



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**THE MULTI-COMPONENT CONCEPT,
A CASE STUDY OF AC/RC INTEGRATION IN ACTION**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS E. O'DONOVAN
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2002



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20020429 140

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE MULTI-COMPONENT CONCEPT,
A CASE STUDY OF AC/RC INTEGRATION IN ACTION**

by

Thomas E. O'Donovan
United States Army, Corps of Engineers

Colonel Michael D. Koplin
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Thomas E. O'Donovan

TITLE: The Multi-component Concept, A Case Study of AC/RC Integration in Action

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 April 2002

PAGES: 46

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This study accomplishes three things. First, it captures in a formal manner the experiences of the Army's first tri-component battalion, the 52nd Engineer Battalion. This ensures that the lessons learned, successes, challenges and overall results at the unit level for the period from tri-component reorganization in October 1999 to the present are recorded and available to planners, analysts, and leaders. Second, the study assesses the multi-component (MC) concept by extrapolating from the experience of the 52nd Engineer Battalion. The assessment is done in three approaches; against the stated goals of the MC concept, against a model for effective change within organizations, and finally using the Doctrine-Training-Leader development-Organization-Material-Soldier (DTLOMS) model for force management. The case study and the assessment form the basis for the third goal, a set of recommendations for the MC program, both in terms of the 52nd Engineer Battalion and the overall MC program. These study goals serve to show that the MC concept has tremendous potential to truly address some of the significant issues that have challenged AC/RC interaction for many years.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
PREFACE	vii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	ix
THE MULTI-COMPONENT CONCEPT, A CASE STUDY OF AC/RC INTEGRATION IN ACTION.....	1
BACKGROUND	2
CASE STUDY	3
UNIT BACKGROUND.....	3
SUCCESSSES	5
CHALLENGES	8
COMPARISON, THE 249 TH ENGINEER BATTALION	11
ASSESSMENT	12
ASSESSMENT AGAINST THE STATED PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.....	13
ASSESSMENT AGAINST A TEMPLATE FOR SUCCESSFUL CHANGE.....	15
Stage 1: Establishing a sense of urgency	15
Stage 2: Creating the guiding coalition	16
Stage 3: Developing a vision and a strategy	17
Stage 4: Communicating the change vision	17
Stage 5: Empowering broad based action	18
Stage 6: Generating short term wins	19
Stage 7: Consolidating gains and producing more change	19
Stage 8: Anchoring new approaches in the culture	19

ASSESSMENT AGAINST THE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES, DOCTRINE- TRAINING-LEADER DEVELOPMENT-ORGANIZATION-MATERIAL-SOLDIERS (DTLOMS)	19
RECOMMENDATIONS	22
52 ND ENGINEER BATTALION	22
MC CONCEPT.....	23
CONCLUSION.....	25
ENDNOTES	27
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	35

PREFACE

With grateful appreciation to Colonel Mike Koplín for becoming a multi-component expert, to my wife and family for tremendous patience over the last three years, as they became multi-component, and to the soldiers of the 52nd Engineer Battalion, we have served together.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. 52ND ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION.....4

THE MULTI-COMPONENT CONCEPT, A CASE STUDY OF AC/RC INTEGRATION IN ACTION

The armies of France have therefore, been mixed, partly mercenaries and partly citizen troops; armies combined together in such a fashion are much better than a purely auxiliary force or a purely mercenary army...

—Machiavelli, *The Prince*¹

This study is designed to accomplish three goals. First, to capture in a formal manner the experiences of the Army's first tri-component battalion, the 52nd Engineer Battalion. This will ensure that the lessons learned, successes, challenges and overall results at the unit level, for the period from tri-component reorganization in October 1999 to the present, are recorded and available to planners, analysts, and leaders. Second, the study will assess the multi-component (MC) concept by extrapolating from the experience of the 52nd Engineer Battalion. This assessment will be in three approaches; (1) evaluated against established goals of the MC concept, (2) evaluated against a model for effective change within organizations, and (3) using the Doctrine-Training-Leader development-Organization-Material-Soldier (DTLOMS) model for force management. The case study and assessment then form the basis to accomplish the third goal, which is a set of recommendations for the MC initiative, both in terms of the 52nd Engineer Battalion and the Army's overall program. These three study goals will serve to show that the MC concept has tremendous potential in addressing some of the significant issues that have challenged AC/RC relations for many years.

The MC concept will be described in detail in Section 2, but suffice it to say that placing soldiers and units from different components together into one unit under a single commander is a natural, but significantly different, extension of efforts to draw the components closer together. These efforts, typically called integration, have recently been defined by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) as:

Creating the conditions and relationships among components that facilitate effective and efficient "joining" of components to perform military missions is now known as integration.

The term "AC/RC integration" may be a recent coinage and integration's scope is certainly broader now than even 10 years ago, but the generic concept's meaning has not changed.²

The multitude of integration efforts and programs undertaken by the Army have been extensive to say the least. What is less clear is the effectiveness of these programs. While GAO's claims that the programs are fragmented and "piecemeal" and the Department of Defense's rejoinder that they are still effective³ notwithstanding, there are no definable goals to measure progress against. This study is an effort to provide valid data in response to the following conclusion by SSI:

Further research should determine if this program produces better results, using the same norms, than more traditional and less invasive affiliation programs. The multi-component units program can warrant support only if the answer to the latter question is yes and results from the former lead to selection of units with an optimal chance of success.⁴

BACKGROUND

The MC initiative is the result of a significant Department of Defense and Army effort to address "seams" in the Army between the components.⁵ As such it falls under the category of AC/RC integration efforts. Other initiatives within this category include programs such as; Integrated Divisions, Teaming, Force XXI Heavy Division Redesign, Bosnia Task Force, Integrated Light Infantry Battalions, Training Support XXI, Unit Mentor Relationships, and the AC/RC Command Exchange program.⁶ These programs all have roots in the histories of the stormy relationships between the active Army and the Reserve forces.

That long relationship is chronicled in detail in a number of sources⁷ but more recent events, such as the experience of the 24th Infantry Division and its roundout brigade, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech), in Desert Storm, highlight the fundamental issues.⁸ More recently, issues of resourcing, readiness, trust and roles came to a political head in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1996 in the form of public sparring over manpower and resources at each others expense.⁹ The intersection of post-Cold War missions, drawdowns, changing roles, reduced funding and other challenges caused a level of conflict that shook senior leaders at both the Army and Department of Defense levels. In 1997 Secretary of Defense Cohen published his memorandum "Integration of the Reserve and Active Components" with a focus on leadership responsibilities for integration. Then Chief of Staff of the Army General Reimer followed closely in 1998 with the publication of "One Team, One Fight, One Future." General Reimer stated that this document "describes our concept for achieving Total Army integration, maximizing the contributions of the US Army National Guard, the US Army Reserve and the Active Army."¹⁰ General Reimer described five key "themes"; (1) readiness is nonnegotiable, (2) the RC is our strongest link to the American people, (3) total Army leadership is essential, (4)

we must change, and (5) the Army has bold new ideas. The primary bold new idea described was that of the "multi-component unit" as described by General Reimer:

The Army's integration initiatives have tremendous potential. In particular, new organizational designs that integrate Active, Army National Guard and Reserve units will enhance Total Army readiness. Creating multi-component units will be a key enabler in building the Total Army leaders and agile, dynamic forces we will need in the 21st Century. This will fundamentally change the way we do business.¹¹

Based on that vision, DA developed a two phased approach consisting of a development phase using selected units and an implementation phase with wider resourcing of units across the Army. This strategy was incorporated into an initial policy letter on the establishment of multi-component units published in 1998, and the first eleven MC units were reorganized in 1999.¹² As of this writing there are 89 units that have, or are scheduled to reorganize as MC coming from 11 MACOM's.

These units encompass a variety of unit types and organizational structures. Units range from overseas high level headquarters units such as the 19th Theater Support Command, Eighth Army, to small specialized units such as the 912th Dental Company (USAR). Organizational structure ranges from 58 AC flagged units (6 with ARNG elements, 40 with USAR elements, 12 with both), to 28 USAR flagged units (27 with AC elements and 1 with AC and ARNG elements) and 3 ARNG flagged units (all with AC elements).

