STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES AND ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: ARE WE SET UP FOR LONG TERM SUCCESS?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEITH G. GEIGER
United States Army

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEITH G. GEIGER
United States Army

Colonel Richard K. Jones
Project Advisor

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Keith G. Geiger

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The recent Presidential campaign highlighted the differences between the Clinton Administration and the Bush campaign on the subject of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). On the one hand, the Clinton administration used military forces for a wide variety of missions to further US interests. This was not a course of action particularly popular within the military, who thought their mission was to fight and win the nation's wars, not to be a relief organization with weapons. After all, our strategy was to fight and win two MTWs near simultaneously. The Bush campaign promised to end the perceived misuse of American forces and would close out its participation in long, resource intensive SSC operations like Bosnia and Kosovo. Political realities both at home and abroad, however, have forced the new Bush administration to rethink its campaign promise in this regard. The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review was characterized as modifying the two MTW scenario as a force shaping construct and has instead decided on a capabilities based approach that, among other things, postulates the continuation of SSCs for years into the future. Since it is apparent that these types of operations will continue, the problem arises as to how we will successfully execute these missions over the long term. How do we need to organize Army forces to handle the full spectrum of operations and reduce the stress on our low density/high deployment assets? What are the options? Do we limit the number of SSCs we can get involved in? Do we create a constabulary force that specializes in SSCs? Or do we merely modify the mix of units available to the Active Army to enable it to meet current and future missions?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES AND ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: ARE WE SET UP FOR LONG TERM SUCCESS?

> If we don't stop extending our troops all around the world in nation-building missions, then we're going to have a serious problem coming down the road. And I'm going to prevent that; I'm going to rebuild our military power. It's one of the major priorities of my administration
>
> —Presidential Candidate George W. Bush

The recent 2000 Presidential campaign highlighted the significant philosophical differences between the Clinton Administration and the Bush campaign on the subject of employing American military forces in smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) in support of foreign policy objectives around the world. On the one hand, the Clinton Administration used military forces for a wide variety of missions to further US interests. Between mid 1993 and Sep 2000, American military forces engaged in 170 separate SSCs, ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, averaging between 20 and 30 a month.[1] During the same timeframe, Army force structure was reduced about thirty seven percent. The increase in missions characterized as SSCs coupled with the reductions in the end strength of the Army placed severe strains on many parts of the Army.

This use or overuse of American forces in multiple SSCs was seen by many within the Army as a distracter from, not a part of, their mission to fight and win the nation's wars. This was the view shared by the Republican Presidential Ticket. George W. Bush and his vice presidential running mate, Dick Cheney, promised in the one Vice Presidential and three Presidential Debates to end the perceived misuse of American forces by being much more selective in the commitment of U.S. forces to those type of operations but also by eventually closing out U.S. participation in ongoing long, resource intensive SSC operations like Bosnia and Kosovo.

Political realities both at home and abroad, however, have forced the new Bush Administration to relook its campaign promise in this regard. The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review in September 2001 was characterized as modifying the two Major Theater War (MTW) scenario as a force shaping construct and has instead adopted a capabilities based approach, which among other things, postulates the continuation of SSCs for years into the future. Since it is apparent that these types of operations will continue, the problem arises as to how we will successfully execute these missions over the long term. How do we need to organize Army forces to handle the full spectrum of operations and reduce the stress on our low

density/high deployment assets? What are our options? This paper will examine the historical background of the issue and then analyze a number of possible solutions.

BACKGROUND

The debate on the appropriate use of American forces lies not in the conduct of Major Theater Wars but rather on all the missions that lie outside of traditional warfighting. But policymakers, the military, and academicians use different terminology to describe military operations outside of traditional force on force operations. In order to remain consistent throughout the paper it is important to clarify what we mean. Academicians and policymakers most often use the phrase smaller-scale contingency (SSC) and official military doctrine uses the phrase military operations other than war (MOOTW). But is either term all inclusive? The terms are used interchangeably in various documents but what is meant by each is not always clear. After the clarifying the phraseology, we'll look at the different force sizing constructs used by the Clinton Administration during the 1990s, as well as the one elaborated in the 2001 QDR to examine what we design our forces to be able to do.

DEFINITIONS

The uniformed services use the term military operations other than war (MOOTW) to describe all military operations short of war. More specifically, the Joint Staff defines it as:

> operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to compliment any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.[2]

Explicit in the definition of MOOTW is the fact that these operations are not necessarily just conducted short of war. They are integral also to the conduct of war. The definition, however, is void of any elaboration of what specific operations actually fall under the term MOOTW. There are operations that are traditionally thought of as MOOTW, but no definitive list or compilation exists to help one conceptualize the term. Although MOOTW is imbedded in military doctrine, this is not the term used by defense and national security policymakers in major policy documents like the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), the National Security Strategy, or oddly enough, the National Military Strategy. It could be the very ambiguity of the definition that has led others to find a term that has a more tangible appeal.

