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**BACK TO THE FUTURE: ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE  
U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS J. DE VINE  
United States Army**

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS J. DE VINE  
United States Army

Colonel Robert A. Salviano, Jr.  
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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## ABSTRACT

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The United States is seeking to leverage a strategic military pause, which resulted from the end of the Cold War, to execute another historic transformation to insure it retains the premier land force in the world. It is critical The Army begins this transformation with the correct roles, functions and missions. However, it is the roles and missions of its components, especially the reserves, where a passionate debate rages.

This research paper uses an analytical approach to dispassionately and critically address the question concerning the appropriateness of the current roles and missions of the United States Army Reserve Component for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. It methodically reviews the history of The Army, presents lessons-learned and develops from them a set of criteria to test and analyze the Army's roles and missions. This leads to recommended roles and missions for the Army Reserve Component for the first third of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.



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## **ROLES AND MISSIONS THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

It is the soldier and the army, not Parliamentary Majorities and votes that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests with the army.

—Wilhelm II

This research paper attempts to answer the question: Are the current roles and missions of the United States Army Reserve component appropriate for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?

Why this topic? The United States is seeking to leverage a strategic military pause, which resulted from the end of the Cold War, to execute another historic transformation to insure it retains the appropriate land force to execute current and future National Security Strategy (NSS) and supporting National Military Strategy (NMS). It is critical The Army begins this transformation with the correct roles, functions and missions. Further, a passionate debate has persisted from the very beginning of the colonization of America to today concerning the proper roles and missions of security forces for the United States. Specifically, the roles, functions and missions of standing armies versus reserve forces.

Conceptually, the options for an Army range from: a national professional standing army large enough to respond to any contingency without requirement of a supporting reserve at any level to the whole security requirement residing entirely in a militia type force. Frankly, very few would seriously contend that either one of these extremes would be appropriate or adequate for the United States. Most believe the appropriate roles and missions and corresponding security organizations lie somewhere between these two extremes. Again, most believe the United States requires an efficient balance between a standing professional army and an effective supporting reserve force. However, it is the roles and missions of these organizations, especially the reserves, where the real debate rages. Defining the roles and missions of security forces to properly fit the form of government and national ethos it supports is vital to effectively determine the types and sizes of security organizations. World history is littered with civil wars, rebellions, insurrections, and suppressed populations when the roles and missions of the security forces are not in concert with national values, priorities and interests.

Currently, The Army is comprised of two components: an Active Component (AC), the Active Army; and the Reserve Component (RC), which consists of the United States Army Reserves (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG). This paper will initially address all Army roles and missions before narrowing the analysis specifically to the RC. This insures the analysis is not biased against roles and missions conducted by either component. This paper will confine

itself to the primary land component of that security force, The Army. To insure a complete and concise understanding, it is highly recommended the reader closely reviews the glossary at the end of this paper prior to preceding.

## **HISTORICAL ROLES AND MISSIONS**

To completely analyze the appropriateness of the current roles and missions of The Army, we must return to the very beginning of the republic and review the original laws, intents, concepts and beliefs of the founding fathers. These are the metrics and guideposts upon which our current roles and missions are founded. From that point, we can inspect the significant changes over the last 230 years, gather roles and missions, discover lessons-learned and distill from them a set of criteria to use to analyze the current roles and missions and recommend changes.

An extensive portion of this paper will focus on an historical review of the evolution of the roles and missions of the American Army. It is vital to understand how and why The Army's roles and missions evolved over our history to fairly judge today's roles and missions and plan for the future.

The roots of the roles and missions of the American Army and militia trace back to Europe to a time prior to the formation of the American colonies. The original colonists had experience with the European, and especially the British, forms of security. Those forms being professional standing armies, militias and navies. From these experiences they formed opinions on the advantages, disadvantages and ultimate effectiveness of each of these forces. By examining their opinions and assessments, we can understand the American leaders' decisions regarding local and national security.

At this point, it is important to note, the only standing professional armies in the Americas were European.<sup>1</sup> The American colonists had formed militias, but even after declaring independence, and forming an independent national government with the Articles of Confederation, the Americans did not have a professional standing army.<sup>2</sup> Even the American Army formed and trained to fight the Revolution was almost completely disbanded immediately after the American Revolution.<sup>3</sup> But, these experiences, observations and lessons-learned from this history help set the conditions for the drafting of the Constitution of the United States. These experiences influenced American leaders as they assembled to draft the cornerstone document that continues today as the basis of law concerning the roles and missions of the United States Army. Simply, the majority of American leaders and authors of the Constitution believed the militia had performed poorly in most major actions leading up to and including the

Revolution.<sup>4</sup> They believed the militia could effectively perform a limited local security role, but the United States required a professional standing Army to conduct actions against other professional armies.