CASE STUDY

The multi-component concept as implemented at the battalion level in the 52nd Engineer Battalion at Fort Carson has had significant successes over the two years since reorganization. Detailed examination of these successes will set the stage for lessons learned about the MC concept, recommendations for future improvements and provide some idea of the potential of this initiative.¹³

UNIT BACKGROUND

The 52nd Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) is an ALO 1, tri-component unit with an AC Headquarters and Support Company (HSC, 220 soldiers authorized) and one AC line company (A Co, 144 authorized) stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado, one National Guard line company (B Co, 144 authorized), stationed in two detachments at Albany and Camp Rilea, Oregon, and one United States Army Reserve (USAR) company (C Co, 144 authorized) stationed in two detachments, Fort Carson, Colorado and Santa Fe, New Mexico (Figure 1). The battalion reorganized as tri-component on 16 October 1999¹⁴ as part of phase I, development, of the MC

concept (FY 99-01). After reorganization, 44% of the battalion was Reserve Component (RC).¹⁵ The RC companies are stationed in two detachments located separately to broaden the recruiting area.




FIGURE 1 - 52ND ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION (HEAVY)(TRI-COMPONENT)

The battalion reorganized from an ALO 2 single component battalion with an AC HSC and two AC line companies, all located at Fort Carson. The current National Guard company was previously the 442nd Engineer Company, a separate combat heavy company attached to the 1249th Engineer Battalion, ORARNG, a mechanized engineer battalion. The detachment at Camp Rilea was a utility detachment. The USAR company was designated D Company, 52nd Engineer Battalion in the early eighties and participated in Desert Storm under that designation. With the reduction to two AC line companies at Fort Carson the company was designated C Company and was headquartered in Santa Fe. There it was subordinate to the 90th RSC and had an informal relationship with the AC portion of the battalion. C Company (USAR) deployed through Fort Carson to Desert Storm and joined the battalion in theater.

The battalion is subordinate to the 43rd Area Support Group (ASG), which is subordinate to the 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson. Training support for each RC company is provided by the geographically supporting Training Support Battalion (TSBn) from the 91st Division (Training Support). 1/364 TSBn, Fort Lewis supports B Company (ORARNG) and 1/361 TSBn, Denver, supports C Company (USAR).

With reorganization in 1999 the 52nd Engineer Battalion was the Army's first tri-component battalion. The battalion mission became: on order the 52nd Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy)

(Tri-component) deploys to any theater of operations and conducts general engineering missions in support of US / Joint / Combined forces and provides countermobility and survivability engineer support as required. Further, upon reorganization, the battalion adopted the multi-component mission of: reach the very highest possible readiness of all components using the individual strengths of each component.¹⁶

Since reorganization, three major battalion collective training events have been completed. In the summer of 2000 about 120 soldiers from the AC portion of the battalion deployed to Oregon for Annual Training (AT) with B Company (ORARNG). The AC element provided command and control, construction support and limited maintenance support for Operation OREGON FOREST, a tactical construction exercise in the Deschutes National Forest of Oregon. Later in the summer the battalion completed exercise COYOTE CASTLE. This exercise involved tactical construction of projects for Fort Carson with C Company (USAR). In 2001 all companies of the battalion deployed to South Dakota to participate in Exercise GOLDEN THUNDER. This 3500 soldier exercise included National Guard and USAR units from across the United States in a Bosnia based scenario of a simulated Corps in mid to high intensity conflict. Again the battalion executed tactical construction. All three of these training exercises involved Training Assessment Modules (TAM's) of RC elements by our TSBn's, OPFOR and deployment operations by many different modes.

Smaller, battalion supported, collective training events included weapons qualification ranges, FTX's, and equipment operator training. The battalion ran weapons ranges using AC soldiers in direct support of RC soldiers qualifying, which allowed maximum use of critical RC training time. Integrated FTX's at Fort Carson have allowed C Company (USAR) to fall in on a battalion footprint that provides mess and medical support, a partially established perimeter, command and control, construction support and maintenance support. This integrated the RC company and maximized RC training time.

SUCSESSES

Wartrace: Unlike much of the RC portion of the Army, B Company (ORANG) and C Company (USAR) Commanders know with some assurance who their wartime commander is.¹⁷ This has significant impact when stating a unit's wartime mission, developing a METL and determining critical supporting battle tasks. This results in better (i.e. more focused) training.

Integration with the Battalion: Through the execution of Operation OREGON FOREST, COYOTE CASTLE and Exercise GOLDEN THUNDER the battalion made significant progress in integrating company leadership into battalion operations. During planning and preparation

phases, VTC's and teleconferences, e-mail of OPORDS and FRAGOs, backbriefs, rehearsals and other forms of continuous coordination were completed. This allowed company and battalion leadership and staff to work together to identify and solve problems, coordinate training, and report accurate information. In any deployment mission these foundations would prove invaluable to deployment success. Further, efforts to integrate junior leaders included participation of company leadership of all components in ceremonies, Quarterly Training Briefs, Company training meetings, social events, visits to training and a METL development and review conference.

Equipment Turnover: When the 52nd became a multi-component unit the battalion deactivated the AC B Company at Fort Carson. The battalion shipped a significant amount of equipment to the new B Company (ORARNG) with the result of a significant improvement in the modernization of that unit. This would not have happened under Oregon's previous lower priority for equipment fielding. For an engineer unit this is particularly notable as it allows Oregon to use that equipment in a wide variety of roles for training or statewide assistance projects (for example under the Army Guard Bureau's Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) Program) or support for disaster response and humanitarian relief.

Equipment Fielding: The designation of the 52nd as multi-component brought all three components to one priority for equipment fielding. Previously C Company's (USAR) priority for fielding was very high due to alignment with XVIII Airborne Corps, while the AC portion of the battalion was somewhat lower and the Guard units of B Company were even lower. Therefore, C Company (USAR) had a wide variety of equipment that has yet to be fielded to the AC and Guard companies of the Battalion. New equipment is now being fielded to all three components simultaneously. Although the battalion has been challenged by different paint schemes,¹⁸ unit fielding has allowed the battalion to receive significant quantities of new equipment simultaneously. This ensures the opportunity for training for both operators and maintainers from all components simultaneously, or for the AC portion to receive training and then train the RC portion during drill or AT. Further, that commonality of equipment and training significantly improves the battalion's capabilities for any mission.¹⁹

Equipment Sharing: Because C Company had higher priority for equipment fielding, it was better equipped than the AC portions of the battalion. This allowed equipment sharing. For example, AC use of USAR night vision devices that have yet to be fielded to the AC parts of the battalion.

Battalion Support: The structure of Combat Heavy Battalions is particularly well suited to company level multi-component organization because much of the critical support required by

the companies is organized at the battalion level. For example, in Combat Heavy battalions, the battalion aid station, the dump truck section, within HSC, that supports haul missions for the companies, the Soils, Survey and Drafting (SSD) section within S3, the communications section, and the battalion Direct Support Maintenance shop all support the line companies. This type of support was difficult for the companies to obtain under other organizational structures. Examples of support range from weapons ranges to flu shots to new radio training to survey support on projects to maintenance assistance in preparation for readiness inspections. Further, for C Company (USAR) the advantages of having their next higher headquarters readily available has helped improve administrative processing of personnel actions. Particularly for those where the AC Battalion Commander is the approving authority.

Interaction with Training Support Battalions (TSBn): A significant issue resolved after reorganization was the designation of which TSBn's would provide coverage for each of our RC Companies. The final decision of the 91st Division (Training Support) to use the geographical footprints is now implemented. This allows the battalion to focus on command and control and support of the company while the TSBn's provide the Observer Controllers (OC's) for TAM evaluations, Lane Training Exercises (LTX's), and Tactical Operations Center Exercises (TOCEX's). This approach is working well and improves with time.

Construction Support: The integration of C Company (USAR) had added impact by allowing the battalion to develop construction projects on Fort Carson that support C Company's training requirements and support Fort Carson's construction needs. This involves construction planning, technical support to C Company, and installation construction at minimal cost for Fort Carson.²⁰

Funding: One success has been the transfer of USAR (Title 11) funds to Fort Carson to allow C Company Commander immediate access to money for class IX requisitions, TDY and other important items. Additionally, the battalion has undergone an Army Audit Agency (AAA) audit seeking to find instances involving mixing of Congressionally titled funds. Since the battalion had carefully managed funds to ensure there was no mixing, no findings resulted. However, ensuring success in the future remains a significant concern.²¹

Staffing: To ensure better support and integration with the RC companies the battalion sought to capture AC/RC expertise within the battalion headquarters. Selection of a Command Sergeant Major with AC/RC (TSBn) experience proved invaluable in having the senior NCO in the battalion deeply familiar with RC organization, training issues, solutions and experience. Also during the three years of preparing for and executing the MC concept the battalion experienced about a 50% success rate of having Field Grade officers with previous AC/RC

experience. These leaders previous experience proved important in coordinating with the 96th RSC and the supporting TSBn's and in understanding the RC companies issues.