The term smaller-scale contingencies or SSCs, has been the term of choice by defense and national security policymakers to describe those operations not included in traditional warfighting. The most common definition of SSCs is:

> The full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, reinforcing key allies, neutralizing NBC weapons facilities, supporting counterdrug operations, protecting freedom of navigation in international waters, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coping with mass migration, and engaging in information operations.[3]

This definition is much more definitive than MOOTW, but does not include overseas presence and those peacetime engagement activities the military is often called on to support. Those activities have as much to do with the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Army as the operational missions assigned to it. Therefore we have to examine what we mean by overseas presence and peacetime engagement. Overseas presence would include permanently forward based U.S. Army forces. That would be defined as Army forces in Korea, Germany, and Kuwait, propositioned equipment, as well as periodic and temporary deployments of forces in response to crises. Those peacetime engagement activities include: defense cooperation, security assistance, regional centers for security studies, training, and exercises with allies and friends.[4]

The definitions of both MOOTW and SSC are, by themselves, a little lacking when trying to understand the strains placed on Army force structure in operations short of major theater warfare. MOOTW, although very inclusive, does not provide enough clarity to understand the term without individual interpretation. There is too much ambiguity to be of use for the discussion of this paper. The definition of SSCs on the other hand, makes a laudable effort to clarify what operations it includes. The term SSC, however, is too narrow a frame of reference to fully describe the spectrum of operations required of Army forces below the threshold of major theater warfare. Since neither term can stand on its own, it is necessary to find a reasonable construct for later analysis. Since SSC is too narrow, it is best to combine it with another term, relatively well defined, to encompass the majority of operations short of major theater warfare. Peacetime engagement and overseas presence (PEOP) described above provides us with that bridge when coupled with the term SSC. So as we examine the issue of Army force structure and the demands placed on it by missions short of major theater warfare, I will refer to them as PEOP/SSC operations.

FORCE SIZING POLICY OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

President Clinton came to office in January 1993 and inherited the post-Cold War force sizing concept of the Bush Administration known as the Base Force. The concept was developed in response to the Soviet revolutions of 1988 and 1991 and as a result, chosen force levels evolved over time. The initial focus of the Base Force was on a capabilities-based

approach to defense planning, driven resource constraints generated by demands from Congress and the public for a "peace dividend."[5] One of the most vocal critics of the conceptual basis of the Base Force was Congressman Les Aspin. He argued that the threat had to be considered when determining force structure. In response to criticism from Aspen as well as others, the Base Force evolved into a combined capabilities-based and threat-based approach and became more anchored to the two MTW requirement.[6] President Clinton nominated Aspin to head the Defense Department and was quickly confirmed as the new Secretary of Defense, after which he quickly initiated a comprehensive review of defense strategy and force structure.[7]

The Bottom-Up Review 1993

The Report on the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was published mere weeks after the U.S. Army lost 18 soldiers in a raid in Mogadishu, Somalia during an operation classified as a smaller-scale contingency in October 1993. In the report, Defense Secretary Les Aspin refined the work of the Bush administration and its Base Force design rather than completely reject the concept outright. The report was a relatively transparent process to develop the required force structure and strategy to achieve U.S. objectives. There were four broad classes of potential military operations used in the BUR to evaluate the adequacy of future force structure alternatives. They were major regional conflicts (MRC), smaller-scale conflicts or crises (peace enforcement or intervention operations, overseas presence), and deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.[8]

With respect to the major regional conflicts, the BUR stated that the United State needed to maintain sufficient military power to be able to win two major regional conflicts that occur *nearly simultaneously.* The illustrative scenarios used were Iraq and North Korea. It also addressed overseas presence by stating that "stationing and deploying U.S. military forces abroad in peacetime was an essential element in dealing with the new regional dangers and pursuing new opportunities." It also stated that the new defense strategy, with the emphasis on engagement, would increase the likelihood that U.S. forces would be involved in operations short of declared or intense warfare.[9] The net result for the Army was that it would go from twelve active duty divisions, envisioned under the Base Force, to ten active duty divisions under the BUR. In reaching that size, it factored in additional SSC operations being conducted while winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously.

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review

There was concern in Congress that the Administration and the military were not focused on the future and preparing for contemporary threats. As a result, in 1996 Congress passed legislation directing the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a review of the U.S. defense program and provide a report in 1997.[10] In the ensuing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, Defense Secretary William Cohen articulated the new Shape, Respond, Prepare defense strategy. Central to the force sizing construct was the need to win two MTWs nearly simultaneously. As with the BUR, the QDR reaffirmed the need to consider smaller-scale contingencies and overseas presence in determining the overall force structure.[11] An element of the QDR that changed from the BUR was in the area of conducting SSC operations simultaneously with MTWs. Rather than factor in forces required for fighting two MTWs and SSC operations simultaneously, the QDR states that U.S. forces must be able to withdraw from SSC operations, reconstitute, and then deploy to a MTW in accordance with required timelines.[12] The implication was that these operations could not be conducted simultaneously. Additional emphasis was also placed on so called low density/high demand (LD/HD) assets. The report acknowledged that many segments of the force have been, and probably will be, used to a very high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) in peacetime in PEOP/SSC operations and that much work needs to be done in assessing the impact on the overall force.[13]

The end result for the Army was a loss of an additional 15,000 active duty soldiers, 45,000 reserve soldiers, and 33,700 civilians. Oddly enough the QDR stated that the 15,000 active duty cuts would be carried out by deactivation, consolidation, and realignment of headquarters and support facilities.[14] In a perverse bit of irony, part of the active duty cut apportioned to Forces Command (FORSCOM) by the Department of the Army resulted in the inactivation of two military intelligence battalions, one in I Corps at Ft Lewis, WA and the other in III Corps at Ft Hood, TX. Both battalions were tactical exploitation battalions and provided each respective Corps with interrogation and counterintelligence support. Both capabilities are considered LD/HD assets in PEOP/SSC operations.