The roots of these beliefs extend all the way back to Henry II and The Assize of Arms of 1181, when every English freeman was required to be a part-time soldier in service to the King.<sup>5</sup> William the Conqueror and the Norman kings used militias.<sup>6</sup> "The Statute of Winchester of 1285<sup>7</sup> and the Instructions for General Muster of 1572<sup>8</sup> elaborated upon these requirements and reinforced them. The militia concept from this period was brought to America with the first settlers.<sup>9</sup> During this period however, the reliance on professional armies was increasing. Charles II relied almost exclusively on a professional army and the history of the British army is usually dated from this period.<sup>10</sup> "When England joined in the wars against Louis XIV. . . the predominance of professional armies on the continent confirmed her own new reliance upon professionals."<sup>11</sup> However, professional armies were costly, not only in money but in manpower. The newly formed American colonies could not afford a professional army. They chose to rely upon an organized militia for security. Russell F. Weigley explains the situation in his *History of the United States Army* as:

The American colonies in the seventeenth century were much too poor to permit a class of able-bodied men to devote themselves solely to war and preparation for war. Every colonist had to contribute all the energy he could to the economic survival of his colony, and no colony could afford to maintain professional soldiers. Yet through most of the century every part of the colonies remained subject to military danger, potentially from Spain and France and actually from the Indians. Therefore, every colony needed military protection, and every colony save the Quaker settlements sought to obtain it by invoking the English principle of a universal obligation to military service, in order to create a military force of armed civilians.<sup>12</sup>

The above quotation illustrates the primary roles for a national security force: *repel invasions (homeland defense)* later formalized in the Constitution. In a security environment requiring a military capability, but without the means to raise or sustain a professional army, the colonies first relied on a citizen-based militia and later on a professional army supplied by England. Here we discover an important criterion: *efficiency*. Compared to a professional standing army, an organized militia, on balance, is more efficient. Therefore, if the militia can effectively execute a role or mission, it would be most efficient to assign that role or mission to it. However, for a host of reasons this militia did not perform well over the next century, especially against professional armies. At first it was unlikely they would be required to fight a professional army. "Their function was mainly to fight Indians, or occasionally white troops of their own character,

such as the French-Canadian militia."<sup>13</sup> However, even during campaigns against the Indians as in the King Philips War, the militia performed poorly.<sup>14</sup> "In general the colonial militias were not a reliable instrument of offensive war distant from their own firesides."<sup>15</sup> The primary reason:

Few men came to America to be soldiers. More likely, they came in part to escape soldiering. They would fight when they had to, to preserve the homes and farms and way of life they had crossed the ocean to find. But they did not wish to abandon homes and farms for months or a season, to go off soldiering in pursuit of objects only remotely connected with their own aspirations or security.<sup>16</sup>

After winning independence, the Americans formed a national government through The Articles of Confederation. However, the Articles did not give the federal government sufficient powers to provide for the common defense of the nation (Homeland Defense). The Articles of Confederation did provide power to Congress to declare war but not the means to conduct it. This is one of the critical flaws of the Articles. This was a result of the conflict between the desire by some to form a strong federal government and others who believed in strong states rights. On vital points concerning security, states rights won. The Articles of Confederation did not give the federal government the power to raise or support security forces; these powers were given to the states. As a result, the Congress had to petition the states to provide their militia and money to prosecute any military operation on behalf of the union.<sup>17</sup>

In the difficult times following the American Revolution, there was a lingering and growing dissatisfaction among the people over a host of issues. Out of this dissatisfaction a group rose up in rebellion in what is now known as the Shays's Rebellion. This situation highlighted another important role for a security force: *suppress insurrections*, again later formalized in the Constitution. When officials looked to the militia to put down the rebellion, the militia sided with the rebels and most refused to respond. The rebellion had to be put down by an army paid for by Boston merchants.<sup>18</sup> This humiliated the state and national government. Shays's Rebellion was "final evidence that the Confederation not only condemned the United States to weakness against foreign foes but also deprived the nation of power to keep order within."<sup>19</sup>

Simply, over an extended period of time, and in numerous actions, the militia system simply failed. Militiamen would not respond to orders to assemble. Of those who did report for duty, many would not remain in the face of danger.<sup>20</sup> The militia was judged to be unfit for prolonged warfare on distant frontiers not directly threatening their personal interests.<sup>21</sup> Repeated failures of the militia and the ultimate need of a professional army to protect the colonies "were to have a far-reaching influence upon later American military thought."<sup>22</sup> With many American leaders

questioning the capability of the state militias and believing the United States required a professional army; a closer review of the key decisions, debate and intent surrounding the drafting the Constitution of the United States and the Militia Act of 1792 is vital.

Amazingly, the Constitution contains very little about national security issues.<sup>23</sup> However, it directs several key responsibilities and powers upon the Congress: "The Congress shall . . . provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States". To execute this responsibility "the Congress shall have the Power . . . To raise and support Armies".<sup>24</sup> The constitution guaranteed to every State the federal government would protect them against invasion and, when requested, against domestic violence. Here we see again the roles of: *repel invasions (Homeland Defense)* and *suppress insurrections*.

With so little written in the Constitution about national security issues, it is difficult to extrapolate the intent of the drafters. Therefore, to gain further insight into the topic, we will examine The Federalist Papers written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay at the time of the debate surrounding the abolishment of the Articles of Confederation and the ratification of the Constitution is required.

