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ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)

by

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14. ABSTRACT Since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War, the US military has been increasingly tasked for operations short of war, in what has come to be labeled Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). While the MOOTW concept has been incorporated into extant US military doctrine, specific missions attributed to MOOTW remain controversial, such as peace operations (Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia) or humanitarian operations (Somalia, Rwanda). This paper broadly analyzes contemporary MOOTW missions and evaluates their relevance for the military in the future. First, it looks historically to determine the roots of MOOTW and how it differs from earlier, related, concepts such as Low-Intensity- Conflict and Unconventional Warfare. The missions encompassed in MOOTW are not new but follow a long history in the US military, described herein. Several differing concepts of future threats are reviewed to determine the continued applicability of MOOTW. Within a wide variety of future threat environments, MOOTW missions should still be able to contribute to enhancing national security. However, the ability of MOOTW responses to counter the threat does not, alone, justify using the military. The paper next examines which MOOTW missions can or should be carried out by the military. Many of the missions in MOOTW are likely to involve combating organized violence; hence those missions are appropriate for the military. For those that do not involve combat, there are several rationale: the military provides exclusive expertise, has appropriate resources, or performing those missions contributes to justifying military budgets and personnel designed for other threats or conflicts. These rationales are not sufficient to justify using the military in some MOOTW missions. The conclusion of the paper expands that discussion with suggestions for other organizations or mechanisms to address those mission areas without reliance on the military.					
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Preface

In the current age of political correctness and projecting appearances rather than substance, this paper critically reviews the latest trend for the military—Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)—to see if there is substance behind it. Such an inquiry is important to determine if the military should conduct MOOTW; and if it should, is it doing what is necessary to succeed in carrying out MOOTW?

The US military's mission is to fight and win the nation's wars. Despite a long history of "other" missions, operations and skills not clearly and directly related to warfighting generally have not been valued.¹ MOOTW, with its contrasting links to and breaks with the past, presents an opportunity to make these "other" missions much more common, accepted, and respected. Improperly executed, it represents bad policy and opens the military, and the government as a whole, to criticism. For this reason we need to evaluate carefully how and why the military should be used in these missions.

As I have wrestled with the myriad issues associated with MOOTW I am grateful to Dr Karl Magyar, my faculty advisor, for his guidance, criticism and (at times) provocation. Much of the ordering of my thoughts I owe to my husband, Mark, Lt Col (USAF, ret), who provides unstinting support, knowledge and encouragement. Errors in fact or analysis, however, are mine alone.

Notes

¹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Unconventional Conflicts,” in *America’s Armed Forces: A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities*, eds. Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 412.

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War, the US military has been increasingly tasked for operations short of war, in what has come to be labeled Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). While the MOOTW concept has been incorporated into extant US military doctrine, specific missions attributed to MOOTW remain controversial, such as peace operations (Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia) or humanitarian operations (Somalia, Rwanda).

This paper broadly analyzes contemporary MOOTW missions and evaluates their relevance for the military in the future. First, it looks historically to determine the roots of MOOTW and how it differs from earlier, related, concepts such as Low-Intensity-Conflict and Unconventional Warfare. The missions encompassed in MOOTW are not new but follow a long history in the US military, described herein. Several differing concepts of future threats are reviewed to determine the continued applicability of MOOTW.

Within a wide variety of future threat environments, MOOTW missions should still be able to contribute to enhancing national security. However, the ability of MOOTW responses to counter the threat does not, alone, justify using the military. The paper next examines which MOOTW missions can or should be carried out by the military. Many of the missions in MOOTW are likely to involve combating organized violence; hence those missions are appropriate for the military. For those that do not involve combat,

there are several rationale: the military provides exclusive expertise, has appropriate resources, or performing those missions contributes to justifying military budgets and personnel designed for other threats or conflicts.

These rationales are not sufficient to justify using the military in some MOOTW missions. The conclusion of the paper expands that discussion with suggestions for other organizations or mechanisms to address those mission areas without reliance on the military.

Chapter 1

Defining Military Operations Other Than War: A Break From the Past

In the early 1990's the military coined a new label, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).¹ Some may wonder what is new about the term MOOTW, and whether this is just a re-packaging of old terms. This analysis shows the similarities of MOOTW to earlier concepts, but concludes MOOTW is indeed a new, broader concept.

Dating from “guerrilla” tactics used by some of the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War the US military has long conducted military operations “other” than “traditional,” force-on-force, major military engagements. The Cold War necessitated expansion of the US military’s conventional (and nuclear) capability to prevail in force-on-force, high-intensity battle. This long period of focus on high-intensity “traditional” warfare raised a stark contrast between “war” and operations “other” than war.

Despite the focus on “traditional” warfare, the military also conducted operations that were “different” with “special” units. Some examples include Air Commandos and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operatives in World War II, or Sea Air Land (SEALs) and Special Forces in Vietnam. In all cases, either the mission, the means of execution, forces conducting the operations or some combination were “different” from those used by the bulk of the military. Two of the common terms used to describe these earlier operations are Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and Unconventional Warfare (UW).

Predecessors

In 1981, the US Army defined LIC as a situation when US forces performed operations or provided support to a foreign state to “establish, regain, or maintain control of areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution, subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power.”² Within this context, the military might have been tasked to perform actual counterinsurgency operations in a friendly foreign country, or simply provide the equipment and training for the friendly foreign government and military to conduct the operations themselves. By the late 1980’s the definition was expanded and reinterpreted by Rod Paschall as “armed conflict for political purposes short of combat between regularly organized forces” where one side is not a regularly organized force (emphasis added).³ In this definition, the explicit purposes for fighting are not limited to counterinsurgency, but the introduction of “short of combat” highlights the “low-intensity.” For this reason, he excludes certain types of peace operations where peace doesn’t already exist. Thus, by the 1990’s the definition of LIC focused on the intensity of the conflict, while broadening the purposes for which LIC could be used.

A second common term for warfare falling into the sphere of MOOTW today is Unconventional Warfare (UW). The classic definition for UW concerns the “spectrum of operations” which are conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces supported by external sources.⁴ The crux of UW is the external support and the often clandestine, covert⁵ or otherwise “unconventional” nature of the activity that distinguishes it from openly sponsored “conventional” military operations.

Both LIC and UW are recognized as “different” operations and it is tempting to substitute these for the term MOOTW. That would be a mistake. The terms use different

aspects to describe and organize activities. LIC describes an intensity, or level, of fighting; UW describes methods of warfare and sponsorship of those activities. In this regard, both LIC and UW are incomplete descriptions of all the operations that are “different” from traditional, force on force warfare. MOOTW fills this gap.