A CHANGE UNDER THE 2001 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW?

The differences between the two presidential candidates through the campaign of 2000 on the issue of defense, and more specifically on the use of U.S. forces abroad, were clear. Al Gore had been a part of the development of the defense strategy of shape, respond, and prepare and the correspondingly high operational tempo of U.S. forces that went along with it. George W. Bush on the other hand was not an advocate of using military forces for an ever

increasing number of PEOP/SSC operations. It was a view that was shared by his vice presidential running mate, Dick Cheney. Their position can best be summed up by Dick Cheney during the one and only Vice Presidential Debate against the Democratic Vice Presidential Candidate, Senator Joe Lieberman. When asked during the debate whether U.S. military personnel should be deployed as warriors or peacekeepers, Dick Cheney responded:

> My preference is to deploy them as warriors. There may be occasion when it's appropriate to use them in a peacekeeping role, but I think that role ought to be limited. I think there ought to be a time limit on it. The reason we have a military is to be able to fight and win wars, and to maintain it with sufficient strength so that would-be adversaries are deterred from ever launching a war in the first place.[15]

That position was consistent with statements made by George W. Bush two days earlier in his first debate with Vice President Al Gore. But how would the policy be put into practice? How would the Bush Administration handle the reality of resource constraints and an unending flow of PEOP/SSC operations?

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld began the process of the QDR in a very controversial way. It appeared to those in and out of the Pentagon that the QDR was a closed, top down process in sharp contrast to the open nature of the Bottom-Up Review in 1993 and the 1997 QDR process. Secretary Rumsfeld created eleven panels heavily drawing on outside consultants and noticeably excluding the military. In fact, a constant criticism of the process was that it cut the military out of the process and thereby threatened the buy in of the uniformed services and the main bureaucratic players.[16] The argument was that if left to their own devices, the military would avoid serious consideration of change due to parochialism and interservice rivalries. The situation all changed with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The ultimate QDR Report was delayed pending a review of the impact of the terrorist attacks on the defense strategy and force structure outlined in the draft report. Any acrimony built up over the process quickly evaporated and the QDR was finally released on September 30, 2001.

The defense strategy of the 1997 QDR of Shape, Respond, and Prepare was replaced in the 2001 QDR with the strategy of Assure, Dissuade, Deter, and Decisively Defeat any adversary. As stated in the QDR, the force sizing construct was in theory changed from a threat and capabilities based approach, characteristic of BUR and 1997 QDR, to a capabilities approach. But after careful examination of the 2001 QDR, there may be more in common than not with its predecessors.

The new force sizing construct is built around four underlying elements. The first element is to defend the United States. This was a significant departure from the BUR and 1997 QDR. The terrorist attacks of September 11th caused the Department of Defense to reevaluate the role of the armed forces in the defense of the United States, whose territorial security was taken for granted for most, if not all, of the post World War II era (the exception being the threat from nuclear weapons). An offshoot of this may be the creation of a unified command specifically for homeland security.[17] The second element is to deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions. The report calls for maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia to assure allies and friends, counter coercion, and deter aggression against the United States, its forces, allies, and friends.[18] Additionally, the report goes on that DoD will focus its peacetime overseas activities on security cooperation to help create favorable balances of power in critical areas of the world and to deter aggression and coercion. A particular aim of DoD's security cooperation efforts will be to ensure access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, while expanding the range of pre-conflict options available to counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on U.S. terms.[19] The third element is to swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for decisive victory in one of these conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation. In effect, for planning purposes, U.S. forces will remain capable of swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes (basically two MTWs).[20] The fourth element takes into account conducting a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations. This planning approach requires the United States to maintain and prepare its forces for smaller-scale contingency operations in peacetime, preferably in concert with allies and friends. These long duration commitments will, in effect become part of the U.S. forward presence. Additionally, DoD will ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized forces and capabilities to ensure that it does not overstress elements of the force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingency operations.[21] The idea advanced by the QDR is that this sizing construct takes into consideration the number and nature of the tasks actually assigned to the Armed Forces and better address requirements for LD/HD assets, enabling forces, and active and reserve component force-mix issues.[22]

What was the impact on force structure? How did this completely new force sizing construct affect the size and composition of the current force? The QDR basically stated that the current force structure was adequate after assessing it across several scenarios on the basis of the new defense strategy, force sizing construct, and the capabilities of the force,

although it did present moderate operational risk. It was judged as sufficient to serve as the baseline force from which transformation would occur.[23] The Army remained at 10 active divisions, 8 National Guard Divisions, and 15 National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades.