The Federalist Papers are "a series of essays explaining and defending the Constitution" and "an authoritative analysis of the Constitution of the United States".<sup>25</sup> This assertion is by a contemporary writer, so to further certify the use of The Federalist Papers as an authoritative guide to the meaning of the Constitution consider the following, Thomas Jefferson described The Federalist Papers as "an authority to which appeal is habitually made by all, and rarely declined or denied by any as evidence of the general opinion of those who framed, and of those who accepted the Constitution of the United States, on questions as to its genuine meaning".<sup>26</sup> The founding fathers clearly believed the national government should be ultimately responsible for the defense of the nation. Both Hamilton and Jay strongly stated their convictions. Hamilton wrote: "The principal purposes to be answered by union are these-the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks."<sup>27</sup> Jay wrote: "a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords them (the people) the best security that can be devised against *hostilities* from abroad."<sup>28</sup> The *union* in these quotations refers to the national government of the United States.

As demonstrated above, many founding fathers strongly believed the responsibility for the common defense of the nation resided with the national government. But, why authorize a standing army? Why did they believe that the national government should be ultimately responsible for common security? Why not depend on the collective strength of the state

militias? At the time, the primary reasons given for the creation of a standing army can be summarized as follows: the vital threats were external professional armies; only a professional army could effectively counter a professional threat; skill and readiness could only be maintained by a professional standing army; and other important security functions required full-time forces which would be too taxing on the state militias.

The leaders of the nation believed the vital threats to the nations were external. Hamilton wrote:

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to the domination of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and establishments subject to the domination of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers, create between them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies.<sup>29</sup>

The European powers possessed professional standing armies with garrisons in neighboring regional colonies. Several were maritime powers with the means to cross the oceans and threaten us. To counter these external powers with effective professional armies, the American leaders believed the United States must possess a standing professional force of its own. "The steady operation of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind."<sup>30</sup> The leaders also clearly believed an effective militia was extremely important for several vital reasons, but they thought that maintaining a militia at a *military skill* and *readiness* level of a standing professional army would be difficult, expensive and disruptive to other important activities of the nation. "A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, nor a week nor even a month, that will suffice for the attainment of it."<sup>31</sup> This passage alludes to a *full time* force that would have the time to attain the required *military skill*. Additionally, they recognized that many other security functions required a *full-time* force. Hamilton wrote: "previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable".<sup>32</sup> Further, "if we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this purpose there must be dockyards and arsenals; and for the defense of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons."<sup>33</sup> However, these enduring missions were judged to be too disruptive to a militia. Hamilton wrote:

Garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens.<sup>34</sup>

The *complexity* of any task, which is fundamental to a specific role or mission, especially a military task, will drive the amount of training time required to attain the requisite level of proficiency or skill to execute these roles and missions. Therefore, *complex* tasks, missions and roles should be assigned to a *full-time* professional security force that has the critical resource, time, to attain the required *military skill*. Roles requiring instant *readiness* or response must be assigned to a *full-time* security force. *Full-time* roles can be assigned to *part-time* militia forces as a secondary role in case of national emergency. Further, assignment of roles should avoid adverse impact on important *non-security functions* like: agriculture, commerce or public administration. Militia members perform these other vital roles; therefore this is another reason *full time* roles should not be assigned to the militia. From the above passages, we can distill several important criteria to judge which security force should be assigned specific roles and missions. They are *military skill*, *readiness*, *full or part time* roles, *complexity*, impact upon *personnel (militia members)* and impact on important *non-security functions*.

There was also a concern that if the common defense were based upon the collective strength of the individual state militias, some states, as a result of their geography, would be tasked with an unequal burden of the common defense. This could result in an unequal balance of power between states, thereby creating internal threats and competition among the states. Hamilton wrote: "the territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding it ought in like manner be the objects of common councils"<sup>35</sup> Using New York as the example, Hamilton describes what might happen if New York maintained a large organized militia as its contribution to a collective national security based on the concept of collective security (no standing army): "if the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm".<sup>36</sup> It must be assumed that the United States could only afford a modest sized professional force, which, by its size, could not be garrisoned in all parts of the union. Therefore, this was another important reason

that America could not rely solely on a militia based security arrangement. The United States needed a professional army.

The organized militia had several key roles it was better suited to play than a federal force. It was seen as the force best positioned to quickly respond to internal threats. It would have the trust of local populations while not further inciting, nor creating a threat to them. Hamilton best communicates his thoughts on this topic in the form of rhetorical questions: "where in the name of common sense are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests?"<sup>37</sup> An organized militia would also be an effective counter-balance to a federal force which some worried could be used by a tyrannical national government against the people. Here we can see, for several important reasons, it was the intent of the founders to have a harmonious balance between a standing army and organized militias. The militia would also have the lead in responding to local internal problems within their capability. The federal Army would only respond when requested by the state governments.