CHALLENGES

A review of areas where the MC concept is challenged at the unit level provides insights into areas needing focus, recommendations for changes in procedures and also adds to a discussion about the potential of the initiative.²² SSI has pointed out that the challenges facing the MC concept may cause its eventual demise,²³ however those are challenges based on DA level review. While those challenges incorporate many concerns they do not address all unit level issues. A review of unit level challenges shows them to be reasonable, important, and most importantly, manageable.

Mobilization / Deployment Planning: One of the Wartrace deployment plans for the 52nd now includes the RC, the other Wartrace does not. In the first plan, AC and RC units are programmed to deploy together with Fort Carson as their power projection platform. Further, the entire battalion deploys together in a timeline that can be met based on current readiness. In the other plan this is not the case. Only the AC portion of the battalion is listed and this small portion of the battalion is counted as fulfilling the CINC's requirement for an entire combat heavy engineer battalion. None of the RC units are identified. Senior planners are aware of this problem but are challenged in correcting it because any delay in arrival dates to reflect required training and deployment times, which allow the battalion to deploy simultaneously, does not meet the CINC's deployment requirements for combat heavy battalions. This problem will take significant time and effort to resolve.

DA Guidance: The multi-component concept and implementation guidance is still predominantly under development. At the DA level, guidance consists of a relatively new (27 July 2001) policy letter that replaces the initial guidance published in 1998. This letter details the criteria for selection of units to become MC, provides policy on derivative UIC's, and has begun to incorporate aspects of the MC concept.²⁴ Important aspects in this policy for selecting units are that units be of like modernization, and be geographically proximate. DA guidance directs MC units to deploy together in timelines which can be met by the entire MC unit. FORSCOM Reg 350-2 briefly discusses MC units and guidance at all other levels is under development.

To resolve the long history of challenges between the RC and AC requires commitment at every level of leadership, it is not sufficient to simply establish MC units. The implementation and guidance must include concepts, designs and mechanisms that ensure the commitment of the leadership and staffs at each level.²⁵ In general, the RC commitment to this concept is very

high. In funding and in many other aspects both the USAR and the National Guard have demonstrated their commitment to making this concept work. Support from the AC side suffers from the tempo and budget constraints that impact all aspects of the AC. Clear guidance will ensure this support is seen in all areas of operations, training, and funding, at all levels, and in all components.

Impact on Soldiers: There are several significant aspects to the multi-component implementation that impact directly on soldier perceptions. For example, some RC soldiers have serious concerns that becoming part of a MC unit increases their likelihood of deployment. Other soldiers fear an increase in OPTEMPO that they are not willing to commit to. Some soldiers do not endorse the concept at all. As one young soldier said "If I had wanted to be AC, I would have stayed AC." Other soldiers look for immediate improvement in their unit (equipment, funding, training and so on) that actually takes time. These concerns can impact on reenlistment decisions. These soldiers represent the minority, but each of these concerns has an impact on the most important issue to RC units, personnel strength, and as such must be addressed by both AC and RC leadership.

Another aspect of the MC initiative for the 52nd is the degree of crosswalk or commonality between civilian skills and military occupational specialty (MOS). For example, in many USAR units there is significant commonality. For the 52nd this proved not to be the case. Less than 10% of the soldiers in C Company had a direct relationship between their civilian job experience and their MOS.²⁶ While there were exceptions, the lack of commonality has significant individual and collective training implications.

Impacts on the readiness of AC units: The time and resources invested in the MC concept by the AC is not without cost. Direct impacts on leaders, budget, soldiers and overall readiness of the AC is affected.²⁷ For example, two RC companies with two detachments results in one unit from the battalion drilling almost every weekend. While that situation is the norm for many RC battalions, it is challenging to sustain focus.²⁸ The challenges of learning the procedures in the RC planning, resourcing and administrative systems also takes a significant toll on AC staff officers whose OPTEMPO is already high with AC responsibilities.

Funding: This area is one of the most complex and challenging. The 52nd operates under three funding sources; Fort Carson, 96th Reserve Support Command (RSC), and Oregon Army National Guard. While DA guidance states that MC units will receive funding and budgets from each component, for the 52nd this is not the case. Each type of funding was held and controlled at the levels above battalion.²⁹ Therefore, it is challenging to tie budgets to training plans. For example, to execute Exercise GOLDEN THUNDER all three components had to provide

sufficient funding to support the battalion training plan. Each organization has their own priorities, which do not necessarily match, and each was only willing to fund the exercise if the other two complied.³⁰

Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA): The current procedure for ensuring effective coordination between the components of a MC unit is specified by DA to be a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between resourcing MACOM's.³¹ The MOA process for the 52nd began in early 1999 with a series of conferences that concluded in early 2000. A final version of the MOA began circulation for signature at that time and had still not been signed by midsummer 2001. Other issues with the MOA process include the difficulties inherent in establishing procedures for running a battalion at the FORSCOM / AGB / USARC levels. For example, one positive impact that completing and resourcing the MOA could have is the issue and accountability of TA-50 for the Ft Carson detachment of C Company (USAR). The MOA specifies that Fort Carson will provide TA-50 to those soldiers. This would allow the Supply Sergeant of C Company to eliminate all the TA-50 he currently controls (a significant work load) and for soldiers to draw from Fort Carson's Central Issue Facility (CIF). Further, this would allow the soldiers to have the same TA-50 as the AC. (Currently there are differences in such items as cold weather boots, mittens, sleeping bags and so on.) The AGR Supply Sergeant would then be able to focus more on other important areas and RC soldiers would have better equipment that matches that of their AC comrades. This is just one example, but it clearly illustrates the issue.

Staffing: The entire battalion staff of the 52nd is AC. This has several impacts which must be considered. First, AC battalion staff officer billets are currently filled with First Lieutenants waiting attendance at the Captains Career Course (CCC) or by recent graduates of the CCC waiting for Company command. Officers in either category normally have less than five years of service and are still learning the AC side of the Army. Therefore, they do not have previous AC/RC experience. To address this shortfall the battalion requested and received a USARC manpower study which recommended that a position be allocated for a civilian administrator in FY 03. It is anticipated that this position will help ensure continuity of RC issues and methods and more effective support of the RC companies.

An unanticipated impact of the MC structure of the 52nd is a full AC staff, with seven captains authorized, all waiting company command. This produced an AC command queue of over 48 months for the two AC companies. Short term solutions to this included giving command of the USAR company to an AC officer³² and recruiting captains who were already planning to depart the Army at the end of their Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) and were

not interested in AC command. These short term solutions proved effective, but the fundamental problem remains.

Unit Status Reporting (USR): Although the USR regulation is under revision, a brief discussion of the impacts within the MC initiative is still appropriate. The DA Policy Letter specifies that the MC commander will consolidate the USR for the entire unit regardless of component. It goes on to specify RC reporting will remain quarterly with monthly updates.³³ This represents a significant effort for the battalion staff and for the full-time staff of the RC units. There is a significant learning curve for AC personnel as they translate RC entries, such as “not available, still in High School” into categories that are in accordance with AR 220-1. The challenge of consolidating maintenance and supply information from disparate organizations such as supporting organizational and maintenance shops, with dissimilar types and levels of computer systems is also notable. In terms of training assessment, the experience with the new Training-METL (T-METL) approach was very good. Because of the METL based nature of the assessment it translated very well for a MC unit. The “days of training required” approach was hopelessly mired in discussions about pre-mobilization versus post-mobilization days and is useless for true assessment within a MC unit because the AC and RC higher headquarters use the two terms in completely different ways, resulting in completely different training readiness assessments.

Equipment Maintenance: The battalion has made significant progress conducting coordination with the many agencies that provide maintenance support to the RC companies. The low manning and funding levels of the Equipment Consolidation Sites (ECS), Organizational Maintenance Sites (OMS), and Consolidated Storage and Maintenance Sites (CSMS) impacts on equipment readiness due to long repair times and poor equipment condition. To assist, the battalion deployed a Direct Support (DS) team from the organic battalion DS shop³⁴ to assist in equipment preparation for Operation GOLDEN THUNDER. While very helpful this did not significantly improve overall equipment readiness.³⁵

COMPARISON, THE 249TH ENGINEER BATTALION³⁶

A case study is not complete without presenting other examples for comparison. A brief review of the MC experience of another unit, the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) provides further insights into the potential and the basis for improvements in the implementation.