SUMMARY

The 1990s witnessed an attempt by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton to assess the threats of the post-Cold War world and fashion a military able to deal, not only with known threats, but the uncertainty of future threats as well. The Base Force of the Bush Presidency was an incomplete concept because of the distraction of the Gulf War. As a result, much of the conceptual basis of that force sizing construct was left unfinished before the arrival of the Clinton Administration.[24] The Bottom-Up Review initiated by Secretary Les Aspin provided a systematic look at current and future defense needs, as well as a transparent process of analysis used in the future. It codified the two MTW force sizing construct using Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia as its most likely scenarios. It also attempted to factor in the impact of the PEOP/SSC operations. The BUR reduced the Army from 12 to 10 active duty divisions at a time when the OPTEMPO was increasing because of the sharp increase in PEOP/SSC operations. The 1997 QDR, required by Congressional legislation, refined the BUR force and elaborated a new defense strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare. The impact of SSCs was a lesser factor in sizing the force. In fact, it postulated that U.S. forces would have to disengage from SSC operations, refit, and redeploy to make the two nearly simultaneous MTW construct work. Again, the net effect for the Army was a loss of active duty, reserve component and civilian personnel. Ironically, a significant portion of the cuts on the active duty side came from units categorized as LD/HD assets. At the same time, the 1997 QDR alluded to the impact of PEOP/SSC operation on those very same assets and that it required more study.

The 2001 QDR was heralded as a break from the past. Its force sizing construct was to be capabilities based to provide forces for the full spectrum of conflict. In the aftermath of September 11, it was supposed to head the Department of Defense and the uniformed services in a new direction. But the similarities with the past, with respect to force sizing, are significant. The four broad classes of potential military operations used in the Bottom-Up Review are very similar to the four underlying elements of the 2001 QDR. Both called for U.S. forces to prevail in any two theaters in overlapping timeframes. Both took into consideration the impact of smaller-scale contingencies and the demands they placed on force structure. Both factored in peacetime engagement activities and overseas presence/forward deployment. The difference

was in the threat to the homeland. The BUR force sizing construct stressed deterrence of attacks by weapons of mass destruction, while the 2001 QDR stressed the defense of citizens and critical infrastructure against acts of terrorism, the latter element of the 2001 QDR being much more manpower intensive than the BUR requirement. The bottom-line difference for the Army is that under the BUR force it had 15,000 more active duty soldiers, 45,000 more reserve component soldiers, and 33,700 more civilian employees than it does under the 2001 QDR.

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS

The ability of the Army to execute operations like PEOP/SSC, as well as MTW will depend on having the right force structure to accomplish them over the long term, not just in short episodic fits. The force sizing studies evaluated previously have judged current end strength as adequate, albeit with moderate to high risk in some scenarios. But by and large, the risk is deemed as acceptable. That means that the Army will have to accomplish all assigned missions with no plus up in end strength. So increasing its size will not be considered as we evaluate options for Army force structure. What then, are the options for Army leaders to ensure the long term viability of the Army vis-à-vis their missions in PEOP/SSC operations? We'll look at whether the two MTW construct is a help or a hindrance to mission accomplishment as well as what constitutes low density/high demand assets for the Army. I'll then evaluate three force structure options, all within the power of the Army leadership to change, to ensure we are set up for long term success. The options to be examined are:

- Do we limit the number of SSCs we can get involved in?
- Do we create a constabulary force that specializes in SSCs?
- Or do we merely modify the mix of units available to the Active Army to enable it to meet current and future missions?

WHAT IS THE ISSUE WITH FORCE STRUCTURE?

The two MTW requirement, still a viable concept under the 2001 QDR, requires that a large portion of Army force structure be conventional combat forces in order to be able to fight two MTWs in an overlapping timeframe. This concept, however, is extremely risk averse at a time when more demands are being placed on the U.S. Army in PEOP/SSC operations than major theater warfare. The two MTW requirement has not been a strategic reality since World War II. At no time during the Korean Conflict (1950-53), Vietnam (1965-73), and the Gulf War (1990-91), the three MTWs in the Cold War and post-Cold War Era, did a potential adversary assess the United States to be vulnerable and initiate a second MTW. Nations tend to act in their own self interest and go to war for specific reasons, not simply because the U.S. happens

to be involved militarily somewhere else.[25] The two-war threat scenario is simply no longer sustainable given the increased likelihood of resource constraints. It is a risk averse strategy to force sizing.[26]

The demands of PEOP/SSC operations place a tremendous requirement on LD/HD assets. But in the Army, what are considered LD/HD assets? For the most part, Army LD/HD assets are people, not platforms. They include those assets that are required frequently in PEOP/SSC operations but constitute a very low percentage of active duty strength. In the Army, it would be impossible to list all the various LD/HD assets, but examples would include: signal, military intelligence, military police, special forces, civil affairs, psychological operations, engineers, aviation, medical, multifunctional logistics, and transportation personnel and equipment.[27] For the purposes of this paper, when I refer to the Army's LD/HD assets, I will mean the forces listed above.