At this point, two more criteria can be established. They are: *federal roles* and *state roles*. Roles that are primarily federal should be assigned to the federal standing army. Best examples, fighting other professional armies and conducting full time missions. If these roles could potentially require a larger force than that of the standing army: the state militias should have these roles as secondary roles, which they could execute after mobilization and federalization. Roles that are best executed by local forces should be assigned to the state militias. Again, if the role could potentially require a larger force than that of the state militias, the standing army should have these roles as secondary roles, which could be conducted after request from state authorities.

During the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, another important new role for the Army was innocently began. The role of *civil works* executed by the Corps of Engineers. When Thomas Jefferson ascended to the presidency, he brought with him hostility toward standing armies.<sup>38</sup> He seemed to hold at once conflicting views on the utility of a standing army vs. organized militias. "If a standing army must be tolerated, however, Jefferson believed it should be as useful as possible, and not merely in military ways."<sup>39</sup> At this time, America did not have any schools to teach and develop citizens in several critical technical skills. America had to rely on foreign trained (European) and normally foreigners (Europeans) for civil and military technical skills. In response, the Army established a school at West Point, New York in 1794 to train artillerists and engineers. America wanted to "escape that dependence on foreigners for the technical skills of those

branches that had characterized the Revolution".<sup>40</sup> "West Point was the only engineering school in the country until Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute was founded in 1824".<sup>41</sup> President Jefferson then employed the Army in road building and exploring. This *civil works* role evolved to include building fortifications, costal waterways, harbors, dams, canals, managing rivers and lakes and more.<sup>42</sup>

The passage of the Militia Act of 1792 was an important military development. The act "fix(ed) the principle of a universal military obligation in the statutory law of the new government. It required the enrollment of every free, white, able-bodied male citizen between eighteen and forty-five in the militia of his state."<sup>43</sup> It also empowered the President to call up the militia for national service. However, it left to the states the establishment of training and performance standards. Based on the militia's poor performance up to this point, many wanted the Militia Act to require the militia to conform to federal training and performance standards. It was the erratic performance of the organized militia during the 19th Century that fueled a debate over the need of a "federal reserve". With the evidence presented up to this point, it is important to conclude that the founding fathers intended the militia to be defensive in nature. Its vital roles were to *react to internal threats* and help the standing professional army *defend the homeland from external threats*. Up to this point in America history, all the components of The Army were employed in roles and missions within North America.

With the blossoming global industrial revolution, in the late 1800's, the national strategic interests of the United States were expanding. As a result, the national security strategy of the U.S. was evolving to reflect the expanding international focus. This required military policy and legal reform to effectively use our military forces in support of these new strategies. The industrial age brought on increased interaction with distant nations. Ultimately, U.S. national interests were expanding well beyond the national borders. Russell F. Weigley writes:

Having become the leading industrial power during the 1890's, having completed the task of settling the North American continent, placed upon a globe shrunken by improving communications, the United States now possessed a wealth and a military potential that drew her into international political (and economic) activity.

<sup>44</sup>

Beginning early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Army gained two important new roles, the first: *seizing and/or holding new territories*. This role was vital during the strategic competition with foreign powers, especially France and Spain, for the expansion west during the colonization of North America. Additionally, new territories, commonwealths and protectorates around the world were gained, for a variety of reasons, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. These roles essentially ended with the last major territorial acquisition of United States with the purchase of

the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917.<sup>45</sup> The second role was: *protecting Americans' lives and property abroad*. Hundreds of relatively small, short duration missions, normally executed by Naval forces, but occasionally by Army units, were conducted throughout the 1800's and into the early 1900's to protect American lives and property abroad. These operations were often conducted under the guise of "protecting American interests".<sup>46</sup> Most of these missions were conducted either in the contested lands within North America or in foreign countries, primarily; the Caribbean, Africa, Central America and Asia (primarily China).<sup>47</sup> The Army's employment in this role significantly diminished in the later half of the 20th century, but has occasionally been recently performed as in the emergency evaluation of American living aboard, the "rescue" of American students studying in Grenada and the re-flagging and escorting of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s.

The U.S. involvement in the Spanish-American War of 1898 occurred for several reasons, the primary of which could be debated. One reason was the result of a role that the United States took on in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century: *militarily defend, assist or restore an ally*. This role grew dramatically in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The ally in this case was a Cuban insurgency group. Although it can be argued there were other reasons why the U. S. intervened, "the ostensible reason for going to war with Spain was to "liberate" Cuba".<sup>48</sup> This new role came into conflict with the laws of the nation, as interpreted at the time, and required legal and military reform. Further, it directly influenced the formation of a permanent "federal reserve" now known as the United States Army Reserve (USAR).