MOOTW’s Distinction From Predecessors

There is little specificity in a title that defines by exclusion. In this broad manner the US military has defined a group of activities that do not constitute “war” and which therefore must share some other common characteristics.⁶ The definition and term is new, but the activities themselves are virtually as old as the US military itself. In regrouping these activities, greater emphasis is placed on the distinction between war and all the myriad missions the military performs and thus, MOOTW is indeed a different concept than its predecessors.

Common Characteristics—War versus MOOTW.

The premise behind MOOTW is to group all activities which “**focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities** in response to domestic crises.”⁷ This is in contrast to the “primary task of the Armed Forces...to fight and win our Nation’s wars.”⁸ MOOTW activities do not necessarily seek victory; rather, they seek some politically determined level of success. Whereas the US military subscribes to the Clausewitzian notion that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means,”⁹ the difference between war and MOOTW distills down to the political purposes for which the activity is undertaken. In war, success is victory. In MOOTW, that politically defined success may be interdicting the drug trade or assuaging human

suffering. War is justified in defending core interests; MOOTW is considered in defense of lesser interests.¹⁰

While war for the American military is conducted for political objectives, the military wants to limit the political guidance to the strategic level. This is a lesson from Vietnam—once the political leadership makes the decision to use military force, the generals will direct its operation to meet the strategic goal set by the political leaders but without “interference” by the politicians at the operational or tactical levels of war. Eliot Cohen has characterized this “falsehood” as the belief that “...the United States can win wars easily if the civilians will set clear objectives and then get out of the way.”¹¹

When the military conducts operations other than war, it cannot execute its operations without full consideration of the political ramifications at all levels of war, including the operational and tactical. Indeed, MOOTW doctrine clearly and repeatedly states that all levels of war during MOOTW are permeated and often sublimated to overriding political considerations. An aggressive action on the part of a soldier distributing humanitarian assistance may propel a non-combat MOOTW operation into combat and fundamentally change the nature of the operation. This, in turn, might change the US’s objectives or strategy and change the interest at stake from one of the intermediate or peripheral level, to a core interest. A similarly aggressive action on the part of an individual soldier during war would have less impact, assuming the war was already defending core interests.

MOOTW also differs from war in that the military is not always in charge of MOOTW operations at an operational or even tactical level. In some cases the military must coordinate its activities with other organizations (perhaps non-governmental) and

accomplish overall objectives via cooperation rather than command. Military commanders involved in MOOTW operations may “rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.”¹² All of these features draw distinctions between war and operations that are not war. That political considerations are the basis of the distinction between war and “other” activities is a new way of categorizing long-standing missions for the US military.

MOOTW in American History

As the Cold War came to an end and the military was tasked to support more MOOTW missions, popular thought regarded these as new missions commensurate with the “New World Order” and a new fad. On the contrary, the history of the military’s role in similar missions helps to put the MOOTW missions of today in context.¹³

Support to Civil Authorities. The US military has long been used to support civil authorities by containing civil strife in the US, ranging from suppression of Shay’s rebellion in 1786 to the military and National Guard’s use in containing the 1992 Los Angeles Riots. The Army Corps of Engineers built the Panama Canal and has responsibility for flood control of US rivers. The military contributed to medical science through surgical and epidemiological research such as Dr Walter Reed’s identification of the cause of Yellow Fever. Military resources are used in emergencies to provide transportation for non-military cargo and personnel. In addition to transportation, the military regularly assists after domestic natural disasters by providing security, supplies, communications, and shelter.

Humanitarian Assistance. While the efforts noted above were specific dedicated to US civil authority, the US military has also provided support and assistance to foreign

nations with what is called humanitarian assistance under MOOTW. Perhaps the most stunning example of this was the Berlin Airlift, which was a calculated attempt to avoid use of a reinforced column from West Germany to West Berlin to guarantee supply. That course wasn't chosen since it was believed such action would have started active hostilities between the USSR and the West. Instead, the airlift (non-combat) option was chosen and provided the energy and basic foodstuffs to support the city for 11 months.

Protection of Shipping. Perhaps one of the earliest uses of the US military to protect shipping was the attack of Tripolitan ports (1801-5) and Algiers (1815) to combat the Barbary Pirates' infringement of US shipping. The most notable, if not most influential, American naval theorist, Alfred T. Mahan, can be credited as a major voice in extolling the virtue and necessity of using the US Navy to command the sea and protect shipping, maritime commerce, and access to markets.¹⁴ More recently, the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq war allowed the US military to protect the tankers and, thus, protect the transit of oil vital to the US and her allies.

Enforcement of Sanctions. Today, enforcing sanctions is not an act of war but is legal recourse under international law, assuming the sanctions are legal under that law. Traditionally, enforcing sanctions meant **blockade** (an act of war), usually conducted by naval forces and carrying out the sanction of total commerce (or specified items) against a country. Examples include the Federal Navy's blockade of the Confederate States during the American Civil War or the blockade of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Arms Control. In the US, arms control historically was the purview of diplomats. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987) was the first arms control agreement to call for on-site inspections of military facilities and equipment to ensure

compliance and began the military's direct participation in arms control.¹⁵ Since then, the military has been involved in on-site inspections in the US and other countries, and verifying compliance in destruction of treaty-limited weapons.

These are but a few examples of the myriad missions the US military has long performed. Although they may have been identified as mission areas, until the concept of MOOTW they were not categorized with any kind of overarching purpose. Since these activities are not new missions, then what has changed with the development, understanding and implementation of the MOOTW concept?

Beyond LIC or UW

The concept of MOOTW is today notable for the inclusion of a broad range of operations, from non-combat to combat, which are related in their political nature. Establishing the primacy of political considerations distinguishes MOOTW from LIC or UW. While LIC or UW operations were directed to support political objectives, there is no mention of political guidance in the definitions of either until the 1990's, when MOOTW was emerging. Instead, the focus of the predecessors to MOOTW was on levels of intensity, certain activities (counterinsurgency) or methods of warfare—not the political purpose behind the warfare.

Additionally, the wide range of missions defined as MOOTW, including virtually all military activities that are not part of large-scale, sustained combat, make MOOTW much broader than LIC or UW. Unlike LIC or UW, sponsorship or intensity of operations are not distinguishing factors; MOOTW encompasses both non-combat and combat operations and many activities that have not been explicitly considered part of either UW or LIC. For example, MOOTW includes arms control, DOD support to counterdrug

operations, certain peacekeeping functions, noncombatant evacuation, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities (on US territory), and protection of shipping. None of these were part of LIC or UW.