KEEP THE STATUS QUO BUT RIGIDLY ENFORCE CRITERIA FOR SSC OPERATIONS

This option would keep current PEOP/SSC operations going, but would strictly limit the criteria for taking on new operations by applying evaluation criteria to only those operations that meet them. As we fight the War on Terrorism, however, how selective can we be? Richard Haass, vice president and director of the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program, has authored several books on American military intervention since the end of the Cold War and developed criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of U.S. military intervention across the spectrum of conflict, although he acknowledges no all-purpose set of guidelines will determine policy (to intervene or not) in every situation.[28] A definitive set of rules, however useful, could unnecessarily constrain those very policymakers, especially when our foreign policy decisions are conducted with as much transparency as possible. A set of criteria meant to explain decisions to the American electorate could also be misinterpreted by potential adversaries. A commonly cited historical example of this is Dean Acheson's public speech in January 1950, leaving South Korea outside the U.S. defense perimeter. Some historians believe that this omission emboldened the communist regime in the north and at least contributed to North Korea's decision to invade months later.[29] So what should the criteria be? What guidelines should policymakers use to ensure that the Army is committed to operations important enough to the interests of the United States without breaking the force?

Richard Haass, in Chapter Four of his book, "Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World," advances a set of criteria to provide a set of questions and a

yardstick by which the proposed intervention can be assessed. The answers don't necessarily determine policy, but departure from the criteria should be carefully considered and justified.

Interests are only a guide. There is no direct correlation between the importance of an interest and the willingness to use military force in a given situation. Although it can be argued that vital interests were at stake in the Gulf War, the same cannot be said for Grenada, Lebanon, Haiti, Panama, and Somalia. Military force is but one tool available to policy makers and must be evaluated against using other instruments of national power.

Tolerance for costs reflects the interests at stake. If there is widespread belief that there are no national interests at play in a SSC operation, elite and popular tolerance for costs is significantly diminished. Somalia and Lebanon are examples where the cost in U.S. lives outweighed our interests. The opposite can also be true. The Gulf War and the current War on Terror are interventions where the interests at stake outweigh the potential costs.

The purpose of the intervention must be clear. The mission of the military forces must be well defined. Additionally, as much consideration should be given to changing the objectives of the operation once underway as was given the original decision to intervene in the first place. The operation in Somalia in October 1993 is an illustrative example of a situation where more consideration should have been given to the change in the mission of the forces committed there. That is not to say opportunities must not be exploited but should be carefully reviewed before being undertaken and all potential costs weighed.

The adversary's response must be anticipated. Operations designed to coerce another nation must evaluate the adversary's staying power as well as that of the U.S. Then the costs must be weighed against the interests involved.

Neither victory nor an exit date should be prerequisites. The requirement for victory is not applicable to all SSC operations. Some are, such as strikes and raids, but not in humanitarian operations for instance. In other operations, more limited goals may be appropriate. For example, preventing a situation from deteriorating further or creating the conditions for diplomatic initiatives might be limited aims. Additionally, setting an end date to the operation in advance can be counterproductive. intractable actors could simply wait out the intervention until the predetermined withdrawal date and undermine its effectiveness. That is not to say end conditions should not be predetermined to determine when the need for the intervention has passed.

Popular and Congressional support is desirable but not prerequisites. The Weinberger Doctrine includes public support as one of its tenants. The War Powers Act requires Congressional approval for the deployment of troops after 60 days if hostilities are imminent. Depending on the operation (short, quick, low cost) this is not always necessary. Additionally, Presidential leadership can sway public opinion to build support for an operation once it is underway and sustain it for the near term through use of the "Bully Pulpit."

Deterrence is not cost free and not always an option. Using forces as a deterrent implies that you are willing to use those forces if that deterrence fails. Failure to make good on the commitment will damage credibility and increase the likelihood of failure in future deterrent missions. Additionally, these types of missions tie down forces and increase OPTEMPO. This may not always be an option, however, given the sensitivities of some countries to the presence of U.S forces.

The adversary is not the only audience. The use of force will have second and third order effects past the immediate situation. The decision to withdraw forces from Somalia after the October 3,1993 raid most certainly had an impact on Osama Bin Laden and what he felt would be the U.S. response following the attacks of September 11, 2001. On the other hand, observers believe that the Grenada Operation had a sobering effect on the Marxist regimes in Nicaragua and Cuba.

Affecting internal politics through force is difficult. Intra-state conflicts are difficult. Civil wars fought along ethnic or religious lines are violent, long lasting, and zero sum struggles. There are multiple actors and lines of authority are much looser. Interventions often produce stalemate unless the interveners are prepared to defeat the stronger side.

Media should not determine policy. Although there is much debate on the "CNN Effect" the impact of the media in focusing the publics' attention on a given situation is illustrated in the Somalia intervention. Some argue that the images of starving Somalis pressured policymakers to put U.S. forces on the ground first, then the images of a U.S. soldier being dragged through the streets, and the revulsion that followed, caused U.S. forces to be withdrawn. Presidential leadership must be present to explain why an intervention is important and the interest outweighs the costs and just as importantly, explaining why an intervention is not worth the cost.[30]

These criteria are guidelines and not a checklist for intervention. Simply because a particular situation meets all the criteria for intervention, does not mean the government should act. Likewise, just because a situation does not meet all the criteria, does not mean the government

should not act. Expert judgment will be required from the nation's leaders in each situation; the criteria merely provide a framework for discussion in determining the appropriateness of intervention in each case.[31] But will the employment of these or other restrictive criteria be enough to limit new interventions and allow for the long term success of the Army?