The planned deployment of a major force outside the United States for the Spanish-American War exposed a possible vital flaw in the Constitution of the United States when the Congress of the United States authorized the President to "employ the entire land and naval forces of the United States to secure the independence of Cuba".<sup>49</sup> It instantly exposed the Army to an old and acute issue. Specifically, using organized militia forces outside the United States. There had been occasions in the past when governors and militia leaders had refused to conduct operations outside the United States based on a generally held belief that the Constitution did not authorize the use of the militia outside the United States. They saw limited militia roles based on their restrictive interpretation of the language in the Constitution as detailed below. Although this was an old issue, it came to a "flash point" early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The laws relating to the militia, as understood and interpreted by key leaders and jurists, were too restrictive to effectively implement the evolving National Security Strategy. Simply, use of the militia outside the United States was judged to be illegal. The following quotation details how they circumvented this issue during the Spanish-American War:

Since the volunteers were intended for overseas service (Cuba), the National Guardsmen were sworn in as individuals, not militia units, thus obviating the old question surrounding the constitutional provision that militia might be called "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."<sup>50</sup>

The formation of a "federal reserve" during the dawn of the 20th Century fundamentally changed the character of the Reserve Component. As detailed earlier, the Militia Act of 1792 had not required the state militias to meet federal training and performance standards. This is one of the leading causes of the erratic mobilization and combat performance of the militias during the 19th Century. This fueled a continuous debate over how to improve the performance of a reserve force. Over many years, many different and varying leaders simply wanted to form a "federal reserve" system to replace the organized militias. Emory Upton recommended:

American citizen soldiery should be made thoroughly subsidiary to the Regular Army. The Regular Army should be reorganized into skeleton formations, and in war those formations should become be filled with the citizen volunteers. Thus the war Army should consist entirely of Regular formations, and all volunteers should serve under Regular officers.<sup>51</sup>

When Elihu Root came to be the Secretary of War early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, he directed the study of several key issues, including the old "question of improving the Army's reserves".<sup>52</sup> Root had personally studied many foreign and domestic options, including Emory Upton's desire to form a "federal reserve". Root chose to reform the existing system. After several years of study and debate several key pieces of legislation were passed including the Militia Act of 1903; commonly known as the Dick Act.<sup>53</sup> The Dick Act was "a fundamental revision of the militia laws, but one which preserved most of the historic state militia system."<sup>54</sup> Some highlights of the Dick Act were:

- National Guard companies and regiments were designated the "Organized Militia".
- To maintain its status and its federal aid, a National Guard unit had to hold at least twenty-four drills or target-practice periods a year, plus a summer encampment of not less than five days in the field.
- The Guard units were to undergo periodic inspection by Regular as well as Guard officers.
- The Regular Army was to detail officers to the states to instruct the Guard.
- Guard officers became eligible to attend Army schools at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War College.<sup>55</sup>

These important reforms significantly improved the manning, equipping and training of the National Guard. These reforms attempted to improve the military skill, professionalism and performance of National Guardsmen and units. In 1908, Congress made several vital changes

to the first Dick Act. Most importantly, "Congress recognized the Guard as a reserve for all wars, foreign and domestic, by stating that the Organized Militia could be called into federal service 'either within or without the Territory of the United States.'" <sup>56</sup>

As the leaders of the country anticipated the possibility of joining the war in Europe, later known as World War I, many were concerned with the preparedness of the United States and debated the requirements and best options available. Meanwhile, the Attorney General of the United States opined that use of the militia outside the United States was unconstitutional.<sup>57</sup> Some may have genuinely believed this, many likely used it as an excuse to form a "federal reserve" and eliminate organized militia or at least relegate them to a third-tier status. Again, the old issue of forming a "federal reserve" was resurrected. The basis of a "federal reserve" was initially formed with the passage of Senate Bill 1424 on April 23, 1908. This authorized the establishment of a Medical Reserve Corps.<sup>58</sup> Additionally, a rider to the 1912 Army Appropriations Act created an enlisted federal reserve force. "Men with a 7-year enlistment would serve in the Regular forces for 3 years and in the Reserve for 4 years."<sup>59</sup> Chief of Staff of the Army, General Leonard Wood organized summer camps at which college students could receive military training and in 1915 he opened up a similar camp at Plattsburg, New York for business and professional men.<sup>60</sup> This would be the foundation of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) formalized later. In that same year, President "Wilson asked his War and Navy Secretaries to formulate new national security programs". <sup>61</sup> This was amidst a heated debate surrounding the preparedness of the United States Armed Forces and the participation in the war looming in Europe. The national security statement that was produced "continued support of the National Guard; but there would also be a federal reserve of trained citizen soldiers, obviously destined for a larger role than the Guard."<sup>62</sup> Secretary of War Garrison:

Suggested that the Regular Army be seconded by a federal force "definitely identified in personnel, provided with equipment and organization, possessed of some training, and subject to instant call . . . They would call it the Continental Army. He would promise the National Guard increased federal support, but he would relegate it definitely to a minor role behind the Regular Army and the ready federal reserve, the Continental Army."<sup>63</sup>

During this "preparedness" debate, party politics were raging between the Democrats and Republicans. Leading Republicans, including War department and military leaders, dominated the "preparedness" movement. However, Southern congressmen "felt misgivings about the Continental Army and the eclipse of the National Guard on states'-rights grounds."<sup>64</sup> Representative Hay offered an alternate plan--

To strengthen the National Guard by increasing federal responsibility for it. The federal government should both equip and train the organized militia and also

pay them. The federal government should curb political patronage in the Guard by reserving the right to qualify state officers for equivalent federal commissions. In return, the states should assure that federal standards would be maintained, and Guardsmen should swear an oath to respond with their entire units to federal calls for service anywhere. The latter would assure both federal control in wartime and the constitutionality of militia service outside the United States.<sup>65</sup>