Another distinction between MOOTW and its predecessors is the forces tasked with MOOTW missions. Whereas the broad range of activities under MOOTW certainly include a number of missions which are primarily tasked to SOF (e.g., support to counterinsurgency), MOOTW also includes missions which may be generally conducted by conventional military forces (e.g., enforcement of sanctions). In contrast, UW and LIC are primarily associated with Special Operations Forces (SOF).

Both LIC and UW inferred the possibility of long duration. This characteristic has carried over to MOOTW: the doctrine clearly states that, based on the situation, some MOOTW operations will require a long duration to achieve the objectives.

MOOTW In The Future

By broadly incorporating a wide range of activities, MOOTW appears to be a simple concept. Yet, the variety of activities and inclusion of combat as well as non-combat missions actually makes MOOTW a very complex concept. It departs from previous concepts of LIC and UW in the breadth of its reach, while including historical missions associated with earlier concepts. The inclusiveness of MOOTW's definition, spanning all activities that are not war, makes MOOTW a mainstream military activity, unlike its predecessors.

The real distinction of MOOTW lies in the primacy of political considerations. As noted above, the US military considers its tasking an extension of politics, and war is

used “to achieve national objectives or protect national interests”¹⁶—clearly driven by political considerations. Yet, the military has distinguished between the political guidance for war and that which guides MOOTW—to deter wars and promote peace.¹⁷ MOOTW operations are more sensitive to political considerations, may not be directed by the military, and can be permeated down to the lowest level by political considerations. MOOTW represents an effort to manage conflict rather than unleashing it as in general war. Managing conflict is a precarious and difficult task, given the unpredictable nature of warfare and human nature. For this reason, too, political guidance must reach to the lowest levels of MOOTW to ensure the result meets mission objectives.

The tie to politics is crucial in considering MOOTW’s future prospects. As MOOTW is continually linked to and guided by political direction, then the strategic environment plays a key role. The nature of the strategic environment in the future will therefore directly impact the requirement for and shaping of diverse MOOTW operations.

Notes

¹ Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 1993), Chapter 13.

² Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-20 Low-Intensity Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 1981), 14.

³ Rod Paschall, *LIC 2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s (US), 1990), 7.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 1994), 399.

⁵ Joint Publication 1-02 defines clandestine and covert. Clandestine: An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. Covert: An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

Notes

⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 1995), ix. The full list of operations: arms control; combating terrorism; DOD support to counterdrug operations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance; military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation operations; peace operations; protection of shipping; recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes and raids; and support to insurgency.

⁷ *Joint Publication 3-07*, I-1. Emphasis in original.

⁸ Department of Defense, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense), 2; *Joint Electronic Library*, “Future Warfare,” CD-ROM, OC Incorporated, May 1997.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

¹⁰ David Jablonsky presents a compelling discussion of war and “other than war” activities in “The Persistence of Credibility: Interests, Threats and Planning for the Use of American Military Power,” *Strategic Review* (Spring 1996).

¹¹ Cohen, Eliot A., “How to Think About Defense,” in 1995-1996 *Brassey’s Merishon American Defense Annual: The United States and the Emerging Strategic Environment* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995), 52.

¹² *Joint Publication 3-07*, page II-3, paragraph 2b.

¹³ *Small Wars Manual*, NAVCM 2890, published by the Marine Corps in 1940, is an early treatment of a variety of missions that now fall under MOOTW. It defined “small wars” as “a vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations... undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.” (p. 1). The manual notes that small wars represented the normal operations for the Marine Corps, having landed troops in 37 foreign countries 180 times between 1800 and 1934. See also Carl Builder, “Nontraditional Military Missions,” in 1994 *American Defense Annual*, ed. Charles F. Hermann (New York: Lexington Books, 1994), 226.

¹⁴ Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 444-477.

¹⁵ United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements* (Washington, D.C: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990), 346.

¹⁶ *Joint Publication 3-0*, I-2.

¹⁷ *Joint Publication 3-07*, vii.

Chapter 2

What Does the Future Hold?

Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing demise of the Soviet Union, analysts and popular critics all wanted to know why the CIA had not predicted what appeared to be, in retrospect, obvious. This was such a massive change, analysts argued, that intelligence officials must have intentionally chosen to ignore the trends in order to preserve their jobs, support political wishes, or for other nefarious reasons. What was overlooked in the critique was how difficult it is for individuals and particularly bureaucratic systems, to identify trends counter to “accepted” beliefs.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a continuing debate as to the nature of threats to national security in the new era. There is no consensus. In fact, there isn’t even a consensus on *when* the Cold War ended! Initially, the radical change in the international security environment seemed to present an opportunity for the US to “engage” with more countries to further US interests and exercise US power by a variety of methods. The military increasingly was used in activities that were outside its conventional war taskings. All the while, the nagging question remained in the background—what kind of threats will there be in the future towards which the military should be building both its structure and its policy?

The range of conceptualizations of the future currently being considered is broad indeed. Analysts propose everything from stateless anarchy to high-tech, highly lethal conflict with a major peer competitor. Not surprisingly, as elaborated below, the official statements of the future threat are, to some extent, a blending of the extremes.

The Official Vision of the Future

The White House *National Security Strategy* produced in 1997 presents a virtual cornucopia of threats to national interests. It generally classifies national interests as vital, important or humanitarian interests. “Smaller scale contingencies” or “major theater war” may threaten any of these interests. Singled out as particularly major threats are the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), terrorism, international crime, drugs, illegal arms trafficking, and environmental damage. In short, almost anything or everything that happens in the world can be defined as a potential threat under this very general and all-encompassing “strategy.”

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must use the *National Security Strategy* as a basis for developing the *National Military Strategy* (NMS). While still very broad in nature, this document is somewhat more specific in identifying and prioritizing threats. It recognizes the lack of a peer competitor in the near future. Thus, first and foremost, the threat of conflict among states and groups of states—**regional conflict**—“remains our most serious security challenge.”¹ Failed and failing states are recognized as a possible threat to US interests and the safety of US citizens.² The bottom line is that the US won’t allow a regional hegemon opposed to the US to negatively impact US interests.