An advantage of this approach would theoretically be to conserve military forces for only the most important operations or those where the cost was low and the potential benefits high. Costs could be reduced and maximum flexibility would be retained for major theater warfare by selectively intervening in SSC operations. This option would also require the least amount of change and turbulence on the part of the Army. Basically, the force structure would remain as well as the OPTEMPO.

There are several disadvantages. First, ensuring the right criteria are in place varies from situation to situation and as Richard Haass even states, it is impossible to apply them universally. As a result, imperfect criteria will be applied by imperfect people to imperfect situations. The chances of intervening militarily in a situation that at first appeared, quick, low cost, and sustainable can quickly change. There is also the case to be made that a PEOP/SSC operation in an area of peripheral interest today may prevent a threat to a vital national interest tomorrow, thereby reducing the need for major theater warfare. The recent developments in Afghanistan incorporate all of the shortfalls to this option. President Bush, who ran for President on the issue of limiting U.S. involvement in PEOP/SSC operations, has been forced to relook how he would like to use the U.S. Army there. Recent commitments to the Philippine government have resulted in a deployment of over 600 special operations soldiers in a PEOP/SSC operation, while at the same time commitments are being made to the new Afghan interim government. Although we are eschewing a role in the international peacekeeping force in post-Taliban Afghanistan, we will be involved militarily for sometime in PEOP/SSC operations there. In a joint news conference with Afghan Interim Authority Chairman Karzai on January 28, 2002, President Bush stated that although we would not be members of the international peacekeeping force (ISIF), we would provide logistical and intelligence help, as well as provide a quick reaction force if ISIF forces got into trouble. Plus, he committed the U.S. forces to help Afghanistan develop its own military.[32] All are missions described as PEOP/SSC operations and can be very manpower intensive. On top of that, the support provided to the ISIF and the Afghan military listed above all involve the Army's LD/HD assets and the War on Terrorism is just beginning. The option, therefore of limiting U.S. involvement in PEOP/SSC operations is well intentioned but cannot guarantee they will not happen. Meanwhile our LD/HD assets continue to be used in a way disproportionate to their size.

CREATE A FORCE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR SSC OPERATIONS

Another option brought forward by many experts is that the United States needs to create or reestablish a dedicated force to conduct SSC operations. Their argument is that the skills needed for major theater war are different than those required for SSCs. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century advocates a constabulary capability for the Army. They argue that the varied and complex contingencies now occurring today are likely to increase. These contingencies require forces different than those designed for major theater war. These contingencies will occur in the future with sufficient regularity and simultaneity to require us to convert part of our force structure to meet those needs.[33] In order to determine what constabulary forces might look like, it is necessary to look to our recent past and see what constabulary forces were used in the occupation of Austria following the Second World War.

Planning for the occupation of Europe began in early 1943 as leaders recognized that once the monumental task of defeating Nazi Germany was done, the basic functions of governance and law and order would be required. Eisenhower allotted approximately two U.S. divisions for the occupation of Austria, together with appropriate transfers from the Mediterranean Theater.[34] These forces became the basis for the U.S. Constabulary that operated in Austria from 1945 -1952. From the elements of the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions, three constabulary brigades were formed and composed of ten constabulary regiments. Most of these regiments had three squadrons plus specialized elements such as a light tank troop, a twenty-five motorcycle platoon, and a horse platoon with 30 horses.[35] The organization that evolved placed a premium on soldiers working in small groups that executed a myriad of tasks that would be classified as PEOP/SSC operations today.

While not having a combat role, the constabulary squadrons had a multi-faceted and flexible force structure incorporating some of the same characteristics as present day armored cavalry regiments. But if we look to soldiers with an MOS suited to this duality in role it may very well be military police (MP) that would be best suited to man the maneuver elements of these types of constabulary units.[36] MPs are trained to be able to conduct limited scale combat operations, often in the rear areas of combat units. Their law enforcement role ideally suits them to conflict resolution, crowd control, convoy security, and a host of other skills required in PEOP/SSC operations. It is a flexible response force that could serve in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, while freeing up conventional ground forces to focus on preparation and conduct of MTWs.

Constabulary forces would require a combination of large numbers of civil affairs, MPs, engineers, medical, food service, communications, intelligence, and liaison personnel. The

force must also be able to work with and sustain long-term relationships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It would have to integrate indigenous personnel into aspects of the operation and upon completion, turn it over to the authority of the indigenous leaders.[37] A constabulary force could then be created by converting three already established MP Brigades or create them from the ground up. All told it would require shifting force structure for an additional 27 MP companies, or about 6,500 men and women to start.[38] You would then have to add the requisite intelligence, logistics, civil affairs, and communications personnel to round it out. That force structure could come from shifting spaces within the active duty or by migrating slots between the active and reserve components.