"Faced with a choice between Hay and Garrison, and between a bill of some kind and no bill at all, Wilson chose Hay and the National Guard. The National Defense Act of 1916 formalized several key initiatives: It generally implemented the Hay's plan by placing the National Guard under increased federal supervision. It accomplished this by requiring its officers and men to swear to obey the President and defend the Constitution of the United States."<sup>66</sup> The federal government would now pay for forty-eight armory drills per year. It prescribed standards for Guard officers. It retained the National Guard as the principle trained reserve. Most ominously, the act provided for a Regular Army enlisted reserve, composed of veterans; and evolved the businessmen's summer camps and student military training program into formal organizations in the Officers Reserve Corps, Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and an Enlisted Reserve Corps. These organizations would grow and evolve into what is now the USAR.<sup>67</sup>

These actions were contrary to the concepts and ideals of the drafters of the Constitution. They had painfully examined and had deliberately crafted, for many important reasons, a security arrangement based upon a professional standing federal army backed up by organized militias. Few leaders recommended reforming the current militia system to make it work better, most just wanted a new system. It is important to point out that most military leaders of this century were regular Army officers trained and commissioned from the military academy at West Point. It is likely they were strongly biased against any organization that was not trained and led by regular professionally trained officers. Since state authorities appointed militia officers, it is unlikely many had professional training. The regular Army officers were likely elitists who looked down upon the militia officers. It is also unlikely that any suggested reform to correct the militia system was seriously considered.

## **CURRENT ROLES AND MISSIONS**

Given the amount of importance given to roles and missions of the U. S. Army, it would seem logical that the United States would have a clear, concise, logical, linked, nested series of strategic documents that clearly and concisely prescribed to the Services, and ultimately to the separate Army components, their roles and corresponding missions. Conceptually, each descending document would further refine and detail exactly who does what, and why. One

could envision the linkage as follows: the Constitution providing broad security roles by Service and component; United States Code (USC) providing more prescriptive authorities, responsibilities, roles, functions and missions to Department of Defense (DoD) and the Services; a DoD directive further defining and assigning specific roles and corresponding missions to the Services; the Services providing further regulation, definition and assignment of specific roles and corresponding missions to each of their components (AC and RC). In this manner, as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and supporting National Military Strategy (NMS) were developed and approved by successive Administrations and Congresses. Appropriate changes could be made to the DoD and Service implementation documents. This would insure an efficient and effective execution of the tasks required to implement the National Security Strategy of the United States.

A review of the following documents Constitution of the United States, Title 10 and 32 of United States Code, the National Security Strategy of the United States, the National Military Strategy of the United States, Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Joint Vision 2020, Army Vision 2010 and Army Field Manual (FM) #1 revealed that no clear, concise, comprehensive list, by Service, by component exists. Additionally, the terms: roles, functions and missions are not precisely or effectively used, therefore, a glossary of key terms is attached that defines and clarifies the usage of these and other key terms.

It was surprising not to find a comprehensive list of the roles, functions and missions of The Army in any single strategic document. Although several proclaim to describe them, none do. Further, none of these important documents attempts to refine and define specific and discreet roles and missions for each component.

The national laws directing The Army are found in two "Titles": Title 10 covering the active Army and USAR and Title 32 which directs the Army and Air Force National Guard. Surprisingly, Title 10 and 32, even taken in combination, do not effectively detail roles, functions and missions of The Army. Title 10, USC states:

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—

- (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any area occupied by the United States;
- (2) supporting the national policies;
- (3) implementing the national objectives; and
- (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.<sup>68</sup>

If these are meant to be the roles and missions of The Army, they are simply too broad. Almost any conceivable mission could be justified under these statements. It abdicates to the Department of Defense and Armed Services to decide exactly what they are supposed to do. It lacks strategic priorities. Additionally, Title 32 does not specifically address the roles and missions of the National Guard. In the general policy section of this document it states: "In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times."<sup>69</sup> It appears that the role and mission of the National Guard in relation to defense of the United States is clear, however other roles and missions are not addressed.

DoD Directive 5100.1 does not comprehensively prescribe the roles or missions to the Services, but it does prescribe common and specific functions for each Service. However, last published in 1987, it does not set priorities and is somewhat dated. The recently released Army FM 1 lists the functions detailed in DoD 5100.1 but makes no attempt to expand upon them, develop specific roles and missions from them, prioritize them or provide specific guidance to each of the components on how they relate specifically to them. In its preface, it claims:

(FM 1) tells us who we are, what we do, and how we do it. It points the way to the future and establishes doctrine for employing land power in support of the national security strategy and the national military strategy. It also delineates The Army's purpose, roles, and functions as established by the Constitution; the Congress in Title 10, USC; and Department of Defense Directive 5100.1.<sup>70</sup>

Unfortunately, the above quotation does not cite Title 32, USC that governs the National Guard. This oversight demonstrates the challenge in providing guidance to "The Army". FM 1 further details "Core Competencies" which it claims "define our fundamental contributions to our Nation's security".<sup>71</sup> This "capstone doctrinal manual"<sup>72</sup> states that "these primary functions (listed in DoD 5100.1) and the diverse, full spectrum set of missions assigned by the National Command Authorities and combatant commanders link The Army's enduring roles with The Army core competencies."<sup>73</sup> This seems to reverse the responsibilities. It appears it is DoD's responsibility to link the Army's core competencies to the Army's enduring roles, not the other way around. A more logical approach to formalize the Army's roles and missions would be to take the functions detailed in DoD Directive 5100.1 and to expand, prioritize and direct specific roles, functions and missions to each of the components.