The NMS identifies a number of “**asymmetric challenges**” that are hard to define, see and counter, yet are very dramatic and vividly threatening. These are the unexpected

or unconventional approach that states, state actors or individuals may take to subvert US conventional strengths; they include WMD, terrorism, and information warfare. These are methods of attacking the US or its interests that are notable due to the possible level of destruction they could inflict on US nationals and the US homeland. There are other asymmetric approaches: threats to our space-based systems or capabilities, interrupting the flow of information, denying access to strategic resources, or environmental sabotage. While these are possible, there is no clear evidence of specific capability or intent. Though difficult to pinpoint, clearly these “asymmetric challenges” exist and there is hard evidence of rogue states with WMD (North Korea, Iraq), and terrorism to underscore the threat. Although there is evidence of capability for WMD and one might presume intent to use WMD, no similar direct linkage exists for some of the other asymmetric threats such as threats to our information flow or strategic resources. Thus, “asymmetric threats” are real, but are not necessarily an identifiable, immediate threat.³

Thirdly, the NMS notes the potential for **transnational dangers** to harm US interests. These concern events and actions that cross international borders, including: human emergencies (not armed conflict); extremism, ethnic disputes, religious rivalries; international organized crime, illegal trade in weapons, strategic materials or illicit drugs, piracy; massive refugee flows; and threats to the environment. Because of the varied nature of the “transnational dangers,” the response to them is left wide open. In some cases, there may be no US response. In others, the military may be called upon to act, such as delivering humanitarian assistance in Rwanda, or interposition of troops to prevent ethnic conflict in Macedonia.⁴

Finally, the NMS also provides for **wild cards**, that may be a combination of the threats above or unforeseen measures, capabilities and threats that may suddenly appear on the horizon. This is an allowance for development of new technology or loss of key allies. In short, an “all others” category. How does one plan for this?

At the outset, the NMS recognizes that the US military has historically “responded to a variety of national needs other than waging wars. So, too, today the security environment includes many dangers other than war yet may call for military forces.⁵ By acknowledging such, the NMS opens the door for military planning and use of MOOTW, yet the sheer variety of possible threats means that all types of MOOTW, as well as all types of conventional and high-tech weapons, can be cast as responding to the NMS.

Outside Looking In

Analysts outside of government have a certain freedom: they have the advantage of proposing ideas without bearing responsibility for the implications of pursuing any resulting policies. Hence, the ideas proposed from those outside government are more wide-ranging yet also more specific and narrow, often vitriolic, in their projections. There are two divergent schools of thought—those that see some kind of technology-based threat (though perhaps from unconventional sources), and those that see the major threats to international security as not technology-based.

Technology-Based Threats

Proponents of the view that major threats in the future will be technology-based assume major technological change will continue or accelerate. The result will be a very different kind of warfare where high technology weapons or systems will make the

pivotal difference. Effective defense, in this thinking, is based on leading edge technology ahead of all competitors. While advocates of these threat theories may agree that a peer competitor may not arise before 2010, they argue that if the US doesn't continue with technological advances, it eventually will be blind-sided and unable to catch up. Generally, since highly technical systems take 15 to 20 years to design and build, the US must continue technology development to maintain its advantage. The technology-based threats fall into two sub-categories: proliferation of highly lethal weapons and, technology advancement.

Proliferation of Highly Lethal Weapons. Some analysts see the development and proliferation of WMD of all types (nuclear, chemical and biological) as the single major threat to national security and fundamentally changing security issues for the US.⁶ A variant on this theme is the argument that proliferation of highly lethal weapons, whether conventional or WMD, is the most ominous threat. In either case, the wide availability of highly lethal weapons makes them a particularly desirable weapon for terrorists as well as states that cannot afford a sizable conventional military; their targets may be selected to induce terror rather than degrade superior military forces. The Toyko subway gas attacks are an example of this. Thus, it is the threat of highly lethal WMD against which the nation must prepare. In response, the conventional military should be expanded as well as developing non-traditional (or MOOTW) capabilities targeted against a fairly universal threat. According to this strategy, a major conventional military capability for the US will act as a deterrent, coupled with MOOTW capabilities to counter terrorists and non-conventional threats.

Technology Advancements. Other analysts maintain the most serious threats to national security encompass the major technological trends in current and future armaments. They argue that a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) is underway and the US military, as a leader in high tech weaponry, must continue to stay at the forefront of innovation, both in hardware and application of the new technologies.⁷ Historical experience with “technical revolutions” applied to warfare clearly points to the significant advantage that accrued to the most forward thinking and quickly adapting militaries. Retaining its technological lead is dependent on the American obsession with ever-better technology and sustainment of the Military-Industrial complex.

A different aspect of the threat derived from technology advancements is Information Warfare, articulated by proponents such as Heidi and Alvin Toffler.⁸ The military has developed an understanding of its dependence on information and identified a new kind of warfare. Like the WMD threat, the thought of a lone hacker wrecking havoc on the US’s information apparatus may not be very likely but would be potentially extremely damaging.⁹ President Clinton has directed a Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection to address this threat and develop a “cyberspace protection plan.”¹⁰ Such planning seems justified: Paschall notes the increasing centralization wrought from our technological innovations and pursuit of efficiency now present targets whose loss would have very devastating effects.¹¹

Transnational and Non-State Threats

In contrast, some analysts see the major security threats of the future stemming from sources that have not traditionally been considered threats. At the extreme, societal change is predicted to cause the demise of the nation state and accelerate devolution into

global anarchy. More moderately, activities such as drug trafficking, international crime, and environmental damage fall into this category.

State-less world without conventional threats. Martin Van Creveld paints a picture of a state-less world, where terrorism, gang fighting, and the like are the result of a complete collapse of our current international system. States will no longer have particular power and the convention of militaries fighting formal wars in the interests of the state will be discontinued.¹² Van Creveld maintains the traditionally structured militaries will have little occasion to fight in their “traditional” or conventional matter. As outlined above, militaries have historically conducted MOOTW-type operations; that those type of operations will become predominant is a widely, though not universally held concept. Van Creveld also points to the loss of distinction between military and civilian, front and rear, as part and parcel of these changes and technological innovation.

Demographics. On a more moderate note, Paul Kennedy suggests that the major threats to the international system and states in general will arise out of three inter-related phenomena. He sees a coming demographic explosion that will exacerbate wealth disparity between economic groups, disparities of technological innovations allowing the rich to get richer while the poor get poorer, and environmental degradation that makes it harder for the poorer countries to adequately provide for their growing populations. While Kennedy notes these threats will not replace “traditional threats to security” his analysis offers a compelling argument that unchecked demographic explosions will have far-reaching impacts, particularly for MOOTW operations.¹³

Just as populations readily migrate across borders, so do transnational threats. Drug trafficking, international crime, border control, and piracy are very real but perhaps not

large-scale threats. Still, as evidenced by the decade-long “war on drugs,” these are areas where the inclination to use the military against non-official militias is very real.