The 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) is a unique organization and the only one of its type in the Army. The unit mission is to deploy worldwide to generate and distribute prime electrical power in support of war fighting, stability and support operations, and disaster relief

operations. The battalion became a MC unit in June 2000 with the assignment of four USAR platoons; two in Massachusetts, one in Washington and one in Pennsylvania with a detachment in the Washington DC area. The battalion had a training relationship with the USAR platoons prior to MC reorganization. This helped ensure a smooth transition. In early 2000 the battalion concluded that administration and logistic support of the platoons exceeded their capability and developed agreements with the three Regional Support Commands (RSC's) to provide support directly to the USAR platoons within their regions.

Positive aspects of the MC initiative within the 249th include training and integration. Focus on the USAR platoons for training includes training management and training visits (both command visits and technical visits). Integration of platoon personnel for deployment missions, such as Bright Star, are also going well, as are improvements in unit esprit and cohesion. Improvements in those areas are primarily due to the Prime Power platoons being subordinate to a unit of the same type rather than various other types of units, which was the case prior to MCU activation.

Some success can be directly attributed to the efforts undertaken by battalion leadership to learn the particulars of the MC mission. This included visits to units that were already MC and attendance at planning sessions at FORSCOM. Additionally, the battalion now has AGR officers and NCO's serving on the battalion staff to ensure more effective integration. The 249th has successfully completed the MOA process between the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the resourcing Major Commands for the 249th.

What is not going as well, is the integration of support systems such as RLAS and other administrative and logistics systems. This has impact on areas such as common items equipping (CTA-50) and technical equipping. Recruiting also remains a significant challenge.

Despite these challenges, the 249th MC experience has resulted in increased readiness of the USAR platoons in the areas of personnel, high training standards in technical skills, and improvements in equipment quantity and condition.³⁷

ASSESSMENT

To capitalize from the results of the 52nd Engineer Battalion's experience, three approaches for assessment will be used. These are: assessment against the DA goals, assessment against a model for effective change in organizations, and assessment against the force development processes of Doctrine-Training-Leader development-Organization-Material-Soldiers (DTLOMS).

ASSESSMENT AGAINST THE STATED PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

The original DA policy letter that established the MC initiative, and the current policy letter, describe four goals or objectives for the MC concept.³⁸ These are; to enhance integration, improve the resource and readiness posture of Army units, optimize the unique capabilities of each component, and improve Army documentation procedures. Assessment against these four goals is an appropriate method to begin determining potential improvements needed in the MC program.

Enhance Integration: Dividing integration into three parts; leader integration (including staffs), individual integration and collective integration (i.e. unit) provides specific areas to measure progress in. Earlier sections addressed a variety of leader and staff integration actions and issues. These included technical and organizational training of leaders and staffs about each other and integration of staff procedures, leading to a much deeper understanding of the Army and each component's role in National Defense. In terms of individual integration, progress is less apparent. For RC soldiers a much closer view of the AC portion of the Army, with predominantly positive results, including increased teamwork, has resulted.³⁹ Collective, i.e. total, integration is the most difficult to assess because it is the most difficult to define. The original vision described by General Reimer described integration as: "maximizing the contributions of" each component and goes on to use the term "seamless" to describe the endstate.⁴⁰ In these terms there has been significant progress in implementing the MC concept, but "seams" still exist that prevent achievement of the true potential.

Improve the resource and readiness posture of Army units: The resource posture has not changed significantly for any of the units relative to previous resourcing levels. Despite an ALO change for the unit overall, no significant increase in personnel, equipment or funding resourcing was provided. The only exception was a significant year-end funding push in FY 2000 for the USAR company that allowed significant tool purchases to replace outdated tool sets. There was no change in priority designation or readiness tier for the RC units.

In fact, the overall readiness posture has not improved significantly during the two year timeframe as recorded in Unit Status Reports (USR). However, there has been progress in several reporting areas. This is evidenced by the following:

Personnel: Overall personnel readiness remains about the same as prior to reorganization. However, the AC leadership now understands many RC personnel issues, particularly the importance of soldier retention and the concept of ghosts (soldiers carried on manning reports that are not actually part of the unit), efforts to positively impact these issues

have proven only marginally effective so far, partly because of systemic manning issues within the RC.⁴¹ Recruiting and retention remain vital issues for both RC companies.

Training: While earlier sections detail training at the battalion level, there has been only limited improvement in the quality of training during monthly drills. Quality of trainers remains the predominant cause for this shortfall. Improvement in this area takes time as quality trainers are developed, but, as the AC side continues to improve at RC planning timelines, all components can take advantage of available training expertise. Training, as measured both by training days required and by T-METL has not made ALO throughout the two year timeframe.

Supply: With the efforts detailed in section 3, this area has seen the greatest improvement, particularly for the ORARNG. With the designation as MC, B Company (ORARNG) received a large quantity of newer generations of equipment. This brought the company to a high Equipment On Hand (EOH) status. Overall, with the exception of night vision devices⁴² the battalion is at better EOH than prior to MC implementation. The issues of individual soldier equipment and unit equipment readiness condition remain.

Equipment Readiness: The reduced manning and funding levels at the many maintenance sites on the RC side have significant impact on MC unit readiness. Long repair times are just one symptom of a larger issue of funding levels for readiness of RC equipment. The MC concept brings important visibility to that larger issue with the readiness of RC equipment receiving increased visibility throughout the AC chain of command. That visibility will have positive impact in the long term.

Overall: Predominantly due to training, but occasionally in equipment or personnel, the battalion has not achieved ALO every month since tri-component activation. However, the potential for future improvement is clear and achievable.

Optimize the unique capabilities of each component: To assess progress against this goal the unique capabilities of the components must first be described in general terms. This is not done in DA policy nor in the vision.

- AC: The AC is generally well equipped, well trained, highly ready, but expensive and generally heavily missioned. Currently the AC represents about 46% of the Army's total capability.⁴³
- RC: The RC is generally less expensive, less well equipped, with restricted training opportunity but the ability to leverage civilian skills, unit organized, with selected assets that are heavily missioned, and represents about 54% of the Army's total capability.

The 52nd Engineer Battalion experience demonstrates progress against this goal in terms of organizing in peacetime as the unit would in combat. It provides the opportunity to structure

the unit against full wartime MTOE. Further, it aligns, at the unit level, the strengths of each component against the challenges within other components. For example, well trained AC NCO's can provide the tools to overcome restricted RC training opportunity. This is an important point, and perhaps the basic foundation of the unit level MC approach.

Improve Army documentation procedures: The incorporation of C Company (USAR) into a MC unit did provide progress toward this goal as all companies are now on the single battalion MTOE.⁴⁴ However, problems with the MTOE remain, predominantly due to the movement of the C Company HQ's to Fort Carson. There are also personnel issues caused by this documentation problem that result in mis-assignment of personnel that are resolved on an individual basis. The solution for this and other smaller issues will take time and perseverance.

ASSESSMENT AGAINST A TEMPLATE FOR SUCCESSFUL CHANGE

The MC initiative is a significant effort to fundamentally change how units are organized in the Army. This initiative could have wide ranging affects on the Army structure and "culture."⁴⁵ If this is the vision, a truly significant change is underway. Therefore, a review of this initiative, from the strategic perspective is appropriate.

Dr. John Kotter, author of Leading Change, describes eight common reasons why significant efforts to change organizations typically fail. He uses these reasons to develop eight stages which ensure effective organizational change. The eight stages from Leading Change are: (1) establishing a sense of urgency, (2) creating a guiding coalition, (3) developing a vision and strategy, (4) communicating the change vision, (5) empowering broad based action, (6) generating short term wins, (7) consolidating gains and producing more change, and (8) anchoring new approaches in the culture.⁴⁶ As an alternative approach, the stages from Leading Change can be used as a tool for assessing ongoing change. Looking at an ongoing Army change effort, by stage, provides insights into what needs to be done to ensure successful change. Application of this approach to the ongoing multi-component initiative provides some useful insights.

Stage 1: Establishing a sense of urgency.