Advantages of creating specialized units to accomplish PEOP/SSC operations are numerous. First, it would enable units with a combat focus to devote their time, resources and effort on the preparation for and conduct of MTWs. Second, the expertise required for PEOP/SSC operations will enable those specially organized forces to more efficiently execute those missions, reducing costs in the long term. Predeployment training for conventional forces going to PEOP/SSC operations and their subsequent retraining upon their return, often away from home station contributes to the increased OPTEMPO. A specially trained and organized unit would not require either.

The disadvantages of specialization of a separate force within the constraints of current end strength are numerous. The size of the force would be hard to determine. It is sufficient to say that given the scope of potential missions, it would be impossible to field sufficient numbers of specially organized, trained, and equipped forces without cutting, perhaps significantly, the combat force structure needed to deter or compel potential adversaries. If a limited number of these units were created, those units would be subject to repeated deployment. Increases in PEOP/SSC missions would strain that specialized force structure and ultimately affect retention. Also, units organized for these types of operations might not be able to operate in a fluid environment where humanitarian operations can transition to strikes or raids, or peace enforcement.[39] The constabulary created to occupy Austria after World War II was suitable for that environment at that point in time. The environment faced today by the U.S. Army is not confined to one country or even one continent to allow for that type of specialization without taking unacceptable risk. Finally, the Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Eric Shinseki, offered a succinct reason why a specialized force was not desirable. "We will design a warfighting Army. We can take a great warfighting formation and retrain it to be a great peacekeeping formation in three months and do A- work. To go the other way takes 20 years."

INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES ON ACTIVE DUTY

The final option we'll consider is to realign the existing force structure mix between the reserve component and the active component and increase the number of LD/HD assets within the Army to better balance PEOP/SSC operations and major theater warfare. This option really involves making changes on the margins. LD/HD assets that would be increased are required for MTWs as well, so there would not be a specialization in PEOP/SSC operations as envisioned in the previous option. A common item in after action reports, observations, and exercises is that the Army has serious shortfalls in providing the required combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) to PEOP/SSC operations.[40] These assets include the majority of LD/HD assets with the exception of the special operations forces. Some of the these shortfalls are the result of having theater-level elements in the reserve component that might be a late arriving force in a MTW scenario but are needed much more quickly in a PEOP/SSC operation. Some deficiencies are the result of elements that are almost exclusively in the reserves and have just become overextended by the unanticipated requirements of multiple overlapping PEOP/SSC operations.[41]

There are two reasons for this imbalance in force structure. First, is a deliberate design in the composition of the active and reserve components by GEN Creighton Abrams following the Vietnam War. GEN Abrams felt that the ability to prosecute the Vietnam War without the reserve component failed to mobilize the American public's support for the conduct of the war. Determined that the military would not go to war without the support of the American people again, GEN Abrams placed a significant amount of the Army's CS/CSS assets in the reserve component to ensure mobilization would have to occur before large scale continuous operations could be undertaken. He did not foresee the end of the Cold War leaving the U.S. as the sole remaining superpower and the dramatic shift in the world's security environment. The second reason is the assumption about the need for simultaneity. Should we be able to fight two major theater wars simultaneously and conduct a limited number of PEOP/SSC operations? There are those that argue that we have not had that capability for quite some time. A number of critical capabilities were stretched to the limit by the conduct of the Gulf War.[42] Historically, no second war erupted when the U.S. was involved in combat in Korea, Vietnam, or the Gulf. Again, states go to war for self interest and are not necessarily tied to whether or not the U.S. is involved in another MTW. So, what should be done?

Because reserve component CS (signal, military intelligence, military police, engineers), CSS (medical, multifunctional logistics, and transportation), and SOF (civil affairs, psychological operations) assets may not be readily accessible on a recurring basis, the Army needs to

realign force structure to shift more of those assets to the active component and shift other capabilities to the reserve component. The net effect on end strength is zero, since it will have to be a one for one swap. In examining the active and reserve component mix for these assets, a number of points must be factored in: response time, frequency, duration, and complexity of operations, as well as challenges to increased access to the reserve components for numerous overlapping PEOP/SSC operations.[43]

Advantages to this course of action are numerous. The pressure points on the Army today are found on those LD/HD assets both in the active and reserve component. Over reliance on the reserves is causing problems in retention and recruiting. A realignment of a limited number of LD/HD assets between the reserve and active component would eliminate a Cold War force design paradigm that has much less relevance today than it did at the end of the Vietnam War, while at the same time lessening the OPTEMPO of the reserve component. Increasing the number of LD/HD assets in CS, CSS, and SOF would increase flexibility by being able to transition quickly from PEOP/SSC and MTW operations. Those LD/HD assets are as relevant to warfighting as they are to peace operations. Sufficient MTW forces, or combat forces, would be retained to mitigate risk and deter or defeat potential adversaries. The preoccupation with simultaneity does not have historical precedent and, given the scarcity of resources in the Army, it is an indulgence we can no longer afford. Additionally, it would not be costly to accomplish and would not require an increase in end strength.

The disadvantages are fewer with this particular option. They do include, however, that it might actually cause our MTW forces to lose their deterrent effect on potential adversaries unless we are willing to use that force. A realignment of the force structure could also do the very thing that GEN Abrams wanted to avoid, prosecuting a war without the support of the American people. Certainly, it is a possibility in light of the nature of the War on Terrorism being conducted today. How constrained will the President feel if he does not have to involve the reserve component in the war and how connected to the effort will the public be if that happens?