MOOTW Against Identified Threats

No doubt, the real threats to national security in the future will contain certain aspects of the various scenarios described above. Given no clear identification of threat, however, the determination of policy, planning and budgeting for the military is very precarious. Simply put, there aren’t sufficient funds to prepare the US military to meet all of the different threats proposed.¹⁴ When the strategic environment was stable and evident, the priorities for spending available funds was clear. The current assessments of future threats vary so widely—from high-tech to demographic change—as to be useless, even counterproductive, in suggesting the best way to spend limited budgets to meet the threat.

A more productive way to narrow the threat and prepare the military effort to counter that threat, is to evaluate the ability of the military to effectively defeat these new threats. Specifically, chapter three addresses whether the military should be used for these MOOTW operations given the various schemes of future threat. And, if so, whether the military is doing the right things to prepare for such missions.

Notes

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1997), 8.

² *National Military Strategy*, 9.

³ Biological weapons require small amounts to effect thousands of people; yet there is scant evidence of weaponization of such elements. The sarin gas attacks in Japan show how difficult using chemical weapons can be, as authorities indicated that the effects

Notes

would have been much worse if the chemicals had been dispensed correctly. Individual terrorist attacks are horrific events, yet the actual number of US citizens killed in terrorist attacks over the years is miniscule.

⁴ See Roderick K. Von Lipsey, ed. *Breaking the Cycle: A Framework for Conflict Intervention* (New York: St Martin's, 1997) for examples of how the US and other national militaries as well as UN forces, have intervened to prevent and/or resolve inter-group (non-state) conflict.

⁵ *National Military Strategy*, 6.

⁶ Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs*, vol 77, no 1 (Jan/Feb 98), 26-41.

⁷ Steven J. Blank, "Preparing For the Next War: Reflections on the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1996), 17-25. Blank contends that the US's technological achievements will not meet their apex unless there is organizational and doctrinal change to optimize the new technology.

⁸ Their *War and Anti War* (Little, Brown & Co, 1993) ignited the debate about information warfare in the military.

⁹ Despite the military's rush to defend against information warfare and pursue it as a weapon, some critics question the real possibilities of information warfare. They contend its impact is overstated both in breadth and duration. See Michael A. Dornheim, "Bombs Still Beat Bytes," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, January 19, 1998, 60.

¹⁰ Neil Munro, "Thwarting An Electronic Attack," *National Journal*, February 28, 1998, 456.

¹¹ Paschall, p. 99. Paschall notes that the US's electricity grid is now controlled via just 4,000 large capacity transformers. Destruction of a few could have a major impact on availability of electricity in any given target area.

¹² Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 201.

¹³ Kennedy, Paul, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Random House, 1993), 129 and 331-335.

¹⁴ On 11 Feb 98, *Associated Press* quoted Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-SC, as questioning Pentagon official reports on readiness. "The official reports we receive from the Pentagon do not contain any information that would lead us to believe that there are serious readiness problems. Can we believe the official Pentagon readiness reports or should we rely more on personal comments from our operational commanders?" The article surmises that there is "suspicion among the GOP ranks that President Clinton's interest in peacekeeping missions is eroding battle readiness." See also Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Officials Upset With Service Budget Allocations" *Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 1998, which cites active duty and retired Army officers complaining that the funding paradigm for the services doesn't reflect changing security priorities. In particular, Army officers (unofficially) complain that the budget, which funds new high tech weapons such as the F-22 and new submarines, underfunds Army readiness needs.

Chapter 3

Putting Military Force to Use

I don't think anyone believes the military option is the best option, but it may be the only option.

—Secretary of Defense William Cohen¹

The first and foremost requirement for military forces for the US is and will continue to be to “fight and win the nation’s wars,” as stated in the *National Military Strategy*. Just as clearly, though, there are other situations that call for use of military forces, outside a conventional war context. Given the variety of thinking on future threats to national security, are MOOTW operations truly meeting threats to national security interests?

As argued above, the missions outside the conventional war context (“other” than war) are not, on the whole, new activities for the US military, although the categorization as MOOTW does present them in a new light compared to LIC or UW. The end of the Cold War brought not only this revision of doctrine, but also a huge escalation in the number of such operations to which the US military was committed. In the decade of the 80’s, the US military was used in 22 foreign operations; from 1990 to 1996, the US military was tasked for 36 foreign operations. Furthermore, the military personnel strength and budget (constant dollars) were both reduced during the course of the 1990’s by approximately 30%.² Even if the trend toward these deployments abates, the reduced

size of the military will still translate into a sizeable portion of the military committed to foreign, usually MOOTW, operations. This appears to reflect a relative priority of conducting these operations that did not exist before the 1990's. Regardless of which emerging security environment described above comes to pass, some elements of MOOTW are still likely to be favored in the future. This level of commitment begs a number of questions. Why is the military being tasked for MOOTW? When is it appropriate or necessary to use military forces for these operations? Is the military sufficiently reoriented from its Cold War status to carry out these missions? What are the costs of conducting these missions?

Why Is the Military Being Tasked For MOOTW?

The varied threats of the future strategic environment described in chapter two all could demand military responses via MOOTW missions, based on the current definition of MOOTW. In general terms, I have depicted this in **Table 1**. Each of the threat scenarios described in chapter two (listed at the left) may be countered effectively by MOOTW capabilities (listed across the top). Some of the MOOTW missions, such as counterdrug or freedom of navigation/overflight operations, may only be applied to a few of the future threat scenarios; nonetheless all of the current MOOTW missions may be effective in combating the varied threats of the future. Thus, based on mission applicability alone, MOOTW could be tasked in support of legitimate national interests under any of the future threat scenarios discussed.

Beyond applicability to a mission comes an analysis, specific to each situation, as to the cost/benefit of using the military instrument to meet national objectives. Qualitative

analysis as to efficacy becomes very challenging here, as each situation is different, and broad generalizations are not very useful.