Within the tenure of General Shinseki, and across the senior leadership of the Army in all three components, the desire for true readiness has received renewed emphasis. The increased reliance on the RC for a wide range of post-Cold War missions and the events of 11 September have created a deep sense of urgency. For example, following the events of 11 September the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff stated:

We will emerge from this attack stronger--with greater resolve to prevail against the forces of hatred and darkness. Our nonnegotiable contract with the American people remains the cause of peace and the alleviation of suffering, but when called, we will fight and we will win our nation's wars as we have for over 226 years. And the legacy of our nation's most esteemed institution remains the American soldier--the centerpiece of our formations. We are strong; we are ready; and we will keep faith with our fallen comrades and their loved ones. And we will fulfill our contract.⁴⁷

Unfortunately, what is true at the senior levels is not necessarily true throughout an organization. It seems that there is no widely accepted belief at the individual and junior leader level in any of the three components that significant improvement in readiness of all three components is required. Viewpoints as extreme as "we don't really need the RC as they aren't ready" to "we don't really need to be ready now, as we aren't really going anywhere" are not uncommon. While not indicative of a very mature or broad view, they must be considered.⁴⁸ As Kotter points out "the key players will be those in middle and lower level."⁴⁹ In the Army those leaders can make key decisions that impact readiness.⁵⁰

Stage 2: Creating the guiding coalition

Successful change in any organization requires a guiding coalition. The very nature of the MC concept requires an integrated coalition between the three components. Each member of the coalition must believe that implementation will address the fundamental challenge or achieve the change desired. The DA policy incorporates this intrinsically by stating that "resourcing components must all agree on the proposed unit configuration prior to nominating a unit."⁵¹ Some aspects of a coalition were seen at the unit level as indicated by public statements of support for the concept from important leaders such as the Chief, Army Reserve and the Commanding General, 96th RSC, senior leaders within the Oregon National Guard and from the Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson (which, as an integrated division, is an AC/RC integration effort). These public statements go a long way in demonstrating a guiding coalition and bringing disparate viewpoints in line with the vision. They are important to soldiers within their commands and produce cohesion among subordinate commanders and staff. Because the MC concept is currently limited to selected units more exposure is needed. Statements of support, and actions supporting those statements will contribute to success.

As Kotter points out, "trust is absent in many organizations"⁵² and without it a guiding coalition cannot be built. "Embedded mistrust among the three components has, in part, undermined attempts for open unfettered debate."⁵³ The MC concept contributes significantly to

trust, as welding together at the unit level ensures a broader viewpoint by the MC commander, and potentially by the staff. The challenge rests with each commander to instill within his staff and subordinates the MC concept. In these terms the MC initiative can be a contributor to the broad concept of "the Army" as described by General Shinseki.⁵⁴

Stage 3: Developing a vision and a strategy

The documentation for the vision of today's integration efforts was given in 1998 in One Team, One Fight, One Future by then Chief of Staff General Reimer. That paper described four principles of total force integration; responsibility, relevant missions, readiness and resources and went on to describe new ideas including the MC concept.⁵⁵ Kotter describes an effective vision as being; imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, flexible and communicable.⁵⁶ Without engaging in too deep a debate the case can certainly be made that the AC/ RC integration vision contained significant aspects in each of these concepts.

With the release of the One Team, One Fight, One Future a wide variety of integration efforts were implemented, expanded or deepened and the MC concept was established within DA.⁵⁷ The DA strategy for MC units was initially described in policy letter 220-98-1 which established four "goals"; Enhanced total force integration, Improve the resource and readiness posture of Army units, Optimize the unique capabilities of each component, and Improve documentation (the ends). A two phased approach that included a test phase in the timeframe FY 98-00, and an implementation phase in FY 01 and beyond, was established (the ways). Component funding was to continue given that MC units were to be geographically proximate and at similar levels of modernization (the means).

Neither of these stipulations was applied in the 52nd Engineer Battalion. The dispersed footprint was apparently a deliberate decision, the consequences of which continue to degrade the overall capability of the unit. The second requirement was corrected by shipment of newer models of equipment directly from the AC to the ORARNG company.

Stage 4: Communicating the change vision

Simplicity, multiple forums, repetition, and give-and-take are some of the key elements of communicating a vision as described by Kotter.⁵⁸ In 1998, with the publication of the One Team, One Fight, One Future and the initial DA policy, communication of the vision was well underway. More recently the use of an AC/RC integration web site and other information tools has helped communicate the vision and implementation guidance. However, much remains to be done in this area. Effective communication requires clear understanding at each level of command.

Turnover within leadership at all levels, regardless of component, the lack of any training for MC commanders, prevents success because leaders and staff continue to “reinvent the wheel.” The use of multiple forums, such as formal publications, web sites, e-mail distribution lists and so on, can improve communication and should be used more aggressively. The results will more than offset the costs, at all levels.

Stage 5: Empowering broad based action

This area is the single largest source of potential change within the MC initiative. Successful execution of this program truly lies at the individual and unit level. Kotter identifies four areas that are typical barriers to effective empowerment; structural barriers within the organization, skills required to change, systems that support the change (or conversely do not), and supervisors.

The approach in the DA strategy for implementation of the MC concept was based on execution by the MACOM's, which in this case was Forces Command (FORSCOM). The DA policy directed interaction between FORSCOM, NGB and the USARC. Interaction in the areas of manpower and budget is extremely difficult due to funding and other “structural barriers.”⁵⁹ The result is true degradation of the effort. An example of a structural barrier was the CIF example, seen in the Challenges section. In fact, determination of who would fund the cost of stocking the items at CIF could not be resolved at the installation level (funds source, availability and different titles of money). Nor could it be resolved at FORSCOM (funds availability and legislative issues). In the end, inefficiencies continue because the cost to become efficient is too great, a structural barrier problem.

Funding challenges are common to MC units and are one of the biggest issues preventing broad-based action. Both the General Accounting Office (GAO)⁶⁰ and the Army Audit Agency (AAA)⁶¹ have looked into similar funding issues and long term solutions are under consideration.

Kotter points out that training and “aligning systems to the vision” are important parts of empowerment.⁶² As previously mentioned there is no training program for leaders of MC units. Given the issues inherent in MC commands there needs to be. But that challenge pales compared to the systems challenge. While the operational, doctrinal and training systems of our three components have significant similarities (for example, an ammo forecast is an ammo forecast and although formats and timeframes may vary, the overall concept is the same), the personnel management, logistics, command and control structures and budget processes are very different. Efforts to align these systems to better support MC units have been meager. This is a responsibility shortfall of senior leadership.

Stage 6: Generating short term wins

Within the battalion there have been important successes which provide some idea of the potential of this initiative. The examples of the transfer of newer generation equipment from the AC to the ARNG portion of the unit, the successful completion of collective training events, including weapons ranges, FTX's, Annual Training, leader training, operator training, equipment fielding and so on are important to note because they demonstrate the possibilities of the program. One additional example of a successful training event occurred when a senior USAR NCO, whose civilian skill was as a master mason, taught AC NCO's more in one visit to a masonry building construction project than any previous AC training had provided. Such training has had significant results and represents short term wins for the initiative. What is needed are efforts to capture these changes, describe them to other MC units and set the conditions for the next stage of consolidating and producing more change.

Stage 7: Consolidating gains and producing more change

Currently, the implementation of this initiative continues with 52 more units scheduled to reorganize as MC during the period FY 02-07.⁶³ The final draft of the new DA policy incorporates many of the lessons learned for MC units and action officer discussion continues to resolve many of the most challenging issues.⁶⁴

Stage 8: Anchoring new approaches in the culture

It is too early to assess the overall impact on Army culture. "Culture is not something you manipulate easily" as "cultural change comes last not first."⁶⁵ Cultural antagonism between the RC and AC components of our Army is deep at almost every level.⁶⁶ Years of funding fights, politics, relationships based on evaluations and so on are deeply ingrained and will not change in the short term. But there remains potential for change. Part of the vision was the training of young leadership to "the capabilities of the entire Army."⁶⁷ In this particular unit, that is working well.

ASSESSMENT AGAINST THE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES, DOCTRINE- TRAINING-LEADER DEVELOPMENT-ORGANIZATION-MATERIAL-SOLDIERS (DTLOMS)

The MC initiative represents a true effort to further develop forces to achieve the Army's overall mission.⁶⁸ Recent work at the DA level has identified the sub-processes of DTLOMS as one approach to measuring the effectiveness of the MC initiative at the unit level. This provides another assessment tool to measure the success of the MC initiative with the 52nd Engineer Battalion. Using DTLOMS allows a structured review of how the case study highlights the

potential of the MC concept and provides a structure for developing areas needing improvement.

Doctrine development: Doctrine development is defined as the process that develops and documents doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for military operations in publications such as field manuals.⁶⁹ There are several important considerations for doctrine in the MC initiative. These include how it is being implemented today and the impacts for tomorrow. Or, carried to a logical end, how it impacts the Objective Force. While the doctrinal role of the RC, and concurrently for AC/RC integration, is still under discussion,⁷⁰ the DA policy letter is the only formal document that captures the “tactics, techniques and procedures” for MC units. While TRADOC is viewed as the Army’s trust for doctrine development, TRADOC’s role to this point has been very minimal from the unit level experience. However, the concept more properly falls under the broader concept of Force Integration. Field Manual 100-11, Force Integration, January 1998, a referenced manual in the DA MC policy letter, captures the Army’s doctrine for the management of change. Therefore, it may more appropriately reflect the MC initiative as it matures conceptually. DA DCSOPS, is the proponent for the MC concept and also the proponent for FM 100-11. This simplifies the coordination required for capturing this concept in doctrine and could be completed through the work of the Army Force Management School, the actual authors of FM 100-11. The incorporation of the MC concept in doctrinal publications will contribute to successful change in many ways but with particular effect in the stage of “anchoring new approaches in the culture”⁷¹ referred to earlier. This will begin to overcome the organizational inertia which currently impacts many aspects of the MC initiative.