A relatively new and growing role with a multitude of missions now places a significant requirement on today's military, the role known as Military Operations Other Than War

(MOOTW). These are a wide ranging set of operations that include: Arms control; combating terrorism; Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flights; humanitarian assistance; military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation operations; peace operations; protection of shipping; recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes and raids; and support to insurgency.<sup>74</sup>

### ANALYSIS OF ROLES AND MISSIONS

In a perfect world, the historical roles and missions of The Army would coincide precisely with the current strategic documents. In this situation, one could crosswalk the current documents with history. We could then use either source as a comprehensive starting point to review, certify and recommend to the Transformation and Objective Force planners for planning, programming, resourcing, missioning, force designing and force sizing of The Army. However, as demonstrated before, the lack of a comprehensive document requires us to go “back to the future”. By this we mean, consolidating the roles and missions developed during our historical review, to use and leverage our rich history, lessons learned and guiding criteria to guide the future.

We graphically represented the relationships between the various criteria and a specific Army role or mission. The graph displays the relationships and relative affinity between opposing criteria, as an example - simple versus complex. We applied professional judgment to determine where between these each opposing criteria the weight was placed. A table is provided to summarize the roles for each component.




FIGURE 1  
16




FIGURE 2




FIGURE 3






FIGURE 4



**FIGURE 5**



**FIGURE 6**

**SUMMARY OF ROLES AND MISSIONS BY COMPONENT**

	Reserve Component	Active Component
Execute the laws of the Union	Lead	Support
Suppress Insurrections	Lead	Support
Repel Invasions	Lead	Support
Civil Works	Eliminate mission	Eliminate mission
Seizing and/or holding new territory	Support	Lead
Defend, assist or restore allies	Support	Lead
Military Operations Other Than War	Support	Lead

## **CONCLUSION**

The national government is ultimately responsible for the defense of the nation. Therefore, the national government is empowered to raise and maintain a federal standing Army and regulate the state militias in order to accomplish this role. The United States requires both professional standing army and an effective organized reserve. The roles of the standing federal Army and the state militias were originally intended to be different. The standing federal Army's role was to be a full-time force, instantly ready, focused primarily on external threats. The state militias were to be part-time forces, quickly ready for small local internal threats, and in times of grave need to mobilize for limited periods to reinforce the standing Army against internal and external threats. The historical effectiveness of the reserves in combat, especially the militia, is closely related to their employment in a proper role. When trained, equipped and employed in a proper role: they normally perform well. When employed in an improper role, their historical performance is less flattering. The founders did not intend the creation of a separate "federal reserve", as in the current USAR. They intended only one organized reserve: the state militias. National security requirements have evolved and expanded over time. This has resulted in new roles for all the components of The Army. However, during this evolution, key changes violated the original founding fathers intents and concepts. An analytical approach was developed in an attempt to dispassionately and critically address the question concerning the appropriateness of the current roles and missions of the United States Army Reserve Component for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Methodically, we reviewed the history of The Army, presented the lessons-learned, researched all appropriate strategic documents, and developed from them a set of criteria to test and analyze the Army's roles and missions. This led to the recommended roles and missions for the Army Reserve Component to execute during the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Congress should eliminate USAR. In the historical review, we detailed the many reasons the USAR was formed and evolved. In review, the core reasons were- -

- To create a federal reserve force with improved performance.
- To circumvent the legal constraints of using the National Guard outside the United States.

The numerous defense and militia reforms over our history has adequately resolved the mobilization, federalization, resourcing and standards issues related to the National Guard which created the perceived need for the USAR. Additionally, the formation of the USAR under

the congressional power to “raise armies”, abused this power which the founders had not intended. Therefore, for the purposes of simplicity, efficiency and unity of command, Congress should eliminate the USAR. The security forces of the United States should be based on a professional standing army, backed by an effective National Guard. The roles and missions performed by the USAR would be absorbed by the active army or National Guard guided by the analysis and recommendations below.

Second, Congress should eliminate all unrelated civil works roles from the Armed Forces. As discussed in the historical review, the Army gained this role out of sheer necessity. Years ago our nation developed a robust academic and private sector capacity to attend to the nation’s civil works requirements. The vast majority of the missions performed by the Corps of Engineers in civil works are not related to security roles. FM 1 does not list civil works as a core competency. This role is no longer appropriate to the Armed Forces and should pass to the private sector with regulation and management by another more appropriate governmental department.