Table 1. MOOTW Missions Responding to Future Threats

	Arms Control	Counter Terrorism	Counterdrug	Sanctions / MIO	Exclusion Zone	Navigation /overflight	Humanitarian Assistance	Support to Civil Authorities	Nation Assistance	NEO	Peace Ops	Protect Shipping	Recovery	Show of Force	Strike / Raid	Insurgency Support
<i>Future Threats</i>																
<i>Official Vision</i>																
Regional	✓			✓	✓	✓				✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Assymmetric	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
Transnational	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
<i>Unofficial Vision</i>																
Proliferation	✓			✓	✓								✓	✓	✓	
Technology Advancement													✓	✓	✓	
Stateless		✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Demographics		✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					

For example, while the military may be tasked to strike an enemy developing WMD, the decision to actually use the military is based on event specifics. This was evident in the consideration of air strikes to reduce Iraq's program of weapons of mass destruction in February 1998. Military strikes *may* be able to significantly reduce a country's WMD capability. The question becomes one of cost—how many air strikes it will take, with what certainty will the WMD capabilities be reduced, what level of losses can be borne, and whether ground troops must be employed to ensure the weapons are destroyed? So, while MOOTW missions objectively can be useful in addressing future threats, as indicated in **Table 1**, in actual events, MOOTW may not be an effective option for national strategy.

When Should Military Forces Be Used?

The discussion and table above address the question of whether the military in the form of MOOTW *can* respond to threats in the future. Clearly, the military instrument theoretically could be applied in response to, or to deter against, the wide variety of threats anticipated. The next logical question is whether the military *should* be used in operations other than war.

The simplest discriminator is based on a unique military capabilities: distinguish between operations that have unique requirements for the military and those that do not. For operations that do not have unique demands for the military, a civilian capability should be developed. The most obvious measure would be only to use the military in combat-related roles, or situations where organized threats to US security may justify combat troops. For comparison, **Table 2** lists the MOOTW missions that may require combat in the left column, and those that may not involve combat in the right column. The majority of MOOTW missions appear in both columns; only arms control, humanitarian assistance,³ military support to civil authorities, and nation assistance are solely in the right column and are highlighted to note that distinction. While combat is not envisioned or inherent in these missions, there is a compelling argument for military participation.

The military's involvement in arms control is generally limited to providing expertise, whether in terms of verifying compliance based on inspections or handling of nuclear materials (e.g., transport of nuclear materials purchased from Kazakhstan). The unique expertise they bring to on-site inspections justifies their expanded role. And while

military participation has increased over the years, it is still a small mission area and not likely to expand quickly or without measured political direction.

Table 2. Requirement for Combat or Non-Combat Forces in MOOTW Missions

<u>Combat Missions</u>	<u>Non-Combat Missions</u>
Counter Terrorism	Arms Control
Counter Drug	Counter Terrorism
Sanctions / Maritime Interdiction	Counter Drug
Exclusion Zones	Sanctions / Maritime Interdiction
Freedom of Navigation / Overflight	Exclusion Zones
	Freedom of Navigation / Overflight
	Humanitarian Assistance
	Military Support to Civil Authorities
	Nation Assistance
NEO	NEO
Peace Operations	Peace Operations
Protection of Shipping	Protection of Shipping
Recovery	Recovery
Show of Force	Show of Force
Strike / Raid	
Support to Insurgency	Support to Insurgency

While the military can very effectively bring its expertise to bear on the other three non-combat mission areas of MOOTW (Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civil Authorities, and Nation Assistance), they do not have an exclusive expertise that demands their participation. Instead, there is political/moral rationale for military participation in these operations. Often called the “CNN factor,” this rationale stems from public and politician’s calls to “do something” about a humanitarian or natural disaster. The military has the airlift, engineering, medical and logistics infrastructure that can very efficiently respond to disaster situations to a much greater extent than the civilian sector can. Therefore, the logic goes, the military *should* be tasked accordingly, whether or not the military effort will have a significant, lasting impact.⁴

The difficulty with this argument is that when the military is tasked to support disaster relief, there is rarely a key US security interest at stake. Again, the relative merits and cost/benefit analysis must be understood before the military is committed to support these operations. As one analyst put it, "...when a great power intervenes anywhere in the world, it creates a vital national interest in the success of the enterprise."⁵ Through the commitment of military forces to a non-militarily significant mission, even peripheral interests can be elevated to core interests; given the impact that fear of failure portends to the American public. Additionally, commitment of military forces, even in a non-combat role, may increase the perception of threat on the part of adversaries, and represents, according to Barry Posen, a vital national interest. He contends that rather than helping a disaster situation (particularly one resulting from civil war), "what good-hearted people are proposing is war."⁶ Any ensuing mission creep is owed to the fact that the mere commitment of forces created a vital national interest.

Beyond the objective analysis of missions that the military *should* take on, is today's budgetary reality. In the current declining budget environment, some military officers are concerned that if the military isn't used, further and more drastic reductions will be levied. Such additional reductions would then make it very difficult for the military to carry out its primary mission of winning wars. Whereas a standing army with little "action" was justifiable during the Cold War, the lack of an immediate peer-competitor threat erodes the justification for such a resting giant. Yet, like the infamous "Ten Year Rule" that stymied the United Kingdom's preparedness for WWII, the US faces a security dilemma today: "Absent a standing military force sufficient to deal credibly with such surprises [as the fall of the Soviet Union and other major shake-ups], democratic

politics will respond with too little, too late.”⁷ To combat the pressures to cut budgets, the military must be seen to be fully and appropriately “occupied.” Some critics have charged that senior US military support of MOOTW, and peace operations in particular, was a bargain to assure continued budgetary support.⁸

Thus, MOOTW missions for the military are currently justified based on three factors: requiring combat forces; demanding military expertise; or responding to domestic moral imperatives. Furthermore, conducting these operations also provides peacetime justification for military force structure. But it also carries a price in terms of training, force structure and readiness.

Changing Times

Training, Systems and Force Structure

The first real change the military made to adapt to the 1990’s expansion of MOOTW missions was to expand training to include MOOTW in field exercises, command post exercises, and throughout the military education system. The Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft Polk, Louisiana has designed training specifically for MOOTW. Civilian organizations such as Non-governmental or Private Voluntary Organizations (NGO/PVO) have also participated in the training there and in conjunction with the Army’s Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks. A smaller training program has also been incorporated into the US Army’s Combat Maneuver Training Center and is used by Germany-based US forces en route to Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.⁹ Much of this training focuses on Peace Operations, as that mission area has seen the greatest growth and development over the 1990’s. However, professional military education, as well as

Ft Polk training and Army Peacekeeping Institute exercises expand well beyond peace operations to cover crisis action planning including virtually the entire range of MOOTW missions. Additionally, traditional military training covers many MOOTW mission areas, including NEO, show of force, and strikes.

In the ever-growing library of joint doctrine, MOOTW has a small, but significant part.¹⁰ Since MOOTW is broad by definition, the doctrine is very general and mostly descriptive. The need for new doctrine varies; existing doctrine may well apply to the strike/raid mission area of MOOTW but new doctrine may be required for peace operations or humanitarian assistance.