Even more important in the effort to capture, develop and distribute lessons learned is the designation of the “how.” Phase I of the MC initiative was designated as a test or developmental effort,⁷² but no program was developed to capture the results of that effort. This oversight has had significant impacts on capturing the full development of the programs overall potential.

Training development: Training development is the process that produces programs, methods, publications, and devices to support individual and unit training. Training is the single largest area where the potential of the MC concept can be seen. Application of expertise in military skills from the AC side to the RC side are readily apparent in the case study, as well as the RC civilian skills to the AC side which may be more common in units with deeper civilian/military skills commonality. More important is the designation of training responsibility. Previously, responsibility for overall training expertise resided within the TSB’s and TSBn’s, who provided all sorts of expertise and support but held no responsibility for execution within units. The ability of the 52nd to bring technical skills and support to bear aligns with the responsibility to

do so and aligns even further with the commander responsible for the results of that training in wartime. The alignment between capability and peacetime and wartime responsibility can go a long way toward making significant improvements in training quality throughout all components.^{73,74}

Leader development: Defined as the process that "produces programs for the training and the professional and personal development of competent and committed leaders for the Army"⁷⁵, leader development is an area of particular success and potential within the MC concept. One key aspect of the original vision was to develop leaders with "exposure to the capabilities of the entire Army."⁷⁶ Success at the unit level is occurring as staff and commanders at each level gain experience working together. To deepen this impact, efforts must be made to ensure leader skills are matched against units. For example, the commander for the 52nd Engineer Battalion is currently a USAR officer transitioned from TPU status to active duty as part of the Active/Reserve Component Battalion Command Exchange Program. This brings an officer with RC expertise to the unit. That sort of expertise can also be brought into the unit by making efforts to ensure commanders of MC units have previous AC/RC experience. Additionally, officers who have MC experience can be utilized very effectively in follow-on AC/RC tours because of that experience.⁷⁷

Organizational development: Defined as the process that translates organizational requirements into organizational models and force structure, the 52nd Engineer Battalion demonstrates that a MC unit, organized with RC companies within a MC battalion, can function. However, there are a wide variety of models for organizing MC units. These range from individuals of different components serving in a unit, to units composed of various echelons from section, platoon to company serving within different component units. Not all possible combinations are going to be successful. An organizational approach is needed which will only establish organizations that can succeed.⁷⁸ For example, many of the challenges of the 52nd are founded on or exacerbated by the three component aspects of the organization. Reduction of the battalion to two components could retain the MC potential while reducing deleterious effects. More focus during the concept plan phase could prevent development of MC units that don't have potential. The rules guiding decisions on how to organize MC units successfully are currently being written. However, care must be taken not to make those rules so restrictive that they prevent the overall concept from achieving its potential.

Material development: This is the process that conceives, develops, and executes solutions to material requirements. For engineer and other types of units having parallels in the civilian sector there are material benefits within the MC concept. For example, the overall DA

strategy of buying civilian construction equipment (CCE), versus developing specialized military equipment, ties well with the MC concept because of commonality with civilian firms and businesses in the utilization and maintenance of the equipment.⁷⁹ This synergy between civilian material solutions and expertise and Army requirements can and will apply in a wide variety of MC units.

Soldier development: Because this is the process that concerns the determination, addition, deletion, or modification of the Army occupational specialties, and because the MC concept is founded on employing units within their doctrinal role, the MC concept itself does not generate any MOS specific changes.⁸⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

A thorough study and assessment must include a set of recommendations for both the 52nd Engineer Battalion and for the MC concept. These provide specifics for improving the concept, but also help further assess the potential through their implementability. If the recommendations needed exceed the ability of the Army to institute them, then the viability of the concept is poor, if the recommendations are feasible, success is achievable.

52ND ENGINEER BATTALION

To improve the implementation of the MC concept, and allow the battalion to achieve its full potential, action should be taken to; (1) reduce the number of components to two, (2) reduce the geographic footprint, (3) increase full-time manning, (4) protect funding, (5) rotate the component for the battalion commander and other selected leadership positions, and (6) continue to let the program mature within the unit.

Reduce the number of components to two: The DA policy does not proscribe three component organizations. But the staff capability issue, and many of the other challenges of the 52nd can be best resolved by reducing the components to two. FORSCOM has developed an approach to do this.

Reduce the geographic footprint: Similarly, the footprint of a battalion stretching from Oregon to New Mexico is excessive. While RC (and less often AC) force structure typically results in dispersed units, the footprint in two different RSC's and in two different TSB's is too large. Reduction to two components should be structured to address this issue.

Increase full-time manning: The 52nd and the 249th both undertook efforts to have expertise on the battalion staff capable of understanding and resolving the issues integral to their RC units. To some degree this is also described in the current DA policy in terms of manpower surveys required for MC units. But this approach should be built more deeply into the

concept and will require full-time manning to achieve.⁸¹ The results would be well worth the effort as more effective integration is the expected result.

Provide and Protect the Funding Required for Resourcing and Retention: AC funding for the 52nd flows through several command layers between funding allocation at FORCSOM and receipt at the unit. One of these intervening layers is not MC, while two are MC in some ways (7th ID and III Corps). While it has been pointed out that "Integrating the Army components definitely does not mean a way saving money,"⁸² that viewpoint is not prevalent on the AC side and money designated for units may not arrive. Controlling funds all the way to unit level is a draconian approach, but might be considered.

Rotate the component for selected leadership positions: As noted, the 52nd is currently commanded by a USAR officer transitioned to active duty under the command exchange program. While originally two separate programs, this combination may have tremendous potential to ensure the leadership of MC units is truly MC in outlook or view point. The concept need not be restricted to the battalion commander but could be applied to the Command Sergeant Major, or to the two Field Grade staff officer positions.

Let the program mature within the unit: The two year experience of the 52nd has served to build the foundations of a MC unit. "Major change takes time, sometimes lots of time."⁸³ As with any other significant organizational change, time is needed to achieve the established goals.

MC CONCEPT

To allow the MC initiative to have the best possible effect on the Army, several key actions should be undertaken. These are; (1) establish MC command responsibility, (2) clarify the objectives of the program, (3) clearly establish the definitive endstate, (4) align AC/RC experience in both command and staff positions, (5) expand and fill full-time manning positions at the unit level, (6) align MC units with MC chains of command, (7) significantly improve information flow, (8) institutionalize the experimental approach, and (9) incorporate effective guidance and doctrine.

Establish MC Command Responsibility: General Reimer's One Team, One Fight, One Future was very clear: "creating MC units will be a key enabler in building Total Army leaders."⁸⁴ Yet, this key concept is missing from the program in at least two significant ways: the responsibilities of the MC unit commander for his MC mission, and the responsibilities of the MC units chain of command to supervise, manage and support the MC mission. This omission is so deep that the MC unit commander is not even designated in the Responsibilities Section

(Section 5) of the current DA policy letter.⁸⁵ The DA policy letter must clearly define the responsibility of the MC commander by stating their overall responsibility for “everything the unit does or fails to do,”⁸⁶ and emphasizing that the unit includes all members of the command, regardless of component. That fundamental point will serve to achieve the intent of the vision.

Clarify the objectives of the program: To achieve the goals they must be clear to those responsible for achieving them. The use of terminology, such as “enhance integration” without defining integration does not provide sufficient information to understand the objective. Similarly “optimize unique capabilities” without at least describing what is meant by capabilities, or describing some of those capabilities, prevents both effective implementation and effective assessment.

Establish the definitive endstate: Neither the vision, nor the DA policy, provide either a final endstate or an interim state. Without it, leaders and staffs at every level question the true impact and overall effect of the program and, to varying degrees, may withhold support or commitment. This contributes to problems within the program and to the possibility of overall failure. Definition of an endstate increases the likelihood of reaching that endstate.