RECOMMENDATION

The pace of current operations, even if no other missions are added, is placing an uneven stress on the LD/HD assets in the Army, both in the active and reserve components. Because a smaller percentage of these assets are found in the active component, an over reliance on the reserve component has developed for the conduct of the PEOP/SSC operations. In order for the Army to be successful across the spectrum of operations from PEOP/SSC to MTWs in the long term, a realignment of force structure must be done. More CS (signal, military intelligence,

military police, engineers), CSS (medical, multifunctional logistics, and transportation), and SOF (civil affairs, psychological operations, special forces), the Army's LD/HD assets, need to be reconstituted into the active component. These are dual purpose forces and are as relevant to fighting major theater wars as they are for peacetime engagement, overseas presence, and smaller-scale contingency operations. That means that the active component will have to find the spaces to ensure that it does not exceed its authorized end strength. Those spaces may come from an overall reorganization as part of Army transformation. We need to determine whether or not we need multiple echelons of command structure when information technology has allowed civilian industry to flatten their hierarchical organizations. Do we really need both a division headquarters and a corps headquarters? Or it may come from reducing the number of fighting formations we have now given that the specter of simultaneous conflict in two theaters has not been borne out in over a half century since the end of World War II. A proper mix of combat, combat support, combat service support, and special operations forces will ensure the long term sustainability of major theater war, peacetime engagement, overseas presence, and smaller-scale contingency operations.

A realignment of force structure, however, will not cure all our ills. While we need to increase our LD/HD assets in the active component, we must also be selective into which PEOP/SSC operations we engage the U.S Army. Embarking on well intentioned missions, without assessing the long term second and third order effects instead of the immediate political impact, has had a negative impact on the Army, both active and reserve component. A set of criteria is needed to analyze situations where the commitment of U.S. forces is being considered in the interagency process of the executive branch of our government. Careful consideration of these criteria, along with the expert judgment of national security professionals, should minimize the misuse and overuse of very finite resources.

SUMMARY

The United States has struggled since the end of the Cold War to find a sizing construct that prepared for known threats and at the same time gave us a hedge on uncertainty. President Clinton inherited the Base Force from the Bush Administration and immediately conducted its own review resulting in the Bottom-Up Review. It was a remarkably transparent analysis that codified the two MTW requirement. The QDR in 1997 cut the force further and, in fact, envisioned the forces on PEOP/SSC operations to be withdrawn, refitted, and redeployed to either MTW in order to meet the two MTW requirement. Secretary Rumsfeld began the 2001 QDR soon after the Bush Administration took office. The report was released after the United

States was directly attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network on September 11, 2001. The QDR was touted as a move away from a threat based force sizing construct to a capabilities based one. Upon closer examination, it is apparent it has more in common with the Bottom-Up Review than it does not. The end result was that there were no calls for a rapid and sizeable increase in the size of the Army. The declaration of war against all terrorist groups with global reach and the nations that support them did not translate into a bigger army as has been our historical tendency.

Since it appears that a bigger force structure is not an option, what can the U.S. Army do to ensure success over the long term across the spectrum of operations? A possibility would be to limit the number of operations conduced by the Army. It is an attractive option especially since the current president purported through his election campaign that U.S. forces were spread too thin in operations he characterized as nation-building operations. But as events in Afghanistan and the Philippines have showed us, what you want to do and what you have to do are often mutually exclusive. New PEOP/SSC missions will surface and we must be cognizant of the second and third order effects. A set of criteria should be formulated to factor in all that should be considered before committing U.S. forces, but that in and of itself will not be enough to ensure long term success. Designing a force specifically for PEOP/SSC operations would not solve the problem either. The number of missions both old and new would quickly overwhelm it. The types of operations from PEOP/SSC to MTW are on a continuum and often blend together. A force designed for one end of the spectrum will not be able to handle the full spectrum that can often occur during the course of a single PEOP/SSC operation. A force of this type would reduce the Army's flexibility in handling those operations. Restructuring the Army to provide a greater percentage of the LD/HD assets found in CS, CSS, and SOF forces in the active component will reduce OPTEMPO on the reserve component as well as the active component. The force design advanced by GEN Creighton Abrams was a reaction to the way the Vietnam War was executed-- without the support of the American people. But the situation today is not the same. The world has changed from a security standpoint and we are using the reserve component in ways he did not envision. Our preoccupation with two major theaters of war happening simultaneously has no historical basis with the exception of World War II. How much combat power is enough to deter a regime determined to act regardless of the consequences? Obviously our conventional forces in being in 1990 did not, in and of themselves, deter Saddam Hussein. Resolute and consistent foreign policy coupled with a willingness to intervene and stay the course will do more than sheer numbers.

Old preconceptions about the security environment must be cast aside if we are to determine how many LD/HD assets and combat forces are enough. The current force mix is not right. Stresses on the Army's LD/HD assets make it imperative that we get it right to ensure the Army's long term success across the full spectrum of operations.

WORD COUNT = 8,694

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