Combat system changes to support MOOTW have been sporadic. Arguably, few new systems are required for MOOTW since these missions are not new to the US military. The only real innovation has been the requirement for non-lethal weapons for use in peace operations and military support to civil authorities. Many new systems that support both MOOTW and conventional force development can be justified based on their contribution to both war and MOOTW. For example, surveillance and intelligence collection systems can be used to monitor drug smuggling, arms proliferators, sanctions enforcement, or recovery operations.

Readiness

The ability to conduct MOOTW operations with a minimum of changes in training or systems has facilitated the increasing use of the military in the 1990's. But while systems and personnel arguably can be used in MOOTW as well as war, there are additional costs. There is a sunk cost of the operations and maintenance (O&M) funds to support those operations, which may or may not be reimbursed (through supplemental

appropriation or interdepartmental reimbursement) and which otherwise might have supported exercises or operational training. Secondly, there is an opportunity cost—using forces in MOOTW means they are not available for other missions.

Finally, there is a qualitative cost—the impact on readiness to do wartime missions. In the early 1990s, critics of MOOTW cited the negative impact on readiness as rationale for not using the military in some MOOTW missions. Policy decisions (inside and outside the military) to conduct the operations despite the critics, coupled with sporadic successes, largely overshadowed that criticism. After several years of extensive MOOTW operations, from the no-fly zones over Iraq, to Bosnia, and humanitarian assistance in many other parts of the world, the impact is now being felt and reported in mainstream, popular news outlets. A recent Rand study, highlighted in *US News and World Report*, reported troop capabilities as measured at the Army’s training centers has gone down consistently since DESERT STORM. Units going through the training centers are “barely more than half staffed” and mission-capable rates for the Air Force’s F-16’s and F-15’s are 77% overall, versus 85-90% prior to the Gulf War.¹¹ High deployment rates are only partly to blame (both in terms of wear and tear on personnel and equipment); spare parts are in short supply for some weapons systems; other observers blame the military’s emphasis on funding new high-technology systems at the expense of current operations. There is no doubt that some MOOTW missions provide valuable training opportunities; there is also clear evidence that the plethora of MOOTW missions are also negatively impacting training and readiness.

The US military has squarely addressed the concept of MOOTW by altered training, doctrine, and deployment. They have made initial efforts to bridge the gap between the

military responses to MOOTW situations and the efforts of civilian counterparts. All of this has been done without serious reflection on the appropriateness of all of the MOOTW missions for the US military. Specifically, *should* the US military conduct all of the MOOTW missions (including non-combat missions) or should some missions be executed by civilian agencies?

Notes

¹ Quoted in Robert S. Greenberger and Thomas E. Ricks, "Under the Gun: Bombing Plan on Iraq Still Leaves Question of What Will Follow," *Wall Street Journal*, 17 February, 1998.

² Congressional Research Service report cited in *US News and World Report*, January 19, 1998, pp. 42-43.

³ Humanitarian assistance is listed only in the non-combat column because the intent of humanitarian assistance, as described in the Joint Doctrine, is to promote peace and is a non-combat role. The mission to Somalia, by this definition, was a peace operation rather than humanitarian assistance.

⁴ Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Clinton Defense Strategy," in *Brassey's Mershon American Defense Annual 1995-1996: The United States and the Emerging Strategic Environment*, (New York: Brassey's, 1995), 124.

⁵ David Jablonsky, "The Persistence of Credibility: Interests, Threats and Planning for the Use of American Military Power," *Strategic Review* (Spring 1996): 14.

⁶ Barry R. Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," *International Security* Vol 21, no 1 (Summer 1996): 111. See also Wg Comdr M.T. Doel, "Military Assistance in Humanitarian Aid Operations: impossible Paradox or Inevitable Development?" *RUSI Journal*, October 1995, 26-38. Wg Comdr Doel notes that the involvement of military forces also puts non-military aid workers at risk of violence.

⁷ Jablonsky, 12.

⁸ Pat Towell, "A Military at Peace With Peacekeeping...Gives Clinton More Options Overseas," *Congressional Quarterly*, Dec 7, 1996, 3348.

⁹ Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense, *Catalog of Peace Operations Training Activities* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, September 1994) contains extensive lists of Service, DOD and Multinational training activities.

¹⁰ As of May 1997, 2 of 44 Joint Doctrine publications, excluding Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures documents, directly (and solely) addressed MOOTW: Joint Publications 3-07 and 3-08. However, many of the remaining publications include MOOTW operations along with discussion of war.

¹¹ *US News and World Report*, January 19, 1998, 42-43.

Chapter 4

Policy Ramifications

The military may not be the one that should do this, but it's the only one that can do it.

—Adm Leighton W. “Snuffy” Smith Jr.¹

With the end of the cold war, the US military has shifted its focus from traditional military confrontation to a broader variety of uses for the military. The concepts of LIC and UW, which were fairly narrow both in scope of operations and forces to perform them, were expanded to encompass all of the contributions the military makes towards national security in operations other than war. Conceptually, MOOTW is an outgrowth of the past with the intent of using the military to pursue a variety of missions and political objectives. Chapter Two outlined a variety of visions of the future threats. Against all of these threats, to one degree or another, chapter three outlined how MOOTW missions may be used. The MOOTW concept clearly has relevance in the future and is not simply a politically correct repackaging.

As discussed in chapter three, MOOTW presents opportunities as well as pitfalls. The opportunity is to address a broad range of moderate-level US interests with well-defined missions and conventional military forces. In the post-cold war era, these missions may be the bread and butter for the military; continued requirements helps

justify the force structure for both MOOTW and major war, while prospects for the future indicate a continued if not increasing demand for MOOTW operations.

The drawbacks to using the military in MOOTW are equally numerous. While the military has highlighted the preeminence of political guidance over these operations, it is nonetheless contrary to the military's criticism of the Vietnam era political control of the military; in particular the effort to use "limited" force for political effect. The military's desire for clear objectives and operational autonomy is founded on operational necessity of managing complex military operations. However, the military's desire for autonomy is in conflict with the necessity of detailed political direction of MOOTW.

By being missions "short" of war, MOOTW is the method by which political leaders can "manage" the use of force. MOOTW's legacy to LIC is thus highlighted: LIC also was based on the idea of managing force. The attempt to manage the use of force is fraught with difficulties, not the least of which stems from the unpredictable nature of humans. Nonetheless, limited force or threat of its use can be a successful tool in compelling or deterring behavior. When military force is chosen, however, the act of committing that force is what "sends the message." For this reason, caution would suggest that military forces should only be tasked with missions where combat might ensue.