Align AC/RC experience in both command and staff positions: Service in a AC/RC assignment serves to ensure a leader truly understands many of the most important aspects of RC units. Therefore, a leader with AC/RC experience will be more effective in MC units because of their understanding. This will result in a better unit. Further, the challenges of low AC/RC officer promotion selection rates could be addressed through this approach by ensuring branch qualification positions for those officers.⁸⁷

Expand and fill full-time manning at the unit level: The latest DA policy requires the National Guard and the USAR to conduct on-site workload verification and to make necessary adjustments. This is a significant step in the right direction but needs further support. The Army Reserve Forces Policy Board (ARFPC), the primary RC advisory panel to the Secretary of the Army has described Full-time Support as the number one RC requirement for several years.⁸⁸ The MC concept supports that requirement, as seen in earlier sections, and support of increased manning will contribute to readiness for the entire MC unit through reduced requirements on the higher headquarters.

Align MC units with MC chains of command: The overall experience of the 52nd Engineer Battalion indicates that MC units serving under MC commands fare better due to better understanding and more effective integration. Therefore, for example, an effort to align MC battalions under MC Groups/Brigades, which in turn are under MC higher headquarters would enhance the concept.

Significantly improve information flow: Information flow is needed in two areas. First, from actual units executing policy to those developing the policy, and secondly between MC units to share experience and lessons learned. Methods to achieve this information flow could include; a specified mission to the Center for Army lessons Learned (CALL) to visit MC units and policy makers, develop a forum for discussion and interaction (which potentially could be web based), and develop an MC portion to the Pre-command course. Without improved information flow the concept may continue to experience growing pains as leaders at all levels reinvent the wheel. Information flow needs to focus on lessons learned to ensure they are consistently developed, disseminated and incorporated. While the Joint User Lessons Learned (JULLS) approach is probably not appropriate to this Army specific area, a similar approach might be appropriate.

Institutionalize the experimental approach: With phase I complete, no effective methodology for the capture of the experience is apparent. While partially accounted for by the speed with which the concept was implemented, such an approach will actually extend the duration of the program development phase.

Incorporate effectively into guidance and doctrine: The results of improved information flow, a system to capture lessons learned and efforts, to ensure the experimental aspects are captured effectively, must result in consistent and effective incorporation into Army formal documentation. Inconsistent incorporation will result in inconsistent application and inconsistent results. For example, the latest edition of FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Army Relationships, introduces MC units,⁸⁹ however, it fails to address critical topics required to effectively synchronize the training and other operations of, and for, MC units across the MACOM.

CONCLUSION

This study set out to achieve three things; (1) to capture in a formal manner the experiences of the Army's first tri-component battalion, the 52nd Engineer Battalion, (2) to assess the multi-component (MC) concept using three methods (against established goals of the MC concept, against a model for effective change within organizations, and Doctrine-Training-Leader development-Organization-Material-Soldier (DTLOMS)), and (3) provide a set of recommendations for the MC initiative, both in terms of the 52nd Engineer Battalion and the Army's overall program. These three study goals were designed to show that the MC concept has tremendous potential in integrating units from the different components of the Army.

The experience of the 52nd has not been captured in any previous work. The 52nd has experienced many aspects of the MC concept and the potential for success. The lessons

learned are important to the overall Army integration effort and provide a basis for a wide variety of professional discussion.

The assessment shows that the 52nd and the overall MC initiative have many areas which can be improved. What is important to note is that improvement in each of these areas is very achievable. All can be achieved within current Army resourcing and capabilities. Each provides benefit to the Army that is commensurate with their costs, and refutes the SSI assessment that “the cost-benefit ratio of these programs (referring to the MC program), in terms of management, political capital, and inter-component stress, will at least restrict their growth and perhaps cause their eventual demise.”⁹⁰

The recommendations provided address specifics for many areas where the program can be improved. Implementing all or some of these will allow the 52nd and many other MC units to advance integration within their units. More importantly, it will allow the MC concept to be expanded to an even greater portion of the Army. Doing so will bring integration to the point where the “seams” will no longer be the focus. Rather, the Army will be able to move forward as a fully integrated force.

Word Count = 10,760

ENDNOTES

¹ Peter E. Bondanella and Mark Musa, eds., The Portable Machiavelli (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 123.

² Dallas D. Owens, AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 5.

³ General Accounting Office, FORCE STRUCTURE Army is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but Challenges Remain, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 4-6.

⁴ Owens, 49-50.

⁵ Dennis J. Reimer, One Team, One Fight, One Future, Total Army Integration, Army Chief of Staff White Paper (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1998), 1.

⁶ GAO, 38.

⁷ See for example Crossland, Richard B. and Currie, James T., Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983. Office of the Chief Army Reserve Washington D.C. 1984.

⁸ Terry M. Haston, AC/RC Seamless Integration: Turmoil-Transition-Teamwork, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2000), 3.

⁹ Haston, 4.

¹⁰ Reimer, 1.

¹¹ Reimer, 1.

¹² Timothy Piccirilli, "The 14th Combat Engineer Battalion: A Model Multicomponent Unit," Engineer (November 1999): 22-24.

¹³ This section is drawn from an article written and submitted by the study author which is scheduled for publication in early 2002 in Engineer Magazine.

¹⁴ Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) 05415LFCM1, FC0200, E Date 19991017 US Army, (Washington D.C.: 3 August 1999)

¹⁵ MTOE 05415LFCM1, FC0200 E date 19991017

¹⁶ Quarterly Training Brief (QTB) to Commander, 43rd Area Support Group and to Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson, October 1999, Fort Carson, CO.

¹⁷ The author of this study served as the Battalion Commander of the 52nd from June 1999 to July 2001. All informational footnotes reflect the author's assessment based on that experience. While it is certainly possible that the RC companies could deploy and operate as separate companies or attached to other units as companies, it is much more likely, particularly for a major conflict, that the RC companies would join with the battalion. The preferred approach by the battalion was to form and train at Fort Carson and then deploy as a battalion.

¹⁸ Due to the AC portion of the battalion participation in OPERATION DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM the AC equipment is tan. The RC, both Guard and USAR, is predominantly three pattern (green) scheme (with some individual pieces in tan). Painting equipment is quite expensive so a decision was made to keep a split scheme so that only half the battalion would need to be painted for any contingency mission. However, for most AMC contracts equipment is only purchased in one color or is fielded in only one color to a UIC. Most program managers have provided funding as required to the battalion to paint locally as being a cheaper option than modifying contracts.

¹⁹ Further discussion of Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) sequence and changes is not possible due to the classification of DAMPL specifics as required by HQ, DA letter 11-01-5, 2 March 2001, 10.

²⁰ This advantage is offset slightly by the challenge of coordinating construction for the Santa Fe Detachment of C Company (USAR). This challenge is another example of why the geographical collocation requirement is a valid one.

²¹ John Tramel, "Army Audit Agency Report of Investigation to the Under Secretary of the Army: Multi-component Unit Funding," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Army Audit Agency, Washington D.C., 2000.

²² This section is based on, and expanded from an article submitted for publication in Engineer Magazine which is scheduled for release in early 2002.

²³ Owens, 44.

²⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army Letter 220-01-1, "Army Polices and Procedures for Establishing Multiple Component Modification Table of Organization and Equipment and Augmentation Tables of Distribution (AUGTDAs) Units, DAMO-FMF" (Washington D.C.: 27 July 2001)

²⁵ For example, going to a monthly USR (vice quarterly for RC units) submitted through an AC chain (vice an RC chain) does not necessarily achieve the level of involvement in readiness that will solve the fundamental readiness problems the Army is after.

²⁶ One soldier summed it very aptly: "I weld all week, why would I want to weld on the weekends." Exceptions include the Platoon Sergeant who owned his own construction firm.

²⁷ The GAO has briefly referred to this impact in their report in terms of OPTEMPO on leadership and states that "The Army has yet to assess fully the effects of integration on the time personnel spend away from home or on retention." GAO, 5.

²⁸ Particularly with almost constant discussion among the AC leadership about eliminating weekend training for AC soldiers.

²⁹ There are two important additional points. First, the 96th RSC did release some funding to Fort Carson for C Company to use. This MIPR worked very well. Second, some funding allocated for the 52nd by FORSCOM based on CATS and other modeling was held at the ASG level (the AC higher headquarters for the 52nd).

³⁰ Coordination of just an AC budget is challenging for a small battalion S4 section, coordination of this magnitude is very difficult.

³¹ In this case these are FORSCOM, NGB, and USARC. HQDA Letter 220-01-1, 10.

³² There were several factors impacting the decision to put an AC officer into command of C Company. The primary reason was that the officer in command when the company transitioned to the MC organization was a two time non-select for Captain and was scheduled to leave the USAR within 120 days. No TPU officer was available and since an AGR had commanded prior to that and because of the transition no AGR officer was available. Therefore, the AC officer who was next in the queue was selected. In November of 2001 after a 24 month command tour the AC officer was replaced by an AGR officer.

³³ HQDA Letter 220-01-1, 12.

