The Revolt of the Admirals
Abstract
When the controversy over the B-36 erupted in the spring of 1949, Pandora's Box was opened on service unification issues. The debate was officially over the B-36 procurement process, but it grew to include a debate over roles and missions between the Air Force and the Navy. The Congressional testimony before the House Armed Services Committee illustrated some pertinent lessons from the revolt of the admirals. The Air Force won the revolt, but the question was why? Was it because their case was sounder than the Navy's, or was it for some other hidden reason? How did doctrine, leadership, and public relations factor into the conflict? This essay will discuss these questions using primary and secondary source material from the Air University Library and the Air Force Historical Research Agency; both located at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. There are few books (Revolt of the Admirals; the Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950 by Jeffrey Barlow is the one notable exception.) that deal directly with the subject, but there is sufficient peripheral information and a considerable amount of source material in the form of periodical literature. The subject will be discussed addressing the previously mentioned categories of doctrine, leadership, and public relations. First, the historical framework of unification will be established. The Air Force won the revolt quite simply because their leadership was congruent and their public relations effort was polished. The weaknesses in Air Force doctrine as well as the strengths of Navy doctrine were not highlighted due to the Navy's fragmented leadership and poor public relations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1998
- Accession Number
- ADA398600
Entities
People
- Andrew L. Lewis
Organizations
- Air Command and Staff College