The clarity with which one might see the pitfalls of using, or threatening the use of force is presently clouded. At the highest level, the National Security Council is responsible for integrating the military with diplomatic and economic efforts to meet national security interests. But committees and working groups in the interagency process, a complex, inefficient and cloudy system, must work out the specifics. Unified

Commanders may not be involved in early discussion of emerging issues in their regions if there isn't a clear, early indication of military applicability. Conversely, military action may be considered without concurrent discussion of diplomatic or economic options. A testimony to this is the reported "initial meeting" on January 31, 1998, of the President's national security advisors on what actions should follow airstrikes against Iraq—after more than two months of escalating tension and force deployments in the region.²

Complicating matters is the reduced level of military experience in the population at large as a long-term result of the all-volunteer force. State Department or Commerce Department analysts with no military background may not consider the military side of a problem at the outset.³ One analyst has argued that a senior Defense Department official should take the forefront in the interagency arena to identify contingencies other than major conventional war and develop possible American responses, military and nonmilitary to these crises. She contends: "Without this kind of umbrella policy, and a plan for its implementation that looks five to fifteen years ahead, economic and military resources available to the United States cannot be effectively employed."⁴

As argued in chapter three, committing military forces to any endeavor *de facto* raises the US's interest in the operation.⁵ The net result of the complicating factors above is that political leaders must be very judicious in using the military in MOOTW missions, particularly where combat power is not necessary: arms control, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, and nation assistance. Arms control requires unique military skills in verification of treaties and handling of treaty-limited equipment. Similarly, there are some unique requirements for military expertise in providing nation assistance (specifically, security assistance training and foreign internal defense.) Where

military expertise is not exclusive (namely, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, and nation assistance), the political/moral rationale for using military forces is compelling yet treacherous, as it accords these operations a higher level of interest than is warranted.⁶ Simply because the military has a capability and is easy to task does not justify its use. Although a flexible and capable military gives the President more tools for implementing foreign policy, it isn't in the long term interests of the nation's security to continue using its limited military resources for inappropriate tasking.

While there is a budgetary benefit for the military's involvement in MOOTW in justifying current force levels, there are qualitative and quantitative costs. Measuring those costs versus the benefit derived is a complex process, subjective across the board. Reported readiness rates appear objective, yet are largely based on a commander's subjective assessment which may or may not be influenced by other factors. The scores from training exercises may be somewhat more accurate in reporting the negative impact of MOOTW missions, but these too must be weighed against the training benefit gained, however limited, from MOOTW missions.

Missions to Forego

Because commitment of the military represents a substantial investment in funding, resources, and potentially lives, the military should be used for missions in support of core or intermediate national interests. Where there is no compelling reason for the military to perform the non-combat missions of MOOTW, the direct or implied benefits are simply not worth the cost. If the mission represents a compelling non-security related national interest, then a non-military force should be developed to do it.

While the US may be very concerned for moral or economic reasons about natural or man-made disasters, unless a disaster is an eminent threat to the US's core interests, military combat forces are not appropriate. Instead, other government agencies (such as the Peace Corps) could develop capabilities to focus on emergency disaster relief. This could be done in concert with additional funding for the American Red Cross or some other US agency to coordinate official and unofficial US aid to disaster areas outside the US.

For long-term nation assistance, perhaps the US Agency for International Development (USAID) could be expanded to provide the civil engineering, communications and logistics capabilities to meet many nation assistance missions. The military may still continue very limited nation assistance efforts in conjunction with bilateral operations in developing countries and only when there is no threat of combat operations.

The only one of the non-combat missions that arguably could remain with the military is that of military support to civil authorities. The reason the military should continue this mission is that, while incurring additional costs and subject to *Posse Comitatus* rules,⁷ this mission does not entail and commitment of US forces against any kind of foreign interest. Thus, there is no long-term repercussion, save opportunity and dollar cost, for supporting this mission. To streamline the mission area, the National Guard could be given principal responsibility and then train and prepare to support domestic disasters.

For any of these non-combat missions, commercial contractors may be willing and able to perform these functions. Contractors have been performing an increasing number

of support functions in recent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies and have proven some level of expertise. While a contract for emergency support may initially appear more expensive than paying a group of enlisted military troops, the savings in terms of opportunity costs and training would offset the differential. More importantly, the use of contractors does not represent the same level of increased interest that commitment of military forces brings. Thus, the nation would avoid a mission creep problem based on the absence of military forces.

While this discussion of alternatives is superficial it represents a variety of options that could be considered to meet the MOOTW missions that do not require and *should not* demand military forces. The risk associated with this strategy is that resources may be transferred to non-military organizations to support increasing their capability. The defense for this will be military arguments that the systems and funding used in MOOTW are justified solely on their applicability to conventional requirements for major war. Any contribution they provide to MOOTW is ancillary. In the main, this is a defensible position; yet the immediacy of MOOTW missions versus the long-term nature of the peer competitor major war threat undermines this argument. Still, the specter of decreasing budgets does not justify tasking the military to perform inappropriate or ill-advised missions. MOOTW missions limited to those which can only be performed by the military, and for which there is a logical military requirement, should be continued as a part of an integrated strategy to build the right military force for the next century.

Freeing the military of one complete (humanitarian assistance) and one partial (nation assistance) non-combat MOOTW mission will not result in any major financial savings. It may actually initially cost more to use contractors or create non-military (i.e.,

Peace Corps, USAID, etc) capabilities. Instead, what it promises to do is preclude the US from inadvertently committing itself to combat by its effort to “do the right thing.” It also will free the military to perform necessary and worthy MOOTW missions without poisoning the entire MOOTW category of operations with a few failed and militarily unnecessary operations.

Notes

¹ Quoted in Towel “A Military at Peace...,” 3348.

² Greenberger, Robert S. and Ricks, Thomas E., “Under the Gun,” *Wall Street Journal*, 17 February, 1998.

³ Gregory D. Foster, “American’s Military in Crisis,” *Government Executive*, August 1997, 61.

⁴ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1997), 258.

⁵ Jablonsky, 14.

⁶ This is particularly important where the ability of the US military to act is limited. “...it is an ethics rule in general that one has no moral obligations where one has no power to act for the good.” Major Peter Fromm, “War and OOTW: Philosophical Foundations” *Military Review*, September-October 1995, 62.

⁷ The *Posse Comitatus* Act (Title 18, “Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus” - United States Code, Section 1385) prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, CD ROM)

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