³⁴ And sent them TDY using AC funds.

³⁵ Operations Order 122-00, HQ, 52nd Engineer Battalion, Fort Carson CO, 22.

³⁶ In early 2000 the 52nd Engineer Battalion hosted a visit from the Battalion Commander and selected staff of the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power) to provide the 249th with an overview of all aspects of the 52nd's MC experience to that date. That visit and follow-on conversations and interaction form the basis for this section.

³⁷ Interestingly the MC organization of the 249th Engineer Battalion is more in line with some of the original concepts for MC units than the 52nd. The RC platoons embedded in MC companies within an AC headquarters, vice RC companies embedded in an MC battalion, was described in detail for maneuver battalions in 1996 by then LTC William McCoy. See William H. McCoy, Total Army Force Mix: Reshaping America's Army, Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1996), 11.

³⁸ HQDA Letter 220-01-1, 27 July 2001, 1.

³⁹ 52nd Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy)(Tri-component), Multi-component Implementation Assessment, 28 June 2001, 5.

⁴⁰ Reimer, 1998, i.

⁴¹ Multi-component Implementation Assessment, 28 June 2001, 6.

⁴² Night vision devices, specifically Night Vision Goggles are only fielded in C Company, with all other components still waiting fielding.

⁴³ Army Posture Statement

⁴⁴ MTOE 05415LFCM, FC0200, E-date 19991017.

⁴⁵ DAMO-FMF, "AC/RC Integration Item 97-32, Multiple-Component (MC) MTOE Units" Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council, Washington D.C., 1 December 2001, 1.

⁴⁶ Dr. Kotter's work provides a powerful approach to ensuring significant efforts to change organizations will succeed and many aspects of this approach are apparent in the ongoing Army Transformation effort..

⁴⁷ Yohn, Helen <Helen.yohn@carlisle.army.mil>, "Message from the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army," electronic mail message to LTC Tom O'Donovan <o'donovante@Carlisle.army.mil>, 14 September 2001.

⁴⁸ Personal discussions with the author.

⁴⁹ Kotter, 46.

⁵⁰ Within the 52nd Engineer Battalion as a multi-component unit that sense of urgency was not sufficient to drive young leaders to do such things as, for example, reach high levels of personal or organizational physical readiness.

⁵¹ DAMO-FMF 220-01-1, 5.

⁵² Kotter, 61.

⁵³ David T. Fautua, "Army Citizen-Soldiers," Armed forces Journal International (September 2000) 73.

⁵⁴ AUSA Convention Speech.

⁵⁵ Reimer, 11.

⁵⁶ Kotter, 72.

⁵⁷ Owens, 8.

⁵⁸ Kotter, 90.

⁵⁹ Kotter, 103.

⁶⁰ GAO, 4.

⁶¹ Tramel, 7.

⁶² Kotter, 115.

⁶³ DAMO-FMF, 12 Dec 2001, 2.

⁶⁴ These steps to consolidate gains and to produce more change are ongoing. What is less clear is the current and long term Army commitment to that consolidation. It is possible these consolidations are the result of institutional momentum (particularly at the FORSCOM level) i.e. started by General Reimer and not killed by anyone after his departure. This may indicate that the change trajectory for this initiative may not reach "orbit". Further this may now be a bottom driven process, i.e. units finding ways to make it work. If so the likelihood of long term effective strategic change is poor.

⁶⁵ Kotter, 155-156.

⁶⁶ Fautua, 73.

⁶⁷ Reimer, 19.

⁶⁸ This definition and description of Force Development and sub-processes is structured in accordance with How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002, pages 2-2 to 2-3.

⁶⁹ How the Army Runs 2001-2002, 2-2.

⁷⁰ Owens, 33.

⁷¹ Kotter, 155.

⁷² In fact SSI describes the initial effort as "experimental." Owens, 44.

⁷³ Similarly there are tremendous potentials for training excellence within the MC concept. One brief example: fielded with a new piece of equipment, called a laser leveler, by the deactivation of the AC B Company, the ORARNG B Company requested that an NCO come to drill to train soldiers on how to use the equipment. The piece of equipment was too specialized to have any expertise within the TSBn so an NCO from the AC A Company was tasked, prepared (and in so doing became more proficient himself) and sent using AC TDY funds. Upon arrival he trained with the unit and with a civilian contractor laid on by B Company (who wanted to sell a more advanced model of

the equipment and taught the AC NCO a lot). Bottom line was increased proficiency all around through synergy.

⁷⁴ There is friction within the MC concept that can prevent achieving the maximum training potential and synergy. The friction is inherent in fights for resources including funding and personnel. Within the AC flag model of the 52nd Engineer Battalion we see synergy based on the special skills (surveying, medics, cooks and so on) that reside at battalion level as well as expertise from the AC side. This is offset by the focus of the AC chain of command above battalion level that must prioritize RC requirements against AC resources.

⁷⁵ How the Army Runs 2001-2002, 2-2.

⁷⁶ Reimer, 19.

⁷⁷ One of the S3's of the 52nd went on to be the G3 of a TSD and described his experience within the 52nd as adding both "knowledge and credibility."

⁷⁸ DA and FORSCOM have begun a process of assessing organizational viability.

⁷⁹ It is reasonable to expect that commonality between military requirements and civilian capabilities to continue to bear fruit for Army engineer MC units as the civilian construction industry moves into the information era with robotic construction equipment and other advances.

⁸⁰ It does generate a wide variety of possibilities for using soldiers to better tie units together that were considered or implemented within the 52nd. These ideas, ranging from LNO's from the AC battalion to company level to ensure support, or increased AGR's on the battalion staff, or increased FTS at the company level to produce better training, should all be considered.

⁸¹ One of the earlier integration efforts with significant similarities to the MC concept was the designation of all RC Special Forces units as falling under USSOCOM. This resulted in an identification of the need for AGR and other FTS support on the USSOCOM and subordinate headquarters staffs as described by LTC Wayne Morgan in "Reserve Component Special Forces: Integration and Employment Models for the Operational Continuum," US Army War College Study Project, 15 April 1992.

⁸² Carolyn Jones, Active Component / Reserve Component Integration: A Slow Reality, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1 May 1999), 24.

⁸³ Kotter, 119.

⁸⁴ Reimer, 1.

⁸⁵ DAMO-FMF 220-01-1, 3.

⁸⁶ Department of the Army, Army Command Policy, Army Regulation 600-20 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 July 1999, 13.

⁸⁷ As an endstate, careful coding of positions could result in reduced officer turbulence and increased retention.

⁸⁸ Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, Quarterly Meeting Summary, June 4-6, 2001: Full Committee Minutes, 2.

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Training, Army Relationships, U.S. Army Forces Command Regulation 350-4 (Fort McPherson: U.S. Army Forces Command, 27 October 1999), 10.

⁹⁰ Owens, 44.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bondanella, Peter E., and Mark Musa, eds., *The Portable Machiavelli*. New York: Penguin Books, 1979).
- Crossland, Richard B. and Currie, James T., *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983*. Office of the Chief Army Reserve Washington D.C. 1984.
- Fautua, David T. "Army Citizen-Soldiers." *Armed Forces Journal International* (September 2000): 72-74.
- Haston, Terry M., *AC/RC Seamless Integration: Turmoil-Transition-Teamwork*. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2000.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army, Letter 11-01-5, "Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL)." Washington D.C.: 2 March 2001.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army, DAMO-FMF, Letter 220-01-1, "Army Polices and Procedures for Establishing Multiple Component Modification Table of Organization and Equipment and Augmentation Tables of Distribution (AUGTDAs) Units." Washington D.C.: 27 July 2001.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army, DAMO-FMF. "AC/RC Integration Item 97-32, Multiple-Component (MC) MTOE Units." Fact Sheet for the Reserve Component Coordination Council. Washington D.C.: 12 Dec 2001.
- Jones, Carolyn. *Active Component / Reserve Component Integration: A Slow Reality*. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1 May 1999.
- Kotter, John. *Leading Change*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
- McCoy, William H. *Total Army Force Mix: Reshaping America's Army*. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1996.
- Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) 05415LFCM1, FC0200, E Date 19991017 (U.S. Army, 3 August 1999)
- Morgan, Wayne. *Reserve Component Special Forces: Integration and Employment Models for the Operational Continuum*. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992.
- Operations Order 122-00, Headquarters, 52nd Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy)(Tri-component). Fort Carson, Colorado:17 April, 2001.
- Owens, Dallas D., *AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge*. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.
- Piccirilli, Tim. "The 14th Combat Engineer Battalion: A Model Multicomponent Unit." *Engineer*, (November 1999): 22-24.