistic situations, including the application of rules, methods, concepts, principles, laws, and theories.
Analysis	Break down material into its component parts identification of the parts, analysis of the relationship between parts, and recognition of the organizational principals involved
Synthesis	Put parts together to form a new patterns or structures, such as unique communication (a theme or speech), a plan for operations (a research proposal), or a set of abstract relations (schemes for classifying information).
Evaluation	Judge the value of material for a given purpose. Learning in this area is the highest in the cognitive hierarchy since it involves elements of all the other categories, plus conscious value judgments based on clearly defined criteria.

Table 5 Behavioral Verbs, AFMAN 33-2236

Level of Learning	Sample behavioral verbs
Knowledge	list, name, match, describe, define, state, outline, identify, select, explain, give and example, state
Comprehension	explain, compare, contrast, differentiate, predict, summarize, generalize, paraphrase, distinguish, solve, compute, identify, give an example
Application	solve, compute, prepare, use, develop, construct, modify, conduct, identify, teach

Table 6 ABC Curriculum

		SCHOOL/PROGRAM:	ABC		Res		
LSN #	Title	Objective Description	Key Concepts	LoL	Method	Media	Contact Hours
3200	Military Operations other Than War	Comprehend the concept of MOOTW. Distinguish between examples and non-examples of MOOTW ; Explain the concept of MOOTW.	How MOOTW is different than war; how MOOTW contributes to national objs; how AF supports MOOTW.	K/C	L/R	Co/P	1:10
		Comprehend how selected AF core competencies affect a CINCs MOOTW options. Describe and give examples how selected AF core competencies affect a CINCs MOOTW options.	How unique AF core competencies supports MOOTW.				
3220	MOOTW exercise	Given joint Air, land and sea forces in the Bosnia Theater of ops, conduct MOOTW to meet JFC tasking requirements.	Enforce boundaries, conduct show of force and IW ops to preclude conflict; protect forces and civilians; patrol and report	Ap	S/R	Co/C	2:50
3225	Transition to Peace: A Warfighter's Perspective	Comprehend the importance of planning for transition to peace following conflict termination	Explain why we need to plan for the transition to peace; Provide examples of how planning for peace is important to conflict termination.	C	L	P	1:00
Levels of Learning (LoL)							Total = 5:00
K=Knowledge; C=Comprehension; Ap=Application; An=Analysis; S=Synthesis; E=Evaluation							
Instructional Methods							
Dp=Demonstration Perf; Gp=Group project; Ip=Individual project; L=Lecture; R=Reading;							
S=Seminar discussion; W=Wargame							
Media							
C=Computer; CD=CD-ROM; Co=Coursebook; P=Powerpoint; T=Television; V=Video Tape							

Table 7 CGOPDC Curriculum

		SCHOOL/PROGRAM:	CGOPDC	Residence			
LSN #	Title	Objective Description	Key Concepts	LoL	Method	Media	Contact Hours
Area 3, Lsn 2	Air Force Basic Doctrine	Compare and contrast the contributions of aerospace power in MOOTW, Spec Ops and info warfare	Spectrum of OOTW combat & concombat); Air Expeditionary Force fact sheet	C	L/R	Co/P	L=1:40
Area 5	Optional - Director Option, Public Affairs	Comprehend how PA programs & resources contribute to the mission	The company grade officer must understand the range of military ops subject to PA; War, MOOTW, contingency, day-to-dayops & trmg, PK, crisis mgmt, humanitarian assistance, terrorism, counterdrug, etc...	C	L/R	Co/P	L/D=1:0
							Total = 1:40
Levels of Learning (LoL)							
K=Knowledge; C=Comprehension; Ap=Application; An=Analysis; S=Synthesis; E=Evaluation							
Instructional Methods							
Dp=Demonstration Perf; Gp=Group project; Ip=Individual project; L=Lecture; R=Reading;							
S=Seminar discussion; W=Wargame							
Media							
C=Computer; CD=CD-ROM; Co=Coursebook; P=Powerpoint; T=Television; V=Video Tape							

Table 8 SOS Correspondence Curriculum

		SCHOOL/PROGRAM:	Squadron Officer School	Correspondence			
LSN #	Title	Objective Description	Key Concepts	LoL	Method	Media	Contact Hours
405	Nature of Counter-insurgency	Know the various operational categories of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Define peacekeeping operations.	Definition and purposes of peacekeeping.	K	R	Co/CD	* selfpaced, length undetermined
		Define terrorism and identify factors that determine terrorist targets. Define peacetime contingency operations.	5 Types of peace operations. 8 principles of Peacekeeping. 9 types of peacetime contingency operations. 3 principles of contingency operations.	K	R	Co/CD	* selfpaced, length undetermined
450	Special Operations Forces	Know how special ops play a vital role in meeting national security objectives.	During peacetime engagement SOF forces are suited to do nation assistance & counteract violence. Can be employed directly or indirectly to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, subversion, & insurgency	K	R	Co/CD	* selfpaced, length undetermined
Levels of Learning (LoL)							
K=Knowledge; C=Comprehension; Ap=Application; An=Analysis; S=Synthesis; E=Evaluation							
Instructional Methods							
Dp=Demonstration Perf; Gp=Group project; Ip=Individual project; L=Lecture; R=Reading;							
S=Seminar discussion; W=Wargame							
Media							
C=Computer; CD=CD-ROM; Co=Coursebook; P=Powerpoint; T=Television; V=Video Tape							

Table 9 SOS Residence Program Curriculum

		SCHOOL/PROGRAM:	Squadron Officer School	Residence			
LSN #	Title	Objective Description	Key Concepts	LoL	Method	Media	Contact Hours
1120	Deployment Stress	~~Know~~ how to recognize and reduce deployment stress.	Strategies for dealing with conditions found in Peacekeeping	K	L/R	Co/P	L=1:0 R= :28
4100	Nature of Warfare	(SOB) Summarize the levels of war and MOOTW	US military responsibilities range between preparing for peace and war; Peacekeeping functions; benefits of MOOTW	K & C	S/R	Co/P	D=1:0 R= 1:0
4260	ANG and AFRES Forces	~~Know~~ the functions, roles and missions of the ANG and AFRES.	ANG & AFRES respond to PK & HA; Supports peacetime and domestic ops; Expansion of Reserve involvement in nontraditional ops	K	L/R	Co/P	L=1:0 R= 1:20
4305	Special Operations	~~Know~~ the org, msns, basic capabilities of SOF and the major contributions these forces make to the warfighter.	Mil to mil contacts; noncombatant evacuation ops; Humanitarian Assistance; Security assistance; Peacekeeping	K	L/R	Co/P/V	L=1:0 R=45
							Total 4:0/3:03 prep
Levels of Learning (LoL)							
K=Knowledge; C=Comprehension; Ap=Application; An=Analysis; S=Synthesis; E=Evaluation							
Instructional Methods							
Dp=Demonstration Perf; Gp=Group project; Ip=Individual project; L=Lecture; R=Reading;							
S=Seminar discussion; W=Wargame							
Media							
C=Computer; CD=CD-ROM; Co=Coursebook; P=Powerpoint; T=Television; V=Video Tape							

Table 10 JP 3-07 Compliance

JP 3-07 COMPLIANCE					
	PROGRAM				
	<u>ASBC</u>	<u>CGOPDC</u>	<u>SOS R</u>	<u>SOS C</u>	
MOOTW					
PRINCIPLES	YES	NO	NO	YES (1)	
OBJECTIVES	YES	NO	NO	NO	
CHARACTERISTICS	NO	NO	YES (2)	NO	
MEDIA	Co/P/C	Co/P	Co/P/V	CD	
DISCUSSION	YES	NO	YES	NO	
LESSONS LEARNED	NO	NO	NO	NO	
SITUATIONAL EXERCISE	YES	NO	NO	NO	
LEVEL OF LEARNING ACHIEVED	K/C/Ap	C	K/C	K	
MOOTW Principles					
Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Restraint, Perseverance, Legitimacy					
MOOTW Objectives					
Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response					
MOOTW Characteristics: Might include the following subjects					
Multi-national operations, ROE, 16 types of MOOTW, interagency process,					
Combat v. non-combat MOOTW, Reserve involvement, postconflict activities					
Level of Learning					
K=Knowledge; C=Comprehension; Ap=Application; An=Analysis; S=Synthesis; E=Evaluation					
Instructional Methods					
Dp=Demonstration Perf; Gp=Group project; Ip=Individual project; L=Lecture; R=Reading;					
S=Seminar discussion; W=Wargame					
Media					
C=Computer; CD=CD-ROM; Co=Coursebook; P=Powerpoint; T=Television; V=Video Tape					
(1) outdated information					
(2) covers Reserve involvement and some types of MOOTW					



Figure II-1. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

Figure 1 Principles of MOOTW, JP 3-07, page II-2.




Figure I-2. MOOTW Contributions to the Attainment of National Security Objectives

Figure 2 MOOTW Contributions to National Security Objectives, JP 3-07, page I-3.




Figure IV-1. Education and Training for Peace Operations

Figure 3 Education and Training for Peace Operations, JP 3-07.3, page IV-1.

MOOTW EDUCATION AND TRAINING		
	GOALS	METHODS
OFFICERS AND NCOS	Ensure all leaders understand the objectives, principles, and characteristics of MOOTW	☒ Discussions ☒ Lessons learned ☒ Situational exercises
INDIVIDUALS, UNITS, AND STAFFS	Ensure individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given MOOTW and that the staffs can plan, control, and support the operation	☒ Individual skill training ☒ Situational exercises ☒ Field exercises ☒ Combined arms live fire exercises ☒ Mobility exercises ☒ Simulation exercises

Figure IV-6. MOOTW Education and Training

Figure 4 MOOTW Education and Training, JP 3-07, page IV-14.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS			
Military Operations		General US Goals	Representative Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	<u>Large Scale Combat Operations</u> <u>Attack / Defend / Blockade</u>
	NONCOMBAT	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement Counterterrorism Show of Force/Raid/Strike Peacekeeping/NEO Nation Assistance Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace & Support US Civil Authorities	Freedom of Navigation Counterdrug Humanitarian Assistance Protection of Shipping US Civil Support

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

Figure 5 Range of Military Operations, JP 3-07, page I-2.

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