WORD COUNT: 7,906

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, 81-82.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 78-79.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 29-43.

<sup>5</sup> Andy Staples, "Henry II's Assize of Arms", May 2000; available from <http://www.minarsas.demon.co.uk/harn/lionheart/armsassize.htm>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Weigley, 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>8</sup> "Instructions for General Musters (1572," ; available from [http://www.constitution.org/sech/sech\\_087.txt](http://www.constitution.org/sech/sech_087.txt); Internet; accessed 10 March 2002.

<sup>9</sup> S. T. Ansell, "Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia," Yale Law Journal 6 (April 1917): 472.

<sup>10</sup> Weigley, 4.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 10-11.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 81.

<sup>18</sup> Kenneth C. Davis, Don't Know Much About History (New York: Avon, 1990), 83.

<sup>19</sup> Weigley, 84.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 15.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York, New American Library, 1999), 512-513.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 513.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, Preface.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, ix.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 121.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 128-129.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 134.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 152.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 129.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 130.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 129.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 131.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 154.

<sup>38</sup> Harry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1789 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), 132-133.

<sup>39</sup> Weigley, 105.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 164.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 165-166.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 93.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 313.

<sup>45</sup> John W. Wright, ed., The New York Times Almanac (New York: Penguin Group, 1999), 224.

<sup>46</sup> Ellen C. Collier, "Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798-1993," 07 October 1993; available from <http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm>; Internet. Accessed 02 February 2002.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Don't Know Much About History, 218.

<sup>49</sup> Weighley, 295.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 297.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 277.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 317.

<sup>53</sup> Charles E. Heller, Twenty-First Century Force: A Federal Army and a Militia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute/ U.S. Army War College, 1993), 14.

<sup>54</sup> Weigley, 321.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 322.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 324.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 325.

<sup>58</sup> "The Army Reserve is Born," available from <http://www.army.mil/usar/history/weekly/2001/week17.html>; Internet. Accessed 10 March 2002.

<sup>59</sup> Heller, 15.

<sup>60</sup> Weigley, 342.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 344.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 345

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 348.

<sup>67</sup> Heller, 17.

<sup>68</sup> Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, 107th Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), vol. 2, 1345.

<sup>69</sup> "Title 32 – National Guard," 10 August 1956; available from [http://uscode.house.gov/title\\_32.htm](http://uscode.house.gov/title_32.htm); Internet; accessed 10 March 2002.

<sup>70</sup> Department of the Army, The Army, Field Manual 1(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), iv.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, iv.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>74</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 16 June 1995), III-1.

<sup>75</sup> Webster's Dictionary, Encyclopedic ed. (Chicago: J.G. Ferguson Publishing, 1977), 1141.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 1196.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 103.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, 741.

<sup>80</sup> Department of Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 24 may 1995), 1-1.

<sup>81</sup> Webster's, 1570.

<sup>82</sup> Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, 1-1.

<sup>83</sup> Department of Defense, "Joint Pub 1-02," 12 April 2001; available from [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jpl\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf); Internet; accessed 10 March 2002.

## GLOSSARY

They are not listed alphabetically; they are grouped in ways to better allow comparison, contrast and comment.

**Militia.** "Any army composed of citizens rather than professional soldiers, called out in time of emergency"<sup>75</sup>. This consists of the organized militia and the unorganized militia. The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) is a federal force and is not considered apart of the militia.

**Unorganized Militia.** All able-bodied male citizens between 18 and 45 years old, who are not part of an organized militia.<sup>76</sup>

**Organized Militia (National Guard).** "That part of the militia consisting of the properly organized, equipped and trained forces of the individual States, supported in part by the Federal government: it becomes a definite component of the Army of the United States when called into active Federal service"<sup>77</sup>. The Army National Guard comprises the organized militia.

This paper addresses the organized militia, therefore, for the purposes of simplicity the terms: **militia** and **National Guard** are synonymous. References to the unorganized militia will be clearly delineated.

**the (lower case "t") Army.** Refers to the standing federal active component Army, exclusive of the militia.

**Standing Army.** "An army maintained in peacetime, as well as in time of war, on a permanent organizational basis."<sup>78</sup> Also known as the **Regular Army**.

For the purposes of simplicity: **the Army, Standing Army and Regular Army** are all synonymous.

**The (capital "T") Army.** Refers to the whole Army including both active and reserve components (Active Army, Army National Guard and the U.S Army Reserve).

### **Function.**

- "A special duty or performance required of a person or thing in the course of work or activity; as the function of a policeman is to protect and assist the public"<sup>79</sup>
- "Specific responsibilities assigned by Congress, by the President, or by the Secretary of Defense to enable DOD components to fulfill the purposes for which they were established."<sup>80</sup>

### **Role.**

- A function or office assumed by someone as a leading public character; as, the role of Romeo; in the role of the statesman"<sup>81</sup>
- "Broad and enduring purposes specified by Congress in law for the Services and selected DOD components."<sup>82</sup>

For our purposes **roles** and **functions** can be used interchangeably.

**Mission.** "The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for taking it."<sup>83</sup>



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