Assessing U.S. Air Force Bombing Effectiveness During Rolling Thunder
Abstract
Analyses of the 1965 to 1968 Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against North Vietnam have not discussed Air Force bombing assessment methods or criteria in detail. The tacit assumption has been that assessments were simplistic or otherwise inadequate, but the evidence suggests the Air Force processes were richly complex. Based largely on contemporary oral history interview audiotapes and other archival sources, this dissertation examines Rolling Thunder bombing assessment from perspectives ranging from Air Force flying units to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Johnson Administration perspectives are also compared with military viewpoints. An overview of the campaign's objectives and strategy as they related to effectiveness measurement is also included. Flying units emphasized quantitative data such as numbers of targets destroyed when evaluating bombing results. Units sought feedback from headquarters, but bomb damage assessment photography and other data proved hard to obtain. However, headquarters agencies demanded ever more intricate reports from flying units. Demands for more data did not always lead to better information. Headquarters staffs undertook complex analyses, using criteria such as numbers and types of targets struck, estimated civilian and military casualties, economic disruption, enemy resource diversion to defensive tasks, aircraft loss rate, morale, enemy willingness to negotiate, and propaganda content. Alternative criteria such as accuracy, numbers of sorties flown, and tons of bombs dropped, received less attention.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 19, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA399425
Entities
People
- Paul D. Berg
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology